NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.
| The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001. Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date. This site is not updated so external links may no longer function. Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein. |
 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXI Near East Region Department of State |
 335. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia/1/ Washington, May 7, 1964, 9:08 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL SAUD-UAR. Secret. Drafted by Moore; cleared by Judd and in substance by Campbell; and approved by Davies. Repeated to Cairo, London, Taiz, and Dhahran. 706. We are somewhat concerned at possibility that as aftermath Nasser's speeches Yemen Faisal may be tempted jeopardize his dtente with UAR by resuming aid to royalists or at very least by allowing Saudi Arabia be used as channel for possible future British aid to royalists. Accordingly, suggest at your discretion you make following points with Faisal at appropriate opportunity. 1. Since concern for security of Saudi Arabia was fundamental reason US became involved in advancing disengagement agreement Yemen, we particularly pleased that SAG renewed support for UNYOM/2/ and continues to eschew sending aid to royalists. Full availability SAG resources for sustaining progress of development and reform program is doubtless best investment for security of country against subversive attacks. /2/In telegram 1020 from Jidda, May 2, Hart reported that Faisal had agreed to renewal of UNYOM for another 2 months. (Ibid., POL 27-14 YEMEN/UN) 2. In view increasing friction on Yemen's southern border and treatment of that conflict in much of Arabic press and radio as part of Arab liberation movement, security concerns Saudi Arabia would seem particularly served by continuing scrupulously avoid any implication involvement (i.e., assistance to royalists) which would doubtless be interpreted in Arab world in fashion detrimental to Saudi regime. 3. We understand that recent governmental changes in Yemen may bring into office persons who command wider Yemeni support, including perhaps northern tribes. We hope Faisal will encourage royalists to keep open mind to possibilities of compromise with republicans. 4. Renewal SAG-UAR relations has opened way for more stable and fruitful development in area; would be shame if momentum this direction gained at time Amer, Sadat visit Riyadh were allowed lapse. We realize that events connected Nasser's trip Yemen may have discouraged Faisal from making contemplated journey Cairo. However, our own dealings with Nasser may have relevant parallel: while we frequently have not agreed with UAR policies and actions, we have found it of continued benefit to maintain dialogue with Nasser, leaving avenue open to explore areas of mutual interest./3/ /3/In telegram 1052 from Jidda, May 12, Hart wrote that he had concluded that it would be premature for him to make the suggested points to Faisal. When meeting with Acting Deputy Foreign Minister Mas'ud on May 9, however, the Ambassador had dwelt on the opportunities offered by the recent governmental changes in Yemen as suggested in paragraph 3. (Ibid., POL SAUD-UAR) Rusk
336. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State/1/ Cairo, May 8, 1964, midnight. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 19 ADEN. Secret. Repeated to London and Taiz. 2631. Reference: Department Circular telegram 1990./2/ /2/Document 54. I had intended devoting major part of upcoming interview with Nasser to situation in Yemen and Aden, with statement of US position as set forth in reference telegram. Shortly before appointment finally set Departmental instructions received concerning another topic whose importance seemed overriding. I therefore elected to deal extensively with second topic (which could only be presented to President)/3/ and leave Yemen-Aden for discussion with FonMin Mahmoud Riad, who has followed question closely while Delegate to UN. /3/Telegram 2632 from Cairo, May 8, recording this portion of the Ambassador's conversation with Nasser is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XVIII, Document 52. President Nasser received me 1930 May 7. After completing major presentation I stated that I had intended to discuss Yemen with him and set forth USA position, but now proposed to do this with FonMin Riad. President Nasser said that this would be a good move since Riad thoroughly conversant with matter and he was trying to make FonMin effective center for Ambassadorial representation. I noted that Riad would doubtless be busy during Khrushchev visit but that I needed to see him during coming week, the earlier the better. President Nasser responded that his FonMin "would not be very busy with Khrushchev" and indicated that he would see to it that Riad would be available. The President then briefly and on his own initiative made the following remarks on the Yemen-Aden situation. 1. Major purpose of President's Yemen trip was to set forward urgently needed reorganization of YAR Government. As he had told me many times in past, YAR Government has been "hopeless," beset with inexperience, inefficiency, personal rivalry, and tribal differences. Sallal has lost much support although he is a "good but sick man." When Nasser went to Yemen he requested Sallal to take with him Yemen expatriates in UAR such as Jaifi and Noman, who, while critical of Sallal, might provide a center of popular support. While in Yemen Nasser produced a new constitution and government structure in discussion with Yemenis, this including Vice Presidents who, while under Sallal, were in fact to be effective administrators of government. He also arranged for popular assembly and overhaul of Political Bureau. When organization completed on paper, Yemenis requested five days for study and reaction but Nasser said that with something of an impish smile, "I gave them only 24 hours and they accepted it." President admitted that paper structure of government is useless without competent operators but believed that some progress toward more stable and popular government has been made. 2. President's attack in Yemen on British position was generated by the fact that UAR has "completely reliable and convincing evidence" of British arms, money and military support to Yemeni dissidents flowing across Southern border. President said, "because of this our men are being killed and I cannot accept this, hence my attack on the British." 3. In general, the present UK Government under Lord Home seems to have reverted to the Eden outlook. Macmillan honestly tried to make a fresh start, letting bygones be bygones. Ever since Ottawa speech it has been clear to UAR that Home's Government has turned its back on conciliatory Macmillan policy and is now acting in Eden mood. 4. Butler's deliberate publicity of UK request for cut in American aid particularly irritated Nasser. He said that UK was publicly uttering threats against UAR and "if they can threaten, we can threaten also." This, he said was natural extension of "harsh" policy to which he would continue strongly to react. I pointed out to the President that it appeared to me unrealistic to expect that a government so near election as the Home Government could take any effective steps altering major UK policy. Nasser admitted this was true but emphasized again that when attacked he would respond in kind. The President then requested that I review entire situation with the FonMin as suggested at opening of interviews. Comment: It is interesting that Nasser chose to give me above details in light of my statement that I had not come to discuss Yemen-Aden and would make my presentation thereon to FonMin. I assume President's evoking topic partly due to extended discussions I have had with him on this throughout past year but more particularly to defensive mood wishing to register directly with me his alleged objectives. It is interesting that when mentioning UK request for curtailment US aid he did not ask what the American reaction had been or what we intended to do. It seemed to me that his obvious assumption was that request had been fruitless. President Nasser was obviously under the weather, looking gray and drawn and perspiring frequently. He said that ever since his return from Yemen he had been ill and was still taking heavy doses of antibiotics. On May 1 when he delivered his fighting speech against Britain he had some fever and felt particularly sick. Badeau
337. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/ Washington, May 15, 1964, 7:38 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 ADEN-YEMEN. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Seelye, cleared by Judd and Campbell, and approved by Davies. Also sent to Taiz and Cairo and repeated to Jidda, Dhahran, USUN, and Aden. 7503. Taiz 643,/2/ London's 5665/3/ and USUN's 4126./4/ We continue attach great importance to early meeting between YARG and UK representatives under UN aegis re abatement Yemen-Aden border tensions. Accordingly, we pleased at report YAR Ambassador al-Aini seeking authority begin talks with Sir Patrick Dean at UN and at fact HMG has apparently not ruled out entirely possibility direct talks. On other hand, we are concerned at British Cabinet's apparent disinclination to authorize direct contact at this time and YARG's continuing to insist that UK must first agree recognize YARG. /2/Dated May 12. (Ibid.) /3/Dated May 14. (Ibid., UN 10-4) /4/Dated May 14. (Ibid., POL 32-1 ADEN/YEMEN) For London: We recognize that HMG might have difficulty authorizing direct talks with YARG at this time in view recent area developments and domestic attacks on HMG position. Nevertheless, request you again approach Foreign Office urging British approval and, citing Taiz 643 (275 to London), stress fact Yemeni authorities continue to protest desire settle peacefully outstanding problems. Emphasize again that failure take advantage opportunity engage in direct dialogue, affording Yemenis opportunity appreciate UK desire abate tensions, will not only weaken ability new, more moderate Yemeni leadership resist UAR domination but force YARG into increasing reliance on UAR (and possibly USSR) in handling affairs affecting South Arabia./5/ /5/In telegram 5686 from London, May 16, Ambassador Bruce reported that, although the Foreign Office was closed for a long weekend, he had conveyed the substance of telegram 7503 to the Arabian Department duty officer, who had noted that nothing less than a ministerial decision would suffice to authorize such direct talks. (Ibid.) For Taiz: Following up Foreign Minister's earlier comments to you re YARG desire for "peaceful settlement" with British, you should stress fact that only practical first step in this direction is UN-sponsored YARK-UK meeting perhaps at UN. If YARG serious in this sentiment, it should waive all pre-conditions for talks. Immediate UK recognition of YARG totally unrealistic to expect, but could well flow eventually from understanding and rapport hopefully established through direct meetings. Latter present Yemenis with opportunity convince UK of their desire for peaceful relations. Also would appreciate knowing what "specific steps" Foreign Minister has in mind (Taiz 643)./6/ /6/Telegram 672 from Taiz, May 25, reported that Yemeni Foreign Minister Sirri stated that Yemeni representatives at the United Nations were authorized to meet with U.K. representatives, and that Yemen was willing to meet with the United Kingdom in New York or Cairo or "through friends." (Ibid.) For Cairo: Request you probe further stated UAR desire (as expressed by Riad to Beeley) for direct YARG-UK talks and indicate that if this in fact represents official UAR position, latter should urge Yemenis--as we are urging British--to agree to meet without setting pre-conditions. At same time you should stress that calling Security Council on Aden would hardly facilitate this. In addition, you should (1) express concern at reports we are receiving that UAR intensifying training of Adeni dissident guerillas and (2) call attention to HMG decision resume constitutional talks re Aden, apparently to include consultation with all Adeni political parties./7/ Rusk /7/In telegram 2747 from Cairo, May 18, Badeau reported that he had discussed the Department's telegram with Deputy Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs Mahmoud Fawzi, who responded that the problem was extremely complicated and that no single factor held the key to the solution. Fawzi said it was unreasonable to expect that training of dissident Adenis should cease without equal cessation of U.K. support for al-Badr, and called constitutional talks on Aden a "facade for inactivity." (Ibid.)
338. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Yemen/1/ Washington, May 26, 1964, 4:23 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL UK-YEMEN. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Seelye; cleared by Davies, Judd, and Dorrance; and approved by Jernegan. Also sent to London and repeated to Cairo, Jidda, Aden, and USUN. 720. Embtel 674./2/ You should continue press YARG agree talk with UK under UN aegis. We have not given up hope UK will relent and believe possible YARG approval will favorably influence UK. Meanwhile, we continuing press HMG both here and in London./3/ FYI. Fact that al-Aini and Dean held private, exploratory discussion New York prior al-Aini departure for Yemen should be closely held and not revealed by you. End FYI. /2/Telegram 674 from Taiz, May 26, asked whether, in view of the reluctance of the United Kingdom to enter into direct talks with Yemen, the Embassy should continue to press the Yemeni Government for talks with the United Kingdom under the aegis of the United Nations. (Ibid.) /3/Telegram 695 from Taiz, May 31, reported that Foreign Minister Sirri had stated definitely on May 30 in the presence of Ambassador al-Aini that Yemeni representatives were authorized to talk with the United Kingdom, but added that Yemen would not continue such talks unless British representatives were willing to discuss specifics. (Ibid.) For London: You should inform Foreign Office al-Aini now in Yemen and that Embassy Taiz being instructed capitalize on his presence to press YARG agree to border talks. Unless you perceive objection, request you again express strong hope HMG will see way clear to agreeing series of meetings with Yemenis under UN aegis, noting that unilateral UK refusal--eliminating best immediate prospect for abatement Yemeni-Adeni tensions--would be extremely regrettable./4/ /4/In telegram 5906 from London, May 27, Bruce reported that he had conveyed the substance of the Department's telegram to the Head of the Arabian Department at the Foreign Office, Frank Brenchley, who expressed his personal view that if al-Aini returned to New York, the Arabian Department would be disposed to recommend to Butler that Dean have another talk with him. He assumed that Butler's reaction would depend in large part on whether Yemeni deeds were consonant with its oral protestations of friendship, and noted the great sensitivity of such talks; even Sandys did not know about Dean's first meeting with al-Aini. (Ibid.) Rusk
339. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/ Washington, June 25, 1964, 6:14 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 UAR-YEMEN. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Seelye on June 24; cleared by Davies, Buffum, Cleveland, Quinn (DOD/ISA), and in substance by Colonel Robinson (G/PM) and Officer in Charge of Politico-Military Affairs in the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Regional Affairs Colonel Donald W. Bunte; and approved by Jernegan. Also sent to Jidda and USUN and repeated to London, Taiz, Dhahran, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, CINCSTRIKE for POLAD, and Aden. 6034. Jidda's 1167, rptd 361 to Cairo./2/ Department continues be concerned by UAR failure make even token withdrawal troops from Yemen in consonance its disengagement undertaking. This fact alone has complicated USG relations with SAG, hardened UK position vis--vis Yemen, jeopardized continuation existing level USG economic support for UAR and, currently, risks bringing about demise of UNYOM and all that connotes. Accordingly, we propose following three-pronged dmarche to UAR over next few days: (1) Assistant Secretary Talbot call in Ambassador Kamel, (2) Charge Boswell see Foreign Minister Riad, (3) First Secretary Horgan approach Presidency Advisor al-Kholi. /2/In telegram 1167 from Jidda, June 24, Hart reported that Saqqaf had transmitted to him Faisal's intention to inform U Thant that although the Saudi Government had no objection to the continuance of the UNYOM presence, it saw no further reason why it should pay anything for it in view of UAR non-performance. (Ibid., POL 27-14 YEMEN/UN) We believe prospective dmarches should be made along following lines: 1. After period of one year, UNYOM has failed observe any net withdrawal of UAR troops, one of purposes for which it was designed. On contrary UAR troop level has increased since UNYOM arrived on scene. While we believe UNYOM has nevertheless served useful purpose, SAG--which has generally complied with terms of disengagement agreement--finding it increasingly difficult continue agree UNYOM's renewal in face continued UAR non-performance. Repeated USG assurances to SAG over past year that UAR would in reasonable time withdraw its troops from Yemen now fall on deaf ears. Fact is Faisal seriously considering discontinuing his monetary support for UNYOM owing lack of even token UAR troop withdrawals. 2. We believe dispensing with UNYOM in no one's interests, including UAR. For our part we shall endeavor urge SAG not cause UNYOM demise. But, speaking frankly, we question whether we will be successful in this regard in light of current SAG frame of mind--unless circumstances change. 3. Collapse of UNYOM would risk opening up Pandora's box of problems, including (a) tossing Yemen problem into lap of Security Council where UAR nonperformance on disengagement would be openly aired and subject to attack; (b) inviting massive Saudi "re-engagement" on behalf of Yemeni royalists, further complicating UAR security problem in Yemen; (c) clouding and perhaps terminating incipient, friendly UAR-Saudi diplomatic relationship which, in turn, might lead to further drift in area away from "summit atmosphere"; (d) virtually eliminating prospect of damping down under UN auspices YAR-SAF border tensions; and (e) further setting back date when UAR enabled reduce its expensive Yemeni commitment. 4. In last few weeks USG has again heard reports of imminent UAR troop withdrawals from Yemen, including indication first step would be departure one UAR brigade. Nasser's June 18 speech also mentioned drawdown UAR troop complement in Yemen. Yet up to moment we have received no indications whatsoever that any reductions have occurred. If withdrawals about take place or in fact taking place, we urge UAR adduce proof for benefit UNYOM and thus indirectly for benefit Saudi Arabia. Would be pity if UAR failure act in time produces collapse UNYOM. 5. We wish remind UAR USG could not afford sit idly by and allow worsening situation in Yemen (which would no doubt flow from removal of UNYOM) threaten security and stability Faisal regime. 