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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXI Near East Region Department of State |
 Yemen 319. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, January 17, 1964. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 US/JOHNSON. Secret. Drafted by Moore on January 15, cleared by Davies and Jernegan, and in substance by John C Dorrance (IO/UNP). SUBJECT Enclosed is a copy of a letter from Crown Prince Faisal/2/ received in response to the President's letter of December 19, 1963./3/ /2/For text of Faisal's letter, see Document 221. /3/For text of the President's letter of December 19, 1963, to Crown Prince Faisal, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XVIII, Document 389. We are pleased with its emphasis on the importance of strengthening relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia and the desire for continued frank exchanges of views. Faisal agrees in this letter to extend the validity of the disengagement agreement in the Yemen for an additional two months or until March 4. Additionally, the Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister has stressed to Ambassador Hart that in this letter the Crown Prince tacitly shows himself amenable to an even further extension of the United Nations Yemen Observation Mission provided a plan can be developed which gives real hope for United Arab Republic troop withdrawals. This is an encouraging sign of a less rigid attitude on the part of Faisal toward easing the Yemen problem. In view of Faisal's expressed desire for further correspondence with the President, the Department proposes to prepare at the appropriate future date a letter for the President's signature containing a general review of the current status of the relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia./4/ /4/See Document 229. Benjamin H. Read/5/ /5/Don T. Christensen of S/S signed for Read.
320. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/ Washington, January 27, 1964, 7:48 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 UAR. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Seelye, cleared by Davies, and approved by Jernegan. Repeated to Jidda, London, Taiz, and Dhahran. 3430. Jidda's 755 to Dept;/2/ Deptel 3306 to Cairo;/3/ Cairo's 1649 to Dept.;/4/ Jidda's 772 to Dept./5/ /2/In telegram 755 from Jidda (sent as 272 to Cairo), January 20, Ambassador Hart reported that Deputy Foreign Minister Saqqaf had requested U.S. assistance through the U.S. Embassy in Cairo to make known to the highest level of the UAR Government that Saqqaf was ready to discuss matters in general with the UAR Government and was ready to welcome a UAR emissary to Saudi Arabia. Saqqaf asked that the U.S. Government make the following points: (1) after Faisal's recent visit to Cairo, the United Arab Republic should have no inhibitions about sending a top level emissary to Saudi Arabia; (2) the emissary should be "a truly important figure"; (3) both sides should start the talks with the concept that the Yemen problem could not be solved except by UAR-Saudi agreement; (4) there should be private talks between the UAR team and Saqqaf before and after each session with Faisal; and (5) several meetings would be required. (Ibid.) /3/Dated January 21. (Ibid.) /4/In telegram 1649 from Cairo, January 22, Badeau argued that the Embassy saw little profit in the proposal in telegram 755, noting a previous occasion when the United States had obtained UAR agreement for private bilateral talks with Saudi Arabia only to have the arrangement vetoed by Faisal. He recommended that the U.S. Government not involve itself in this question unless it received a direct request from Faisal. (Ibid.) /5/Dated January 26. (Ibid., POL SAUD-UAR) While noting there are hopeful indications certain Arab League countries are promoting further UAR-Saudi contacts, we share Embassy Jidda's view that UAR-SAG relationship insufficiently improved to warrant our ignoring opportunity play catalytic role. We have repeatedly urged reconciliation and profferred our assistance in connection therewith. Also SAG no doubt reposes most confidence in USG middleman role. We inclined believe best prospect for inducing Faisal agree to detente lies in following Saqqaf's stategy. Accordingly, unless you perceive strong objections, request you (1) make known to GUAR fact that Ambassador Hart has seen Saqqaf, who in reply to Ambassador's question stated SAG is now ready discuss matters in general with GUAR but without prescribed agenda and is ready to welcome anyone from GUAR to SA, (2) convey as much of material contained five numbered-paragraphs Jidda's 272 to Cairo/6/ as you deem appropriate. /6/See footnote 2 above. Ball
321. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, January 31, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Yemen, Memos, Vol. I, 11/63-6/64. Secret. Yemen. This is merely to inform you that we have quietly and successfully redeployed our miniscule jet fighter force (8 planes) out of Saudi Arabia./2/ Defense has been panting to do so for months and you'll recall we finally agreed to leave them there till 31 January only to make sure Faysal extended the disengagement rather than reopening the Yemen war. /2/On June 13, 1963, President Kennedy approved the temporary deployment of an air unit (operation Hard Surface) composed of eight U.S. F-100D tactical fighter aircraft and one transport-type command support aircraft to Saudi Arabia in exchange for Saudi agreement to end all aid to the Royalist side in the Yemen civil war. Your 19 January letter to Faysal/3/ clinched his adherence, and he raised no objection at all when we told him we were withdrawing above "training" mission. His subsequent friendly letter to you/4/ didn't even raise the question (we're preparing a suitable reply). /3/Reference is to Johnson's letter of December 19, 1963; see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XVIII, Document 389. /4/For text of Faisal's January 11 letter, see Document 221. In fact, our best guess is that the Yemen flap is about over (there's been little fighting for months), and a UAR/Saudi reconciliation in the cards. I may be wrong but I think we can keep this messy little problem off your list of trouble spots. R. W. Komer/5/ /5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
322. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, March 10, 1964. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Confidential. Drafted by Seelye on March 11. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Prince Abdul Rahman ibn Yahya, leading member of Hamid al-Din family NE--Rodger P. Davies The Prince covered familiar ground in presenting the royalist case to Mr. Davies, including the following: 1. The presence of an Imam in Yemen is essential to both the Zaidis and Shafeis. In the absence of an Imam as temporal-spiritual head of Yemen, the people are staying away from Friday prayers. (In response to a query, the Prince stated that while the Imam does not have to be drawn from the Hamid al-Din family, no other family qualified for the position has sufficient stature or the appropriate personality.) 2. The new Imamate, unlike its predecessors, is enlightened and seeks to introduce reform and modernization to Yemen. It would look to the United States for guidance and assistance. 3. The royalists cannot participate in a republican-led, UAR-supported coalition government, particularly while UAR troops remain in Yemen, since to do so would only reinforce the UAR position by enabling the UAR to claim to the world that it enjoys full Yemeni support, thus permitting the UAR to bring about a UAR-YAR federation. 4. Evidence of the UAR's determination to remain in Yemen, as well as its deceit, is exemplified by the following recent incident: In response to a request from the UN transmitted via Saudi Arabia the royalists "opened" an important road artery in Yemen in order to allow the UAR to "withdraw" some of its troops from outlying areas; however, instead of withdrawing troops, the UAR took advantage of the situation to attack the royalists. Mr. Davies restated the USG position, including the following: 1. We seek similar objectives in Yemen, i.e. the withdrawal of foreign military forces, peace and security in Yemen, and Yemeni self-determination. 2. The creation of a broader-based Yemeni regime offers the best hope for effecting a drawdown of UAR troops in Yemen sooner rather than later. 3. The failure to achieve a coalition-type regime in Yemen risks the danger that the UAR will be induced increasingly to take over running the YAR government machinery down to the provincial level and to add to its military forces in Yemen. (The Prince noted that the UAR is already "running things," notably security, and told of a British correspondent who was able to see Vice President al-Amri only in the company of two Egyptian officers.) 4. Our impression is that the UAR resists the proposal that the YAR be federated with the UAR. We understood that the UAR turned down earlier efforts by Sallal to bring about such a federation. 5. He reported his conversations in Yemen last October with Vice President al-Amri and UAR General Qadi and noted General Qadi's apparently genuine interest in helping develop Yemen. 6. He noted the recent suggestion that the UAR military force in Yemen be replaced by an Arab League force. (The Prince opposed this idea since he assumed such a force would be composed only of troops from pro-UAR countries. However, he would not oppose the dispatch of a "neutral" UN force.) The Prince handed Mr. Davies the Arabic original, together with an English translation, of a letter from Imam Badr to President Johnson./2/ He expressed the hope that the letter would be transmitted to the President. Mr. Davies assured the Prince that he would see to it that the letter reached the White House. /2/The Imam's letter to the President is ibid.
323. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, March 17, 1964, 3:30 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret. Drafted by Seelye on March 18. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS The Secretary The Lord Harlech, British Ambassador The Secretary expressed the view that the time had come to reassess the situation in Yemen in the light of recently restored relations between the UAR and Saudi Arabia./2/ He observed that the British have created the impression that they are actively supporting restoration of the Imamate, inducing the YAR and the UAR to "go after" them in South Arabia. He recalled that earlier in Cairo the USG had expressed support for the British position in Aden. He wondered if the British believed the UAR was seriously trying to evict them from their Aden position or whether HMG felt itself committed to do something for the royalists. /2/Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic resumed diplomatic relations, broken on November 6, 1962, on March 3. The British Ambassador said that his government is endeavoring, not wholly successfully, to discourage Aden-based operations in support of the Yemeni royalists and noted that the British mercenaries fighting with the royalists are "a private enterprise." He denied further that mercenaries are in the employ of either Faisal or the Aden shaikhs; he contended that they are financed from private sources. He acknowledged that insofar as these operations were mounted from Aden, HMG was placed in an embarrassing position. He called to the Secretary's attention a recent report of YAR air attacks over Beihan on March 13 and a subsequent demand by the South Arabian Federation Supreme Council for British retaliatory action. He said that London was at that moment considering the matter. The Ambassador commented that the British Government is "not necessarily anxious" to restore the Imamate, believing that the Yemeni consensus might favor such a development. He acknowledged awareness of the USG view that restoration of the Imamate appears impracticable. He stated that the British position remains flexible. Mr. Jernegan emphasized that our position is also flexible and that we welcome any regime which is viable. The Secretary alluded to the possible distinction between what we might wish to encourage and what is realizable. He expressed the view that a formula other than restoration of the Imamate had a better chance of being acceptable to both Faisal and Nasser. He recalled that Faisal had indicated readiness to acknowledge any government in Yemen acceptable to the Yemenis. The Secretary, recalling the YARG public statement of December 1962 affirming a desire to maintain good relations with the South Arabian Federation, wondered whether another such statement at this time would be useful. The Ambassador doubted that such a statement would be appropriate unless HMG were on the verge of recognizing the YARG. Unless the latter were the case, he felt it would be extremely difficult to get the Yemeni regime to make such a statement. Mr. Jernegan expressed our concern at the fact that neither side appears to be making a real effort to prevent serious trouble from erupting along the Yemen-Aden border. He questioned whether the British High Commissioner and other officials in Aden have been sufficiently energetic in endeavoring to restrain the gun-running and other activities in support of the royalists. The Secretary inquired as to whether the YAR had mounted land attacks across the border. The Ambassador said that there had been cross-border shelling. He noted that there had been long periods of quiescence along the border. The Secretary commented that UAR disengagement from Yemen would be facilitated if the UAR and YAR could be satisfied that HMG in Aden offered no threat. Mr. Jernegan said that the UAR is fed up with the Yemen problem and wants to find a graceful way out. The Ambassador noted that the Yemenis also are fed up with the Egyptians. The Ambassador concluded by saying that he would be happy to report to his government the USG interest in damping down the border conflict and to suggest that HMG take stock of the Yemen situation in light of the UAR-SAG restoration of relations.
324. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, March 30, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. I. Secret. Mac-- You asked the other day what gestures we could make toward the Arabs. One smart move would be to show we aren't in sympathy with UK's foolish Sandys style Arab policy. Most of us accept that Nasser's 22 February speech reference to Libyan bases/2/ (which triggered current mess) was a reaction to Home's Ottawa remarks about Suez. Note also that UAR has nationalized two UK oil companies (pour encourager les autres?). /2/On February 22 UAR President Nasser made a speech declaring that no country could claim independence unless the foreign military bases on its territory were liquidated. The Libyan Government subsequently announced that it did not intend to renew the treaties whereby the United States and the United Kingdom maintained bases in Libya. British covert support of Yemeni Royalists is breeding dangerous reactions too. Now Brits, in response to UAR/YAR border fiddling (which has killed only camels so far) have made retaliatory raid on a Yemeni fort./3/ This over-reaction will lead to much greater Arab pressure on UK, and us too unless we stand aloof. /3/British jets attacked a fort in the Harib area of Yemen on March 28 in reprisal for a March 27 attack from Yemen into South Arabian Federation territory. Our man in Yemen urges (Taiz 549)/4/ that we cease representing the UK in Sana'a, as a gesture of disengagement. Talbot and I quite agree (it's a small, low-key gesture that would get little if any publicity, but be read correctly in London, Cairo, and Sana'a)./5/ But Rusk is so-so on this. If opportunity offers, put in a word. The Brits will lose us Wheelus if we're not careful. /4/Telegram 549 from Taiz, March 29, urged that the United States cancel its British representation function in Yemen and argued that it would be more effective as a relatively disinterested party rather than in its present role, which was interpreted by many YARG officials as that of lawyer for the United Kingdom. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 ADEN-YEMEN) /5/A handwritten notation on the memorandum reads: "RWK. I doubt that we should do this [at] this moment. McGB" RWK
325. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations/1/ Washington, April 1, 1964, 8:01 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 31-1 UK-YEMEN. Confidential. Drafted by Deputy Director of the Office of UN Political Affairs William G. Jones; cleared by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs William C. Burdett and Talbot; and approved by Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Harlan Cleveland. Repeated to London, Taiz, and Cairo. 2581. Subj: Security Council Meeting on Yemen-Aden Problem. Pending further clarification tactics British plan pursue in Security Council in countering Yemeni complaint/2/ and, of course, subject to unforeseen developments in Council itself, following are our thoughts and general guidelines for your use in Council: /2/In an April 1 letter to the President of the UN Security Council Yemen charged that the United Kingdom had committed more than 40 acts of aggression against it since September 1962, culminating in the air attack against Harib on March 28. A British letter of March 28 stated that the attack had been launched to protect the South Arabian Federation after a series of Yemeni air and ground attacks during the month of March. The Security Council convened on April 2 to consider the charges and countercharges. 1. We inclined agree with British and your assessment that there will not be enough votes for serious condemnatory resolution directed against the U.K. We would expect therefore that the outcome of the Council meeting would be adjournment with no resolution or a relatively mild resolution deploring the situation and urging all parties concerned to refrain from further exacerbation of the situation and urging them to settle their differences. We would hope to see the debate limited to the incidents per se but doubt that this can be done. If the debate expands to include a broad and vitriolic attack on the British position on Aden, we presume the British will respond by pointing to the fact that the UAR has failed to carry out its agreement to disengage and continued Egyptian military presence in Yemen has now given rise to the border incidents. While we would not want to initiate a debate which drags the UAR into the picture, if others have already done so we may wish to find some way of referring to the matter in our statement. 2. Resolution. The general parameters of an acceptable resolution seem to us to be as follows: (1) Resolution should not be condemnatory nor fix blame. A paragraph which deplored the various violent incidents which had taken place without specific mention of one side or the other would seem appropriate. As an ultimate fallback, and providing the British are also prepared to accept, we could live with a resolution which deplored the various incidents on both sides but in which specific mention was made of the British attack of March 27 which precipitated the Yemen complaint. (2) We doubt the need or desirability at this juncture for injecting a UN presence or field operation of any sort into the situation and presume the U.K. would not want such presence at this time. Furthermore, we foresee a probable reluctance on the part of the SYG to become engaged in the tangled web of U.K.-Arab disputes. If the U.K. could accept, and if there is substantial pressure for involvement of the UN, we could agree to a general request to the SYG to exercise his influence as he deems appropriate with the parties concerned to restore peace and order on the Yemen-South Arabian frontier. (3) In its operative paragraphs the resolution presumably would call on the parties to the conflict to cease violent action and attempt to settle their differences. We see some advantage to having the call made on all members of the UN to cooperate in avoiding actions which exacerbate tensions and lead to violence in the area. This broad language has the merit of embracing the UAR and USSR. (4) We, of course, would not want to introduce a resolution ourselves and presume that this would be done by one or more non-permanent members of the Council, perhaps Brazil or Bolivia. Hopefully such a resolution would dissuade Morocco or others from introducing a strong and unacceptable condemnatory resolution which would have no chance of passing. Rusk
326. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, April 9, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Yemen, Memos, Vol. I, 11/63-6/64. No classification marking. SUBJECT The disputed resolution on the British-Yemen air strike has three parts. The first condemns reprisals in general as contrary to the Charter. The second deplores the British attack on the fort at Harib on March 28. The third deplores all other actions by any party which led up to the British attack./2/ /2/The draft resolution, submitted to the Security Council by Morocco and the Ivory Coast on April 8, also called upon Yemen and the United Kingdom to exercise maximum restraint; and requested the Secretary-General to try to settle the outstanding issues in agreement with the two parties. (UN doc. S/5650) Stevenson argues that we must support the resolution because: (1) we have a consistent record of opposition to reprisals and strikes of this sort; (2) this particular strike was out of all proportion to the provocation, although the provocation was real; (3) the impact of abstention will be very severe in the Middle East and in the UN where we need support from many of those who will be most outraged--especially Africans, Arabs and Asians; (4) Stevenson has already spoken against the British action, with State Department approval,/3/ and his own moral position (a matter of deep interest to him) will be affected./4/ /3/For text of Ambassador Stevenson's statement before the Security Council on April 6, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 713-714. /4/In a 10:59 a.m. telephone conversation with Rusk on April 9, Stevenson declared that he could not abstain on a resolution that condemned reprisals and attacks and called for restraint; he argued that no one would respect the U.S. moral position any longer. The Secretary responded that it had been a considerable battle to keep the British from voting against the resolution; he noted that the British position in South Arabia was very important to us and that they needed U.S. help in this situation. If the United States voted for this resolution, it would undermine reasonable and moderate elements in London and make it difficult to get British help in other matters. Stevenson reiterated the moral importance of this. Rusk said that he felt strongly about it and would advise the President to abstain. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Rusk Telcons) Rusk argues equally strongly the other way: (1) Rab Butler has fought a determined fight against the hard-liners in the British Cabinet to prevent a veto and to secure a British abstention;/5/ (2) the provocation is more sustained and serious than Stevenson recognizes; (3) the U.S. itself may have to respond to provocations of a more serious but technically similar sort either in Cuba or in Vietnam; (4) We have other business pending with Sandys which makes this no time for a Suez-type reaction from hard-line British Tories. /5/In a 10:02 a.m. telephone conversation with Rusk, the British Ambassador, Lord Harlech, that Foreign Secretary Butler had gotten the Cabinet to agree not to veto the resolution. The Ambassador said he was very disturbed at the fact that having gotten the Cabinet to agree to abstain, the United States and France would not abstain with Britian. If the United States did not abstain, it would create a most deplorable situation in Britain. (Ibid.) My own reluctant but clear recommendation is as follows: (1) we should abstain; (2) we should go in very firmly to Home to say that this is a one-time act of loyalty which we could not repeat in parallel circumstances, because in our view the reaction, on which we were not consulted, was excessive and imprudent; (3) we should find a way of making it known that we have abstained in order to help prevent a veto, in order to support the wise Butler against the foolish Sandys, and because of an underlying feeling that these resolutions totally miss the real issues involved. We should also seek to have the "good British" help us somewhat by explaining that their abstention indicates less of a sense of righteousness than a veto would have done, since they are in fact accepting passage of the motion. McG. B.
327. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, April 9, 1964, 12:06 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and Rusk, April 9, 1964, 12:06 p.m., Tape F64.23, Side A, PNO 6. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. The first portion of the recording is inaudible. Rusk: . . . in a lot of places here . . . he has not performed in Yemen, he is undermining us in the wheel of space, and he is pitching this arms race into the Near East. Johnson: Well, this is not going to help us with him, is it? Rusk: But I think it's important for Nasser to know that we're not . . . that he mustn't take us for granted on these things . . . I think an abstention on this is something of a warning to Nasser that we're coming close to the end of the trail on this business. Johnson: Don't you think they'll pound us like hell all over the United Nations and all over the papers of the country? Rusk: Well, I think that there will be . . . will be . . . . Johnson: Stevenson will be running around raising hell like he was about the Venezuela delegation, won't he? Rusk: Oh, I think he will be . . . he will be personally unhappy for two or three days, but I don't think there's going to be any major press campaign picking this up. Johnson: Have you already told him what to do? Rusk: Yes sir. Well, I told him . . . we had an instruction for him several days ago not to have a resolution that condemned the British, and this does . . . it said it deplores this thing the other day, but to express a general regret about violence on that frontier. Well, the resolution went beyond the point where we felt we could in our total interest here support it, but as it now stands, he wanted . . . he is willing . . . he is ready to do what we talked about this morning, but he just wanted to be sure that you know it's a close balanced decision and that he had some concern about it. Johnson: Well, you just tell them that I do know, but I knew it the last minute . . . didn't know anything about it beforehand . . . don't know anything else I got to do except go with my Secretary of State when he tells me he feels strongly about it, but I sure think they ought to talk to us ahead of time and we ought to know more about it before the last minute, don't you? Rusk: Yes, I think that's right . . . I think that's right . . . Johnson: All right. You tell him that, and I'll try to reach him too, if I can. Rusk: Thank you./2/ /2/On April 9, by a vote of 9 to 0 with 2 abstentions (U.K. and U.S.), the Security Council adopted the draft resolution as submitted on April 8. Resolution 5650 condemned reprisals, deplored the British attack on Harib, deplored all attacks and incidents that had occurred in that area, called upon Yemen and the United Kingdom to exercise maximum restraint, and requested the Secretary-General to use his good offices. (UN doc. S/5650) The text is printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 715-716. Stevenson told the Council that his government did not consider the resolution equitable nor responsive to the realities and facts that had been reviewed in the Council's debate, and that, accordingly, it could not vote for the resolution as it would like to have done. (UN doc. S/PV. 1111, par. 7)
328. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, April 10, 1964. /1/Source: National Defense University Library, Special Collections, Taylor Papers, Chairman's Staff Group, April 1964. Secret; Eyes Only. SUBJECT 1. Mr. Bundy presided throughout the meeting. 2. Yemen. There was a crisis yesterday concerning US vote on the Yemen issue at the UN. Involved were the President, Bundy, Ball, Stevenson, and Rusk. The crisis was not anticipated in advance, either by the State Department or the White House. It involved our backing the British on a vote in the Security Council. The US and the British abstained, and nine others condemned the British. Stevenson called Ball, Rusk, and the President and tried to get a shift in the US position after we had already informed the British that we would go along with them. Bundy wanted a post-mortem by Sam Belk, to see why we got that close to a vote without recognizing the problem. Bundy said it should have been clear to a lot of people, including himself, that we were heading in such a direction. Komer, who is responsible for Yemen, was silent at first, but said yesterday afternoon, he asked State why they had not warned him. Bundy said another question was why the White House had not warned State. There were no hard feelings, but the whole affair made a bad impression on everyone, including the President. [Here follows discussion of other subjects.] WYS
329. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk in Manila/1/ Washington, April 11, 1964, 2:55 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 31-1 UK-YEMEN/UN. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Jeanne W. Davis (S/S); cleared by Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State George S. Springsteen, Jr., and in substance by EUR Staff Assistant Jerome K. Holloway and Bromley Smith; and approved by Davis. Tosec 11. President has received following message from British Prime Minister. Acting Secretary and White House concerting on possibly reply. Will endeavor advise you prior your meeting with Carrington. "April 10, 1964. I should like to thank you most warmly for your decision to abstain on the resolution in the Security Council on Thursday, despite the doubts of most of your own people. I am most grateful for this act of solidarity. I should now like to build on this decision and see whether we cannot achieve a sense of common purpose and align our common policies more closely over the whole problem of the Yemen and Aden. Experience has shown that the general Western interest, as well as the particular British and American interest, are best served when British and American policies are in harmony. I should now like to do for the Middle East what we did for South-East Asia last February. Our respective Secretaries of State are shortly to meet. I hope you will agree that they should use this occasion to reach a general understanding over these questions. Alec Douglas-Home" Ball
330. Message From President Johnson to Prime Minister Douglas Home/1/ Washington, April 12, 1964, 1603Z. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Yemen, December 1963-March 1966. Secret; Nodis. CAP 64114. 1. Many thanks for your note./2/ Our decision to abstain was indeed an act of solidarity, but I feel I must tell you quite frankly that I approved it reluctantly and only because as the matter finally came to me it seemed to me that you were entitled to expect that we would not oppose you directly. On the merits, in a future case, it would be hard for me to make the same decision again./3/ We may have to pay heavily for the abstention in a loss of authority and an awkward precedent that can be used against us. /2/See Document 329. /3/In a 4 p.m. telephone conversation with Ball on April 10, Bundy said that the President wanted to send a message on the post mortem of the Yemen problem to the Prime Minister, making it clear that the United States did not want to get into the habit of getting caught in an abstention it really didn't believe in. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Papers of George W. Ball, Yemen, 4/9/64-2/23/66) 2. I, of course, have no illusions about Nasser or the mischievous game he is playing. But I quite frankly doubt that at this point in time abrupt challenges to the Arabs are useful for our joint interests. 3. So I agree that this incident and its aftermath make it more than ever important that we concert our Near Eastern policies more closely. I hope that Rusk and Butler will be able to reach some solid conclusions when they meet during the CENTO session later this month. We both have such great interests to guard in that tortured part of the world that we cannot afford to pursue divergent policies.
331. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, April 21, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Kingdom, Meetings with Butler, 4/64. Secret. Mac-- Rusk's talk with Butler on Yemen, Aden, and YAR policy is set for next Monday the 27th. So lunch today may be the best time for LBJ to weigh in. There are signs the British themselves now see the Harib retaliation as involving excessive political cost. It got all the Arabs (not just Nasser) sore at them, and pointed the finger directly at Aden. Let's also remember that trouble on Yemen/SAF border is largely result of UK clandestine ops in support of Yemeni royalists. As for a tougher line toward Nasser, the overriding argument is that it will cost us more than we gain. The Aswan Dam episode and refusal of US military aid in 1955-56 is a case in point. They led directly to Soviet entry into the Arab world, and Nasser's seizure of the Suez Canal. We've spent some years digging out of that hole; why get into it again. Sure Nasser is trying to oust us from US/UK bases in Libya and Aden, and opposes us on Israel. But the key point is that our support to him (which goes mostly into the bellies of the fellahin) constrains him from pushing too hard. He knows he has something to lose if he makes too many speeches about Libyan bases (one was bad enough). We can't lick Nasser so long as he symbolizes Arab nationalism. So the best way to prolong our hold on our assets is to string him along, not give him a bloody nose. A flexible policy--using carrots as well as stick--best serves UK as well as US interests, and the Fonoff knows this. Nor does succumbing to Sandysism buy us kudos in London. I'd argue that the British will be more amenable if we growl at them, than if we are apologetic about the Middle East. After all, our record is better than theirs. RWK
332. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts/1/ Washington, April 22, 1964, 7:59 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Confidential. Drafted by Symmes, Seelye, and Jones on April 21; cleared by Buffum, Sisco, Officer in Charge of Economic Affairs in the Office of Near Eastern Affairs Enoch S. Duncan, and Davies and by Officer in Charge of U.K. Affairs Thomas M. Judd in substance; and approved by Jernegan. Sent to Cairo, Jidda, London, Taiz, Dhahran, and USUN and repeated to Aden, CINCSTRIKE, and CINCMEAFSA for POLAD. 1971. Jidda's 981 (326 to Cairo)./2/ Before Faisal comes to Cairo, Department believes Embassy Cairo might profitably make presentation along following lines to someone close to Nasser. /2/In telegram 981 from Jidda, April 17, Ambassador Hart reported that he had told the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for Yemen, Pier P. Spinelli, before the latter met with Crown Prince Faisal on April 14 that he hoped Faisal did not believe the U.S. Government could or would try to force Nasser to withdraw his troops from Yemen if Faisal made no helpful moves at the forthcoming Cairo meeting. Following the meeting Spinelli told Hart that Faisal was being very cagey regarding what he might be prepared to do in Cairo. The Ambassador reported that Spinelli's approach was to try to obtain withdrawal of the house of Hamid al-Din from Yemen with the simultaneous withdrawal of UAR troops and phasing in of UN troops. Hart commented that he saw no way to extract the members of the house of Hamid al-Din from Yemen. (Ibid., POL 27-14 YEMEN/UN) 1. Present constellation of factors bearing on Yemen situation offers opportune and appropriate occasion to press toward normalization: a. We presume Arab states wish preserve momentum of Arab detente, as symbolized by upcoming Faisal-Nasser meeting. b. UNYOM/3/ is up for renewal May 4. /3/The UN Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM) was established on July 4, 1963, following a June 11 Security Council Resolution requesting that the Secretary-General establish a mission to observe Saudi and UAR disengagement from the Yemen civil war. (UN doc. S/5326) For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, p. 607. UNYOM's mandate was renewed each 2 months thereafter with the mutual consent and financial support of the two parties involved, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic. c. Now that Spinelli/4/ has been on job for over 4 months, his findings should be ready for examination by parties. /4/Spinelli was appointed Special Representative for Yemen on November 3, 1963. d. Harib raid and Security Council hearings thereon have had sobering effect. We have impression all parties would welcome acceptable formula to reduce tension along Yemen-SAF frontier. 2. USG has over-all interest in reduction Arabian Peninsula tensions, and specific interest in creating circumstances that will facilitate pursuance economic cooperation with UARG. UAR is in final stages concluding stabilization program and new standby agreement with IMF that will meet one of three prerequisites for US commodity loan. As emphasized from beginning, diversion of resources to Yemen operation has been obstacle to commodity loan type assistance. Earlier progress in reducing tensions over Yemen (e.g., restoration Saudi-UAR diplomatic relations) has encouraged us that problem of economic drain being reduced. It is important that progress continue, since difficult Congress believe US resources not being diverted to Yemen campaign when news full of alleged YAR violations of SAF air space, UAR-YAR propaganda campaign against British position in Aden, and indications continued high-level UAR expeditionary force. 3. We would hope that during next few weeks the parties concerned could explore following possibilities: a. Complete SAG dissociation from Hamid al-Din family. b. De facto pull-back of SAF and YAR troops from respective sides of frontier. c. Extension UNYOM patrols to southern frontier. d. Consolidation of YARG. We would appreciate UAR's views on advantages of according progressively increasing responsibilities to moderate republican elements, especially those in Political Bureau. e. Encouragement of dialogue between these elements and northern tribes not irrevocably aligned with Hamid al-Din family. f. Encouragement of YARG to normalize relations with Saudi Arabia, work for detente with UK, and freeze border dispute with SAF. g. Immediate public and substantial withdrawal UAR troops to coincide with implementation of one or more of the above points. 4. Last week in separate conversations Talbot and NE officers impressed on Kamel importance of expeditious progress on disengagement, pull-back, and extenstion UN presence beyond May 4. By associating such progress with Nasser-Faisal meeting, UAR might hope to improve relations with SAG, reduce Yemen opposition capabilities, lay groundwork for negotiated solution to Yemen dispute, and begin to transfer some of onerous economic and military burden UARG has borne in Yemen for a year and a half. 5. Collapse of Imamate left vaccum that UAR is currently filling. However, Egyptians can read in historical record unlikelihood of any collapse of northern tribes' will to resist. UARG may find that, to normalize Yemen situation, it must make some unpleasant concessions such as those floated at Amran. Only early hope of dignified extrication from massive involvement 1500 miles from home seems to lie in melding moderate northern and southern Yemeni elements in viable YARG, under UAR and Saudi sponsorship. 6. If, as we suspect, UARG's main concern is to prevent restoration of Imamate and SARG's is to get Egyptians out of Yemen, grounds for negotiated settlement would appear to be taking shape. 7. In short, does UARG share our feeling that failure to make moderate concessions now could bring on costly consequences later? Or does it feel capable of maintaining heavy commitments in Yemen indefinitely against Saudi and royalist opposition without damage to its wider national interests? 8. In any case, we believe UAR should immediately confirm to SYG that it favors extension UNYOM for at least two more months. FYI: Department increasingly puzzled by UARG's lack of enthusiasm for broadened YARG or Spinelli initiatives. We would welcome addressees' estimates whether this attitude merely reflects indecision or whether UARG is playing for time in expectation of change in international circumstances (Labor victory in UK, trouble in Aden, etc.)./5/ /5/In telegram 2514 from Cairo, April 27, Ambassador Badeau commented that the instructions in circular telegram 1971 impressed him as a shopping list of items already discussed in his many meetings with Nasser on Yemen, with the only substantive request being for UAR confirmation to the United Nations of its willingness to extend UNYOM. Badeau said he had arranged to meet with Nasser after his return from Yemen on a separate matter. When they met he proposed to inquire about Nasser's estimate of the Yemen situation based on his recent trip, which would give him an opportunity to raise most of the questions in the instructions in a more useful form than a formal presentation. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN) Rusk
333. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, April 28, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Kingdom, Meetings with Butler, 4/64. Secret. Mac-- Butler's case to Rusk is "Nasser is our implacable enemy."/2/ The UK recognizes this, and the US will too in time. The UK is the target now, but we'll be next. So, since Nasser has declared war on them, the British are going to fight back: (a) They'll match UAR/YAR subversion in South Arabia with a stepped up covert campaign in Yemen; (b) they want us to cut off aid to Nasser; (c) they plan to bring the case against the UAR to the SC, and want a promise of US support. (It was left vague whether UK wants us only to back demilitarization of a border zone, or to back a harsh condemnatory blast too.) /2/For a memorandum of conversation recording Rusk's April 27 discussion with Foreign Secretary Butler, see Document 55. The Brits, in their frustration and concern over Aden, are grossly over-reacting. So far the UAR/YAR threat to Aden is more talk than anything else. With 40,000 troops in Yemen, Nasser still can't control the place. But the clinching argument against the UK proposals is that they can't win: 1. Regardless of the covert or overt pressure, we can't force Nasser out of Yemen. Since September 1962 he's repeatedly demonstrated that he'll send in whatever amount of force is necessary to hold on (it's 40,000 now). And instead of bowing to covert external pressure he'll up the ante with counter subversion (as he did with Saudis till we turned them off, and as he is now in countering continued UK covert support of Royalists). 2. We and UK couldn't win in the UN either. It would become a straight "colonial issue" on which we usually lose. The way to defend Aden is to keep it out of the UN. 3. True, we could bleed Nasser indefinitely in the Yemen (as UK has been doing in fact for months). But this is one of factors which make our disengagement policy fail. We keep Nasser in the Yemen by bleeding him. Worse yet, we'd stand to lose far more than we could conceivably gain. 1. We wouldn't just be waging war with Nasser. Except for the Saudis every Arab state would back the UAR. In fact, we'd solidify the Arabs against us, largely because Nasser would again agitate US/UK support of Israel--the one surefire Arab cause. 2. When Nasser ups the ante the logical focus of his attack will be the bases in Aden and Libya. So instead of preserving our base rights we'd increase the ultimate pressure on them. 3. Butler says they'd stay covert, but this is impossible in the Middle East (we know). The whole affair will soon leak as Cairo trades legitimate charges of subversion with London. 4. The threat to Aden is far from immediate (it will take the UAR years to make Yemen a country). But the threat of heightened Arab-Israeli tension is immediate. This is the year of the Jordan Waters (and the US elections). There could hardly be a worse time to throw down the gauntlet to the Arabs, and have them react against our Israel policy. 5. Despite Butler's claim of a UAR/YAR/Soviet link, we see the UAR as wanting to limit the Soviet presence in Yemen (for its own reasons). But the UK proposals could force the UAR to let the Soviets come in big. Then where's Aden? In sum the Brits can't have thought through their proposals. They'd stand to gain us nothing but trouble. And this to bail out a lame duck cabinet whose policy might get reversed come October. What to do? Unless we turn the UK off hard, I'm afraid we'll get whipsawed. Talbot proposes a gentlemen's agreement to pursue divergent lines for the moment. But I fear that their policy will inevitably rub off on us. Wheelus is, after all, another base like Aden. And if the Brits join the Israelis in sniping at our policy, the pressure may get out of hand. So the best defense may be a strong attack. And let's toss in counterproposals: 1. If the President is willing (the Brits are obviously trying to see if he's an easier mark than Kennedy here), let's tell Butler we flatly disagree, and LBJ wants to take the case to Home. This will raise the level from Rusk/Butler (Rusk's NEA people are in despair). 2. Diplomatic approach to Nasser suggesting UK will call off dogs in Yemen, if Nasser will lay off Aden. 3. Agree to back demilitarization of south Yemen border area, if and only if UK agrees in return not to raise hell in UN. 4. Make clear we don't want a fight with Nasser while Arab-Israeli issue hot. 5. Tell Brits we'll bite back if they start attacking our ME policy. RWK
334. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, April 29, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Meetings with the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. I. Secret. SUBJECT [Here follows discussion of another subject.] The main topic Butler wants to take up is the Mideast (it's a commentary in itself on UK policy that when they say Mideast they mean Aden and Yemen). Butler's pitch to Rusk is that the British intend to fight fire with fire, and take the offensive against Nasser in the UN and in Yemen. We're from Missouri on this one, and healthy skepticism is the order of the day. We simply doubt the British have thought through this matter. First, we don't see how going to war with Nasser (the British have already been needling him in Yemen covertly for months) will get him out of Yemen and relieve the threat to Aden. As he's already shown, he's much more likely to send more troops down there and raise more hell about getting UK colonialist bases off Arab soil. We can't win in the UN either, on a straight anti-colonial issue. Just as shooting up Harib, it will hurt more than it helps. Worse yet, this is a game where Nasser is likely to up the ante. Jousting with him right now might well generate an across the board US/UK falling out with the Arabs, with repercussions on Libya as well as Aden, and even on our oil. This wouldn't be just a war with Nasser. All Arabs but the Saudis are highly suspicious of the US on Israel and the Jordan Waters, especially in an election year. They'd all back the UAR as a matter of Arab solidarity if we backed the UK against the UAR. But even if we don't join the UK, we'll suffer too, in Libya for example, from the Arab backlash against them. So we hope you'll go further than denying Butler's plea, and seek to persuade him our way. For what it's worth, even the UK Foreign Office experts seem to join with ours in worrying over the bloody-mindedness of their ministers. This is just not the time to start a war with Nasser--especialy one which, like the Aswan Dam fiasco, we're not likely to win. And if Labor comes in next October, UK policy will probably become more like ours. McG.B. /2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. [Continue with the next documents] Volume XXI Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |