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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXI Near East Region Department of State |
 398. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State/1/ Cairo, April 8, 1966, 1115Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to London, Aden, Taiz, and Jidda. 2571. My April 7 conversation with President Nasser lasting just under one hour began with a discussion of my recent fishing trip to Red Sea. The President said he did not like fishing because he had to be patient all day every day and he found fishing an unnecessary drain on his patience. I said that regretfully I was there to ask for more patience with regard to a favorite topic of ours, Yemen. I said that during recent months I had been convinced of President Nasser's basic desire for peace in the Yemen. I had repeatedly in reports to my government and in appearances before the Congress regarding the recent aid agreement drawn heavily on his efforts to reach a Yemen solution and praised his statesmanlike conduct, particularly in reaching the Jidda agreement. I was aware of the frustrations that the Yemen problem had caused him and of the continued requirement on him for wisdom and patience. I was now perplexed. The Department of State had asked me to reconcile my convictions of his basic purpose with his recent public statements, particularly the March 22 speech which had had unfortunate repercussions. For example, King Feisal had considered the speech an attack upon himself (Nasser nodded). On our side, we considered that the changes for a high level meeting between the UAR and Saudi Arabia were lessened by the speech. In effect what I hoped he would do was to write my report for me. How could I respond to my Dept's request for clarification of my own sympathetic view of his basic aim toward peace with what he had said publicly. "The answer," he said, "is that we have given up. King Feisal believed when I entered into the Jidda agreement that it was a move from weakness but it was not. It was a move to avoid a clash between the United Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia. That clash now is before us." The avoidance of this clash was the basis for Nasser's efforts to reach the Jidda agreement which he now considered no longer existed. "The Jidda agreement is finished. There is no agreement. As I told you last time, we are consolidating our troops and will withdraw in large numbers, perhaps even up to half of them, but we can stay in Yemen for ten years. We are not weak. This does not cost us as much as Feisal thinks it does. It does not cost foreign currency. The present cost is 35 to 40 million pounds a year and with the steps I propose we can reduce that cost to something like 20 to 25 million." He stressed that this does not mean a resumption of hostilities by the UAR but that what happens depends on the Saudis. I said that if he intended to withdraw, why could he not withdraw as part of his efforts to implement the Jidda agreement. Perhaps a concession toward implementing that agreement by him would bring concessions from the other side and this new situation might engender new possibilities of a solution. "This is impossible as the Jidda agreement is one piece," he said. "If I claim to implement that agreement by a withdrawal of troops, I am prevented from reentering Yemen if at a later date hostilities have been resumed and they need my assistance." But if the other side resumes hostilities, this will be a new situation, I pointed out, and we must look upon the Yemen problem step by step. He repeated that the Jidda agreement is one piece and cannot be partially fulfilled unless the total understanding can be implemented. I reaffirmed the need for patience and quiet diplomacy. He responded by stating that he could not do what the Saudis do--to talk one way and act another. Either there was a basic understanding and friendship between two countries or there was not. He could not pretend publicly what did not exist in fact and therefore must state what he felt to be the realities of the situation with respect to dealing with the problem. The Egyptian people have a deep interest in the Yemen and a right to know the situation. I repeated that this problem could not be dealt with publicly. There must be a restrained quiet effort toward solution if there is a chance of improvement in the present outlook. He replied, "I have been restrained--there is much more I could say about the Saudis than I have said. They are spending money in Kuwait, Beirut, and other places against us. I know that but I have refrained from talking about it." I pointed out that my country still hoped that a dialogue between the UAR and the Saudis could be resumed and in the light of the present situation the Saudis considered the next move up to Nasser. They believed that they had not had an answer to the Feisal communication from Khartoum. (The President shrugged indignantly.) I had reason to believe that an initiative by the UAR to send a high level rep to Jidda to pay respects to the King and to resume discussions at the level of the rep would be well received. The President replied most emphatically, "This is impossible." Later I brought up the matter again and the President said, "We will receive a rep from the Saudi Arabians but I will not initiate it and I cannot send anyone there at present." I then pointed out that my country wished to be helpful in this problem within the limits of its judgement that it could not mediate this complex intra-Arab problem but could only contribute to keeping a climate between the two countries which left hope for continued discussions. My own concern stemmed from my knowledge that the Yemen and its closely related problem of the Aden loomed large on the horizon as a problem between our two countries and this I sought to avoid as I had sought to avoid or remove any problems that might create difficulties between our two countries. I asked whether the President had any suggestions for me in this context and he said that he did not. He wishes us to be informed completely and thoroughly on his actions on the Yemen and will be happy to talk with me at any time since he knew of our interest in the Yemen. During the conversation the President again mentioned the problem with the army. "If we bring it back, I can control it," he said, "but it will not be easy. I can make speeches and explain the situation and they will respond." (He seemed less than convinced on this point.) I asked whether the President had had any further thoughts with respect to Aden since we last talked, indicating that this problem was closely related to the Yemen. He said that he had no suggestions. I repeated that we must look for constructive answers to the problem raised by the projected British withdrawal and wished to assure him again of the high degree of flexibility the British appeared to have on this matter. I urged that he look toward constructive action which would bring about stability and a government in Aden that reflected the will of the