6. In conclusion USG strongly urges UAR make immediate token withdrawal UAR troops from Yemen in order avert possible demise of UNYOM, and in consonance with its disengagement undertaking./3/ /3/Telegram 6061 to Cairo, June 26, reported that the dmarche outlined in telegram 6034 had been made by Deputy Assistant Secretary Jernegan to UAR Ambassador Kamel on June 26. Kamel had responded that anything that caused the demise of UNYOM would be a disaster, that the situation in Yemen was now in a "stage of relaxation" with the atmosphere ripe for gradual withdrawal, and that the United States should not permit Faisal to create suspicion when the situation was "moving forward." (Ibid.) For Jidda: You may inform Saqqaf confidentially of fact we making three-pronged approach to UAR. At same time, know you will continue urge him not allow Saudi Arabia be cause of UNYOM's going down drain and impress upon him considerable advantages to SAG of its continuation regardless UAR failure perform on disengagement./4/ /4/In telegram 1189 from Jidda, June 28, Hart reported that he had talked to Saqqaf along these lines. (Ibid., POL 27 UAR-YEMEN) In telegram 1201 from Jidda, July 1, the Ambassador reported that on June 30 he had called on Saqqaf to congratulate him on obtaining Faisal's agreement to renewal of UNYOM. (Ibid., POL 27-14 YEMEN/UN) For USUN: Believe you should outline for SYG our information about Faisal's thinking on question of UNYOM's extension, as reflected Jidda's 1167. Source should of course be protected. You might indicate this information does not seem to square with SYG's belief UNYOM extension will be easily arranged. (USUN 4593)/5/ /5/Dated June 23. (Ibid.) For Cairo: Re your 3155,/6/ you should respond to al-Kholi as you propose, e.g. UN best suited perform role of mediator and April 9 SC resolution requested SYG use his good offices settle outstanding issues re south Yemen, in agreement with parties concerned. FYI. We prefer avoid undertaking mediatory roles. End FYI. /6/Dated June 24. (Ibid., POL 27 YEMEN) Rusk
340. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, July 2, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Cables & Memos, Vol. II, 6/64-12/64. Secret. McGB: UNYOM will be renewed for another 2 months on 4 July. But Faisal agreed to pay his share of costs only on condition that the SYG report to the Security Council his intent to liquidate UNYOM by 4 September unless the UAR pulls out a substantial number of troops. Stevenson is suggesting to U Thant today that he shouldn't tie his hands but might say he "may have to liquidate." SYG's report will probably hit the press this weekend./2/ /2/An excerpt from the Secretary-General's report of July 2 (UN doc. S/5794) is printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 726-727. We made another pitch to the Egyptians both here and in Cairo, but so far response has been noncommittal. We've seen no signs at all of troop withdrawals despite Nasser's 18 June statement that the Yemenis are "ready to fend for themselves." Related subject. I've started the wheels turning in State and AID to develop a position by 15 July on the Salhia Project we talked about this morning. Undoubtedly they will start from our present impasse over Yemen in considering where next with Nasser./3/ /3/A handwritten notation in the margin in Bundy's handwriting reads: "But the way they should look at it is this: What would be a good package, with Salhia?" Hal
341. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Yemen/1/ Washington, July 7, 1964, 8:16 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 17 YEMEN-US. Secret. Drafted by Seelye; cleared by Davies and in draft by Campbell and Frazier Meade of EUR/BNA; and approved by Talbot. Also sent to London and USUN and repeated to Cairo, Jidda, Dhahran, Aden, and CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA. 10. In call on Assistant Secretary Talbot July 6 YAR Ambassador al-Aini reported following re his recent visits to Sana'a and Cairo: 1. YAR leaders immensely disappointed with Nasser's visit to Yemen. Although at first he had indicated understanding YAR viewpoint, just before returning to Cairo Nasser produced fait accompli of constitution prepared in Cairo. Instead of strengthening authority of Prime Minister, as YAR leaders had wished, UAR-imposed constitution accorded President "all authority." 2. Despite foregoing, Prime Minister Jaifi and other YAR leaders resolved to "do their best." Yemenis believe Nasser's "plan" for Yemen will fail in long run. For his part Nasser evidently still looking for dramatic change elsewhere to help him out of Yemen imbroglio. Egyptians in Yemen refer optimistically to UAR "gains" in Iraq. 3. In several meetings with UAR Foreign Minister Riad in Cairo al-Aini sought ascertain UAR intentions re Yemen and took exception to UAR use of Yemen as base for UAR attacks against "South Arabia." Also urged UAR refrain from laying Aden problem before UNSC. He did not reveal nature Riad replies. 4. YAR leaders believe YAR-UK differences can only be resolved if UK recognizes YAR and allows "self-determination" for Aden complex. Once these achieved YAR prepared to make border settlement in accordance 1934 Treaty./2/ Without foregoing, deployment observers along SAF border, establishment DMZ, etc, impossible. /2/On February 11, 1934, the United Kingdom, India, and Yemen signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (the Treaty of Sanaa), whereby Yemen evacuated the areas it held in the Aden Protectorates and both sides, without renouncing any claims, agreed to accept the status quo as it had existed under the Anglo-Turkish border convention of 1914. For text, see British and Foreign State Papers, 1934, vol. 137, pp. 212-215. Ambassador asserted that in his private meeting with Sir Patrick Dean in New York before he left US he had stressed fact Aden liberal movement in existence long before Nasser became interested and UK policy vis--vis YAR only inducing UAR remain in Yemen. In response Talbot question re prospect reconciliation divergent Yemeni factions, al-Aini said implicit UAR threats of reprisal made it difficult for Republican leaders keep in touch with northern tribes. Nasser had threatened that he could easily bring Badr back if Yemenis fail tow mark. Al-Aini acknowledged that Nasser's determination maintain pre-eminent UAR position in Yemen serves as deterrent to USSR penetration. Talbot again urged YAR agree engage in preliminary discussions with UK without setting pre-conditions. Stated difficult for UK recognize YARG in absence evidence YARG acting independently of UAR. Talbot noted UAR had acquiesced in UNEF without recognition of Israel. In response Talbot query re talk unity, al-Aini said he had urged Sallal in Cairo to take "no other steps" until YARG consultative council formed. For USUN and London: Suggest you withhold contents paragraph four from your British colleagues until USUN has had opportunity discuss subject further with al-Aini during Harlan Clark visit to UN July 9-10. Ball
342. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations/1/ Washington, August 13, 1964, 9:20 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27-14 YEMEN/UN. Confidential. Drafted by Campbell, cleared in draft by Moore and Buffum, and approved by Cleveland. Also sent to Taiz and repeated to Cairo, Jidda, and London. 384. Asst Secy Cleveland briefed al-Ainy today on SYG's talks with Dept on Yemen problem (Deptel 785 to Cairo),/2/ stressing that SYG prepared to set up UN presence in Yemen to succeed UNYOM if YARG wants it. US believes small UN presence could help (1) improve SAG-UAR relations, (2) find solutions YAR-UK-South Arabian Federation problems, and (3) find formula for reconciliation within Yemen. This would be in interests of YARG and peace of area generally. /2/Telegram 785 to Cairo, August 10, reported that U Thant informed the Department on August 6 that Nasser told him during the Organization of African Unity (OAU) meeting that UNYOM's dissolution might make Saudi Arabia unhappy, but not the United Arab Republic. Nasser also said unequivocally that UAR troops would remain in Yemen; they could not pull out in face of the evidence of continued Saudi aid to the Royalists. The Secretary-General stated that he could envisage establishment of a UN presence to take UNYOM's place if the Yemeni Government requested it. (Ibid.) The meeting of the OAU Heads of State was held at Cairo, July 17-21, 1964. In reply al-Ainy's questions, Cleveland said mission would be small, with somebody like Spinelli in charge and with only such assistants and communications staff as required. He explained such presence would be in traditional pattern for which there now many precedents. Might be funded either out of regular UN budget or by YARG. (Al-Ainy said YARG earlier had refused to pay for observers, but Cleveland noted new mission would be much less expensive.) In order to establish UN mission there no need for SC approval or big debate on Yemen question. Al-Ainy noted this fine occasion for UN to help, but referred to need for overall solution. "We optimistic" for solution of UAR-SAG problem at Sept Arab summit meeting, he said. As for problem with UK, he recalled he told SYG and Asst Secy Talbot YARG would accept UN observers "and even demarcation of border according to 1934 treaty" if UK will recognize YARG and assure self-determination for people of South Arabia. (Deptel 55 to USUN, 10 to Taiz)/3/ He represented this position as important concession by Yemen. /3/Document 341. He continued however that SYG had told him UK will not recognize YARG unless latter recognizes SAF. He observed: "How can we recognize SAF? It isn't state. UK doesn't recognize it." Cleveland said purpose of UN is to provide lubrication for solution and establishing UN presence should not be considered as part of substance of problem. As far as UN concerned, there no problem of recognition. As for second YARG condition--self-determination for South Arabia--YARG must negotiate this with UK. He then inquired about YARG-UK talks in NY. Al-Ainy said UK talked about observers, but YARG would only accept observers as part of overall solution. He added: since UK won't recognize YARG without our recognition of SAF, "I have no instructions to continue talks." Cleveland said USG would not urge SYG to send observers if YARG doesn't want them, but concluded problem won't be settled by silence and this showed need for UN presence to help bring all sides together. Al-Ainy said he would refer to YARG and also discuss with SYG. Rusk
343. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/ Washington, August 17, 1964, 5:07 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27-14 YEMEN/UN. Secret. Drafted by Moore, cleared by Buffum and Symmes, and approved by James P. Grant. Also sent to Taiz and repeated to London, Dhahran, USUN, and Jidda. 918. Cairo tel 562,/2/ Jidda tel 127./3/ Continued UN Presence Yemen. It now appears that UNYOM may be at an end, having been all but written off by all parties, including SYG. Concur with Cairo view that Nasser-Faisal understanding is sine qua non of overall settlement. However, continued UN presence Yemen could be especially important catalyst for promoting internal settlement and easing southern border tensions, and could play limited impartial observer role on ad hoc basis. With such broad frame of reference, UN presence could also serve as symbol of commitments undertaken by UAR and SAG in Bunker Agreement, which we consider remains broadly in effect even after departure formal UNYOM observation mission. /2/Telegram 562 from Cairo, August 16, commented that the United States had expended a considerable amount of influence in Saudi Arabia to maintain in Yemen a UN organization that had now demonstrated it was incapable of preparing the way for a solution of the Yemen situation, and emphasized that the key issue in Yemen was the crisis of confidence between Faisal and Nasser. (Ibid.) /3/In telegram 127 from Jidda, August 16, Hart reported that Faisal had told Spinelli that he had no objection to the continuation of UNYOM, but saw no reason to continue paying a share of the costs, since the United Arab Republic was determined to flout the agreement by retaining its troops in Yemen. (Ibid.) While USG willing acquiesce in demise UNYOM, we strongly believe that continuation UN representatives in country with political mandate would thus appear to be in interests all parties concerned. For Cairo: You authorized approach UARG at appropriate level to urge UAR/YAR support for UN presence, using argumentation above and in ref Cairo tel. For Taiz: In coordination with Spinelli you should urge YARG to request that SYG establish UN presence. (Understand from al-Aini that while he reported to Taiz gist his August 13 talk with Assistant Secretary Cleveland--Deptel 52 to Taiz/4/--he did not request authority ask SYG take action.)/5/ /4/Document 342; telegram 384 to USUN was also sent to Taiz as telegram 52. /5/Printed from an unsigned copy.
344. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State/1/ Jidda, August 19, 1964, 3 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Cental Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Also sent to Cairo, Dhahran, Taiz, and CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA for POLAD and repeated to USUN. 135. Embtel 133./2/ Translation of Faysal's letter to President Johnson dated August 17. /2/In telegram 133 from Jidda, August 18, Hart reported that on August 17 he met with Crown Prince Faisal, who said that UAR planes had invaded Saudi air space twice in the last few days, and that he had received a report from inside Yemen that UAR troops were moving northward toward the Saudi border. Therefore, he had decided to send weapons and troops to defend the Yemen border, and considered the disengagement agreement as ended and would feel free to help the royalists after September 4. Faisal said it was essential to know where the United States stood if war broke out between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic; if the United States could not help, he would seek help anywhere he could get it. Hart reminded the Crown Prince of the 1963 U.S. position on helping Saudi Arabia against unprovoked attack, but pointed out that the United States would consider aid to the royalists' provocation. The Ambassador urged Faisal to keep his troops in a defensive posture if he wanted U.S. help. (Ibid.) Excellency: I received with great appreciation Your Excellency's letter dated 15 June 1964./3/ I thank Your Excellency for informing me of the satisfaction expressed to you by your Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Rusk, following his meeting with our Permanent Deputy Foreign Minister in Washington June 15 concerning the results yielded by the visit to the Middle East of the USSR Prime Minister. /3/Document 229. I considered that Mr. Khrushchev, in his statement to which Your Excellency referred, had not succeeded in finding accommodation but (rather) had spotlighted the basic conflict between the Communist concept of class unity and the Arab doctrine of national unity. But I do not consider this statement important enough to outweigh the many advantages which his visit in this area won for the Soviet Union and the Communist system which is closely associated with it. That statement troubled those who are sincere about Arab unity, which aims at strengthening the bond between all Arabs in all classes, yet for those who comprehend there is no truth in the Communist doctrines (they saw) it offers nothing new, since (they realize) these doctrines are basically aimed at the destruction of nationalist concept. The residual effect of this statement lay not in the fact it was made. It lay in the fact that it was published during his visit to an Arab country and in its hidden distant objective as shown when it attacked Kuwait. Were this the extent of its effect on thoughtful men, who comprehend Communist doctrines, the statement for the masses I believe would not have the effect which the visit itself had. Because the worker, and the peasant, has a limited culture; he is not affected by such a statement to the extent that he is affected by the spectacle of the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union being embraced and embracing his colleague, smiling for all to see. His host provided great propaganda for the Soviet Union and its leader as always supporting the people's desire for freedom and hurrying to offer every help to raise the standard of living, especially for the worker and the peasant. In this regard I am happy to express to Your Excellency my deepest pleasure in the warm sentiments Your Excellency expressed about the program of reform which I am trying to achieve in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. I feel great confidence that Your Excellency will not spare any effort to offer assistance which will guarantee the achievement of well being for our country and which will provide the best evidence both of what links us and links the friendly peoples of our countries in strong friendship. I hope this sincere cooperation is increasingly strengthened with the passage of time. In connection with what Your Excellency indicated regarding the desire of the Republican leadership in Yemen to establish peaceful relations with the Saudi Arabian Kingdom, we have assured Your Excellency more than once that we sincerely desire friendly cooperation with any Yemeni Government deriving from the free will of the Yemeni people far from any foreign influence and following the withdrawal of the foreign troops from the soil of Yemen! We seek only stability and a cooperation with our neighbors which will enable us to implement the program of reforms we have charted for our country. This was why we signed the disengagement agreement--despite our certainty of the lack of sincerity of the other party regarding its implementation--and (why) we have renewed it six times for a total of one year. What induced us to sign it and to comply with its provisions was a desire: 1. To demonstrate our good intentions following the guarantee of the United States as expressed personally by Mr. Bunker, representing the late President Kennedy, that the honor and the dignity of the United States stood behind the implementation of this agreement. This guaranty was repeated every time the agreement was renewed. 2. To give the United Nations the opportunity to carry out its responsibilities to establish peace and security in the area, fearing the spread of the flame of discord to other areas which would thereby help spread those extremist doctrines which you and I are trying to combat. Now has happened what we expected from the beginning. Recently in an unmistakably clear fashion the President of the UAR informed Mr. Thant, Secretary General of the United Nations, that he will keep his army in the Yemen and he has no present intention to withdraw it. The Secretary General of the United Nations was confident of this before his meeting with the UAR President as he indicated in his report which he presented to the Security Council, No. S5794 dated 2 July 1964, regarding the operations of the UN observation mission in Yemen!/4/ He reported there was no benefit to be expected from continuing to renew the agreement as formerly done if something did not occur during the coming period of renewal which would represent compliance with its provisions. Mr. Spinelli, special representative of the Secretary General, also indicated this during his recent visit to me on August 15. /4/An excerpt from the Secretary-General's July 2 report to the Security Council (UN doc. S/5794) is printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 726-727. In recent days we have seen plainly what the UAR is harboring for our country, particularly before the meeting of the second Arab summit conference. We were shocked on August 13 and August 15 by violation of Saudi air space by Egyptian aircraft. Three aircraft circled repeatedly at low altitude over cities on our southern frontier. Therefore, we find ourselves obliged as of now to secure the defense of our country by various planned measures. I have explained the situation to Ambassador Hart in a more detailed fashion. He will forward it to Your Excellency. I await with hope the day when stability will be realized in this region and when its reponsible leaders will be enabled to move their people toward progress and prosperity. I am happy to convey to Your Excellency my best salutations and good wishes for yourself and for the success and the increasing happiness of the American people. Signed Faysal. Hart
345. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, August 22, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Saudi Arabia, King Faisal Correspondence, Vol. I. Secret. SUBJECT In the enclosed letter to the President/2/ and in discussion with Ambassador Hart at the time of its presentation on August 17, Crown Prince Faisal of Saudi Arabia expressed his belief in a U.A.R.-sponsored plot to divide Saudi Arabia among Jordan, Iraq and Yemen. Referring to U.A.R. overflights of Saudi Arabia on August 13 and 15, he voiced his fear that a current U.A.R. military operation in Yemen would lead to an attack against Saudi territory. He stated that as a result he was sending troops and weapons to the Yemen border to defend his country and that he considered the disengagement agreement to be ended after September 4. He would then feel himself free to help the royalist dissidents in Yemen as he saw fit. However, he still intends to go to the Arab Summit Conference at Alexandria on September 5 where he will talk to Nasser concerning the Yemen if the latter raises the subject. He has not set a date for resumption of aid to the royalists. /2/Document 344. We have no information concerning the highly improbable alleged Arab plot against Faisal. There are also no indications that Egyptian military activity in Yemen is directed against Saudi Arabia. The Egyptians, aware of continued Saudi assistance to the royalists, appear to have overflown Saudi territory only in connection with their present major offensive in Yemen, aimed at finally eliminating royalist opposition. Faisal may be seizing the overflights as an excuse to prop up the royalists in Yemen and thus strengthen his own position prior to discussions with Nasser. Of major concern is possible U.A.R. reaction to the movement of Saudi arms to the border. Should the Egyptians believe that this equipment is destined for the royalists, bombing raids on munition dumps across the frontier could occur in the pattern followed by the U.A.R. in late 1962. Faisal asked specifically where we would stand in case of fighting between U.A.R. and Saudi troops. In restating our 1963 position of support for Faisal against unprovoked attack, Ambassador Hart noted that we would consider further aid to the royalists as a provocation. We intend to instruct him to repeat this stand to Faisal, to inform the Crown Prince of our intelligence estimates that no military threat to Saudi Arabia currently exists and to urge that Saudi Arabia not become reinvolved in the Yemen. We will press Cairo not to continue overflights and not to react unnecessarily against the movement of Saudi troops within their own territory. We will inform U Thant of Faisal's concern and ask if he has received an up-to-date assessment of the situation from the United Nations Yemen Observation Mission which could be passed to Faisal. We are considering the desirability of a subsequent United States Air Force fighter squadron training exercise in Saudi Arabia as a reassurance of our continued interest to Faisal, provided he clearly forswears provoking the situation by increased aid to the royalists. Pending the results of the foregoing approaches, we do not recommend that the President reply to Faisal at this moment. Benjamin H. Read/3/ /3/Deputy Executive Secretary Grant G. Hilliker signed for Read.
346. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia/1/ Washington, August 22, 1964, 10:51 a.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Moore on August 21; cleared by Symmes, Campbell, and Stoddard (DOD/ISA); and approved by Grant. Also sent to Cairo, Taiz, and USUN and repeated to Amman, London, Baghdad, Dhahran, and CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA for Ramsey. 104. Jidda tels 133, 134 and 143./2/ Faisal open reinvolvement Yemen clearly counter US interests of damping down struggle. It would seem equally counter Faisal's own interest of maintaining stability and forward thrust of development and reform program within Saudi Arabia. /2/Telegram 133 from Jidda, August 19; telegram 134 from Jidda, August 19; and telegram 143 from Jidda, August 20; none printed. (All ibid.) Faisal understandably disturbed by UAR overflights which themselves provocative. At same time must be realized that UAR is aware of continued Saudi assistance to royalists and that overflights appear to have been observational, connected with major military operation in Yemen rather than hostilities directed against SAG. We have no indication that UAR proposing any military move against Saudi Arabia, either from Yemen in context current campaign or through tripartite deal. However UAR seems particularly intent in current operation on crushing royalists prior Arab Summit Two, with initial successes reported. Faisal strong reaction recent overflights indicates he may be seizing on them as pretext for final attempt bolster fading royalist cause and strengthen his own position before discussion with Nasser. USG continues support integrity Saudi Arabia, but would consider resumption open aid to royalists, particularly at time present concentrated military operation, as provocatory. While we willing consider visible "re-statement" our concern for Saudi Arabia in form USAF squadron visit, such action would be difficult in face unprovoked SAG aid to royalists. We gratified that Faisal does not appear intent on rushing aid to royalists. If this the case, major immediate concern becomes potential UAR reaction to movement Saudi arms and troops to border. If Egyptians interpret this as opening move to concentrate troops and establish munition dumps in preparation for massive assistance al-Badr, they may react with cross-border bomb attacks within military operational framework in pattern 1962-63. Thus urgent need exists dissuade UAR from further overflights and from over-reacting to Saudi defensive move to frontiers. Action Requested For Jidda. You should re-emphasize to Faisal (or Saqqaf for Faisal) that our concern for and interest in Saudi Arabia remains same as it has in past, that in all sincerity we maintain our policy of support for SAG against unprovoked aggression. At same time, exacerbation by SAG of Yemen situation by provoking military confrontation with UAR, would make it difficult for us come to Saudi support. While expressing understanding for legitimate defensive posture, you should strongly urge Saudis avoid any appearance of becoming reinvolved in Yemen problem and suggest they may wish make very clear to UAR purpose, extent and limits their present mobilization on frontier in order avoid any mistaken hasty UAR reaction. Affirm that we have absolutely no indications that UAR troops Yemen intend transgress Saudi soil; nor do we have any report from any other source concerning alleged tripartite plot. (FYI. Department considering what further action may be desirable in light recommendations this subject contained your 146.)/3/ /3/In telegram 146 from Jidda, August 21, Hart recommended a warm Presidential letter to Faisal, and consultation with London on strengthening U.S.-U.K. cooperation in the Arabian peninsula. (Ibid.) In telegram 156 from Jidda, August 23, the Ambassador stated that it was in the U.S. interest for him to see Faisal with the message in telegram 104 and that he would talk it over with Saqqaf first. He noted that it now seemed clear that Faisal's action in reinforcing the south, although multiple in purpose, was weighted by his desire to show Nasser that he could react quickly and strongly. Hart did not think that Faisal would send forces over the frontier or renew aid to the royalists before the summit. (Ibid.) Telegram 106 to Jidda, August 24, advised Hart that he could delay the dmarche at his discretion, and that a proposed draft letter was being sent by separate telegram. (Ibid.) For Cairo. At highest possible level you should express our concern that UAR overflights Saudi Arabia serve needlessly to inflame UAR-Saudi relations and threaten confrontation which clearly would not be in UAR, Saudi or YAR interests in area. Urge strongly that UAR not react unnecessarily to Saudi frontier mobilization which SAG has fully assured us is entirely of defensive nature. You should stress our view that greater UAR-Saudi rapprochement, especially concerning Yemen, much to be desired; we hope this will be outcome Nasser-Faisal meeting in September. For Taiz. In your discussions with YARG and UARG officials you should emphasize need for not allowing short range military requirements of present operation to obscure greater importance of avoiding actions which would arouse Saudi fears and be apt provoke sharp Saudi reaction to detriment possible easing of Yemen situation. For USUN. You should inform UNSYG or Bunche of Faisal's concern that UAR military action against Saudi Arabia contemplated and of Saudi remilitarization border area (Jidda tel 133) and ask if he has up-to-date assessment of situation from UNYOM. You authorized tell him of our dmarches in Cairo and Jidda, above. Rusk
347. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, August 24, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Yemen, Cables & Memos, Vol. II, 7/64-12/68. Secret. Mac-- I haven't bothered you to date, but we may have trouble over Yemen again: (1) UNYOM will probably breathe its last on 4 September, though we may be able to keep a UN presence there;/2/ (2) UAR/YAR offensive to clean up north Yemen and present Faysal with a fait accompli at Alexandria summit seems to be going well; (3) Faysal and UK are very unhappy over this, in fact Saudis are sending supplies to their border area and threatening to resume aid to royalists; (4) our UAR friends made a few recon flights again over Saudi border. /2/In response to an inquiry from the Secretary-General, Saudi Arabia responded on August 26 that it had carried out its responsibilities under the disengagement agreement, but the United Arab Republic had not. Saudi Arabia found itself unable to continue to share in UNYOM's expenses or to abide by the terms of the disengagement agreement after September 4, 1964. After receiving a U.A.R. reply that it had no objection to termination of UNYOM, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council on September 2 that he intended to terminate UNYOM's activities as of September 4. An excerpt from the Secretary-General's report (UN doc. S/5927) is printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 727-728. So Faysal has again made emotional plea to LBJ/3/--since disengagement is a flop, he may have to start the war again. Will we protect him? He made same plea to UK. /3/See Document 344. Butler has neatly passed buck to us to note to Rusk. It's the old song--shouldn't US and UK at long last work together to put blocks to Nasser. Fortunately Rusk gave right answer to a sheepish Greenhill./4/ Talbot tells me Rusk sees no point in accommodating Brits till we see which HMG we're dealing with. We've also gone out to calm down Faysal, telling him again we back Saudi Arabia, but that if Saudis reopen Yemen war they do so at their own risk. Hart wants another LBJ letter, but State and I feel not just now, unless absolutely necessary. /4/A memorandum of conversation recording British Charge d'Affaires Denis Greenhill's meeting with Secretary Rusk on August 21 is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN. See footnote 2, Document 349, for a brief summary of their conversation. The whole Yemen-Aden business may come to a boil at summit. Nasser will try to isolate Faysal and may bring off a compromise. But if he browbeats Faysal we'll probably get an open break, and a flareup again. We're urging Nasser to play it smart, but without great hopes. We're doing our best to keep this one buried, but don't ask the impossible. RWK [Continue with the next documents] Volume XXI Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |