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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXI Near East Region Department of State Washington, DC

313. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State/1/ Jidda, July 20, 1968, 0958Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, UN 7. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, London, Tel Aviv, and USUN. A note on the telegram indicates that the Communications Office did not pass the telegram to Cairo. 4811. Dept pass Cairo. Ball/Sisco Audience with King Faisal. Summary 1. In two-hour audience with King Faisal, Ball emphasized importance USG attaches to settlement Middle East problem and reported on his talks in Israel, Jordan and Lebanon. Said he had impressed upon Israelis that their insistence on direct negotiation is an untenable position which will only lead to continued freezing of problem. Expressed gratification that two questions GOI had asked Jarring to put to UAR might offer some scope for movement through indirect discussions. Ultimately some direct talks likely be necessary, but this is problem which need not be hurdled now. Israelis more anxious arrive at urgent settlement with Jordan than with UAR and, while in absence any negotiations GOI is not required formulate firm positions, he had gained personal impression that they sought only such border rectifications as necessary for security reasons. Jerusalem problem different and Israelis insist any settlement must be in context unified city which is capital of Israel. However, Eban had indicated awareness Israeli occupation their Islamic holy places intolerable to Muslims and expressed willingness "stretch imagination" to find some acceptable solution. Jarring mission continues offer best way to proceed, and presence FonMins in New York next month might also be helpful. USG will do utmost assist such efforts. 2. After expressing appreciation Ball's appointment and trip, Faisal gave long, cathartic monologue on background Arab-Israel question and dangers continued US support for Israel. King emphasized extent to which Arabs have moved to find settlement in context Israeli inflexibility. He took some credit for counseling moderation at Khartoum. He thought Hussein could not move before UAR does. Equating Israelis with Communists, he contended Soviets also support GOI and attributed all problems of area to them. His reaction to GOI's questions was that one already answered. While second could not be answered at this time, he was adamant on Israeli retention of Jerusalem reiterating that even if Jordan and UAR accept such arrangement, he would have to declare Jihad and would be supported in this by Muslims and Christians. He expressed deep concern Communist inroads into Middle East as result unsettled problem. 3. Ball said USG shares King's concern about Communist activities in area, but brought Faisal back to principal issue by reemphasizing need for indirect negotiations within the principles of UN resolution in order to break deadlock and move toward settlement. King expressed no objection such talks and affirmed his own interest in achieving settlement. Noted this would allow canal be reopened and relieve him of burden of financial subsidies. End Summary. 1. King Faisal received Ambassador Ball, Sisco and me in two-hour audience 10 p.m. July 19. Atherton and Stockey also attended. On Saudi side Prince Nawwaf (special advisor), Rashad Pharaon (Royal Counselor), and Omar Saggaf (Minister of State for Foreign Affairs) were present. 2. Ambassador Ball began discussion by saying when he accepted position Ambassador to UN, he told President Johnson he wished to visit Middle East because its problems are among the most important the UN must deal with. President agreed and said Ball should visit Saudi Arabia and obtain Faisal's views and wisdom in order help US seek solution Middle East problems. Ball conveyed President's warm personal greetings. Faisal expressed thanks for the President's noble sentiments, which he said are fully reciprocated, and for sending Ball to confer with him. Faisal said he had welcomed news of Ball's appointment, because of what he had learned of his qualities and personality. 3. President Johnson, Ball continued, attaches great importance not only to ending Vietnam war, but to USG making a real contribution to permanent peace in Middle East. Ball was accordingly visiting Middle East with President's full approval. He had been to Israel, Lebanon and Jordan, and conferred with Israeli Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and other leaders, with King Hussein, and with Lebanese Government. He wished convey to King some of impressions gained from these consultations. 4. Israel Govt, Ball said, is in state some disagreement embracing wide range of opinion, and with no common position. He gained impression GOI will not attempt form common position until obliged to do so. It will be required to do so only when engaged in some negotiating process. Meanwhile, GOI has adhered to position it will accept no negotiating process except through direct bilateral discussions with Arab states. Since this principle inconsistent with decisions Khartoum Summit Conference, it relieves GOI of necessity come to grips with substance of problem. As his first task, therefore, Ball undertook impress upon Israelis that this position untenable. As result his discussions with Israeli reps in New York and later in Israel, he believed he had made progress in convincing GOI some form indirect negotiations with Arabs is necessary. 5. As an indication there has been some relaxation Israeli position, Ambassador Ball states, GOI recently gave two questions to Ambassador Jarring to give to UARG, requesting UAR reply. (Here King's interpreter read text GOI questions earlier provided to Saqqaf.) Significance this Israeli move, Ball said, not so much in content of questions as in indication GOI prepared enter into some process of indirect discussion with Arabs in order sharpen issues. This could be beginning of progress on problem otherwise completely frozen, Ball had not seen Jarring recently, and therefore unable say whether latter had transmitted questions to GUAR, or intends to do so. GOI's desire have reply these particular questions also gives UAR opportunity raise own questions, thus perhaps beginning process indirect discussions. 6. In Amman, Ball stated, he had told Hussein he had found GOI most anxious arrive at means living together with Jordan, its next door neighbor, and attached far less urgency to settlement with UAR. To extent GOI has any definite opinion, he told Hussein, it not interested in increasing its territory at expense Jordan, but in arriving at secure borders. In his opinion, Ball said, Israel seeking some rectification June 4 boundaries, but on basis security considerations alone and without incorporating numerous Jordanians. Exactly what secure borders are can be worked out only through some form of negotiation. 7. In case Jerusalem, on other hand, there are other factors than security. Ambassador Ball said he had pressed GOI vigorously on Jerusalem question. Foreign Minister Eban had replied GOI cannot conceive of Jerusalem which not united. Furthermore, any solution must take account of fact Jerusalem is capital of Israel. At same time Eban said he well aware of fact no Muslim can tolerate situation in which Israel in control Muslim holy places. Within framework two principles mentioned, GOI will "stretch its imagination" to find some solution acceptable to Muslims. Ball emphasized he not seeking defend GOI position, but merely wished report it as he had heard it. He assumed it represented initial Israel negotiating position. 8. Ambassador Ball repeated US endeavoring find way of arriving at agreed solutions. Best instrument available for this purpose is Jarring mission. There will also be opportunity for progress when Foreign Ministers convene for opening UNGA in September, and he told King he had expressed hope to Saqqaf that Faisal would permit him attend UNGA. 9. Faisal thanked Ambassador Ball for describing his discussions, saying he wished preface his reply with a historical preamble. Ball was, King said, well aware of situation between Israel and Arabs before June war. No Arab could have conceived of discussions with Israel, direct or indirect. Since Israel was established, Arabs have never mobilized against Israel, whereas Israel has repeatedly concentrated forces and attacked Arab states. Before creation Israel Arab world lived in tranquility, without revolutions or disturbances, despite some difference of opinion. No one then could have predicted present state of indiscipline or present close relations with Communists. 10. While having no right or wish interfere in US affairs, and recognizing each country must follow own policy, but speaking as friend, without emotion but analyzing facts, Faisal contended support of Israel is not in interest US but on contrary great liability. US gives aid in form bonds, arms, etc., lavishly to Israel without getting anything in return, whereas US has genuine material interests in Arab world. Thirty or forty years ago, he said, no one would have believed US would participate in establishing intrusive state on land of a people, at the price of expelling and dispersing them. US, he acknowledged, not solely responsible for creation Israel. Communist countries worked for it also because it is in their interests and against those of US. Faisal recalled he was at UN when Soviet rep accused US of obstructing formation of Israel. USSR had wanted precede US in recognizing Israel, but as UN located in US President Truman received news of formation Jewish state first. 11. After June war, Faisal went on, Arabs underwent unprecedented wave of hysteria which clearly evident at Khartoum Conference. Although having no more sympathy than other Arab states for Israel, Saudi Arabia sought moderate extreme proposals then being advanced, such as complete embargo oil exports, severance diplomatic relations, etc. Only Saudi Arabia stood against extreme ideas and was consequently accused of reaction, subservience to imperialism, etc. Following conference, Faisal sent President Johnson his views concerning its decisions. Unfortunately, his message had no effect on US position. Now more than one year has elapsed and nothing has happened. After much discussion November resolution was adopted which Faisal said he had thought no Arab could accept because close analysis shows it conflicts with Khartoum resolutions. Nevertheless, he said he had told the Arab states directly involved they are free to seek solution and assured them Saudi Arabia would not object, interpose obstructions, nor take opportunity to attack them. This, King said, was effort on part of Saudis to facilitate solution of problem. 12. Rejection of Security Council resolution, Faisal said, came from Israeli rather than the Arab side as he had expected. He attributed this to Communist influence on Israel. While Communists pretend be on Arab side, in reality they are with Israel and Israel is taking their advice. For example, whenever Arabs adopt moderate positions, Israeli demands increase. This can come only from Communists. It gives them chance spread own influence in Arab states on pretext of helping them. If problem settled, there no reason for Arab countries place themselves under Communist control or influence. Communists provide military assistance adapted for defense only, then claim Arabs inefficient and were unable use arms previously supplied them. They furthermore seek convince Arabs US presence in area is solely for defense of Israel. They seeking isolate Arab states such as Saudi Arabia which friendly to US. They are working in Syria, UAR, South Arabia, Yemen and wish to advance into Arabian Gulf. Saudi Arabia now stands almost alone, and is keenly aware of Communist danger. King Hussein had been on verge resorting to USSR for arms, since his country was defenseless and his government about to fall, but Saudi Arabia dissuaded him, and appealed to US to assist him. Now, Faisal said with note of bitterness, we can only wait and see what conditions Israel will dictate. 13. Adverting to GOI questions to UAR, Faisal asserted UAR had already replied to first by agreeing to Security Council resolution which provides for termination state of war. He dismissed second question as untimely and calculated only to cause difficulties. After basic principles of Security Council resolution have been fulfilled, Faisal said, terms can be worked out, and first of resolutions principles is withdrawal Israeli forces. 14. It inconceivable either Christians or Muslims can accept Jerusalem remain in hands of Jews, Faisal asserted. He recalled he had told me he would have to declare Jihad in defense holy places. He said even if Jordan and Egypt agree, we will not, and we will declare Jihad. We may die, but it will be with honor. He also recalled there is Security Council resolution on Jerusalem. Furthermore, freedom of navigation is assured by Security Council resolution. He could only conclude Israel intransigence is inspired by Russians. 15. Longer solution is delayed, King asserted, more Soviets will gain at expense of US. He deprecated significance East European states breakaway from USSR, since all are Communists. He requested Ball not to laugh if he asserted he fears communism even in US. He convinced race riots and other disturbances in US are fomented by Communists. He pointed to events in France one month ago and declared "If France goes all Europe goes." He said Communists have even been found in Saudi Arabia, where people strongly attached to faith. He asked us be alert to fact Zionism is a form of communism, and Jews applied Socialist doctrines as early as 1911. Saudis are not against Jews--"We have good friends among Jews"--but against Zionism. Faisal expressed conviction arrogance of Zionist policy will eventually turn entire world against it. In US, he pointed out, there are anti-Zionist Jews, who are not pro-Arab but simply conscious of real Jewish interests. 16. King expressed view intransigence not in Israeli interest. Arabs bound eventually to recover their rights. Jews are not more numerous or powerful than crusaders. Israel must realize Arabs now willing keep within own boundaries, which inconceivable formerly. Entire question, Faisal repeated, goes back to instigation by Communists. 17. Ball might reply, King said, as I had frequently told him, that US ability influence Israel limited, but if Israel does not take US advice, he said, US can withhold aid as it did with UAR, and this might be effective. Enormous US aid to Israel may even be significant element in US balance of payment difficulties. Tax-free concessions on aid to Israel are unique in world, and support for Israel had become object of auctioneering among candidates in elections. He would, Faisal said, not speak such words except as friend of US and as one who wants all Arabs to be US friends. Finally, Israel occupation of territory in 1967 runs counter to US guarantees to Arab states. 18. Ball thanked King for comprehensive statement his views of situation. Present difficulties, he said, are result of unnatural situation, and this is reason US is so anxious for settlement. Until then unrest will spread and Communists will exploit it. Although Russians had role in bringing on June war, he continued, they appear interested in arriving at solution. With Suez closed they are finding it costly to supply Vietnam and are frustrated in extending their influence into Yemen, South Arabia and Indian Ocean. King commented Soviets already supplying Yemen and planting influence South Arabia. They are unloading aid shipments in Alexandria which transported overland to Egyptian Red Sea ports for shipment Yemen. Russians are trying convince world they want solution. But, King warned, one should never believe a Communist. Ball agreed Communists do not want permanent peace because they can exploit instability. He observed that he and King were in agreement on central point that so long as present situation exists, Communist influence will spread. Faisal expressed satisfaction Ball agreed with him; he had long tried convince, but no one listened. He hoped speedy measures would be taken to end Communist encroachment. Saudi Arabia stands alone, even US friends such as Iran and Turkey now have relations with USSR, which thus making inroads on US strongholds. 19. Ambassador Ball noted he was just beginning to approach problem. He believed, however, that we had reached point where we can achieve some movement on problem which has been on dead center one year and one month. He reiterated importance Israel questions to UAR not necessarily because of their substance, but because they can represent beginning of an exchange. Issues cannot be settled until requirements and positions on both sides are discussed and sharpened. US prepared play as vigorous role as it can to encourage such exchange, without however seeking replace Jarring mission or Security Council. He recognized Jerusalem question one of great sensitivity to Muslims, Christians and Jews. Faisal challenged idea there any place in Jerusalem holy to Jews. He dismissed Wailing Wall and Temple of Solomon as of no deep religious significance. Last thing in area sacred to Jews, he asserted, was rock on which Moses trod which UAR had allowed be shipped from Sinai to New York. Jews therefore can simply visit their holy place in New York. He again warned that unsatisfactory Jerusalem settlement would require him declare Jihad. 20. Ball noted US is pragmatic and believes only way to begin on existing dangerous, long-standing situation is to begin. Faisal saw no objection to beginning, and Ball expressed gratification, since US feels there has been some breakthrough and Israel has moved slightly away from rigid position which had heretofore been excuse for doing nothing. US, he said, will continue use all influence we have with parties to continue indirect discussion. He expressed personal feeling no final solution can be reached without some direct discussion, but this hurdle can be dealt with later. Final result must be some form of agreement committing parties. Ball expressed confidence Jarring able negotiate agreement within framework principles Security Council resolution. US, he concluded, will take Faisal's views into careful account. Our diplomacy will not be idle during this period, and US will do all it can to bring end to present agonizing situation. He expressed his own and President Johnson's gratitude for this audience and opportunity to discuss with King problem of great concern to both countries. Faisal agreed support Jarring mission was best approach but insisted matter was urgent. Jarring had already been underway for six months without result. Jarring should be encouraged, but Israel also must be persuaded abandon its intransigence. Ambassador Ball reiterated hope UAR will take opportunity to ask questions of its own of GOI thus opening door to continuing exchange. "Open the door", Faisal agreed, "but quickly." 21. In connection final reference to continued closure Suez Canal, Faisal indicated a settlement would enable Canal be reopened and relieve Saudi Arabia of onerous financial burden of subsidy payments to UAR. Eilts   314. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia/1/ Washington, August 29, 1968, 2224Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12-5 SAUD. Confidential. Drafted by Newton; cleared by Colonel Wix (DOD/NESA), E. Randall Backlund (AID/PPC/MAS), Colonel Bunte, and Lewis D. Junior (G/PM); and approved by John N. Gatch (NEA/ARP). Repeated to CINCSTRIKE. 230121. Ref: Jidda 5140./2/ Subject: Saudi Armored Forces Planning. 2 Telegram 5140 from Jidda, August 19, reported that, at the request of the Saudi Ministry of Defense and Aviation (MODA), USMTM was conducting a study of tanks for the future development and modernization of the Saudi armored forces, and that the Saudis were thinking in terms of eventually acquiring 300-350 new tanks. In order to make realistic recommendations, USMTM needed to know whether the U.S. Government in principle was willing to sell such U.S. tanks as the M-48A3, the M-60, the M-609A1, or the M-551 to Saudi Arabia. It stated that, in the Embassy view, the U.S. Government should, for purposes of current MODA planning, permit the Saudis to assume that in principle the United States was prepared to authorize the sale of U.S.-manufactured tanks to them. (Ibid.) 1. As indicated Brewer letter of July 1 to Ambassador/3/ believe it undesirable stimulate Saudi interest in purchasing new tanks. SAG has already expended substantial funds on various types of military hardware and number of tanks quoted reftel appears to be considerably in excess of SAG's needs and of its maintenance and manpower capabilities. /3/Not found. 2. It seems highly unlikely that tanks such as the M-60 and the XM-551 would be available for SAG purchase within time frame covered by study. Furthermore, we must consider possibility legal and policy restrictions overriding our general desire be responsive to Saudi requests. Thus we wish to avoid serious difficulties that would arise should planning exercise be taken by SAG as promise which we would later be unable fulfill. We, of course, also recognize our interest in maintaining US position as supplier military equipment to Saudis and would make every effort, upon specific request by SAG, to respond favorably within the limits noted above. 3. We have no objection to USMTM's providing MODA with comparative data as requested. However, would not appear that comparability study requires we give commitment as to availability two years hence. As previously stated by Ambassador to Prince Sultan, we are not in a position to make such commitment. Therefore Embassy should inform USMTM that possible legal and policy restrictions plus uncertainties of supply limit USG ability to do more at this time than provide comparability data without explicit or implied commitments. 4. Jidda 5140 repeated separately for info CINCSTRIKE. Rusk   315. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State/1/ Jidda, September 12, 1968, 1545Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 6-2 SAUD. Confidential. Repeated to London, Dhahran, CHUSMTM, COMIDEASTFOR, CNO, DOD, and DIA. 5325. Subj: US Naval Survey. Ref: Jidda 5186./2/ /2/Dated August 26. (Ibid.) 1. US Naval Survey Team/3/ (reftel), en route back to US after completing in-country portion of survey, briefed DATT Col Merino and myself today. /3/Telegram 190428 to Jidda, June 25, noted that the U.S. Government had agreed to undertake a naval survey in response to the Saudi Government's expressed desire to plan for expansion of its Navy and related facilities, and transmitted terms of reference for the U.S. Naval Survey Team. (Ibid.) 2. Naval team's preliminary recommendations as outlined to US will include: A. Operating base at Jidda. B. Training and operating base at al Jabayl. C. Headquarters ultimately located MODA Riyadh. D. Requirement that acquisition any fleet unit be preceded by personnel, training, and base facilities. E. Base maintenance and ship repair by contract personnel in order to free trained Navy units. F. End strength in approximately 10 years to be 650 enlisted, 84 officers. G. Anticipted end strength in 10 years of surface units in Red Sea: 3 torpedo boats, 1 gun goat (flagship), two coastal minesweepers. Same for Gulf. H. Construction cost estimates based on stateside cost data, and area cost factors are not considered realistic. Costing data to be developed after arrival CONUS. I. Next step in plan requires architect engineer study to accomplish preliminary engineering and develop detailed, reliable cost estimates. J. Realistic phasing within capabilities of RSN to absorb new units and functions. 3. Team met with Gen Malik (Coast Guard Commander) and discussed role and mission of Coast Guard. Saudi Navy Mission, assumed by team and as understood result Aug 22 meeting with Sultan, compatible with Malik's view of Coast Guard mission. Malik indicated Coast Guard would cooperate with Navy but no joint usage of facilities. 4. Team returning CONUS via MAC Sept 13 and will be available in office Chief Naval Operations (OP-632) afternoon Sept 16. Team Chief Capt Morgan will contact Country Dir Arabian Penin Affs Brewer after arrival Pentagon. Amb Eilts may also wish briefing by Morgan. Suggest he or Brewer take opportunity request survey be completed soon as possible, since team gave Sultan estimate of 30 days total time required for survey including necessary stateside research. 5. We debated and then turned down idea of Morgan meeting with Prince Sultan before departing for CONUS. Courtesy of saying farewell outweighed in our judgment by Washington directive to team that survey recommendations must be cleared in DOD and State prior discussion with SAG and possibility of some misunderstanding of Morgan's remarks (especially re non-commitment of USG beyond survey) by Sultan or other Saudis at meeting. Saudi Naval officers asked that Emb notify Sultan of departure of team, and I plan write Sultan to inform him in-Country portion of survey now completed, Saudi cooperation excellent for which team and we grateful, and we shall do all possible expedite completion of survey. Stoltzfus   316. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia/1/ Washington, October 24, 1968, 1441Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Davies and Eugene Rostow on October 23; cleared by Atherton, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs David H. Popper, Hart, and Brewer; and approved by Eugene Rostow. Repeated to Dhahran. 260750. Jidda's 5646./2/ For the Ambassador from Under Secretary Rostow. 2 In telegram 5646 from Jidda, October 16, Eilts reported to Under Secretary Rostow that top Aramco officials were "very disturbed" at what they considered an imbalance in the U.S. position toward the Arab-Israeli dispute, and were clearly worried about the ultimate consequences of U.S. policy on the major U.S. interest in the Arabian peninsula. They were especially fearful that gradual deterioration of U.S.-Saudi relationships and confidence would increase Saudi pressures on the company and in the long run perhaps even lead to nationalization, and were concerned about the security of the Aramco staff in the event of a new outbreak of hostilities that could lead to riots in Dhahran. (Ibid.) 1. Appreciate your 5646 and your forthright and effective actions. We will try to have significant telegrams on US views on Near Eastern problems repeated to you so that you can continue to explain our positions and policies systematically to King Faisal, his ministers and to American oil company officials in area. We hope that appropriate and regular briefings of the King may help restore perspective which we fear has been impaired by coterie of counselors around him. 2. Jarring's mission is at critical phase this month. It is essential that both sides develop some confidence in professions by the other of willingness to move to an enduring settlement. We are seeking to encourage the exchange of substantive ideas on a solution. We are concerned of course to protect King Hussein at this delicate phase while pushing for a fair and dignified agreement between Jordan and Israel. At the same time we hope to maintain a dialogue with the UAR to encourage any inclination to move toward acceptable agreement. UAR October 20 gave Jarring written reply to Israeli proposals provided Jarring by Eban. Eban's willingness to give Jarring substantive negotiating positions represents major modification in Israeli insistence on direct negotiations, obtained in part by U.S. diplomacy. While we do not wish discuss substance GOI and UAR papers, we believe important thing is for process of substantive exchanges to begin in earnest and to mature. Understand Jarring has similar view. 3. Announcement of Phantom negotiations/3/ made in light of considered U.S. assessment of trends and developments in the area including Soviet posture. It was in no way intended to set back process of conciliation on which Jarring is embarked. Regardless of when agreement concluded, delivery time obviously some time away. It is our hope that all concerned will push forward long before that time to agreement to establish just and lasting peace under November 22nd resolution. Rusk /3/On October 9 the White House issued a statement by President Johnson saying that he had signed the Foreign Assistance Act of 1968 and taken note of section 651 stating that it was the sense of the Congress that the President should take the necessary steps to negotiate an agreement with the Government of Israel providing for the sale by the United States of such number of supersonic planes as might be necessary to provide Israel with an adequate deterrent force capable of preventing future Arab aggression.   317. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia/1/ Washington, October 28, 1968, 1647Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL SAUD-US. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Brooks Wrampelmeier (NEA/ARP) on October 25, cleared by Brewer and Davies, and approved by Hart. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Kuwait, London, Tel Aviv, Dhahran, and USUN. 262448. 1. Following FYI and based on uncleared memcon, Noforn and subject to change on review: 2. Saudi Minstate for FonAffs Saqqaf called on Secretary Rusk October 25. Saudi Charge Faki and Asst Sec Hart also present. Secretary began by remarking US now going through turbulent election period but elections would have no effect on US-Saudi relations. Saqqaf said he pleased to hear this but stressed that USG should not rely too much on Saudi Arabia. US and Saudi Arabia had had long history of close relations but US must take into consideration that these relations could be shaken by "something or other." To Secretary's comment that both sides would lose in that event, Saqqaf responded that if Saudi Arabia loses then whole ME area lost. Communism would spread throughout region. Regimes in radical Arab states are shaky and subject to communist subversion. SAG cannot do much about this itself. However, Saqqaf asserted USG not doing much about it either. He expressed fear USG has lost interest in area. 3. Secretary noted US needed help from countries involved to do anything in region. Reviewing history of events surrounding June 1967 war, Secretary said Nasser had run headlong into USG commitment to maintenance of freedom of navigation through Straits of Tiran. Other Arab actions had been unhelpful to UN efforts arrange cease fire on first day of fighting and to Latin Americans' later unsuccessful attempt obtain Middle East resolution at extraordinary UNGA. Arabs had later regretted these actions when it was too late. Saqqaf said SAG doing its best to be helpful. Soviet trickery had led to developments which Secretary had just described. Secretary remarked that Syrians and UAR, as well as Soviets, bear great responsibility for what happened. Saqqaf rejoined that Israelis too bear great part of responsibility. 4. Secretary expressed hope that Jarring would successfully accomplish his mission. Saqqaf appeared dubious, remarking that perhaps after US elections Jarring's task might become easier. Secretary hoped UAR would enter into substantive discussions of ME settlement. USG has been pressing Israel to be flexible on direct negotiations question. Unless there is some movement on both sides Jarring can make no headway. Saqqaf insisted Israel will not withdraw but merely wants keep occupied territory. If Israel really intended to withdraw, it could put forth plan for discussion. Secretary replied that UAR must act to test Israeli intentions. If Nasser had not agitated Tiran issue, there would have been no problem of territorial changes. He emphasized that USG has no interest in change of even one inch of territory in area. 5. Secretary said USG doing its best to help Jarring get to heart of the matter. While some on Arab side skeptical of Israeli territorial motives, he felt this not crucial issue. Latter is Jerusalem. On this USG has its own view, disagreeing with both Israel and Jordan about city's status. Solution on other territorial aspects is possible. Saying he speaking privately, Secretary thought it possible that some generous arrangement concerning Holy Places could also be worked out. This would lessen area of Jerusalem in dispute. Saqqaf argued there really no sacred Jewish Holy Places in Jerusalem. City is Muslim and Christian. Hart reminded Saqqaf that Arabs in general had long regarded city as sacred to three religions. 6. Conversation terminated at this point due arrival of physician summoned by Secretary to examine Saqqaf, who had become increasingly unwell (septel). 7. Comment: Saqqaf obviously not at his best. Early termination of interview, which lasted less than half hour, prevented discussion of other matters. Tone of meeting was cordial throughout. Saqqaf did not at any time refer to Phantoms but tenor of his opening remarks suggests he had been instructed by King to deliver firm warning that, although SAG continues desire maintain close and friendly relations with US, it might not be able to do so in face of US actions regarded by Arabs as hostile to their basic interests. Rusk   318. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State/1/ Jidda, December 8, 1968, 1545Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 US/SCRANTON. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to Tehran, Beirut, Cairo, Moscow, Kuwait, and London. 6239. Subj: Faisal-Scranton Talk./2/ /2/Telegram 279191 to Jidda, November 28, transmitted a message from President-elect Nixon to King Faisal, stating that he was sending Governor William Scranton on a fact-finding tour of the Middle East and hoped that the King would be able to receive him and to give him a full and frank exposition of his views on the local situation and the region as a whole. (Ibid.) 1. After long meeting with Saqqaf earlier in day in Jidda, Governor Scranton had two hour private meeting with King Faisal in Riyadh evening December 7. Governor informed that Faisal generally reiterated his known views. Subjects covered as follows: 2. Communism in Area. Faisal went round Arabian Peninsula outlining Soviet and ChiCom strength various states. Yemen is under Soviet influence. So is PRSY whose leadership leftist. (At Governor's request, Faisal agreed Saqqaf should prepare paper on PRSY for forwarding to Scranton.) Syria most leftist state in area. Iraq less influenced by Communists and situation there still salvageable, although King obviously dislikes leftist oriented Baath. In UAR communism also strong, but many Egyptians do not want it. Same applies to Algeria. Faisal expressed concern about Kuwait, which is now thinking of taking Soviet equipment. Despite ample funds, Kuwait not as stable as it ought to be. Spoke at some length about vulnerability of Trucial states to leftist subversion. 3. Saudi-Iran Relations. Faisal expressed his pleasure about recent meeting with Shah. Stated it his intention to cooperate fully with Shah to try to bring about a settlement of problems of Gulf. 4. Arab-Israel. Faisal repeated well known views. Israel is unique situation in history of mankind. Outsiders came in and expelled people already there. Faisal questioned whether it good that Israel exists in long run, at least not as a theological state. He could accept Jews in area if they did not seek impose theologic issue. He contended Israel is essentially a leftist, Communist state which is constant threat to area stability. 5. On what should be done to resolve problem, Faisal contended most important element is Israeli withdrawal to former boundary lines. On Sharm al-Shaikh, Sinai and Suez aspects, Faisal would go along with whatever UAR wants. Matter entirely up to Egyptians. Straits of Tiran should be open./3/ Tiran and Senafir Islands should be returned to him. /3/Documentation on Tiran and Senafir islands, which were occupied by Israel in June 1967, is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volumes XIX and XX. 6. Arab refugees should be granted right to return. Of 1948 refugees, Faisal thought less than 5 percent would want to go back. Displaced persons of 1967 hostilities should also be allowed back. Most of them will do so. 7. Faisal was his customary strong self on Jerusalem. It is Holy City of Muslims. Jews have no right be there. Unless Israelis withdraw from it, Muslims will declare holy war to recover it. He willing to die for it. 8. Arab Leaders. Faisal was dispassionate in his comments on Arab leaders. Hussein had at times in past been vacillating, but should be supported. He was not bitter about Nasser, but wished keep him at arm's length. 9. Saudi-U.S. Relations. Faisal was clearly pleased with Mr. Nixon's election. Toward end of conversation he grasped Governor's hand and clutched it while expounding on U.S.-Saudi friendship, danger of Israel and Zionism and Communist threat to area. 10. Security. Faisal did not appear be concerned about security in Saudi Arabia. Felt he can control situation here, but was worried about what is happening around him. Large part of area already Communist-influenced and, unless Jordan is helped to recover from effects of June, 1967, hostilities, it too can fall. 11. Comment: Governor was struck by dispassionate nature Faisal's presentation. Faisal looked tired, but obviously welcomed opportunity make his views known to new administration through Governor Scranton. Saudis are very pleased about Governor's visit. Eilts [Continue with the next documents] Volume XXI Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State