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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXI Near East Region Department of State |
 422. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State/1/ Cairo, January 30, 1967, 1518Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Priority. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, Aden, Sanaa, USUN, Beirut, Amman, Kuwait, and Jidda. 4239. 1. I am deeply disturbed by increasing tensions between Egyptians and Saudis. While these tensions arise from many sources, current focus is, of course, Yemen. In Yemen problem there are various elements that can lead to rapid and dangerous escalation regardless of whether it is what anyone wishes or serves interest any party. Unfortunately this escalation may well involve us. I can well understand Amb Eilts' concern over situation and his belief we must reassure Feisal that we will back up often repeated words of assurance that we will come to his assistance in event of unprovoked aggression. It seems to me, however, that what is most needed by the Saudis, the Egyptians, the Yemenis and, most importantly, by the US, is time. Feisal needs time to provide excuses for not unleashing royalists and/or retaliating. Nasser needs time to keep from getting himself in greater mess than he already has stirred up. The Yemenis need time because they will be the greatest loser with the least influence on outcome of any participant. The US needs time because it does not want to risk instability, war, or direct and serious confrontation with Nasser in which US would be on side conservative regimes against Nasser and revolutionary countries, thereby increasing dangerous trend toward polarization which has been under way for some months. Time alone will solve nothing. It might, however, permit a loosening of positions already much too rigid and possibly the creation of a climate in which new elements can emerge. 2. Our choices for the moment are the following: A. To rely on Kuwaiti or other efforts (Moroccan, Sudanese, Pakistan, etc.) with little hope of success. B. Do nothing except continue our words of warning and concern to both UAR and Saudis. C. Take such steps as necessary to reassure Saudis we will back up our commitment recognizing that such steps run risk escalation. D. Take new initiative to resolve Yemen conflict or at minimum provide cooling off time for all countries involved. 3. Of the alternatives only the new initiative (para D) offers much hope in situation that is inherently dangerous and contains elements real risks for US. It is wiser for us to face fact we are already involved and to take relatively small risk of mediation than to permit drift which will bring us inevitably to point we will have to back up commitment to Saudis, presumably with US forces. 4. I understand reasons that have argued against direct US offer mediate Yemen since last Bunker mission. However, to offer to mediate now risks only loss prestige in effort preserve peace. I am quite willing see us risk minor loss of face to prevent or at least delay major confrontations which can be disastrous from our point of view. 5. Various ideas have been advanced in recent weeks re possible mediators from Arab or international world. I recommend we recognize that we are involved in outcome Yemen no matter what happens and try to make our involvement as helpful toward bringing solution as possible. I therefore urge that we make offer either of good offices or mediation in situation that is highly explosive. Suggest Amb. Bunker, long acquainted with Yemen problem and having great stature in area and world, be assigned task of mediation. It would at least give time for situation to sort itself out and avoid dangerous military escalation. Believe it especially important we take such a step before we find ourselves committing US forces in Arabian peninsula./2/ /2/In a January 31 memorandum to Rostow, Howard Wriggins commented that although there was merit in Battle's proposal that the United States should undertake a new mediation effort, he agreed with Deputy Assistant Secretary Rodger Davies, who argued that the U.S. Government should attempt to reactivate the Kuwaiti mediation before involving itself directly. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Saunders Files, UAR-Saudi (Yemen issue), 4/1/66-1/20/69) Battle
423. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia/1/ Washington, January 31, 1967, 7:35 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 SAUD-UAR. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Moore and Campbell; cleared by Sisco, Buffum, Davies, Brown, L. Bruce Laingen (NEA/PAF), and Bennsky; and approved by Handley. Also sent to Cairo, Rawalpindi, Kuwait, Sanaa, and USUN and repeated to Amman, Beirut, and London. 128727. Jidda tel 2930,/2/ State 127476./3/ /2/See footnote 4, Document 421. /3/Document 421. 1. Possible US responses to Saudi request for implementation our security assurances fall into broad fields of military and political. Separate message being sent indicating possible range our action in military field, which strongly limited by importance our avoiding direct involvement UAR/SAG hostilities./4/ /4/Telegram 128587 to Jidda, January 31, a State-Defense message, authorized the U.S. Military Training Mission in Saudi Arabia to send a small number of technical experts to advise Saudi air defense units in the border area for a short period, but cautioned the Mission to exercise particular care that its role remained advisory and not operational. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 SAUD-UAR) 2. Action in political field required in first instance to prevent immediate outbreak hostilities and, subsequently, to bring Faisal-Nasser detente. (Anticipate that specific details Yemen solution would be outgrowth of latter rather than determining element.) As hours pass without renewal UAR bombing or immediate Saudi retaliation and with apparent continued SAG attempt keep diplomatic relations with UAR, certain amount of automatic cooling off is occurring. Prompt action by Kuwaitis could further ease immediate problem. Main aim at moment is to get Egyptians and Saudis talking again at any level as noted by Saqqaf (Jidda tel 2954)./5/ Following are among possibilities for achieving this: /5/Dated January 29. (Ibid.) 3. Offer direct US mediation. As suggested Cairo's 4239,/6/ such offer might be best technique for immediate requirement of gaining time in order permit a relaxation of currently rigid positions. Ultimate success doubtful in view our lack sufficient leverage, particularly in Cairo. Faisal may also have some doubts about usefulness direct mediation since he considers Bunker disengagement effort as failure./7/ 6 Document 422. /7/In telegram 3034 from Jidda, February 1, Eilts stated that he agreed with Battle's proposal that the United States consider reintervening in the Saudi-UAR confrontation with a direct offer of U.S. mediation, either alone or in conjunction with the Kuwaitis. He commented that in view of the salability to Faisal of a renewed U.S. mediation effort, there might be distinct value in having a new mediator who could not be personally reproached with past failures, such as Governor Harriman. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN) 4. New Third Party Effort. If Kuwaitis are no more active or successful now than in last few months, may be useful for us encourage new mediator./8/ With Saqqaf's indication Pakistani effort would be acceptable (Jidda 2962),/9/ Ayub may offer practical hope for bringing detente. /8/In telegram 4341 from Cairo, February 3, Battle stated his belief that the present Saudi-Egyptian imbroglio required more rapid action than they were likely to get out of the United Nations or the Kuwaitis and argued that if the United States wanted to seek a solution to the basic problem of Yemen, it was going to have to intervene actively. (Ibid.) /9/Dated January 30. (Ibid.) 5. Further possibility is to bring UN into problem. (Note from Jidda 2963/10/ that SAG also giving this active consideration. Baroody has seen UNSYG, but details this meeting not yet known.) Following factors enter into such consideration: /10/Dated January 30. (Ibid., POL 27 SAUD-UAR) a. It is of importance that further increase in tensions and polarization of Arab world be avoided. Injection Saudi-UAR confrontation into UN framework could in fact sharpen polarization by focusing broad international attention on dispute in which US and USSR would predictably be taking opposite sides. b. If, however, we become convinced Saudis must and will do something in retaliation Najran bombing which will complicate problem, more desirable alternative would be recourse to UN Security Council. Advantages of SC meeting are: (1) It would provide cooling off period; and (2) Saudis would probably have sympathetic response from most SC members and could reasonably expect 9 votes for satisfactory resolution even though USSR may veto. Disadvantages: (1) Meeting would result in bitter recriminations with further worsening SAG-UAR relations; (2) UAR could probably make damaging counter charges against Saudi's continued support of group (Yemeni royalists) working to overthrow government accepted by UN; (3) Saudis may not get as much in resolution--despite good case--as they might hope, e.g., condemnation of UAR. And in any event USSR might veto if UAR requested. 6. Foregoing assumes Saudi charge will be limited to Najran bombing. It impossible to predict what would happen if Saudis leveled poison gas charges. That would depend on how provable their case is. If they raise charge without providing convincing proof, they may cast doubt on their general credibility, including Najran charges. We would prefer to suspend judgment on this until further info available on poison gas accusations. 7. Since there is no clear case in favor of going to SC, might be useful consider prompting different type UN action as suggested para 5 Jidda's 2930. Some interested party could ask SYG to step back into SAG-UAR problem with offer to continue his efforts which began in fall of 1962. On April 29, 1963 (S/5298) SYG reported he consulted regularly with SAG-UAR about "certain aspects of situation in Yemen of external origin with view to making my office available for such assistance as might be desired toward insuring against any developments which might threaten peace of area." As result SYG appointed Bunche to fact-finding mission, which eventually with Bunker's help ended in creation UNYOM. Although UNYOM terminated, SYG could revive his personal role and perhaps appoint a representative whose mission would be initially limited to easing current tension between UAR and Saudi Arabia and if successful to recommend additional steps for further mediation of basic SAG-UAR differences over Yemen. (In terminating UNYOM, SYG put himself at disposal of parties in search of peaceful solution.) 8. Whether USG or some other interested party requests SYG intervention could be decided later. It would be advisable, if possible, to obtain prior Saudi and UAR agreement before asking for SYG help. In any case SYG will insist on SAG and UAR concurrence at some point. 9. Posts are requested to comment urgently on foregoing possibilities./11/ /11/In telegram 773 from Kuwait, February 2, Cottam argued that Kuwaiti mediation still seemed to afford the most likely means of eventually resolving the underlying dispute. Any new direct U.S. mediation initiative would increase U.S. involvement, but probably with no greater chance of success than the present Kuwaiti effort. Of the various alternatives suggested in the Department's telegram, the Embassy believed reinvolvement of the UN Secretary General might be the most desirable. (Ibid., POL 27 YEMEN) Rusk
424. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/ Washington, February 3, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Yemen, Cables & Memos, Vol. II, 7/64-12/68. Secret. SUBJECT Since your discussion in staff meeting this morning Peter Jessup has requested a full CIA rundown on the evidence of the UAR's use of poison gas. The intelligence community has already gone over the evidence we have with inconclusive results. The study Peter has requested will give us the latest judgment./2/ /2/No CIA study has been found. Spurgeon Keeny is also in touch with the agency's scientific people and we will stay in touch with Dr. Hornig's staff. Spurgeon rightly feels that they can be useful in making sure the intelligence people make the most of the evidence we have. State doesn't want us to get too far out in front on this, and I think they're right. The UN now has two formal requests--one from Yemen and one surprisingly from the UAR--to investigate Saudi charges./3/ The next step should be a UN investigation, which we'd support. (The convention on poison gas is a UN, not a Red Cross responsibility.) /3/In response to a Saudi suggestion that the United States analyze blood samples from alleged Yemen poison gas victims, telegram 123250 to Jidda, January 22, instructed the Embassy to state that it would be preferable if scientific tests to determine UAR use of poison gas in Yemen were performed by an international agency or in a country having no direct interest in the region. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-10 YEMEN) Our public posture so far has been that we do not have conclusive independent evidence of our own and therefore can not pronounce ourselves on the merits of the case. However, we do deplore the use of poison gas anywhere. That may continue to be the best posture, but CIA's study will hopefully give us a better base for our behind-scenes maneuvers. Hal
425. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Kuwait/1/ Washington, February 3, 1967, 10:55 a.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Moore on February 2, cleared by Davies and Bennsky, and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Jidda, Cairo, USUN, and London. 130616. Kuwait tel 763./2/ Please deliver following message from Secretary to FonMin Sabah: /2/In telegram 763 from Kuwait, January 31, Cottam reported that he and Brewer had made a strong appeal to Foreign Minister Sabah to take an immediate initiative to de-escalate the Saudi-UAR conflict, and had reiterated U.S. support for and appreciation of Kuwait's mediation efforts. (Ibid.) "Dear Mr. Minister: I recall with pleasure our most recent meeting in New York last September and the discussion we had at that time regarding our mutual concern for a peaceful solution to the problem in Yemen. Our interest in that problem has continued and we have followed closely and sympathetically your efforts to mediate the conflict within the Arab family. We have tried discreetly to supplement your efforts by encouraging each side to exercise moderation and to seek agreement. We are now greatly disturbed over the effect which the recent aerial attacks on Najran may have on general peace and stability in the Near Eastern area, in addition to their discouraging impact on attempts to reach a settlement in Yemen. We have informed the Government of the United Arab Republic of our concern and have also discussed the matter with the Government of Saudi Arabia. We have urged both sides not to engage in further acts which would threaten the outbreak of hostilities between them. Ambassador Cottam has informed me that you are still prepared to continue your mediation efforts between President Nasser and King Faisal. You have our wholehearted appreciation and support for these efforts and our assurances that we would welcome your recommendations as to how we could best assist your attempts to keep peace in the area. Please accept, Mr. Minister, my warmest personal regards. Sincerely, Dean Rusk"/3/ /3/Telegram 836 from Kuwait, February 16, transmitted a summary of Foreign Minister Sabah's reply to the Secretary's letter, stating that Kuwait had been pressing mediation, but pointing out that the obstacle of Hamid ad-Din's withdrawal and its relation to the number of UAR troops remained and that neither the United Arab Republic nor Saudi Arabia would change its stand. (Ibid.) Rusk
426.Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Davies) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, February 6, 1967. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 32-1 SAUD. Secret. Drafted by Korn and Moore. A copy was sent to the Under Secretary. The initials "DR" on the memorandum indicate that the Secretary read it. SUBJECT 1. U.A.R. air strikes on January 27 against the Saudi town of Najran, only a few miles from the Yemen border, have prompted the Saudi Government to invoke our long-standing assurances of support in case of unprovoked attack. We have sought to implement our commitment mainly by diplomatic means, e.g., the Under Secretary's representations on January 28 to the U.A.R. Ambassador and your letter of February 3 to the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister/2/ encouraging continued mediation efforts. We have turned down a Saudi request for two U.S. Army-manned Hawk missile batteries to be stationed near Najran. The Saudis continue however to urge us to "do something" to protect them. /2/See Documents 421 and 425. 2. Saudi faith in our friendship would be seriously undermined if we were to be completely unresponsive to their requests for military assistance. We have accordingly authorized our 235-man Military Training Mission in Saudi Arabia to detail no more than three officers for short visits to the Yemen border area to advise on Saudi air defense arrangements. The officers, who are to visit Najran on February 8, have been instructed to maintain as low visibility as possible and to avoid any operational involvement. We have also approved in principle a Saudi request for purchase of Sidewinder air-to-air missiles for four Saudi Air Force F-86s, although delivery may be delayed for some time owing to unavailability of mounting devices. Our Defense Attache in Jidda has just returned from a visit to Najran to survey the damage caused by the U.A.R. air strikes. 3. The Raytheon Company, which holds the Hawk missile contract with the Saudi Government, has agreed to a Saudi request, made directly to the Company and without our knowledge, to position its recently arrived first Hawk battery near Najran. Raytheon technicians would erect the battery, which could be in place by the middle or end of February, but would not fire the missiles. We are aware that placing the Hawks so near the border could result in their being fired into Yemeni airspace. Additionally, if Raytheon technicians at Najran should be inadvertently involved in hostilities it would add to U.A.R.-U.S. frictions. It could also pose legal problems for the individual Americans concerned. (We will be advising them of their legal position and of possible limitations on the extent of official U.S. protection which could be afforded them.) However, we have no legal control over the Hawk battery since it is now Saudi property. More importantly, we believe any official U.S. move to prevent Raytheon from complying with the Saudi request would result in loss of all Saudi credence in us and our oft-repeated assurances of support. On the other hand, continuation of the low-key type of support we are giving will come as no surprise to the Egyptians and, of itself, should not lead to a more serious confrontation with them than we are already in.
427. Memorandum From W. Howard Wriggins of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/ Washington, February 17, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Wriggins Memos, 1967. Secret. SUBJECT As you will have seen from the summary,/2/ Luke Battle asks for authority to offer good offices to Faisal and Nasser. He is persuaded that: (a) the Kuwaiti mediation has run out of steam; (b) the UAR's tough action in Najran and a tough-talking speech by Faisal have put both in a position where they cannot by themselves make progress; (c) U Thant missed the boat last time and will not move with sufficient alacrity. /2/Not attached. Therefore: Luke thinks he should take the opportunity given by Nasser's stopping our overflights/3/ to discuss the full complex of Middle-Eastern questions and to offer a high-level good offices effort. Rodger Davies, Deputy Assistant Secretary, agrees and is shaping such a recommendation for Nick. /3/Telegram 4542 from Cairo, February 12, reported that the UAR Foreign Office had informed the Embassy that the UAR Government had decided to cancel its previous permission for U.S. aircraft to overfly the United Arab Republic carrying arms for Jordan. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 17-1 US) In my view unless some such step is taken, (a) polarization will sharpen, (b) our relations with the UAR will become increasingly more strained, and (c) the likelihood of our having to come to Faisal's help or lose our reputation for reliability will greatly increase. We are in the middle already, and the role of responsible statesmanship requires a U.S. initiative, rather than pretending we are on the sidelines. Do you agree? I need to know in order to play a useful hand as the State Department shapes its position today and tomorrow.
428. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/ Washington, February 18, 1967, 7:35 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Moore on February 17; cleared by Davies, Bergus, and Wriggins; and approved by Katzenbach. Also sent to Jidda and Kuwait and repeated to London, Beirut, Sanaa, and Amman. 140276. Ref Cairo 4649./2/ /2/Dated February 16. (Ibid., DEF 17-1 US) 1. Department agrees that continued deterioration Saudi-UAR relations makes it increasingly desirable for US direct offer of good offices or mediation, perhaps sooner rather than later. Whether this ultimately should take form of high level US statesman (probably Bunker) visiting both capitals, promotion of Saudi-UAR meetings in Europe (Jidda 3314),/3/ or some other technique depends on further developments and recommendations addressees. Would appreciate receiving Amb Battle's proposed scenario for approach to Nasser offered para 8 reftel. /3/Dated February 16. (Ibid., POL 27 YEMEN) 2. Final tour d'horizon with Nasser would, we believe, be useful in any event. 3. Although chances Kuwait mediation are fading, believe we should do all possible promote GOK efforts at least in interim until we decide act ourselves. Further GOK activity in any event not incompatible with US moves. Since Saqqaf visit Kuwait still scheduled for Feb 21, best hope lies in facilitating meeting at that time with al-Khouli or other appropriate UAR official. For that purpose request following action: A. For Jidda--Recognize need for King's approval Saqqaf-Egyptian discussion and assume there no use pressing Cairo send al-Khouli until certain King would not oppose talks. Request you ascertain King's views soonest./4/ /4/In telegram 580 from Dhahran, February 20, Eilts reported that the King had responded that Saqqaf had not been instructed to discuss details of the Yemen problem and that any senior UAR officials would be welcome in Riyadh if the United Arab Republic wanted to send one for this purpose. In answer to the Ambassador's argument that such a meeting would be better in Kuwait or elsewhere, Faisal said he had not studied the matter and could give no answer at that time. (Ibid., POL 27 YEMEN) B. For Cairo--Request you strongly urge UAR respond to Kuwait "direct question" (Kuwait tel 835)/5/ that it in fact wants continuation GOK mediation. If it is clear by the time you make this approach that Faisal has no opposition Saqqaf-al-Khouli discussion, you should urge UAR take advantage Saqqaf presence Kuwait to initiate dialogue. /5/In telegram 835 from Kuwait, February 16, Cottam reported that Foreign Minister Sabah intended to call in the UAR Ambassador to pose a direct question through him to Nasser: i.e., does the United Arab Republic want Kuwait to continue mediation? (Ibid., POL 7 SAUD) C. For Kuwait--If Faisal sanctions meeting, you should urge Kuwaitis invite al-Khouli meet with Saqqaf under GOK auspices. Katzenbach
429. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State/1/ Cairo, March 28, 1967, 1206Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Jidda. 5738. Reference: Cairo 5030/2/ and Jidda's 3391/3/ and 3473./4/ /2/In telegram 5030 from Cairo, March 4, Battle reported that during his farewell call on Nasser, he had raised the subject of Yemen and asked whether on his return to Washington he should urge the U.S. Government to join in one of several offers to mediate or to take the initiative on its own in that direction. Nasser responded that he had gone to Jidda and entered into the Jidda Agreement against the advice of his colleagues. He was not now hopeful of a solution in view of the other side's determination to view this as a sign of weakness, which it had not in fact reflected. Battle said that he took this to mean Nasser would not oppose U.S. efforts, but did not hold out much hope for their chance of success. Nasser agreed that this was his attitude. (Ibid., POL UAR-US) Printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XVIII, Document 393. /3/Dated February 20. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN) /4/Dated February 25. (Ibid.) 1. During President's dinner for Ould Daddah last evening Foreign Office Under Secretary El Feki asked me to call on him this morning which I have just done. 2. El Feki said President Nasser had been pondering most seriously suggestion of possible US mediation UAR-Saudi difficulties mentioned by Ambassador Battle during his farewell call on March 4. President now wished US to know that he would in principle accept Ambassador Raymond Hare in this role. If he could be made available, final decision on mediation would, of course, have to be reached in light his terms reference and parallel Saudi agreement. 3. I said I personally was greatly heartened by President's response to offer put forward by Ambassador Battle and knew that he would be also. I would report this development immediately and would recommend prompt and favorable USG consideration. 4. Comment: This is first break we have had in many months of deterioration US-UAR relations. I feel Ambassador Hare is logical and ideal choice and that assuming he is acceptable to Saudis will just by undertaking task greatly lower temperatures in area and give US-UAR relations much needed blood transfusion. 5. Would appreciate Department's reaction soonest and if possible prior Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's departure from Cairo April first. Nes
430. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia/1/ Washington, March 29, 1967, 11:55, a.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Brewer; cleared by Battle, Bergus, and Hare; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Cairo. 164518. Cairo 5738;/2/ Jidda 3967./3/ /2/Document 429. /3/In telegram 3967 from Jidda, March 29, Eilts stated that he believed Faisal could be persuaded to agree to resumption of U.S. mediation if Ambassador Hare were involved, but pointed out that the King would first want to know the terms of reference. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN) 1. Dept encouraged by UAR suggestion. We fully concur Ambassador Hare would make exceptionally effective choice, both from personal and professional standpoint. In our view, next step should be early discussion with King Faisal in effort secure his agreement in principle, following which detailed terms of reference could be worked out on ad referendum basis to both governments. 2. You are accordingly instructed seek immediate audience with His Majesty to raise this subject. You should inform him that Ambassador Battle, after consultation with Dept, took advantage his final meeting with Nasser before leaving Cairo to reiterate our hope that way could be found bring about peaceful resolution Yemen problem. On personal basis Ambassador Battle asked Nasser whether on his return to Washington to assume broader responsibilities for USG relations with Near East he should urge USG offer join in one of several offers mediate Yemen problem or take initiative on our own in that direction. Nasser response was noncommittal. However, our Cairo Embassy learned some days ago that Egyptians were continuing keep this suggestion under advisement and, on March 28, Deputy FonMin informed our Charge that Nasser had reacted favorably Ambassador Battle's idea and now willing respond favorably to US initiative possibly through a US representative such as Ambassador Raymond Hare. Ambassador Hare well and favorably known His Majesty from long association with Saudi Arabia both in Dept and as USG Ambassador, and we would be willing propose him formally undertake this task. Accordingly Dept has instructed you immediately approach His Majesty in order discuss general idea with him, stressing Dept interest in constructive proposal and willingness be of whatever help we can in helping resolve this longstanding problem. 3. Assuming Faisal reacts favorably, you should tell him that we envisage next step would be preparation terms of reference which we would then refer both parties for their consideration and acceptance. Once this done, and nomination Ambassador Hare approved by both sides, new USG initiative assist parties in reaching settlement could formally get under way. 4. For Cairo: Inform FonOff soonest Dept most interested in UAR attitude on possible role for Ambassador Hare and we now urgently taking up with Saudi Government. Rusk
431. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State/1/ Jidda, April 2, 1967, 1500Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Cairo. 4047. SecState 164518;/2/ Jidda 4008./3/ /2/Document 430. /3/Dated March 30. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN) 1. Met with King Faisal for about two hours late last night. Rashad Pharaon present throughout audience. At outset Saqqaf also there, but soon left and did not reappear. (He is ill.) King relaxed and in good form and spirits. 2. I first reviewed long-standing USG interest in encouraging peaceful solution to Yemen problem. Recalled that during first several months my mission here and in wake failure Haradh conference, we had done utmost keep direct SAG-UAR dialogue going to resolve divergent interpretations Jidda agreement. Subsequently, when direct dialogue aborted, we had actively encouraged Kuwaiti mediation effort. Although regrettable latter now also stalled, our interest in peaceful solution remains. I then carefully gave him substance para 2 State 164518. (In doing so, I thought it best gloss over delay between Ambassador Battle's original proposal and March 28 reply to avoid, if possible, King's taking similar time to reply.) I noted that in accepting in principle renewed US mediation, sole UAR stipulations were (a) Saudi concurrence in such mediation and (b) opportunity approve terms of reference. These perfectly understandable and, if His Majesty likewise agreeable in principle, such terms of reference as might be prepared would of course also be submitted to him for consideration and acceptance. Thereafter, and once nomination Ambassador Hare approved by both sides, new USG initiative to assist parties in reaching settlement could formally get underway. 3. Faisal listened carefully and with obvious interest. He then said wished speak very candidly and hoped USG would take his comments in spirit offered. From many previous talks with him on subject of Yemen, I certainly aware of background of problem and of details his position. He assumed USG fully briefed on these. They remain unchanged. All previous pertinent agreements had been broken by Nasser. He frankly doubtful Nasser any more sincere this time. More likely this another Nasser trick either to buy time or to obtain USG help. Nasser had cooperated with Bunker mission to keep PL-480 flowing. When assured of this, he lost interest. Similarly, immediately after Jidda agreement Nasser went to Moscow where, King charged, he used Jidda agreement to extract more Soviet aid and then jettisoned agreement. Also, time growing short before Brits leave Aden. There body of opinion in Saudi Arabia that believes USG is in "collusion" with Nasser and is not really concerned about getting UAR troops out of Yemen lest this aggravate Arab-Israeli problem. Similarly, there are reports that USG indifferent to possibility of Nasser-dominated South Arabia. In telling me this, King insisted did not wish to suggest he believes these charges, but they involve matters which have to be considered. He personally is convinced USG wishes SAG well and would do nothing deliberately hurt latter's interests. However, US unwillingness recognize Nasser threat inexplicable and worrisome. 4. USG, he recalled, had been first to attempt to mediate Yemen problem in form of Bunker mission. It subsequently disengaged contending Yemen entirely an Arab problem. SAG had initially placed complete reliance in US mediation effort. Solemn promise had been made to him from very chair I sitting on that all prestige President Kennedy and American people would be exerted get Nasser out of Yemen. Nothing had happened. Some Saudis contend USG did not really try. He does not share this view. USG had indeed tried, yet its efforts totally unavailing in getting Nasser out. Is renewed USG mediation effort likely be any more effective? Furthermore, while Amb Hare is esteemed personal friend, how could Nasser make Hare's designation a "condition" of any such mediation? Surely if Nasser really wants US mediation, it should be through USG rather than through any individual person. King could only speculate about Nasser's purpose in proposing specific individual. Faisal quickly added did not wish his comments be interpreted as a Saudi refusal, but he would obviously have to know more about "basis" on which any USG mediation would operate before giving definitive reply. 5. I pointed out to King that Nasser had not made designation of Amb Hare a "condition" of USG mediation. While I did not know exactly what had prompted mention of Amb Hare, I wanted to suggest a more constructive reason for this than one he had adduced. To me, Nasser's mention of Hare as possible mediator highly heartening development. It suggested Nasser may be genuinely anxious try to resolve Yemen problem. Hare well and favorably known in UAR, in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in Near East. Until his recent retirement he could properly be called Dean of American diplomats serving in Near East. We here in Jidda had in fact from time to time suggested Hare's name to Dept as possible mediator. If as King feared all of this no more than another Nasser trick, I thought Hare would surely be last person whom Nasser would want to bring into matter. Hare intimately acquainted with Yemen problem and with psychology of major protagonists. Prospects either party attempting pull wool over his eyes slim. If anyone able find way through maze of divergent viewpoints and recriminations, Hare ideally qualified to do so. Faisal acknowledged validity these points. 6. As for alleged USG-UAR "collusion" that he had mentioned, I hoped he would not take it amiss if I also spoke frankly and called charge utter nonsense. I confident Faisal too wise believe it. I recalled he and I had discussed identical charge prior King's trip to US last summer, and reminded him of Secretary Rusk's specific statement to him at Blair House that objective USG policy was get UAR troops out of Yemen so that Yemeni people might decide their own future. As far as I aware there no change in this policy. Faisal recalled conversation. As for indifference to future of South Arabia, without mentioning names, I said had also heard this claim here in past few days. I was authorized categorically deny any such charge and spoke to him along lines para 1 SecState 165551./4/ He seemed gratified. As for "basis" of US mediation, I reiterated purpose present talk was merely to ascertain if King also agreeable in principle to renewed US mediation. If so, appropriate terms of reference could be drafted and submitted to him, and to Nasser, for consideration and approval. I emphasized that US mediation offer made only after most careful study. It represents constructive effort continue search for peaceful settlement. As friend, I personally hoped he would give this offer very serious study it deserves. /4/Telegram 16551 to Jidda, March 30, stated that the U.S. Government was concerned at the deteriorating security situation in Aden and supported British efforts to ensure an orderly transfer of power to the new state. (Ibid.) 7. Faisal responded that, in context my comments, he wished USG to know that he has "no objection in principle" to renewed USG mediation. However, he would not wish USG be under any misapprehension. It should be clearly understood from outset that any Saudi participation in renewed USG mediation subject to certain "qualifications." Specifically, (a) SAG not willing commit itself to any particular actions or restraints while mediation going on, but reserves right to act as its interests dictate; (b) aim of mediation should be that no vestige of UAR influence remain in Yemen and that Yemeni people have right decide their future; and (c) during period of mediation is in progress, no special USG aid to UAR should be offered or given. He reiterated his suspicion that primary purpose Nasser's agreement is to obtain renewed concessionary food aid. Once assured of this, Nasser will again lose interest. If these qualifications not acceptable, Faisal thought there little purpose in USG attempting mediate. 8. I asked him exactly what he meant by not being willing commit himself to any particular actions or restraints. I pointed out, for example, that unless Yemeni royalists continue be restrained from resuming hostilities, there little prospect for anyone's mediation. UAR could rightly be expected to hit back. Faisal claimed fighting already taking place in Yemen. UAR bombing of northern Yemeni villages going on daily, and Yemeni royalists must take steps defend themselves. I recalled various previous assurances he had given me that no Saudi arms going to Yemeni royalists and asked if this still represents Saudi policy. He told me that it did when we last discussed matter, but situation now changed. While he did not specifically admit that Saudi arms aid to royalists resumed, he said "if royalists ask us for arms, we will provide them." I urged him take another look at this. I recalled he had constantly assured me [he] wanted a peaceful solution and would leave no stone unturned to achieve this. While no one could say with any certainty whether renewed USG mediation will succeed, it offers sole present prospect continue search for a peaceful settlement. As such it is highly significant development. Many Saudi friends had urged that only USG could help break impassse. But if we are to try, it requires wholehearted cooperation of all. Alternative is war which no one can win and which in no one's interest. He again insisted that war is going on and that UAR air attacks on Yemeni royalists continuing. In this situation, if Yemeni royalists ask for arms, he insisted [he] has no honorable choice but to provide them. 9. Re any new US aid to UAR, said I doubted USG could make any such blanket commitment. However, drawing on SecState 165522,/5/ I noted UAR has withdrawn its long-standing request for food aid. Hence, question of food assistance to UAR no longer current matter in US-UAR relations. He made no comment. /5/Dated March 30. (Ibid.) 10. Assured him I would at once convey his views to USG for study. In doing so, however, I had frankly to tell him that if Saudis encourage resumption of hostilities in Yemen by new arms aid to royalists or other means, it could well raise question in minds US officials whether SAG really wants a peaceful settlement and whether there any purpose to renewed US mediation. Faisal responded "You may assure them I want peaceful settlement, but that I will not be tricked by Nasser again. In my view, his main purpose is to gain time and to get renewed USG aid. Same time I have no objection in principle to renewed USG mediation, with Ambassador Hare as mediator, subject already mentioned qualifications. I shall want to see terms of reference." 11. King then rehearsed at some length his well-known theme re Communist encroachment into Middle East, Saudi Arabia only state standing against this, US interests here enormous, yet USG appears discount threat and doing little cope with it. Perhaps pertinent Saudi information sometimes exaggerated. However, even in lesser form, Communist threat very real. Who would have believed ten years ago there might be Saudi Communists. Now there are, all taught in UAR. Nasser himself may or may not be Communist, but he mainly responsible for furthering Communist objectives in Near East. Unless USG takes threat more seriously now, another Vietnam will ultimately ensue in this area. I assured King we take threat just as seriously as he does, but also believe vigorous programs of economic, social and political reform offer best way of grappling with this admittedly difficult problem. For this reason we applaud programs King has instituted and look forward to still more being done. It being close to midnight, we did not pursue subject. 12. Comment: Notwithstanding his "qualifications," Faisal's quick agreement in principle is encouraging. I had frankly thought he might ask for more time to think it over. His qualifications come as no surprise. They reflect areas in which he feels he has been burned in previous mediation attempts. They also reflect his utter lack of confidence in anything Nasser may say or do. As seen from here, most disturbing is his present unwillingness commit himself to continued restraint vis-a-vis Yemeni royalists. Even this may not be as ominous as it sounds. If we can get mediation moving ASAP with Amb Hare, and can obtain some indication of UAR willingness take tangible steps to defuse UAR-Saudi relations and to stop air attacks on northern Yemeni villages, I think there is still good chance that Faisal can be persuaded find quiet ways exercise needed restraint. Domestic and other pressures on him will be heavy and he (through us) will have to produce, but I believe we should give it a try. We currently in process preparing some recommendations for possible inclusion in terms of reference. 13. In connection with foregoing, also recommend Dept now solicit HMG's early support as suggested by Saqqaf (Jidda 4008). I have of course said nothing to UK Amb about above approach. However, UAR Amb apparently informed by his govt. He pulled me aside at FonOff dinner for UN mission last evening to ask if King has accepted Hare as mediator. I could truthfully tell him had not yet seen King but hoped do so later that evening./6/ /6/In telegram 5937 from Cairo, April 3, Charge d'Affaires David G. Nes commented on Faisal's conditions, stating that although condition A was acceptable, providing it was reciprocal, clearly B and C were not. He pointed out that it was unreasonable to expect the United Arab Republic, before entering mediation, to agree that it was going to lose out. In addition, condition C amounted to an attempt to interfere in U.S.-UAR bilateral relations. If Faisal were to impose such conditions, he suspected the Egyptians would prefer to forget the whole thing. On the other hand, when it got down to details, they would probably have conditions too. The problem was that the United States had to tell the Egyptians soon whether Faisal had accepted the offer and any delay or hedging would be seen as evidence that he had imposed conditions. Nes suggested the possibility of sending Hare to the region on an exploratory mission with no definite terms of reference to see whether could do something to resolve the crisis of confidence. (Ibid.) Eilts
432. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/ Washington, April 6, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. V, Memos. Secret. WWR: Secretary Rusk specifically asked that the attached cables/2/ be cleared with you. /2/Not attached. Presumably reference is to telegrams 170451 to Jidda and Cairo, 170460 to Jidda, and 170459 to Cairo; see Document 433. They put Ray Hare in business to try his hand at mediating the Saudi-UAR dispute over Yemen. Both Faisal and Nasser have accepted Hare's mediation. Faisal threw out some tentative conditions, but the idea is to use the terms of reference to negotiate them out. As far as we know, the Secretary simply wants you to know that we're formally launching this operation. No one expects you to dig into the details (look OK to us). He mentioned our mediation earlier to the President and did not ask for his clearance on these. I'm glad to see us make this try, though I think the odds are against success. We have to keep trying to keep peace among the Arabs because a fight would either draw us in or force us to renege on our commitments. This may give them a face-saving way to back off from a confrontation, which they do seem to want to avoid. We're not excited about Hare since he's pretty passive, but the UAR picked him and he's persona grata in Riyadh. Recommend you clear. A call to S/S will do the trick unless you have questions./3/ /3/Saunders hand wrote the last sentence of this paragraph. Handwritten notations on the memorandum read: "OK. WR" and "S/S informed by phone April 7. BKS." Hal
433. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia/1/ Washington, April 7, 1967, 11:53 a.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Brewer on April 4; cleared by Hare, Bergus, Battle, and Walt Rostow; and approved by Secretary Rusk. Also sent to Cairo. 170451. Yemen Mediation. Following are proposed Terms of Reference which should be presented both UAR and SAG as soon as possible in accordance special instructions being sent separately:/2/ 2 Telegram 170460 to Jidda, April 7, transmitted talking points that the Ambassador was instructed to use when he saw Faisal to present the terms of reference transmitted in telegram 170451. Telegram 170459 to Cairo, April 7, instructed Nes to present the terms of reference to the UAR Government through the usual channels, i.e., el-Feki at the Foreign Office and al-Khouli at the Presidency, since there were protocol obstacles to a meeting between a Charge and President Nasser. Nes could, however, note that the terms were being presented by Ambassador Eilts personally to the King and indicate that he was at Nasser's disposition if the latter wished. (Ibid.) "TERMS OF REFERENCE 1. USG Undertakings: --to name a Special Representative acceptable to both parties who shall seek to reduce current tensions between the UAR and Saudi Arabia. --to prepare, on the basis of the Special Representative's discussions with interested parties, general guidelines for settlement of the dispute over Yemen. These guidelines would form the basis of subsequent detailed negotiations among the parties using USG continuing good offices as desired. --to terminate its conciliation effort at such time as the Special Representative determines that one or the other of the parties is not observing its solemn undertakings as listed below. 2. UAR Undertakings: --to cooperate with the Special Representative in carrying out the USG undertakings noted above. --during the conciliation period, to refrain from aggressive acts or hostile propaganda against Saudi Arabia or Saudi Arabian forces which would prejudice the conciliation effort. 3. SAG Undertakings: --to cooperate with the Special Representative in carrying out USG undertakings noted above. --during the conciliation period, to refrain from aggressive acts or hostile propaganda against the UAR or UAR forces which would prejudice the conciliation effort."/3/ /3/In telegram 6142 from Cairo, April 8, Nes reported that, in view of UAR sensibilities, he was deleting "aggressive" from the second paragraph of the respective UAR and Saudi undertakings as given in the Department's telegram. Telegram 171462 to Cairo and Jidda, April 8, instructed both addressees to drop the adjectives "aggressive" and "hostile" from the Terms of Reference. (Ibid.) Katzenbach [Continue with the next documents] Volume XXI Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |