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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXI Near East Region Department of State |
 387. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/ Washington, February 20, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Saudi Arabia, 1965-March 1966. No classification marking. SUBJECT I. Circumstances of the Visit: King Faisal has asked you to receive his brother who is carrying an urgent special message. We are unaware of the subject but believe it will reflect Faisal's deep concern over the Yemen problem. Prince Sultan is [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] well regarded by the King. II. Faisal's Position on Yemen reflects the following: 1. Concern that Egyptian troop withdrawals from Yemen have not yet started and belief that Nasser does not intend to honor commitments to complete these withdrawals by the end of September 1966; (We believe Nasser will withdraw but not until the Saudis agree to an acceptable transitional regime.) 2. Belief that the Soviets are financing Nasser's staying in Yemen in order to establish a foothold in the Red Sea area, including submarine bases; (We disagree, believe Saudi figures on numbers of Soviets and Chinese Communists in Yemen are highly inflated, and consider unfounded Saudi claims of Soviet naval or military installations in the Red Sea region; we are willing to share with the Saudis our detailed assessments of the Communist threat.) 3. View that U.S. PL 480 food deliveries to the UAR abet Nasser's remaining in Yemen; (We disagree: the threat of loss of our food aid is not sufficient to bring Nasser to accept humiliation in Yemen.) 4. Expectation that he will resume aid to the royalists if Egyptian troop withdrawals do not soon begin. (We caution patience; resumption of aid would result in renewed fighting, the Jidda Agreement contains obligations for both sides.) III. Failure of Nasser and Faisal to agree on such vital arrangements as the form of the interim government in Yemen and the ratio in it between royalists and republicans make it unlikely a resumed Haradh conference could achieve results. Faisal seems increasingly inflexible and his failure to respond to UAR overtures is a major factor blocking agreement. IV. Recommended points to make to the Prince: 1. The objective of all parties should be an independent Yemen in which the Yemenis are free to determine their own future without any outside intervention. 2. The Jidda Agreement of August, 1965 provides the best basis for achieving this objective. We believe it unlikely the current misunderstandings can be resolved without renewed contact between King Faisal and President Nasser of a serious, frank and flexible character. We urge that King Faisal seek this contact. We are similarly urging President Nasser to be flexible. 3. Resumed fighting could well force the republicans into greater reliance on the Soviets and the UAR. 4. We continue highly to value the friendship of Saudi Arabia and reaffirm our support for Saudi territorial integrity. As we have previously informed the Saudi Arabian Government, we could not permit this commitment to be used as a shield for Saudi initiatives in the Yemen situation that would provoke UAR attacks on Saudi Arabia. 5. We most appreciate Faisal's support for our position in Viet Nam and his efforts at last fall's Arab Summit Conference in Casablanca to prevent condemnation of U.S. bombing of North Viet Nam. 6. You are pleased at the cooperation between our two countries in the development field, including the recently concluded agreement for assistance from our Department of Interior for construction of a five million gallon per day water desalting plant at Jidda. Dean Rusk/2/ /2/Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original.
388. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, February 23, 1966, 12:40 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret. Drafted by Michael Sterner (NEA/NE) on February 24 and approved in S on March 3. The time of the meeting is taken from Rusk's Appointment Book. (Johnson Library) SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS His Excellency Anwar al-Sadat, President of the U.A.R. National Assembly The Secretary After welcoming Mr. Sadat and his colleagues, the Secretary asked how the meeting with President Johnson had gone./2/ Mr. Sadat expressed his entire satisfaction at his meeting with the President, and Ambassador Hare also indicated that it had been both a friendly and productive discussion. Secretary Rusk commented on Mr. Sadat's personal familiarity with Yemen and asked for his assessment of the present situation there. Mr. Sadat replied that first he wanted to express his warm thanks for the Secretary's invitation and for the cordial reception he had received in the U.S. /2/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XVIII, Document 274. As the Secretary knew last August Nasser went to Jidda and reached an agreement with King Faisal for a settlement in Yemen. The Secretary commented the U.S.G. had felt this was a very constructive episode in Arab affairs. Mr. Sadat said the main provisions of the agreement had been the holding of a conference to set up a provisional government, after which there was to be a plebiscite to approve this government. Thereafter, the U.A.R. would begin to withdraw its military forces from Yemen. The U.A.R. was in fact prepared to do this, but it could not leave the country before a workable provisional government had been set up. The Haradh Conference had failed to accomplish this task. Sadat personally had foreseen that the Haradh conference would fail unless the Egyptians and Saudis got together beforehand to agree on what the conference was to accomplish. The Saudis refused at that time and the conference had failed as expected. Again, the U.A.R. had asked the Saudis to sit down with them after the Haradh conference to discuss where the two sides went from there. This offer also was rejected by the Saudis. All told, there had been six offers by the U.A.R.G. for direct contacts with S.A.G., including an offer by Marshal Amer to go to Riyadh, all of which had been rejected by the Saudis. The Secretary asked what exactly the point was on which the Haradh Conference had foundered. Mr. Sadat replied that on the surface it centered on the question of the title that should be given to the country while it was under the provisional government. The Saudis disliked the title "Republic" so the U.A.R. readily agreed to the term "state". Underneath, however, the dispute was really a question of whether the Hamid al-Din family was to participate in the future political life of the country. Because of the amount of blood and money the U.A.R. had expended in Yemen, the U.A.R. could not accept a restoration of the Hamid al-Din family in Yemen. This was also the way the vast majority of Yemenis felt about it. The U.A.R. thought it had an understanding with King Faisal on this subject but apparently not. It was clear at the Haradh Conference that King Faisal had not given clear orders to the Royalists that the Hamid al-Dins were to be exiled from future Yemeni political life. The Secretary said he had the impression that the Yemenis on both sides were somewhat resentful that the Saudis and Egyptians were making decisions about their country without consulting the Yemenis themselves. Sadat said this was indeed one problem, but not nearly as important a factor as the lack of U.A.R.-Saudi agreement as to how the Jidda agreement was to be carried out. The Secretary wondered whether, even if the U.A.R. and Saudis were in complete agreement, they could make it stick with the Yemenis. Sadat indicated his firm belief this was the lesser of the two problems. Once the Saudis and Egyptians had a meeting of minds, the Yemenis would have no choice but to fall into place. The Secretary hoped the Saudi reply to Nasser's recent Yemeni proposals would be constructive. Ambassador Hare noted that the Saudi Ambassador in Cairo had been expected to get back to Cairo with a reply the very day that Mr. Sadat left the U.A.R. The Secretary commented that he had a feeling the personal equation was especially important in dealing with King Faisal. It seemed to him that the meeting in Jidda in August had been successful largely for this reason. Mr. Sadat agreed. He said the U.A.R. appreciated this and it was for this reason the U.A.R.G. had repeatedly tried to have direct contacts with the Saudis. It was difficult to know where to go in view of Saudi rejection of these offers. The rejections had been polite but rejections nonetheless. Ambassador Kamel said he thought King Faisal's ultimate objective was to create a confrontation between the U.S. and U.A.R. Mr. Sadat added, that and to see the U.A.R. humiliated by a continuing costly involvement in Yemen as the only alternative to "total surrender", i.e., a restoration of the Hamid al-Din Imamate. The meeting adjourned for lunch.
389. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, February 23, 1966, 3:33 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret. Drafted by Moore on February 24 and approved in S on February 28. The time of the meeting is taken from Rusk's Appointment Book. (Johnson Library) SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS The Secretary welcomed the Prince and the Prince extended King Faisal's sincerest personal greetings. Speaking on behalf of the King, the Prince said that the threat of Communism in the Near East was the biggest danger the Saudis now saw. They felt Islam was the strongest shield against Communism and endeavored to work on the basis of their religion against Communism just as we work against it as a doctrine. With full recognition of the broad intelligence gathering capabilities of the U.S., the Prince said the Saudis had strong indications that the Yemen problem and Nasser's activities there were part of the long range Communist blueprint for gaining strength in the area. Nasser's main aim seems to be to create chaotic situations and divert the constructive attitudes of countries like Saudi Arabia, which aim at building stability and economic progress. Concerning Yemen, Nasser and Faisal undertook obligations to settle the problem in both the Bunker Agreement of 1963/2/ and the Alexandria Agreement of 1964./3/ The Saudis worked hard to carry out these agreements in letter and spirit, but found Nasser unwilling. Joint Saudi-UAR observation groups in Yemen were set up under the Alexandria Agreement. They came to an end, however, when Nasser forcibly sent the Saudi participants back over the border. /2/For documentation on the April 1963 disengagement agreement negotiated by U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, Presidential Special Emissary for mediation of the Yemen conflict, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XVIII, Documents 187-189, 193-196, 202-203, 205, and 209-211. /3/See Document 353. In August 1965, the Prince continued, under internal economic pressure and probably after strong words from the U.S., Nasser entered into the Jidda Agreement. Prior to his arrival at Jidda, Nasser had agreed with Faisal on the broad outlines of a settlement. As a result of the agreement, the Saudi ceased military and material assistance to the Yemeni royalists at the time of its signature on August 23. Subsequently, however, Nasser went to Moscow and developments took a different turn. Radio Sanaa violently attacked the agreement. The Yemeni Prime Minister travelled to various places ("including Russia and China"). Arms were brought into Yemen from various sources. (Three Soviet ships unloaded arms and equipment at Hodeida.) The Saudis reproached the UAR saying that these developments did not fit into the spirit of the agreement. The UAR responded that it was having trouble controlling the Yemeni republicans. At the Harad Conference, said the Prince, the Saudis made all efforts to insure that the royalists would be responsive to opportunities to find a peaceful solution. Nasser failed to exert similar control over the republicans. When this was brought to his attention, Nasser suggested that the UAR and the Saudis again come together to work out a practical program for an agreement. Nasser responded by inviting Faisal to send his emissary to Cairo and at the same time forwarded to Faisal five suggested points: 1. the formation of a coalition provisional government; 2. this coalition government to be composed of 2/3 republicans and 1/3 royalists; 3. Yemen to be called, "State of Yemen"; 4. Egyptian troop withdrawal to be completed 10 months after the coalition government was formed; 5. the Hamid al-Din to be excluded from Yemen. According to the Prince, Faisal became increasingly disturbed at the apparent Communist involvement indicated by the formation of "popular fronts" ("Tandhim al-Shaabi") in Yemen; the presence of some 400 Chinese and a similar number of Russians in Yemen; the report that the USSR was establishing a submarine base on UAR territory; and an alleged agreement between the Yemeni republicans and the USSR--concluded with UAR help--for the Soviets to establish a naval base south of Hodeida. As a result, Faisal's response to Nasser's five points was as follows: a 50-50 representation of royalists and republicans as previously agreed on; withdrawal of UAR troops should take place within 10 months from November 23, 1965, in accordance with the Jidda Agreement (although its completion within 10 months from mid-February, the current time, would probably not be unacceptable); and, after a provisional government had been formed and both Saudi Arabia and the UAR had completely disengaged from Yemen, it would be incumbent on Nasser and Faisal to enforce any decision of that government to exclude the Hamid al-Din or any other group. The Prince was surprised to learn that Nasser had said yesterday that UAR troops would stay in Yemen until the British withdraw from Aden in 1968. This appeared to indicate Nasser had no intention of carrying out the Jidda Agreement. The Saudis believed that this stemmed from Communist desires to continue the existence of chaos in Yemen. The Secretary responded that we were most sensitive to any Communist moves to increase their control and would be particularly concerned with any such attempts to organize activity against Faisal. We believed it most important to have a close and systematic exchange of views on this subject with the Saudis. He requested Mr. Hare to work out the technique for implementing this on the basis most suitable to the Saudis (e.g., exchanges through our Embassy, or as desired). He said we had investigated and had found no confirmation of reports of Soviet submarine or naval bases in the area. He noted that Communist activity in other parts of the lower Red Sea also made it most important that we and the Saudis work closely together to improve our mutual understanding of what was going on, e.g., in South Arabian Federation, Somalia, etc. Concerning Yemen, the Secretary said that he had today listened to UAR Vice President Anwar Sadat speak on the same subject. On the basis of the Prince's and Mr. Sadat's comments, he felt that the Jidda Agreement was not dead. He was inclined to discount Nasser's speech of yesterday (the U.S. very often was not spared such attacks) and believed that further exploration of the points of the Jidda Agreement could lead to a solution. King Faisal had made very substantial diplomatic gains in the Jidda Agreement; every effort should be made to preserve that agreement in the best interests of Saudi Arabia. Turning to details, the Secretary gave his impression that Cairo still considers itself bound by a commitment to establish a provisional coalition government; that it expects to withdraw its troops from Yemen within ten months of the time such a government is established; that it is committed to support a plebiscite amongst the Yemenis to decide their own future; that Nasser has conceded the name, "State of Yemen," rather than "Republic of Yemen". The Secretary noted that it seemed indeed to be a fact that Nasser had had his problems with the Yemenis. He recalled that when speaking to the Yemeni Foreign Minister last fall, the latter had betrayed discontent with the UAR and Saudi Arabia having arranged an agreement without consulting the Yemenis. Despite troubles with the Yemenis, however, he believed that in the end Faisal and Nasser would have the final say concerning a settlement. The background elements at the time of the Jidda Agreement were much the same as they are today, which puts continued pressure on Nasser to carry out the agreement. Since that agreement was so much in Saudi Arabia's advantage, it would seem important for the Saudis to again attempt to make it work. The Secretary commented on the great increase in stability and development in Saudi Arabia in the last three years, for which Faisal should be congratulated. He noted that implementation of the Jidda Agreement would contribute markedly to continuation of that stability, to the benefit of Saudi Arabia. He emphasized that we were not trying to intrude ourselves between the UAR and the Saudis, but hoped that they would explore every possibility for saving the valuable Jidda Agreement. Mr. Hare said that he also had the same reaction after speaking to Mr. Sadat earlier in the day and had felt on reading the messages from Cairo and Jidda over the last few weeks that a certain spirit for agreement continued to exist on both sides. There was now only a cloud which needed to be pierced by quiet careful efforts from both parties. The Prince said that his Government was fearful that the Yemen would explode, to the benefit of the Communists, if a settlement were not reached in the near future. Mr. Hare asked if the Saudi reply to Nasser's five points had yet been delivered in Cairo. The Prince said that, to his information, Saudi Ambassador Alireza returned to Cairo the day before yesterday and presumably requested an appointment with Nasser. He guessed that, since Nasser's sharp personal attack yesterday on King Faisal, Ambassador Alireza might be instructed not to see the UAR President. The Prince then asked if we had any doubt of Saudi sincerity in supporting the Jidda Agreement. The Secretary said he had implicit trust in King Faisal's word that they supported the agreement. The Prince continued that they were ready in letter and spirit to find a settlement in Yemen but this was the third time that they had been deceived and he hoped we would not blame them for what they might have to do. Mr. Rusk referred to his personal involvement in nearly every great Communist-Free World crisis since World War II and said that he had learned patience to be the most important virtue since the alternatives were so terrible. After asking about the Prince's personal plans, the Secretary said he wished to discuss this matter in further detail with Mr. Hare and with the President and might be in touch with the Prince during the latter's stay in New York over the next two days. He assured the Prince that any suggestions we make are not merely maneuvers but are direct, honest views based on deep friendship. At the close of the discussion, the Prince noted that he had received a telegram from King Faisal asking that we seriously consider Jordan's request for supply of aircraft to avoid Jordan's being pressured to acquire Soviet planes at the forthcoming March Arab Prime Ministers' Conference. The Secretary said we are much aware of the problem and are working hard to meet it. The Prince expressed the hope that he could have some message from the President to take back with him to King Faisal.
390. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Hare)/1/ Washington, February 24, 1966, 11:03 a.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Box 929. No classification marking. Transcribed by Rusk's personal assistant, Carolyn J. Proctor. TELEPHONE CALL TO AMB. HARE Sec said he assumed H had been thinking about the best follow up for the Saudi-Egyptian business; Sec wondered whether he was too positive about the possibility of an agreement. H thought not, but Faisal has been needling Nasser. Sec wondered if he should see Sadat again. H said he had said he would, so he should. Sec said ok, and 5 pm Friday was agreed; Sec said he wanted to talk about reducing the arms race. H said they were working on a letter to Faisal for the Prince to take back tomorrow night. Sec wondered if we should be doing any dickering between the two while they are here; Sec thought it was better for them to deal straight with each other; H agreed. Sec said he needed to be in touch with the Prince in order to give the letter to take back.
391. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, February 25, 1966, 5:05-6:39 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret. Drafted by Sterner on February 28 and approved in S on March 28. The time of the meeting is taken from Rusk's Appointment Book. (Johnson Library) SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS The Secretary said that since seeing Sadat last, he had had a chance to talk to the Saudi Defense Minister, Prince Sultan, and get his views on the Yemen situation. After hearing both the U.A.R. and Saudi views, the Secretary felt there were no major obstacles to settlement. He would like to encourage the thought that with a little more work on the part of both of these great countries the gap between them could be narrowed. Mr. Sadat hoped the Secretary's optimism would prove to be well founded. Since the Jidda agreement, the U.A.R.'s objective in Yemen was to evacuate its troops from the country completely. Now, in view of King Faisal's ambiguous attitude, the U.A.R. might be forced to change this objective. Faisal kept saying he wanted a settlement in Yemen, but his acts were beginning to point to another conclusion, and it was the acts that counted, not the words. The Secretary hoped the Saudi reply, which should have been received in Cairo by then, would be constructive. Mr. Sadat said this raised another question. Suppose the latest Saudi response turned out to be more of the same--sugared words but no constructive action underneath--what should the U.A.R. do? The Secretary said he had the impression from his recent conversations with both sides that the gap was not so great as might seem. It did not appear to be one which further discussion had no hope of bridging. The Secretary said he would like to make two comments, both against the background of our relations with the U.S.S.R. The fewer things that were said about the other side publicly with sharp edges on them the better. Secondly, he strongly urged that a decision not be made too quickly that further discussion was pointless. For one thing, the alternatives to discussion were not too pleasant. The Secretary felt diplomacy had a duty to be persistent. Mr. Sadat agreed with the last statement. Before coming on this trip he had met with President Nasser on Yemen and they had agreed the U.A.R. would give Saudi Arabia another two months, from the date that they informed the U.S.G., before deciding on a "change of strategy" in Yemen./2/ /2/Ambassador Kamel later told Ambassador Hare that this statement was not intended to be an ultimatum. He said the intention of the Speaker was to say that the U.A.R.G. had decided to wait at least another two months before reviewing the situation to see whether a change of strategy was required. [Footnote in the source text.] The Secretary said the U.S. would continue its friendly interest in a settlement but we didn't feel we could play a role that could substitute for direct contact between the U.A.R. and Saudi Arabia. Mr. Sadat said he knew this was U.S. policy, but he wished the U.S.G. would give further consideration to playing a helpful role. The U.A.R. saw the need to compromise but it could not abandon the field empty handed. The Saudis seemed now to want the complete extinction of the Yemeni Republic and the total discrediting of the U.A.R. for having supported it. This the U.A.R. would never accept. Aside from the blood and treasure the U.A.R. had expended in Yemen, there was the consideration that the Yemeni Republic had been recognized by the U.N. and most of the nations in the world. The Secretary emphasized that internationally the U.S. had a great interest in seeing peace maintained between Saudi Arabia and the U.A.R. We also wanted to see a government in Yemen that was acceptable to the Yemenis themselves. The Secretary promised the U.S. would continue to follow the situation and if there were things the U.S. might do to help matters along, we would give them consideration.
392. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Sudan/1/ Washington, March 8, 1966, 6:59 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Moore; cleared by Symmes, Davies, Officer in Charge of Sudanese Affairs Robert W. Stookey, and Hare; and approved by Rusk. Also sent to Jidda and repeated to Taiz and Cairo. 305. Cairo tel 2267 to Dept (being rptd Khartoum)./2/ Yemen. /2/In telegram 2267 from Cairo, March 7, Battle reported that al-Khouli had informed him that Nasser met with Saudi Ambassador Ali Reza on March 5 to receive Faisal's long-delayed reply to his proposals for a new agreement on Yemen. The King asked for withdrawal by September 25 and an interim government with a 50/50 ratio of republicans and royalists, and said that he would consider banishing the Hamid al-Dins once withdrawal was complete. Nasser responded that the United Arab Republic was not prepared to withdraw its proposal for an all-Yemeni interim government with a 2-to-1 ratio of republicans to royalists. (Ibid.) 1. Khouli's report (reftel) of Nasser response to Faisal message on Yemen gives hope real progress. Important we urge Faisal not lose opportunity presented or allow slackening in momentum. 2. For Khartoum:/3/ Please deliver urgently following oral message from Secretary to Faisal: /3/Faisal was in Khartoum preceding the Arab Prime Ministers' Conference, March 14-17. a. Hassan Sabri al-Khouli has informed us of Nasser's March 5 response to King's recent message on Yemen. (Summarize gist of message as in reftel.) b. As emphasized both to Prince Sultan and Anwar Sadat in recent visits Washington, we believe Jidda Agreement still affords best approach for peaceful solution Yemen conflict and hope way can be found move forward toward peace on that basis. We understand from UAR that present Nasser response supplied in spirit of advice given here to Sadat to keep dialogue going. c. Nasser's present message appears open way by which King, through prompt statesmanlike act, can achieve immediate goal of bringing start to UAR troop evacuation Yemen which, once begun, could be carried through by end September. King's longer range goal of limiting Communist influence Yemen will be enhanced by bringing closer time when Yemen can be reunified and governed by all-Yemeni government giving Yemenis opportunity for realization legitimate desires develop in peace, dignity and freedom. Only under latter conditions can real halt to Communist penetration be expected. d. Realize that questions ratio republican and royalist participation in transitional government and future of Hamid al-Din family not completely resolved but should be negotiable. e. Present proposal contains possibility of solution with honor for both King and President Nasser. Doubt strongly that any settlement feasible in which honor and dignity do not accrue both sides. f. Renewed expression my personal respects and deep friendship accompanies this urgent plea to Your Majesty that you give careful consideration to this further opportunity achieve peace in Yemen./4/ /4/In telegram 636 from Khartoum, March 13, Ambassador William H. Weathersby reported that Faisal had expressed appreciation for the Secretary's message and his interest in a peaceful settlement in Yemen. Faisal told him that he had instructed Ali Reza to reply to Nasser that a 2-to-1 ratio of republicans to royalists was impossible; Nasser would have to live up to the Jidda Agreement for 50-50. Weathersby said he had emphasized the urgency of an immediate start in troop evacuation and repeated the Secretary's suggestion that the ratio of participation in the transitional government should be negotiable. The King replied that even if Nasser kept his troops in Yemen for 10 years, he could never accept a 2-to-1 ratio. Upon being urged again to keep the dialogue going, Faisal said that he had instructed Ali Reza to keep the door open and to respond to any initiative from Nasser. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN) 3. For Jidda: Request you pass foregoing to Saqqaf for his possible parallel transmission to King. Rusk
393. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/ Washington, March 15, 1966, 8:34 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Russell, cleared by Atherton and Davies, and approved by Hare. Repeated to Jidda, London, Taiz, and Aden. 5175. Your 2334./2/ /2/In telegram 2334 from Cairo, March 14, Battle reported that he was disappointed but not greatly surprised by Faisal's negative response to Nasser's proposals as reported in telegram 636 from Khartoum. (See footnote 4, Document 392.) He had asked for an appointment with Nasser and planned to tell him that the United States was convinced that the Saudis sincerely wanted a settlement and that although it appeared that there were honest differences of opinion on interpretation and implementation of the Jidda Agreement, these did not necessarily imply bad faith. The Ambassador also planned to suggest that both sides ignore the republican and royalist designations and try to pick out a representative group of 20-30 men to run the country. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN) 1. Concur with approach to Nasser on Yemen suggested reftel. You may say USG convinced Saudis sincerely want settlement and appears there are honest differences of opinion on interpretation and implementation Jidda Agreement, but these do not necessarily imply bad faith. 2. You should make clear, however, that detailed suggestion about ways out of impasse your personal views. USG wishes avoid becoming party to negotiations and does not espouse any particular formula for implementing Jidda Agreement. 3. Desirable you recall Kaissouni request for new PL-480 agreement and need for review within USG of developments in US-UAR relations before we decide whether or not to begin negotiations. This connection, you should indicate, in whatever way seems most appropriate, that among factors to be weighed will be UAR actions and attitudes vis-a-vis Yemen and South Arabia and tangible progress toward solution these problems. Rusk
394.Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia/1/ Washington, March 19, 1966, 3:11 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret. Drafted by Moore and Korn on March 18; cleared by Assistant Legal Adviser for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Donald A. Wehmeyer (paragraph 2), Symmes, and Davies; and approved by Hare. Repeated to Cairo, London, Taiz, Aden, and Dhahran. 540. Yemen Settlement. 1. Question arises whether Faisal, confident in own strength, and perhaps misled by reports UARG internal difficulties, unduly rigid in pressing advantage in hope ultimately unseating Nasser or, at minimum, dealing lasting blow to Nasser's position outside Egypt. If so, appears great miscalculation strength UAR regime which could lead to prolonged instability Yemen and whole Peninsula, with ultimate serious effects for Saudi Government. Leave to your discretion how best convey this thought to King, but consider it essential he realize that durable Yemen settlement depends on freely consented compromise by both UAR and SAG. 2. Agree with your tel 794/2/ that vague wording Jidda Agreement leaves room for honest difference interpretation Article 6 re timing UAR troop withdrawal. Doubt, however, that any party justified in citing individual article out of context. From practical point of view, UAR cannot accept public embarrassment of withdrawal without agreement on successor regime. Also, it questionable if leaving republican areas Yemen in vacuum would serve Western or Saudi interests. /2/Dated March 13. (Ibid.) 3. Re points at issue, tentatively agreed list 100 acceptable Yemenis offers hopeful base for discussion transitional government, either by UAR-SAG reps or, as possible first step, by individual royalist and republican reps (e.g., Shami and Iryani). Concerning Hamid al-Din, it doubtful that Faisal could prevent them from future activity in Yemen in any event. (Spirit Jidda Agreement implies eventual halt Saudi financial aid, which has been prime tool for Saudi control royalists.) 4. In your next meeting with Faisal, suggest you reiterate our position along lines Secretary's message (Deptel 508),/3/ urging focus on spirit Jidda Agreement as enunciated in preamble. Also might note Article 9 provides for direct Faisal-Nasser contact to avoid difficulties re implementation; we pleased learn SAG prepared send "high personality" to Cairo for this purpose (Embtel 814)./4/ We recognize Saudis have been solely tried by Nasser but wonder if some further compromise would not pay dividends in getting UAR forces out of Yemen. In any event UAR failure honor any new Faisal-Nasser agreement would considerably strengthen Saudi position in eyes rest of world. /3/Repeated as telegram 305 to Khartoum, Document 392. /4/Dated March 16. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN) 5. You should use this, or other early occasion and context which you deem appropriate, again to make clear to Faisal that our commitment to support Saudi integrity does not extend to providing military cover for SAG operations in support hostilities in Yemen or to any Saudi actions of provocative nature./5/ /5/In telegram 844 from Jidda, March 22, Eilts reported that he shared the Department's view that at least some of Faisal's present rigidity was probably prompted by his belief that Nasser's regime was tottering. He said he would continue to impress on the King that the U.S. estimate of Nasser's internal position was different, and the dangers of basing Saudi policy on any such mistaken estimate. He would also stress that a durable settlement in Yemen depended on a compromise freely consented to by the United Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia. The Ambassador noted, however, that this was only one element in Faisal's hardened position. First, the King was deeply distrustful of Nasser. Second, he believed Nasser was seeking a pretext to avoid beginning any withdrawal from Yemen. Third, he believed that Nasser was willingly acting as a "commie agent" in the Middle East. And finally, he believed the Yemenis should have self-determination, rather than a Saudi-UAR imposed government. (Ibid.) Rusk
395. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State/1/ Cairo, March 20, 1966, 0905Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL UAR-US. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Jidda, Taiz, Aden, and London. 2388. I have just returned from one hour of extremely cordial but very vigorous conversation with President Nasser. Before I could begin, he expressed extreme pleasure with Sadat visit saying Mr. Sadat had been well received and greatly impressed by everything and everybody he saw in the US. Meetings with Pres, Secretary and Congress as well as State govt officials had impressed him, had been productive and were encouraging. I said that we too were pleased with the visit and presented him with the letter from the Pres/2/ which he read carefully two or three times and obviously appreciated. I then stated that quiet discussions of problems represented best approach to dealing with difficulties between our two countries. I said that we had gone a long way toward solving some of our problems and that I hoped that through quiet conversation through usual diplomatic channels augmented by other visits we could keep issues on responsible level and make further progress without putting our differences in headlines. He assented. /2/Telegram 5017 to Cairo, March 7, transmitted the text of a letter from President Johnson to President Nasser replying to the message from the latter delivered by President of the UAR National Assembly Anwar al-Sadat on February 23. The President's letter expressed the hope that continued UAR-Saudi talks would make it possible to reach a solution to the Yemen problem. (Ibid., POL 7 UAR) Johnson's February 23 conversation with Sadat is printed as Document 274 in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XVIII. I stated one of my roles as American rep was to foresee problems and hopefully to find a way of dealing with them before they became a threat to our bilateral relations, the success of which were most important to both countries. I said I wanted to lead off our discussion with two difficulties that might, given past experience and the magnitude of the problems, be issues in the future if we were not careful--Yemen and Aden. I stated that we were not a party to the Yemen dispute, but were good friends of both SA and Egypt and that while we could not mediate the complex issues between them we wanted to do what we could to preserve an atmosphere between the two that would be productive and helpful. I had been greatly encouraged by the obviously statesmanlike response to King Feisal concerning which al Khouly had informed me. The responsive tone represented an obvious effort, as had the Jidda agreement, to reach a solution to a difficult problem. The US has encouraged SA to be equally responsive and I hoped that talks were continuing. Honest difficulties in interpreting the Jidda agreement could occur but this did not necessarily mean bad faith on either side. I said we were convinced that both sides wanted a settlement, at which point he interrupted vigorously and said, "do you really believe the Saudis want a solution?" I said we believed they did and that the interested parties must find a way to continue discussion and to rebuild confidence that had existed in the past. The President then reviewed the Yemen problem over the past several years, adding little that was new. He then paused as though he was not sure where to go next and I mentioned, making it very clear that it was a personal suggestion, the thought that perhaps a transitional govt in the Yemen could be based on no formula of distribution between republicans and royalists but on the selection of individuals who might play a role but who were not identified completely with either side. He said it was hard to tell a republican from a royalist in terms of what they stood for. That, I indicated, should make my suggestion more attractive. He said that it was impossible to look toward such a solution since all responsible people carried one or the other designation even though it really did not make much difference as far as their abilities or philosophies were concerned. We played around with the idea for a bit but it got nowhere. The Pres then remarked that I had said we were not interested in the Yemen. I corrected him by saying we were not a direct party at interest and that one of my particular interests was the relationship of Yemen to US-UAR relations and beyond that to stability in the area. He said, "If shooting resumes, you will be a party at interest immediately." I nodded. "You must therefore follow this issue closely." I nodded again. "I have instructed my people to keep you completely informed on all aspects of the Yemen problem." I expressed my gratitude and returned to my basic thesis, which was the need for continued talks. I asked whether the Haradh conf would resume. The reply was in the affirmative, but the Pres did not believe anything would come of it. I stated that as I understood the situation at present there was a possibility of talks at higher levels between the UAR and SA. The Pres stated that the UAR had suggested this some time ago and that King Feisal after first designating Prince Sultan to represent him had withdrawn from the idea. I stated that I had understood there was still a possibility of talks, not necessarily between King Feisal and Pres Nasser but at a senior level. He said no such suggestion was before him. I asked him 3 times whether I had understood him and said that I had hoped that the latest response from Saudi Arabia had included the suggestion for high level talks. Each time he denied this. He then launched into a long discourse on his own situation. He said that King Feisal thought the economic drain was too great for the UAR to bear and that the UAR would eventually have to leave the Yemen. The UAR could stay for years as he had pointed out. I asked whether he meant at the present level of troop strength and he said, "No," that all military requirements could be met by reduction to about 50,000 or even fewer men. The current regrouping of troops is toward this eventuality if it becomes necessary. To my surprise, the President stated that one of his main problems was the morale of the Egyptian army which would have great difficulty in accepting a defeat in the Yemen. "As you can realize, this would present real problems for me." He then said very emotionally, "I fear that a clash between the UAR and Saudi Arabia is inevitable." I said, "I do not accept that and I hope you will not. The stakes are too great to permit us to believe that there is no solution and I hope that the Middle East and the world can count upon your patience and your wisdom to solve this difficult problem. We must not accept the inevitability of what will always be a defeat for mankind and I hope that you will continue your efforts as you have in the past to solve this problem." He replied that I could count upon him to continue to try but implied that he was discouraged. He then said, "I understand the relationship of this problem to my relations with you and your country and I assure you we consider it carefully in that light." After a pause we turned to Aden. I stated that we believed the British decision to grant independence to South Arabia and to close out its military installations there by 1968 provided an opportunity for constructive Arab action and was in fact exactly the development that he had sought. 1968 is close at hand and there are many problems that must be resolved in a short space of time. Political, social, and economic difficulties are many and it will take the constructive help of all concerned with peace and stability in the area to create a situation which will be helpful on the long term and offer a chance of stability. He had great influence in the area and a key factor is whether he wishes to play a constructive role which we very much hope that he will do. I emphasized that there was great flexibility on the part of the British and on the part of all concerned with the future of Aden and South Arabia and that we must attempt to be constructive in working out solutions. The President mentioned immediately the UN resolutions but admitted very quickly that the difference between what the British had offered and the UN resolution was negligible. I said that we must try to look to realities and not form and that the opportunity that had been sought for the aspirations of the people of South Arabia could be found in the present framework. Again I pointed to the flexibility on the part of the British in dealing with various groups in Aden and to the hope we all had for help from the UAR toward a constructive resolution of a difficult problem. I was sure the Pres would realize that the alternative to the constructive approach I had outlined was that of a Yemen-like situation. At this point he reacted strongly, saying, "You cannot believe we would ever put troops in Aden!" I said I was not suggesting that he would but I would appreciate an interpretation of his recent speech in which he had appeared to tie his withdrawal from Yemen to the British position in Aden. There followed what he described as an explanation and which contained some elements of apology but which was in fact neither. He appeared to regret the speech as I suspect he does many of his speeches. He indicated he was talking to the British primarily and to a lesser extent to the Saudi Arabians that he had had inadequate time to prepare his notes for the speech. He assured me, however, that he did not connect the Aden situation with his own settlement of the Yemen problem. I asked whether I could assure my govt that he had not changed his position on Yemen to relate to the situation created by the planned British withdrawal. He most emphatically affirmed that I might do so. I returned to the basic issue of Aden and to the situation created by the British decision and again asked for his constructive assistance. He stated that he did not know many of the issues in this problem in detail but that he would study them carefully in the light of what I had said and assured me he would attempt to be helpful and within the time framework that I had outlined to him. He said he would like me to have more conversations with FonMin Riad on Aden, going into more detail. Comment: Several points struck me rather emphatically. 1. Pres Nasser still wishes a settlement of the Yemen problem but does not quite know where to go. If there is a "new element" in Saudi position (para 5 Jidda Embtel 814 to Dept)/3/ he is unaware of it. /3/See footnote 4, Document 394. 2. I believe there is still flexibility in Nasser's position provided Feisal forthcoming, but distrust is obviously great. 3. Nasser will make every effort keep us informed in hope we can be helpful. 4. This conversation was first in which he has admitted depth his concern about domestic problem military morale if defeat in Yemen obvious. I dealt with both Yemen and Aden throughout conversation in terms their importance to US-UAR relations and at one stage referred to them in connection my continuing talks Kaissouni regarding aid which I hoped could be continued provided no new difficulties arose. I have no doubt he understood. I have been sending him messages to this effect via Eugene Black, John Badeau and others for some time, believing private expressions dangers to US-UAR relations by resumed Yemen hostilities were sometimes more effective than official expressions. In addition I have had own private talks with Kaissouni, Riad, Mustafa Abdul Aziz and Hassan Sabri al-Khouly. It is interesting the President did not raise arms to Israel or the nuclear potential of Israel, particularly in view concern reportedly expressed in Arab PriMins meeting on these subjects. Battle
396. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/ Washington, March 26, 1966, 3:25 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Russell, cleared by Atherton, and approved by Davies. Repeated to Jidda and London. 5397. Ref.: Jidda's 856 rpt info Cairo 218, London 236./2/ /2/In telegram 856 from Jidda, March 24, Eilts reported that he met with the King on March 23, and once again urged an early Faisal-Nasser meeting as the best way to break the present impasse over Yemen. The Ambassador said he was aware of Nasser's March 22 speech attacking Saudi Arabia, but Nasser's speeches should be taken for what they were--emotional outbursts--and this should not be allowed to obstruct the search for a Yemen settlement. Faisal said Saudi Arabia had been trying for a long time, and noted that Nasser had said in his speech that he was prepared to stay in Yemen for 10 years. He said that in view of Nasser's speech, he was no longer willing to send a high-level person to Cairo, nor was he prepared to meet with Nasser. After much urging from Eilts, Faisal agreed that the U.S. Government might, if it wished, indicate to the United Arab Republic that he was willing to receive a high-ranking UAR official in Jidda and to designate a Saudi official of equal rank to discuss the Yemen problem with him. (Ibid.) 1. Clear from reftel Nasser speech March 22/3/ serious setback to Nasser-Faysal dialogue and progress toward peaceful settlement in Yemen. Such public statements can only impede settlement and therefore clearly inconsistent with description Nasser's attitude given earlier same day to Secretary by Amb. Kamel, who said Nasser sincerely wishes withdraw from Yemen. Therefore believe desirable you seek early meeting with Nasser to obtain clarification. On hopeful assumption Saudi-UAR differences still in fact relate to conditions of settlement and not intent, consider it important prevent possible misunderstanding and miscalculation on both sides from jeopardizing prospect solution Yemen problem. You should draw as appropriate on reftel and Deptel 5347/4/ stressing: /3/In his speech on March 22 Nasser had threatened to attack "bases of aggression" in Saudi Arabia. /4/Dated March 24. (Ibid.) (a) Faysal considers March 22 speech personal attack on him that belies UAR assurances to us that Nasser anxious extricate himself from Yemen in peace and with honor. (b) Whatever motivation and intent of speech may have been, result is serious setback to progress toward peaceful settlement in Yemen. Present circumstances postpone possibility high level meeting we had hoped might break impasse and provide key to settlement. (c) We appreciate pressures on Nasser, difficulties he faces and frustrations he feels but importance to all of peace in Yemen warrants exercise maximum patience, wisdom, hard work, sacrifice, and above all quiet diplomacy. Peace with honor is two-way street, and alternatives clearly unacceptable. (d) In light Faysal's reaction to March 22 speech and fact reply required to Faysal's message from Khartoum, next move clearly Nasser's. We believe situation offers opportunity for statesmanlike action. (e) We believe indication by UAR of willingness send high level emissary to pay respects to King and discuss with Saudi official of equal rank such outstanding problems as exist might do much to mitigate unfortunate impression made by speech. Such meeting could provide way convey response to Faysal's latest proposals and conceivably pave way for eventual Nasser-Faysal meeting. 2. In manner you deem most appropriate, you should re-emphasize continuing U.S. interest in peaceful Yemen settlement leaving no doubt important bearing this issue on US-UAR bilateral relations and UAR hopes for new PL-480 agreement. Rusk
397. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia/1/ Washington, March 29, 1966, 4:42 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL SAUD-UAR. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Korn; cleared by Atherton, Chief of the Near East Division in the INR Office of Research and Analysis for Near East and South Asia Harold W. Glidden, Quinn, Judd, Commander Cone of the Navy Department, Colonel Codding/Captain Zimmerman (JCS), and Meyers; and approved by Davies. Repeated to Cairo, Taiz, London, CINCSTRIKE, COMIDEASTFOR, and CHUSMTM Dhahran. 569. Ref Jidda's 877./2/ 2 In telegram 877 from Jidda, March 28, Ambassador Eilts reported that Sultan had told him that he had "reliable" information concerning UAR stockpiling of arms and ammunition in the Haradh-Abs area and a UAR troop buildup there. Sultan emphasized that his country wanted peace and did not want a resumption of fighting, but argued that, in order to be militarily prepared to defend itself in the event of a UAR attack, the Saudi Arabian Government urgently needed U.S. assistance. (Ibid., DEF 6 UAR) 1. Dept commends your handling Sultan request reftel. In addition points you made in which we concur, you may tell Sultan: a. USG understands and sympathizes SAG concern its security and territorial integrity, which also of concern to us, and appreciates Prince's informing us immediately reports he receiving re UAR military activities in Yemen border area. b. Intelligence available USG indicates probable presence Harad-Abs area UAR commando and paratroop battalions mentioned para 2 reftel. We have nothing confirm presence other units reported by Saudis, and very much doubt UAR has ground to ground rockets in area. It possible there may have been some redeployment forces to northwestern coastal region following UAR withdrawal from eastern outposts but we doubtful this intended as prelude to offensive action against Saudi territory. It more likely that strengthening UAR forces Harad-Abs area, if true, prompted by fear possible royalist move from Jizan base to cut Sanaa-Hodeida road. c. USG actions suggested by Sultan would merely complicate current delicate Saudi-UAR relations and might jeopardize possibility, however, slight, for Yemen settlement. USG will follow situation closely and remain in consultation with Sultan and SAG authorities. Hope Saudis will continue restrain Yemeni royalists from renewed military action, consequences of which could be serious under present circumstances. 2. FYI. Dept/DOD considering stepped up series naval visits to Saudi ports. End FYI. 3. Emb London should inform FonOff on strictly confidential basis Sultan request and US reply, expressing hope British will respond along similar lines should they be approached by Saudis. Rusk [Continue with the next documents] Volume XXI Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |