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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXI Near East Region Department of State |
 374. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State/1/ Jidda, August 11, 1965, 1531Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL SAUD-UAR. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Aden, Cairo, Dhahran, London, Taiz, CHUSMTM, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, COMIDEASTFOR, and USUN. 102. Acting Deputy Foreign Minister Mas'ud summoned me on one and one half hours' notice to meet with him and Minister of Defense Prince Sultan at Foreign Ministry August 11. After exchange courtesies, Sultan informed me of SAG decision purchase F-104G and associated package (subject separate telegram)./2/ He reviewed close USG-SAG relationship and expressed desire it should continue. He pulled from his pocket sheaf of telegrams he had just received from Saudi border posts. Reading from telegrams he listed following aggressive UAR actions: /2/Not further identified. 1. August 9, UAR tanks crossed Saudi border vicinity Jizan penetrating Saudi territory one-half kilometer vicinity villages Jalban, Twal, and Malwan. After reconnoitering, tanks withdrew behind border. (Unable locate on our maps villages named but presumed somewhere southeast Samitah.) 2. August 10, UAR observers suddenly pulled out of last remaining joint UAR-SAG observation post at Abs. (Department will recall Saqqaf stated to me August 1 (Embtel 64)/3/ that Egyptians had withdrawn from all five observation posts.) According Sultan, Egyptians had earlier withdrawn from four posts and method of withdrawal throughout peremptory and "savage." Saudis had allegedly been forcibly escorted from posts to border and deprived of food and water. /3/Telegram 64 from Jidda, August 1. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL SAUD-UAR) 3. UAR had bombed Saudi territory twice in vicinity Jizan some ten days ago, accounting for minimum damage (presume same bombings referred to in Embtels 66 and 72)./4/ /4/Telegrams 66 and 72 from Jidda, August 2. (Ibid., POL 27 YEMEN and POL SAUD-UAR) 4. UAR overflights of Jizan, Najran and, to some extent, Abha occurring almost daily. (SDI has received no reports overflights last few days.) 5. UAR "massing" troops in Yemen, including in such border towns as Harad, for purpose aggressive action against Saudi Arabia. 6. SAG has knowledge secret UAR plan bomb Taif and Al-Kharj, as well as Jizan, Najran and Abha. He claimed Al-Kharj listed as target because of important military depot. (When I asked for sources this information, Sultan was evasive.) Sultan said whereas Saudi military units along Yemeni border had earlier been instructed secretly not open fire on Egyptian ground forces (in order, he said, to avoid escalation), he had now instructed these border posts to fire immediately on any UAR-YAR units crossing border. In response my query, he said that previous Saudi instructions withhold fire had not applied to anti-aircraft units. Sultan said he had asked to see me on King's instructions. View foregoing indicators re UAR intention attack Saudi Arabia, King had three requests to make of President Johnson and Secretary Rusk: 1. USG should be made aware of foregoing indicators. 2. SAG desires that USG dispatch destroyers to Saudi Arabia soonest to Jizan area for purpose deterring UAR. 3. SAG requests USG dispatch "unit" of fighter aircraft to Saudi Arabia as further deterrent to UAR attack. My first response to Sultan was to indicate my personal impression that buildup of tensions over Yemen appeared to have subsided somewhat. I cited conciliatory nature recent UAR press commentary re Yemen developments (Cairo's tel 34 to Jidda)/5/ and evidently beneficial effect USG public statement August 4. I then suggested that SAG immediately submit its bill of particulars to President Security Council. Sultan replied that while this move "under consideration" by King, SAG's experience with UN in connection with Yemen question indicated "Mafish Fa'edi" (it is of no benefit). He said Saudi Arabia relied on itself and on its friends. I reiterated advantages to Saudi Arabia of registering complaint with UN in order balance current YAR complaint before Secretary General and also as useful parallel action to relying on itself and its friends. /5/Telegram 401 from Cairo (34 to Jidda), August 5. (Ibid.) With regard to King's three points, I replied as follows: 1. I would immediately communicate to Washington information he had provided me. 2. I noted that an American destroyer is scheduled to call at Jidda on August 25. Sultan said this was too far off and SAG wanted several visits. In that case, I said, I would undertake to request that the visit of destroyer USS Fox be advanced, and that I would endeavor to ascertain possibility of subsequent early visits by other destroyers. Sultan asked to be informed immediately upon receipt USG reply to this possibility. 3. Re squadron US aircraft, I reminded Sultan of USG-SAG dialogue this subject over past two years and, in particular, Ambassador Hart's conversation with King in March./6/ USG position remains as before, i.e., difficult justify any USG military action to assist SAG in face UAR attacks against purely military targets in Saudi territory near Yemen border. While we have repeatedly informed SAG that we will come to its assistance against unprovoked attack, I said dispatch of USG military units to Saudi Arabia while latter allows its territory be used as base for Yemeni Royalists was, insofar as I aware, precluded. Possible exception this policy is if UAR attacks should spread elsewhere in Saudi Arabia (i.e., beyond purely military targets near Yemen border), at which time USG would review its position. I asked Sultan whether SAG had given serious thought to stopping its aid to Yemen Royalists. This triggered long lecture on how SAG had in fact stopped its aid for period of time only to find UAR had no intention fulfill its part of agreement, i.e., withdrawal UAR troops from Yemen. He claimed he could not understand, in view SAG's demonstrated cooperation with US re Bunker agreement, why Saudi Arabia should now be penalized for what he characterized as legitimate Saudi effort get UAR troops out of Yemen and return Yemen to Yemenis. Sultan said that if condition for dispatch air unit is cessation Saudi aid to Royalists, then Saudi Arabia did not wish air unit. He asked my forebearance if he were so bold as to criticize USG policy which forced staunch friends of US at times like this to seek military help wherever they could find it. I told Sultan that in any case I would forward King's request to Washington. /6/See footnote 5, Document 363. Comment: I regret Saqqaf's absence at this time since believe he might have talked Sultan and King out of requesting air unit--at least under circumstances in which Saudi Arabia continues actively support Yemen Royalists. Sultan obviously excitable and appears be exaggerating seriousness current threat. However, view his statement he speaking for King, am obliged convey as King's request plea that (1) destroyer visits Jidda and vicinity be stepped up and (2) air unit be dispatched immediately Saudi Arabia. I would be hesitant recommend dispatch air unit under any but most dire circumstances view problems we experienced in deployment Hard Surface 1963-64. Seems to me we should rather continue explore all possible alternative means for deterring possible UAR attack. Fact that up to now we have attached conditions to dispatch of air unit and fact Saudis now unprepared accept these conditions may be blessing in disguise. I do not take seriously Sultan's subtle threat re turning elsewhere for military support. Recommend we make effort cooperate re accelerating destroyer visits--including advancing visit USS Fox while politely demurring on air unit, citing not only Saudi involvement Yemen but perhaps heavy USG military commitments elsewhere. This connection we might consider implementing current proposed plan deploy in training exercise reinforced rifle company supported by aircraft (tentatively scheduled for October 1). However, any decision proceed this exercise should be made soon in order permit advance planning. Seelye
375. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia/1/ Washington, August 12, 1965, 8:02 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Moore; cleared by Davies, Bunte, General Sibley (J-5), Stoddart (DOD/ISA), Hart, Komer, and Warren; and approved by Handley. Also sent to Cairo and repeated to London, Taiz, Aden, CINCSTRIKE/ CINCMEAFSA for POLAD, Dhahran, CHUSMTM, COMIDEASTFOR, CINCUSNAVEUR, and USUN. 68. Jidda tel 102./2/ Agree with Jidda's analysis that our efforts must be concentrated on means deterring UAR attack and bringing Faisal and Nasser to bargaining table. We are not considering dispatch air unit unless serious threat to Saudi Arabia's integrity develops. Believe there are strong parallels between situation now and that prevailing one year ago when UAR and Saudis were jockeying for military advantage prior to September meeting Alexandria. /2/Document 374. For Jidda: In view known unreliability Sultan as channel for information and his past propensity for exaggerating dangers, it important you hear directly from King his analysis situation. In discussion with King you should take following line: 1. You have been given preliminary report by Sultan expressing King's concern. In view of situation you wished have benefit first-hand discussions with King on what occurring on border. 2. UAR tells us it desires talks with Faisal to reach peaceful solution Yemen problem. We encouraged by Cairo press report that SAG Ambassador Alireza met with Faisal August 11. We continue believe Faisal-Nasser meeting most desirous. What are King's views on prospects? 3. In response Sultan's request we can arrange early visit US destroyer to Jidda and speed up future proposed visits. (FYI: Navy has sent separate message to COMIDEASTFOR requesting program for stepped-up schedule visits, with Embassy to be consulted on suitability this schedule. You may inform King of exact date of visit if firm by time your conversation. Navy here estimates a destroyer, not the Fox, could be in Jidda in 55 hours. Destroyer cannot approach closer than two miles to Jizan because of the reefs and shoals. In any event call at Jizan probably unsuitable so long as Saudi aid to royalists continues. End FYI.) 4. FYI only: We seeking high level authorization proceed with planned visit early October reinforced rifle company involving 500 men with own air transport. You should not apprise Faisal of this possibility until instructed. End FYI. 5. Urge King make subject UAR overflights and penetration matter of record with UN. Should again be noted that Saudi case in UN as well as US ability aid Saudis seriously complicated by continued SAG assistance to royalists. For Cairo: You should seek immediate appointment with appropriate UAR officials (perhaps Al-Khouli and/or FonMin Riad) for discussion on following lines: 1. Pass on Saudi report on occurrences Yemen border (points 1 through 5 of reftel). 2. Emphasize we doing utmost get Faisal agree to meet with Nasser but above forms UAR military pressure make this task virtually impossible. 3. As stated to Nasser by Assistant Secretary Talbot in April, UAR attack on Saudi Arabia could cause very great trouble in US-UAR relations. We strongly urge UAR halt any infringements Saudi territory or air space in order pave way for Nasser-Faisal meeting./3/ /3/Telegram 1001 to Cairo, August 13, informed the Embassy that the points in the Department's telegram had been made to Ambassador Kamel on August 13. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN) Telegram 499 from Cairo, August 16, reported that Embassy senior political officer Richard B. Parker met with UAR presidential adviser Hassan Sabri al-Khouli on August 14 and passed on the Saudi report of border incidents contained in telegram 102 from Jidda. Parker also gave al-Khouli a paper containing points 2 and 3 of the Cairo section of the Department's telegram. Al-Khouli contended that the whole business of a UAR military threat was a concoction being spread with the help of the Beirut press and that if the threat were real and Faisal were really interested in negotiating, he would agree to a meeting with Nasser. Al-Khouli noted that so far, he had not done so. (Ibid.) Rusk
376. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, August 13, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 13. No classification marking. Saudi/UAR tension over Yemen is heating up. The worried Saudis have asked us to send a fighter squadron to scare off the Egyptians, who have increased minor crossborder activities from Yemen into Saudi territory. They've also asked us to speed up a destroyer visit already scheduled for Jidda on 25 August and to schedule a few more closer to the Saudi-Yemeni border. Faisal has asked through his Defense Minister that we bring this to your attention. We're prepared to authorize the destroyer visit, but not any more jet fighters like we sent to Saudi Arabia in 1963. We only sent the unit after the Saudis agreed to stop clandestine arms supply, etc. to the Yemeni royalists. Now the story is repeating itself. Fortunately, we've told the Saudis repeatedly we couldn't send another air unit to deter Nasser, if it would only serve as an umbrella for renewed secret aid to the Yemeni royalists. Should the Egyptians unexpectedly launch a full-scale attack on Saudi Arabia, however, that would change the name of the game (and we'd reconsider). Meanwhile, we want to keep the pressure on both Saudis and Egyptians to talk out a Yemen settlement themselves. To protect your freedom of action on the above, I've said no air deployment without Presidential OK. I've taken the same precaution with another step State and Defense are considering--a long planned exercise to stage a 500 man rifle team into Dhahran for a two week exercise demonstration--as a quiet reminder to the UAR to lay off. This isn't as risky, or as expensive as an air squadron, but I think State and DOD ought to get your express approval before starting down this Yemen road again./2/ /2/A notation in the President's handwriting reads: "See me. L." Below this McBundy handwritten wrote: "RWK--for action as indicated. McGB." R.W. Komer
377. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State/1/ Jidda, August 15, 1965, 1033Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL SAUD-US. Secret. Repeated to Cairo, Taiz, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, USUN, Dhahran, London, CHUSMTM Dhahran, COMIDEASTFOR, and Aden. 109. I opened audience with King morning August 14 in Taif with statement I had been instructed see him as follow-up my meeting with Prince Sultan August 11. I referred to three requests which Prince Sultan had made of USG on King's behalf. Re first request, said I had transmitted urgently to Washington info re UAR aggressions and threats described to me by Sultan. Indicated I had also expressed in my message what Sultan had characterized as King's deep concern with developing situation. I then asked King whether he considered situation as serious as it had appeared three days before. I noted Cairo press reports re meeting of Saudi Ambassador Mohammad Ali Reza with Nasir August 11 and of Ali Reza's subsequent return from talks with King. King said degree of seriousness of situation at any one time difficult to gauge. Certainly threat exists, has existed and will continue to exist as long as Nasir's troops remain in Yemen. He assumed we had independent reports of UAR build-up in Yemen and could judge for ourselves extent of current threat. He commented that even in course of Saudi-UAR negotiations UAR planes flew over Saudi Arabia, tanks crossed into Saudi territory, and UAR threatened along border. What he had asked Sultan do in seeing me was to "make clear" to US nature of recent developments. I told King that largely on basis information SAG had provided we were again making representations in Cairo. I said I knew that President and Secretary were very anxious that he continue his negotiations with Nasir. As he knew, in Viet Nam though faced with a very difficult situation, President continued to make himself available for negotiations with adversary. I urged that "thread of dialogue" with UAR, no matter how narrow, be maintained. King affirmed without hesitation "we will continue to talk despite everything." (Mas'ud told me August 15 that King and Nasir would definitely meet before Arab summit conference.) Re Sultan's second request, I said my government was arranging to dispatch destroyer to Saudi Arabia as soon possible. When date of arrival known, I would inform King through Mas'ud (did so August 15). Subsequent destroyer visits would also be accelerated. King seemed pleased and implied he had proposed destroyer visits to Sultan "to deter the Egyptians." (No mention was made re visit to Jizan.) Re third request--dispatch of air unit--I said unfortunately this was not possible at moment. Nevertheless, matter was under study and my government was following developments with care. As King knew, it was difficult for US justify US military measures in Saudi Arabia as long as SAG involved in Yemen imbroglio. On other hand, we had indicated several times our support for maintenance of Saudi Arabia's integrity. Important thing was to prevent escalation. King said he assumed US would protect Saudi Arabia's integrity and fulfill spirit of friendship prevailing between our two countries. He said matter of dispatch of air unit decision for US to make in context foregoing. He did not desire place "unnecessary burdens" upon US. Re linkage our support to so-called Saudi involvement in Yemen, he wished state categorically that, unlike UAR, not single Saudi soldier fighting in Yemen. Said I had one more matter to raise. My government held strongly to view that SAG should register formal complaint before UN re series of UAR aggressions. Absence of such complaint complicated Saudi case at UN and weakened USG ability support Saudis in possible UN debate. King replied that SAG had communicated much of this information privately to UNSYG in response latter's referral of Yemen complaint. However, he said SAG did not wish make public protests and noted fact SAG concealed from its own public information re UAR aggressions. (Latter is true: info re UAR aggressions kept out of local press and Prince Sultan has reprimanded officials in Jizan and Najran for relaying reports of UAR overflights, etc. to SDI pilots and others.) I said that, nevertheless, SAG should seriously consider registering formal complaint at least for procedural reasons, especially in UN debate in progress. King asked who SAG opponent in possible UN debate might be. I said I assumed UAR. He smiled, noting that current complaint before UN is YAR complaint (and no doubt was wishfully thinking that by then YAR delegate to UN would in effect be Saudi camp view current Taif reconciliation between Yemeni factions). Comment: While it is clear Sultan acted on King's instructions when he summoned me August 11, also true King predictably showed himself less flappable than Sultan. However, relaxed way in which King received turn-down re dispatch air unit may be deceptive since Mas'ud told me August 15 that King disappointed with response. (I, therefore, agreed with Mas'ud's proposal that in his talk with King today Mas'ud emphasize "under study" aspect of my response. Mas'ud claimed UK had offered send unit. I made no comment. He said further that SAG prepared defray all costs of dispatch USG air unit.) King does not seem to question ultimate USG determination carry out its stated commitment re protecting Saudi integrity but does want US take every possible military measure nip UAR attack in bud. Sooner we can notify King of reinforced company exercise--assuming decision affirmative--the better. Also occurs to us that prompt dispatch US military mapping mission to undertake Persian Gulf median line survey would at this important juncture demonstrate helpful USG response to standing SAG request. Same time would add to over-all USG military presence in country. King seemed sincere in his intention to keep negotiating door open with UAR, even though there was no suggestion he optimistic talks would lead to settlement Yemen question. View similar request made of HMG by Sultan, have conveyed gist of foregoing to British Charge Brown. Seelye
378. Memorandum From the Department of Defense Regional Director for Near East and South Asia (Strickland) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Solbert)/1/ I-36093/65 Washington, August 25, 1965. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 5127, 092. Yemen, 25 Aug. 65. Top Secret. SUBJECT At Tab A/2/ we have set out the military alternatives available to the US in the event of a Saudi-UAR confrontation over the Yemen. The alternatives set forth in Attachment A have been submitted by the JCS (Tab B)./3/ These are not recommended military actions and have been labeled as possible military alternatives. /2/Not printed. /3/Document 366. JCSM-295-65 (Tab B) notes that in the event the situation in the Arabian Peninsula deteriorates and any use of US military forces is contemplated, the JCS will provide further comments in the light of the situation existing at the time. In this connection, STRIKE's 788/65 (Tab C)/4/ proposes under the guise of a combined training exercise with Saudi Arabia a show of force designed to initially position forces and initiate useful measures that would facilitate active operations if required. /4/Not printed. In addition, there are STRIKE's contingency plans that can be considered in the event it is decided to come to a full-fledged exercise in shoring up Saudi integrity. At the present time we are hopeful that the Nasser-Faisal dialogue goes well and some improvement in the situation is evident. We still have in the planning stage the idea of introducing an airborne rifle company into Saudi Arabia. This force (approximately 200 with 10-12 transport aircraft) would assist the Saudis in (a) tactical principles of employment of small units, (b) use of supporting weapons, (c) operation and care of vehicles and communications equipment, and (d) basic field military sanitation. It is to be noted that the introduction of the airborne company may or may not be utilized. Our Embassies in Cairo and Taiz do not favor it at all (see Tab D)./5/ /5/Telegram 48 from Taiz, August 22. Other means of assisting the Saudis in the event the outcome of the Nasser-Faisal dialogue is good, and assuming the Saudis accept, are (a) in the buildup of Saudi air defense capability and (b) sales of US type equipment to the Saudi White Army. The political courses of action available are set forth in Tab E./4/ It is somewhat difficult to pin down the type of force required to enhance an effective military course of action without knowing what is required or the mission to be accomplished. If a high-level decision is made to undertake a US military course of action in Saudi Arabia, the JCS should be given specific guidance in order that the composition of the force can be determined to meet the stated mission. Eugene L. Strickland
379. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State/1/ Cairo, August 25, 1965, 1112Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Jidda, London, Taiz, and CINCSTRIKE. 567. Believe Yemen agreement signed yesterday by Feisal and Nasser and reported to Dept in Embtel 562/2/ is very promising development. While we do not yet know details of any secret side agreements, such as what if anything is to be done about Badr and Sallal, and 15 months' period required for implementation may give too much time for participants to come to blows over details, agreement clearly much more concrete than most expected. Elements which strike us as being particularly good about agreement are: (1) It is public and therefore harder for parties to back away from than was case with Alexandria agreement. (2) Egyptians have agreed to what we have understood was Saudi condition that determination future form of govt be left to Yemenis. (3) Definite time set for evacuation Egyptian troops, but evacuation spread out over period which will permit some efforts at ensuring stable transition period. /2/Telegram 562 from Cairo, August 24, transmitted the text of the agreement on Yemen reached by President Nasser and King Faisal that day in Jidda. (Ibid.) The Jidda Agreement called for: (1) a cease-fire; (2) a popular plebiscite to be held in Yemen no later than November 23, 1966; (3) UAR-Saudi cooperation in setting up an interim conference of Yemeni republicans and royalists to convene in Haradh (in Yemen) on November 23, 1965, to negotiate arrangements for a transitional government and the plebiscite; (4) withdrawal of UAR military forces within 10 months from November 23, 1965; and (5) Saudi agreement to stop immediately military assistance in any form to the royalists or use of Saudi territory for action against Yemen. Egyptian willingness give on points which previously obstacles to settlement reflects what we believe is genuine determination get out of Yemen at almost all costs. We hope that Dept will be able inject note of optimism into any comments USG may make on settlement and that someone will be able to echo admirable remarks Senator Fulbright re Nasser's (and Feisal's) statesmanlike efforts settle problem./3/ /3/On August 31 President Johnson sent King Faisal a letter expressing his pleasure upon learning of the agreement. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Saudi Arabia, Presidential Correspondence) Battle
380. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Yemen/1/ Washington, September 14, 1965, 8:39 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Confidential. Drafted by Moore, cleared by Davies, and approved by Talbot. Repeated to Cairo, Jidda, and London. 47. In call September 14 on Talbot and in subsequent conversation Department officer, YARG Ambassador al-Aini expressed considerable pessimism concerning motives Faisal and Nasser in Jidda agreement on Yemen. Al-Aini, who just returned from Cairo to resume duties in US and UN, said that before traveling Jidda Nasser in fact did not consult with YARG leaders on nature solution he contemplating. Similarly on his return, Yemenis forced rely on radio and press for information concerning agreement reached with Faisal. Al-Aini greatly worried that some secret agreement reached whereby UAR and SAG would maintain their mutual influence in Yemen following withdrawal Egyptian forces. Said that selection 50 participants for November Haradh Conference will be proof of Faisal and Nasser intent reach real solution. Truly Yemeni representatives will be able do so. He worried that participants will be only spokesmen for UAR or SAG, leading to deadlock. If latter develops, al-Aini speculates nationalists from both republican and royalist camps would make common cause. Rusk
381. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan/1/ Washington, October 6, 1965, 6:06 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret. Drafted by Moore on October 5; cleared by Israel, Lebanon, Yemen Desk Officer Harry F. Hemmerich (AID/NESA/NE), Robert W. Kent (EUR/GER), Symmes, and in substance by Grant V. McClanahan (A/FN); and approved by Davies. Also sent to Bonn, Beirut, Jidda, Kuwait, and Tripoli and repeated to Cairo, London, Taiz, Aden, and CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA for POLAD. 149. Re Taiz tels 97/2/ and 98/3/ to Dept. (Being repeated addressees.) Concur your response to Numan, pointing out continued US support for YARG, US policy non-interference, our support of Jidda agreement, and our serious concern if any country should take action to prejudice agreement or success of Haradh conference. While we intend continue our currently planned AID/Y activities in Republic,/4/ believe decision any further US economic and technical assistance programs should be held in abeyance, pending formation transitional government which expected to evolve from Haradh conference. (US military assistance clearly out of question at this time.) In addition other considerations, we judge that starting new program, other than further deliveries under Title II aid, would open us to accusation taking sides prior to Yemeni Haradh conclave. /2/In telegram 97 from Taiz, October 3, Clark reported that he had met with former Yemeni Prime Minister Numan, who delivered a strong appeal for U.S. military and financial aid to Yemen. Although he was suspicious of UAR motives, Numan also feared that if the Jidda agreement were implemented, the cards were stacked against the republic. The United Arab Republic had prevented Yemen from developing an independent, effective government and the country would be left without an army or treasury. Clark responded that the United States had recognized and supported Yemen by all appropriate means and that a cornerstone of U.S. policy was the principle of non-interference in internal Yemeni affairs. He noted that the U.S. Government welcomed the Jidda Agreement, and would be seriously concerned if any action were taken to prejudice the agreement or the success of the Haradh conference. (Ibid.) /3/Telegram 98 from Taiz, October 3, transmitted Clark's comments on his conversation with Numan, including his advice that if the United States was to have any leverage with the current or future leaders of Yemen, further U.S. aid would be an important factor. (Ibid.) /4/U.S. aid to Yemen in FY 1965 amounted to $4,520,000. (Airgram A-40 to Kuwait, June 23; ibid., AID (US) YEMEN) Realize, however, that whatever government develops after November 23 will be in immediate serious need of assistance, probably straight budgetary aid in addition to food and material help to rebuild country. As Taiz aware, expanded PL 480 program in north Yemen dependent on success present program. We believe for number reasons, however, that at same time area states should also be urged consider early, direct financial and material assistance to Yemen in order help new all-Yemen government attain stability. Moderate Arab states have obvious interest in success Jidda agreement and should be prepared support financially development moderate regime in Yemen. Additionally, public statements at present of interest and concern for Yemen and willingness deal with post-Haradh government would be encouraging gestures. Unless reasons to contrary perceived, addressee posts are requested to discuss at appropriate level with host governments importance of above for future stability and development Yemen, and encourage them give urgent consideration to what assistance possible for them give Yemen. On current situation you may say while that there is evidence of some behind scenes maneuvering, both Saudis and UAR appear to be moving forward with implementation of Jidda agreement. Joint Saudi-UAR ceasefire supervision teams reportedly now in operation, exchange of prisoners is being affected, and UAR forces reportedly beginning evacuation to Hodeida. We are optimistic re agreement's chances of success and hope all parties will cooperate in avoiding potentially disruptive actions. Where appropriate you may wish point out threat of Communist countries further solidifying their positions if Yemenis forced rely heavily on them for underpinning for new government. You should offer share with them on continuing basis our assessment of situation in Yemen as it develops./5/ /5/In telegram 292 from Jidda, October 13, Seelye reported that he had discussed the contents of the Department's telegram with Mas'ud on October 12 and had emphasized that the U.S. Government hoped that the Saudi Arabian Government was planning to provide economic assistance to the new Yemeni Government, Mas'ud replied that the King had indicated that he was prepared to "do everything possible" in the area of economic and financial assistance to Yemen once an appropriate government was formed and stability returned. (Ibid.) Ball
382. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, October 19, 1965, 4:30 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Confidential. Drafted by David A. Korn (NEA) on October 21 and approved in S on November 12. The memorandum is part I of IV. Part III is Document 254. The time of the meeting is from Rusk's Daily Diary. (Johnson Library) SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS 1. Yemen After an exchange of greetings, the Secretary said he would be interested in learning from Mr. Saqqaf how the Saudi-UAR agreement on Yemen is working out. Mr. Saqqaf said the Saudis are fully behind the Jidda agreement and to date had encountered no difficulty in its implementation. Nasser was equally determined to make the agreement work, for he was anxious to be rid of the Yemen problem. This problem could be considered two-thirds solved. The Secretary said he had the impression that the Yemenis themselves might be causing some trouble. Mr. Saqqaf replied that the Yemenis were indeed "difficult" and, if left to themselves, would wreck everything. However, now that the Saudis and the UAR had reached agreement, he could assure that there would be no mix-up and that the Yemenis would take the right direction. Mr. Saqqaf indicated that the Saudis would be prepared to give assistance to a Yemeni coalition government following the Haradh conference. The Secretary expressed pleasure over Saudi-UAR determination to make the Jidda agreement work and said the US would also be interested in helping the Yemenis if they get on the right path. The Secretary asked whether the Jidda agreement had been reinforced by a private understanding between Faisal and Nasser. Mr. Saqqaf said that most of what was agreed on at Jidda was made public, although there had been a private understanding regarding the choosing of the royalist and republican delegations to the Haradh conference. Mr. Saqqaf said the Jidda agreement should not be looked upon as a diplomatic victory for either side. However it did show that Nasser was a courageous man. Mr. Saqqaf said the Jidda agreement had also been beneficial in shaking the socialist front in the Arab world. The Secretary said it was his impression that there was a mood of moderation in the Arab world now. Saqqaf agreed, stating that in Iraq there was no longer talk of socialism and the Syrians were fed up with socialist slogans. Iraq was now going the right way. The Secretary asked how active the Chinese Communists were in Yemen. Mr. Saqqaf replied that they were not very active now and that in any case the Chinese were too poor to accomplish anything serious. They could do little more than spread propaganda. Mr. Saqqaf stated that Peiping is losing everywhere as the result of US policy. The world knows that the US is no longer a paper tiger. Mr. Saqqaf said that there is no profit in the US trying to "be nice". Mr. Symmes remarked that he had noted considerable Chinese Communist activity in Yemen when visiting Yemen six weeks ago. Mr. Saqqaf acknowledged there are now 500 Chinese in Yemen and that a number of large projects are being considered for implementation by the Chinese. Mr. Symmes noted that the problem of Chinese Communist presence in Yemen could become critical. 2. US-UAR Relations During discussion of the Saudi-UAR agreement on Yemen, the Secretary remarked that internal economic difficulties may have strengthened the UAR's desire to come to terms. The Secretary said the Yemen war had caused many strains in US-UAR relations. Mr. Saqqaf asked if US-UAR relations had improved as a result of the Jidda agreement. The Secretary said we had hopes in this direction but time was required to repair our ties. The Secretary said there is no doubt that if the Jidda agreement is carried out it will make a significant impression on our relations with Cairo. The Secretary asked if the return of the 50,000 Egyptian troops now in Yemen would cause Nasser trouble. Mr. Saqqaf said the soldiers would be brought back in small groups, discharged and put to work in light industry or handicrafts. Nasser had matters firmly in hand. Mr. Saqqaf said he had been pleased to learn of Mohieddine's appointment and anticipated that the UAR's economic situation would improve considerably as a result of this move. The Egyptian people had welcomed Mohieddine's appointment, he said.
383. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Hare) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)/1/ Washington, December 27, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, NEA/ARP Files: Lot 69 D 547, Arabian Peninsula Political Affairs & Rel., 1965, Yemen-UAR. Secret. Drafted by Korn on December 23 and cleared by Symmes and Officer in Charge of Politico-Military Affairs in the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Regional Affairs Colonel Billy W. Byrd. SUBJECT /2/Dated January 30, 1964 and entitled "Procedures for Anticipating Foreign Crises." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, Master File of National Security Action Memoranda (NSAMs), 1961-1968, NSAM 277) 1. Pursuant to Ambassador Thompson's memorandum of September 15,/3/ there is enclosed a political-military contingency study on UAR-Saudi hostilities over Yemen. This study was prepared with the assistance of the Department of Defense (ISA, JCS, DIA and DOD Policy Planning) and CIA. /3/Not found. 2. This study has been undertaken at a time when the situation in Yemen is in great flux. The Nasser-Faisal agreement of August 24 brought about a cease-fire in the three-year Yemeni civil war and led royalists and republicans to the conference table at Haradh beginning November 23. At the time the present draft was completed and agreed upon by committee participants the Haradh conference was still in session, but it had failed to make any significant progress toward the creation of an all-Yemeni provisional government. The Yemeni situation is so volatile that it is difficult to rule out any hypothesis, from the peaceful establishment of a royalist-republican interim government to full scale resumption of civil war, with UAR and Saudi participation. This uncertainty merely highlights the utility of contingency planning. 3. A central problem in any consideration of possible Saudi-UAR hostilities is to find a means of honoring our often reiterated verbal commitment (see Annex A of contingency paper)/4/ to protect Saudi integrity while avoiding being drawn into a degree of direct military involvement which might redound to the disadvantage both of the US and the Saudi monarchy. One of the main potential dangers appears to be that of too precipitate US military action in the Saudi defense. For this reason we have stressed diplomatic action to forestall and arrest a UAR-Saudi conflict and have foreseen direct US military intervention only in the most extreme circumstances. /4/Not printed. 4. While a paper covering the contingency of a coup in Saudi Arabia was done in 1964,/5/ this is the first study of its kind on Saudi-UAR hostilities over Yemen. Owing to the volatile nature of the Yemeni situation, we believe it would be advisable to take a further look at this study within the next six months. A review during this period will enable us to take account both of developments in the rapidly changing Yemeni situation and comments by Embassies Jidda and Cairo. /5/Not found.
Attachment Contingency Planning Paper UAR-SAUDI HOSTILITIES OVER YEMEN I--Summary While tension between the UAR and Saudi Arabia over Yemen has subsided as a result of an agreement between Nasser and Faisal in August of 1965, Yemen will probably remain a bone of contention between the two Arab countries for many years to come. The advent in Sanaa of a regime openly antagonistic to either Saudi Arabia or the UAR could spark renewed hostilities. The United States has a long-standing and often-reiterated commitment to protect Saudi Arabia from foreign aggression. Behind this commitment lies our interest in the continued free flow of Saudi oil to Western Europe, the security of air transit facilities across the Peninsula, and the survival of a regime which is one of our best friends in the Middle East and a staunch foe of communism. We intend to remain true to this commitment. We must at the same time be cognizant of the danger of precipitate US military action in the Saudi defense which could ignite an explosion of Arab nationalist wrath against the Saudi monarchy and the United States as well. Consequently this paper stresses diplomatic action to forestall and arrest a UAR-Saudi conflict over Yemen and foresees direct US military intervention (except to evacuate American citizens) only in the most extreme contingency. [Here follow the body of the paper and four annexes.]
384. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Yemen/1/ Washington, December 30, 1965, 6:39 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret. Drafted by Moore, cleared by Symmes, and approved by Davies. Also sent to Cairo and Jidda and repeated to London, CINCSTRIKE, and USUN. 132. Taiz tels 215,/2/ 218./3/ Yemen Settlement. 2 In telegram 215 from Taiz, December 29, Clark reported that Numan, now ranking member of the republican delegation to the Haradh conference, told him that the conference had not succeeded because Yemeni delegates on both sides were closely controlled by Nasser and Faisal respectively and were not permitted to reach a settlement. Numan argued that the only chance of an acceptable Yemen settlement would be for the Arab League or the United Nations to preside over the next session of the conference, and asked the United States to support his idea. Clark pointed out that in the eyes of the world the Yemenis themselves were to blame for failure to reach agreement, and argued that the Yemen complex of problems could only be solved by the parties directly involved. His report referred to the "oriental deviousness" of Numan's exposition and noted that Numan and several other YARG officials had left for Cairo by air that morning. (Ibid.) /3/Dated December 29. (Ibid.) 1. Concur with Embassy's characterization Nu'man explanation Haradh Conference breakdown/4/ as "oriental deviousness." Appears from here that basic reason for failure conferees reach agreement lay in continued individual and group jockeying on both sides for immediate power advantage, regardless of professed desires for peace and cessation foreign interference. Each side now blaming other (and Faisal and Nasser) for failure, wellsprings of which are decades-long Yemeni inability develop consensus support for central government rather than tribal diversity. More immediate contributory factors may of course include built-in ambiguities of Jidda Agreement and somewhat obscure role of certain SAG and UARG representatives, but we inclined believe these subordinate to foregoing. /4/The Haradh conference adjourned on December 24 after failing to reach agreement on even the first steps toward a Yemen settlement. 2. Apparent continued efforts Faisal and Nasser press for solution offer hope for future. Anticipate, however, next two months until resumption Yemeni conference may see new strains in Cairo-Riyadh relationships, particularly if Faisal encourages some royalist military activity either in response any delay of UAR troop withdrawal or independently. 3. Pending further developments in Nasser-Faisal relationship re Yemen, do not believe it appropriate or useful for us try play more active role by, for example, exploring receptivity to neutral groups' supervision future conference as suggested by Nu'man. (YARG has easy access to Arab League and UN if it desires make use of it.) However, action addressees should use appropriate opportunities in discussion host government officials to indicate our continued desire peaceful settlement and to probe for information on next moves contemplated by UAR and Saudis. Rusk
385. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, January 12, 1966. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Confidential. Drafted by Moore on January 17. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Ambassador al-Aini said that he was pessimistic about possibilities for a successful settlement in Yemen arising from the Jidda Agreement. Discussions at Haradh had proven that the only technique now suitable for an agreement would be for Faisal and Nasser to announce their exclusion of the Hamid al-Din royal family and of Sallal and his clique from political affairs in Yemen for a specific future period, perhaps five years; for the Saudis and UAR to cease their interference in Yemeni attempts to establish a future administration; and for the coming together of select Yemeni leaders--perhaps those who had participated at Haradh--without any prior "royalist" or "republican" labels in order to set up the framework of a future state. It was now clear that neither a purely republican nor purely royalist regime would be successful in ruling Yemen. It was also clear that the holding of a plebiscite in Yemen was a completely impractical concept. In response to Mr. Hare's question concerning the extent of support of the foregoing view among influential Yemenis, Ambassador al-Aini indicated that a majority of the leaders and of the public, itself, held this opinion. He added that the basic problem at the Haradh Conference had arisen from attaching the designation republican or royalist to each of the participants, thereby giving the individuals a certain personal feeling of responsibility for supporting one side or the other. He said that neither the republicans nor the royalists, but rather the tribes, were now the deciding factor in Yemen. If Faisal and Nasser were not realistic in their acceptance of this, they were liable to find the situation removed from their hands with the Yemenis seeking help from elsewhere. In response to Ambassador Hare's question of the meaning of "elsewhere", he mentioned the Chinese Communists and the Russians as possibilities. Answering a further question, Ambassador al-Aini said that Saudi and Egyptian help might perhaps be needed to set up the forthcoming conference, but only in its initial stages. The Yemenis themselves were most aware of who the real leaders of the country were. By and large they were satisfied with the representative character of the group assembled at Haradh. Subsequently he would anticipate establishment of a Presidential Council as the chief executive authority, possibly along the lines of the August Taif Agreement. Ambassador Hare noted the present difficulty for a central government to operate in Yemen and said that it was clear the ultimate solution must be a Yemeni one, the result of efforts of a group working for the country as a whole and not just for its individual power interests. The need was for a consensus, although that was clearly a difficult thing to find in Yemen. Ambassador al-Aini expressed the hope that Jidda and Cairo were equally as well aware of the need for a Yemeni, not foreign-imposed, solution. In a subsequent conversation with Mr. Moore, Ambassador al-Aini said that his reports on the Haradh Conference and his analysis of the prevailing opinion in Yemen had come from his father-in-law, Sinaan Abu Luhum, (a recent defector from the Republic who participated on the royalist side at the conference) who had recently telephoned him from Beirut. The Ambassador is considering going to Beirut himself in the near future for further consultation with various Yemenis assembled there.
386. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/ Washington, January 20, 1966, 4:18 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret. Drafted by Moore and Russell, cleared by Symmes and Davies, and approved by Hare. Repeated to Jidda, Taiz, and London. 4031. Embtel 1712,/2/ Jidda tels 584,/3/ 595./4/ Yemen. /2/Telegram 1712 from Cairo, January 8, reported a meeting with senior adviser to Nasser, Hassan Sabri al-Khouli, to explore UAR attitudes toward Yemen. Al-Khouli described the basic problem as a four-sided interpretation of the Jidda Agreement and said that the solution lay in an agreed UAR-Saudi interpretation. He commented, however, that King Faisal was playing a "mysterious and evasive game" and said that all UAR efforts to arrange a high-level meeting or agreement on details of a settlement had been fruitless. (Ibid.) /3/In telegram 584 from Jidda, January 16, Ambassador Eilts reported that following presentation of his credentials, he had a 40-minute conversation with King Faisal about Yemen. Faisal warned that unless UAR withdrawal took place to allow the Yemenis to work out their own destiny, there was a threat of communism taking over in Yemen. The King said that the United Arab Republic showed no signs of wishing to honor the Jidda Agreement and that no withdrawal was taking place. On the contrary, he had received reports of further UAR military deployment to Yemen. (Ibid., POL 17-1 US-SAUD) /4/In telegram 595 from Jidda, January 18, Eilts reported that, at the King's suggestion, he met with Dr. Rashad Pharaon on January 17 to discuss the current situation in Yemen. Pharaon said that Nasser's most recent letter to Faisal, carried by Saudi Ambassador Ali Reza from Cairo to Jidda, reiterated his intent to implement the Jidda Agreement terms in letter and spirit. However, Ali Reza had also conveyed Nasser's oral message that he could not begin troop withdrawals until an interim government was formed. (Ibid., POL 27 YEMEN) 1. In view indications of worsening Cairo-Riyadh relations, believe it appropriate you again discuss Yemen problem with top-level UAR. 2. Suggest you draw on following points: a. US continues strongly desire peaceful solution to Yemen problem and development all-Yemen administration. Hopeful prospects for this, contained Jidda Agreement, have played significant role in improvement US-UAR relations. b. We disturbed at reports cooling of atmosphere between Cairo and Riyadh, particularly in view importance good SAG-UAR relations not only re Yemen but for broader stable climate for development and progress in Near East. c. Appears to us that problem may arise from lack detailed exchange views at highest SAG-UAR level, complicated by speculation at lower less informed levels. In this regard we understand SAG concerned that UAR troop withdrawals from Yemen not started. We hope initial failure Haradh Conference has not cooled UAR support for arrangements contained Jidda Agreement. At same time we recognize UAR and SAG may have honestly differing interpretations of troop withdrawal provision of Agreement. Would suggest that if UAR has timetable for troop withdrawals, informing SAG of details would greatly contribute to dissipating latter's concern. d. We aware rumors and press speculation re pending development "Islamic Pact" of conservative forces arising from Faisal visit to Iran. We doubt likelihood creation such grouping and of course have played no role in matter. e. Hope UAR will do utmost encourage Yemenis resume discussions as scheduled and assist where possible in enabling them reach successful conclusion. f. Continued progress on Yemen helps us to defend aid to the UAR./5/ /5/Telegram 1855 from Cairo, January 21, reported that Parker met on January 20 with al-Khouli, who told him that if the United Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia cooperated, peace in Yemen was possible. He said that, in an effort to break the deadlock, Nasser had sent Faisal a personal letter proposing a new agreement including UAR withdrawal within the 10 months prescribed by the Jidda Agreement, i.e., by September 23; establishment of a transitional government to be composed of one-third royalists and two-thirds republicans to be called the "Transitional Government of the Yemen"; and banishment of the Hamid ad-Dins from Yemen until after the November 23 plebiscite. Al-Khouli argued that if Faisal really wanted a solution, he would have responded immediately to Nasser's proposals. (Ibid.) Rusk [Continue with the next documents] Volume XXI Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |