 450. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, June 7, 1967. /1/Source: Department of State, NEA/ARP Files: Lot 69 D 350, POL YEMEN-US, YEMEN 1967. Confidential. Drafted by Brewer. SUBJECT
US-YARG Break in Relations PARTICIPANTS His Excellency Abdulaziz al-Futaih, Ambassador of Yemen
Mr. Lucius D. Battle, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Mr. William D. Brewer, Country Director, Arabian Peninsula States Ambassador Battle said that he had asked Ambassador Futaih to call. He deeply regretted the purpose of this meeting. We had, however, been informed by our Charge in Sanaa of the YARG's decision to break relations with the US./2/ This was a source of particular regret to us due to the baseless nature of the charges on which the YARG action was founded. Ambassador Battle noted that Ambassador Goldberg on June 6 had publicly invited the United Nations to send investigators to the Sixth Fleet to satisfy themselves that the charges that US aircraft had been involved in support of Israeli military operations were groundless. With a very minimum of effort, Ambassador Battle thought that the accuracy of these allegations could have been correctly established. /2/Telegram 208565 to Sanaa, June 6, instructed the Embassy to take immediate steps to evacuate all personnel and to close both Sanaa and Taiz, and stated that the U.S. Government was asking the Italian Government to represent U.S. interests in Yemen. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 17 US-UAR) Telegram 210053 to Asmara, June 10, informed former Charge d'Affaires Lee F. Dinsmore that the Italian Government had formally agreed to serve as the protecting power for U.S. interests in Yemen. (Ibid., POL 17 US-YEMEN) Telegram 210598 to Rome, June 13, instructed the Embassy to inform the Italian Foreign Ministry that the Somali Embassy in Washington had informed the Department that the Government of Yemen had asked Somalia to act as the protecting power for Yemeni interests in the United States. (Ibid., POL 17 YEMEN-US) Ambassador Battle told Ambassador Futaih that we must now reciprocate the YARG action. Accordingly, we must request that all YARG diplomats accredited to the US be withdrawn from this country within 48 hours. Ambassador Battle assumed Ambassador Futaih, as his Government's accredited representative to the United Nations, would go to live in New York. Other members of the Embassy staff had until 3:00 PM on June 9 to leave the country, slightly more time than was being given to our representatives in the Yemen. Ambassador Battle continued that he was deeply disturbed by reports just received that our installations in Taiz were on fire. He very much hoped that the break in relations would be dignified and that full protection would be accorded our diplomats in Yemen as it would be to Ambassador Futaih and his staff here. Ambassador Futaih said that he had received no word from his Government. There was nothing that he personally could do. He felt that the political and social system in the US made it easy for one group to manipulate public opinion. US policy then had to reflect this public opinion. He thought this had brought great trouble on the US and expressed hope that those responsible in this country would think increasingly of Near Eastern problems in their basic human terms. Ambassador Battle said that we had recognized the YARG early on. We had extended considerable aid to the Yemen. The USG had extended much more aid to the Arab countries than to Israel, including over one billion dollars in assistance to the UAR alone. Ambassador Futaih commented that the USG had been held in much higher regard by the Arabs years ago, even before major aid programs had been instituted. Both Ambassadors expressed personal regret that their association had been so short. 451. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia/1/ Washington, June 28, 1967, 5:32 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Limdis; Noforn. Drafted by Brewer on June 27; cleared by Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Eugene Rostow, Davies, Bergus, Battle, and Deputy Director of the INR Office of Research and Analysis for Near East and South Asia Herbert J. Liebesny; and approved by Katzenbach. 219929. Jidda 5498,/2/ 5520,/3/ 5538./4/ /2/In telegram 5498 from Jidda, June 22, Eilts reported that Rashad Pharaon informed him that during the recent crisis several Arab states had urged Faisal to settle the Yemen problem. The Saudi response had been consistent; the King had indicated that if UAR troops were withdrawn from Yemen, Saudi aid to the royalists would also cease. The Saudis would expect a period of civil war, following which the Yemenis would decide their own government. In the absence of UAR troops in Yemen, Saudi Arabia would accept any government the Yemenis themselves chose. (Ibid.) /3/Dated June 24. (Ibid.) /4/Dated June 25. (Ibid.) 1. Recent UAR military defeat in Sinai and accompanying area developments, including further Egyptian troop withdrawals from YAR, obviously have implications for Yemen problem. Jidda 5538 suggests these not lost on Royalists and their backers, who may well believe now is the time resume major fighting with maximum chance success in ejecting remainder Egyptian troops and causing downfall Sallal regime. 2. Royalist capabilities remain something of an enigma. They appear recently have scored some success in local fighting around Hajja, but whether they can interdict UAR communications and capture Sanaa would appear highly uncertain. Though reduced in numbers UAR Air Force in Yemen is still unchallenged. Ruthless gas bombings seem to have cowed populace in some areas, and such tribal leaders as al-Ahmar and Ruwayshan seem for moment to have swung toward YARG. 3. Particularly view radical successes South Arabia, UAR may well consider it should remain in Yemen at all costs in order (a) avoid additional loss of face which withdrawal now would mean; and (b) facilitate FLOSY's takeover in Aden. If UAR is so disposed, and we not in position to tell, new Royalist military effort could well backfire, prompting return more troops and increasing Egyptian military and subversive pressure on SAG. 4. Whether indigenous effort can force Egyptians out remains uncertain, but circumstances have now altered due Israeli triumph. Moreover, we have less to lose vis-a-vis UAR than formerly, should Yemen war intensify in coming months with active Saudi support. 5. Our reiterated counsels restraint on SAG in past were prompted by concern that UAR countermeasures, including occupation Saudi territory, would directly involve USG in view our commitments to Saudi regime. Now, however, even though UAR may still be able maintain itself in Yemen, Egyptian capability for offensive military action against Saudi Arabia would seem to be reduced. It would of course be error for us counsel SAG to "unleash" Royalists, since such palpable encouragement would increase our vulnerability to Saudi appeals were renewed fighting to backfire on Saudis. However, circumstances do suggest we might now be somewhat less emphatic and repetitive in recording our well-known reservations re increased Saudi support for Royalists. This would not substantively change our position but would be tactical modification. 6. Unless you perceive objection, you should be guided by foregoing in your future discussions Yemen problem with senior SAG officials. Suggest you point out, per State 214082,/5/ that we continue believe any action which might prompt brutal UAR military response against Saudi Arabia might be ill advised. However, in absence normal means accurately assessing situation in either Yemen or Egypt, we no longer in position give Saudis as much meaningful counsel on this subject as formerly. In any case, decision re Royalist action obviously one entirely for SAG to take in light all circumstances./6/ /5/Dated June 21. (Ibid., POL 15-1 SAUD) /6/In telegram 5616 from Jidda, June 30, Eilts reported that he had mentioned to Prince Sultan that Yemen seemed to be quiet for the moment, to which Sultan had replied that things were not as peaceful there as it might seem and that he expected the center of attention would soon shift back to Yemen. Sultan also said that the Saudis were maintaining very strong restraints on the Yemeni royalists in spite of their eagerness to resume action. (Ibid., POL 27 YEMEN) Rusk 452. Editorial Note On July 14, 1967, the 303 Committee, the interdepartmental committee which reviewed and authorized covert operations, discussed a [text not declassified] proposal for covert support on a trial basis of paramilitary operations by dissident groups in Yemen with the purpose of increasing Nasser's difficulties in Yemen and South Arabia. Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Foy D. Kohler, representing the Department of State, stated that in view of the tenseness and uncertainty throughout the Middle East, he wanted to discuss the matter with Secretary Rusk. At a meeting with the President on July 18, Rusk stated his opposition to the proposal. Secretary of Defense McNamara expressed his agreement, and the President said it was agreed that nothing would be done. At an August 7 meeting of the 303 Committee, chairman Walt Rostow reported that the Yemen proposal had arisen at a "Tuesday lunch" with "higher authority," and that the Secretary of State was opposed. The 303 Committee did not approve the proposal. (Minutes of 303 Committee meetings, July 14 and August 7, 1967; National Security Council Intelligence Files, 303 Committee Files, Minutes--1967, and ibid., Yemen; memorandum from Helms to Rostow, July 15, 1967; ibid.; notes of meeting, July 18, 1967; Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings) 453. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the European Office of the United Nations/1/ Washington, July 22, 1967, 12:37 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-10 YEMEN. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Frank A. Sieverts (U) on July 21, cleared by Brewer and Senior Intelligence Officer Susan T. Tait (INR/RNA), and approved by Eugene Rostow. 11599. Ref: Geneva 145./2/ /2/Telegram 145 from Geneva, July 12, reported that the ICRC was becoming increasingly concerned over unconfirmed reports that UAR planes had again carried out poison gas attacks on scattered villages in the royalist areas of Yemen. (Ibid.) 1) ICRC concern over UAR gas use in Yemen fully justified by information available to us, including press reports. Gas attacks continued for two weeks after ICRC Delegation visit to Gahar (May 16), then stopped in June, during and after Sinai crisis. Attacks resumed July 2-3, with dozens of gas bombs dropped on several villages, including al Darb in area of Khaulan, with many victims killed or gravely affected by gas. Further attack occurred July 15 at Hajjah, with 150 reported dead. 2) As ICRC knows, we fully share their concern about this subject. Committee's public statement on gas use in Yemen, and delegation report sent to four parties, were significant actions in calling attention to subject, though these actions have not received the wide publicity they merit, due in part to fact that Middle East news coverage in past two months has been occupied by Sinai crisis. UAR may have been encouraged to resume gas attacks in July because of relative lack of public outcry. 3) We sympathize with ICRC request re gas masks, medicaments and related equipment. We see practical difficulties in mass distribution such materials, and wonder if this is what Committee has in mind. Effective use of masks, medicines, and equipment requires training or supervision of type not easy to arrange in conditions of this area. Many Yemeni illiterate and would require oral instructions in use of masks. Yemeni known to fear injections and would be hard to train to make proper use of medical kits. 4) Mass distribution might have significant propaganda effect and thus deter UAR from further attacks. If this is Committee's intention, limited or general appeal to societies or governments for masks, medicaments and equipment would seem more appropriate than private request to us. It goes without saying USG would be prepared respond positively. 5) As alternative to mass distribution, Committee might consider establishing small stock of needed items, to be stored with its own medical supplies, for its own use and for distribution to Yemenis in areas likely be affected. We would be willing quietly supply masks, medicines and equipment on this basis. However, most such equipment readily available commercially in Europe, so might be simpler for Committee to purchase items itself, financed from Committee's general funds to which we have made, and expect continue to make, substantial contributions. We understand West Germans may have 20,000 surplus masks in which Israel formerly interested. Committee might wish contact Bonn directly, suggesting Germans make available as whole or partial grant. 6) Particularly because inhumane gas campaign continuing, we believe additional actions needed focus world attention on this problem. We wonder whether ICRC has yet received replies from any of four recipients of its original report. If ICRC has no plans publish report, is Committee thinking of sending it to UN? In our view some such positive action would make significant contribution toward generating atmosphere in world public opinion which would render such outrages less likely in future. 7) We remain deeply concerned on this subject but desire stay in background because of sensitive intelligence and propaganda implications. Mission should discuss subject frankly and informally with Committee in this light and report fully. Rusk 454. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State/1/ Jidda, July 23, 1967, 0931Z. /1/Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Roger Channel Telegrams, Jidda. Secret; Roger Channel; Special Handling. 281. State 10446./2/ /2/Telegram 10446 to Jidda, July 20, informed the Ambassador that after further examination of the possibility of assisting Yemeni groups, the Department had concluded that no positive action should be taken at that time. (Ibid.) 1. Appreciate rationale re Dept's conclusion that no positive action should be taken now to assist various anti-UAR Yemeni groups. I should point out, however, that pursuant SecState 219929/3/ I have stopped actively urging Saudis not to assist Yemeni royalists or to continue restrain them. Instead, I have taken line with Rashad and others that Saudis aware of dangers and matter is one for them to decide. Saudis have quickly sensed our more relaxed line which, I suspect, is one reason we beginning hear rumors of Saudi help to Yemeni royalists and of permitting them try their luck. /3/Document 451. 2. I respectfully request Dept's reconsideration of one possible item of aid to Yemeni royalists, namely 20,000 (or as many as we can provide) gas masks. UAR continues indiscriminately use poison gas in Yemen. On our part we no longer seeking obscure this fact. Various items in US press including US News and World Report and Drummond's article in Washington Post, are publicizing it. Pursuant State 217282,/4/ we here are also discreetly urging Yemeni royalists give wider, more effective publicity to these poison gas attacks. However, apart from more publicity, a real need exists for some gas mask protection. We could supply such masks though Saudis if we prefer not to be directly involved. Even if it became known, provision of such equipment could scarcely be labeled as offensive help to Yemeni royalists, but as essential defense need to meet blatant UAR use of gas against combatants and non-combatants alike in Yemen. It would also show Yemeni royalists that our concern with Yemen is an impartial one. /4/Dated June 27. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 17 YEMEN-SAUD) 3. In this connection, I assume that with YAR withdrawal of recognition from USG our political commitments in Yemen have been wiped clean. We ought now try to establish contact with as wide spectrum of Yemeni political contacts as possible. We should seek develop at least some influence with all groupings, but at this time commit ourselves to none. By doing so, hopefully, we may at some future time be able to exert constructive influence for a broadly based Yemeni Govt. This will have to include Yemeni royalists who have shown remarkable staying power. It is unrealistic continue to ignore them. Apart from few personal contacts with Ahmad Shami, we have heretofore leaned over backwards to avoid contact with royalists to avoid embarrassing our relations with UAR and YAR. These considerations obviously no longer apply. Assume Dept has no objection to a discreet but overt effort on our part to broaden, our personal bases, our circle of Yemeni royalist contacts./5/ /5/Telegram 13532 to Jidda, July 27, informed the Embassy that the Department had no objection to a discreet effort to broaden its circle of Yemeni royalist contacts on a personal basis. Regarding the Ambassador's request for 20,000 gas masks for the royalists, the telegram stated that the United States should avoid direct involvement with any Yemeni faction at that stage. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Roger Channel Telegrams, Jidda) 4. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] concurs. Eilts 455. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France/1/ Washington, July 24, 1967, 2209Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN. Confidential. Drafted by Brewer, cleared by Rene A. Tron (AFN), and Country Director for France and Benelux Robert Anderson, and approved by Brewer. Repeated to Algiers, Jidda, London, Moscow, Rome, and Aden. 12259. Rome 338,/2/ Paris 1068 (Notal)./3/ /2/Telegram 338 from Rome, July 15, reported that the Italian Embassy in Sanaa had informed the Italian Foreign Ministry that 20,000-21,000 troops had left Yemen during May and June. (Ibid.) /3/Telegram 1068 from Paris, July 21, reported that the Quai d'Orsay estimated that fewer than 20,000 UAR troops were left in Yemen. (Ibid.) 1. FYI. While Dept has no desire get into numbers game with French or Italians re size UAR forces Yemen, our own best estimate is there still some 25,000 UAR troops there. End FYI. 2. Far from Egyptian withdrawal being "closer to route" as QuaiOff indicated Paris reftel, UAR seems determined remain. Egyptians have in fact recently reoccupied several outlying posts and have had renewed resort to gas bombing on several occasions so far this month. We have seen no evidence Egyptians have modified their decision remain in Yemen at least until after South Arabian independence proclaimed in January 1968. 3. Re French report suggesting Algerian troops for Yemen (para 2, Paris reftel), we of course unable confirm. As far as we aware, only Algerian combat until now outside Algeria is battalion posted along Suez Canal. However, UPI carried ticker item from Aden July 22 quoting "travellers from Republican areas of Yemen" that Algerian infantry and airmen are moving into Yemen. View greater role Algeria now seeking play in Near East, we cannot exclude this possibility and would appreciate any additional info addressees able develop. Repeat replies Aden. Rusk 456. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia/1/ Washington, August 2, 1967, 1524Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-10 YEMEN. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Brewer; cleared by Sieverts, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs David H. Popper, and Daniel Brown (NEA/P); and approved by Battle. Repeated to Geneva, London, and USUN. 14947. Ref Jidda 383./2/ /2/Dated July 30. (Ibid.) (1) Re SAG interest in what USG had in mind in its public reference to support of international action to deal with gas problem/3/ (para 4 reftel), you may inform Masud following response Dept spokesman to press question August 1 as to whether US trying to collect its own evidence on gas warfare situation: "No, I would not say that this is a case in which the United States is trying to lead the field. We have been concerned about the reports. We would like to see the countries most affected take some initiative and as I indicated before we would be prepared to support any appropriate international action." /3/On July 27 Robert J. McCloskey, Director of the State Department's Office of News, told a press conference that the United States continued to be deeply disturbed by the many reports regarding use of poison gas against civilians in Yemen, condemned such actions as inhumane and entirely contrary to the laws of nations, and would support international action to deal with this problem. (American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pp. 630-631) (2) FYI. Understand British may shortly approach us on this problem (London 714)./4/ We have no preconceived notions on this subject but character USG support would certainly take account of specific international action which might be proposed by state or states directly concerned. End FYI. /4/Dated July 28. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-10 YEMEN) Rusk 457. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia/1/ Washington, August 19, 1967, 1808Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret. Drafted by Dinsmore, cleared by H. Eugene Bovis (NEA/UAR), and approved by Davies. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Kuwait, London, Rabat, Tripoli, Tunis, Dhahran, and USUN. 24047. Ref: Jidda 631./2/ /2/In telegram 631 from Jidda, August 17, Eilts reported that Deputy Foreign Minister Saqqaf had informed him that Saudi Arabia was under considerable Arab pressure to accept a UAR offer to revert to the Jidda Agreement. Saqqaf stated he had continued to make clear that the Jidda Agreement, which the United Arab Republic had scuttled, was no longer a valid basis for settlement of the Yemen problem. He said that his government was also unwilling to agree to establishment of a proposed three-man committee on the grounds that this would simply result in renewed Arab mediation and buy the United Arab Republic more time. (Ibid.) 1. Department understands Saudi hesitancy regarding initiatives on Yemen which it fears may merely be clever UAR attempt gain respectability by submission proposal which not only sterile but also cloaks Egyptian intention to maintain its course toward objective of subservient Yemen. Department finds this interpretation plausible but does not necessarily share it. 2. Saudi problem is complicated by encouragement from other Arab states. UAR proposals may appear to latter be sincere UAR offer to settle reasonably. 3. If you should find opportunity, believe expression following observations may be useful reminder at this point: (a) Since other Arabs showing interest in expressing themselves on this Arab problem Saudis may find it useful to consider ways and means to invite other Arabs join in search for solution. (b) In any event, we presume Saudis sense they must take reasonably positive stance in response UAR gesture lest they find themselves unfavorably isolated on problem in which they vitally concerned. Rusk 458. Intelligence Note From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ No. 713 Washington, September 1, 1967. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. SUBJECT
Mediators for Yemen Face a Rough Road The first tangible result of the Arab Summit meeting in Khartoum/2/ is its authorization of a plan proposed by the Government of Sudan to end the Saudi-UAR confrontation over Yemen. This paper examines the latest mediation effort and its chances of success as one aspect of the summit meeting. The results with regard to the Arab-Israeli dispute are not yet clear enough to be analyzed and these aspects will be dealt with later. /2/The heads of state of 12 Arab nations (minus Syria) conferred in Khartoum, August 29-September 1. The conference-approved device proposed by Sudan does little more than remove the Yemeni dispute from contention at the moment. Deliberately general, the summit-meeting resolution reflects an agreement in principle on the part of the UAR and Saudi Arabia, but neither protagonist has given significant ground on the issues in dispute or on the timing of the proposed disengagement. In sum, this new approach only transfers the task at which two earlier mediators had failed to a tripartite committee (Morocco, Iraq, and Sudan); Prime Minister Mahgoub serves as the "neutral" chairman. Although Mahgoub has stated that he wants to start from the viewpoint of the Yemenis themselves, both the Yemeni republicans and the royalists have denounced the plan before it has even gotten under way. And the committee has no magic formula for gaining access to the several dissident factions within Yemen. The most optimistic development is a slightly softer attitude on the part of the UAR, to whom the cost of the Yemen occupation must now be doubly burdensome. Nasser no longer demands the exile of the former Yemeni ruling house, the Hamid al-Dins, as a condition precedent to his withdrawal. But there is no sign that he is willing to accept open and humiliating defeat. Furthermore, Nasser's "reasonableness" could be merely a tactical device to help create a facade of Arab unity and to secure moderate support against radical pressures from Algeria and Syria. Saudi King Faysal, who now feels that he has the upper hand, is in an even less generous mood than before. Another factor also enters into the calculation. According to reports from Khartoum Saudi Arabia will contribute $140 million to a fund of $378 million designed to alleviate the economic difficulties of the UAR and Jordan. Kuwait ($154 million) and Libya ($84 million) are the other two contributors. It is not clear when and how these funds are to be made available and what proportion of the total for the UAR ($266 million) will come from Saudi Arabia. In any event, the fact that the UAR needs Saudi money strengthens Faysal's position and may give him a weapon to obtain concessions from the UAR. Finally, Sudan's internal politics will affect the performance of the Committee. Sudanese President al-Azhari desired the original plan as part of an intricate maneuver to expel or neutralize the leftists and Nasserites in his government, and to carry it back to the former moderate coalition. But the leading role now has been seized by Mahgoub, whose backing includes the more radical nationalists. Political maneuverings within the Sudan may thus affect the committee's chances for success. 459. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Battle) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, October 13, 1967. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15-1 YEMEN. Confidential. Drafted by Dinsmore and cleared by Brewer. SUBJECT
New Cabinet in Yemen President Sallal announced a reorganization of his government on October 13. Dropping the most thoroughly discredited stooges of the UAR from his Cabinet, he has chosen several well-known moderate and conservative personalities whose credentials should be acceptable to all but the most die-hard Royalist oppositionists to the Republic. Sallal himself has become Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, as well as President and Commander-in-Chief. Of particular interest is the appointment of a person as Adviser for Presidential Affairs who maintained fairly close and cordial relations with the American Embassy in Yemen, and who is acceptable to Yemeni tribes. Sallal quite obviously is trimming his sails as he heads into a precarious period when his Egyptian supporters finally leave Yemen. They have announced they will be out of the capital, Sanaa, by October 15 and completely out of Yemen by December 15. Meanwhile several members of the outgoing Cabinet, known for their loyalty to the UAR, are believed to have left Yemen for safe-haven in Egypt. Hard-bitten Royalists will not be mollified by the announcement of a new government but will continue to insist upon and may cause the ouster of Sallal. Nevertheless, he is demonstrating an ability to gain the cooperation of a few of the country's most important tribal leaders and to maintain Army loyalty. Sallal is trying to ride out the storm which Egyptian withdrawal will set in motion. It is too early to determine whether he has more courage than good judgment in making this attempt. 460. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts/1/ Washington, November 7, 1967, 0018Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-9 YEMEN. Secret. Drafted by Brewer on November 6, cleared by Davies, and approved by Brewer. Sent to Aden, Amman, Beirut, Dhahran, Kuwait, London, Rome, Tehran, Tel Aviv, and USUN. 65492. Recent Yemen coup/2/ represents move in more moderate direction and may improve possibility some YARG/Royalist compromise settlement. However, picture still far from clear and atmosphere civil war likely continue characterize situation for some period. In these circumstances, we are refraining from substantive public comment on Yemen developments, both (a) to prevent any embarrassment moderates which US welcome recent move might cause at this juncture Arab-American affairs; and (b) to avoid giving impression to new YARG that we would be receptive to renewal formal relations and provision specific help at early date. In our view, US attitude should be one of quiet encouragement to both sides to compose their differences in order stable and viable central government can be established which would merit broad international recognition. Addressees should be guided by foregoing and should in general avoid speculation re USG attitude towards new regime. /2/On November 5 Sallal was removed from office by a military coup as Qadi Abd al-Rahman al-Iryani was named Chairman of the Presidency Council and former Yemeni Ambassador to the United States Muhsin al-Aini became Prime Minister. Rusk 461. Memorandum From John W. Foster and Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/ Washington, November 13, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Saunders Files, Yemen, 4/1/66-1/20/69. Top Secret. SUBJECT
The Situation in Yemen Just a background word about Yemen since it provides a measure of Nasser's and Faisal's relative fortunes and of prospects for future Arab-Arab cohesiveness. Very simply, Nasser continues his pull-out, and the Yemeni Republican coup improved chances of an internal political settlement. It's still too early to tell whether the Yemenis are gong to be able to work out their problems and whether the Saudis and Egyptians will buy their solution, but prospects have improved. The coup was led by moderates, some of whom were under house arrest in Cairo until recently. The coup leaders have so far succeeded in keeping the Republicans united, and opposition to the coup has been weak. Because the new government isn't pro-Nasser, it will deal more easily with those anti-Republican tribes which have been motivated primarily by anti-Egyptian rather than pro-Royalist sentiments. The coup leaders are already claiming some success in winning over these people, who contribute significantly to Royalist strength. One factor which could limit Republican ability to make progress with lukewarm Royalists, however, is the natural reluctance of the coup leaders to share their power with their potential allies. The hard-line Royalists, as far as we can tell, still think they can win the civil war and haven't yet shown any interest in negotiating. The cease-fire reported in the press this morning was a local deal around Sanaa, not a general arrangement involving all Royalists. Both Egyptians and the Saudis are becoming less involved. Nasser is acting as if he has given up on controlling Yemen, although he clearly expects to have close relations. Over half the Egyptian troops have already been withdrawn, and plans still call for the remainder to leave by the end of the year. There's some chance that the Saudis--who never liked the Yemeni Royal family--might decide that they can live with the Republican moderates. We have one report that Faisal has already suspended his financial support of the Royalists, but the Saudis are keeping their own counsel for the moment. Faisal would face a tough decision in cutting off those who have carried on the fight these five long years. The coup may have been a temporary setback for the USSR since the coup leaders are basically "conservative" Republicans. However, the new crew, while somewhat more moderate, is not so much so as not to turn for help wherever it can be found. There will be a vacuum to exploit, and I see no signs of anyone else hurrying to fill it. We aren't rushing to pat the new fellows on the back. This time, we want to hold our blessings until we're sure how completely the government represents all Yemen and how acceptable it is to the Saudis and Iranians. We also want to avoid a situation where the Yemenis ask us to pick up the bill the UAR may no longer pay. With relations suspended and us still smarting from ill-treatment even before the war, we are generally inclined to sit back. This makes the Communist-watchers jittery, but given our aid resources I can't see our rushing in even if we thought it was wise before we are a lot surer of Saudi support for the new regime. Hal JWF 462. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia/1/ Washington, November 22, 1967, 2104Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN. Confidential. Drafted by Dinsmore, cleared by Root, and approved by Brewer. Repeated to Kuwait, London, Aden, and USUN. 73272. 1. Yahya Jaghman, senior Yemeni UN delegate, lunched unofficially at own request with Dept Off in Washington November 21. Jaghman clearly had two objectives: (1) reestablish informal low key contact, and (2) seek USG assistance vis-a-vis SAG to cease assistance to Royalists. During extended discussion, DeptOff noted it our impression Saudis, as their part of bargain struck in Khartoum, no longer assisting Royalists. Royalist leaders who had fought Egyptians so long nevertheless represented clear power element in situation. Yemen had suffered enough and all factions should seek compromise, since they owe country opportunity settle down peacefully. 2. Jaghman said his understanding had been that Saudi policy one of opposition to foreign army in Yemen. Said he was under impression SAG opposed "occupiers" but not particularly concerned about Yemen's internal situation. Over past five years YARG had relayed messages to SAG saying "recognize us and your problems with Egyptians in Yemen will disappear". SAG had refused. Now that Egyptians going, what is holding Saudis back from making peaceful gesture of recognition? DeptOff noted that problem is one between two peninsula countries and ought be solved by them. 3. Jaghman called attention recent public statement made by FonMin Hassan Makki re Yemen "disturbances" and YARG's adherence to "positive neutrality and non-alignment". He read from personal letter from PriMin al-Aini which stated "situation serious and confused," that "communists and harakiyin" (which Jaghman defined as ANM) "influenced by Chinese" are playing devious game trading on situation as at an auction (muzayid) to escalate confusion. Jaghman professed see connection between al-Aini's concern and Makki's reiteration of YARG non-alignment. (Department notes that if al-Aini's letter genuine both Saudis and Aini have reservations over ANM activities. Also possible al-Aini's Baathi sentiments involved.) 4. Jaghman professed but did not stress YARG desire resume relations with USG "on same basis" as previously. DeptOff referred to difficulties YARG created for Embassy, reminded him that YARG, not USG, had broken relations, that US property had been burnt and wrecked, and that private American plane still held in Yemen. Said that YARG initiative to return plane and make amends for losses would be evidence of good will. 5. Comment: Jaghman's comments are further evidence YARG reluctance deal with Saudis on any basis other than Republic. We are reminded of Numan's claim to Embassy Taiz some 18 months ago that Faisal reportedly would not tolerate anything except monarchy in Yemen. Jaghman was unspecific on question resumption USG/YARG relations and we surmise USG intervention vis-a-vis Saudis was a more important objective. As indicated, we gave him no encouragement. Rusk 463. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Italy/1/ Washington, December 5, 1967, 2123Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN. Confidential. Drafted by Dinsmore, cleared by Arthur R. Day (IO/UNP), and Rush W. Taylor, Jr. (EUR/AIS), and approved by Brewer. Repeated to Jidda, Aden, London, and USUN. 79591. 1. Italian Counselor informed Department December 4 that their Charge in Sanaa had met with former PriMin Hassan al-Amri, now member of Republican Council and Commander of Armed Forces, on November 30 (PriMin al-Aini in North Africa and FonMin Makki in Moscow). Al-Amri reportedly received Charge cordially, expressed regret over action which led to departure US Embassy from Sanaa last June, condemned "dirty actions" against us by predecessor government (Sallal's). Al-Amri asked Charge to convey on behalf of himself and Yemeni people Yemeni desire to resume diplomatic relations with US. Amri further stated he prepared release US mission aircraft immediately (septel)./2/ /2/Not further identified. 2. Amri expressed appreciation and gratitude to Italians for Ambassador Ortona's discussion with Assistant Secretary Battle (State 77503 pouched USUN)./3/ He told Charge that YARG willing give King Faisal full assurances of YARG's good intentions and of its determination to be good neighbor with Saudi Arabia. YARG would be grateful if US and Italy would use their good offices with SAG to that end. As for Soviet influence, Italians and US could assure Saudis that YARG would not allow any foreign state to interfere in its internal affairs. YARG is presently obliged to accept Soviet help in order to protect its frontiers, but Yemen is prepared accept help from any side, "especially from US" and even from Saudis. Amri concluded by suggesting that best way to circumscribe Soviet relations with Yemen is for US to resume diplomatic relations. /3/Dated November 30. (Ibid., POL US-YEMEN) 3. DeptOff expressed appreciation for Italian role in foregoing. Noted we had offered meet with YARG representatives informally to discuss outstanding problems but had not yet seen any specific Yemeni response. We also watching situation as closely as possible and will be most interested note developments next few days including final withdrawal UAR troops. Italian Embassy's report (State 79142 pouched USUN)/4/ seemed indicate that widespread civil war is about break out again. DeptOff repeated willingness of Department to engage in informal talks with Yemeni representatives and said we would be willing send DeptOffs to New York on these occasions to meet with Yemenis there in YARG UN delegation. /4/Telegram 79142 to the U.S. Mission at NATO, December 4. (Ibid., POL 27 YEMEN) 4. Re Saudis, DeptOff noted we had on occasion privately counseled moderation on SAG re Yemen and would always do what we could to facilitate settlement. However, we pointed to unique position Italians currently have for using their influence with SAG, since they represented both in Yemen and Saudi Arabia. DeptOff suggested GOI might consider passing al-Amri's remarks to Saudis through Italian Embassy Jidda. Italian Counselor said he would report this suggestion. He wondered whether USG would take further action with SAG should situation in Yemen worsen. We commented that Italians' own reports suggested situation deteriorating and indicated it would be preferable have clearer picture of events on the ground before considering any formal approach to SAG. 5. Counselor phoned later and told DeptOff that his Foreign Office had contacted PriMin al-Aini in Rabat regarding informal discussions with us. Al-Aini had stated he fully agreed regarding contacts in New York and would immediately instruct YARG delegation accordingly. Counselor later called to report that YARG del had on December 4 asked for appointment with Italian del New York on December 5 on means arranging contact with US officials. 6. Comment: Department plans move cautiously with these talks. Our main interest will be to show good intentions toward Yemen, while seeking YARG commitment on property claims which we shall make. With Yemen situation obviously in turmoil, Department not prepared at this time positive steps toward resumption diplomatic relations. Rusk 464. Memorandum From Nathaniel Davis and Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/ Washington, December 8, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Saunders Files, Yemen, 4/1/66-1/20/69. Secret. At day's end, we want you to know what the Intelligence Community is doing on Soviet activity in Yemen. OCI this afternoon is putting the finishing touches on its memorandum on the subject. ONE is doing a more estimative memo which will be ready early in the week. INR is writing an all-sources memo to bring together a complete record of the intelligence./2/ Luke Battle has long been concerned about this situation and is watching it closely but still sees nothing more that we should be doing. /2/None of these documents has been found. You will be interested in some of the preliminary observations which the authors of these papers have made: --The Soviet airlift since November 17 looks dramatic but we ought to remember that this is the only way the Soviets can get to Yemen with the Suez Canal closed. Compared to the airlift to the UAR last summer, this one is relatively modest. While about 100 flights to Yemen are now scheduled compared with 300 to the UAR over the summer, we have to remember that the resupply to the UAR also included 2-3 dozen shiploads of equipment. The total so far moved to the Yemen amounts to the equivalent of about one shipload. --The evidence clearly points toward the direct involvement of Soviet pilots in combat--although the Intelligence people are still not willing to say they are sure. Flights by Soviet pilots may have been a stop-gap measure pending the arrival and readiness of the Syrian pilots who have been flown in. (Soviet pilots also flew sorties in Yemen in 1963 during the Egyptian campaign, when the Egyptians were not yet combat effective.) --The Soviets look to us as if they are out on a limb. However, we have not had people on the ground in Yemen for more than six months, and they may know more than we about the balance of forces there. However, they may simply have decided along with the Egyptians that they just could not let the Republicans down without trying to help. --If the Yemen's Republicans lose, the Soviets have lost their stake. They may figure that this additional effort is at least worth a try. They may also calculate that the stakes vis-a-vis the United States are not very high, and their vigor in supporting an Arab friend will offset the "neo-colonialism" aspect of the matter. --People do not appear to be thinking in terms of any Soviet commitment of ground forces. The shuttle flights are carrying personnel, but their nationality is not clear and they may be advisers, trainers, etc. When the intelligence papers are all in early next week, we will sit down with Bob Ginsburgh and see if they provide any new insights. Meanwhile, today's developments on the ground do not take us much beyond where we were when we talked this morning. Nathaniel Davis
Harold H. Saunders/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears these typed signatures. 465. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia/1/ Washington, December 8, 1967, 2102Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Brewer and approved by Davies. 82430. 1. In course your coming audience with King Faisal we hope you will be able discuss in some detail recent Yemen developments. You should express our growing concern at indications increasing Soviet involvement and make clear to him USG has no intention in present circumstances resuming relations with present YARG regime. Insofar as we have had contacts with Yemenis of various groups, we have taken line with them all that the Yemen problem cannot be settled from outside nor by force. Both Royalists and Republicans have their sympathizers and their tribal levies. No clear-cut military solution seems likely. Royalists should not expect turn clock back to unpopular Imamate nor should YARG insist on republican concept and refuse to negotiate with Royalist leaders who clearly command significant support in certain areas. Both sides should accordingly make renewed efforts to move their differences from military to political arena by finding some formula (e.g. State of Yemen concept; revitalized Arab Tripartite Committee) which would permit meaningful negotiations to get under way. We would hope all those with interests in seeing Yemen problem gradually de-escalated would see things in similar light./2/ /2/In telegram 419 from Dhahran, December 13, the Ambassador reported that he discussed the Department's concerns with Faisal that day and asked the King for his assessment of the situation. Faisal noted that if his earlier warnings had been heeded, the situation might be different now. He had only one suggestion. The U.S. Government should talk to the Soviets and try to make them understand that their intervention would only keep the parties apart and perpetuate the Yemeni civil war. (Ibid.) Rusk 466. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Battle) to Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach/1/ Washington, December 11, 1967. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN. Confidential. Drafted by Dinsmore and Brewer and cleared by Davies. SUBJECT
Yemen: Prime Minister's Letter to Secretary In line with our willingness to meet informally with officials of the Yemen Arab Republic Government (YARG) to discuss outstanding problems, Ambassador Goldberg and NEA/ARP officers on December 8 met with Yahya Jaghman, YARG delegate to the United Nations, in the New York office of Italian Ambassador Vinci, who heads his country delegation to the UN. Ambassador Goldberg was present for an initial few moments with the conferees. The substance of the talks with Jaghman was reported in State 82442, which is attached at Tab A./2/ /2/Telegram 82442 to Rome, December 9, described the December 8 meeting with Jaghman, who alleged that the Saudis were currently providing "massive" assistance to tribes supporting the royalists and indicated that the U.S. Government could, if it wished, limit Saudi support of the royalists. A Department officer noted that U.S. information about the situation in Yemen was not reassuring, especially concerning the use of Soviet pilots. He pointed out that the Yemeni Government's refusal to meet with the royalists offered the opposition no alternative but military action. (Ibid.) During the meeting Jaghman delivered a letter dated November 30 addressed to the Secretary from YARG Prime Minister Muhsin al Aini. The letter, and a Yemeni translation thereof, is attached at Tab B./3/ /3/Not attached. Al Aini was YARG Ambassador to Washington and to the UN until October 1966. During al Aini's incumbency in these positions the Secretary apparently developed respect and regard for him. Thus, al Aini writes as to a close acquaintance. The Prime Minister, writing from outside his country (he has been on a trip to North African capitals) states his government's aim to establish peace, stability and unity in Yemen and asserts his surprise over what he alleges is a new "deluge of money, arms and supplies flooding the country." Al Aini declares that this effort cannot "force the monarchy anew upon Yemen" but that it will cause "war and strife." The Prime Minister asserts that the Yemeni civil war "is about to become a war among bigger powers" and refers to Viet Nam. He then asks the Secretary to "give the matter the consideration it deserves . . . for the sake of world peace." We do not believe that a formal reply is necessary. The United States has no diplomatic relations with Yemen at present and the military situation within Yemen is highly confused, with Republicans and Royalists fighting fiercely for control of Sanaa. A reply at this time would be misinterpreted as implying USG support for the YARG at a time when it is receiving active military help from the Russians and Saudi support of the Royalists is continuing. Nevertheless, in view of the Secretary's personal regard for al Aini, we believe it would be appropriate to convey a brief oral acknowledgment to Jaghman in New York. We would simply plan to acknowledge al Aini's letter on the Secretary's behalf, express the Secretary's continuing personal friendship for the Prime Minister and note our own view that compromise among contending Yemeni elements seems the only sure way of ending the country's five-year civil war. We would note confirmed reports of Soviet activity, deny Egyptian and Yemeni controlled press stories indicating that the United States is in any way involved, and express regret that Yemen continues to lend itself to false propaganda campaigns against this government. Recommendation That you approve an oral response along the foregoing lines./4/ /4/Katzenbach initialed the approval line on December 13. A handwritten notation reads: "Action taken 12/13/67. See outgoing telegram." Reference is presumably to telegram 84379 to Rome; Document 467. [Continue with the next documents] | 
