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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXI Near East Region Department of State |
 406. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Kuwait/1/ Washington, August 5, 1966, 5:37 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Bergus and Korn, cleared by Davies, and approved by Hare. Also sent to Jidda and Cairo and repeated to Taiz, Aden, and CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA. 22681. Kuwait's 79,/2/ Cairo's 569,/3/ Jidda's 67./4/ /2/Dated August 2. (Ibid.) /3/Telegram 569 from Cairo, August 3, reported that al-Khouli had confirmed that he would meet the Saudi representative, Dr. Rashad Pharaon, in Kuwait on August 15 to attempt to resolve their last disagreements on Yemen. Al-Khouli had indicated that the only significant remaining issue was disposition of the Hamid-ad-Din family. Both parties had agreed on the name of the provisional government (state of Yemen) and its composition (three-fifths republican and two-fifths royalist). (Ibid.) /4/Document 403. 1. Begin FYI. We gratified at energy and skill used by Kuwaiti negotiators in isolating issues and bringing SAG and UAR so close to agreement. While not surprised Hamid ad-Din issue remains unsettled, we concerned lest it has assumed proportions prevent settlement Yemen dispute for months if not years. We also concerned lest, with apparent interruption of Arab summitry, Kuwaiti mediation might be last chance to reach settlement for a long period to come. 2. We believe both Nasser and Faisal look upon Hamid ad-Din question as key to future of Yemen and basic to survival their own regimes. Nasser believes, not without reason, that Hamid ad-Din's remaining on Yemeni soil under any guise would make any UAR claims to "famous victory" in Yemen sound hollow. He is concerned lest anything other than reasonably plausible claim of victory raise discontent in UAR armed forces to intolerable level. 3. Faisal on other hand remains so deeply suspicious of UAR motives and distrustful of Nasser that he reluctant to compromise. King has however on several occasions indicated he not wedded to maintenance of monarchical principle in Yemen. His main interest in Hamid ad-Din appears to be tactical one of leverage he can exercise on Yemen situation through them. This attitude most recently reflected in King's July 6 talk with Ambassador Eilts (Jidda 67) when he expressed fear exiling Hamid ad-Din before completion UAR withdrawal would reduce royalist forces to tribal rabble and give Nasser sole mastery of situation. 4. Given above considerations, both Faisal and Nasser may prefer rock along with present Yemen situation, unpleasant though it may be, rather than make final sacrifice required for settlement. With accord apparently so close and consequences continuation conflict so dangerous to both sides, we strongly hope Saudis and UAR can be persuaded make necessary concessions while agreement still possible. End FYI. 5. For Jidda: You should approach Pharaon and reiterate keen USG interest in successful outcome August 15 meeting with Khouly. Suggest presentation along following lines: a) Forthcoming talks appear to be last remaining possibility within foreseeable future to bring about withdrawal of UAR forces from Peninsula. With agreement between two parties apparently so close, USG cannot believe Saudis would let pass opportunity to get UAR troops out of Yemen, particularly in view of serious threat they pose to future of Saudi Arabia. b) We recognize importance Hamid ad-Din issue for Saudis but wonder whether there not room for compromise even on this point. Would it not be possible for example that banning of Yemeni royal family might be arranged in stages, with exiling of Hamid ad-Din princes being echeloned to parallel withdrawal of UAR forces? (Similar suggestion was made to Ambassador Eilts by Kamal Adham during conversation March 12 (Jidda's 790)./5/ Yemeni Ambassador al-Aini broached same possibility in talk with Department Officer August 3.) We have no idea what UAR reaction would be to such proposal and mention it only as illustration that legitimate possibilities for compromise exist. c) Even Yemeni republicans visibly tiring of UAR presence and are actively seeking means of asserting their independence. Once UAR has withdrawn we are confident SAG's ability establish influence and good relations with Yemeni Government. d) You may also wish reiterate points your excellent presentation to Faisal July 6./6/ /5/Dated March 12. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN) /6/In telegram 451 from Jidda, August 7, Eilts reported that he met with Faisal, Pharaon, and Saqqaf on August 6 and carried out the Department's instructions. The King responded that the Saudis had in the past shown great flexibility and been the only party that had genuinely sought to compromise. He stated that he would never agree to specifying removal of the Hamid ad-Din family by name; any exclusion would have to be in general terms of "undesirables." Second, he would not agree that the Hamid ad-Dins be excluded by any Yemen organ until the last UAR soldier was out of Yemen. Despite Eilts' urging that he reconsider the last point, Faisal continued to insist that these two points were non-negotiable. (Ibid.) 6. For Cairo: Charg should approach Hassan Sabri al-Khouli or suitable other available GUAR official and state that all parties to Kuwaiti mediation effort have been kind enough to keep us informed of its progress. Seems to us that in current state of affairs in Arab world, Kuwaiti mediation may well be last opportunity to reach honorable settlement Yemen issue for a long time to come. We believe GUAR fully aware of wholesome effect freely negotiated and fully implemented Yemen settlement would have. We urge GUAR overlook no opportunity contribute to such a settlement at upcoming meeting in Kuwait./7/ /7/In telegram 683 from Cairo, August 8, Nes reported that he and Parker had met with al-Khouli that morning and spoken along the lines of paragraph 6 of the Department's telegram, noting that the United States was making a parallel approach to the Saudis in hopes that he and Pharaon would have maximum flexibility. (Ibid.) 7. For Kuwait: You should inform Foreign Minister we making approaches Cairo and Jidda to urge both sides make every effort achieve settlement at forthcoming meeting. You should express our warmest appreciation to Kuwaitis for energy, tact, and skill with which they have pursued this difficult task. We hope for successful outcome August meetings, but would urge Kuwaitis to continue their efforts beyond this if required. A great deal is at stake, in terms of our mutual desire for a stable and prosperous Arabian peninsula./8/ /8/In telegram 99 from Kuwait, August 7, Cottam reported that he had met with Sayyid Bishara, Director of the Kuwaiti Foreign Office, who affirmed that Kuwait did not consider this the last and final round, although for tactical reasons it had said so. (Ibid.) Rusk
407. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/ Washington, August 20, 1966, 2:54 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66 POL 27 YEMEN. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Davies and approved by Hare. Also sent to Kuwait and Jidda and repeated to Beirut and Taiz. 32315. Yemen Mediation. 1. In light Kuwaiti request,/2/ Embassies Cairo and Jidda may indicate at appropriate level local foreign ministries continuing USG interest in solution Yemen problem and hope that governments will continue show forthcoming attitude as reflected in recently concluded meeting in Kuwait./3/ /2/In telegram 137 from Kuwait, August 20, Cottam reported that Bishara had asked for U.S. support of Kuwait's proposal for a Yemen settlement. (Ibid.) /3/In telegram 662 from Jidda, August 22, Seelye reported that he discussed Yemen with Mas'ud that day as instructed. (Ibid.) In telegram 1026 from Cairo, August 25, Nes reported that he discussed Yemen at length with el Fekki, expressing the hope that some progress had been made in the recent al-Khouri-Pharaon talks in Kuwait. El Fekki responded that the talks had gone well, but that subsequent Saudi secret contacts with royalist tribal leaders in Yemen indicated that King Faisal was not sincerely interested in a solution. (Ibid.) 2. Request Embassy Kuwait inform posts substance proposal as it emerged after Pharaon-Khouli discussions./4/ /4/In telegram 866 from Jidda, September 6, Eilts reported that following his return to Jidda, Saqqaf had informed him of the current status of the Kuwait mediation effort, which now called for: a) a transitional Yemeni government (3/5 republican, 2/5 royalist); b) UAR troop withdrawal within 9 months after a new Haradh conference convened October 1-15; and c) withdrawal of Hamid ad-Din and other "undesirables" when UAR troops were down to 3,000 i.e., a number equal to the proposed 3,000-man Arab peacekeeping force. Saqqaf also said that, on instructions from the King, Pharaon had insisted during the negotiations with al-Khouli that one-fifth of the republican three-fifths be "third force" republicans. The Kuwaitis had since told the Saudis that the United Arab Republic had demanded that the Hamid ad-Din be excluded when the half of the UAR forces had been withdrawn. (Ibid.) Rusk
408. Telegram From the Embassy in Yemen to the Department of State/1/ Taiz, September 4, 1966, 1300Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Noforn; Limdis. Repeated to Aden, Cairo, Jidda, Kuwait, and London. 340. Ref: Cairo MRN 1116,/2/ Kuwait 178./3/ /2/Dated August 30. (Ibid.) /3/Dated August 28. (Ibid.) 1. Reftels confirm our recent growing conviction that UAR playing double game in Yemen. Idea that Egyptians merely seeking honorable way out does not square with their activities here. Admittedly they appear be sincerely and patiently participating Kuwait mediation. But we note that only point among Kuwait proposals which actually reduces their power dominate Yemen or frustrate emergence representative leadership is one on which UAR balks, namely the withdrawal of its army. We can also not shake suspicion that UAR planning keep its forces in place here for day of "liberation" South Arabia 1968 in anticipation of new opportunities. 2. UAR with ease can manage arrange delays and postponements of the proposed Harad conference and the nine-month troop withdrawal specified in Kuwaiti proposals, just as UAR appears able create circumstances to justify maintaining itself in effective control government Yemen. More important, it has tested its ability recently to do so and the angry but impotent and scattered government may be best evidence really of Egyptian sovereignty in Yemen. 3. Were there any hint that this smothering dominance of the Yemenis had begun be lifted during recent hopeful period of Kuwait mediation we might be inclined more relaxed view. But UAR controls, rumor mongering, incitements, military actions, pamphleteering, claims of British "overflights" and border intrusions" are increasing. 4. Part of the stepped up campaign is clandestine and open propaganda against US. Another leaflet (second seen by Embassy) has been circulated which links US (charging dollar subsidies) with anti-Sallalist Republican Council dissidents in Taiz. Radio Sanaa is constant purveyor claims to effect US is midst dark plots against republic. Newspapers are channels anti-Western diatribes. Al Khouli's assertion reported para 2 Kuwait's 178 is poppycock. "Hostile press" claim is evidence of government-controlled media UAR. We assume Kuwaitis as aware of this as Saudis. 5. UAR of course not pleased over presence US in Yemen. We are only mission observing UAR's blatant conduct affairs here Egypt has reason to worry about. While we can probably have little effect on UAR policy I believe time has come at least to register our displeasure at their propoganda and whispering campaign against US in Yemen. I suggest Department authorize Embassy Cairo to approach UARG at high level to protest unfounded and flagrant vilification of exemplary US conduct in Yemen. 6. Thus as Egyptian intervention in Yemen becomes even more devious and heavy handed, playing at negotiation through Kuwait mediation on one hand and on the other seeking undermine the group of reasonable men who are still determined gain sovereignty of their own country, we suspect UAR identifies us as prime obstacle to its having completely free hand in this region Arabian peninsula. We note that already a variety of anti-American activity led by Egyptians in Yemen has had its effect. In these efforts the UAR is aided and abetted by Soviets and Chinese. We are not quite quarantined from contact in the community but all Yemenis, particularly officials, are wary about relations with US. (Tribal personalities who disregard or do not feel this pressure are an exception to this general rule, but relations with these men have their limitations.) 7. Successful Kuwait mediation which guaranteed prompt exit UAR troops would be historic event of good omen here and would be crippling blow to what I believe are current Egyptian plans dominate Yemen, if necessary by force it is unable establish puppet government, until such times Brits evacuate South Arabia when the whole area can be exploited. Dinsmore
409. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/ Washington, September 6, 1966, 5:07 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Bergus, cleared by Moore, and approved by Davies. Repeated to Jidda, Kuwait, Aden, London, and Taiz. 41545. 1. Department concerned at UAR tendency reported Taiz 340/2/ make USG scapegoat for UAR's own problems in dealing with difficult Yemeni leadership. Accordingly Embassy Cairo should see either FonMin or Hassan Sabri al-Khouli at first convenient opportunity to make clear that gratuitous charges against US which are being floated in Yemen are not appreciated. Nor would we be inclined accept explanation that these activities are the result of initiatives undertaken by uninstructed or overzealous Egyptian satraps in Yemen. GUAR must accept responsibility for deeds of its military and diplomatic officials in YAR. These directly affect the broad spectrum of US-UAR relations. They run counter to assurances recently given by highest levels in USG and GUAR that we should work together to try to improve relations. /2/Document 408. 2. Embassy should point out that USG is one of few major Western powers to recognize YAR as sovereign and independent state. Our dealings with YAR have been on that basis. Our aid program, though small, has made real contribution to Yemeni development. We at a loss to understand how our goals for Yemen conflict with those of UAR. We remain desirous of a Yemen settlement based on honor and justice for all parties to dispute, including Yemenis. Rusk
410. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Yemen/1/ Washington, September 27, 1966, 5:55 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 17 YEMEN-US. Secret. Drafted by Moore, cleared by Gabriel J. Paolozzi (IO/UNP), and approved by Hare. Repeated to Cairo, Jidda, London, Aden, and USUN. 55142. 1. In farewell call on NEA Assistant Secretary Hare September 26, YAR Ambassador al-Aini/2/ gave lengthy account recent events Yemen/3/ and his views future developments. Following is summary detailed pouched memcon. /2/Ambassador al-Aini resigned on September 21. /3/On September 16 the UAR press announced the resignation of the Hassan al-Amri government, most of whose members were then in Cairo. On September 18 President Sallal announced formation of a new Yemeni cabinet composed almost exclusively of hard-line UAR supporters. Members of the al-Amri government were placed under house arrest in Cairo, and a purge of moderates in the Yemeni Government and Army began, culminating in the execution of former Minister of State for Tribal Affairs Muhammad al-Ruaini and four associates on October 25. 2. Al-Amri and colleagues' trip to Cairo was last desperate measure to forestall outbreak fighting between tribes and Sallal supporters. Unhappy events which followed have one positive effect of showing whole world extent Egyptian control Yemen. Nasser no longer can legitimately claim he is supporting revolution in Yemen. 3. Concerning next steps of Yemeni "moderate" group, al-Aini said he had in past refrained from raising subject Yemen in UN in order avoid embarrassment to whole Arab cause arising from Nasser's suppression Yemenis. However, in last few days he had extensive discussions his Arab colleagues NY emphasizing Arabs themselves must now take action to settle problem. If this does not develop, it possible that moderate republicans would send delegation to UN Committee of 24 protesting Egyptian colonization Yemen and requesting UAR set date for withdrawal from Yemen just as British had set date in Aden. 4. In response query, said thought Egyptians wish remain Yemen but emphasized they could not do so in face growing consolidation Yemeni opposition. Added that Nasser does not know what he wants; return of troops to UAR in semblance of defeat would face him with possible Egyptian military revolt; staying in Yemen threatens Yemeni revolt. 5. Answering question on Russian interest Yemen, al-Aini said USSR seemed favor Nasser presence Yemen for pressure it put on British in Aden and had originally channeled all support to Yemen through UAR. Subsequently, at Yemeni request, Soviets made agreements with Sallal for direct aid. However, few of these agreements fully implemented; Russians now seem to be shifting their support away from Sallal to more neutral stance vis a vis Yemeni Republican elements. 6. Sees little hope for success Kuwaiti mediation in view continued Nasser-Faisal distrust. Noted that Faisal unsuccessful in four-year attempt get UAR out by working through royalists. He now should trust Yemeni people (i.e., moderates) who equally desire ousting Egyptian troops. Moderates need only assurances that Hamid al-Din will not be forced on them by Saudis if they take action against Egyptians. If moderates thought for moment that Hamid al-Din controlled any important part of the country they would deal with them. However, royalists represent nothing but Saudis. Saudi support for Hamid al-Din continues give Nasser excuse stay in Yemen and limits extent anti-Egyptian activity by moderates. Expressed oft-repeated hope we could explain this to Faisal. 7. Shafai-Zaidi friction has little significance for present course of Yemen. Egyptians had tried use confessional differences as basis for split of country, but failed. With long history as single entity Yemen will continue stand as one country, be it all republican or all royalist. 8. Al-Aini expects leave US in week or so, traveling via Rome and Beirut, to accompany family as far as Asmara on their return to Yemen. Ambassador will determine in Asmara whether he also should return Yemen (which he desires) or possibly travel to other Arab capitals in service cause Yemeni moderates. 9. Al-Aini expressed particular gratitude to Secretary and Asst Sec Hare for continued sympathetic reception accorded him in Department during nearly four years in US. Rusk
411. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Yemen/1/ Washington, September 30, 1966, 12:02 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 YEMEN. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Ollison (NEA/P), cleared by McCloskey (P/ON) and Moore, and approved by Daniel Brown (NEA/P). Also sent to Cairo. 57200. AP ticker carries Cairo dateline story quoting Al-Ahram that Yemen President Sallal has accused ousted cabinet ministers of collaborating with US agents to sabotage Yemeni revolution. Story also cites reports harassment US officials in Yemen/2/ and distribution anti-American leaflets. /2/On September 28 the Yemeni Government declared U.S. AID contract employee Michael Harriz, a U.S. citizen, persona non grata. If queried re above Department spokesman will respond as follows: "The accusation of US activities against the Yemeni revolution is patently false. We are not involved in Yemeni internal affairs and have maintained normal diplomatic relations with the Republic since according it formal recognition in December 1962./3/ /3/Telegram 55933 to Cairo, September 28, instructed the Embassy to approach al-Khouli and state that Yemeni charges that Harriz was involved in disturbances in Taiz were patently untrue, as demonstrated by the fact that Harriz was in Sana'a at the time of the incident. Al-Khouli should be told that the United States had tried unsuccessfully to reach a responsible Yemeni official to discuss the Harriz case, and that it would be in their mutual interest if UAR authorities could persuade Yemeni officials to review the charges against Harriz with great care before ratifying the expulsion effort, which was bound to have a damaging effect on the overall U.S.-Yemeni relationship. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN) Telegram 1671 from Cairo, September 29, reported that, since al-Khouli was absent from Cairo, an Embassy official had made the presentation at the Foreign Ministry that morning. (Ibid.) While there have been incidents where local Yemeni authorities have delayed US officials in their travels, press reports of widespread anti-Americanism in Yemen are greatly distorted. We continue to discuss with the Yemen Government particular problems as they arise in a spirit of mutual respect."/4/ /4/Printed from an unsigned copy.
412. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ SecDel/MC/49 New York, October 7, 1966, 4-5 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret. Drafted by Simmons on October 11 and approved in S on October 25. SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE TWENTY-FIRST SESSION New York, September-October 1966 SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS U.S U.A.R. The Secretary asked about prospects for success of the Kuwaiti mediation effort on Yemen. The Foreign Minister said that the sticking point related to the withdrawal of the royal family. The U.A.R. position is that the family should be withdrawn when half of the U.A.R. troops in Yemen are pulled out. The Saudi posture is that all troops must first be withdrawn. U.A.R. public opinion makes this completely unacceptable. The Saudis apparently fear that should the royal family leave Yemen, the U.A.R. would fail to complete its part of the agreement. This was unrealistic since the U.A.R. was asking only that the royal family leave Yemen and not asking for the family's exile to Africa or the Far East. The Minister said that he had been informed by the Kuwaitis that the Saudis had accepted the proposed composition of the new YARG, i.e. three-fifths Republicans, two-fifths Royalists. The Foreign Minister said that troop withdrawal would begin at the moment the new government is established. He said that the points of dispute are trifling and if the Saudis were willing an agreement could be signed immediately.
413. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Yemen/1/ Washington, October 12, 1966, 6:54 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID (US) 8 YEMEN. Secret. Drafted by Moore, cleared by Director of the AID Office of Near Eastern Affairs James C. Flint, and approved by Hare. Repeated to Cairo, London, Jidda, and Aden. 64728. 1. In call on Assistant Sec Hare October 11, Yemeni Foreign Minister Sallam made puerile impassioned plea for further US aid, particularly for paving Mocha-Sanaa road. Sallam stated Yemenis appreciated US recognition Republic, but felt US had done nothing further assist in developing Yemen, that major aid projects all given only to Imamate regime. Contrasted US lack willingness help with massive efforts Soviets and Chicoms. 2. Sallam blamed Saudis and British for present plight of Yemen. Emphasized that Yemenis welcomed UAR presence as first step toward larger unity Arab world. 3. Ambassador Hare stated (and reiterated number times during conversation) that US policy toward Yemen clear from beginning, never hidden or doubtful: we desired only situation where Yemen could develop at peace internally and externally and could control its own destiny. We in no way involved in trying manipulate internal affairs Yemen. Our activities open and above board. We not engaged in passing money, plotting or any of other allegations which currently being circulated in Cairo and Yemen. We desire nothing from Yemen except Yemeni self-determination. This being stressed to Foreign Minister not only to set record straight but also to give assurances that this has been and continues to be our policy. If YARG doubts this it will be unable understand our attitudes and future course our relations. 4. Ambassador Hare continued that in exercising our limited influence with UAR and Saudis concerning Yemen we had spoken only on above lines, urging the two larger powers to reach some accommodation which would allow Yemenis decide own future. 5. Concerning US assistance, Ambassador Hare emphasized our aid efforts before and since revolution had concentrated on helping Yemeni people, without reflection on what regime controlled country. Our current programs, involving smaller projects primarily in rural areas, specifically were designed this purpose. Was noted that approximately half of all US aid ever given Yemen had been supplied since revolution. 6. In subsequent call on AID Assistant Administrator Macomber, Sallam made similar but more restrained appeal for aid, concentrating on paving road. Macomber made no promises but indicated we were sympathetic toward helping Yemeni people within limitations our budget and as necessary stability and planning capability in Yemen evolve over coming years. Expected that our program would in near future continue emphasize rural self-help. Specifically commented that at present stage Yemen development there was some question whether paving road should have major priority. Rusk
414. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia/1/ Washington, October 12, 1966, 10:30 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 SAUD. Secret. Drafted by Moore; cleared by Officer in Charge of Somali Affairs Peter C. Walker, Director of the Office of Northern African Affairs John F. Root, Bergus, Atherton, Campbell, and Symmes; and approved by Hare. Repeated to Cairo, Taiz, London, Aden, and USUN. 64986. (Following FYI Noforn, based on uncleared memcon, subject revision on review.) Following principal subjects discussed during Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister Saqqaf's call on Secretary October 11. 1. Yemen. Saqqaf convinced UAR does not want solve problem or leave Yemen at least before British departure from Aden in two years. (Secretary noted UAR still tells us they want solution and their attitude in Yemen not affected by developments in Aden.) Saqqaf believes Kuwait mediation efforts of no avail. Within Yemen, none of groups involved seems any longer satisfied with circumstances. Many Yemenis dying all parts of country from sickness and hunger. Fighting continuing in some areas where UAR is invading "royalist regions". Secretary queried if, following Kuwaiti efforts, putting Yemen problem into UN would be helpful. Saqqaf demurred noting none of parties had mentioned subject in the UNGA speeches and little progress to be expected since Yemen Republic was UN member. [Here follows discussion of other subjects.] Rusk
415. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/ Washington, October 15, 1966, 12:49 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 31-1 SAUD-UAR. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by John T. Wheelock (NEA/UAR), cleared by Davies and Moore, and approved by Hare. Also sent to Jidda and repeated to Kuwait, London, Taiz, USUN, CHUSMTM, and CINCSTRIKE/ CINCMEAFSA. 66851. Ref: Jidda's 1400/2/ and Cairo 1972/3/ (being repeated addressees). /2/In telegram 1400 from Jidda, October 14, Eilts reported that acting Deputy Foreign Minister Mas'ud informed him that four UAR aircraft had attacked Najran that morning killing three people, and that he had just delivered a strong oral protest to the UAR Ambassador. Eilts expressed shock at the bombing but also urged calm and restraint. (Ibid.) /3/In telegram 1972 from Cairo, October 15, Battle requested guidance on the UAR attack on Najran for a previously scheduled meeting with Fawzi on October 17. (Ibid.) For Cairo: Suggest you tell Fawzi we have reliable report several lives lost in Najran morning October 14 result bombing by aircraft and ask whether UARG has any information. If appropriate you should express hope UAR will exert greatest care avoid incidents which would counter Kuwait's mediation efforts and could exacerbate delicate situation Yemen./4/ /4/In telegram 2020 from Cairo, October 17, Battle reported that he discussed the Najran bombing with Fawzi that morning. (Ibid.) In telegram 2021 from Cairo, October 17, the Ambassador reported that 3 hours later he had been asked to return to receive the UAR response, which stated that UAR forces had noted unusual military activities and movements indicating Saudi aggressive intentions and endangering the security of UAR forces and had therefore taken preventive measures, such as day and night military explorations, which could result in the possibility of mistakes. (Ibid.) For Jidda: Line you have taken with Mas'ud just right. Believe we should maintain low key and urge restraint both sides until facts and UAR intentions clearer. Rusk
416. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia/1/ Washington, November 10, 1966, 6:06 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Moore and Davies, cleared by Judd and Bergus, and approved by Hare. Also sent to Cairo, Kuwait, and London and repeated to Amman, Taiz, Dhahran, and CINCSTRIKE. 83055. Jidda 1762, Yemen./2/ Following points for use as you deem appropriate in discussion with King: /2/Dated November 7. (Ibid.) 1. Assessment UAR intentions: a. We frankly uncertain what Nasser's ultimate intentions in Yemen may be. b. Believe, however, that domestic pressures coupled with rising Yemeni republican discontent UAR presence should incline Nasser to seek way to extricate UAR from its uncomfortable position. However, Nasser cannot, we think, make decision withdraw without concurrence military which cannot accept formula which gives other than impression success UAR arms. We speculate that minimum circumstances acceptable to military would be expulsion principal members Hamid al-Din and emergence of interim government capable of standing on own for at least some months after withdrawal. UAR attempts in last three months establish "strong" government by draconian measures signal all out effort obtain some form of stability. Regardless Nasser's ultimate intent, seems evident that a greater modicum of stability in Yemen is unquestionably a precondition if he is to decide to withdraw. c. In these circumstances, resumption open hostility by royalists would not promote goal UAR withdrawal. Full-scale fighting for three years failed expel Egyptians. (Royalist threat "dump entire problem into Saudi lap" seems idle one; problem has been Saudi one for many months.) Expected UAR response to renewed fighting would be application more force, particularly increased air strikes and perhaps new augmentation ground troops, which presently down to about 40,000. Unleashing royalists would doubtless strengthen "hawk" mentality in UAR to point where concerted attack against Saudi Arabia could not be ruled out. d. Present anarchic conditions Yemen work to weaken UAR position there. However, resumption more active SAG role, via royalists, could well coalesce many of presently divided Yemenis into front against Saudis which would negate internal forces currently working in SAG favor. e. We have no indications that UAR planning attack Saudi Arabia. However, Saudi connivance at resumption fighting by royalists could well serve as provocation for UAR retaliation. (UAR no doubt aware increased royalist pressure on SAG for resumed fighting and may resort to such isolated incidents as mid-October bombing Najran as warning of Saudi vulnerability of wide-scale fighting resumed Yemen.) f. Just as we cautioned UAR re dangers mid-October Najran bombing we would caution Faisal against allowing royalists resume activity. 2. In our view, Kuwaiti mediation continues offer principal hope for settlement although we following with interest such other Arab lines of approach as those being pursued by al-Aini. Believe details current proposals and counter proposals relatively unimportant since, judging only from them, area of disagreement between Faisal and Nasser on modalities solution is very narrow. Vital missing ingredient is lack mutual trust between Faisal and Nasser. No third party can supply this, which is up to principals involved to work out in framework their common Arab concerns. However, Kuwaiti efforts provide required channel for the two to air their differences. We strongly advise King continue to operate through this channel. We currently urging Kuwaitis resume their efforts at early date./3/ /3/In telegram 295 from Dhahran, November 13, Ambassador Eilts reported that in a meeting with Faisal that day he referred to reports that hostilities might soon resume in Yemen and urged the King to restrain the royalists, outlining in some detail the assessment contained in telegram 83055. (Ibid.) 3. We are presently making similar dmarche in Cairo concerning continuation mediation efforts. 4. For Cairo. Request you seek occasion make following points at appropriately high level UARG: a. We are strongly urging Faisal follow policy restraint in Yemen and continue cooperate with Kuwaiti mediation efforts. b. We realize broad range differences between Faisal and Nasser hinders Yemen settlement but believe it of extreme importance that both continue work to narrow their differences. c. We urge UAR to avoid any actions which would exacerbate situation and to resume discussion, presumably through Kuwaitis, for settlement./4/ /4/In telegram 2662 from Cairo, November 15, Battle reported that he and Parker had reviewed the Yemen situation with al-Khouli that morning. Battle made the presentation outlined in telegram 83055, and al-Khouli presented the UAR perspective. Battle concluded pessimistically that he feared the United Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia might be drifting toward open, armed conflict in Yemen. (Ibid.) 5. For Kuwait. Request you inform appropriate level GOK of our foregoing dmarches in Cairo and Riyadh, of our concern that more extensive fighting may soon break out Yemen, and of our strong hope for early resumption Kuwaiti mediation efforts as Foreign Minister assured Secretary in New York he intended do./5/ /5/In telegram 449 from Kuwait, November 12, Cottam reported that he had conveyed the substance of the Department's telegram to Bishara, who assured him that the Government of Kuwait was actively continuing its attempts to mediate. (Ibid.) 6. For London. Request you draw on foregoing and reftel for discussion current Yemen situation with HMG and suggest HMG may also wish similarly advise SAG against resumption hostilities Yemen./6/ /6/Telegram 88539 to Jidda, November 21, reported that the British Embassy had informed the Department that although the U.K. Government did not wish to see full-scale fighting resume in Yemen, it had decided not to approach Faisal on this subject. (Ibid.) Rusk
417. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Kuwait/1/ Washington, November 17, 1966, 1:12 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret. Drafted by Moore, cleared by Bergus, and approved by Davies. Repeated to Cairo, Jidda, and Taiz. 86358. Cairo 2662,/2/ Jidda 1871,/3/ Yemen. /2/See footnote 4, Document 416. /3/Dated November 16. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN) 1. Al-Khouly's analysis current status Kuwait mediation indicates basic sticking point is UAR concern that troop level at which Saudis willing oust Hamid al-Din is too low to insure security and order in Yemen./4/ To meet this concern might be useful if Kuwaitis would propose to SAG and UAR an increase in the planned number of troops to be requested from other Arab countries, e.g., two or three thousand from each of three countries instead of the projected 1,000. This might or might not also involve a matching number of UAR troops as in first proposal. /4/Telegram 2662, November 15, also reported al-Khouli's statement that the only remaining issue to be settled was timing of the departure of the Hamid ad-Dins from Yemen. The United Arab Republic had proposed what he called a "reasonable compromise"--removal of the Hamid ad-Dins when evacuation of UAR troops was half completed. The Saudis rejected this and proposed their removal when UAR troop strength was down to 3,000. The United Arab Republic was unwilling to accept this, fearing that this was not enough to permit it to control the military situation. (Ibid.) 2. We have no desire get directly involved in details of solution and are under no illusion that foregoing would be touchstone for settling problem. However, it might be useful gimmick to enable Kuwaitis keep door of negotiations open a bit longer, which seems to be desire of both sides. 3. Since Kuwaitis have in past asked for our ideas, request you discreetly suggest this possibility to them in your further discussions concerning their mediation effort. Rusk
418. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Yemen/1/ Washington, December 20, 1966, 4:40 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID (US) YEMEN. Confidential. Drafted by Korn, Flint, and Harry F. Hemmerich (AID/NESA/NE); cleared by Director of the AID Office of Development Planning for the Near East and South Asia Afred D. White; and approved by Brewer. The Embassy Branch Office in Sana'a, Yemen, was elevated to Embassy status effective December 15, 1966. The same day the Embassy in Taiz was redesignated American Embassy Branch Office. 105650. Joint State/AID message. Ref Taiz 844 (TOAID 186)./2/ Subject: FY 1967/68 Program and Staffing. /2/Telegram 844 from Taiz, December 1, complained that the reduced U.S. aid program for Yemen gave the Embassy no talking points with the Yemeni Government, since there was no possibility of dialogue other than the negative one of defending a dwindling program. (Ibid.) 1. Washington agencies in full sympathy with problems faced by Embassy/AID/Y in maintaining US presence Yemen. However exceedingly tight budgetary situation coupled with continuing political instability in Yemen and UAR domination of YARG make it impossible to envisage increase in FY68 Yemen allotment. We were in fact fortunate hold country allotment at $2.4 million level in FY67. Yemen was only country in NESA area to escape cut from FY67 Congressional Presentation level. 2. While Sanaa watershed and Taiz Technical Institute surveys involve only relatively small amounts it would not be realistic authorize either unless there appeared be some prospect of our being able effectively to initiate it in FY 1968. Near certainty of reduced world-wide availabilities next fiscal year unfortunately rules out such step. For same reason it impossible to consider dredging Mocha port or paving Mocha-Sanaa road as separate capital project. Because Yemen is not a general support country, see no reason broach with YARG general subject of Yemen aid level. To best of our knowledge this has not been done in past. 3. Realize this places burden on Embassy and AID/Y in their efforts maintain effective US presence, especially in face of large-scale Chicom and Soviet efforts. This situation places even greater premium than in past on imaginative use by Embassy and AID/Y of self-help funds. In this regard, two possibilities come to mind: a. As stated in Farr-Hamer letter Nov 16,/3/ we are prepared entertain proposal for pavement limited section Mocha-Sanaa road on self-help basis if this can be accomplished without sacrificing principles self-help program. /3/Not found. b. Embassy/AID/Y might consider self-help projects designed underscore US presence Sanaa area and foster better understanding on part Sallal and YARG that US program is most effectively serving interests both government and people Yemen by providing small, self-help projects which spread assistance to largest number of people. 4. Would appreciate Embassy/AID/Y comments on suggestions para 3 or other proposals which might broaden impact AID/Y program within limits current budget. 5. Embassy requested pass this message Taiz for AID. Rusk
419. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Davies) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, January 4, 1967. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 31-1 SAUD-UAR. Confidential. Drafted by Korn and Brewer. The initials "DR" on the memorandum indicate that the Secretary read it. SUBJECT 1. Saudi authorities have informed us that U.A.R. planes overflew the province of Najran, on the Yemen border, on December 27 and January 1 but that earlier reports of bombings and strafings on these dates were incorrect. Taken together with a U.A.R. bombing sortie against a hamlet just inside the Yemen-Saudi border on December 26, these overflights are probably intended as a warning to Saudi Arabia against encouraging any renewed large-scale fighting by Yemeni royalists. 2. These incidents mark another phase in the war of nerves between Saudi Arabia and the U.A.R. By immediately publicizing an earlier series of explosions within Saudi Arabia, the U.A.R. press has sought to create an impression of growing popular dissidence and discontent with the rule of King Faisal. For their part, U.A.R. authorities are no doubt concerned over recent apparently successful Saudi efforts to bring Yemeni royalists and republican dissidents together into a single coalition, as well as by the threat of renewed royalist military action in the Sanaa region and indications of wavering loyalty on the part of a key tribal leader. 3. While not of a serious nature, the U.A.R. overflights are likely to strengthen rather than weaken the hand of those in Saudi Government councils who advocate a general renewal of organized hostilities in Yemen and a consequent showdown with the U.A.R. King Faisal has thus far resisted growing pressure in this direction from his advisors. It seems likely he will continue to move cautiously at least until work on air defenses in southern Saudi Arabia is completed, probably sometime this spring. 4. We are authorizing Ambassador Eilts to tell King Faisal that we have been impressed by his statesmanlike restraint and to urge him to continue to follow this policy. The Ambassador may confirm our earlier assurances with respect to unprovoked aggression against Saudi Arabia but at the same time is to stress our hope that the current psychological warfare between the U.A.R. and Saudi Arabia will not be a prelude to new outbreaks of tribal fighting in Yemen./2/ /2/Telegram 111756 to Jidda, January 3, authorized Eilts, when meeting with Faisal, to express U.S. concern over recent reports of UAR bombings of the Najran frontier area, and to state that the Department was impressed by the King's statesmanlike restraint in face of this and other provocations, all of which appeared to be part of a propaganda war rather than a renewal of serious hostilities. Such restraint still remained in the U.S. view the best course. The Ambassador was also authorized to confirm earlier U.S. assurances regarding unprovoked aggression against Saudi territory. (Ibid., POL 15-1 SAUD)
420. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia/1/ Washington, January 20, 1967, 6:27 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 SAUD-UAR. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Moore and Brewer; cleared by Houghton, Officer in Charge of Economic Affairs in the Office of Near Eastern Affairs George M. Bennsky, and Country Director for Pakistan and Afghanistan James W. Spain; and approved by Davies. Also sent to Kuwait and Cairo and repeated to London, Beirut, Amman, Sanaa, and Rawalpindi. 122702. Jidda 2755 (Notal) SAG-UAR Tension./2/ /2/Telegram 2755 from Jidda, January 17, reported that recent indications were that Saudi-UAR confrontation was sharpening, and that as mutual Faisal-Nasser suspicion deepened, the few remaining threads of meaningful direct contact that might allow some dialog to be resumed on smaller matters were being severed. Eilts proposed that the U.S. Government continue to urge Kuwait to proceed with its mediation effort, but also take additional steps to ease present tensions, such as urging Faisal and Nasser to look for ways and means to bring about a Saudi-UAR dtente as a prerequisite to resuming a meaningful dialog on outstanding problems such as Yemen. Alternatively, the United States might seek to have some mutually acceptable, uncommitted Arab chief of state, such as President Helou of Lebanon, use his good offices between Faisal and Nasser. (Ibid.) 1. Agree SAG-UAR struggle has sharpened, with specific problems of Yemen and Islamic solidarity contributing to what has now become general Faisal-Nasser confrontation. Head-on military collision clearly not in our interest. Question arises, however, if such collision as imminent as has been true at other times in past, e.g., summer 1965. While Saudi and Egyptian troops are facing each other across north Yemen border, they have been in relatively static position for many months. We have seen no offensive troop deployments on either side which might foreshadow attack. Nasser has publicly threatened attack Saudi support bases for Yemeni royalists in Najran and Jizan, but such threat has been conditioned on Saudi resumption major aid to royalists. Current UAR policy seems blend propaganda and harassment which hard on Saudi nerves but unlikely escalate to military conflict. Meanwhile Faisal seems clearly recognize that continuing restraint of royalists is very much in his own self-interest. We do not discount existence royalist pressure on him but believe Saudi influence on royalists greater than vice versa and that SAG restraint likely continue be exercised at least until end pilgrimage season early April. 2. UAR emphasis on propaganda and support Yemeni subversion in Saudi Arabia may diminish in strength as non-Saudi subversive types rounded up, recently initiated SAG security precautions become more effective and absence significant popular Saudi support for anti-regime activities becomes clearer. (Jidda 2763/3/ indicates such popular response to UAR efforts has not been forthcoming.) Just as Faisal has overestimated domestic impact on Nasser of lengthened UAR involvement in Yemen, so Nasser seems to underestimate extent popular acceptance Faisal within Saudi Arabia. /3/Dated January 17. (Ibid., POL 23-7 SAUD) 3. Foregoing is not to downgrade very real concern Dept shares with Embassy about present state Saudi-Egyptian relations, but does indicate that these relations have not yet deteriorated to point where area peace threatened. In this tense but not traumatic situation, and in absence any indication that either side ready for dtente, we doubt there is at present any useful action which USG might take. In fact, US initiative at this time might make positions of parties more rigid, each believing our action was sign that other side weakening under existing pressure. Aside from question of whether Helou would be acceptable to both sides or willing undertake role (on which we have doubts), foregoing argument would seem apply any approaches at present by Lebanese. While Kuwait mediation dormant, it is an open channel available to parties whenever they choose to use it. Intervention this juncture either by USG or by Helou could result closing this channel. In event situation were to deteriorate to point where hostilities appear imminent, we would be willing consider high level US approach to both sides. 4. Both Embassies Jidda and Cairo should nevertheless continue make use suitable occasions to discuss SAG-UAR problems, importance for both of meaningful dtente, and need exercise restraint on military activities Yemen in order avoid provoking direct Saudi-Egyptian hostilities. 5. Possible encouragement for Pakistan effort (Dhahran 477 Notal/)/4/ is subject separate message. /4/Telegram 477 from Dhahran, January 19, reported that during a meeting with the Ambassador on January 18 Pharaon had expressed his personal view that the Kuwaiti mediation effort was "finished." He also informed Eilts that the Government of Pakistan had sent a letter to the Saudi Arabian Government indicating its willingness to help and suggesting a Faisal-Nasser meeting in Karachi. The Saudis had replied by sending Pakistan a statement of the Saudi position on the Yemen problem, to which there had so far been no response. (Ibid., POL 27 YEMEN) 6. For Kuwait. You should continue encourage GOK at highest appropriate level keep mediation effort active. DeptOff took this line with Kuwait Ambassador January 19 but latter indicated immediate outlook not promising. Rusk
421. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/ Washington, January 28, 1967, 6:44 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 SAUD-UAR. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Bennsky, Moore, and Korn; cleared by Davies, in substance by Director of the Office of UN Political Affairs Elizabeth Ann Brown, Quinn, and Judd; and approved by Katzenbach. Also sent to Jidda and repeated to London, Amman, Beirut, Kuwait, Sanaa, Dhahran, Taiz, USUN, CINCSTRIKE, and CHUSMTM Dhahran. 127476. Ref: State's 127384,/2/ Jidda's 2926/3/ and 2930./4/ /2/Telegram 127384 to Cairo, January 28, informed the Embassy that the Under Secretary had called in UAR Ambassador Kamel to express U.S. concern over the UAR air attacks on Najran. (Ibid.) /3/Dated January 28. (Ibid., E 11-3) /4/In telegram 2930 from Jidda, January 28, Eilts proposed possible measures to signal U.S. concern at the Najran bombings while also demonstrating U.S. support for Saudi Arabia's integrity, such as a public statement, a strong U.S. dmarche to Nasser, a symbolic military gesture, and an effort to get a leading international personality, possibly through UN channels, to mediate. (Ibid., POL 27 SAUD-UAR) 1. Acting Secretary made following points to UAR Ambassador Kamel this afternoon re UAR bombing of Najran. a. SAG has informed us Najran bombed twice January 27 by UAR aircraft with loss at least eight lives, others wounded and property damaged. One of these raids reportedly witnessed by foreign journalists. We also have reports of third raid on January 28. b. We have no evidence SAG has taken any actions which would have provoked such bombing raids. Our indications are Faisal has been making determined and successful efforts restrain Yemeni royalists from resuming hostilities in Yemen. c. Such raids can only serve to harden positions and make solution in Yemen more difficult reach. d. Acting Secretary expressed USG concern (1) over these raids in an area of world where we have strong interests and (2) that such incidents be avoided in this region where we desire see peace and stability maintained. e. When these raids are reported by our press they will cause public reaction which, as Ambassador Kamel knows, will make more difficult our joint efforts improve US-UAR relations and reach agreement on various matters under discussion between us. 2. Kamel responded at length making following points: a. He did not have facts this matter from his government. b. Questioned fact foreign correspondents would be in out of way place such as Najran as raising doubts validity alleged bombing raids. c. Gave detailed coverage Yemen problem from beginning, as seen from Egyptian viewpoint, concluding that Faisal out to humiliate and defeat Egyptians there rather than seeking mutually acceptable solution allowing their withdrawal. Made strong pitch USG should get active in Yemen matter via mediation or other means as he had been urging for some months. d. Emphasized Najran was base for royalist infiltrators who were killing Egyptian "boys" and Egyptians could not give up right self-defense. If UAR bombed Najran there must have been provocation. 3. In response Acting Secretary stated we believe it true UAR planes had bombed Najran. He wanted emphasize strongly that this in no way helped situation of UAR or made solution Yemen problem easier. Faisal has been restraining resumption royalist activities including infiltration according to our information. Suggested correspondents could have been in Najran because of recent reports gas bombing by UAR in North Yemen near Saudi border. 4. Kamel said he would do his best express USG concern to his government and requested we restrain Saudi Arabia from provoking UAR. 5. Without specifically mentioning current top-level USG consideration UAR food request, presentations Acting Secretary (and Dep. Asst. Sec. Davies afterwards) gave Kamel clear impression USG concern over bombing raids could at the least slow up the deliberations. 6. For Cairo: You requested take up Najran bombing raids with highest appropriate level UARG drawing on Acting Secretary's presentation paras 1 and 3 above for substance dmarche /5/ /5/In telegram 4219 from Cairo, January 29, Battle reported that he had expressed U.S. concern over the bombing to Foreign Office Under Secretary el-Feki, following the Department's guidance, and had pointed out that there were newspaper reports from journalists who had witnessed the bombing. He noted that el-Feki, who was unable to give him an official response, made no real effort to deny the fact of the bombings. (Ibid.) 7. For Jidda: In response Saudi query re proposed US action (paragraph 2, Jidda telegram 2925)/6/ request you speak to Saqqaf as follows: /6/Dated January 28. (Ibid.) a. Inform him of foregoing representation in Washington and of planned follow up in Cairo. b. Should make clear to him that we deeply concerned over UAR action and that we indicating this concern in response press queries. (Unprovoked attack on Saudi territory should place SAG in powerful position vis--vis world press and public opinion. Presence foreign journalists in Najran strengthens Saudi case.) c. Request he convey to King our renewed assurances of concern for Saudi integrity and indicate that various courses action in support Saudi Arabia are under active study by USG. We understand need for rapid action. At same time believe it of major importance that we avoid any precipitate step which could redound to ultimate disadvantage of both Saudi Arabia and US. King should be assured problem receiving urgent attention at highest levels USG and that we prepared consult continuously with SAG re most useful courses action. 8. FYI. Believe decision on issuance public statement should be deferred until receipt UAR reaction to our dmarches. Concerning recommendation for dispatch infantry unit on "training mission," we need better assessment UAR intentions and motives before making decision. Our 1963-64 experience with Operation Hard Surface demonstrated problems involved in sending token force. If faced with determined UAR action, would probably be necessary either withdraw or strengthen such symbolic force. (May be appropriate allow USMTM advisers travel Najran but would prefer delay decision at least until Army Attach Col. Broady returns from projected visit.) We studying possibilities of action within UN framework (initiated either by Saudis or others) or of prompting third party mediation as suggested by Jidda. End FYI. 9. For London: Have informed British Embassy in general terms of representation to Ambassador Kamel. You may similarly keep Foreign Office informed. Rusk [Continue with the next documents] Volume XXI Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |