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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXI Near East Region Department of State |
 434. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State/1/ Jidda, April 12, 1967, 1152Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated Priority to Cairo. 4220. State 170451/2/ and 170460./3/ Yemen Mediation. /2/Document 433. /3/See footnote 2, Document 433. 1. Two hour struggle session with King Faisal last night, at which Rashad Pharaon also present, produced somewhat inconclusive results. In summary: (a) Faisal still agrees in principle go ahead; (b) generally accepts terms of reference (TR), but was persuaded by Rashad seek some emendation; (c) generally accepted our interpretations of his qualifications re removing UAR influence from Yemen and possible USG aid to UAR and (d) utterly refused commit himself to stopping aid to Yemeni royalists during conciliation period. In order give flavor debate, and perhaps a fuller appreciation of King's views, following reports pertinent talk in some detail: 2. I first presented TR amended to delete word "aggressive" from paras 2 and 3 per State 171462./4/ These were read to him in Arabic translation prepared by EmbOff. In doing so I noted TR deliberately left general to give special representative maximum latitude in carrying out his functions. These same TR being simultaneously presented to President Nasser through FonMin Riad. I knew of no reaction as yet from UAR, but we hopeful both SAG and UAR will accept them. If they do, Amb Hare prepared promptly visit both countries to begin his consultations. /4/See footnote 3, Document 433. 3. I then took up Faisal's various "qualifications": A. In connection with essential acceptance of proposition that aggressive acts against each other should be suspended during conciliation, I stressed Saudis should agree suspend further support to royalists other than food. Added that Yemeni royalists should also continue to be restrained from resuming hostilities. On its part, UAR being asked cease bombings and support for harassment acts inside Saudi Arabia. This would at least insure standoff between principal antagonists and allow special representative see what he can from both sides should also tone down provocative propaganda. Noted that while we cannot vouch for Nasser's genuine interest in reaching settlement, we heartened by his acceptance US conciliation and his suggestion of Amb Hare as mediator; conversely, we convinced he prepared keep troops in Yemen as long as necessary. In such situation, resumption Yemeni royalist hostilities likely delay rather than accelerate any prospects UAR military withdrawal. More important, they expose Saudi Arabia to retaliation. TR drafted to be consistent with obligations which both parties have already undertaken in international instrument such as UN and Arab League Charters. B. Re Faisal's qualification that all vestiges UAR influence in Yemen be removed, I said we interpreted this to mean withdrawal UAR military forces. In these terms, this consistent with Secretary's statement to King at Blair House and has always been USG aim. Neither we nor Saudis nor anyone else could hope to remove every vestige UAR influence in Yemen or anywhere else in ARP world. As largest Arab state, UAR bound to have influence in this part of the world. C. On subject USG aid to UAR, I said was sure he not attempting place conditions on our bilateral relationships with UAR which we seeking improve if ways can be found to do so. Although food not a factor in current USG-UAR relationships, we could conceive situation where some USG help to UAR would be of benefit to us and SAF in moving toward an eventual Yemen settlement. However, assured Faisal USG has no intention undertaking any special programs with UAR that would prejudice conciliation effort. D. As footnote, and having in mind question he had voiced during previous audience, I explained to him how Amb Hare's name had surfaced. Had earlier mentioned this to Rashad, but I wanted to be sure King got straight story from me. 4. After listening very carefully, Faisal commented as follows: Saudi policy has been and continues be seek peaceful settlement of Yemen problem. In this context King welcomes renewed USG conciliation effort. Qualifications he had set at previous meeting not intended obstruct this, but to reflect realistically his doubts about Nasser's intentions. They are based on his past experience with Nasser: A. Taking these qualifications individually, he stated had no right or intention to tell USG what to do or what not to do in its bilateral relations with UAR. In spirit of frankness he had merely wished give us friendly advice. Once before Nasser had been cooperative up to point when he assured of USG food aid, then dropped any interest in Yemen settlement. As result, USG had found itself with food commitment which was in fact aiding, directly or indirectly, Nasser's foreign adventures. If any USG help is to be given to UAR once UAR military out of Yemen, he could have no objection. He fully satisfied with USG assurance no help would be given UAR which would prejudice conciliation effort. B. He agreed reference to every vestige UAR influence in Yemen being removed should be viewed primarily as withdrawal all military forces. All other aspects of possible residual UAR influence could either be negotiated or be left to Yemenis to decide so long as they able make free decision. They unable do so when coerced by massive UAR military presence. SAG has no permanent interest in Yemen, and he perfectly willing take his chances in context friendly and peaceful competition in a free Yemen. C. Faisal absolutely adamant in his unwillingness commit himself to any particular actions or restraints re Saudi aid to Yemeni royalists while mediation going on. While he was evasive on whether arms aid actually resumed, he reiterated would have to give arms aid if Yemeni royalists ask for it. Only condition on which he would again restrict his aid to Yemeni royalists and/or actively restrain them would be as part of agreement whereby UAR withdraws its military forces from Yemen. Fighting, he claimed, has never ceased in Yemen. Despite his efforts restrain Yemeni royalists during past year, UAR bombings of north Yemeni villages had continued without let-up. They still going on. He had first agreed Yemeni royalists should only defend themselves, but they have no defense against air and gas attacks. If they now retaliating more directly, this entirely up to them to decide and he not in position stop them. Insisted he is not actively encouraging Yemeni royalists, but could not accept equating his aid to royalists with what UAR is doing in Yemen. Although SAG recognizes Yemeni royalist govt, there are no Saudi soldiers in Yemen. This is in marked contrast massive UAR military presence. If because of Saudi aid to Yemeni royalists Nasser attacks Saudi Arabia, this makes no difference. He has already attacked Saudi Arabia when Saudi aid to Yemeni royalists still suspended. "We are not afraid of his attacks; all we can do is die defending our country." We rehashed this one again and again, but he would not budge. D. He dismissed UAR propaganda as unimportant. In answer my suggestion mutual toning down of hostile propaganda would be a helpful indicator that both sides willing improve relations, he agreed. Insisted, however, that Saudi propaganda activities hardly comparable with those of UAR. Saudi public media had not deliberately attacked Nasser. Neither had he in his speeches which he hoped USG has noted have in tone been conciliatory and in marked contrast to Nasser's public utterances. Should Saudi Arabia, he wanted to know, be expected restrain its public media from stressing Islam as defense against godless communism? Or should Saudi public media be stopped from stating Saudi aversion to socialism? UAR has several times objected to articles critical of socialism. I said did not wish at this point get into details what respective parties ought to do to improve relations. This matter for special representative. However, I reminded him that SAG already has good relations with various countries that are in one way or another socialist. I had also read articles in Saudi press in which banner of Islam and anti-communism had clearly been waved as direct attacks on UAR. I doubted anyone would wish restrict constructive public media efforts. When they become instruments of attack on others, they breed distrust and ill will. In frankness I had to tell him Saudi public media sometimes also deserves share of blame. He agreed, but again insisted no comparison between what Saudis and UAR doing against each other in propaganda field. Added SAG willing stop direct attacks on UAR. 5. I then told him did not know whether USG would feel able carry on if other than food aid for Yemeni royalists is resumed, but nevertheless wanted to know more specifically his reaction to TR. He first said TR so general as to have little meaning. We could do without them: he did not wish at this time commit SAG to any "undertakings," but quickly added that this should not be construed as Saudi disinterest in proposed USG conciliation effort. "Let it proceed and we will see what happens." I pointed out both he and President Nasser had asked to see TR which, as result, now being presented to both. Speaking personally, I thought Faisal unwilling at this time accept broad undertakings of cooperating with special representative or refraining from prejudicial acts or hostile propaganda against UAR or UAR forces, there was little use in sending a special representative. There nothing in or inconsistent with SAG's undertakings elsewhere. USG not offering its good offices again because of any keen interest in involving ourselves in Yemen problem. We doing so solely and reluctantly in order help friends like Saudi Arabia and try to keep peace in area. I had always understood latter is also what King wants. TR, while general, are at least a further expression of willingness both sides again look for peaceful solution and offer broad parameters in which special representative might work. While I appreciated his point, I did not see how in these circumstances I could recommend to my govt that we go ahead. Moreover, if UAR accepts undertakings in TR and SAG is unwilling do so, I wanted to tell him as friend he will be in poor position posturally. Onus for continued impasse will then be largely on him. He thought about this for a moment. Then, with a great gesture of his hand, he said somewhat wearily, "All right, I accept the undertakings in their terms of reference." 6. At this point Rashad, who had sat by quietly during most of talk, intervened. (While King had not himself read TR and contented himself with hearing them, Rashad had been studying them closely.) Rashad argued inclusion of phrase "or UAR forces" in second sentence of SAG's undertakings is redundant. Moreover, it implies SAG has in past acted against UAR forces. He referred to King's earlier statement no Saudi troops in Yemen. He suggested this phrase be deleted. Faisal agreed. I said did not think this would be possible. TR had been written identically not to suggest that both sides had done the same things, but to avoid implication USG attempting prejudge issue. TR presented to SAG and UAR should remain identical. King accepted this. 7. Returning to charge, Rashad then argued both texts be changed to read "During the conciliation period, to refrain from aggressive acts or hostile propaganda against Saudi Arabia (the UAR) which would prejudice the conciliation effort." (This reinserts "aggressive" and deletes "or UAR forces.") The UAR, he insisted, has carried on aggressive acts against Saudi Arabia such as recent bombings on Najran. This should not be obscured by bland reference to "acts." He thought his proposal placed into clearer focus obligations both SAG and UAR would undertake. I argued this a distinction without meaning. Our phraseology already encompassed that idea. Moreover, in terms his earlier concern about inference Saudi Arabia had acted against UAR forces, Rashad's proposed change could be inferred to suggest Saudi Arabia had in fact carried on past aggression against UAR. Finally, these TR already presented to UAR and Saudi nit-picking at this time hardly helpful in getting effort underway soon. Unfortunately, King agreed Rashad's proposed terminology preferable and would like it substituted for ours. I again pointed out to him that language Rashad proposed and that he now requesting could probably more easily be used against him in connection with his support for Yemeni royalists. He said wearily, "I suppose so, but they will do that anyway." He concluded that SAG will accept TR if aforementioned change is made and if UAR also accepts them as amended. 8. Session frank but cordial throughout. Comments by immediately following telegram./5/ /5/In telegram 4221 from Jidda, April 12, Eilts commented that the King's reaction to the terms of reference was disappointing, even if not entirely unexpected, and that most disturbing was Faisal's unwillingness to commit himself to stopping aid to the Yemen royalists during the conciliation period. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN) Eilts
435. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State/1/ Cairo, April 24, 1967, 1357Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Jidda. 6665. 1. In view possible effects yesterday's unleashing in Yemen of ex-King Saud/2/ could have on our mediation effort, I asked for appointment and was received by Under Secretary El Feki this morning. /2/On April 23 former King Saud arrived in Sanaa from Cairo aboard a UAR plane with UAR Vice President Amer and was given full military honors before assembled ministers, diplomats, and high-ranking Yemeni Government officials. Radio Sanaa subsequently broadcast speeches by Yemeni President Sallal and Saud in which Sallal referred to Saud as the "legal king of the Saudi people"; while Saud announced that, on behalf of the Saudi people, he fully recognized the Yemen Arab Republic and President Sallal. (Telegrams 442 and 444 from Sanaa, April 23, ibid., POL 7 SAUD) Telegram 180743 to Sanaa, April 23, instructed the Charge and other Embassy officers not to attend any official functions specifically honoring former King Saud. (Ibid.) 2. Referring to my meeting with Foreign Minister Riad on April 8 I said that more than two weeks had now passed and that I was naturally interested in UARG's reaction to our proposed terms of reference. I said that our Ambassador in Jidda had discussed these draft terms of reference with King Feisal on April 11 and that we would consult both parties again as soon as we heard from UARG. El Feki asked whether we had received Saudi reaction during our April 11 meeting and I said that we had but that in order to maintain strict impartiality it would not of course be possible to discuss King Feisal's views until those of Pres Nasser were also known. 3. As he had during informal corner conversation with me during the Danish Amb's reception of Apr 18, El Feki again indicated obliquely that UARG was aware in part at least of King Feisal's views. 4. In this connection I would appreciate learning what, if anything, Amb Kamel has been told in Washington. We have held on to this very tightly here. 5. Amb El Feki said he was sorry that he could only say our proposed terms of reference were still under consideration and assure me that he would get in touch immediately when he had something to say. I closed conversation on this subject by saying we wished to get to work as soon as possible. I asked whether he thought King Saud's Yemen trip would be harmful to our mediation effort. He said emphatically that it would not insofar as his govt was concerned. We left the matter there. Nes
436. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/ Washington, April 25, 1967, 5:54 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Bergus, cleared by Brewer, and approved by Battle. Repeated to Jidda. 181932. Ref: Cairo's 6665,/2/ Jidda's 4389./3/ Yemen Mediation. /2/Document 435. /3/In telegram 4389 from Jidda, April 25, Eilts commented that the United Arab Republic action in taking Saud to Yemen was obviously a deliberate slap at Faisal. He noted that some Saudis might ask if, assuming the U.S. mediation effort was already formally underway, this kind of blatant UAR action would be regarded under U.S.-drafted terms of reference as reason for the mediator to terminate his effort. Nor was the long delay in the UAR response likely to be helpful in persuading Faisal that Nasser genuinely wanted U.S. mediation. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN) 1. View unhelpful and dilatory nature el-Feki's response to Nes approach and unsettling effect of GUAR-sponsored trip of ex-King Saud to Yemen, we believe Charge should seek earliest opportunity make following points to UAR Fonmin Riad: a) Offer of USG to assist in mediatory role in UAR-SAG dispute over Yemen, made by Ambassador Battle in his farewell call on President Nasser, was based on a desire to help parties directly concerned avoid what could be an increasingly dangerous situation. We believed then as we believe now that USG could not hope to be of any assistance unless both Saudi Arabia and UAR voluntarily and wholeheartedly accepted our offer of assistance and were prepared to work with us. b) We were therefore heartened by GUAR's preliminary and affirmative response to our offer. Matter has subsequently been followed with interest at high levels USG. c) Identical terms of reference were delivered both to SAG and GUAR over two weeks ago. King Feisal immediately gave us his initial reaction to these terms of reference. Fonmin will understand why it would be inappropriate for us to discuss details of SAG response with GUAR at this time. Proper procedure is for USG to await substantive response of GUAR to terms of reference after which it can make another simultaneous approach to both capitals. d) We are concerned at delay in GUAR response to US draft terms of reference. Document is brief, simple, contains no hidden meanings, and requires parties to assume no obligations beyond those already incumbent upon them through various multilateral undertakings such as UN and Arab League charters. We believe that 17 days which have elapsed since April 8 have been ample for GUAR to prepare a position on terms of reference. e) Our concern is heightened by recent surfacing of ex-King Saud in Yemen. Though it was Sallal rather than GUAR leaders who hailed Saud as "legal King of Saudi people," we do not wish to get into such legal niceties. Fact remains Saud was taken to Yemen in official GUAR airplane and in company of some of highest Egyptian officials. SAG has not complained to us about this behavior on part GUAR. Nor does USG propose insert itself into legal or political effects of this incident on UAR-SAG relations. We are, however, concerned at its effect on prospects for our own mediation proposal. Actions such as this make it more difficult for USG to be helpful. f) USG has felt throughout that without some degree of cooperation and responsiveness from both parties, there would be little point in pressing mediation effort. We have no desire allow ourselves into situation in absence desire of both sides to work with us. g) We would appreciate the GUAR's considered views on these matters. 2. FYI re para 4, Cairo's 6665. Ambassador Kamel has been informed by Cairo of US offer and UAR acceptance of US mediation. He has been told by us that terms of reference have been delivered both in Cairo and in Jidda. In response to his questions re Feisal's reaction he has been given line contained in State's 173904,/4/ i.e. it would be inappropriate for USG to discuss SAG response until GUAR responds and USG can make simultaneous approach to both capitals. Kamel has accepted this as proper diplomatic procedure and has not pressed for details. End FYI./5/ /4/Dated April 12. (Ibid.) /5/Telegram 182453 to Cairo, April 26, informed the Embassy that the Department was not impressed with el-Feki's explanation that the UAR response to the U.S. terms of reference was being held up pending a meeting of the Supreme Executive, noting that this small group was composed of individuals in daily contact with Nasser. It expressed concern lest the United Arab Republic have the impression it could keep the United States on a string while it acted as it saw fit in Yemen. (Ibid.) Katzenbach
437. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/ Washington, April 26, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Yemen, Cables & Memos, Vol. II, 7/64-12/68. Confidential. Our Embassy office and AID Mission in Taiz were ransacked today by a Yemeni crowd. This followed the arrest of a Bureau of Public Roads official earlier in the day./2/ /2/Documentation on this incident is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-8 YEMEN and POL US-YEMEN. We have lodged all the usual protests and have approached both the Egyptian and Yemeni governments to insist they guarantee the safety of our people there. Fortunately, no one has been hurt. It will be a day or two before responsibility is clear enough for us to decide how we should play this--whether we should blame the Egyptians for it, pull out our road-building project, withdraw our Charge, or close out entirely. No one is inclined toward the more radical steps at the moment, but our decision may depend on what happens next. Hal
438. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State/1/ Cairo, April 27, 1967, 1420Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Jidda. 6805. Ref: State 182453./2/ /2/See footnote 5, Document 436. 1. Foreign Minister Riad received me this morning and as instructed I confronted him with Department's comments on current status our mediation effort as set forth paragraphs A through G State 181932./3/ /3/Document 436. 2. After introductory remarks to effect Washington found it difficult to understand long delay in receiving UARG reaction to our proposed terms of reference [garble] points verbatim adding to point F that we would back out of the exercise now if this is in fact the wish of the GUAR. 3. Foreign Minister Riad pondered my presentation for several minutes and then said that his government had appreciated very much our readiness to be helpful and to mediate their differences with Saudi Arabia. 4. It was fully realized that all sides must cooperate fully and frankly in such an endeavor and that the atmosphere must be propitious and optimistic. 5. Our proposed terms of reference had embraced obligations on all three parties which might require further clarification. His own personal feeling was that our draft was too short and too vague. In any event it required study and while no changes might be called for, some clarification might be sought. This study was now in process and must of necessity involve the top command of the UAR. 6. Riad said he would contact me immediately when views of Supreme Executive Committee were known. In this connection he mentioned in passing that President Nasser intended to take ten days rest from his official duties and this might involve further delay. 7. Referring to my reference to ex-King Saud under point E he smilingly said that at time when King Feisal was treating and referring to Badr as "King of Yemen" he could hardly complain about UAR references to Saud as King of Saudi Arabia. There did not seem to be much purpose in pursuing this subject. 8. Comment: It is quite evident that Foreign Minister Riad supports idea of our mediating Yemen embroglio and probably sees in it means of improving US-UAR relations in general. I find it difficult to predict exactly what decision of committee will be or when we will receive it but I strongly recommend we play this out to end as to withdraw our offer now would only magnify our problems which seem to be sufficiently difficult as they are. Nes
439. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and Director of Central Intelligence Helms/1/ Washington, April 27, 1967, 8:30 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Rusk Telephone Conversations, Box 928. No classification marking. Transcribed by Jane M. Rothe. TELEPHONE CALL TO MR. RICHARD HELMS H. returned the call. Sec. asked if H. had been getting any reporting out of Yemen in the last few days. H. said yes--quite a bit. Sec. said the Yemeni have just put out a long statement expelling our AID Mission, etc. Sec. asked if H. knew anything about any of this, and if there was any possibility that any of our people are mixed up in this in any way. H. said these accusations have been going on for 48 hours--they have been interrogating these fellows with American witnesses. H's fellows are predicting a collapse of the Mission as they are making quite a case against them. H. said there was no espionage and nothing sinister going on--[1 line of source text not declassified]. They sacked the Embassy yesterday. H. said they feel it is quite clearly a political move against the United States. Sec. thanked him.
440. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, April 27, 1967, 10:45 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 26. No classification marking. An "L" on the memorandum indicates that the President read it. Mr. President: I have been in touch with Luke Battle. Two Americans at the USAID mission in Yemen have been accused of blowing up the Capital. We are evacuating the AID mission, and only leaving a minimal staff. We have been in touch with the Yemen and U.A.R. ambassadors here. Since they have announced publicly, it's unlikely they will reverse their announced decision about our two men. The background is that in both Cairo and Yemen, there have been some groups who have wanted to either keep the US connection, or get rid of it. The latter appear to have won. We shall be announcing tomorrow that the charges are without foundation--which they are. Both State and I will follow closely. WWR/2/ /2/Printed from a copy that indicates the original was initialed.
441. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts/1/ /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL US-YEMEN. Confidential. Drafted by Korn; cleared by NEA Staff Assistant Michael A.G. Michaud, Country Director for Ethiopia, Somali Republic, and Sudan Matthew J. Looram, Bergus, and Robert H. Flenner (EUR/SOV); and approved by Brewer. Sent to Addis Ababa, Amman, Asmara, Bonn, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, Kuwait, London, Moscow, Paris, Tehran, Tel Aviv, Rome, Aden, and Dhahran. Washington, April 28, 1967, 6:07 p.m. 184507. 1. Following is background current crisis US-Yemen relations for addressee's information and use with diplomatic colleagues and host government officials as appropriate. 2. Mob violence April 26 against US Embassy Branch Office and AID compound Taiz apparently sparked by shooting and explosions of undetermined origin evening April 25. Yemeni and UAR security authorities entered AID "campsite" compound shortly thereafter and took into custody for questioning seven American AID employees including AID Director. Director and four others were subsequently released. Gradually became clear local UAR and Yemen authorities were alleging that two remaining personnel, Stephen Liapis and Harold Hartman, were responsible for a bazooka attack on ammunition dump Taiz in which a UAR soldier and a Yemeni were reportedly killed. 3. Mob shouting "No Americans after today" paraded through streets Taiz morning April 26. Crowd estimated at 3000 and carrying coffin gathered in front of compound and broke in, overturning vehicles and destroying furniture, plumbing and other official and personal effects. Although UAR military camera man was reportedly with mob, appears adequate Yemeni security contingent may not have been provided until after considerable destruction accomplished. Yemeni security forces were subsequently stationed in front of compound. Demonstration renewed April 27, but compound not subsequently attacked. 4. On learning of demonstration and arrests, Department summoned Yemeni Ambassador Washington to protest incident, request official apology, YARG agreement in principle make full repayment for damage, and ask immediate release detained American official personnel. Charge Sanaa was instructed make parallel dmarche. Representations were also made in Cairo and to UAR Ambassador Washington to request UARG assistance in securing release detained American personnel. 5. Despite initial hope more moderate elements might be willing to give us forthcoming response, we now forced conclude that Taiz riots and detentions AID personnel probably instigated by local UAR officials with support pro-UAR YARG elements, notably Minister Interior Ahnumi. Following facts point in this direction: (a) Equivocal initial response made by Vice Premier Juzaylan to Sanaa Charge's first representation; (b) the ridiculous charges of "murder" and attempt to "blow up all of Taiz" brought against Liapis and Hartman, who are holders of U.S. official passports and considered by USG to have diplomatic status; (c) trumped-up Cairo press campaign including false report that USG gave YARG a "24-hour ultimatum"; (d) YARG unilateral termination US-Yemeni foreign assistance agreement. (We were first informed of this step by Sanaa radio broadcast, official notification having been given our Charge subsequently.) 6. As a result YARG actions, USAID Mission Yemen being withdrawn. Arrangements being made immediately evacuate all dependents and all except key Embassy personnel. As retaliatory measure for restrictions placed on our personnel Taiz, Department has confined Yemeni Ambassador here to Washington area until further notice, subject to Department approval for travel outside Washington. Future US-Yemen relations still uncertain, but we are making it clear that we expect immediate release two detained Americans. Rusk
442. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/ Washington, April 28, 1967, 7:16 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL US-YEMEN. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Bergus, cleared by Brewer and Battle, and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Taiz and Sanaa. 184712. Deliver following soonest to FonMin Riad from Secretary. 1. "Dear Mr. Minister: Over the last two days we have expressed to your Government through regular diplomatic channels our mounting concern at developments in Yemen. We have requested the United Arab Republic to use its influence with the Yemen Arab Republic to the end that American officials presently unjustly detained in Ta'izz be released and that they and those of their colleagues who are being withdrawn from Yemen be permitted to depart in dignity and safety. To these official communications I would like to add this note of personal concern. 2. I would not be frank if I did not make it clear that the events in Ta'izz and actions by Yemen government officials have significantly and adversely affected American public opinion. The fact that some United Arab Republic officials, particularly in the Ta'izz area, are participating in these events is public knowledge here. Tendentious and distorted accounts appearing in the Cairo press and over UAR radio are also widely known. All this can only prejudice and limit any efforts which either of us would hope to make to improve relations between our two countries. The improvement of these relations remains the goal of my Government as well as myself. 3. I have carefully examined the charges against certain of our American personnel in Ta'izz in the light of all the evidence at my disposal. I am convinced that these charges are absolutely without foundation. Nor have our representatives in Yemen delivered any "ultimatum" or threatened to withdraw United States recognition from the Yemen Arab Republic as press has reported. 4. We are in the midst of a very difficult and highly tense situation. I believe it in the interest of both our Governments that measures tending to calm matters down be taken as soon as possible. The constructive influence which you and your Government could exercise at this juncture is a very important element in the situation. 5. With personal regards. Sincerely yours, Dean Rusk."/2/ /2/In telegram 6895 from Cairo, April 29, Nes reported that at noon that day he had delivered the Secretary's letter to Foreign Minister Riad, who said he had no comment. (Ibid.) Rusk
443. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State/1/ Cairo, April 30, 1967, 1628Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL US-YEMEN. Secret; Limdis. 6945. Ref: Cairo 6944./2/ /2/In telegram 6944 from Cairo, April 30, Nes reported that he had met with Riad who gave him Field Marshal Amer's reply to the Secretary's message. Riad said Amer also wished to convey an oral message to the Secretary that a "quieter situation" would assist the United Arab Republic in its efforts with the Yemeni Government to stop the trial. If those efforts were successful, the next UAR step would be to obtain the release of the two Americans. Riad indicated that the "quieter situation" Amer was referring to involved lifting restrictions on the Yemeni Ambassador in Washington. Nes strongly recommended that this be done, noting that most of the Americans in Yemen had been evacuated and that equivalent restrictions were not yet placed on the U.S. Charge in Sanaa. (Ibid.) On April 27 the Department had notified the Yemeni Ambassador that he and his staff were restricted to the Washington area until further notice. (Telegram 183980 to Sanaa, April 28; ibid., POL 17 YEMEN-US) 1. Following is text of unofficial translation of message from Field Marshal Amer addressed to Secretary: 2. I have received your message of April 29th 1967/3/ on the developments related to the attack which took place in Taiz, Yemen Arab Republic which led to the present tense situation between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Yemen Arab Republic. /3/See Document 442. 3. Notwithstanding the fact that the matter falls within the Yemen-U.S. relations, the U.A.R. Government has maintained a very close watch over its development. We have equally received your representatives and engaged with them in a frank and sincere discussion, with a view to avoiding any further deterioration in the situation. 4. I wish, however, to state some observations related to the April 25th attack and its consequent developments; --On the night of April 25 bazooka shots were fired at an army ammunition depot in Taiz, resulting in the death of a Yemeni soldier and another from the United Arab Republic forces. Two other soldiers were gravely injured. This is no doubt a highly serious matter. --The Yemeni authorities have carried out an investigation, which required the arrest of two United States citizens. They have been interrogated in the presence of the United States Consul in Taiz. The investigation has proceeded in accordance with the general norms and practice which insure its objectivity. --I have been informed by the Yemeni Government that they have evidence which proves the implication of the two detained Americans. --Despite the gravity of the events and the loss of lives, the Yemeni authorities, as well as U.A.R. authorities have maintained self-restraint. --In the course of his meeting with the Deputy Prime Minister of the Yemen Arab Republic, the United States Charge d'Affaires orally threatened that the United States would withdraw its recognition of the Yemeni Government if the latter does not respond to the United States protest within twenty-four hours. The attitude of the United States Charge d'Affaires has undoubtedly left serious effects with the Yemeni Government and resulted in the deterioration of the situation. --On our part, I instructed the commander of the U.A.R. forces in Yemen to provide their assistance with a view to insuring the safety of the United States citizens and to cooperate in securing the withdrawal of those American citizens who wish to depart. --I wish to add that we shall exert our efforts to lessen tension in the present situation and to bring it to normalcy./4/ /4/Telegram 185098 to Cairo, April 30, reported that the Department informed UAR Ambassador Kamel that the Department had received Amer's message and had particularly noted his expressed interest in lowering tension between their two governments. The U.S. Government was also interested in lowering tension and, as a result of the orderly progress in evacuation of Americans from Yemen, it had lifted restrictions on the Yemeni Ambassador in Washington. (Ibid., POL US-YEMEN) Nes
444. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/ Washington, May 4, 1967, 9:40 a.m. /1/Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Roger Channel Telegrams, Cairo. Secret; Flash; Roger Channel. Drafted by Bergus; cleared by Battle, Walter W. Harris, Jr. (NEA), and James R. Gardner (INR/DDC); and approved by William McAfee of INR/DDC. 187506. 1. After consultation with Nes, Brommell should approach Saleh Nasser and pass following message. We leave to discretion Nes and Brommel exact phrasing of message so that most effective presentation can be achieved. 2. Begin message: "Saleh Nasser's assurances that Liapis and Hartman would be released have been reported to Washington. These assurances well received as men are innocent and enjoy diplomatic immunity./2/ However there is another very serious problem. /2/A May 10 memorandum from Rostow to Johnson informed the President that the UAR Foreign Minister promised that the two U.S. AID men in Yemen would be out of jail by May 15, and noted that the United States had evacuated all but a skeleton crew from Yemen. Rostow commented: "We don't think Nasser staged the incident in Yemen to get us out. However, once Egyptian mishandling on the scene created an opening, Cairo gave vent to its emotions and played it out for its full propaganda and intelligence advantage." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. V) Rostow's memorandum is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XVIII, Document 417. The two Americans were released on May 17. 3. USG officials have been denied access to AID buildings Ta'iz for more than one week. While denial access has been in name YARG authorities, inescapable fact is AID building under effective control of UAR military authorities. Our people in Yemen have clearly observed that guard detachment comprised of UAR military police commanded by UAR officer. 4. AID building in Yemen was considered by us as part of our diplomatic mission to that country and was treated as such. Consequently it contains archives and other US diplomatic papers. We frankly concerned that UAR authorities may seek to exploit this situation and attempt major penetration US interests. 5. We wish to make it clear that any attempt at penetration will raise serious doubt as to intentions and motives of UAR. 6. If the UAR believes it in its own interest to avoid such a situation, it should at once facilitate arrangements whereby the property and archives of the United States can be returned, uncompromised, to safekeeping by authorized representatives of the United States." Rusk
The President's Daily Brief for May 16, 1967, includes Item 6, "Egypt" which reads as follows: [1 paragraph (5 lines of source text) not declassified] (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History, Middle East Crisis, Vol. 6, Appendix A)
446. Memorandum From [name deleted] to the Chief of the Near East and South Asia Division in the Central Intelligence Agency Deputy Directorate of Operations (Critchfield)/1/ Washington, May 19, 1967. /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/NE (Critchfield) Files: Job 80-00105A, Box 2, IRG/NEA Working File, Communist Presence, UAR/South Arabia. Secret. SUBJECT /2/See Document 95. 1. The following suggestions are for your consideration in preparation for IRG meeting on South Arabia: a. Most eyes in area are on our behavior toward the Egyptians. We will look foolish if we break relations with Yemen without going rather far down the list of what we can do to retaliate against Egypt. As a minimum we should use the vulnerability of our AID mission in Cairo under present agreements to insist on a clear statement of diplomatic immunity for its members or cut it back drastically--and preferably eliminate it. [1 paragraph (81/2 lines of source text) not declassified] c. If we do not break relations with Yemen, we should argue for a radical shift in Embassy aims there. Until now the Embassy has run around looking for ways to help the Yemenis. We should cease all such activity and forget any public or cultural affairs activities too. We should maintain minimum contact with top Yemeni and Egyptian officials (the Charge), protect American [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] d. In planning for South Arabia, we should prepare for the contingency of a split with an Arab socialist regime in Aden proper and the traditional rulers outside. This may call for [1 line of source text not declassified] perhaps diplomatic missions of some sort on each side too. e. In such a chaotic and unruly world it may be far more important in protecting U.S. interests to have some collaborators [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] rather than to run around looking for "leverage" in AID or cultural programs. 2. The above points deal with the narrower elements of the problem, but might be worked into the discussion [2 lines of source text not declassified] [initials not declassified]
447. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the European Office of the United Nations/1/ Washington, May 23, 1967, 9:06 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-10 YEMEN. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Frank A. Sieverts (U), cleared by Battle, and approved by Rostow. 200653. For Tubby from Rostow. Ref: Geneva 3809,/2/ 3821./3/ /2/In telegram 3809 from the U.S. Mission in Geneva, May 22, Ambassador Robert W. Tubby reported that, as instructed, he expressed to Jacques Freymond of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) U.S. concern at reports of repetitive use by the United Arab Republic of lethal chemical weapons in Yemen. Freymond had suggested that Tubby see ICRC Executive Director Roger Gallopin and that he personally urge a strong, formal ICRC protest to the UAR if the facts warranted. Tubby noted that it would be useful in this regard if he could be provided as soon as possible with U.S. Government information regarding the types of gas it believed the UAR had been using in Yemen. (Ibid.) /3/In telegram 3821 from the U.S. Mission in Geneva, May 23, Tubby reported that he met that day with Gallopin who stated that it was unlikely that the ICRC would make a public statement in the absence of clear evidence of use of gas by the UAR. (Ibid.) 1) When you seen Gallopin again you should stress seriousness our concern at use of poison gas by UAR against Yemen. We discussing this with ICRC in strictest confidence in hope they will take steps on their own to investigate gas use in part of world where for practical purposes they are only neutral, impartial observer. We hope ICRC will act fast to strengthen its representation in Middle East including Yemen. 2) Might be helpful to tell Gallopin you discussed subject with Freymond, who previously discussed subject on personal basis with me. Sieverts will bring additional info on gas types and use. Material for use with ICRC will be provided by telegram. Might be best to hold this material until Rochat returns and presents his findings./4/ /4/Printed from an unsigned copy.
448. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the European Office of the United Nations/1/ Washington, May 25, 1967, 8:57 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-10 YEMEN. Secret; Priority; Exdis. 202562. For Tubby and Sieverts. Ref: Geneva 3809./2/ /2/See footnote 2, Document 447. 1. Information in paragraph 2 may be passed to selected ICRC officials on a non-attributable basis and cannot be further disseminated or used publicly. 2. Begin non-attributable information: Following are UAR gas attacks reportedly carried out in Yemen since January 1, 1967: (a) January 5 attack on Kitaf in which 155 people and many animals allegedly were killed and more than 40 people injured. (b) May 6 attack on Bait Maran in which 2 people killed and 15 injured. (c) May 11 attack on Gahr and Gadafa where 51 and 24 respectively were reported killed. (d) May 17 attack on Gadafa where 100 people hiding in cave allegedly were killed. (e) week of May 14-20 attacks at villages of Naugher, Queais, and Kor in the Arhab and Khaulan areas. International Red Cross official said total casualties in those three villages plus Gahr and Gadafa during week were 243. There is corroborative evidence that on at least one occasion a highly lethal nerve gas agent was present in the area attacked. Mustard and perhaps phosgene may also have been used. End classified non-attributable information. 3. Information this paragraph can be published. Following are examples of press and radio mention which has been made of UAR attacks: (a) UPI January 31 said correspondent John Lawton and other Western correspondents who visited site of the Kitaf attack believed there was little doubt gas had been used. Yemeni reports claimed 150 people were killed. (b) A Yemeni royalist radio broadcast heard February 12 claimed on February 8 UAR aircraft dropped gas bombs on Bani Salab village and killed 75 people and 40 sheep. (c) Reuters reported February 17 a Yemeni soldier alleged 19 people were injured and 32 killed during a UAR gas attack on royalist positions at Bayt Al-Suraym between Sanaa and Hodeidah February 6. (d) Spokesman for royalist forces in Yemen stated during broadcast from Jidda February 15 that on February 5 UAR aircraft used poison gas bombs for second time in Anis area. (e) Jidda press May 14 carried royalist report UAR planes made poison gas attack on May 11 on the Yemeni town of Hairan, northeast of Sanaa, leaving 75 dead. (f) Jidda paper al-Nadwa quoting royalist command reported May 18 that UAR planes attacked a village 30 kilometers from Sanaa on May 16. (g) According to Reuters, South Arabian Broadcasting Service announced May 20 that UAR bombers using high explosives and poison gas raided royalist villages of Bayt Ghadir, Bayt Jabas, and Nawfal 20 miles north of Sanaa on May 18 and killed 38 people. Begin FYI. In case you are asked about New York Daily News erroneous story May 20 reporting that US officials have evidence poison gas bombs dropped in an attack on Najran and Jizan "last weekend" bore markings indicating Russian origin, no evidence gas employed in Saudi Arabia. Story said scientists were seeking to determine whether "as suspected, the gas was a new kind of nerve gas," also stated "it has been established that phosgene gas was the lethal agent in the earlier attacks." The article said officials believed the gas used on Najran and Jizan was "a much more modern type of lethal agent and was being used for experimental purposes by Communist scientists." End FYI. Rusk
449. Telegram From the Mission at the European Office of the United Nations to the Department of State/1/ Geneva, June 6, 1967, 0004Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-10 YEMEN. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to London and USUN. 4091. Ref: Geneva 4069,/2/ State 206905./3/ From Sieverts. Subject: Poison Gas in Yemen. /2/Telegram 4069 from the U.S. Mission in Geneva, June 2, reported that an ICRC press release on the use of poison gas in Yemen, which, as expected, was a "bland statement," had been issued at noon that day. Reports, which were factual accounts of the ICRC findings but did not point to the guilty party, had been given to the UAR, Saudi, and Yemeni missions in Geneva and a copy sent to Jidda for transmittal to the Yemeni royalist authorities. (Ibid.) /3/Dated June 2. (Ibid.) 1) Following is rough summary based on rapid oral description of ICRC delegates reports on use of toxic gas in Yemen, sent June 1 to four parties, obtained from ICRC in strictest confidence. Should be closely held and treated as Noforn. Summary repeated as provided, with no effort to smooth transitions or logic. Spelling in part phonetic and approximate. Begin summary: 2) Incident took place at Gahr in the Yemen, on May 10 or 11. ICRC team arrived four days later, having been delayed by the bombing attack on their convey. They interviewed four surviving victims and noted there were 75 dead. They examined the survivors and found objective symptoms of bronchitis, conjunctivitis, and facial edema. Their tympanum was intact, and there were no traumatic lesions. They exhumed one corpse from the common grave. The victim had died four days previously, and had been buried 12 hours. They noted a smell of garlic in the grave. There was edema all over the body. The lungs were soft and enlarged. There were no signs of traumatic lesions on this body or any other bodies, of a type which would have been caused by high explosive or pressure. Statements of the surviving victims are consistent with the objective finding that cause of death was pulmonary edema caused by inhalation of toxic gas. 3) This report of the delegates was brought to the attention of Dr. Lauppi in Bern, whose supplementary report was annexed to the report sent to the four parties. Report notes the finding of mucous in respiratory tract and lungs, indicating pulmonary and hemocoelic edema, and concludes there is no epidemic disease with these symptoms. Also notes absence of traumatic lesions and states that conclusion that toxic gas used is perfectly justified. Reviews types of gas that could have been employed: phosphoric esters (nervene gas), phosgene, mustard, chlorine, bromide, and a type of chloride. Considers mustard and lewisite most likely. Mustard consistent with garlic odor. Report concludes that evidence hard to evaluate since toxic material fades away quickly after bomb explodes. End summary. 4) Report does not point to guilty party, since ICRC unable acquire conclusive evidence. Statement and protest sent to UAR on bombing of ICRC convey does specifically identify UAR marked planes as source of attack. 5) Hamilton of NY Times attempting to piece gas report together on basis interview with Jamil Baroody, Saudi Ambassador to UN, who here past few days with Saudi King. Baroody advised Hamilton to get text from royalist Yemeni, suggesting he contact Abdul Raxman and Mr. Yassine at the Rome Hilton. Hamilton attempting to do this through NY Times man in Rome. I told him I unable assist him to obtain text. He reports Baroody plainly reluctant to be agent of delivering text to Times, since this would violate present spirit of Arab unity against Israel. When Hamilton noted Baroody's detailed comments this subject eight weeks ago in UN, Baroody quoted Arab proverb: "You join with your brother to fight your cousin. But you join with your cousin to fight your enemy." Tubby [Continue with the next documents] Volume XXI Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |