 467. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Italy/1/ Washington, December 14, 1967, 0208Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN. Confidential. Drafted by Brewer on December 13; cleared by Country Director for Italy, Austria, and Switzerland Wells Stabler; and approved by Battle. Repeated to Jidda, Aden, London, Moscow, USUN, Beirut, Amman, Kuwait, Paris, Rabat, and Tripoli. 84379. State 83247/2/ and 82442/3/ (Notal). /2/Dated December 12. (Ibid.) /3/See footnote 2, Document 466. 1. DeptOff telephoned YARG UN Delegate Jaghman December 13 to acknowledge on Secretary's behalf PriMin al-Aini's personal message (reftel). DeptOff expressed Secretary's continuing personal friendship for YARG Prime Minister and noted our own view that compromise among contending Yemeni elements seems only way of ending country's five-year civil war. 2. Jaghman expressed appreciation for December 8 meeting with DeptOffs (reftel) as well as for acknowledgment al-Aini's personal message. Noting DeptOff's concern at status Yemen problem Jaghman asked what specifically YARG should do, for example should effort be made induce such moderate Royalists as FonMin Shami and tribal leader Qasim Munassir come to Sanaa to collaborate with YARG. DeptOff recalled existence Arab Tripartite Committee, and described Sudanese PriMin Mahjub's recent public statement calling for renewed action by it. On personal basis he thought it would be helpful if YARG could give Mahjub initiative positive response. 3. DeptOff then said we increasingly concerned re stories coming from Yemen indicating USG in some way involved on Royalist side. DeptOff quoted chapter and verse from recent tickers, citing in particular statement by YARG Culture Minister Marwani December 10 in Aden asserting "Yemeni authorities have seized documents proving that American, Belgian and French mercenaries are directing the disorders and the attempt to attack Sanaa." Jaghman said he unaware these reports which he admitted caused him concern. He volunteered attempt do something about them, emphasizing YARG eager for USG do what it could in advising "others" not to exacerbate problem. DeptOff said we by no means confining our efforts to YARG alone but felt he should know Yemeni tendentious propaganda of type we now seeing hardly likely improve atmosphere. DeptOff noted these reports without foundation and recalled similar unfortunate propaganda by YARG last spring which had adversely affected our relations. Jaghman said he knew mercenaries were operating with Royalists including American named Conde. DeptOff replied Conde renounced US citizenship some years ago. As far as we aware only nine Americans in Yemen, eight of whom defenseless missionaries in Republican territory near Taiz. Ninth Bushrod Howard admittedly employed by Royalists but as far as we aware in non-combat role. In any case, would be unjustified for YARG spread propaganda condemning USG on basis putative private actions one American citizen. 4. Referring Tripartite Committee, Jaghman said al-Aini was in close touch with Mahjub and was worried re further deterioration in situation. DeptOff suggested it would be opportune for YARG manifest more concrete interest in Tripartite Committee's work than evidenced publicly hitherto. Jaghman expressed appreciation exchange views and indicated he would promptly contact PriMin. Katzenbach 468. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia/1/ Washington, December 15, 1967, 0033Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret. Drafted by Brewer on December 14, cleared by Battle and James W. Pratt (EUR/SOV), and approved by Kohler. Repeated to Dhahran. 84871. Reference: Dhahran 419./2/ For Ambassador. /2/See footnote 2, Document 465. 1. FYI--In connection Faisal's suggestion that we talk to Soviets re Yemen problem, Deputy Under Secretary Kohler did raise this question with Ambassador Dobrynin here December 11. Kohler stated we had been surprised by extent and nature of Soviet involvement in the fighting going on in Yemen. Dobrynin commented that USSR for years had been supplying aid to YARG and that this was simply continuing in present more difficult situation for YARG. Dobrynin volunteered he confident Soviet policy of not using Soviet personnel had not changed. USSR had supplied planes and other military equipment, but he was confident Soviets not being used except as instructors. End FYI. 2. Without referring foregoing, you may pass to Faisal fact that USG has been in touch with USSR on Yemen question at high level. Situation under study and further contact will depend on developments. Katzenbach 469. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia/1/ Washington, December 20, 1967, 2301Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret. Drafted by Dinsmore and Brewer on December 19; cleared by Battle, Country Director for Iran Theodore L. Eliot, Jr., Country Director for United Arab Republic Affairs Richard B. Parker, and MacCracken; and approved by Under Secretary Rostow. Repeated to Moscow, Tehran, London, and Cairo. 87479. Dhahran 419./2/ /2/See footnote 2, Document 465. 1. Dept continuing watch Yemen situation closely, particularly evolution Soviet airlift of military assistance and any further indications combat involvement Soviet pilots. For present we planning restrict public comment to minimum level that may be required by new developments and resultant press interest here. Meanwhile, we will continue (without illusions) to give appropriate encouragement to efforts find political solution, including possible new activity by Arab Tripartite Committee. 2. As indicated State 84871,/3/ we have already flagged our interest in problem to Soviets. To provide additional signal to them of area concern, we are inclined believe might be desirable for Saudis discuss problem frankly with Egyptians. Accordingly, unless you perceive objection, you should approach senior SAG officials along following line. /3/Document 468. 3. While tactics obviously for SAG decide, it has occurred to us might be useful if Saudis were to make known to Egyptians their concern over recent indications increasing Soviet involvement in Yemen. We would think Saudis could well point out that UAR/SAG Khartoum agreement implemented in good faith by both parties but neither presumably desired simply replacement past arrangements with weak Sanaa regime dependent on Soviets for support. Egyptians and Saudis are prepared let difficult Yemen problem seek its own level, provided there no interference from outside, and Saudis remain prepared accept any regime worked out among Yemenis themselves. However, Saudis would hope UAR would agree that establishment firm non-Arab position in strategic Yemen region hardly bodes well for future of independent Arab states themselves. Saudis might conclude by raising with Egyptians possibility that latter might use their influence with Soviets to exercise moderation in involving selves further in Yemeni inter-tribal morass. (FYI. We aware UAR influence on USSR likely be small. However, our thought is UAR might get point that future SAG financial help could not be counted upon if spirit Khartoum understanding violated by Egypt's Russian friends. Even if possible approach to Soviets not specifically raised, UAR still no doubt sufficiently aware implications Saudi concern that Egyptians might well be motivated to do what they could with Soviets in direction greater caution. End FYI.)/4/ /4/In telegram 2190 from Jidda, December 23, the Ambassador reported that he presented the Department's suggestion to Mas'ud that day, stressing that the U.S. Government was not suspending its efforts with the Soviets. Speaking personally, Mas'ud expressed his doubts about the U.S. proposal. He believed that recent Soviet activities in Yemen had been going on with UAR knowledge and approval, and doubted that Faisal would want to approach the UAR on this matter. Nevertheless, he undertook to convey the U.S. suggestion to the King immediately. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN) 4. For Tehran: We had hoped Iranians might be prevailed upon also flag their concern over Yemen developments to USSR. However, in light FonMin's negative attitude on this point (para six Tehran's 2552),/5/ we leave to your discretion whether specific approach now warranted. /5/Dated December 16. (Ibid.) Rusk 470. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts/1/ Washington, January 4, 1968, 0030Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret. Drafted by Dinsmore and Brewer on January 3; cleared by Vladimir Toumanoff (EUR/SOV), Chief of the South Asia Division in INR's Office of Research and Analysis for Near East and South Asia Thomas P. Thornton, and Director of INR's Office of Research and Analysis for Soviet Bloc Helmut Sonnenfeldt; and approved by Battle. Sent to Aden, Algiers, Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Jidda, Kuwait, London, Moscow, Rawalpindi, Tehran, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, and Tunis. 92898. 1. Addressees may find following useful in continuing keep appropriate host govt officials up to date re current situation in Yemen: A. We have no evidence combat flights by Soviet pilots since early December. Yemeni ex-PriMin al Ayni reliably reported to have said Soviets stopped combat missions after Yemenis attempted press them for increased assistance. Soviet Ambassador said to have remarked: "Russians never flew planes in Vietnam and they are not going to get involved in the Yemen war." B. Soviet Ambassador left Yemen after mid-December for consultations Moscow. He was followed by departure numbers Soviet economic aid technicians. Unclear whether several Soviet diplomats may remain in YARG capital but Russian Embassy seems to have moved to Hodaydah amid stories Republican annoyance USSR "pulling out." However, so far as we aware inputs of Soviet materiel are continuing. C. Military situation around Sanaa little changed in recent weeks. While city itself in full YARG control it remains isolated by Royalists and dependent air supply for essential items. With Ramadan now over, further fighting seems likely with YARG seeking reopen surface communications while Royalists try tighten noose. D. In part due continuing military stalemate, diplomatic efforts find some compromise solution have recently been reviewed. Each Soviet counselor, in recent talk with Italian Charge in Sanaa, has indicated growing Russian recognition re desirability of political settlement. Arab Tripartite Committee on Yemen has renewed its efforts find settlement and is seeking arrange 15-man preparatory committee meeting Beirut January 12 to select Yemeni participants for a proposed national reconciliation conference (State 91905 Notal)./2/ YARG issued public statement December 30 accepting Tripartite Committee good offices. Royalists publicly have expressed skepticism their side will receive adequate representation, but Saudis have welcomed Committee's new initiative while expressing concern re Soviet military intervention. /2/Circular telegram 91905, January 2. (Ibid.) E. USG position has been limited to public confirmation December 13 early evidences Soviet activity together with continued diplomatic encouragement for an Arab political solution as envisioned under Khartoum agreement (State 84178 Notal)./3/ We have made clear USG has not in past, nor is it now giving arms to Royalists, and that YARG claim Americans are serving as mercenaries with Royalists is ridiculous (State 84504)./4/ /3/Circular telegram 84178, December 13, 1967. (Ibid.) /4/Circular telegram 84504, December 14, 1967. (Ibid.) F. We continue believe that foreign military intervention in Yemen only likely to increase level of tension in region. As Under Secretary Rostow made clear to Italian Ambassador December 30 (State 91625),/5/ we consider indigenous Arab political solution is most sensible approach. We continuing watch situation carefully and believe other friendly states should also do what they can encourage current efforts achieve indigenous political solution to Yemen problem without further intervention from outside. /5/Dated December 30, 1967. (Ibid.) Rusk 471. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts/1/ Washington, January 20, 1968, 1713Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret. Drafted by Dinsmore on January 10, cleared by Director of the INR Office of Research and Analysis for Near East and South Asia Granville S. Austin, and approved by Brewer. Sent to Ankara, Aden, Algiers, Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Jidda, Kuwait, London, Moscow, Rawalpindi, Tehran, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, and Tunis. 102181. State 92898./2/ Yemen Situation. /2/Document 470. 1. Recent weeks appear have been characterized by sharp but inconclusive fighting. Air attacks and ground action by Republicans have held off but not stopped Royalists. Both sides employing tribesmen. Reports indicate skirmishes, attacks and battles as widely spread as Rada west of Dhamar, Maswar and Hajjah west of Sanaa, Maabar south of Sanaa and Khamr to north of it. While some of these locations as far as 80-100 miles from Sanaa, we also note reported shelling city itself. This connection, only Embassy believed still Sanaa is Chinese, others either moved to Hudayda or Taiz. Royalists claim two airports Sanaa now under their control. Republican air access Sanaa said be limited DC-3 type planes using small dirt strip northern suburbs city. Roads from Sanaa to Taiz and Hudayda apparently still cut. Second MIG aircraft reported downed by Royalists but confirmation lacking. 2. Soviets remain visibly less involved than early December. Syrian pilots as well as Yemenis reportedly flying combat missions. USSR undoubtedly backing YAR but Pravda has shown sensitivity over public references to its involvement by disclaiming reports re participation Soviet citizens in combat and by drawing attention instead to mercenaries in Royalists' employ. Notwithstanding radical Arab propaganda, according British observer with one Royalist group only handful 13 foreign mercenaries, mainly French, in important Eastern sector commanded by leading Hamid al-Din Prince Muhammad Hussain. 3. Arab Tripartite Committee's efforts organize Yemeni session Beirut to prepare for wider popular Yemeni conference, so far have failed. Republicans refused sit with Hamid al-Din representative and Royalists refused meet until Soviets and Syrians ceased aid to YAR. Tripartite Committee has now called for Nasser and Faisal intercede to try eliminate obstacles to a conference. On January 19 Tass commented that Tripartite Commission failed yield results "primarily because of uncamouflaged subversive activities Saudi Arabia." 4. Meanwhile YARG UN representative Jaghman has confirmed to Dept YARG willing allow American (or, presumably, third country national) pilot to remove US mission aircraft from Yemen. Jaghman indicated YARG might also be willing consider USG's claims against damage sustained US property in Yemen. Jaghman also sought unsuccessfully persuade us assign officer to Italian Embassy in Yemen. (FYI. Plans now underway remove plane and compensation claim will be submitted, but we avoiding any action (e.g. assignment USG personnel to Yemen) which might at this juncture be seen as favoring either side. End FYI.) 5. USG position regarding developments in Yemen has consistently been to encourage indigenous peaceful solution. Department made statement along these lines available to press January 16 reiterating no Americans in Yemen serving either side./3/ USG position has been made clear to King Faisal./4/ /3/For text of the Department's statement on January 16, see circular telegram 99676, January 17. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN) /4/Telegram 94464 to Jidda, January 6, instructed the Embassy to urge the Saudi Government to exert its influence to persuade the royalists to cooperate more fully with the present Arab conciliation effort. (Ibid.) In telegram 2315 from Jidda, January 7, Eilts reported that he had conveyed the Department's concerns to Mas'ud that day. (Ibid.) 6. Comment: Apparent failure Tripartite Committee's most recent effort bring Yemenis to conference table are disappointing and suggest that neither Republicans nor Royalists believe they likely be defeated. Outlook thus for further bloodshed, at least until military situation less inconclusive than at present. Rusk 472. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts/1/ Washington, February 24, 1968, 0051Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN. Confidential. Drafted by Dinsmore and Brewer on February 23, cleared by Robert H. Flenner (EUR/SOV), and approved by Brewer. Sent to Ankara, Aden, Algiers, Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Jidda, Kuwait, London, Moscow, Rawalpindi, Tehran, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, Tunis, and CINCSTRIKE. 120053. State 102181./2/ Yemen SITREP. /2/Document 471. 1. Since reftel military situation in Yemen has been altered by YARG success February 6-7 in reopening Hudayda-Sanaa road. Since that time road has been used to transport reportedly large quantities of food, arms, ammunition and other supplies. Saudi and Royalist sources in Jidda confirm loss control strategic road. 2. Reports indicate that part of reason for Republican success may have been clumsy handling by Royalist prince of local sub-commanders in charge Royalist road blockade, resulting disaffection latter from duties. There is also speculation that Royalist tribesmen feared flow of financial subsidies to them might dry up should Royalists take capital and no longer need maximum support tribal levies. Whatever the combination of reasons, Royalist pressure on Sanaa has for the moment been relieved. 3. Meanwhile Republicans have embarked on new initiatives to discuss reestablishment of diplomatic relations with USG./3/ YARG leadership reportedly prepared talk about inclusion Royalists in a Republican government, excluding Hamid al Din (Imam's) family. They also continue express desire friendship with Saudi Arabia and with West. These actions suggest some YARG concern at becoming overly dependent on Soviets but neither Republican nor Royalist positions yet appear be flexible enough to encourage meaningful negotiations toward peaceful settlement. /3/Documentation on these initiatives is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 17 US-YEMEN. 4. New Italian Ambassador has arrived in Yemen and had initial contacts with top level YARG. He has also conveyed to Rome interest on part YARG leadership in resumption relations with West. GOI particularly interested this prospect to provide for greater Western presence in Yemen. 5. YARG has reiterated that plane formerly assigned US mission in Yemen may be removed. Tentative arrangements underway do so around end February, using British crew. 6. YAR and PRSY cooperated in military action in border region Bayhan/Baidha in mid-February to rout "infiltrators" and capture alleged arms cache of tribal elements said to be loyal exiled South Arabian sultans. According Sanaa and Aden radios coordinated action was success. President al-Shaabi in talk with our Charge made it clear PRSY considers arms stockpiling was stimulated by Saudis and hinted at trouble PRSY might make for Saudis if latter were to encourage new anti-PRSY schemes. 7. According Saudi press King Faisal replied to Arab Tri-Partite Committee request for new Saudi-Egyptian effort to solve Yemen problem (following failure convene protagonists in Beirut) by stating Yemenis should choose provisional government from all contending factions. Reply added all others should abstain from military-political interference. Within this framework King reportedly willing assist any efforts toward settlement. According Saudi Deputy FonMin, Nasser's reply to Committee's request had signified UAR willingness work with SAG toward solution through Tri-Partite Committee. Meanwhile, indications are Saudis resuming arms aid to Royalists. 8. Soviet assistance to YARG continues but at lower level than December. Soviets seem to be interested in preserving the regime. Comment: Situation on ground still unclear with further military action likely. Republican aircraft still active and Sanaa in less immediate danger from Royalists. As Hajj period in Saudi Arabia approaches (late February) there may be lull in military operations while both sides reassess and restock from outside. Remains be seen whether Royalists in near future able mount decisive offensive. Meanwhile, we continue question whether military solution feasible and will do what we can encourage efforts looking towards political settlement. Rusk 473. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/ /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Brewer, cleared by Battle in draft and by Irving G. Cheslaw (EUR/BMI), and approved by Davies. Repeated to Jidda, Tehran, Aden, Kuwait, and Dhahran. Washington, February 29, 1968, 1645Z. 122374. Jidda 2692./2/ /2/In telegram 2692 from Jidda, February 4, Eilts reported that the King had informed him that Communist interference in Yemen had nullified the Khartoum agreement and that he had therefore decided to resume arms aid to the royalists. (Ibid.) 1. Dept has been giving considerable thought to implications for Yemen civil war represented by Faisal's decision resume arms shipments to Royalists (reftel). As in past, our main concern re Yemen situation is whether opportunity may be provided by prolonged fighting for expansion and consolidation Soviet presence. While our own info admittedly incomplete, we continue to believe neither Republicans nor Royalists likely achieve decisive victory for some time. We accordingly continue hope renewed efforts can be made, perhaps through Arab Tripartite Committee with Saudi and UAR support, to move this problem to the political arena. While past conciliation efforts have aborted, we gather there still flicker of interest in such solution in certain Arab quarters. In our view, these flickers should be fanned, as this development would be likely reduce opportunities for expanded Soviet and radical Arab (e.g., Syrian) presence in Yemen. 2. FYI. While admittedly highly sensitive, we would appreciate any info you can develop re HMG policy toward Yemen civil war, now that UK out of PRSY and withdrawing from Gulf. We aware British in past extended some support to Royalists but unclear whether any tangible help continuing. We inclined to view that early resolution Yemen conflict should be overriding goal, but British in past have apparently thought differently. End FYI. 3. Embassy accordingly instructed approach FonOff informally and casually. You should note it has been some time since we compared notes on Yemen developments and express concern at implications protracted fighting might have for consolidation Soviet position. You may draw on substance para 1 above and inquire how British view situation now that they no longer present in Southern Arabia. We particularly interested in current British position on Yemen problem and how best they think Communist presence there can be reduced./3/ /3/In telegram 6998 from London, March 6, Ambassador Bruce reported that he discussed the Yemen situation with Assistant Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs Brenchley on March 5 and with Head of the Foreign Office Aden/Yemen Department McCarthy on March 6. Brenchley expressed the opinion that no military solution in Yemen was possible and argued that the civil war there was of no concern to British or U.S. interests; every foreign power that intervened in Yemen got bogged down in a morass of inter-tribal rivalries. McCarthy stated that even if they tried hard, which seemed unlikely in view of their December experience, the Soviets could not succeed where the Egyptians with 70,000 troops had failed. (Ibid.) Rusk 474. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State/1/ Rome, March 30, 1968, 1205Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Jidda, Aden, Kuwait, Tehran, London, and CINCSTRIKE. 5178. Summary. Following summarizes extended three hour session between YARG MinFin, ARP Country Director and EmbOff on civil war and future USG/YARG relations during which MinFin conveyed official message re restoration diplomatic ties and USG assistance vis-a-vis Saudis in resolving long-standing civil war. 1. YARG MinFin Ahmed Abdu Said arrived Rome for meeting with EmbOff in accordance arrangements earlier worked out here at YARG initiative. Already in London on other business, ARP Country Director Brewer participated in session at Italian FonMin March 29. Min Commerce Attar accompanied Said to Ministry but Said met alone with Brewer and EmbOff. 2. Burden Said's presentation, which he stressed specifically authorized by YARG Presidential Council, was two-fold: (a) USG should recognize YARG or at least take lesser step, such as assigning officer Italian Embassy Taiz, which would manifest USG interest in Yemen; and (b) USG should communicate to SAG YARG interest in mutual efforts to end civil war. 3. MinFin asserted top level YARG united in desiring progress on foregoing. Cos [sic] abd al-Wahhab, who MinFin claims supports cabinet, had heartily endorsed Said's mission, saying he himself prepared even "Go to Israel" if necessary end civil war. As MinFin described it, present republican leaders worried about radical threat from unnamed junior officers with either Baathist, ANM, or Communist sympathies, as well as concerned with growing radicalism in Aden. Faced with these pressures as well as royalist activities, YARG leadership fears radical influence in Yemen likely increase at their expense unless some YARG/SAG detente achieved. MinFin said continuation low level of fighting of last four weeks would ease situation but renewed heavy fighting would undercut YARG moderates and render almost impossible later peaceful solution. 4. As to message which YARG hopes we will convey SAG, MinFin said his government is inflexible on only one point--exclusion of Hamid al-Dins from Yemen. Leadership prepared consider compromises other points. When Brewer asked if this included "state of Yemen" formula and inclusion non-royal family royalists in cabinet, MinFin said all possibilities could be considered in context Saudi/Yemeni efforts end conflict. Problem was YARG did not know what Saudis desired, but feared worst. 5. MinFin then reviewed what he described as past efforts current regime improve contacts with SAG. Sallal had been dropped. In November-December YARG had been in contact with Saudis and elderly respected figure Mohammad al-Hijri (imamate ex-minister now on republican side) had "ticket bought" go Asmara in December as al-Amri rep to meet Saudi emissary. For reasons unclear YARG, Saudis had called off at last minute. YARG also had sent delegation Beirut meet tri-partite committee, though some officers had objected. YARG disappointed SAG "allowed" Hamid al-Din Prince head royalist delegation. YARG had also sent Attar to Kuwait to see if GOK could again be active but has heard nothing. 6. In reply, Brewer assured MinFin our basic friendly intentions Yemen people. We aware current leadership had been in Cairo jail not in power Sanaa when YARG broke relations with US. However regrettable, this had produced factual situation we had to recognize. We nevertheless always willing meet informally with senior YARG reps, such as Said, to discuss outstanding problems. YARG efforts in connection evacuation aircraft had been appreciated in Washington. MinFin interposed that YARG also recognized compensation due for damages US official and personal property. Brewer welcomed this assurance but noted continuation civil war situation created serious problem for US in considering any formal steps improve ties. We had no wish become involved on either side in internal dispute but did desire do whatever we could advance a settlement. 7. Re YARG efforts mentioned para 5 above, Brewer asked whether present cabinet had sought through such means get word to SAG that Hamid al-Din issue is only item on which regime not prepared consider compromise. MinFin replied he thought not. Brewer noted our influence vis-a-vis SAG is limited and indicated message might have more impact coming directly from YARG. He was confident Arabs could find means contact other Arabs directly if they wished. Perhaps neutral Yemenis in Beirut could help. MinFin said Nu'man and Pasha reluctant but Kuwaiti was coming SAG April 6 on FAO business and cabinet might send message back through him. 8. Brewer stressed necessity YARG recognizing that Saudi control over Hamid al-Din limited and SAG did have legitimate security concerns re Yemen developments. In Saudi view, royalists still lawful government. If YARG seriously interested in compromise, it no good simply calling publicly for meeting with SAG, as Saudis would have to reject this. Republicans should be more flexible in seeking quietly get their views across. YARG might regard SAG as threat but opposite also true. Saudi villages had in past been bombed by planes based Yemen and Yemeni infiltrators had caused trouble. Though in no position speak for SAG with whom we had not recently discussed this question, Brewer speculated that chief Saudi concern was to see their country not menaced by foreign forces operating from Yemeni soil. Replacement Egyptian by Soviet help to YARG thus hardly an improvement. 9. MinFin sought play down Soviet involvement, asserting only Russians now Yemen were mechanics needed service aircraft. He agreed YARG should itself continue seek ways bridging gap with SAG but asked that YARG views be conveyed Saudis by his old friend Ambassador Eilts. Brewer replied conversation would be reported fully and we would of course do whatever we could help resolve current impasse. Extent to which Ambassador Eilts might be in position communicate these views, would, however, depend on circumstances. Saudis might well discount another message through Americans. If YARG sincere, it should not expect others solve its problems but find way acting on its own behalf. 10. Said repeatedly pressed for assurance USG would at least agree assign officer to Italian Embassy Taiz. We gave him no encouragement, noting effective means contact already exist and possibility American official presence could be used by Yemeni extremists to set back prospects favorable evolution our relations. Said saw point but indicated he anxious take something concrete back to cabinet. 11. Comment: MinFin gave every evidence candor and friendliness throughout conversation. While no doubt disappointed not be able achieve more tangible results from single talk, we believe he does recognize USG wishes YARG moderates [well] and will so report. His pleas for continuation low level hostilities obviously self-interested but we feel this attitude stems more from concern at future republican moderates than out of alarm at royalist military capabilities and should thus not be taken as sign military weakness. His primary concern seemed to be for future Yemeni moderates like himself unless somehow a compromise with Saudis can be worked out. We believe MinFin grasped our primary message that further YARG efforts on own behalf to achieve compromise on civil war are needed before great progress on USG/YARG bilateral relations likely. We hope he will use this message prod his colleagues accordingly but believe, assuming Dept concurs, that Ambassador Eilts might be authorized pass substance foregoing to Saudis at level and in manner he deems appropriate. Should of course be stressed to Saudis that information arose in course one of our periodic informal discussions with YARG officials at their initiative on which we anxious Saudis be promptly and fully informed. Ackley 475. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia/1/ Washington, April 2, 1968, 0122Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Dinsmore and Brewer on April 1 and approved by Davies. Repeated to Aden, Kuwait, London, Rome, Tehran, and CINCSTRIKE. 140117. Rome 5178./2/ /2/Document 474. 1. Department concurs recommendation para 11 reftel that Ambassador Eilts be authorized convey to Saudis substance Brewer-Said meeting, in manner and at level he deems appropriate but without disclosing names or venue. Ambassador may wish stress meeting at Yemeni initiative another in series to discuss outstanding problems but that YARG emissary obviously instructed take advantage session to put forward official feeler re ending civil war. 2. While these Yemeni views not inconsistent with earlier similar expressions moderate YARG leaders, we are impressed by attitude compromise and particularly with what appears genuine desire republican moderates overcome rising threat from radical left. These YARG leaders seem regard any long continuation civil war as destined increase power to Yemeni radicals and cause loss control by present government. This connection, YARG's willingness permit return FLOSY leaders to Taiz bears witness to their reservations re PRSY developments. 3. Department continues want avoid direct USG role in Yemeni-Saudi question but desires keep SAG fully informed re periodic informal USG/YARG contacts. View indications Jidda 3408/3/ [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that Saudis ceasing aid to Royalists and have open mind about type government for Yemen, would appear that juxtaposition sentiments both sides provides opening for progress. We thus believe Saudis should be particularly interested this indication YARG views. /3/Telegram 3408 from Jidda, March 30, reported that, on the King's orders, Prince Sultan had informed royalist leaders that effective immediately all Saudi financial and material aid was being stopped until and unless royalist leaders united and showed that they could work together to find a solution to the Yemeni problem. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN) 4. In Rome meeting YARG was encouraged seek communicate its views to SAG via Arab intermediary or directly but unclear what YARG may do. If Saudis have means communicating directly (as reported abortive Asmara meeting last December suggests), chance arrange new direct contact might be well worth taking./4/ /4/In telegram 3550 from Jidda, April 9, the Ambassador reported that he had briefed Mas'ud on the recent U.S.-Yemeni exchange as instructed. (Ibid.) In telegram 3608 from Jidda, April 14, Eilts reported that he had discussed Yemen with Saqqaf, who said that the King did not believe that the Yemeni expression of interest in better relations had any meaning as long as the republicans continued to demand the exclusion of the Hamid al-Dins. (Ibid.) Katzenbach 476. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Italy/1/ Washington, May 20, 1968, 2213Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN. Confidential. Drafted by Dinsmore and Brewer, cleared by Rush W. Taylor, Jr. (EUR/AIS), and approved by Brewer. Repeated to Aden, Beirut, Jidda, and London. 167296. Jidda 4043./2/ /2/Dated May 18. (Ibid.) 1. Recent reports make clear that question of position Hamid al-Din family members, at least during next stage Yemen's political evolution, continues be key consideration at this point in any attempt reconcile views of YARG and Royalist moderates. 2. Recent exchanges between YARG representatives and Italians, between Ahmad Numan and Embassy Beirut, between Saudi Prince Sultan and Yemeni Royalists, and among Royalists before, during, and after their conference at Saada, suggest there may be opportunity during this period of regrouping and reassessment for low key approaches with both sides designed stimulate greater mutual flexibility. 3. Accordingly, to supplement approach reported Rome 6033/3/ and in interest trying move situation off dead center, Embassy should propose to FonOff that in our view it might prove useful if GOI were (a) to ask Ambassador Bernucci to encourage further thinking by al-Iryani or al-Amri of either some limited role for modest Hamid al-Din participation in government as Yemeni individuals or their possible acceptability in number diplomatic posts abroad; and (b) to suggest Ambassador Sabetta call Saudi attention to Iryani's recent comments (State 162566)/4/ and raise question SAG giving further thought to desirability continuing to insist on support whole family on basis its former royal status. /3/Dated May 19. (Ibid.) /4/Telegram 162566 to Jidda, May 11, informed the Embassy that the Italian Ambassador in Taiz had been summoned on May 6 by Republican Council President al-Iryani, who stated that his government's aim was to resist Soviet penetration and noted that it was now fighting on three fronts--against the royalists, against the PRSY extremists, and against internal subversion. Al-Iryani called for "enlightened intervention by Faisal to prevent an irreparable situation in Yemen." (Ibid.) 4. Embassy may tell GOI that we would be prepared support any such Sabetta approach, along lines suggested para four State 161441,/5/ if our two Ambassadors believed this useful./6/ /5/Paragraph 4 of telegram 161441 to Beirut, May 9, stated that if, as reported, there was a positive desire for compromise on the republican side, including the key question of the Hamid al-Dins, prospects for a negotiated political solution might be improved. (Ibid.) /6/Telegram 6088 from Rome, May 22, reported that an Embassy officer had reviewed the Department's telegram with Vice Director General of Political Affairs Perrone in the Italian Foreign Ministry, who agreed that the recent conversations mentioned provided some basis for a new approach to the Yemenis and the Saudis. He said that the Italian Ambassador in Yemen would be asked to sound out Yemeni leaders along the lines of paragraph 3. Perrone stressed that any new joint approach to the Saudis should await the results of this step; if the YARG leaders remained adamant on participation of royal family members, he doubted the utility of any effort in Jidda. (Ibid.) Rusk 477. Airgram From the Department of State to Certain Posts/1/ CA-8598 Washington, June 11, 1968, 9:28 a.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN. Confidential. Drafted by Dinsmore, cleared by J. Stapleton Roy (EUR/SOV) and William B. Dozier (EUR/AIS), and approved by Brewer. Sent to Addis Ababa, Aden, Asmara, Beirut, Jidda, Kuwait, London, Mogadiscio, Moscow, Rome, and Tehran. SUBJECT
Capsule View of Situation in Yemen In the course of a discussion with an Italian Embassy Officer June 5, Department officers made the following observations on the situation in Yemen: 1. A military solution of the Yemen problem is not possible. 2. The solution must be a peaceful one. 3. The United States will not take sides. 4. Both Republican and Royalist elements must compromise. 5. If no solution of Yemeni political differences is forthcoming, the effects on the Western position are unlikely to be serious unless a continuation of the civil war should stimulate the Soviet Union markedly to increase its own position in the country. 6. We have the impression that the Soviets have been less active in Yemen during the last several months. They may have learned that the Yemen Arab Republic Government will hardly be able to establish its control throughout the country even with major foreign help, and that the YAR is not representative enough to control the turbulent population. Moreover, Eastern Europe may be claiming the USSR's attention, giving Yemen a low rating in the Soviet scale of priorities at the present time. Rusk 478. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State/1/ Jidda, July 21, 1968, 1330Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL SAUD. Confidential; Limdis. 4831. 1. I paid call on King Faisal today to pay respects before departing on home leave. Told him while I knew his current view on Arab-Israel problem as he had outlined it during Ball-Sisco visit, I wondered if he might bring me up to date on his thinking on Yemen problem and his evaluation current Iraqi problem. 2. Yemen Faisal recalled we had in past frequently discussed Yemen question. He expressed his regret that there has been no real change. He said in somewhat general terms that Yemeni republicans have sought to contact SAG to suggest Saudi "mediation" with Yemen royalists. He had sent reply that SAG is not a party to Yemen dispute and that republicans should work out solution directly with royalists. He dismissed what he called republican idea of accepting a few royalists in cabinet as insufficient. What is needed is a new conference between republicans and royalists to agree on principles of a settlement. In this context, while SAG has no desire impose Hamid ad-Dins on Yemenis, Hamid ad-Dins are Yemenis and should have same right to determine future of Yemen as do others. 3. I asked if he sensed any sign of movement between republicans and royalists to compose their differences. He said he did not. Republicans are divided between leftists and Amri-Iryani elements, which he called more moderate. Royalists also divided, but he contended their fissures not so severe. He did not know whether Tripartite Committee still extant. It has never been formally disbanded, yet seems quite moribund. Yemeni republicans are receiving considerable aid from Soviets, Chinese, UAR and Syrians. When I asked about alleged UAR aid to Yemen, he insisted UAR is still giving active help to republicans. Hence, Saudis are continuing to give royalists some aid. They are not giving as much as royalists would like, but it is keeping royalists going. 4. I indicated responses USG has been giving to occasional republican overtures to resume diplomatic relations. He said he thought this was wise and expressed hope that USG will use any such approaches to urge republicans work for national reconciliation conference. I said we had already spoken along these lines to republicans. He also thought US should give tangible support to royalists. I told him this was not in the cards, and that I doubted any US aid would be available even for a united Yemen. [Here follows discussion of Iraq.] Eilts 479. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia/1/ Washington, October 3, 1968, 1509Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL SAUD-US. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Brewer on October 2; cleared by Deputy Director of the Office of UN Political Affairs William H. Gleysteen, Eliot, and Atherton; and approved by Davies. Repeated to Tehran and USUN. 249230. For Ambassador. 1. Following guidance provided in connection your prospective call on King Faisal. 2. Yemen. When you last discussed this issue with Faisal (Jidda 4831),/2/ he said he noted no sign of movement between Republicans and Royalists to compose their differences and commented, among other things, that Republicans were divided between leftists and more moderate Amri/Iryani group. Subsequent developments would appear have changed this picture. Recent "exile" 22 leftist officers to Algeria, reconstitution YARG cabinet and Amri/Iryani approach to Italians (State 245488/3/ and 248204,/4/ para 3) suggest situation may be somewhat improved. Saudi public statement Oct 2 on Yemen (Jidda 5504)/5/ would appear reflect this trend. Current Amri trip Moscow hardly reassuring, but you may note confidentially we understand that what YARG regards as SAG failure react positively to recent Yemen developments may have played part in timing Amri trip. Dept would be interested King's current assessment situation, particularly whether Imam's return Yemen likely foreshadow further fighting or real effort get Yemeni peace dialogue going which King and we both favor. You may add USG policy on non-resumption relations with YARG remains firm and we continuing do what little we can encourage parties establish meaningful contacts. This connection, you may wish probe for any evidence continuing quiet SAG/YARG contacts./6/ /2/Document 478. /3/Telegram 245488 to Jidda, September 26, reported that on September 22 Italian Ambassador to Yemen Bernucci met with Prime Minister al-Amri and YAR Republican Council Chairman Iryani, who told him that the Yemeni Government had now purged itself of extremists. They described this as a guarantee of its good intentions to work for improved relations with Saudi Arabia but warned that this was the "last act of moderation" that could be expected; if the Saudis did not respond, the present regime would be unable to resist for long Soviet pressure for the return of the extreme leftists to positions of influence. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN) /4/Telegram 248204 to Jidda, October 1, stated that it was unclear how the Yemeni desire for improved contacts with the Saudi Government had been communicated to the Saudis. (Ibid.) /5/Dated October 2. (Ibid.) /6/In telegram 5721 from Jidda, October 23, Eilts reported that he had discussed Yemen with Rashad Pharaon, who acknowledged that some YAR emissaries had been in touch with the Saudis. He said that the King had reiterated his long-held position that the Saudi Arabian Government was not a party to the dispute and that the republicans should meet with the royalists to work out a settlement. (Ibid.) [Here follows discussion of Arab-Israel and Persian Gulf issues.] Katzenbach 480. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State/1/ New York, October 16, 1968, 0107Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret. Repeated to Aden, Rome, Jidda, and London. 7118. Yemen Problem. 1. During visit New York Oct 15, ARP Country Director Brewer had opportunity for informal exchange views on Yemen problem with new YARG FonMin Jaghman who accompanied by incoming YARG UN PermRep Mohammad Said Attar and outgoing PermRep Muhsin al-Ayni (whose future assignment not revealed). FonMin began by expressing hope YARG/USG relations might soon be normalized, stating this one of his real goals as FonMin. Brewer responded we continued recognize the republic as state; that we remained prepared do what we could assist parties work out some settlement to long-standing civil war; but that question resumption relations premature as long as civil war continued, since for USG act affirmatively would be form of intervention in Yemen's internal affairs. 2. Jaghman then expressed concern at what he said was recent USG action in notifying some ten Yemeni students here that their grants being terminated. Jaghman felt this unworthy pinprick by great nation. Brewer responded major factor was simply that Dept funds for purpose had been severely cut. Given this financial problem, it would have been exceedingly difficult justify renewal grants with state with which USG has no diplomatic relations. Jaghman argued some cuts understandable but elimination program hard to accept. Brewer said would look into but frankly thought nothing could be done. 3. FonMin noted recent USG announcement re supersonics for Israel and said had asked Somalis, who represent Yemeni interests Washington, protest on YARG behalf. He felt our action would only make Israel more intransigent. Brewer took established line, noting coming negotiations would take time and that it could be argued USG move actually strengthened Israeli "doves" rather than contrary, providing reassurance on all-important security question. 4. After general discussion, FonMin took Brewer aside for further review Yemen problem. Jaghman said he had hoped as FonMin be able work out some compromise. He agreed with Brewer comment that all parties seemed recognize no military solution feasible. In response question, Jaghman agreed YARG might be willing consider acceptance one or two Hamid al-Din Princes as Ambassadors abroad and said SAG could be so informed. Brewer asked whether there some flexibility along lines "state of Yemen" concept. Jaghman said not, that regime had had trouble in August from leftists who had felt YARG had already gone too far, and that no compromise on "republic" was feasible. FonMin continued that "key is in Saudi hands", asserting SAG had sent Imam Badr back into Yemen to put pressure on YARG. Brewer queried this conclusion, opining Saudis also favor settlement. Jaghman said he thought they did but that questions Hamid al-Din (except as noted above) and status "republic" not negotiable. He agreed that this made further fighting most likely prospect but said YARG always willing come to understanding with SAG. Brewer encouraged FonMin seek develop direct contacts with Saudis in effort work out some compromise between two peninsular neighbors who must learn live together. 5. Comment: Opportunity frank exchange views with new YARG FonMin useful even though Jaghman revealed no significant give from past YARG positions. He planning return Yemen in about ten days. Wiggins | 
