NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.
| The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001. Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date. This site is not updated so external links may no longer function. Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein. |
 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXI Near East Region Department of State |
 362. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia/1/ Washington, March 2, 1965, 6:34 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret. Drafted by Moore and approved by Davies. Also sent to Taiz and repeated to Cairo, London, and Aden. 426. Taiz tel 326,/2/ Jidda tel 628/3/ to Department. /2/Telegram 326 from Taiz, February 23, reported that the Embassy had been approached by a spokesman for the Zubairi group requesting that the U.S. Government pass to Faisal its declaration that it represented the most popular force in Yemen and deserved Faisal's support, and that Yemenis wanted neither a monarchy nor a UAR-dominated military dictatorship. (Ibid.) /3/In telegram 628 from Jidda, February 26, Hart expressed doubt as to the utility of having the United States serve as a channel to Faisal for the Zubairi group views, noting that Faisal might well feel that the group would be useful in showing up the fragility of the Amri puppet regime but that they were no substitute for the royalists who alone constituted a palpable challenge to UAR domination of Yemen. (Ibid.) Department concurs with Jidda in questioning utility US formally involving self as channel to Faisal for Zubairi group's views. (FYI. On February 24 al-Aini made strong pitch to Talbot for US support Party of God and was told we could not give encouragement to idea that we would support any internal domestic faction in Yemen.)/4/ /4/See Document 361. Taiz is authorized at its discretion explain to Zubairi's emissary Faisal's attitude toward Yemen problem as we understand it (as recommended Jidda 628 to Department). In keeping with non-involvement position, do not believe we should particularly encourage or discourage any attempt Zubairi send representative to Faisal. However, Jidda is authorized discuss Zubairi's opinions with Saqqaf on off-the-record basis in context general review Yemen scene if Ambassador considers appropriate. Rusk
363. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/ Washington, March 9, 1965, 1:32 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Moore on March 8; cleared by Davies in draft, and by Campbell, George L. Warren (G/PM), Quinn, Judd, Bunte, and Talbot; and approved by Ball. Also sent to Jidda and London and repeated to Taiz, Paris, USUN, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA for Ramsey, and COMIDEASTFOR. 5335. Jidda tels 634 and 638 and Cairo 3059/2/ to Department. Threatened UAR Attacks on Saudi Arabia. /2/Telegram 634 from Jidda, March 1; telegram 638 from Jidda, March 2; and telegram 3059 from Cairo, March 4. (All ibid.) Saudi avowed aid to royalists places US in extremely difficult position. If UAR attacks Saudi territory in strictly military context of Yemen campaign, any US move provide aircraft patrols similar "Hard Surface" opens us to charge giving air umbrella for SAG activities against regime which we recognize in Yemen. (Fact of Iranian assistance to royalists, presumably through Saudis, poses additional complication.) In absence extensive network ground observers, it would be difficult for us give credence any Saudi bona fides that aid not being supplied, if such should be offered as quid pro quo for US air cover. In any event, only really effective form in which we could come to Faisal's aid would be with US military strength, risking direct US-UAR clash. Saudi direct involvement in Yemen precludes present consideration such action. In these circumstances, must be made clear to Faisal that while we continue concerned with integrity Saudi Arabia, our commitment does not extend to providing defense against UAR attacks within framework Yemeni military campaign directed at armament dumps for royalists on Saudi territory. Despite fact Faisal claims he acting only in interest self-defense, we not ready give him this degree support in defending such an extended concept of defense. Obviously if UAR attacks expanded to other parts of country we would be required review our position. At same time, agree with Jidda we should make clear in Cairo our continuing grave concern at any extension conflict in Yemen which would endanger Saudi integrity. Realize we have little leverage with Nasser, but in wake Haikal's threatening remarks on resumption attacks on Saudi Arabia it imperative we make certain UARG under no illusion about our continued concern for Saudis. For Cairo: You should make following points at as high level in UARG as possible, perhaps Ali Sabri or Fawzi for passing to Nasser: 1. US was heartened by events following Nasser-Faisal conversations last September which seemed indicate Yemen on road to peaceful solution and to government acceptable to all Yemenis. Subsequent breakdown of ceasefire and apparent narrowing of YARG popular base have been discouraging. 2. Continued massive UAR troop presence Yemen is cause of concern by Faisal and has been steady source friction in US-UAR dealings since withdrawal undertakings made in connection Bunker Agreement. 3. US continues be greatly interested in support integrity and independence Saudi Arabia and views with concern continuation bloodshed Yemen, threatened increase armed action there and possible expansion of conflict to Saudi Arabia. 4. US would view with great seriousness any extension UAR military activities to Saudi airspace or territory as indicated by Haikal (Cairo tel 3002)./3/ Such action would be further aggravation present US-UAR relations. /3/Dated February 27. (Ibid., POL ARAB-ISR) 5. US urges UAR, and is similarly urging SAG, to resume discussions with Saudis for resumption of ceasefire in Yemen, perhaps strengthening joint patrols, and ultimate settlement by Yemenis themselves, as reportedly planned following Erkowit conference./4/ /4/In telegram 3439 from Cairo, April 1, Battle reported that on March 31 he had made the points in the Department's telegram to Deputy Prime Minister Fawzi, who said that the United Arab Republic had also been hopeful after the Nasser-Faisal meeting, but that Saudi Arabia had subsequently stepped up its supplies to the rebels. Fawzi assured the Ambassador that the United Arab Republic desired to settle the matter if it could be done honorably. (Ibid.) For Jidda: Request you have full and frank discussion with Faisal in response his query for definition US attitude, making following points: 1. The oft-repeated US concern with Saudi integrity continues unabated; our friendship is of long standing and highly cherished by US. 2. As stated in past, US continues willing come to Saudi assistance against unprovoked attack. However, we frankly believe that continued Saudi material aid to Yemeni royalists can be considered provocative. With continuance such aid, US hard put to justify within world-wide framework any military reaction to assist SAG in face UAR attacks against purely military targets in Saudi territory near Yemen border. US can scarcely provide military umbrella for continuation Saudi support of a movement against the government in Yemen which we recognize. If UAR attacks should spread elsewhere in Saudi Arabia we naturally would review our position. 3. As evidence US interest in Saudi defense, US made technical survey air defense requirements SAG and presented results to Saudis over one year ago, including recommendations for improving F-86's currently in Kingdom to enable SAG, pending procurement and delivery new air defense aircraft, develop some defense capability. US offers made at that time, and subsequently elaborated on, to supply interceptor aircraft and related ground environment systems, including training and follow-on spares, are still open for Saudi acceptance. 4. US was encouraged by Faisal-Nasser conversations last September and subsequent Erkowit conference but was disheartened by later breakdown ceasefire and current preparations on both sides for increased military operations Yemen. We are strongly re-emphasizing to Nasser our concern for integrity and independence of Saudi Arabia and our hope for resumption Nasser-Faisal negotiations for peaceful solution Yemen problem. Similarly, we wish emphasize to Faisal our hope he will resume contacts with Nasser--either directly or indirectly--for this purpose. Additionally, we should again warn Faisal about the inadvisability of reinvolving Saudi Arabia directly in support Yemen royalists, pointing out as one example the difficulty with which this faces us in aiding Saudi Arabia in case of attack. 5. If there were imminent or actual UAR attacks on Saudi Arabia, Faisal would probably wish to take matter to UN, giving him forum present his case to world opinion, and marshal such opinion against UAR aggression and in favor of talks between Faisal and Nasser. Hopefully, UN consideration would tend to inhibit further military action and renew pressure for negotiated settlement in Yemen, both of which we assume to be in Saudi interest./5/ /5/In telegram 680 from Jidda, March 16, Hart reported that he had delivered the instructions contained in the Department's telegram to the King orally on March 14. Faisal had thanked him for the statement of the U.S. Government position, but commented that it contained "nothing new." He insisted that following the Alexandria conference Saudi Arabia had done everything possible to facilitate UAR withdrawal of troops "without loss of dignity" and that the United Arab Republic and Yemen had broken the truce. Faisal stated that his country was obliged to support the royalists as long as UAR troops remained in Yemen. (Ibid.) For London: You should inform HMG of above thinking and dmarches and request British join us in urging restraint on Faisal. Clearer picture would be helpful of what, if any, commitments British have made to Saudis and of current British attitude and dealings with Yemeni royalists./6/ /6/Printed from an unsigned copy.
364. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia/1/ Washington, March 20, 1965, 11:45 a.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret. Drafted by Moore on March 19, cleared by Staff Assistant Edward J. Streator (S), and approved by Davies. Repeated to Cairo, Taiz, and Dhahran. 466. In courtesy call on Secretary March 18, devoted entirely to Yemen, Saudi Ambassador Sowayel made following points: 1. Faisal extends regards to Secretary and appreciates US interest finding solution Yemen problem. Unfortunate that Nasser had not seen fit carry out agreements reached with Faisal last September and has now increased troops and begun insulting Saudis. Saudis ready consider any technique for solution we might suggest. 2. Frictions between Yemenis and Egyptians greatly increased. Royalists coming to Jidda preparing selves for new military action and are very confident, primarily because of growing popular genuine dissatisfaction with UAR presence. 3. Saudis certain Nasser in difficult situation in Yemen and are "only trying help him get out". 4. When he had asked Faisal if he should make representations against US PL-480 shipments UAR, Faisal had said no, that SAG would not want US stop sending food to Egyptians on Saudi behalf. (Secretary responded that honor and integrity US involved in completion present contract, but unless larger issues resolved it doubtful additional wheat would be sent UAR.) 5. In response to query, said most recent Arab League meeting devoted only to Germany, that Yemen not discussed. Secretary responded as follows: 1. As Ambassador Hart recently informed King, we deeply committed to safety and security Saudi Arabia and encouraged at internal development progress King has made in last two years despite Yemen situation. Faisal can count on us to support safety and security Saudi Arabia. But with candor must be noted that situation on border poses great problem for us, particularly since we launching military strikes against North Vietnam because they sending aid South Vietnam rebels. Thus policy problem posed for us in Yemen is very great one. We desire keep close touch with SAG, develop our common ties and mutual search for solution in Yemen. 2. Our relations with UAR hanging by slender thread because of various problems, including Yemen and Congo. We have little influence in Cairo but we are in touch with Egyptians concerning these problems. 3. Practically one-third USSR aid outside Communist Bloc going to Egypt. In this circumstance, we consider it particularly important for our Arab friends keep contact with UAR. 4. Unfortunate that search for inter-Arab cooperation has become confused with personal position of Nasser. There is much to be gained by Saudi Arabia and other countries from closer inter-Arab ties. In response to Secretary's questions, Ambassador said that, to his knowledge, Saudis were not discussing Yemen problem with other Arab states except for brief indecisive talk with Bourguiba; and that current UAR anti-Saudi propaganda not particularly strong. No further memcon is being prepared. Rusk
365. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/ Washington, April 2, 1965, 8 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 SAUD-YEMEN. Secret. Drafted by Jones and Moore, cleared by Davies, and approved by Jernegan. Repeated to Jidda and Taiz. 6051. Saudi-Yemen Border. We are gratified by indications (Cairo's 3439/2/ and 3448/3/) UARG taking pains to avoid violation of Saudi territory. However, Jidda's 740 and 744/4/ report two recent instances where UAR precautions broke down. Hope Embassy (perhaps Political Counselor to Al-Khouli) will have early opportunity insure UARG understands USG concerned over any violations SAG territory or airspace and USG commitment to support Saudi safety and security remains in effect. We trust reports of massive Egyptian troop movements in border area do not foreshadow increased border friction. /2/In telegram 3439 from Cairo, April 1, Battle reported that in response to his expression of U.S. concern over any extension of UAR military activities to Saudi airspace or territory, Deputy Prime Minister Fawzi assured him that the United Arab Republic would exercise all restraint possible. (Ibid., POL 27 YEMEN) /3/Dated April 1. (Ibid.) /4/Both dated April 1. (Ibid., and POL 31-1 SAUD-UAR) Rusk
366. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ JCSM-295-65 Washington, April 21, 1965. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1265, Saudi Arabia 381, 3 Mar. 65. Top Secret. SUBJECT 1. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) requested by memorandum, I-21497/65, dated 3 March 1965,/2/ subject as above, a review of the military options and alternatives open to the United States in the event the Saudi Arabian Government requests US assistance to complement the capabilities of its own armed forces to deter or contain possible UAR military action in or over Saudi Arabian territory. /2/Not printed. 2. The development of US military plans for supporting the Saudi Arabian Government is complicated by the fact of US diplomatic recognition of the Yemen Arab Republic, a UAR-sponsored regime opposed by the United Kingdom and by the Saudis through their support of the Yemeni Royalists. The consequence of this aid to the Royalists is to provoke retaliation by or on behalf of the US-recognized Yemen Arab Republic. Therefore, US military planners face the paradox of supporting the Saudi Arabian Government against a Yemen Arab Republic also supported, at least diplomatically, by the United States. Similarly, any coordinated US-UK effort would be complicated by the fact that the United Kingdom and the United States recognize, diplomatically, different Yemeni factions. For these reasons, all feasible nonmilitary actions, including actions in the United Nations, should be undertaken prior to any US military action in the Arabian Peninsula. 3. Consideration should also be given to the possibility of utilizing UK forces in the Arabian Peninsula before US forces are provided for assistance to Saudi Arabia. UK military forces presently in the area offer a significant capability and can conduct effective military operations in the Arabian Peninsula. 4. It should be emphasized that token forces do not have a capability properly to defend themselves or friendly powers, or to engage and defeat a determined attack. Moreover, if such show of force fails to deter, then the United States must be prepared to conduct land, sea, and air operations on a scale large enough to achieve our political obligations; and our plans must cover these contingencies. 5. The military options available to the United States in support of Saudi Arabia range from increased military materiel and training assistance to the deployment and employment of sizable land, sea, and air forces. The courses of action in JCSM-188-63, dated 6 March 1963, subject: "Courses of Action in Saudi Arabia (U),"/3/ were believed to be representative of an appropriate ascending order of possible US military force deployments to deter UAR aggressions. However, review with CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA has resulted in some revisions and additions to the options previously furnished. For your information, a discussion of the composition, capability, closure time, effect on US readiness posture, and cost, where applicable, of the examples is included in the Appendices hereto./4/ It should be recognized that these examples are possible military alternatives, not recommended military actions. In addition, these options are not mutually exclusive; a combination of two or more alternatives may be the best course of action to produce the desired result. Moreover, the listing of only air and naval deployments is not meant to preclude consideration of the use of land forces as a show of force. /3/For text of JCSM-188-63, March 6, 1963, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XVIII, Document 177. /4/Attached but not printed. 6. In the event that the situation in the Arabian Peninsula deteriorates, and any use of US military force is contemplated, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will provide further comments in light of the situation existing at the time. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: L. J. Kirn
367. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State/1/ Jidda, April 21, 1965, 1827Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL SAUD-US. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Tel Aviv for Talbot, Cairo, London, Taiz, Aden, Beirut, Baghdad, Damascus, Dhahran, Kuwait, and CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA. 813. Conversation with Assistant Secretary Talbot with King Faysal, April 19. Introductory Exchange. Meeting attended by Crown Prince Khalid, Deputy FonMin Saqqaf, Royal Protocol official and interpreter, Abd al-Aziz Majid, and Ambassador Hart. Mr. Talbot began by expressing appreciation that King had left proceedings Islamic conference Mecca to take time to receive him at Jidda. He brought warm greetings from President Johnson and Secretary Rusk and stated that strong US friendship for Saudi Arabia and interest in its integrity and independence remained unabated. Progress developing under Faysal's wise leadership was much admired by US and significance this effort, while retaining strong religious values guiding Saudi nation, was understood and appreciated. Talbot also referred to US global commitments, its efforts in Southeast Asia and its special interest in maintaining peace and stability in Middle East. Faysal thanked Talbot for his greetings and comments. With regard to Vietnam, he remarked that as he had recently told Ambassador Hart situation there had deteriorated because initial US stand had not been sufficiently firm; once US took determined action Communist side immediately began to appeal for solution by peaceful means. Addressing himself to relation between Islam and progress Faysal emphasized Islam contained nothing which should slow up progress of any nation, in fact, greatest leaders Muslim world were those who had been devoted followers of prophet's teachings. Conversation quickly turned to Yemen, Faysal referring to his 1962 talks with Talbot in Washington-New York,/2/ when he had predicted that entry UAR troops into Yemen would create serious complications. Facts had borne this out and it was continued presence UAR forces in Yemen which constituted main problem. Had upheaval in Yemen been limited to Yemenis alone they would have settled matters in due course. SAG could not pretend to be indifferent to UAR intervention, which had proved to be directed against Saudi Arabia. Tracing history of efforts to solve problem before and after Arab summit, Faysal said that once Yemen had been returned to Yemeni hands, SAG was ready respond to any request for help, no matter who Yemeni leaders then were. It was not in Saudi interest to have problems in Yemen. Solution now rested entirely in UAR hands. UAR and SAG should both get out of picture. Moment UAR desired solution it would be easy. It had only to leave Yemen. Nasir had made public statement that conversations between him and Faysal had no mention UAR military withdrawals. /2/See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XVIII, Document 58. Should Faysal publicize the secret agreement he had with Nasir? Meanwhile, UAR was publicly berating SAG and SAG was remaining silent. He had no intention of replying. However, this situation could not go on indefinitely. How long would UAR remain in Yemen? Faysal did not understand Nasir's ultimate aims for at Alexandria he had said he wanted some way out. Faysal had then paved way after return from Alexandria and had presented proposals which would have made it possible for UAR to withdraw from Yemen with dignity so as to avoid adverse reaction from people of UAR or other countries. Elements of these proposals were first of all, cease-fire, and secondly, mutual UAR-SAG efforts to bring together key people of Yemen to decide for themselves on their future. Observers had been sent. Faysal, right after Alexandria, had stopped all aid to Royalists as gesture of sincerity. Royalists abided by cease-fire for long time, but after Erkowit meeting UAR violated cease-fire so flagrantly Faysal ultimately felt obliged renew aid to Royalists. SAG had felt it useful in order to forestall complete stand-off by Republican-Royalist Yemenis at projected national conclave (Haradh) to suggest structure of a temporary govt ("state of Yemen"). Faysal then gave resume its provisions, already known to Dept. Discussions over this SAG proposal had continued without success. Emissaries had come and gone and after Ramadhan Saudi Ambassador to UAR had returned to report to Faysal that UAR would accept Saudi proposal provided provisional govt were called "Republican" and Yemen in fact remained permanently republican. Faysal said this was form of dictation to Yemenis in advance of meeting for self-determination. Saudis could not accept this. Meanwhile, Marshal Amer had made speeches to same effect in Yemen and in UAR. Saudi Ambassador was finally instructed on return to Cairo to inform UAR Govt that such statements were contrary to Faysal-Nasir agreement. However, Ambassador had not yet been received. It was not fair to ask Saudi Arabia to accept a dictated solution. Before responding on this matter, Talbot said he wished refer to Southeast Asia and to Faysal's remark that force should have been used sooner against Communists. US had helped Filipinos to get rid of Huks by policy of limited assistance and hoped to assist Vietnamese to solve their problem as Asians rather than by bringing in "white-faced Americans" to do job for them. However, South Vietnam had never lacked awareness of US sense of purpose. Talbot was glad Faysal believed North Vietnam was ready to have peaceful solution; up to now US aware only of North Vietnamese insistence on unacceptable conditions. To this Faysal responded that what he had meant to imply was that other side was now "crying all over the world" for peaceful solution. Talbot noted US did not yet rule out possibility of major confrontation with Red China. Faysal remarked that intervention of Red China in Vietnam would be understandable in its way, but why should some Arabs take similar position and intervene in un-neutral fashion against US in Vietnam, Cuba and other places? Talbot said he would like to review recent developments in US relations with UAR. Particularly as concerned Yemen, including mention of his April 18 conversation at Cairo with President Nasir./3/ As Faysal already knew, US relations with Egypt had been narrowed by important differences to point where they were now very narrow indeed. Ambassador Hart, following his return from Washington, had reported to His Majesty elements of this situation as seen in Executive dept of US Govt and in Congress. Problems between UAR and US had almost nothing to do with internal situation of UAR. Here US had actively supported and encouraged development, indeed tried to get UAR to concentrate on domestic progress. Differences had arisen over relations with third countries in which US had interest and found Egyptians heavily involved. First of these third country situations was Yemen. US relations with Egypt had never been really satisfactory since start of Yemeni affair. Then came our deep concern over Egyptian assistance to Congo rebels. We also found ourselves questioning what was going on in South Arabian Federation and in Persian Gulf. During same period African students in Cairo set fire to US library and Nasir had made speech which US found unacceptable. We were now coming to end of chapter in sense that because of Yemen no new development loan had been made to UAR since 1963, and 3-year PL-480 program was running out at end of June. We also had problems over Jordan waters and UAR in connection with "an old and familiar subject." In this context Talbot had been instructed to go to Cairo and examine with Nasir and with others attitude of UAR toward US and to explain US position on various subjects. He had raised many subjects, including Yemen. He had told Nasir US had been greatly heartened last August when there appeared be approach to solution of this long, troublesome and costly dispute. As His Majesty had mentioned, we ourselves--although not an immediate party--had made earnest efforts to help. Ambassador Bunker's work had, unfortunately, not been successful but we hoped parties directly concerned could find path to settlement. Meanwhile, our failure to give economic development loans to UAR, while never announced as policy, had been clearly understood in Cairo; however, we had kept food supply going. Subsequently we found our hopes for direct settlement had been premature. On earlier occasion Talbot had told His Majesty that US concern for security of Saudi Arabia would remain firm and indeed it had. Sometimes we heard rumors we favored keeping Nasir bogged down in Yemen because this helped Israel and because Israel favored this course. We do not know Israel's position on this matter or its activity, but as for ourselves, Talbot could assure His Majesty US position was that Yemen should be governed by Yemenis and we did not approve or condone presence large UAR forces in Yemen. In response to Talbot's questions Nasir had described events as he saw them and His Majesty would not be surprised to learn that there were differences with His Majesty's description. Nasir had admitted there were differences in interpretation of SAG-UAR agreement. Talbot had then asked Nasir what could be done to end this unfortunate situation. Referring to Cyprus, Talbot had said that US was urging interested parties to meet for substantive talks and hoped similar course could be followed on Yemen. Nasir had replied that he did not see much value at this stage in talks at ambassadorial level. Talbot had then asked whether he expected to meet Faysal again and, if so, whether in the near or distant future. Nasir had expressed strong view Yemen problem solvable only by direct Saudi-UAR agreement. Chance to meet Faysal might occur if Faysal attended Algiers Afro-Asian conference or next summit. Meantime since he had once sent Marshal Amer to talk with Sultan latter might undertake return visit and meet with Amer to discuss differences in interpretation of Nasir-Faysal agreement. /3/A report of Assistant Secretary Talbot's conversation with Nasser on April 18 was transmitted in telegram 3653 from Cairo, April 18. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, ORG 7 NEA) A summary of Talbot's April 18 conversation with Nasser is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XVIII, Document 208. Talbot said Faysal would not be surprised to learn that Nasir spoke rather strongly of Saudi assistance to Royalists and termed it "breach of understanding." Nasir had also spoken without noticeable enthusiasm of situation in Yemen, where people were taking money both from Saudi Arabia and from UAR. Faysal responded wryly: "We know our people there. They are the Royalists. If they can get something from the other side that is up to them." As for agreements, SAG and UAR had had two, each embodying exchange of notes, but there had been no result. As for sending Sultan to UAR, Faysal was agreeable to any recourse, even to going himself, but when Saudi Arabia was being insulted (in Cairo press) it would be interpreted as submission to blackmail. Nasir wanted to prove that writing one or two articles would force Saudis to come to him. Saudis could not accept that. Let UAR write hundreds of articles if it wished. Talbot made clear he was not acting as another Ambassador Bunker. However, because Nasir knew he was coming to Saudi Arabia he was conveying Nasir's reflections. To this Faysal responded SAG was ready now and had always been ready to work to solve this problem but would not accept dictation. If Nasir found situation in Yemen good, then let it be. "We are at our ease." Talbot rejoined that he did not find Nasir "at ease." Economic conditions in the UAR made it in Nasir's interest to solve problem. Furthermore, Nasir very aware of US interest in Saudi Arabia's integrity and independence. Talbot had strongly affirmed there would be great trouble for UAR in its relations with US if Nasir brought trouble into Saudi Arabia. Faysal responded Nasir naturally wanted SAG to desist from helping Royalists so could dominate Yemen and threaten Saudi Arabia. Why should not both UAR and SAG stop interfering in Yemen, Nasir withdraw and Faysal stop aid? Talbot commented US is frequently blamed by either side of controversy for favoring the other and cited India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir. This seemed to be our lot and was not dissimilar to role in which leader of any country finds himself between domestic factions. To this Faysal replied, "We never suspected you were partial. Nasir is the one we are addressing. Why does he deviate from sound solution and seek some other course?" Yemen was different from Kashmir or Cyprus. Saudi Arabia did not have designs on Yemen nor did it desire even a preferential position in that country. What Saudi Arabia wanted was that both outside parties should quit; Nasir to quit and Faysal to quit. Talbot rejoined that US shared Saudi desire that Yemenis govern themselves without outside interference. US had expended 160 thousand American casualties and hundreds of billions of dollars since World War II without seeking any territory or influence. Faysal again asked why Nasir stayed in Yemen. Talbot responded it was US belief that eventually Yemeni people would resolve their problems and have a Govt of Yemenis. This being case, we wondered whether it would be necessary to continue to give aid to Royalists. It was complicating factor as Ambassador Hart had already explained. Faysal asked how, if SAG stopped aid to Royalists, anyone could guarantee that Yemenis would be in position to resist UAR tanks and planes. Why not have both outside parties pull out? Talbot replied he did not disagree; in other places Arabs were having troubles with Arabs, Faysal knew Arabs better than we, and would perhaps be able to explain. Faysal responded that illogic comes from Arabs as well as from non-Arabs. Talbot then reviewed food-grain program to UAR and said that question of unshipped balance originally promised FY 65 must be decided soon and probably would be. After that, there was larger question--partly political, partly economic and partly psychological--whether another food-grain program to UAR should be started. Faysal commented that in previous conversation he and Talbot had agreed needy people should be helped. However, if this permitted Nasir to divert money to cause trouble in the area, this disturbed him. Faysal said it was inconceivable he ask US to stop shipping food to the hungry, yet how was this problem to be avoided? Talbot and Faysal both agreed this constituted basic dilemma of the program. [Here follows discussion of another subject.] Hart
368. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/ Washington, April 30, 1965, 6:17 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 31-1 ADEN-YEMEN. Secret. Drafted by Moore, cleared by Judd and Campbell, and approved by Davies. Repeated to Taiz, USUN, and Aden. 6955. YARG Charge Jaghman, acting on instructions from FonMin al-Aini, approached Dept April 30 with reference recent HMG note protesting overflights Harib area and giving notice possible turn to UN Security Council and armed action against interlopers (Deptels 6741 to London, 238 to Taiz)./2/ Requested US try convince British of problems which such notes and possible airing of situation in UN posed for new moderate Nu'man government/3/ during this critical time when it trying get feet on ground. Said Govt obviously needed respite in order get established before it would be able try get UAR stop such activity. Strongly hoped British could hold off "for at least two or three weeks" on any further actions or protests they might have. He referred to alleged sharp criticism YARG by British spokesman during UN Committee Twenty-Four discussion Aden earlier this week as further example type of thing which he hoped could be held in abeyance for time being to give moderate YARG breathing space. /2/Telegram 238 to Taiz (6741 to London), April 23, transmitted the text of a British note protesting overflights of South Arabian Federation territory by MIG fighters from Yemen that the United Kingdom had asked the United States to deliver to the Yemen Arab Republic Government. (Ibid.) /3/On April 20 Ahmad Numan, a pro-Western Yemeni moderate who advocated a program of internal reconciliation and eventual UAR withdrawal, formed a new Yemeni Government. Tone of approach was exceptionally rational, restrained and even pleading. Dept discussing with British Embassy Washington, giving strong endorsement this request from new FonMin al-Aini who has made clear in number conversations with Dept over past months his firm desire end Egyptian interference his country, goal shared by USG and HMG. Request London make similar approach FonOff. Rusk
369. Telegram From the Embassy in Yemen to the Department of State/1/ Taiz, April 30, 1965, 1200Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 YEMEN. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Cairo, Jidda, London, Bonn, Aden, and CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA for POLAD. 463. Following are main points made by Mohsin al Aini in my first call on him in his capacity as FonMin: 1. He expressed cordial friendship for US and urged that USG stand by Yemen's side and help it in this, its greatest hour of trial as well as of opportunity for peace and sound progress. 2. Numan govt represents what Yemen people hoped for when revolution of 1962 broke out, but were prevented from realizing by outsiders. It has backing of entire nation but lacks an army and is beset by many obstacles. He said UAR wants to discredit the group of leaders under Numan and is working hard to see that Khamir conference fails. Al Aini believes conference will succeed and lead to some changes in govt and particularly in powers of presidential council, where Sallal trying thwart Numan's policies. 3. YARG truly wants peace with SAG and UK and if they will adopt understanding attitude peace will come and UAR troops will withdraw. Yemen wants good relations with UAR but does not want to bow to Nasser's policy lines. Numan took brave step in dropping post of Minister of Occupied South and is under pressure from UAR to restore it. Numan trying take over radio and press against Sallal's objections, in effort stop attacks on SAG and temper output on Arab South. He being accused of kowtowing to imperialism and must move cautiously. Faisal and British must be understanding and patient until he wins this battle. He cannot do so if they continue to help Hamid al-Dins, who do not have slightest chance of returning to power. We can help best by convincing British and especially Faisal of this fact. If as UAR hopes SAG brushes off Numan govt it will fall and all Yemen will decide UAR is right in saying Faisal does not want a Yemen at peace. Result would be a bigger war. (In response my question he said all Yemenis want to settle the Yemen question themselves and resent idea it can be worked out by Nasser and Faisal. It is rather for SAG and UAR to acknowledge fact of an all-Yemeni settlement once it occurs. Virtually all Yemeni tribes though not Hamid al-Dins will be represented at Khamir conference.) 4. Al Aini made no specific request for U.S. material aid, but implied one would be forthcoming after Khamir conference. He deplored growing Yemeni dependence on bloc and said there are many hundreds Yemeni students behind iron curtain who will constitute danger to stability when they return. Other hundreds should be accepted by universities in France, UK, West Germany and US. He hoped France would recognize YARG. He reaffirmed YARG would not recognize GDR (Embtel 461) and said I must know it was not Yemeni who organized anti-FRG affairs. Numan govt would submit written apology and make other amends but "not now". 5. In response my inquiry al Aini said in view of Numan's known pro-Western policies and charges circulated by his enemies that he is Western stooge, it would be better for me not to call on PriMin until after Khamir conference. I asked him convey Numan USG's best wishes for success and other points in Deptel 232,/2/ which he acknowledged gratefully. /2/Telegram 232 to Taiz, April 20, authorized the Embassy to inform Numan that the United States was pleased at current Yemeni moves to attain greater stability by establishing a broader-based government. (Ibid., POL 15 YEMEN) 6. AID/Y Director John Benz accompanied me to Sanaa and had cordial and useful talks with Ministers of Public Works, Economy, Health and Finance. Comment: While we are not yet sure UAR policy at least at highest levels, towards Numan govt is as anti-Numan as al Aini described it, there undoubtedly is campaign to pad Khamir conference with obstructionists and that Numan is facing many obstacles. I agree with FonMin's assessment of importance Faisal's attitude, and although it would be miracle if he could be brought to support Numan govt., it is to us equally great miracle that latter has come to power. (One indication that it truly has power is persistent report that UAR high command asked but was refused Numan govt's permission to bomb Royalists attempting to cut access routes to Khamir conference. Numan said he would rely on guarantees given by tribes.) We earnestly hope SAG and UKG will realize that the present opportunity is a golden one and that if lost is not likely ever to recur. I recommend US do its best in Riyadh and London to enlist the "understanding attitude" al Aini seeks. Clark
370. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia/1/ Washington, June 10, 1965, 6:32 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret. Drafted by Moore, cleared by Davies and Director of the AID Office of Near Eastern Affairs James C. Flint, and approved by Talbot. Repeated to Taiz, Cairo, and London, and Aden. 639. YARG Charge Discussion with Talbot. In call June 9 on Asst Secretary Talbot, Yemeni Charge Geghman, who just returned from consultations Cairo with YARG FonMin al-Aini, made following points on behalf FonMin: 1. Present YARG, under Numan, is at critical juncture and vitally needs support friendly countries. Desperately hopes US will use its influence convince Faisal cooperate with Numan government as last hope for avoiding descent Yemen into utter chaos. 2. New YARG received full confidence representatives overwhelming number Yemenis at Khamr conference on basis that government would bring about expeditious withdrawal Egyptians. Nasser promised Numan during recent discussions Cairo that he would remove troops when Yemenis requested. (Geghman, in subsequent conversation Dept Officer, said tribal chiefs able force Egyptians withdrawal and took oath at Khamr they would do so if UAR did not act if and when requested by YARG.) 3. Faisal cooperation is key to settlement in Yemen. While Faisal's publicly stated plan for solution does not appear practical, YARG ready sit down to discussions with "Saudi brothers" at any time. Realize Faisal may have personal negative feelings toward Sallal; however, he should realize Sallal no longer chief spokesman for YARG but has "stepped down" to present position as head Republican Council. 4. Yemenis do not desire involvement in SAG-UAR problems but wish only seek improvement SAG-UAR relations. 5. YARG particularly grateful for US PL 480 wheat shipments. Food will continue be item critically important for stability in country for next six months; YARG hopes US will be able supply further shipments. (Talbot said would investigate.) In response Talbot indicated our support for peaceful solution and government of Yemen by Yemenis. Said from our experience he doubted whether non-Arab power able appreciably help solve this Arab problem. Hoped various Arab leaders would have opportunity discuss matter in Algiers. Geghman gave no specific reply when Talbot asked if YARG wished us transmit above points to SAG as direct message from Yemenis. (Assume his instructions not this precise.) However, suggest Jidda pass gist points 1-4 above to Saqqaf./2/ /2/The Numan cabinet resigned on July 1. On July 18 President Sallal asked former Prime Minister Hassan al-Amri to form a new government. Rusk
371. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, August 2, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret. Drafted by Russell. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Mr. Russell expressed our concern about provocative U.A.R. overflights over Jizan and the opinion expressed by the U.A.R. Consul in Taiz that the U.A.R. might broaden the Yemen war if the mission of Hassan Sabri al Kholi were unsuccessful or no progress toward a Faisal-Nasser meeting were made at the September Summit Conference at Rabat. We had the impression that al Kholi might have been disappointed with Faisal's reaction to his proposal for a Nasser-Faisal meeting. We thought, however, that Faisal did not wish to close the door to such a meeting but might find it difficult to comply with U.A.R. desires for fear of appearing to capitulate publicly to Nasser's threat of a confrontation. There might be some advantage to re-instituting the U.A.R.-S.A.G. border observation teams disbanded some months ago. Speaking informally and personally, Ambassador Kamel said that Faisal's present policy in Yemen was an invitation to trouble in Saudi Arabia that inevitably would affect American oil companies and the U.S. Government. It would be unfortunate if by pulling down Faisal's house the U.A.R. caused the collapse of its own, but this was a necessary risk. There was hope and speculation in Egypt that the U.S. would use its good offices to convince Faisal of the desirability of working with the U.A.R. for a peaceful settlement in Yemen. A Nasser-Faisal meeting after such U.S. action would be useful. Kamel envisaged a U.S. effort similar to the one mounted in 1963. He stressed the desirability of a U.S. initiative to allay widespread suspicions among the U.A.R. military that the U.S. is seeking to undermine the regime in Egypt. Both the Odell case and the U.S. sales of arms to Saudi Arabia contributed to the conviction that the U.S. was backing Saudi Arabia against the U.A.R. in Yemen. Ambassador Kamel suggested the desirability of a Battle-Nasser talk to 1) dispel suspicions arising from the Odell case and the Yemen situation; 2) convey to President Nasser the Secretary's hopes for a PL-480 agreement. A high level approach on these subjects both in Cairo and in Washington about a week before Nasser's visit to Moscow could have a restraining effect. A similar approach to Nasser through Tito might provide a useful means to reassure high level U.A.R. officials. In this connection, the Ambassador suggested the U.S. make a gesture by granting export licenses for hydraulic pumps ordered by the U.A.R. for use in the construction of the HA-300 fighter. This might provide Ambassador Battle with a useful pretext to call on Marshal Amer and explain the U.S. position in Yemen. While Ambassador Kamel appreciated the delicacy with which we had handled the deferral of a response to the U.A.R. request for these pumps, he felt that, while preferable to outright disapproval, even this might cause an adverse reaction given the sensitivity of the Egyptian army.
372. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Handley) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, August 6, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, NEA/ARP Files: Lot 69 D 547, Political Affairs & Rel., 1965, Saudi Arabia-UAR. Secret. Drafted by Moore and cleared by Davies, Russell, and Sisco. SUBJECT Since Nasser's July 22 public offer of peace and threat of war with Saudi Arabia over Yemen,/2/ there have been a series of U.A.R. overflights of Saudi territory in the Yemen border region, including bombing of a Saudi tent encampment near the latter town. The Saudis have played down these occurrences both publicly and privately. Faisal has given a temporizing response to Nasser's request for any early meeting but is expected momentarily to reply definitively. /2/On July 22 Nasser made a bitterly anti-American speech that also offered renewed negotiations with Saudi Arabia over Yemen but warned of the danger of war if the negotiations failed. Extracts from Nasser's speech are printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 619-620. We have informed both the U.A.R. and the Saudis of our hopes for an early solution to the problem and at the same time reiterated our continuing commitment to Saudi integrity. The Department's press spokesman, on August 4, gave a statement in similar vein in response to a question about the imminence of hostilities./3/ We have counseled the Saudis to cease their aid to the royalists in order to unencumber our commitment and have advised them to take the matter to the United Nations. We have kept the U.N. Secretary General informed of the rising tensions. We doubt that he will make any statement or otherwise take action, at least until he receives some word directly from the Saudis about the problem. /3/On August 4 the Department of State spokesman reiterated U.S. support for the maintenance of Saudi Arabia's integrity. (Telegram 22 to Taiz, August 4; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN) We judge Nasser does not want a confrontation with the Saudis but is seeking desperately for a way out of the Yemen impasse. A major problem is Faisal's conviction Nasser is bogged down to the extent he cannot do much against Saudi Arabia and his refusal to consider halting aid to the royalists. Our efforts are concentrated on furthering a Nasser-Faisal rapprochement and avoiding a confrontation. We have done some contingency planning, emphasizing diplomatic activities but also including the possibility of deployment of limited United States military forces if necessary. If such deployment is required, it should be carefully considered to avoid the appearance of any provocation on our part.
373. Telegram From the Embassy in Yemen to the Department of State/1/ Taiz, August 10, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 YEMEN. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Cairo, Jidda, Aden, London, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Kuwait, Tehran, USUN, and CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA for POLAD. No time of transmission appears on the telegram; it was received at 4:13 p.m. 34. Ref: Embtel 31./2/ My two-hour interview with PriMin Hassan al Amri on August 9 was as trying as I had expected and doubtless was embarrassing to the half dozen educated aides who listened to him ranting and me rejecting his distorted statements. He has limited intelligence and is clearly incapable of balanced judgements. He indulged in such extremes as vilifying the United States one minute and shortly thereafter exclaiming "we Yemenis love the U.S. far more than the Saudis do". After repeating charges such as were included in the Beichman Herald Tribune article (Deptel 28),/3/ he ended by quoting an Arab proverb that to complain to a friend is to show his love for him, and requesting a U.S. loan for development purposes. He urged me appeal to President Johnson to put a stop to Saudi machinations in Yemen. /2/In telegram 31 from Taiz, August 8, Charg d'Affaires Harlan B. Clark reported that Yemeni Foreign Minister Yaqub had told him on August 7 that after nearly 3 years of futile attempts to persuade the Saudi dynasty to stop committing aggression against the Yemen Arab Republic from bases in Najran and Jizan, Yemeni patience was now exhausted and that it appeared that the only way for Yemen to stop the aggression was to attack those bases. (Ibid.) /3/Telegram 28 to Taiz, August 6, instructed the Embassy to make clear to Yemeni Prime Minister Hassan al-Amri U.S. displeasure with the attitude reflected in an August 6 Herald Tribune article quoting his statement that the "US encourages Saudi Arabia to war against us." (Ibid., POL 27 YEMEN) The details are best left to a memcon, but I feel I succeeded in setting the record straight and injecting a much needed note of caution into current Y.A.R. and at least local U.A.R. deliberations. (The press and radio characterized our talk as a review of existing "friendly" YAR-US relations.) I was told that the captured American arms are being flown to Cairo as fast as they come in and that a plan is afoot to display them at the UN in connection with a YAR attempt to have Saudi Arabia condemned as an aggressor. I pointed out the damage such a move might do to the Republican cause, and urged peace talks as the only realistic course to pursue. My talks with a number of other key persons including UAR Amb. Shukri and the top UAR military command showed that they were thinking in similar terms, but have not yet made up their minds as to what they should do next; Shukri said he would have some freshly captured arms for us to inspect in a day or two but acting UAR Commander General Kabir said the details would be given to Embassy Cairo. I urged them to let an Embassy officer here inspect some. Shukri assured me that no military action would be taken against Saudi Arabia until all possibilities for peace had been exhausted in talks now proceeding. All UAR officials were calm, frank and cordial but made clear they would not indefinitely let Saudi Arabia keep on training and supplying the Royalists with a steadily rising number of US arms without taking action to protect their forces. Kabir asserted there are hundreds of thousands of Yemenis living in Saudi Arabia from which a steady flow of fresh recruits is being sent to fight the republic, with their wives and children being held hostage for their good behavior. (Emb Jidda please comment.) This, he asserted, was clearly aggression, and it was mainly US arms that were being employed. They seemed eager to have our help in stopping the war and reproachful we had not done more. Kabir said Royalists and Saudi spokesmen are broadcasting that the USG is fully behind them and this is having its effect on ignorant tribesmen. All Egyptians asserted their aim was to withdraw as soon as peace was achieved, leaving only a troop training contingent. If al Amri were the only YAR critic of US policy re Saudi Arabia I would not be so concerned and would be tempted to blame the two suspected Communists (Shahari and Yahya Bahran) in the presidency for most of this anti-US campaign. From my talks in Sanaa over past three days with a variety of people including Arab diplomats, pro-Western Yemenis, UNTAB Amb Tinay and Yugoslav Charge Grebovic, I gather that feeling is widespread in YAR circles that we are closing an eye to Saudi actions if not actually encouraging them. Unfortunately the press statement contained in Deptel 22/4/ has strengthened this belief, since it does not single out Saudi Arabia as being involved in supplying Royalists and in YAR eyes seems to imply we will "protect" Saudi Arabia come what may. Much of my time was taken up setting statement in perspective, and Shukri told me YAR has seized upon the reference to Yemenis being left free to determine their own destiny as implying we think that republic should give way to something else since Saudi position is also that Yemenis should have right to "self-determination", meaning return of Imamate. This was a helpful tip and I made good use of it. I made a bold point of inviting Shukri, UAR Generals and all others to help me set record straight and in almost every case they gave lip service to idea. Grebovic said he would try but it would help him do so if USG made clear it would only protect Saudi Arabia so long as it did not permit its territory to be used to attack a friendly govt which nearly all countries of world recognize. /4/Telegram 22 to Taiz, August 4, quoted the Department's press statement that the United States hoped that UAR-Saudi talks would lead to a situation where the Yemenis themselves would be able to decide their own national destiny free from any outside interference. The Department spokesman also reiterated U.S. support for Saudi Arabia's integrity and said that the United States would deplore any extension of hostilities in the area. (Ibid.) Grebovic contrasted Soviet and ChiCom policy in Yemen in a manner which is disturbing but should probably be treated with reserve. He said the Soviets were pledged to help republic and would continue to supply needed arms, but only wanted a peaceful, united Yemen which would cooperate in "co-existence". The ChiComs wanted to escalate the war as much as possible, on the other hand, and he had heard from Yemeni officials that ChiComs had offered as many well armed troops as needed, and would have 10,000 here in a month if requested. YAR had not requested them but its young military men were bitter, ill-informed and desperate, and anything could happen if the US "permitted" SA to continue its present policy. He urged us to pursue our "historic destiny" of ensuring a peaceful, progressive local order. Comment follows. Clark [Continue with the next documents] Volume XXI Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |