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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXI Near East Region Department of State |
 348. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia/1/ Washington, August 28, 1964, 3:45 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Moore on August 27 with text from the White House; cleared by Symmes, L. Grant (M), and Komer; and approved by James P. Grant. 117. Embtel 135./2/ Following Presidential message to be delivered to Viceroy: /2/Document 344. "Your Royal Highness: I fully appreciate the concerns expressed in your letter of August 17. Indeed I am glad that you wrote to me and expressed your views so candidly. This spirit of candor even where our views may differ has done much to insure a climate of genuine friendship and understanding between us. You know that I particularly share your concern over the unauthorized aerial intrusions into your country about which you wrote. We are making urgent representations to the Government of the United Arab Republic. We shall keep the most careful watch on any further such developments and will seek through appropriate methods to forestall their recurrence. I also understand and sympathize with your feeling that you need to take further measures to defend Saudi Arabia against possible attack. Ambassador Hart has informed me in detail about this problem. At the same time, my concern that the Yemen dispute not again threaten to expand to Saudi Arabia leads me to hope that your responses will be measured so as to dampen rather than increase the flame of conflict./3/ I fully realize that our counsels of restraint are not always welcome, but I believe you will agree that they are honestly and sincerely meant. I would be failing in my duty as a friend if I did not express my strong belief that your own interests will be best served by your carefully refraining from reinvolvement in the strife in Yemen. /3/An August 26 memorandum from Komer to the President advised: "A warm but unmistakable word of caution from you, backed by a strong pitch from our Ambassador, will help keep Yemen damped down through the election." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Saudi Arabia, Memos, Vol. I, 12/63-4/67) You, Your Royal Highness, are subject to singularly unique burdens. In addition to the responsibilities of leading your people on the road of social progress and economic reform, you have the added duty of maintaining the Holy Places of Islam. I well understand that this honor in serving a great world religion also has imposed on you obligations which are not shared by the leaders of other states. In the pursuit of peace which this responsibility demands, you may rest assured of the firm friendship and full support of the United States. Let me repeat with all sincerity that our great concern for maintenance of the integrity of Saudi Arabia, expressed in word and deed over many years, remains as strong as always. We are determined to maintain and strengthen the spirit of cooperation which has linked us in friendship. As you continue to seek a stable and peaceful relationship with your neighbors, you may count on us. May God grant to you and your people health, prosperity and peace. Lyndon B. Johnson" Rusk
349. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/ Washington, August 28, 1964, 3:58 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 SAUD-UAR. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Moore on August 27; cleared by Symmes, Grant, and Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs J. Harold Shullaw; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Cairo, Jidda, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Kuwait, Taiz, and Amman. 1454. Depcirtel 348./2/ Please deliver following message from Secretary to FonSec Butler:/3/ /2/Circular telegram 348, August 22, reported that British Charge Greenhill called on Secretary Rusk August 21 to discuss an urgent letter from Foreign Secretary Butler concerning the threatened increase of friction between the United Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia in Yemen. Butler appealed for coordination of U.S. and U.K. policies and requested that the United States strongly urge Nasser to reach a political arrangement with Faisal at their Alexandria meeting. (Ibid.) /3/In telegram 998 from London, August 29, Ambassador Bruce reported that after he delivered the Secretary's message to Butler, the Foreign Secretary had demurred at the suggestion that Faisal's resuming aid to the Yemeni royalists would be damaging to "all of our interests." He thought that such aid might prevent Nasser from triumphing in Yemen, which was all to the good, since having Yemen become "an Egyptian fief" was "not in any of our interests." Also, since recent developments made any coalition government in Yemen improbable in the near future, Butler did not see what agreement Faisal and Nasser were likely to work out in Alexandria. (Ibid.) "Dear Rab: We also are disturbed by the situation in Saudi Arabia and Yemen of which you wrote in your letter of August 20, and we are troubled by the renewed United Arab Republic overflights of Saudi Arabia. However, we do not anticipate that they are the automatic precursors of further Egyptian attacks, air or ground, on Saudi Arabia unless Faisal intervenes more actively in the Yemen. More recent intelligence has reassured us in holding this view. In any event, we are making urgent representations to the United Arab Republic to stop its overflights and to refrain from rashly reacting to Saudi defensive moves on the frontier. We are also impressing on both the importance for everyone that Faisal and Nasser reach an agreement on Yemen at their forthcoming meeting. We continue prepared to support Faisal by whatever means seem appropriate in the face of unprovoked hostilities with the United Arab Republic. At the same time, we continue to feel very strongly, and are again so informing the Viceroy, that it is in his best interests not to resume open aid to the Yemeni royalists. We agree with you that he has become increasingly and dangerously isolated from the Arab states. We fear that his aiding the royalists tends to increase that isolation and encourages the threat to his regime from both within and from outside Saudi Arabia. A primary objective of the disengagement agreement, in our view, was to allow Faisal breathing space in order to face internal problems. To encourage him to increase his aid to the royalists, thereby inviting a return of these same problems, would appear dangerous for all of our interests in that area. In the total framework of Anglo-American cooperation throughout the world our differences of view toward Yemen are a friction which it would be good if we could eliminate. As your Charge stated when delivering your message, the basic problem seems to center around tactics in dealing with Nasser. This, I understand, is to be the subject of forthcoming working level discussions between our people, the outcome of which I have no wish to prejudge. I hope, however, that through our continued concentrated efforts we can more narrowly define those points wherein we differ in the Middle East so as better to focus our efforts on resolving them and on more closely coordinating our policies in that part of the world. With warm personal regards, Sincerely, Dean Rusk" Rusk
350. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, August 31, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Saudi Arabia, Memos, Vol. I, 12/63-4/67. Secret. Mac-- We've had very strong reply by Faisal (Jidda 177)/2/ to our counsels of restraint, backed by LBJ letter. In effect, Faisal says that disengagement is dead, UAR presence in Arabian Peninsula puts SA in "mortal danger," and SA will take all means necessary to prevent royalists from going under. /2/Telegram 177 from Jidda, August 29, reported Hart's conversation with Faisal when he delivered President Johnson's letter. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN) Hart thinks Faisal (who's still going to Arab Summit) hopes for some sort of solution but is braced for a showdown. Hart thinks we should play it cool, not show panic or argue with Faisal any more. He and State both think Faisal as well as Nasser is engaging in pre-Summit brinkmanship. For your amusement, Rusk took seriously Saudi request that US "oversee" Faisal's flight to UAR, commenting that Nasser is one leader who would stoop to assassination of competing leaders. NEA took great umbrage and did research job proving Nasser had never done so to our knowledge. We can probably avoid too much Yemen trouble through Arab Summit (say till 8 September), but I'm starting to worry we'll have a minor flap after that. We'll do our best. RWK
351. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, September 10, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. II. Secret. Mac-- We may already be in early stages of a new Yemen flare-up. Reports indicate Faysal already started a massive resupply effort to stem royalist disaster as long ago as 24 August. UAR probably knows about it. Thus, unless Faysal/Nasser talks now going on produce a quite unlikely accommodation, trouble is ahead. Brits are actively abetting Faysal, giving him direct contrary advice to ours. Meanwhile, Rusk has been manfully fobbing off UK pressures, most recently Harlech coming in today./2/ I've been helping NEA feed him counter-arguments (see attached)./3/ /2/A memorandum of conversation recording the Secretary's September 10 discussion of Nasser's activities in the Middle East with the British Ambassador, Lord Harlech, is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330, Sept. 1964. /3/Not attached. My constant pitch to NEA is that overreacting now (with UK, Saudis and Nasser) is a lot wiser than trying to stem flood once it breaks. If LBJ thought we ought to be brutal in telling UK not to commit us over Malaysia, same analogy holds good for ME. This could be done at Tuesday lunch, if events wait that long. I'll do a brief, but would you entertain moving earlier?/4/ /4/A handwritten notation in the margin reads: "Give me a call. McGB" RWK
352. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, September 12, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 6. Secret. You may be hearing from Rusk shortly about growing tension in the Middle East, particularly a new flare-up in the Yemen civil war. This is no Cyprus crisis, but could have still painful repercussions during our election campaign. If the Saudis resume aid to the Yemeni royalists, Nasser will no doubt resume bombing Saudi supply bases, in which case Faysal will scream for help. The British, who strongly disagree with our policy of pouring oil on troubled waters, have been at us hard to unleash Faysal, even at the expense of our relations with most other Arabs. Though the Arab Summit seems at first glance to have been a dud, we also may have renewed muscle flexing toward Israel or a Jordan crisis. Either of these could bring new Israeli aid pleas just before the election, and new attacks on our Arab policy. We assume that your own feeling about the Middle East is the same as your view on the Malaysia issue last week, i.e. we certainly don't want another war on our hands for at least two months. This word from you was very helpful in getting State to calm down the British. A few similar cautionary words about the Middle East on Tuesday would encourage State to weigh in with Arabs, Israelis and Englishmen as well. In our judgment, this would be a quite useful noise. I'll bring it up Tuesday & give you a chance to comment if you want./2/ /2/The last sentence was handwritten by Bundy. R. W. Komer
353. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts/1/ Washington, September 24, 1964, 6:40 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret. Drafted by Moore on September 23; cleared by Davies, Campbell, and Judd; and approved by Talbot. Sent to Cairo, Jidda, London, Taiz, USUN, and Aden. 532. In call September 23 on Assistant Secretary Talbot, YARG Ambassador al-Aini made following points: 1. In light Nasser-Faisal September 14 communiqu, hope US will use its influence with both parties to promote a settlement in Yemen./2/ /2/The joint communiqu of September 14 declared that the two countries intended to cooperate fully in solving existing differences between the various parties in Yemen and that steps would be taken to establish the necessary contacts with the interested parties in order to reach a peaceful solution to existing differences. Telegram 905 from Cairo, September 15, transmitted the text of the joint communiqu to the Department. (Ibid.) 2. Settlement envisaged by al-Aini personally would involve following: a. Elimination of al-Badr; as necessary quid pro quo YARG would no doubt have to expel Sallal. b. Conference of up to 300 representatives of various Yemeni elements to be held, preferably outside Yemen (Sudan or Kuwait for example) to preserve strictly neutral atmosphere; group to determine membership new Yemeni Government. SAG and UAR could divert some of their aircraft now used support military activities Yemen to transport the group. c. UAR troops to withdraw from Yemen and Saudis to cease interference. d. Joint Arab force from countries not involved in dispute might be required in Yemen for limited period of time. e. UAR and SAG to devote fraction of their present expenditures on military operations to economic and developmental assistance for Yemen. 3. Emphasis must be on solution by Yemenis themselves, not imposed by outsiders. Any government not representing real will of Yemenis would not receive required long-term popular support. 4. Nasser-Faisal communiqu represents necessary start; but by its recognition that each side has followers in Yemen it shows possible intent of UAR and SAG to play with country, perhaps ultimately dividing it into spheres of influence in opposition to desires Yemeni people. 5. Concerning southern frontier, al-Aini repeated willingness as stated to UNSYG to establish DMZ, UN observers and even demarcation, provided these part of overall settlement in which British recognize YAR and concede rights of people in south freely to choose own government. (In response subsequent specific query from Department officer, al-Aini said recognition and provision for self-expression in southern Arabia were the only elements which YAR stood to gain from British since demarcation would mean giving up longstanding Yemeni claims to south; these items would have to be part of ultimate package settlement with British, although not necessarily first step.) 6. Foreign Minister Sirri has given al-Aini continued assurance that YARG doing all possible not exacerbate situation on border, although to some extent it is pushed unwillingly in this direction by Egyptians. Example of latter was UAR creation puppet National Front for Liberation Occupied South in violation of al-Aini-Mahmoud Riad agreement that UAR/YAR would deal with all nationalist groups in area. Al-Aini suggested UK-YAR solution to own problems would ease Egyptian anti-British interference in south. In response, Talbot noted that Yemen problem had reached encouraging new stage with September 14 communiqu and now, for first time in two years, UAR and SAG talking directly with each other about situation. We hopeful for future and would keep in mind possibilities where we might be able to assist as situation develops. Rusk
On November 2, 1964, Yemeni republican and royalist representatives meeting at Erkowit, Sudan, concluded an agreement providing for a cease-fire in Yemen beginning November 8 and a national conference in Yemen beginning November 23. The conference, which was expected to agree upon a coalition government, was to be composed of 169 religious, military, and tribal leaders as well as the 18 delegates attending the Erkowit meeting. The agreement also called upon the United Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia for help in executing its decisions. Airgram A-322 from Cairo, November 7, transmitted the text of the cease-fire agreement to the Department. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN)
355. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts/1/ Washington, November 30, 1964, 7:57 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 16 YEMEN. Secret. Drafted by Moore, cleared by Davies and Judd, and approved by Talbot. Sent to Cairo, Jidda, London, Taiz, and Aden. 1056. In call November 30 on Assistant Secretary Talbot to discuss Yemen, British Minister Stewart stated HMG willing in principle recognize compromise Yemeni Government which might emerge from forthcoming conference but with number conditions to be sorted out before such recognition granted. Said HMG continued hold same criteria for recognition (i.e., general popular acceptance of government which exercising effective control bulk of country) however willing apply these leniently to situation to gain bargaining points. Stressing treaty obligation to obtain SAF approval before acting, Stewart read and left paper describing preliminary views Foreign Office on HMG pre-recognition desires as follows: (1) Substantial reduction UAR forces and firm prospect they will run down at least to a low level; (2) For purposes assuring acceptance SAF as a fact, would hope for statement from YAR at least equivalent to December 1962 assertion its respect for international agreements and calling upon Yemenis in adjacent territories to respect law and order (would be desirable for YAR make specific mention Treaty of Sanaa and HMG in acknowledging such statements would make clear it intended live in peace with Yemen); (3) Essential put stop to subversive and propaganda activities in SAF (required if HMG to persuade SAF acquiesce in recognition; HMG would make point directly to UARG but would welcome similar action by US); (4) Desirable obtain progress demilitarization, demarcation or observation proposals put forward by HMG at UN in April (HMG prepared in return take all possible action insure that SAF rulers abstain from activity across border). Stewart emphasized HMG wanted continue discussions with US including US views on paper, and specifically desired parallel US approach in Cairo. In response Talbot noted our understanding that many moderate Yemenis apparently strongly desire easing Yemen-SAF frictions and removal UAR troops. Indication to them now of British willingness recognize government provided certain criteria met could strengthen them in pressing get UAR out. He assumed that Saudi position on recognition would also play significant role for HMG. British, according Stewart, felt that informing Yemenis at this time of British position would lead YAR expect quick recognition after conference and result in unwillingness take conciliatory attitude toward manifold problems involved. Agreed that argument could be made both for and against informing Yemenis at this time and expressed hope Talbot could further discuss with Foreign Office during visit London next week. Concerning any US approach in Cairo, Talbot noted problem was one of timing since Arabs still handling matter among selves and we deeply involved with UAR at moment on other matters. Stewart agreed, saying any contemplated approach would only be for consideration after results Yemeni conciliation conference known. During discussion Talbot also mentioned Yemeni allegations inflammatory output Aden Radio. British Embassy subsequently informed Department that Foreign Office already investigating matter on basis previous dmarches Washington and London. Harriman
356. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Sec Del/MC/51 New York, December 11, 1964, 3:30 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Confidential. Drafted by John P. Walsh on December 12. The memorandum is Part I of II. SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE NINETEENTH SESSION SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS U.S. Saudi Arabia The Secretary opened the discussion by asking the Minister for an assessment of the Yemen situation. In response, the Minister said that the meeting which had been planned between the royalist and republican factions in Yemen had been postponed because the UAR had withdrawn its concurrence to certain arrangements which had been agreed upon by Nasser and King Faisal. Whereas it had been agreed that representation at the meeting was to be on a 2/3 republican and 1/3 royalist basis, the UAR subsequently claimed that the republicans had refused to accept these proportions. As a result the meeting was postponed. The Minister went on to say that he hoped that a solution could be found to the Yemen question but at the moment he was uncertain as to when or how this could be accomplished. He believed that a viable agreement would have to permit the Yemeni to have an Imam. He said that the King wanted Nasser to withdraw his troops from Yemen but he had not insisted that this occur prior to a meeting of the warring factions. Abrupt withdrawal would subject Nasser to increased domestic pressures from his army, as well as pressures from a variety of dissident Arab elements. The King contemplated phased reductions from the very high current level of over 50,000 troops. Some method of certification of these withdrawals would have to be agreed upon in addition to arrangements for joint Saudi-UAR policing of the cease fire in Yemen. Actually, he said, Saudi Arabia is less concerned about the UAR forces today than it was a year ago. His Government continues, however, to be seriously concerned about the dangers of anarchy and Communist activity in Yemen. Today, virtually every facet of international communism, including the Russians, Chinese, Poles and Czechs, are at work in Yemen. About 900 Chinese are in the country. The Minister said that the relative positions of King Faisal and Nasser had changed considerably in the past year. Faisal now has very broad support in Saudi Arabia and expatriate elements are returning to the country. In addition, his social and economic programs are showing signs of success. Furthermore, UAR propaganda attacks on King Faisal had largely ceased. Nasser, on the other hand, is considerably weaker than he was a year ago. His economic situation is increasingly chaotic and there is growing opposition to him in the army. The King has no desire to destroy Nasser in part because of uncertainties about the nature of a successor regime. Turning to the subject of U.S. aid to Nasser, the Minister said that at times it appeared that the U.S. was providing direct assistance to him to carry out policies in Yemen which the U.S. opposed. He recognized, however, that the U.S., as well as Saudi Arabia, was confronted by dilemmas in respect to this question. Saudi Arabia could not, for example, oppose aid given to help the people of the UAR. Yet this assistance freed other resources for utilization in Yemen. It is a difficult situation. The Minister went on to express the opinion that the U.S. could be helpful in the present situation if it urged Nasser to come to an agreement with King Faisal in regard to the future of Yemen. The establishment of peace and stability in that country was clearly to the advantage of everyone but the Communists. In response, the Secretary said that he was very pleased to note the progress that had been made by Saudi Arabia in the past year. Looking back upon the Bunker Mission, one had to admit that the disengagement objective had not been realized. After all, he said, there are more UAR troops in Yemen today than there were at that time. In another sense, however, there had been positive benefits. By means of Hard Surface and other means we had made perfectly clear to the UAR that we wished them to refrain from attacks on Saudi Arabia. Other internal Saudi Arabian factors had manifestly found expression in political stability and economic and social growth. The Secretary stated that there are, of course, dilemmas in economic aid policy. We have employed economic aid, in part, as a means of maintaining a meaningful dialogue with the UAR Government. The situation today might have been worse if we had not been able to exercise certain restraint on U.A.R. policy decisions. The disengagement process in the Yemen has not been satisfactory and this has been a factor in our decision to halve the flow of certain types of economic assistance to the UAR. We continue, however, to advocate an accord that will bring peace and stability to Yemen and that will reduce some of the current difficulties that we have with the UAR. In closing this segment of the conversation, the Secretary asked the Deputy Foreign Minister to convey to King Faisal the assurances of President Johnson that the United States firmly supports the independence, integrity and well-being of his country.
357. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State/1/ Jidda, January 6, 1965, 1154Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 SAUD. Secret. Repeated to Dhahran, London, Cairo, Aden, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Taiz, and Tel Aviv. 504. Meeting with Faysal. Deptels 304/2/ and 311./3/ /2/Document 236. /3/Dated December 30, 1964. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL UAR-US) Proceeded Riyadh late January 1, having been notified I would have appointment with King following day. Faysal granted interview morning January 2 as soon as he was informed my arrival. I found him extremely cordial and forthcoming in course of meeting which lasted over two hours. I gave him personal regards President, Secretary, Undersecretaries and Asst Sec Talbot. President Johnson's oral message obviously moved him deeply. For some minutes after hearing it Faysal groped for appropriate words to express appreciation and to reaffirm conviction importance of strengthening Saudi-American bonds. While much of ground covered was familiar from previous conversations and will be summarized by airgram, of particular interest was prominence his concerns over Soviet infiltration Red Sea area. Faysal expressed conviction Russian and Chinese pressures on Nasir have played important role influencing against withdrawal UAR forces from Yemen. He also sees Anwar Sadat as having personal stake in twisting execution of Nasir-Faysal summit agreement of September 1964. This agreement, as distinct from published communiqu had been drawn up secretly and signed in duplicate, Nasir and Faysal each retaining a copy. Without revealing text ("which preserves both our dignities") he made clear agreement provided that nature of Yemeni state would not be decided in advance but left for Yemenis to ultimately determine. National conference would be held while UAR troops still in Yemen (Royalists had objected but SAG had overcome their objections). By six to eight months after national conference UAR troops would be out. Plebiscite would determine new Yemen Government which would climax UAR withdrawal. Faysal stated he had proposed but Nasir had not yet formally agreed that interim government be named "state of Yemen" and headed by sovereignty council (Lijnat Ar-ra'Asa) of three or seven personages. State organs would include council of ministers composed of mixed Royalist-Republican representatives and consultative assembly (Majlis Ash-shura) of 50 to 100 members whose membership component would be determined by decision of national conference. This interim government would conduct plebiscite. King deprecated UAR maneuverings to select "rabble from streets" as true Yemeni representatives at national conference and to insist interim regime be called "republic," contrary to Nasir-Faysal agreement. He asserted recent resignations YAR ministers plus wave of arrests had fully exposed as lie UAR justification it was keeping troops in Yemen solely to help liberate Aden and Arab South. Faysal stated he has instructed his Ambassador to Cairo to inform UAR leaders he, Faysal, considered Alexandria agreement still binding and basis for any progress toward Yemen solution. He commented "Nasir told me at Alexandria he had then 49,000 men in Yemen" and that his intelligence sources report arrival of additional 7,000 troops since. When he raised matter of US relations with Nasir, I replied that when I had discussed this with Secretary December 23, latter had smiled and told me I might relay to him that US-UAR relations were now worse than those of SAG-UAR. He grinned at this. In commenting on my statement of Dept's position (Deptel 311) Faysal stated he had no desire see USG break off ties with UAR but maintained interests at stake in present situation were broader than those of either Saudi Arabia, UAR or Yemen due to Communist threat to area. He also dwelt on need for some Arab regime in south which would be completely independent of UAR or USSR and made clear his willingness to financially assist one whenever--as he had advised SAF officials as well as al Jifri and Asnaj--the various South Arab interests got together and settled their mutual differences. He expressed repugnance at recent UAR-inspired terrorist attacks in Aden, predicting they would not succeed in forcing pace of UK withdrawal. Comment: In terms reminiscent of our mid-1963 exchanges, Faysal pressed for answer to question "When USG would act to force UAR withdrawal from Yemen?" Inconsistently and only half seriously he suggested that if USG used Sixth Fleet Nasir would get out at once. I replied this would play into Nasir's hands. His words were couched in much less emotional terms than on earlier occasions, reflecting perhaps his belief time is on his side in view Nasir's worsened relations with United States, UAR economic crisis and evolution of events within Yemen. Hart 358. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts/1/ Washington, January 13, 1965, 6:05 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret. Drafted by Moore on January 12; cleared by Davies and Deputy Director of the Office of Northern African Affairs James J. Blake; and approved by Talbot. Sent to Algiers, Cairo, Jidda, Kuwait, London, Taiz, Tunis, and USUN. 1254. In call January 11 on Assistant Secretary Talbot YARG Ambassador al-Aini commented as follows: 1. Written resignation last month Nu'man, Iryani and others had been circulated as clear statement their opposition to UAR; it noted they had tried cooperate all possible ways but had been completely frustrated by Egyptians and that UAR forces were present Yemen only to support corrupt regime. 2. Al-Aini had just heard reports, which he unable evaluate, that Jaifi, Uthman and al-Ahmar had refused cooperate with new Government; that provinces Taiz and Hajja in revolt; and that some ex-Ministers now jailed. 3. He had written Sallal indicating general loss confidence in Yemen Government which now prevailed internationally and implying he ready resign if situation continues as at present. (Later commented to Department Officer he purposely vague on resignation, not wishing prejudice position his deputy, Jaghman, whom he had sent via Cairo on December 13 en route Yemen to ascertain facts of situation. Department Officer responded positively to al-Aini's hope that we would be willing transmit any messages from Jaghman.) 4. Al-Aini had approached Ambassadors Algeria, Tunisia, Kuwait, UAR (sic) in US to request their assistance for Yemenis in face UAR takeover, noting that their countries willing interfere such areas as Congo and therefore should be ready help in this Arab problem. He said UAR Ambassador Kamel is "with us", understands problem and promised report to Nasser. 5. If appears useful, al-Aini will visit various Arab capitals to present Yemeni case for freedom from Egyptian control. 6. Suggested Nasser had full support USSR in preventing establishment any Yemeni Government which capable of running country and not being manipulated by UAR. Talbot responded that we scarcely able act as arbiter in this Arab problem, but continued make clear to Cairo our concern with Yemen situation. Continuation of our aid program was one way we felt we could be generally helpful. Al-Aini agreed that little more we could do. Rusk
359. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/ Washington, February 4, 1965, 7:54 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret. Drafted by Moore, cleared by Jones, and approved by Davies. Repeated to Jidda, London, Taiz, and Aden. 4602. Taiz 304 (181 to Cairo)./2/ Department disturbed at various reports in past weeks, culminating in Amer statement reported reftel, that UAR considers US has nefarious interests in continuation fighting Yemen and in supporting rigid position Faisal. UARG leadership may not fully believe this but may be setting stage for more open attack on US for alleged action Yemen. Thus insofar as possible believe we should make effort set record straight. /2/Telegram 304 from Taiz, February 1, reported that UAR Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer, who was in Sanaa attempting to resolve the political crisis, had told the Yemenis there was little chance that the postponed Haradh conference would come off because Faisal had imposed "impossible conditions." Amer said that Faisal had stiffened his position because of U.S. pressure and that the U.S. Government "likes war in Yemen." (Ibid.) At your discretion, request you approach UARG at appropriately high level, note apparent trend UAR thinking, and review USG policy toward YARG, emphasizing our continuing efforts in Yemen, as well as in Saudi Arabia and UAR, since revolution have been aimed promoting evolvement of an independent Yemen free of any foreign interference. This continues our goal. In order protect Iryani as source information on closed meeting, you should avoid quoting Amer as exponent of UAR view. Ball 360. Special Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/ No. 9-65 Washington, February 18, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Yemen, Cables & Memos, Vol. II, 7/64-12/68. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared in the Office of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency. NASSER'S PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS IN YEMEN Summary 1. Nasser is in a dilemma in the Yemen. The existing stalemate is a burden on his resources and an affront to his prestige. He would like to avoid outright annexation of the country. Yet he is unable to establish an indigenous government which is both independent enough to gain widespread support among Yemenis and docile enough to be a reliable ally in Nasser's scheme of things, in particular, as a base of operations for eliminating British influence from Aden and South Arabia. 2. Nasser is most unlikely to withdraw. Nor do we believe that he would accept any Yemeni regime that was much more than a puppet of Cairo. It is possible that he will launch a major campaign to smash the royalists, but he is unlikely to succeed in such an effort. In any event, we doubt that he could install and maintain a subservient Yemeni government. For some time at least, we look for continued stalemate, punctuated by desultory Egyptian-Saudi negotiations toward a settlement and by occasional outbursts of fighting. Given growing anti-Egyptian sentiment among virtually all Yemenis, the longer this goes on, the more unsatisfactory to Nasser the eventual conclusion of his Yemeni venture is likely to be. 1. The situation in Yemen over the past two years has been characterized by two factors--stalemate on the military front and increasing animosity toward the Egyptians on the part of a widening spectrum of Yemenis. Since September 1962, when the Egyptians first intervened in Yemen with modest forces, their strength has grown to about 45,000 men--comprising 10 infantry brigades, plus armor, aircraft, and supporting units. The UAR military forces have remained largely on garrison duty in the principal towns of northern Yemen. While they have not shown much aggressiveness, they have probably lost about 5,000 dead and the attrition of equipment has been high. The financial burden is also heavy; it has probably exceeded normal peacetime costs by more than $60 million per year. 2. Nasser's original aim was to establish a Yemeni government which was republican in form and led by men willing to follow his policies of Arab nationalism and socialism. His efforts were frustrated by the unexpected durability of the royalists, backed by Saudi Arabian support. Failure to subdue the partisans of the Imam and bickering and factionalism among republican forces have led Nasser to increase his investment in men and material and to take an ever greater voice not only in the running of the war but in the control of the Yemeni Republican government. 3. Nasser has thus fallen into something very like the trap he has been seeking to avoid. He has plainly not desired outright annexation of the Yemen, or even a less complete union with Egypt such as the United Arab State which he formed in 1958 and which became moribund by 1960. On the other hand, he is unwilling to let the Yemeni republicans run their own affairs. This is in part because they have pretty clearly demonstrated their incompetence to do so in a fashion suitable to Cairo and in part because Nasser wants to retain sufficient control in Yemen to prosecute his campaign against the British position in Aden. 4. Yet Nasser's efforts to find a way out of the Yemen mess--which Prime Minister Ali Sabri has characterized as "Egypt's Vietnam"--have thus far been futile. Two efforts toward a negotiated solution have failed--the agreement negotiated by Ambassador Bunker in 1963 and direct talks between Nasser and Saudi Arabia's Faisal in the fall of 1964. The latter effort started well enough, as Faisal and Nasser each probably believed that the course of events would favor his own cause, and the preliminary conference at Erkwit in the Sudan seemed to show that royalists and republicans were able to compromise their respective difficulties with little trouble. But the Saudis subsequently refused to accept the designation "Republic" for the future state of Yemen, claiming that it would prejudice the outcome of the proposed talks; the republicans--some of whom had been excluded from the Erkwit talks--quarreled among themselves over the makeup of their delegation; and the Egyptians attempted to control its composition. The upshot was that the plenary conference did not convene and the cease-fire--which had been fairly widely observed--has broken down. 5. The shelving of the conference has been a severe blow to the Yemeni republicans. Their resentment at Egyptian domination of Yemeni affairs has been growing for a long time. A majority of republican leaders have withdrawn their cooperation from the present government, now virtually an Egyptian puppet. A mood of "Yemen for the Yemenis" is sweeping the country and is tending to increase contacts and perhaps even cooperation between republicans and royalists. 6. The Egyptians seem unable to visualize assisting a Yemeni regime which is not entirely dependent on them./2/ The recently appointed government of al-Amri is so obviously out of tune with the general sentiment in the country that several of its designated members have refused to serve. There is virtually no chance that it can be effective in governing or in prosecuting the struggle against the royalists. However, the continuation of this sort of regime probably appears preferable to Nasser than loss of face by admitting defeat or the risks of permitting the establishment of a government which insists on a substantial measure of freedom of action. /2/This is not only intransigence on Nasser's part; it is a reflection of a political characteristic of the Arab world, namely, that power is indivisible. A leader either has supreme power or he doesn't, and, if he shows in some specific instance that he doesn't, then doubts arise as to his power in general. Considerations of this sort lie behind the unwillingness of successive Iraqi governments to conclude arrangement with the Kurds for defining the degree of Kurdish separateness in Iraq. They also underlie the almost universal tendency toward authoritarian government--whether by King, president, or prime minister--in the Arab states. [Footnote in the source text.] 7. Nasser's use of Yemen as a position from which to mount paramilitary operations against the British position in Aden is, from his point of view, an additional reason not to give ground. Such a retreat in the campaign against the vestiges of the colonial position would be counter to his entire foreign policy outlook. Over the past year, the Egyptians have armed and paid dissident elements in Aden and the Federation to carry out terrorist actions. The republican leaders have a different view. Though they eventually want to see the British out of Aden, they would like to win their own war first. In response to Egyptian thrusts, the British have given clandestine support to the royalists, precisely to deprive the UAR of its point of vantage in Yemen. 8. Anti-Egyptian sentiment is widespread. Some republican worthies have retired to their tribal bases, and many have withdrawn their cooperation from the Sallal-al-Amri government. Nevertheless, they are inhibited from positive action to unseat it by a feeling of helplessness in the face of Egyptian military power. Some of them, moreover, remain opposed to the royal family and refuse any cooperation with it as an institution, although not with certain of its younger members. Nonetheless, a sharing of a common enmity towards the Egyptians will tend to bring royalist and republican closer together, and make the UAR's tack in Yemen more difficult. Outlook 9. Nasser's several interests in Yemen and the extent of his commitment there make an outright withdrawal highly unlikely in the foreseeable future. Although his costs will continue to mount, and will contribute to grumbling and discontent within Egypt, there is little likelihood of a sudden and dramatic deterioration in the Egyptian position. 10. There are indications that the UAR may be preparing for another major offensive, perhaps aimed--as was a joint UAR-Yemeni effort in August 1964--at eliminating centers of royalist resistance and cutting royalist supply route to Saudi Arabia. Additional forces are arriving in Yemen, and the UAR command is employing such weapons as 6,600-pound bombs and chemical mines, apparently to terrorize the tribespeople. We would expect a major effort to have success in occupying territory and inflicting local defeats, but we do not think the Egyptians are able to penetrate the rugged mountain fastnesses to which the royalist tribes would retreat. Also, with many republican leaders disaffected, the Egyptians will have less tribal support to draw on than in the past. A heavy Egyptian offensive might lead to some bombing raids within Saudi Arabia. However, we do not believe that the UAR is likely to invade Saudi territory. 11. Over the next several months, the Egyptians and Saudis will probably continue their contacts in an effort to reach a settlement. Faisal will want to keep the talks going so as not to give Nasser an excuse for further attacks on him again. He also probably sees certain advantages for him in having the Egyptians expend resources in Yemen, and he appears to feel that time is on his side in the Yemeni question. Accordingly, Faisal will probably not be willing to compromise his basic objective: withdrawal of the bulk of Nasser's forces. He appears to view the establishment of a government chosen by and acceptable to a broad consensus of Yemenis as favoring this objective. For their part, the Egyptians want to keep the contact open, in the hope of finding some process or mechanism which can be manipulated to their advantage. Faisal and Nasser will probably attempt to get royalists and republicans together again, but the prospects for progress toward a solution in the coming six months or so are dim. 12. We do feel that the Egyptians will be forced to agree in time to a compromise settlement. The longer that time is, the less influence and the fewer supporters are they likely to have in whatever government emerges. The "third force" of anti-Egyptian republicans will almost certainly play a prominent role in any such settlement. There is a good chance that at least some of the Hamid-al-Din princes would also be involved. The ultimate result could well be a regime which is neither republic nor monarchy, but which contains elements of both, as well as a strong tribal flavor. 13. Even so, hatred of the Egyptians may not prove sufficient cement to hold a compromise Yemeni regime together. There is on the horizon no single leader who has the ability to run the country. Nor has any one faction--royalist, republican, or independent--the capability of imposing its will on the others. Unless the Yemeni leaders succeed in subduing their personal, tribal, and political rivalries in the common interest, a measure of anarchy is a not unlikely prospect for Yemen, if and when the Egyptian hand is withdrawn. For the Board of National Estimates: Sherman Kent
361. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, February 24, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL YEMEN. Secret. Drafted by Wolle on February 26. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Ambassador al-Aini called at his request to discuss developments in Yemen. In summary, the Ambassador's remarks constituted a passionate indictment of the U.A.R.'s activities in Yemen and a request that the United States through diplomatic efforts encourage Saudi Arabia to support Zubairi's Party of God movement as an alternative to its policy of full backing for the royalists. The Ambassador said that Zubairi and his people were continuing their efforts to build support for the Party of God. They were apparently having some success in gaining tribal support from both Y.A.R. and royalist sides. He did not know if Zubairi had had any contact with the Saudi Government so far. Mr. Talbot said it was the Department's impression that more U.A.R. troops are now in Yemen than ever before, and that the rather favorable atmosphere of last fall, when it seemed President Nasser and King Faisal were working toward settlement of the Yemeni problem, has unfortunately vanished. He said it seemed that the Arabs somehow ought to be able and willing to face the situation and seek a solution. Ambassador al-Aini said that his government had been promised that Jordan's King Hussein would contact Nasser in an effort to help clarify the situation and advance toward a solution, but he did not know whether Hussein had taken any steps as yet. Mr. Talbot said he had no information on this but that during his recent discussions with King Hussein in Amman on other matters, he gained the impression that the King would be anxious to help, if possible, on the Yemen problem. Ambassador al-Aini said he was convinced that the Party of God movement gave the Saudi Government an alternative to continued support of the royalists. Why did the Saudis not take this opportunity and make contacts with the new movement? It was certainly more representative of the thinking and feelings of the Yemeni people than the Hamid al-Din family elements which were in the vanguard of the royalist camp. The Ambassador said he thought the U.A.R. would reconsider its policy in Yemen if it became clear that the Party of God movement had great support. The U.S. Government, said the Ambassador, should not remain aloof from the problem but should help toward a solution. Mr. Talbot reminded him of the major American efforts of 1963-64 and of the Bunker missions. The Ambassador responded that Zubairi's movement was a new factor and that U.S. diplomatic assistance at this time could be effective. He then launched a bitter attack against U.A.R. activities in Yemen, describing the Egyptians as the "worst colonialists any country has experienced". He ascribed to the U.A.R. the objective of occupying and using Yemen for its own interests and said the U.A.R. would never willingly withdraw from his country. U.A.R. actions were savage and inhumane. Not content with bombing Yemeni villages by day, the U.A.R. was now conducting air raids at night against "thousands and thousands" of Yemenis. It had devastated huge sections of the Arhab district. Mr. Talbot asked if the Ambassador was aware of recent unconfirmed reports that the U.A.R. forces were using poison gas. The Ambassador responded that "everything is possible" and that the Egyptians would stop at nothing to carry out their designs. He claimed to have factual reports that U.A.R. forces had even burned persons alive in front of others. He declared that Nasser wished the Hamid al-Din family to remain at the helm of the royalist opposition so that he would have a popular pretext for his own designs in Yemen. Mr. Talbot referred to the situation along Yemen's southern border, stating that an opportunity to establish greater peace in that area may have been missed, inasmuch as the new Labor Government in the United Kingdom might have seen fit to change somewhat the direction of British policy had it been met halfway by the Y.A.R. The Ambassador responded that the Egyptians are fomenting the difficulty in the south. He said the U.A.R. had organized the National Liberation Front to spearhead terrorism and that the Cairo press and radio are attacking all the old political groupings in the south which historically had been working for advancement of the peoples' interests. The U.A.R. is using violence indiscriminately in the south, he said, because it wants to replace the British as the occupying power. The Ambassador concluded that Yemen must be aided for the sake of the entire Arabian Peninsula. It is, he said, the duty of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom and the United States to help out in this situation. It must be realized that the unified Yemeni people are facing "a tyrant" (the U.A.R.). Mr. Talbot assured the Ambassador that the Department watches the situation with sympathy and understanding. He said he wished to make it clear that he could not give any encouragement that the United States could entertain the idea of assisting the Party of God or any internal domestic group in Yemen. The U.S. continued to hope the situation would improve and that there would appear among the parties concerned the necessary concessions and willingness to change which might make a settlement possible. [Continue with the next documents] Volume XXI Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |