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North Africa Region 1. National Intelligence Estimate/1/ NIE 60-66 Washington, May 5, 1966. /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79-R01012A. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet: "The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Department of State, Defense, and the NSA." All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on May 5, except the Atomic Energy Commission Representative and the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction. A table of contents is not printed. THE MAGHREB (MOROCCO, ALGERIA, TUNISIA) The Problem To examine and assess trends and problems of the individual Maghreb states and of the area as a whole over the next two or three years. Conclusions A. The three Maghreb states share a certain sense of identity, but this tends to be overshadowed by the differences between them. Some modest forms of economic cooperation are developing, but over the next few years nothing approaching economic integration or political unity is in sight. (Paras. 1-6, 43-46) B. Tunisia is likely to enjoy continued political stability under President Bourguiba and his entrenched Destourian Socialist Party. Bourguiba's departure would probably not bring on a serious succession crisis or major policy changes, at least in the short term. Long range economic prospects are fairly good, but Tunisia will suffer from some painful economic problems, particularly a balance of payments deficit, over the next few years. (Paras. 17-25) C. Morocco is also likely to enjoy relative political stability for the next few years. King Hassan II, facing minimal domestic opposition and supported by the security forces, will probably continue to dominate the political scene. In time, however, the combination of rapid population growth and continued economic stagnation is likely to pose a major threat to the nation's social and political order. (Paras. 7-16) D. In Algeria, Boumediene will probably continue to seek a broad consensus in support of his government, but the army will remain the dominant political force. Considerable political infighting within the regime is likely, probably involving occasional charges within the leadership. There is considerable potential for economic growth, but political confusion and the leaders' demonstrated difficulty in reaching policy decisions will hamper the task of dealing with Algeria's monumental economic problems. However, high levels of petroleum revenues and French economic assistance will keep the economy going, though at a slow pace. (Paras. 26-32) E. France will continue to be the single most important foreign influence in the Maghreb. The cultural link is likely to persist for some time, and France is the principal trading partner of each of the three countries. Algeria will continue to be the most favored by French subsidies and other economic aid, though throughout the area these will decrease over the longer term. (Paras. 38-42) F. Algeria's relations with the US will be less suspicious, and with the USSR more reserved, than in Ben Bella's day. Algerian dependence on the Soviets as a source of arms aid, and Algerian distrust of US policy--notably in Vietnam but also in the Maghreb itself--will be limiting factors on any basic change. Tunisian and Moroccan relations with the West, particularly the US and West Germany, are likely to remain close. None of the Maghreb countries is likely to become closely involved in the affairs of the Eastern Arab or sub-Saharan African states. (Paras. 47-51) G. Both Morocco and Tunisia have border disputes with Algeria, and both fear that Algeria may try to dominate North Africa. Algeria, on the other hand, fears that Morocco and Tunisia, backed by Western powers, might attempt to encircle it. These attitudes have contributed to a North African arms race, with Algeria receiving large amounts of Soviet arms, and Morocco and Tunisia pressing for extensive military aid from Western powers, particularly the US. Algeria's military capabilities are now greater than those of Morocco and Tunisia combined, and we believe Algeria would seek additional Soviet arms if a major build-up of Moroccan or Tunisian forces occurred. (Paras. 33-36; Annex, Paras. 1-10) H. Despite the tensions among the Maghreb states, none is likely to mount a deliberate major armed attack against a neighbor during the period of this estimate. Limited border conflicts may occur, but they would probably be localized and of short duration. (Paras. 36-38) [Here follows the body of the paper.]
2. Paper Prepared in the Department of State/1/ Washington, undated. /1/Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 318, February 8. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. The source text is attached as Tab C to a transmittal memorandum from Department of State Executive Secretary Benjamin Read to Rusk, undated but drafted on February 7. The memorandum notes that Tab C is the discussion paper, which Rusk had already seen, prepared for the NSC meeting on North Africa scheduled for February 8. NORTH AFRICA The Strategic Importance of North Africa 1. Increasing Soviet naval activity in the Western Mediterranean and substantial arms shipments to Algeria raise new questions for us and for NATO about the significance of the Soviet thrust into the area. North Africa has a southern Mediterranean coastline extending from Portugal to Turkey. With Spain, it commands the Atlantic approaches to the Straits of Gibraltar. The United States enjoys military facilities at Wheelus Air Base in Libya and the Kenitra Naval Communications Center in Morocco. The immense oil and gas reserves of Libya and Algeria constitute a strategic as well as an economic asset of considerable importance. 2. Intrusion of the USSR into an area of such vital strategic and economic importance to the United States adds a new dimension to an already difficult set of North African problems. France has so far appeared indifferent to Soviet activities, and the helpfulness of other North Atlantic nations is questionable. It falls largely to the United States to examine the military and political implications of the increased Soviet presence. The Arms and the Anxieties of King Hassan and President Bourguiba 3. One of our major difficulties involves the Moroccan and Tunisian reaction to the intensive Algerian military buildup with Soviet assistance. Algeria over-reacted to its pummeling by Moroccan forces in 1963 and has acquired the third largest military establishment in Africa. Soviet military assistance, half in grants and half in loans, now totals over $180 million. Greatly concerned by the growing Algerian potential, Hassan and Bourguiba have sought from us additional military assistance, as well as a United States guarantee of their national security. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Both appear to be upset that we have not been more responsive to their requests for arms and protection. King Hassan, who arrives in Washington tomorrow on an official visit, intends to raise the security problem as a prime order of business. 4. Security commitments pose obvious difficulties for us. While in one sense a convenient solution, perhaps, to the pressures from Hassan and Bourguiba, they do not seem to be a practical possibility at the present time. On the other hand, while we are considering limited amounts of arms for Morocco and Tunisia, we are determined to avoid being caught up in a North African arms race. The problem of reassuring such friends as Hassan and Bourguiba is thus a very difficult one. Polarization 5. Morocco and Tunisia, as their own relations with France have become strained, have turned increasingly to the United States for military and economic assistance, while France and the Soviet Union have clearly opted for Algeria. Strictly regional issues therefore tend to take on overtones of wider international significance, and could, if present trends continue, lead to East-West confrontation. The Border Problems 6. This polarization is further aggravated by Moroccan territorial claims against a large part of western Algeria and to the whole of Spanish Sahara and Mauritania. There are minor Tunisian claims against Algeria, which would be manageable were it not for the precedent a settlement here would establish for the Moroccan case. Even so, periodic border incidents mar otherwise good relations with Tunisia and have explosive potential with Morocco. Algeria 7. In an effort to de-fuse the arms race and avoid polarization, we have believed it necessary to find a basis for improved relations with Algeria, without prejudice to the friendly relations we enjoy with Morocco and Tunisia. The course of our relations with Algeria, however, has been far from smooth. The Algerian Government appears sincerely to want good bilateral relations and has accorded warm welcomes to a series of American officials, including Governor Harriman and Senator Edward Kennedy. A hostile press dominated by French-trained left-wing intellectuals and strong GOA criticism of our Viet-Nam policies have marred the relationship which we hoped would improve after the elimination of Ben Bella by Colonel Boumediene. 8. Algeria nevertheless has need of Western assistance, including that of the United States, in developing its tremendous gas, oil and steel potential, and it is reasonable to hope that economic realities will eventually take precedence over the more extreme political inclinations of some of its leadership. We therefore consider it desirable to maintain at least a modicum of U.S. presence in the form of food and other assistance, in the hope of gradually improving relations. Spanish Sahara 9. Generalissimo Franco's letter to the President expressing concern that we may be too generous in response to King Hassan's arms request underlines Spanish concern over Moroccan ambitions to acquire control of Spanish Sahara by force. Spain has committed itself to a solution based on self-determination and has refused to enter into bilateral talks with Morocco on this issue. Morocco has also accepted the principle of self-determination for Spanish Sahara but wants international control of a plebiscite in the belief that a fair vote would be favorable to Morocco. King Hassan's visit on February 9-10 will provide the occasion to emphasize our interest in the elimination of tensions and the peaceful resolution of the Spanish Sahara and Algerian border problems. Food Problems 10. North Africa is rapidly becoming one of the major food deficit areas of the world, and the problem will become more acute as population continues to increase at an alarming rate. With a present population of about 30 million, the North African countries have been receiving from us nearly three quarters of a million tons of PL 480 grain annually. Last year, because of a serious drought, the food deficit in the area amounted to over two million tons. Nevertheless, the prospect of increased food production through use of fertilizers and other improved agricultural methods is encouraging, provided these countries devote sufficient resources to the task. Tentative steps toward planned parenthood with the assistance of American private organizations have already been taken and will doubtless increase as education and women's rights develop. Economic Development 11. The general prospects for economic development in the area, given in particular the petroleum and gas resources of Libya and Algeria and the phosphates of Morocco, Spanish Sahara and Tunisia, are good. We already have a major assistance program in Morocco and Tunisia, and the latter is an outstanding example of what can be accomplished in the less developed world through a combination of self-help and foreign aid. Libya has passed from the category of aid recipient to aid donor, though on a minor scale, and the IBRD forecasts a potential growth in GNP for Algeria of 7-1/2 percent a year, though the bank considers this growth rate contingent on major U.S. and other foreign assistance. North Africa could become, in the not too distant future, a significant trading partner for the United States. 12. In view of North Africa's petroleum, phosphates, iron ore and other mineral resources, it is possible to conceive, at least, of a vast regional effort for the integrated development of the area's impressive industrial, agricultural and commercial (including touristic) potential. Such an effort would require a much greater degree of regional cooperation than presently exists, and major financial and technical assistance from the IBRD, U.S. and other Western sources, public and private, would be indispensable. The Bank would probably have to play a catalytic role. Regional Cooperation 13. Coexisting uneasily with the arms race is a strong but sluggish current pushing the Maghreb countries towards increased regional cooperation. There are now annual meetings of the Economic Ministers and a Permanent Consultative Committee in Tunis. Seven permanent commissions for specific problems or commodities have been established and are working on such possibilities as a common Maghreb airlines and the elimination of impediments to regional trade. While these constitute small steps toward a big goal, they compare favorably with efforts of other regional groups at similar stages of development. 14. Sheer economic necessity might, in time, dampen down the arms race and spur regional economic cooperation. If national markets for local industries are small, elimination of tariff barriers would open up a market almost the size of Spain's. Technical Assistance for Libya 15. Libya typifies that category of country where normal aid activities are no longer justified for economic reasons, but where there is still a requirement for foreign technical help. The Libyans hire foreign technicians but cannot employ Americans because of their higher salary range. In order to maintain our important position in the Libyan economy and to give American firms the opportunity to bid on Libyan development projects, we are trying to devise a formula that would enable the Libyans to acquire the American technical advice they require. We are accordingly attempting to establish some mechanism, preferably within the U.S. Government, but perhaps from private sources, to furnish technical assistance to Libya at a subsidized price. U.S. Interests and Objectives 16. Our primary interest is in the stability and progress of the area as a whole. As in other parts of the developing world, we support the national integrity and independence of the countries of the region, attempt to help them promote social and economic development in the interests of stability and seek to promote regional cohesion. We seek friendly relations with all four countries of the Maghreb and to deny any part of this strategically important and potentially prosperous region to Soviet domination. We do not ourselves need to dominate any part of it. 17. The United States, in addition to these general interests, does enjoy some useful special facilities. These include Kenitra Naval Communications Center and the VOA relay station in Morocco, substantial private investment in Algerian gas and oil, a close political relationship with Tunisia, and Wheelus Air Force Base and major investments in Libya. U.S. Strategy and Past Actions 18. We have operated on the assumption that our interests in North Africa could be safeguarded by a relatively modest effort, complementary to that if the French and responsive to the needs of all the countries of the region. We have been aware of the dangers of excessive polarization and possible East-West confrontation and have therefore tried to include Algeria in our assistance programs and to convince its leadership of our good will. 19. In the field of military assistance, we have taken the position that arms expenditures are wasteful and should be subordinated to economic and social development and regional cooperation. Since Algeria's independence, we have provided only about $65 million in military aid to Morocco, Tunisia and Libya. New programs for these countries involve relatively modest amounts and are presently under discussion. Future Actions 20. The question to be asked is whether this policy is succeeding. It is a rational policy, provided events beyond our control do not dictate more radical measures. Improvement of our bilateral relations with Algeria appears vital to a solution of the arms race, polarization and regional cooperation. At the same time, it appears necessary to move ahead with modest military assistance programs for Morocco, Tunisia and Libya, keeping the Soviet thrust into the Western Mediterranean under the closest scrutiny. Where opportunities present themselves, we should of course opt for regionally oriented assistance projects. 21. In view, however, of the explosive tensions within the area, our difficulties in finding a basis for cooperation with Algeria, the limited resources available to us for economic and military assistance, uncertainty about French attitudes, and the potential threat to Western interests posed by the Soviet challenge, it is advisable to keep the problems of the Maghreb under continuous review and to re-examine our policies again in another six months. Background In assessing the problems outlined in this paper, the following background elements are worth keeping in mind: a. The four countries of the Maghreb occupy an area one-half the size of the United States on the northwest African littoral. They have considerable religious, ethnic, cultural and linguistic cohesion side by side with the greatest political diversity. Islam is the cement and a western dialect of Arabic the common language. Relations among peoples are as close and uncomplicated as those between governments are difficult. b. We are dealing in the Maghreb with old cultures but new and untried countries and governments. Algeria is five years old and never existed as a country before 1962; it has had to develop institutions and political practices from scratch. Libya is in comparable straits, and Morocco and Tunisia only are somewhat more fortunate. c. All have emerged from a common colonial past, but only in Algeria was a major and prolonged war required to achieve independence. The war and its aftermath caused half a million Algerian casualties, the relocation of nearly three million people, and the precipitate departure of one million Europeans who had formed the country's administrative and technical elite. Only in the case of Algeria, furthermore, did the United States side with the colonial power. d. If the countries are new, so are the people. Fifty percent of the population of the Maghreb is under twenty-one. There is a long-term risk that this generation coming of age in new countries without strong institutions or economies will demand more of their governments than they can possibly provide. In the short run, all the countries of the area must spend inordinate amounts on education and social services. e. The discovery and development of oil and gas have rapidly made North Africa one of the most significant producing areas in the world. Investments by Western oil companies in Algeria and Libya are in the multi-billion dollar range. Algeria has 10 percent of the world's gas reserves and some of the largest fields in the world. Libya is producing oil at the rate of 1.5 billion barrels per day and will reach 2-2.5 billion bpd in a few years, putting it in a class with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Over 90 percent of the investment and production in Libya is by American companies. The French are of course the predominant investors in Algeria, but American companies come second with about $100 million invested. The IBRD estimates that there is an additional potential for investment in Algerian oil and gas of over $1 billion, much of which would presumably have to come from the United States. North African hydrocarbons enjoy a price advantage over those from the Middle East because of the proximity of the European market. The strategic advantage of lying west of Suez could one day make this source of energy even more important to the NATO area.
3. Paper Prepared in the Department of State/1/ Washington, undated. /1/Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 318, February 8. Secret. Attached to a February 6 memorandum from Palmer to Rusk, and both are Tab B to Read's February 7 memorandum (see footnote 1, Document 2). No drafting information appears on the source text, but Read's memorandum indicates that the paper was drafted by Officer in Charge of Algerian Affairs Rene Tron and cleared by Palmer, J. Stapleton Roy in EUR/SOV, Francis R. Campbell in EUR/SPP, and Richard W. Aherne in EUR/FBX.
TALKING POINTS FOR THE SECRETARYNSC MEETING ON NORTH AFRICA 1. Number of upcoming Presidential decisions make discussion timely. These include: PL 480 for Morocco and Algeria, both of which require waivers under Findley Amendment because of trade with Cuba, Morocco's being of major proportions; MAP for Tunisia, and military sales packages for Morocco and Libya; Tunisian and Moroccan requests for security guarantees; possible US participation in regional economic projects; and reply to Franco's letter on Spanish Sahara. There are visits by Chiefs of State of Morocco and Tunisia, Hassan tomorrow and Bourguiba in June. 2. All these decisions are inter-related and may well shape political context in the Maghreb for years to come. 3. Underlying problems we face are: growing polarization, with Morocco and Tunisia supported by US, and Algeria underwritten by France and Soviet Union; unresolved claims on Algerian territory by Morocco and to much smaller degree, Tunisia, and claims by Morocco to Spanish Sahara; and economic development. 4. Although problems not as immediate as in some other parts of the world, we could have our strategic interests threatened, either by implantation of Soviet military power or by loss of our own military facilities. 5. We have substantial elements of strength, including a sound relationship with three of the four countries. Libya, where we feared fragmentation and Egyptian influence several years ago, now appears firmly cemented together by economic prosperity. Tunisia is making sound economic progress, and Bourguiba's control is firm, although succession problem is causing some concern. In Algeria, alongside major problems, we possess potentially important assets. The Moroccan internal political situation has disturbing elements of weakness, but Hassan's popularity in the countryside and proven political shrewdness provide assurances for the stability of his regime. 6. Arms problem is difficult. French refused to take problem seriously until recently, but are now trying to expand their influence in the Algerian military field. We have discussed situation in NATO. Would it be useful to discuss problem directly with Soviets? Would it be possible to enlist the help of the UN in devising a solution to the arms race and other problems of the area? Assuming that a US bilateral guarantee is out of the question, is there any other form of reassurance that could be given Morocco and Tunisia with respect to our interest in their security and well-being? 7. Underlying cause of arms race is suspicion between Morocco and Algeria based on major border difficulties. We subscribe to OAU principles on need to solve African border problems by peaceful means. 8. A long-term solution to the arms race and mutual suspicion is the creation of close economic ties between the four Maghreb countries in general and Morocco and Algeria in particular. Morocco and Tunisia are countries of aid concentration, however, and we have no aid programs of any consequence in Algeria and none in Libya. Does this harden economic nationalism rather than sponsor regional cooperation? Could we sponsor a program of increased food production based on advanced agricultural techniques and fertilizer production, on a regional basis? Morocco is particularly rich in phosphates and Algeria has ten percent of the world's natural gas. 9. To what extent should we be prepared to "co-exist" with the Soviets in the area? Should we be prepared to make parallel investments, as in the Algerian steel complex, or in meeting food needs of the area. 10. Essentially, we see no alternative to pursuing the broad general policy outlined in our paper. The assistance that we feel would keep the door open to passably friendly relations with Algeria is modest, while to withhold all assistance from Algeria and to concentrate our efforts exclusively on Morocco and Tunisia would be costly in terms of increased political tensions in the area. Moreover, such an extreme position is not yet warranted by the degree of deterioration of our relations with Algeria or by our understanding of Soviet intentions.
4. Notes on the Meeting of the National Security Council/1/ Washington, February 8, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. 4, Tab 50, 2/8/67, North Africa. Secret. A handwritten note on the source text indicates that the notes were drafted by Harold H. Saunders of the NSC Staff. Discussion of North Africa At the President's request, Secretary Rusk sketched the policy framework within which we operate in North Africa as follows: We have an interest in the success and stability of all four North African countries. We have been concerned over polarization in the Arab world which has seen some countries (e.g. Egypt, Algeria, Syria) drawn to Arab socialism. These nations have put pressure on the more conservative regimes. The Soviet Union has sent substantial quantities of arms to two of these more radical regimes--Egypt and Syria. Neither we nor the French know why they have poured so much materiel into Algeria, but it has stirred up instability in Morocco and Tunisia. We have been in touch with the Soviet Union in the Middle East about possible limitation on arms. The Soviets are willing to see the area denuclearized but have no interest in the control of conventional arms. Our immediate problem is to give King Hassan a sense of stability. Therefore, we have recommended a $14 million arms sale and a new food agreement. In this process, however, we do not believe we should abandon Algeria. There are other cases around the world--the passing of Ben Bella, Nkrumah, Sukarno--where our maintaining a presence through a difficult period has paid off. Algeria faces a food problem like the other North African nations. It has bought 405,000 tons of wheat in the United States in FY 1967. We would like to keep a presence there to give us some influence while our private sector moves ahead. At this point the President asked what the Algerians might be willing to buy in the future. For instance, we furnish India 8-10 million tons of grain and India buys commercially elsewhere. Although Algeria has bought grain here, would it buy more? Assistant Secretary Palmer felt Algeria, if it needed more wheat, would probably buy elsewhere. When asked, he could not argue that this was because prices were better elsewhere. Whether or not we could make our Algerian sale conditional on further purchases is another matter, he felt. Secretary Rusk concluded, in essence, that Algeria has all but met its requirements for this year, but in FY 68 probably could buy more grain in the US. The President concluded by asking him to pursue that point.
5. Intelligence Note Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research/1/ No. 643 Washington, August 3, 1967. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem. Transmitted in a memorandum from Hughes to Rusk. SUBJECT The spirit of unity that pervaded North Africa during and immediately after the Arab-Israel war has evaporated. Algeria has rejected any compromise with Israel and the West and has called for a resumption of the war. Armed with this militancy, its reputation as the strongest Arab state undefeated in the recent conflict, and a 60,000-man army equipped with the most modern Soviet weapons, it has made a powerful bid to replace the UAR as the leader of the Arab world. Algeria's moderate neighbors, Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya, realizing the futility of further conflict and anxious to preserve political and economic ties with the West, have moved in the opposite direction to temper opinion at home and restrain opposition elements seeking to undercut a more realistic policy. So far, the two camps have avoided a direct confrontation. Both appear to have made gains in their respective strategies. Yet the long-term success of either depends as much on how domestic affairs are handled as on the future course of the Arab-Israel struggle in the Middle East. Algeria's Inadequacies. Boumediene's motives in pushing for an uncompromising policy on the Middle East appear to derive heavily from domestic political considerations. Over the past year Algerian politics has reverted increasingly to the Ben Bellist pattern. The regime has subordinated earlier post-coup plans for domestic reconstruction to the imperatives of "revolutionary" politicking, as demagogic politicians vie with each other in pressing for more stridently anti-Western policies abroad and more rapid socialization at home. Boumediene, lacking a secure political base, has come to depend increasingly on short-term political tactics designed to keep his adversaries off balance and prevent them from outflanking him on the left. Seizing on war hysteria, he has turned away from decision-making to an increasingly personal form of leadership. The economy continues to deteriorate as the government's socialist-oriented policies and anti-US and UK measures discourage new investment and dry up even existing markets for Algerian goods. In the process of turning from domestic reconstruction to "revolutionary" politics, Algeria has become increasingly dependent on the USSR. Even normally excellent French-Algerian relations have been damaged during the recent crisis by the prevalence in France of pro-Israel sentiment and the anti-European backlash in Algeria. Signs are growing that these developments have resulted in considerable dissatisfaction both among elite groups and in the population as a whole. Hobbled by its domestic inadequacies, the Boumediene regime is nonetheless buoyed up by its new-found prestige in the Arab world. Yet this prestige stems more from the stridency of Algerian pronouncements on renewing hostilities with Israel, Algeria's entente with Syria, and the diminished stature of UAR President Nasser than from the exercise of any real leadership by Algeria in the present crisis. The Arab moderates in both halves of the Arab world have rejected Algeria's bellicose anti-Western panaceas. Even the UAR appears reluctant to be pushed into a new conflict before it recovers from the wounds of the last one. Still more significant is the apparent reluctance of the Soviets to endorse the Algerian hard line for fear of being drawn into an eventual confrontation with the US and out of concern for what would happen to their Arab proteges should full-scale hostilities break out again in the near future. Given the natural reluctance of the eastern Arabs to submit to the leadership of a geographical remote Maghrebian state, secure from attack by Israel, there is little likelihood that Algeria over the long run can make good its present claims to Arab leadership./2/ If it does not succeed in doing so, however, this, together with its domestic failures, will inevitably threaten Boumediene's position at home. /2/See Intelligence Note RAF-481, "Prospects for Algeria as a Replacement for the UAR as Leader of the Arab World," June 15, 1967 (Secret/No Foreign Dissem/Controlled Dissem). [Footnote in the source text.] Moderates Batten Down the Hatches: Morocco Seeking Arms. For the moderates the essential problem has been to gain control of public opinion, disarm unruly opposition elements, and improve the effectiveness of security forces. To keep his domestic opposition in line, King Hassan of Morocco has strengthened the authority of his tough Interior Minister Mohammed Oufkir, thereby guaranteeing--because of French President de Gaulle's opposition to Oufkir as the result of the Ben Barka affair--a continued freeze in relations with France. He has also cracked down on the country's two strongest political groups, labor and the Istiqlal Party, thus reducing the prospects for ending emergency rule and for broadening the political base of his regime. With the help of efficient security forces and traditional rivalries among opposition groups, he has had reasonable success in these efforts. But while he has made some headway towards popular acceptance of a more realistic accommodation to power realities in the Middle East, Moroccan opinion remains volatile and unpredictable. As in the case of Algeria, Hassan's main headaches are economic ones growing out of stagnation in the industrial sector and the continuing inadequacy of Moroccan agriculture; these, in turn, contribute to rising social tensions. Hassan cannot afford to turn his full attention to domestic concerns, however, because of Algeria's growing military might and increasing radicalism. Because of the prominent role the Moroccan army plays in his regime, Hassan must respond to military demands for heavy armaments to match those of Algeria, even at the expense of high-priority economic projects. Hassan's principal concern, therefore, has been to obtain more arms quickly. Despairing of obtaining quick delivery from the US of the types of military equipment he is seeking under our $14 million commitment of last February, he has turned to Czechoslovakia for T-54 tanks and other heavy equipment. The burden of any attempt to match the Soviet arms build-up in Algeria on the already stagnant Moroccan economy would be crushing, making unrealistic any major expansion of programs to reduce unemployment and relieve social tensions. The extent of the additional strain will depend on the size of foreign aid inputs: Hassan is clearly looking to the US for additional economic and military assistance. Tunisia Reorganizing Security Forces. Domestically, Bourguiba's regime in Tunisia is stronger than the monarchies in either Libya or Morocco. Bourguiba's skill as an effective modernizer and the success of his development efforts have won him the loyalty of much of the population, particularly the older generation. Nonetheless, the restlessness of Tunisian youth, the strong pro-Arab sentiments aroused during the recent crisis, and the economic strains of an ambitious development program have had an unsettling effect on the regime. Tunisian leaders have been unable to control public opinion, inflamed by Algiers and Cairo radios. While the government has made progress in restoring its authority by dealing severely with rioters and in moderating opinion by using government media to instill greater realism, it is aware that a new outbreak of hostilities could produce a fresh wave of hysteria and new threats to public order. Bourguiba's principal concerns spring from the inadequacies, both quantitative and qualitative, of his army and security services. The June 5 riots demonstrated that Tunisia's security services were neither alert to the dangers of rioting nor able to control the rioting once it began. To remedy its defects the security apparatus is being reorganized under a new chief. The army is also undergoing a reorganization to improve its efficiency and morale. There's no real prospect, however, that Tunisia's forces could be adequate to withstand a direct military challenge from Algeria. Moreover, Tunisia's ability to withstand a determined effort to subvert it by Algeria and the UAR is unknown--particularly in the event that the present Libyan regime should be replaced by one favorable to the UAR. Even more than Morocco, Tunisia looks to the US for its ultimate security. Libya--Putting The Lid Back On. New Premier Abd-al-Qadir al-Badri, pressed into service and prodded into action by King Idris, seems to have mastered a previously chaotic internal situation. Badri broke the crippling oil and dock strikes, jailed free-wheeling political and labor agitators, muzzled a rampaging press, and has Libyan oil flowing again. But Libya may never be the same as it was before the Arab-Israel war. The deep humiliation of the Arabs--which the Libyan people share--will keep the Palestine issue alive. The identification of the US as the principal enemy will die hard--if it dies at all. The internal opposition forces unleashed in June 1967 will prepare to try again, convinced--correctly, we believe--that only the timely intercession of a 78-year old monarch prevented the foundering of the regime. Their opportunity may come as the result of the reopening of negotiations, scheduled to begin in August, for the withdrawal of US and UK bases--if the Libyan Government cannot demonstrate concrete results within a reasonable period of time. Barring a resumption of hostilities in the Middle East, Idris and Badri (or a successor) may be able to clamp the lid on once more. But the long-term prospects for Libyan stability, and for the resumption of Libya's special ties with the US and UK, are as cloudy as ever. Radicals vs. Moderates: Which Side Will Crack First? The prospects for the survival of the moderate regimes have thus considerably improved over the past eight weeks. Their internal security is stronger, and anti-Western sentiments destructive of public order have cooled. The very fact that Libya has survived strong radical pressures has improved the moderate position throughout the area. The moderates have also profited indirectly from the failings of radical leaders: their infighting, their inability to settle on a viable diplomatic or military strategy to compel the withdrawal of Israel from Arab territory, and Soviet reluctance to endorse any early resumption of hostilities. Nonetheless the prospects over the longer term are less clear. Should the impasse between Israel and the Arab states be prolonged indefinitely and the UAR, Algeria, and other radicals build up sufficient military strength, the logic of a military solution could once again become compelling, and pressure could once more build up on the moderates. In such an atmosphere the radicals might be able to work off Arab frustrations by fastening the onus of stalemate on the moderates for maintaining ties with the West. In the meantime, domestic considerations will probably largely determine the relative advantages of radicals and moderates. Both camps have significant internal weakness. Libya will remain vulnerable to nationalist agitation as long as foreign bases remain. The competitive efforts of both Morocco and Algeria to build up military and security forces will aggravate their internal economic strains--perhaps leading, ironically enough, to a net decline in real security. In this game the side with the most generous foreign donors will hold an important advantage. [Next documents] Volume XXIV Index | Historian's Office | Department of State |