people--a goal he had long had. As I rose to go he said there was one problem he wished to discuss with me. He had been informed this morning of my talk with Dr. Kaissouni on rice (see Embtel 2554),/2/ and he considered our decision to exercise the option as a "threat." I said this was not the case and the exercise of the option stemmed, I was sure, from the general problem of food with which the US was faced around the world. He then said, "We have no rice. We cannot give you fifty thousand tons." He mentioned my discussion with Dr. Kaissouni about the Indian food problem and the copy of the President's message re India which I had given Kaissouni. He then stated, "India has its problems and we have ours." /2/Dated April 7. (Ibid., INCO-RICE UAR) The President referred to the US decision to exercise the option in a manner suggesting that he believed it stemmed from his recent public remarks on the subject of rice. I said I had accepted his assurances on many matters, and hoped he would accept mine on this one. The decision to exercise the option on rice had already been made before his speech and was not an outgrowth of those remarks. He indicated he would accept my assurances, but I do not believe he is convinced of the truth of my statement. I indicated that I was going into the facts of the rice situation in Egypt with Kaissouni and said that the understanding permitted the option to be met from rice from next season's crop. With respect to American aid he said he did not even like to discuss this subject. He wished that relations between us did not involve aid but he had the problem of his people and the development of the country and while his job would be easier as President if he could ignore aid, he could not do so. You are giving us now only wheat and the economic assistance which we had hoped for and had been promised in the early days of President Johnson's administration has not been forthcoming. I referred to the importance of the wheat and other various private credits which had been extended to the UAR and said that I hoped that the climate of our relations would continue to improve and that eventually other forms of aid might be introduced into the UAR. I only hoped that problems such as Aden and the Yemen would not cloud our relations in which there had been such marked improvement in recent months. In the last moments of my conversation I urged the President to adhere to his basic goal which, as I understood it, was still peace and a UAR withdrawal from the Yemen and to find a way to bring this about. I asked whether the Harad conference would be resumed and whether we could look for progress in this context. He said that it would be resumed but would amount to nothing. "I have a speech coming on May first," he said, "and I must continue to talk about the Yemen and I must discuss the Islamic pact." "But you must remember," I said, "that there is a great need to maintain flexibility in your position in order to respond to new situations that we hope will emerge and which will make resumption of talks between you and Saudi Arabia possible." Comment: The conversation was at all times cordial, at times light and amusing, but in other moments very ominous. The President came very near to an explosion on the matter of rice and seemed very badly informed on the matter, referring to the fact that we were only going to pay 25 percent in dollars. I corrected this impression by saying this was entirely a pound transaction and diverted the conversation by saying I would talk further with Kaissouni about the matter. I am very depressed about the chances of a Yemen settlement at this time and regretfully conclude that Nasser has decided at least for the present to remain there. This does not mean that he is not capable of changing his position quickly and completely for no apparent reason but such a shift seems a remote hope at present. Therefore we must decide the limits of our tolerance in the Yemen and must formulate a contingent policy based on the several possibilities that exist, ranging from stalemate to resumption of major hostilities. A separate telegram is being submitted regarding this matter./3/ /3/Not further identified. Battle
399. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, April 12, 1966. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Confidential. Drafted by Atherton and approved in S on May 23. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS The Secretary opened the conversation by enquiring when the Harad Conference would resume. Ambassador al-Aini said no date had yet been set but in any case no results were possible until Cairo and Riyadh had reached agreement on a Yemen settlement. At the Secretary's request, Ambassador al-Aini then reviewed the origins and principal issues of the Yemen conflict. Emphasizing that he was giving his own assessment and not reflecting the views of his government, the Ambassador made the following points: (1) The 1962 revolution in Yemen had been unrelated to the Arab "cold war," but Saudi Arabia and the U.A.R. had made Yemen a cold war battlefield. (2) Attempts by the Yemenis to solve their own problems had been frustrated by Saudi support for the royal Hamid al-Din family and by the U.A.R.'s refusal to withdraw its troops. (3) Any attempt to return the Hamid al-Din family to power would prolong the Yemen conflict indefinitely, since it would not only be opposed by the Yemenis themselves but would threaten complete defeat for the U.A.R. and thus be totally unacceptable to Nasser. (4) The Jidda Agreement had been unworkable from the beginning. A plebiscite in Yemen was difficult to envisage under the best of circumstances. If held one year after formation of a provisional government, as agreed at Jidda, a plebiscite would subject the country to a year of outside political pressures and maneuverings. An immediate plebiscite (which the Ambassador later defined as a plebiscite immediately after departure of the last U.A.R. troops) would be preferable, though still of doubtful feasibility. A solution better suited to Yemeni conditions would be an elected council of tribal representatives from which should be excluded members of the Hamid al-Din family on the royalist side (the Ambassador subsequently said this meant eight to ten individuals at most) and members of the Sallal group on the republican side. (5) There were some on both sides who benefited from the present situation, but the Yemeni people were the losers. While a solution now would be difficult to achieve, it would be much more difficult later--say five years from now. (6) The Ambassador had discussed Yemen with Anwar Sadat during the latter's visit to the United States and had concluded that Cairo's new Yemen strategy was extremely dangerous. That strategy, as the Ambassador saw it, was to prepare for a long stay, while minimizing the cost to the U.A.R. by consolidating the Egyptian position in south Yemen where the U.A.R. had concentrated its efforts from the beginning. This would relieve the U.A.R. of responsibility for holding the difficult mountain areas but leave it in a position to launch air strikes against those areas whenever it felt this necessary. To relate his new strategy to future developments in Aden, as Nasser had done, was purely a pretext. It would not bring stability to Yemen or South Arabia; only the evacuation of U.A.R. troops and formation of a unified Yemeni government would do that. (7) The "main and only solution" was to convince Saudi Arabia that it must guarantee the removal of the Hamid al-Din family from Yemeni political life. This would not be a defeat for Saudi Arabia, but a success for all concerned. Nasser and the Yemeni Republicans would then accept the "State (as opposed to the Republic) of Yemen" formulation, would agree to the exclusion of President Sallal and his followers, and U.A.R. troops would be withdrawn. (8) If the U.A.R. were to withdraw before the threat of a return of the royal family had been eliminated, a number of Republicans would turn for support to the Russians and the Chinese, who now had a significant presence in Yemen. (9) In summary, the essential elements of a Yemen settlement were: (a) elimination from Yemeni affairs of the Hamid al-Din family and of Sallal and his followers; (b) withdrawal of U.A.R. troops; (c) an end to Egyptian and Saudi interference in Yemen; (d) Yemeni neutrality with respect to inter-Arab differences. If these conditions were agreed upon, the United Nations could play a helpful role in guaranteeing that they were carried out. It was essential, however, that they constitute a single package. A piecemeal approach would not work. The Secretary asked a number of specific questions about the Harad Conference of November-December, 1965, to which Ambassador al-Aini replied along the following lines: (1) Harad failed primarily because the Saudis refused to permit the Conference to deal with the future of the Hamid al-Din family. Having been assured by Nasser that exclusion of the royal family from a future Yemeni government had already been agreed upon, the Yemeni delegates discovered at Harad that this was not so and that the subject was not one they could settle at the Conference. The impression was conveyed to the Conference that King Faisal supported the Hamid al-Dins. This had the effect of strengthening Nasser's hand and dividing the conferees along pro-Hamid al-Din and pro-Sallal lines. In fact, however, there were no royalists outside the royal family itself. It was opposition to the U.A.R. presence in Yemen, not support for the Hamid al-Din, which united the "royalists." (2) If it had not been for Saudi and U.A.R. pressures at Harad, and if there had been a firm guarantee that the royal family would have no future political role in Yemen, the delegates at Harad could have reached agreement on a "State of Yemen" solution. The Khamr Conference of May, 1965, had demonstrated that, if left to themselves, Yemenis could achieve an all-Yemen solution. The Government which emerged from that conference (with Ahmad Numan as Prime Minister and Ambassador al-Aini as Foreign Minister) had represented all elements of Yemeni opinion. It had not won Saudi support, however, and efforts to elicit the support of other Arab governments had failed. Finally, the Numan government had been actively opposed by Nasser, and this had led to its ultimate collapse. The Khamr Conference had nevertheless revealed the basic weakness of Nasser's position in Yemen at that time. It was thus the Yemenis themselves, not Faisal, who had obliged Nasser to conclude the Jidda Agreement. (The Secretary requested Ambassador al-Aini to send him copies of the Khamr Conference resolutions.) The Secretary said it appeared from what Ambassador al-Aini had said that two basic questions were involved. The first was what would happen within Yemen. This was for the Yemenis themselves to decide, hopefully with a maximum degree of solidarity. The second related to the tensions between Saudi Arabia and the U.A.R. The latter problem, however, had become interwoven with the first. He wondered if the Yemenis could not find some way--perhaps through the United Nations--to show the world that they were prepared to agree among themselves. Perhaps this would have a good effect on Saudi Arabia and the U.A.R. He had a feeling that the problem was less one of Saudi emphasis on the Yemeni royal family than it was of simply making the voice of the Yemeni people heard in the world. Though he might be quite wrong, a Yemen settlement seemed just out of reach and might be achieved if the Yemenis could get together and make their voice heard. What role could the United Nations play? Ambassador al-Aini replied that the U.N. could supervise the implementation of any agreement that might be reached. The previous U.N. effort in connection with the Bunker Mission had not been fruitful because, largely due to Nasser's opposition, there had been no true agreement for the U.N. to supervise. If an agreement were now reached, there would be a role for the U.N. to play. The difficulty was that responsible Yemenis were too disillusioned and exhausted, too disappointed by the failure of the revolution, to seek a solution now on their own. They had come to feel that the matter was no longer in their hands. There were many like himself who were neither pro-U.A.R. nor pro-Saudi and who had nowhere to turn. In the Ambassador's opinion the United States, as a friend of all concerned, was in the best position to help. The Secretary said that our influence was more limited than the Ambassador seemed to imply but we would give thoughtful consideration to this problem. He continued to believe, however, that the important thing was to make the voice of Yemeni solidarity heard in the world--perhaps through a new Harad Conference, which was after all a device that both Saudi Arabia and the U.A.R. had accepted. Wouldn't it be difficult for Saudi Arabia and the U.A.R. to reject a Government on which the Yemenis themselves had agreed? Ambassador al-Aini thought it might be useful to seek support in other Arab capitals but outside of the Arab League framework. Earlier in the conversation he had noted that the Ruler of Kuwait was now in Cairo, reportedly to discuss Yemen, and that the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister had recently visited Saudi Arabia and had expressed hope that Kuwait might be able to play a useful role. Turning to U.S.-Y.A.R.G. relations, Ambassador al-Aini praised the Taiz Municipal Water System, an A.I.D. project, and suggested similar projects in such places as Sanaa and Hodeida. Such projects were a demonstration of American support for the Yemeni people and unrelated to the republican-royalist conflict. The Ambassador also urged that the United States provide more scholarships for Yemeni students. Only about twelve Yemenis had been sent to the United States to study since the revolution, whereas hundreds had gone to the Eastern Bloc. The Secretary replied that we would look into both of these matters. Finally, Ambassador al-Aini urged that U.S. PL-480 wheat deliveries to Yemen continue.
400. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State/1/ Jidda, May 2, 1966, 0808Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret. Repeated to Cairo for Ambassador Hare, London, and Taiz. 1040. King Faisal's comments on Yemen. 1. By prearrangement, Ambassador Hare/2/ and I called on King April 30 in Riyadh. Meeting lasted more than two hours, was extremely cordial and informal. King warmly welcomed "long time friend" and after a while decided session should be considered "family" rather than official gathering and did rare thing invite us smoke. Also present were Prince Sultan (who made special flight from Jidda to be there), Saqqaf and Rashed Pharaon. After extending invitation to King visit US (septel)/3/ Hare alluded to Sultan's able presentation of King's views to President, Secretaries Rusk and McNamara and others during MODA's recent visit to US. King and Sultan obviously pleased. /2/Assistant Secretary Hare was on a trip to the Near East during which he visited several other capitals, including Amman, Beirut, Cairo, and Tel Aviv. /3/Reference is to telegram 1038 from Jidda, May 2. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 SAUD) 2. Most of meeting devoted to discussion of Yemen. Hare recalled his own previous connection with Yemen while Amb to Saudi Arabia. At his request, King then outlined background and status current Kuwaiti mediation effort. Noted Kuwaiti FonMin's recent visit to Saudi Arabia and UAR during which both sides had outlined their points of view. Kuwaitis have said they plan bring Khouli to Riyadh to discuss outstanding issues with Saudis, but SAG has heard nothing further about any dates for such visit. Kuwaiti FonMin also indicated his readiness join any such session to help parties minimize areas of disagreement. King said he agreeable such meeting, but was noncommittal on prospects for success. 3. This led King into lengthy review of development of Yemeni problem with emphasis on Nasser's failure comply with various agreements reached with him, despite lip service of willingness to do so. King specifically mentioned Bunker agreement, Alexandria conference and most recent Jidda agreement. Saudis, King insisted, have done all possible facilitate Nasser's withdrawal from Yemen with honor and dignity. Haradh conference aborted because of UAR failure tell YAR leaders of obligations assumed by Nasser in Jidda agreement. In contrast, Saudis have kept Yemeni royalists under control. Indeed Yemeni royalists were displeased with some aspects Jidda agreement, but King had insisted they must accept it. Hare noted Secretary's strong view that Yemenis must ultimately decide their own form of govt. King said this also his view and referred to two major outstanding issues of composition interim govt and Hamid ad-Dins. Implication his comments was that Saudi positions on these two items intended allow Yemenis themselves to choose. 4. King's account was largely re-hash of what he and other senior Saudi officials have repeatedly related to us. Throughout session King kept reiterating unanswered question "Why" has Nasser apparently changed his position. He cited various reasons adduced by "some people" for this. One is that "outside" forces are pressing him to do so. (Pharaon here interjected account of Nasser's trip to Moscow few days after Jidda agreement. Thereafter Nasser had seemingly taken new tack.) Another is that Nasser afraid of reaction of UAR military to any withdrawal. Third is possible desire move into Aden vacuum when Brits leave. There even "some people" who argue USG wants Nasser remain in Yemen in order lessen prospects of Arab-Israeli clash. King noted all of foregoing conjecture and confessed he unable fathom reasons for Nasser's seeming change. He was deeply puzzled about it and its implications. He wondered if USG had any info which might throw light on Nasser's current position on Nasser's seeming turnabout on Yemen. 5. Hare disclaimed any special USG knowledge of what might be prompting Nasser's action. He asked King if His Majesty knew of anything internal in UAR which might have some bearing on Nasser position. King said he did not. King noted immediate aspect of problem watched by SAG is border situation where Egyptian military has regrouped. Sultan interjected account of recent intrusion several UAR tanks into Saudi territory about which he claimed he had not heretofore told King. Fortunately there had been no firing and Egyptians had subsequently apologized for incident and claimed tanks got lost. (This presumable same incident reported Embtel 1024.)/4/ Sultan noted that if single Saudi or Egyptian soldier had panicked and started shooting situation could quickly have deteriorated. /4/Dated April 28. (Ibid., DEF 12-5 SAUD) 6. Hare commended King's statesmanship in exercising patience and restraint in present admittedly difficult situation. Hare noted that our relations with UAR can hardly be described as satisfactory, but as with other difficult states we continue to try to keep dialogue going. King agreed on need for patience, but wondered how long forebearance can be continued. Sultan noted UAR has regularly been bombing certain Yemeni royalist villages last few weeks. 7. Comment: While nothing startlingly new came out of lengthy Yemen discussion, opportunity for King get things off his chest with senior American official from Washington was useful. Have subsequently been told by Saqqaf that King very satisfied with meeting. One point of passing interest, apropos of nothing, was comment by King in discussing Kuwaiti mediation effort that Kuwaitis quoted Nasser as telling them USG had told Sadat that Sultan had complained to Secretary about Soviet installations which UAR allegedly permitting be built on UAR territory. King's purpose relating this round robin exposition unclear, and he did not pursue point. Eilts
401. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Yemen/1/ Washington, May 5, 1966, 5 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret. Drafted by Moore, cleared by Symmes, and approved by Davies. Repeated to Cairo, Jidda, London, and CINCSTRIKE. 247. Your 414/2/ and 419./3/ /2/Telegram 414 from Taiz, May 3, reported that the Yemeni news media had published statements by six top YARG leaders, including Prime Minister al-Amri, supporting Nasser's May Day speech. Al-Amri was quoted as saying that Nasser had expressed what was in the heart of every Yemeni, particularly regarding the aims of the revolution and the desire to regain the stolen parts of Yemen. (Ibid., POL 15-1 UAR) In his speech, Nasser had threatened to seize Najran and Jizan and return those provinces to Yemen. /3/Dated May 5. (Ibid.) 1. While major decisions re future Yemen rest with Saudis and UAR, Yemenis themselves continue have possibility wrecking attempts reach settlement. Inflammatory statements of type reported reftel are particularly destructive and seem represent to some degree Yemeni abdication responsibility. 2. Request at your discretion you discuss subject along following lines with appropriate high level Yemeni officials: a. Continued USG policy is to work for cessation foreign interference Yemen and freedom Yemenis decide own future. Our recognition and support of Republic are manifestations this approach. b. Since termination Bunker Agreement we have tried avoid taking direct role in mediation efforts, but nonetheless have continued exert all feasible efforts encourage Saudis and UAR reach settlement and avoid hostilities. c. Statements attributed YARG leaders in Yemeni news media May 2-3 inflame situation and make more difficult attempts by US and other friendly countries to ease Yemen problem. After three years fighting, Yemenis must share our hopes for return of peace and stability to country. We fail see that heightened UAR-Saudi tension furthers these goals. d. We strongly urge YARG leaders contribute to our and others' efforts by avoiding such pronouncements./4/ /4/In telegram 429 from Taiz, May 9, Clark reported that he had met on May 8 with Foreign Minister Makki, to whom he had expressed his own great personal disappointment over developments and presented the Department's views regarding recent UAR and YAR statements. (Ibid., POL 27 YEMEN) Rusk
402. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, June 22, 1966. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 SAUD. Secret. Drafted by Moore on June 24 and approved in S on July 14. The memorandum is Part I of II. For other memoranda of conversations recording King Faisal's meetings with President Johnson and Secretary Rusk during his June 21-23 visit to Washington, see Documents 274-278. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS King Faisal The Secretary The King opened the discussion with a general query about DeGaulle's visit to the U.S.S.R. The Secretary said we did not expect any surprises; that there had been some movement among the Eastern European countries for closer relations with Western Europe, but we continued to treat signs that the Communist countries wanted a dtente with considerable caution in the light of our past experience with them. The King expressed his view that no one could believe the promises of Leftists. He continued to endorse fully our firm positions in Vietnam and Berlin and hoped that we would be equally firm in not pulling out of the Near East. The Secretary said we, as the only free world country capable of independent action, must take a global view of the Communist problem. We watch the situation in the Near East very closely. It is clear that the U.S.S.R. wants to build its policy around Nasser. Nasser goes along with this up to a point, but where his limits lie is not clear. Concerning Yemen, the Secretary affirmed our hope that the U.A.R. would withdraw its troops. He noted, however, that with more troops in Egypt, the possibility existed for the U.A.R. to move toward the east, which would result in a full scale war; to the west, where we had our important base in Libya; or to the south, which would create a large problem with the Sudan and would not be welcome by the Africans. With these possibilities in mind he asked for the King's view concerning the strategic importance of the withdrawal of Egyptian troops from Yemen. He added that they had already spoken of the impact that these troops would have within Egypt itself, but that was Nasser's problem, not ours. In response, the King suggested that consideration of Egyptian military movements to the east, west or south of the country was basically hypothetical. He did not think Nasser would have the interest or capability of taking such action. The practical realities were whether the Egyptians would or would not withdraw from Yemen. In his view, their staying in Yemen would have far more serious repercussions than would their return. (The Secretary interjected, "I agree".) The King continued that the presence of Egyptian troops in Yemen deprived the Yemenis of that domestic stability which is essential for improving their lot and would continue to pose a constant source of fear, particularly for the Gulf and South Arabian states. It would allow the Communists firmly to establish themselves among the Yemeni masses, not just in the government and army, and threaten development of another Vietnam. The King's fear was not particularly that he would be attacked, but concerned the long range penetration of the Communists which is abetted by the presence of U.A.R. troops in Yemen. The King said he knew Nasser personally and was certain that he was not a believing Communist, particularly because he believes in nothing except his own personal domination. For this he would follow any ideological line necessary. He said this with pain since, when he spoke of Nasser, he spoke in a sense of a part of himself, for Nasser was an Arab, was counted among the Muslims, and was for a long time a good personal friend. The King said he had recently received information that the U.A.R. had now returned 5,000 troops to Yemen, more than balancing earlier withdrawals. The Secretary commented that maintaining troops in Yemen posed real problems for the U.A.R., not just economic ones, but other types. Among these were the growing opposition to the Egyptian presence among many Yemeni republicans, and the increasing dissatisfaction with and suspicion of U.A.R. activities by other Arab countries. Responding to the Secretary's query about possibilities for the success of the Kuwait mediation effort,/2/ the King said that he, just as the Secretary, had had hopes regarding the Jidda Agreement but that this was the third agreement on which Nasser had reneged. He attributed this to Nasser's fluctuating psychology which led him at times to be conciliatory (as when he went to Jidda) and a few days later to change to a mood of personal recalcitrance. With appropriate good will, a negotiated solution is always possible, but if that solution is to reflect solely Nasser's desires, then it is not possible. The King emphasized that the Kuwait proposals were clearly only Egyptian proposals, as shown by the timing of their presentation to him. He listed them as: 1) formation of a transitional government on a 50-50 basis; 2) that government to request withdrawal of U.A.R. troops (to be guaranteed by Nasser), withdrawal of the Hamid al-Din (to be guaranteed by Saudi Arabia); and a symbolic presence of up to 100 troops from each of several Arab countries to assist with the plebiscite. The King said he had problems with this, among them being that his agreement to this general proposal would displace the specific U.A.R.-Saudi accord reached in the Jidda Agreement, and instead would involve some type of projected accord between each country and the transitional government. The stipulation concerning the Hamid al-Din was difficult. As previously agreed, he would fully support requests by a transitional government, after withdrawal of Egyptian forces, for exclusion of any person or group. Additionally, the Hamid al-Din do not take orders from him and were not necessarily always amenable to his proposals. If the Hamid al-Din decided to remain, despite implementation of the Kuwait proposals, it was conceivable that the Saudis, as a party to those proposals, would have to send troops against the ex-royal family. The Jidda Agreement continued to be the basis for the Saudi position. In this they had agreed that the transitional government would be the sole authority in the country, absorbing both republicans and royalists. Basically the Kuwait--which should be considered Egyptian--proposals are all contained in the Jidda Agreement. The new suggestions are just a smokescreen. Concerning troop withdrawal, the Jidda Agreement had no ambiguities: Egyptian troops were to begin withdrawal on the date of the Haradh Conference and to complete it within 10 months. /2/Telegram 3129 from Cairo, June 6, reported Ambassador Battle's discussion of Kuwaiti efforts to mediate the Yemen conflict with al-Khouli, who had just returned from Kuwait. The initial Kuwaiti proposal called for formation of a transitional Yemeni government (50 percent republican and 50 percent royalist) which would: set the date for a plebiscite in Yemen; ask Cairo to withdraw UAR troops from Yemen; ask Saudi Arabia to withdraw the Hamid al-Din family from Yemen; and ask the Arab League to send token forces to Yemen to help maintain order in collaboration with equal strength Saudi and UAR forces. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN) The King sent for a copy of the letter containing the actual Saudi responses to the Kuwait proposal. These were: 1) adherence to the Jidda Agreement in letter and spirit; 2) adherence to the text of the Agreement, noting particularly that the first four articles discuss the desire for a solution in accordance with the desires of the Yemeni people and therefore provide for a transitional government, and that both the U.A.R. and Saudis are committed to assist this government; 3) the solution should involve (a) renewed Haradh Conference; (b) the name "state of Yemen"; (c) the government during the transitional period to be formed on a 50-50 royalist-republican basis (as was the clearly implied intent of the Jidda Agreement, reflected in the proposed proportion of representation at the Haradh Conference); (d) members of the transitional government to be appointed by the Haradh Conference; (e) both republicans and royalists to support the transitional government and not disturb the peace during the transitional period; (f) both the U.A.R. and Saudi Arabia agree to support implementation of the transitional government's decisions; (g) Egyptian troops to be withdrawn in a time period to be established, but not to exceed 5 to 6 months; (h) the Saudis to refrain from giving military aid to the royalists; (i) the transitional government to have the right to expel any person or group considered a threat to the people or whose presence would exert undue influence on the plebiscite; (j) symbolic forces of not more than 100 to be requested from Kuwait, Sudan, Libya, and Morocco to assist in supervision of the plebiscite. The Secretary asked if the problem could be approached piecemeal with, for instance, the King and Nasser first agreeing to establish a transitional government on a 50-50 basis and then moving to the next step. He asked this because he had the impression that the Yemenis on both sides were becoming most restive with continued presence of the Egyptians and because he felt such a group, agreed to by Yemenis of both persuasions, would get very strong international support. He added that this query arose only from our interest, that he was not volunteering as a mediator. The King said he had as yet not heard of any reaction from Cairo to the current proposals but believed that Nasser--as the probable author of the proposals--would doubtless agree to a 50-50 representation. The Secretary said we continued to follow the situation with great interest, are keenly interested in peace in the area and believe withdrawal of Egyptian troops would contribute to this objective. We were at a relatively low point in our up-and-down relationship with Cairo, and our influence there was thus very limited.
403. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State/1/ Jidda, July 7, 1966, 1230Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Beirut, Cairo, Kuwait, London, and Taiz. 67. Jidda 36 (Notal)./2/ Kuwaiti Mediation Effort. /2/Dated July 5. (Ibid.) 1. In my first talk with King July 6 since his and my return to Jidda (Jidda 66),/3/ I recalled our conversation in car en route JFK airport June 30 when King told me had just received details latest UAR proposal as conveyed by Kuwaitis. King's initial reaction had been UAR proposal represented retrograde step over what Kuwaitis had earlier led SAG to believe was Nasser's position (Jidda 1272),/4/ but King had wished study matter further following his return to Saudi Arabia. I asked King if he had any further thoughts on subject and about status of Saudi reply. King answered SAG still studying latest UAR proposals. Dr. Pharaon currently drafting reply for his consideration. Observed he personally had not had much opportunity since his return to consider question further in view heavy accumulated backlog of work. /3/Dated July 7. (Ibid., POL 7 SAUD) /4/Dated June 13. (Ibid., POL 27 YEMEN) 2. I recalled Secretary's observation to King that most important aspect Yemen problem is to get UAR troops out (Deptel 867)./5/ In this context I stressed need keep dialogue going and expressed hope that King not overlook any practical opportunity achieve this aim even though some price might have to be paid for it. While caution clearly needed in dealing with Nasser, I urged that King earnestly consider further areas of "give" which would not jeopardize Saudi security. Where King felt he could not agree to UAR proposals as advanced by Kuwaitis, I further urged he offer constructive counter proposals. Seemed to me that area of disagreement was being reduced, even though slowly and painfully, and it important effort do so continue. In this context it also important that ways be sought give Nasser honorable way out. /5/Telegram 867 to Jidda, June 24, summarized the Secretary's June 22 conversation with King Faisal. (Ibid., POL 7 SAUD) 3. King listened carefully. Re last point, claimed he had been seeking offer Nasser honorable way out of Yemen for last three years. Trouble is Nasser cannot be trusted. He recalled had agreed with Secretary's view on importance getting UAR troops out. He also recalled Secretary's observation that perhaps problem could be tackled piecemeal, first by setting up Yemeni interim govt on 50-50 basis and carrying on from there. Latter would have been consistent with earlier Kuwaiti proposal which Saudis believed Kuwaitis had first cleared with UAR. Latest UAR proposal, as conveyed by Kuwaitis, drops equal representation in interim govt and deliberately seeks weigh govt on republican side. King emphasized he not prepared give UAR diplomatic victory in Yemen when its massive military interventions had failed to achieve this. 4. King then dwelt on UAR insistence that he specifically agree to exclusion Hamid ad-Din. Reiterated he had no interest in Hamid ad-Din or anyone else in Yemen, but claimed sole purpose Nasser desire name Hamid ad-Dins is to achieve by political means what UAR has failed achieve militarily. King candidly admitted that Hamid ad-Din family, with all its shortcomings, is currently core of royalist cause. In King's view, the moment he specifically agrees to exclusion Hamid ad-Din, royalist cause will disintegrate and transform into tribal rabble. Nasser knows this which is sole reason, King insisted, that Nasser is so persistent about point. Moment King agrees to specific exclusion Hamid ad-Din, Nasser will leak word of it. Thereafter, he will jettison any guarantee he has given and keep in Yemen whatever number UAR troops remain there. This is constant Nasser tactic. I argued any such effort by Nasser to renege on solemn guarantee would mobilize world public opinion against him. King dismissed argument saying world public opinion, even if it could be mounted which he doubted, had never deterred Nasser from overt or covert activities against other states. 5. King continued his position remains that interim Yemeni Govt, if constituted on mutually agreeable basis, should be authorized exclude any Yemenis whose continued presence is believed to be harmful to stability, but that he would not agree to specific exclusion Hamid ad-Din except after last UAR soldier out. Thereafter Yemeni people could decide in plebiscite or any other way type of govt they want for future and persons they want in it. If such Yemeni Govt wants financial help, SAG, along with other states, would be prepared consider such help. 6. I said I appreciated King's position, but cautioned against SAG appearing inflexible. If latest proposals not fully agreeable, I again urged that constructive counter proposals be offered. For example, would 2/5-3/5 ratio be so bad if Yemeni third force were charged to republican side. In any event, once UAR troops out, there likely be considerable realignment of political forces in Yemen on both sides with various what are now republican and royalist elements crisscrossing to form new groupings. I understood anti-Egyptianism rampant in Yemen which should offer some safeguard against UAR influence. As for Hamid ad-Din, could they perhaps be kept out during period of interim govt before plebiscite or perhaps they might be withdrawn after larger number UAR troops out than half but before all are out. I stressed I was advancing purely personal thoughts solely for illustrative purpose to identify possible further areas of "give" which might be explored in order to achieve principle aim getting UAR troops out. King, in his wisdom, Dr Pharaon and other Saudi officials intimately acquainted with Yemeni situation could doubtless devise other even better alternatives which would show SAG willingness compromise, yet prove viable. Important thing was that SAG-UAR dialogue carry on. King said SAG would do utmost, but noted "after three years of futile talks, UAR has tired US on Yemen just as USG efforts with North Vietnam to find peaceful solution have tired you." I seized on this to remind King that, despite all frustrations of Vietnam, President has made it clear USG continues search for peaceful solution and is doing so. I hoped King would do likewise in Yemeni situation. King merely responded "I will continue to do my best." 7. I shall also seek opportunity discuss matter with Dr Pharaon next few days. Deptel 1924 July 6/6/ just received. I believe my remarks consistent with it. /6/Telegram 1924 to Jidda, July 6, endorsed the Ambassador's intention to further explore with the King specific areas of give in the Saudi position, and instructed him to encourage Faisal not to overlook any practical possibilities for achieving withdrawal of UAR troops from Yemen. (Ibid., POL 27 YEMEN) Eilts
404. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Yemen/1/ Washington, July 23, 1966, 10:44 a.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret. Drafted by Moore on July 22, cleared by Davies and Campbell, and approved by Hare. Repeated to Cairo, Jidda, London, Aden, Dhahran, and CINCSTRIKE. 13996. Subject: Request for US Financial Aid. Ref: Taiz 79,/2/ 80./3/ /2/Telegram 79 from Taiz, July 18, reported that an approach had been made to Embassy AID Director Benz by a representative of a group of Yemeni republicans, who informed him that they were urgently considering the possibility of forming a new government against UAR wishes and wanted to know whether they could depend on friends like the U.S. Government and Saudi Arabia to help them financially. Benz replied that as AID director, he was unable to respond to this request but agreed to forward the request to Washington. (Ibid.) /3/In telegram 80 from Taiz, July 18, Charg d'Affaires Harlan B. Clark argued that unless Nasser and Faisal reached agreement, the proposed attempt to free Yemen of its financial dependence on the United Arab Republic would bring the United States into direct confrontation with Nasser, which might cause troubles elsewhere in the Near East. (Ibid.) 1. While sympathizing with Yemeni efforts establish moderate government, believe it most important we avoid any impression of partisan involvement in factional Yemeni domestic politics. On this basis you should continue discourage requests for US assistance such as reported reftels. 2. If responsible YARG group subsequently requests UN role, we would be willing consider sympathetically what we could do to help in light of circumstances at time of request. Rusk
405. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Hare) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, August 2, 1966. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, NEA/ARP Files: Lot 69 D 257, Political Affairs & Rel., YEMEN 1966, POL YEMEN-UNITED STATES. Secret. Drafted by Korn; cleared by UAR Country Director Donald C. Bergus and Director of AID's Office of Near Eastern Affairs James C. Flint. SUBJECT Discussion: Ambassador al-Aini will be accompanied by Mr. Held of NEA/ARP. A biographic sketch is attached./2/ /2/Attached but not printed. The Ambassador has just returned from consultation in Cairo with top officials of his government, having participated in the initial stages of a confrontation between Yemeni and UAR leaders over continued Egyptian domination of Yemen. He reports that formerly pro-UAR Prime Minister al-Amri and other top YARG figures are now prepared to stand up to the Egyptians and believes that the YARG is well on its way to limiting UAR control of his country. Ambassador al-Aini also foresees better US-Yemeni relations and has expressed the hope that the US would take steps to promote an improved atmosphere. Specific items the Ambassador may raise in this context are the YARG's request for famine relief and the proposed Sanaa water works project. Probably unknown to Ambassador al-Aini, his assertions of Yemeni independence of Cairo have been reflected in clandestine approaches to our Embassy in Yemen by civilian and military officers of the YARG. These officials, who claim they speak for powerful but unnamed groups of Yemenis, have expressed disgust over high-handed YAR actions and stated that the formation of a new Yemeni government against UAR wishes is under consideration. They have asked for US and Saudi financial assistance sufficient to insure payment of Yemeni Army salaries (approximately $500,000 per month). We have instructed our Embassy to discourage such requests./3/ While we sympathize with Yemeni efforts to establish a moderate government, we believe it most important that we avoid giving any impression of partisan US involvement in Yemeni domestic politics. /3/See Document 404. Following talks in Jidda and Cairo late last month, the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister announced that King Faisal and President Nasser have agreed to send representatives to Kuwait shortly for direct negotiations on Yemen. The UAR and the Saudis have reportedly accepted the principal elements of a six point Kuwaiti proposal but are apparently still in disagreement over the length of time to be alloted for withdrawal of UAR troops from Yemen and the point at which the Yemeni royal family should be banned from the country. We have been trying since mid-January to arrange a program for distribution of food to all hungry Yemenis, both royalist and republican. The YARG has refused to accept a proposal for distribution of US-supplied food by the ICRC. We are at present attempting to arrange for distribution of food in all Yemen through the World Food Program (WFP) of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization. The YARG itself has requested help from this agency, but the WFP has not yet decided whether it can undertake an "all-Yemen" program. Recommendation: That you tell Ambassador al-Aini: a. We sympathize with the YARG's desire to be master in its own house. b. We are encouraged by the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister's apparent success in persuading the UAR and the Saudis to agree to send representatives to Kuwait for talks on Yemen. We are hopeful these talks will result in a settlement acceptable to all the parties involved. If Ambassador al-Aini raises the Sanaa water project or the YARG request for famine relief, that you: a. Suggest that he discuss the Sanaa water project with Mr. Macomber during their meeting scheduled for August 4. (Barring an increase in the AID allotment for Yemen, this project would require a sizeable diversion of funds from our very successful urban and rural development program. It is not currently under consideration by AID.) b. Express hope that, for humanitarian reasons, arrangements can be made soon for food to be distributed to all hungry Yemenis, either through the WFP, if that agency is preferred by YARG and is willing to undertake the program, or through the ICRC, if the WFP cannot respond to YARG's request./4/ /4/Rusk met with Ambassador al-Aini at 11:05 a.m. on August 3. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book) [Continue with the next documents] Volume XXI Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |