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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXI Near East Region Department of State |
 301. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State/1/ Jidda, September 7, 1967, 1392Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 SUDAN. Secret; Priority; Exdis. 959. 1. In absence Saqqaf who is on leave in Beirut, Acting Deputy Foreign Min Mas'ud asked me call today. He handed me letter from King Faisal/2/ in Taif to President Johnson. Translation prepared by EmbOff follows (non-essential words omitted): /2/A copy of Faisal's letter was transmitted to the President under cover of a September 9 memorandum from Rostow that reads: "Herewith a letter to you from King Faisal, which reports that the oil will be moving; but is pretty stiff-backed on any relations with Israel. Although it sounds like a stone wall, there is maneuver room for a formula which would include:--an end to belligerence; and--a refugee settlement." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Saudi Arabia--Presidential Correspondence) "His Excellency President Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the United States of America. Dear Mr. President: In light decisions Arab summit conference held in Khartoum, Sudan, between August 29 and September 1, 1967, permit me, Mr. President, to explain my views to Your Excellency in all sincerity, since I firmly desire preservation and strengthening of existing friendship between our two countries, and since Your Excellency has encouraged me to present my views on course of events whenever I find reason to do so and assured me that Your Excellency would give them most serious attention. Arab summit conference issued wise and courageous decisions which as whole indicate how well Kings and Presidents Arab states and their representatives appreciate responsibility placed upon their shoulders with regard their peoples and future their nation following latter's injury at Zionist hands, in defiance decisions of UN and flouting spiritual and humanitarian values proclaimed in its Charter. In reviewing decisions of conference, two important decisions arrest our attention: (1) Resumption flow of oil to all countries of world. (2) Removal effects of aggression: that is, return to situation existing before June 5, 1967. This means it is possible for Arab states study any proposal from which following four points are excluded: Reconciliation with Israel, recognition of her, negotiation with her, or any thing prejudicial to right Palestinian people to their homeland. Mr. President, it was not easy to arrive at this courageous and constructive step in conditions, of which Your Excellency can appreciate the gravity, where a wave of emotional agitation had taken possession of Arab peoples as result open Zionist aggression, after paralysis of UN in reacting to it and punishing its perpetrators, after the silence of the world's conscience in deterring it and doing justice to those who fell victim to it, all of which made leaders of Arab countries unable stand before violent popular current but were obliged conform to it in many of their actions. Permit me to say, Mr. President, that decisions Arab summit conference were highly constructive. Door has been opened for Western camp to reconsider its hardened position, so as enable its friends among Arabs to persuade hot-headed Arab peoples that the West, and those who travel in its orbit, are not standing against them in their dispute with Israel, and in order give leaders Arab countries opportunity proceed to further constructive step toward producing just solution to problem. I can declare to Your Excellency that situation has now become propitious for arriving at prompt and rapid solution acceptable to Arabs, provided four points I set forth above are left aside. But should solution be delayed, pressures will return intensified and permeate the entire Arab world. Then solution would become impracticable and your friends would be unable control feeling of bitterness among Arab peoples toward position of Western camp concerning their cause. Other side would seize upon this as means of confusing thoughts and spreading anarchy. I furthermore consider that it not in interest of United States of America to regard attitude of certain Arab countries toward it as reason stand against Arabs on issue which every Arab considers vital to himself. Question of Yemen was discussed in Khartoum in ancillary meetings between myself and President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Together we arrived at agreement which we believe this time to be final, God willing. In conclusion I send Your Excellency my sincere wishes for health and happiness and for our friends people of United States of America all progress and prosperity. Your friend, Faisal 1 Jumad al-Thuni 1387, corresponding to September 6, 1967." 2. Signed Arabic original will be pouched under cover airgram for White House records./3/ /3/President Johnson's reply, September 25, is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XIX. Eilts
302. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, October 4, 1967, 4:30 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 7 SAUD. Secret. Drafted by Brewer on October 10 and approved in S on October 19. The memorandum is part 2 of 3. The time of the meeting is taken from Rusk's Appointment Book. (Johnson Library) SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS
During a meeting with the Secretary on October 4, the Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister raised the question of the current suspension of American arms shipments to Saudi Arabia. Saqqaf noted that each time there is a serious problem in the Near East, there seems to be an attempt to influence policy through arms procurement matters. The Saudis were coming to feel that there was nothing on which they could depend. Since June 5, all shipments had been stopped, even spares and training. This had caused deep feeling among the officers of the Saudi Army on whom the Government must depend. The Secretary explained that two separate issues had happened to coincide in June which made the problem particularly difficult. Both with respect to the Export-Import Bank and AID legislation, there had been a major revolt in the Senate on the question of arms. A severe struggle was now under way in the Senate-House Conference Committee. This development plus the events of last June had simply made it impossible for us to move on this question. The Secretary said that he hoped the problem would be resolved soon, and added that he would himself do his best to this end. He informed Saqqaf that there had been an opportunity to settle the matter on the basis of limiting arms shipments in the area to Israel alone but that the Administration had rejected this approach. The Secretary hoped that we would soon be in a position to move forward on matters involving purchases and export licenses. Saqqaf assured the Secretary that Saudi policies remained the same. There had been no change in their support for Western positions. He indicated that there had been considerable pressure on Saudi Arabia from other Arabs to recognize Communist China or at least not to vote against Chicom admission to the UN. The Saudis had, however, resolutely refused to change their attitude. The Secretary expressed appreciation for this manifestation of continued Saudi support.
303. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, October 10, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Saudi Arabia, Cables, Vol. II, 4/67-1/69. Secret. A handwritten "L" on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it. SUBJECT /2/See footnote 3, Document 301. In telegram 1356 from Jidda, October 5, Eilts described his 2-hour audience with King Faisal on October 4 to present the President's letter. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR) Since you've now seen King Hussein's somewhat bitter letter, you will also want to be aware of King Faisal's testy reaction to your recent letter. Both reflect Arab feeling that we have let them down and are taking a pro-Israeli line by not pressing Israel to withdraw as we did in 1957. Ambassador Eilts reports that he had about as difficult a session with Faisal as he's ever had when he presented your letter./3/ /3/Eilts said this in telegram 1357 from Jidda, October 5, which commented on his session with Faisal. He noted that the King obviously felt that the United States was either unwilling or unable to understand the problems he and other moderate Arab leaders faced. (Ibid.) Faisal is sensitive about our intimating that the Arabs didn't go far enough at Khartoum. He feels we don't understand the risks Arab leaders are taking by any show of moderation toward Israel. He, like Hussein, clearly sees Israel as the aggressor. He's no longer willing to admit that Arab provocation played a role in bringing on the June war. Significantly, he says he'd be willing to end the "state of belligerency" provided Israel recognized such Arab rights as the refugees' right to go home. He, like Hussein, feels we're asking them to give up their hole card--ending the state of war--in return for Israeli troop withdrawal but not for settlement of their main long-term grievances. (This same theme creeps into Hussein's report that Nasser now links opening the Canal with a refugee settlement.) At the root of Faisal's reaction are 20 years of frustration beginning with the UN resolution creating Israel, which he believes came about only as a result of US pressure. He was at the UN himself in 1948 and speaks from deep personal conviction. Ever since, with the exception of 1956-57, he believes we have leaned toward Israel. He just doesn't believe--no matter how many times we say it--that we can't influence Israel. Jerusalem is his most sensitive spot. As guardian of Islam's holy places, he believes he has a special obligation. Our abstention on the Jerusalem resolutions in July hit him especially hard--as it did most Moslems. Eilts did his best to calm Faisal, but he was clearly upset. He may relax a little when he has time to reflect. Walt
304. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia/1/ Washington, October 24, 1967, 2337Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 19-8 US-SAUD. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Sterner, cleared by Quinn and Sober, and approved by Brewer. Also sent to London. 59213. Subject: US Military Supply Policy for Saudi Arabia. Ref: State 58793./2/ Re para 5 reftel, following is more detailed description of items which will be released for Saudi Arabia: /2/Dated October 24. (Ibid., DEF 19-8 US-NEAR E) 1. Saudi Mobility Program. Vehicles, construction material and other items in connection with SAMP will be released with exception armored personnel carriers, which will be held for time being. 2. Weapons Repair and Maintenance Program. Earlier authorization permitted completion of negotiations for and signing of RAMP Agreement. Implementation all aspects of program may now proceed. 3. Spare parts from commercial and military sources for F-86 and C-130 aircraft will now be released. 4. Release of TACAN (navigational) radar and related equipment is approved to UK for installation in Lightning aircraft. 5. Miscellaneous items from commercial and military sources, including: (a) 10,150 Colt revolvers and ammunition for Saudi police; (b) six cargo trailers; (c) 17 generator sets; (d) 40,000 rounds .50 caliber ammunition; (e) 120 radio sets of various models; (f) seven power supply units; and (g) miscellaneous repair parts. No heavy weapons or heavy weapon ammunition are being released at this time./3/ /3/Telegram 2081 from Jidda, December 10, stated that although the partial lifting of the arms moratorium for Saudi Arabia had temporarily alleviated pressures on the United States, its initially helpful effect was beginning to wear off as the Saudis realized that those items on which they placed the greatest priority were still banned for them--specifically, long-sought Sidewinders; additional F-86 and T-33 aircraft; and 106 mm recoilless rifles. It noted that Saudi requests for these items antedated the June hostilities. Because these cases were looming increasingly large in U.S. relations with the Saudis, the Country Team urged that all possible efforts be made to break the aforementioned items loose from the moratorium list. (Ibid., DEF 19-8 US-SAUD) For London. You may inform FonOff of US action on TACAN radar. Katzenbach
305. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, December 7, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Saudi Arabia--Presidential Correspondence. Secret. SUBJECT We've had reports that King Faisal feels we've been ignoring him in the swirl of negotiations that put the UN representative in the field. He was in New York in 1948 when Israel became independent, and ever since he has deeply felt that we've taken Israel's side. Against that background, he can't understand our present position except as our digging in alongside Israel again. The best we can hope for is to keep reassuring him that we have his concerns in mind and are trying to start an honest negotiation that will give Arab interests a fair hearing. The attached letter tells him we think the November 22 UN resolution/2/ provides a good framework for a fair settlement. /2/For text of UN Security Council Resolution 242, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pp. 616-617. Secretary Rusk has instructed our ambassadors in all the Arab countries to take a similar line with each of the Arab foreign ministers before their meeting this weekend, but Faisal is worth a little extra personal attention. We will shortly be recommending to you a letter to Eshkol urging him also to give the UN representative full cooperation. The attached is for your signature if you approve./3/ /3/See Document 306. Walt
306. Letter From President Johnson to King Faisal/1/ Washington, December 7, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Saudi Arabia--Presidential Correspondence. No classification marking. Your Majesty: Since the unhappy events of last June, I have tried to keep Your Majesty currently informed on the attitude of the United States toward developments in the difficult Near Eastern situation. In this spirit, I would like to share with you my views on the future now that the United Nations Security Council has unanimously adopted its resolution on this complex problem. The extended debates in New York, both in July and for the past two months, have been difficult for us all. None of us has achieved everything desired. We have all had to adjust and modify our views to establish a workable consensus. Throughout the long effort, our own objective has been to work for a resolution with which both sides can in good conscience cooperate. The unanimous adoption of a resolution by the Security Council on November 22 makes clear that we have succeeded in this important initial step. Passage of this resolution embodying an agreed set of principles--including withdrawal, an end to belligerency, and secure and recognized boundaries--and authorizing the Secretary General to designate a Special Representative to help the parties concerned work out solutions is most welcome. But it is only a first step. I recognize that neither our Arab nor Israeli friends are entirely happy with the outcome. We fully understand the concern of both sides on matters which so vitally affect both, and I know how deeply Your Majesty feels on such key issues as Jerusalem, troop withdrawal and a just solution to the refugee problem. But all members of the Security Council have worked diligently to establish a framework for peace in which the legitimate concerns of all parties can be met. We believe that passage of the November 22 resolution has now set in motion a process which provides an excellent opportunity for us all to do what we can to help establish lasting conditions of peace in this long troubled region. I recognize and appreciate the contribution to moderation and stability which the Saudi Government has made in recent weeks under your wise leadership. While Your Majesty's country is not one of the four states most intimately concerned, I have no doubt that Saudi Arabia will continue to take a constructive attitude toward the efforts, now in the hands of Ambassador Jarring, to work out a just and lasting settlement in full agreement with both sides. You may be sure that we will continue to exert our diplomatic and political influence in support of this effort to secure a fair, equitable and dignified settlement so that all in the area can live in peace, security and tranquility. The unanimity of the Council's action gives us all a particular opportunity, which we should not let pass, to try to resolve outstanding problems on a basis mutually acceptable to both sides. I value highly our continuing friendly exchanges on matters of key importance to both our governments. With understanding and good will, I believe that the many difficulties that still lie ahead can be surmounted and conditions of permanent tranquility established which will benefit all the peoples of the Near East. All best personal regards, Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson
307. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/ Washington, December 30, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Saudi Arabia--Presidential Correspondence. Secret; Exclusive Distribution. SUBJECT /2/Attached to the memorandum is Faisal's December 26 letter in which the King stated that he was confident that the United States would not leave the aggressor to reap the fruits of his aggression and that the President would not approve an aggressor's use of his aggression as an illegitimate tool to accomplish ends inconsistent with justice. Faisal said that Saudi Arabia continued to attach great importance to three basic issues which were the key to a solution: 1) the question of Jerusalem; 2) withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Arab territories occupied in June 1967; and 3) providing a just solution to the problem of the refugees. The King expressed confidence that the President would devote close attention to this problem, as the United States was known throughout the free world for its support of right and justice. King Faisal's reply to the President's message of December 7/3/ is enclosed. The Department does not recommend that a reply be sent at this time. While it is apparent that Faisal's views remain solidly aligned with the Arab camp, nevertheless it is worth noting the King's willingness not to interfere in any decisions in the Arab-Israel context taken by any of the Arab states directly concerned. He wished success to the Jarring mission. 3Document 306. Benjamin H. Read/4/ /4/Signed for Read in an unidentified hand. 308. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/ Washington, January 19, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Saunders Files, Saudi Arabia, 1/1/68-1/20/69. Secret. A January 22 covering memorandum from Rostow to Johnson commented: "King Faisal has been helpful in urging Hussein not to turn to the Russians. Keeping our military supply line open to him should help assure him that we are a reliable source of supply and give us a stronger voice in encouraging him to move in constructively behind the British as they pull out of the Persian Gulf." A handwritten notation on the memorandum reads: "President read & put in outbox without comment, so I cleared telegram based on this memo." SUBJECT On the basis of recommendations of the IRG and the SIG, and in line with earlier approvals of selected arms shipments to Saudi Arabia, such as Hawk missiles, I have now authorized the release to that government of the arms listed below. These items are for purchase by the Saudi Government which, in fact, had already paid for those items so indicated before the June arms ban was imposed. I believe that this action is in accord with our general position of continuing gradual relaxation of our arms restrictions affecting the moderate Arab states. It should be helpful in reassuring King Faisal as to our basic intentions as well as demonstrating that another Western-oriented Arab leader, in addition to King Hussain, continues to derive tangible benefit from a policy of close relations with the United States. I believe this demonstration will be particularly useful at a time when the Soviets are manifesting disturbing interest in Yemen and have indicated willingness to meet Jordan's arms needs. The outstanding Saudi purchase requests which I have approved are the following: --60 mortars and 150,000 rounds of ammunition for the National Guard (already paid for by SAG). --100,000 rounds of mortar ammunition, 20 recoilless rifles with 20,000 rounds of ammunition and 40,000 rounds of .50 caliber ammunition--all for the Saudi Army and all already paid for by SAG. --5 armored personnel carriers and 5 tank recovery vehicles for the Saudi Army under the SAMP Mobility Program (also already paid for by SAG). --18 Howitzers which the Saudis paid for in March 1966. --8 F-86 and 8 T-33 trainer aircraft for the fledgling Saudi Air Force. --100 Sidewinder missiles with kits to fit them to the F-86's. In addition to the foregoing, I have approved normal action on more recent Saudi requests to purchase an additional 20,000 rounds of recoilless rifle ammunition and 10-20 American helicopters on which tentative assurances were given to the Saudi Government a year ago./2/ /2/Telegram 102781 to Jidda, January 23, authorized the Ambassador to inform the Saudi Arabian Government at a high level that the U.S. Government had now relaxed its arms ban vis-a-vis Saudi Arabia with respect to items on order or under consideration prior to June 1967. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 19-8 US-SAUD) Dean Rusk 309. Airgram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State/1/ A-301 Jidda, February 11, 1968. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 1 SAUD-US. Confidential. Drafted by Political Officer Robert W. Stookey; cleared by Deputy Chief of Mission Talcott W. Seelye, and in draft by Supervising Economic Officer C. Melvin Sonne, Jr., Public Affairs Officer George R. Thompson, Defense Attache Lieutenant Colonel Robert F. Merino, Consul General Arthur B. Allen in Dhahran, and General J.S. Addington in CHUSMTM; and approved by Ambassador Eilts. Repeated to Aden, Amman, Ankara, Beirut, Dhahran, Kuwait, London, Paris, Rabat, Rawalpindi, Tehran, Tripoli, Tunis, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, COMIDEASTFOR, and USMTM. SUBJECT REF [Here follows a table of contents] Summary U.S.-Saudi relations have been put to a severe test by the Arab-Israel hostilities in June, 1967, and the protracted Near East crisis still persisting. The U.S. and Saudi attitudes on the basic issues involved in the Palestine problem remain irreconcilable. However, patient exposition and explanation of our views, in exchanges at the chief of state level as well as through normal diplomatic channels, have helped to minimize the effect of these differences. Our close cooperation with Saudi Arabia in a variety of fields--military, commercial, economic, cultural and security--has contributed substantially to the maintenance of stability and cordiality in our bilateral relations, and should be continued. However, we cannot take Saudi Arabia for granted should there be a renewal of Arab-Israeli conflict. Developments in adjacent areas of the Arabian Peninsula have created new problems for Saudi policy. The USSR and other radical elements have replaced the UAR in support of the republican faction in Yemen; a left-wing regime has inherited control from the British in South Arabia. U.K. military withdrawal from the Persian Gulf states has become imminent. We should continue to encourage the Saudi leaders to deal with these questions in a statesmanlike manner, avoiding rash adventures of dubious outcome which might react against the security of the Kingdom and its regime. I. Strengthening U.S.-Saudi Bilateral Relations The validity of U.S. policies toward Saudi Arabia during past years was put to a critical test by the June 1967 Arab-Israel hostilities and the continuing Arab-Israeli confrontation. The structure of U.S.-Saudi relations has been severely rocked, but as a result of King Faisal's policy of friendship for the U.S. managed to withstand the strains. It is thus clear that we have generally been on the right track, and that the existing U.S. approach to relations with the country, suitably adapted to changing circumstances, provides a sound, proven base for the future insofar as broader considerations permit us to follow it. The key limiting factor is, obviously, the tangle of issues related to Palestine, on which there is virtually no common ground between the U.S. and Saudi positions. The concept that history does not turn back to correct past injustices is utterly rejected by the Saudis, who can see no acceptable solution other than to return to 1947 and, instead of founding the state of Israel, make of Palestine an independent Arab state in which only the Jewish sabra community is accepted. Any proposal which seeks to deal with the problem in the shape in which it now confronts the world is, in Saudi eyes, an affront to right and justice. (A major factor in King Faisal's refusal to attend the Rabat Arab summit conference proposed for January 17 was his apprehension that he would be associated there with a position compromising Arab rights in Palestine as he sees them.) Saudi emotions on the subject are heightened by the presence in Jerusalem of sites sacred to Islam, particularly the al-Aksa Mosque. Sincerely, whether or not realistically, Faisal considers that his responsibilities as custodian of the Muslim holy places extend to those in Jerusalem, and the fact that these have passed beyond Arab control weighs heavily upon him. The Saudis are unshakably convinced that American policy-makers are obliged, out of concern for the votes of Jewish Americans, to pursue a policy of partiality toward Israel and against the Arabs. While we cannot hope to persuade the Saudis to agree with our views on this issue, there is definite utility in explaining them fully, as we are doing, to the Saudi leadership, particularly as U.S. positions are frequently distorted, misrepresented or deliberately falsified in the region's information media. Patient exposition of our views, pointing out that they flow from general principles which the Saudis can accept (even though they draw different conclusions from them) helps to calm emotions and permit normal discussion and cooperation on other subjects where a meeting of minds is possible. The President's exchange of correspondence with the King on the problem has been helpful. While it has not brought the U.S. and Saudi positions into harmony, it indicates to the King that the U.S. at the highest level respects and values his views, and ensures that he is authoritatively informed of our own. It furthermore affords opportunity to encourage the King to persevere in the moderate orientation of his over-all policy and to exert his influence in this direction in inter-Arab councils. This dialogue at the chief of state level has enhanced the effectiveness of the Ambassador's frequent discussions with the King and his close advisors; it should continue as suitable opportunities present themselves, but not be overdone. In the context of the June crisis both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia felt obliged to take measures damaging to our bilateral relations. The U.S. moratorium on arms shipment to the Near East was of particular concern to the Saudis, who had looked primarily to the U.S. as the source of equipment for their armed forces, and who had substantial quantities of materiel on order and paid for when hostilities broke out. Even though now totally lifted, the impact remains and the Saudis are looking to other sources as alternative military suppliers. The Saudis withstood pressure from the radical Arab states to sever diplomatic relations with the U.S. They felt forced, however, to demonstrate their solidarity with other Arabs by joining in the embargo on oil exports to the U.S. (and U.K.) until it was lifted by action of the Khartoum Summit Conference. While confronted with a considerable segment of public opinion aroused against the U.S., the Saudi leadership endeavored to limit the effect of the crisis on our joint activities. It was on urgent Saudi plea that we decided not to evacuate American dependents from the Kingdom. Whether this Saudi policy could have continued if the June conflict had been protracted is uncertain. We suspect some further retaliatory actions would have had to be taken against us. During the ensuing six months, relations have evolved toward a situation approaching the normal. The Palestine problem, for which no solution is in sight, remains in the foreground, however, and retains its potential for setting off further crises. When these occur we should again try to minimize their harm to our bilateral relations by proceeding normally insofar as feasible with the various projects on which we are cooperating with Saudi Arabia. However, Saudi Arabia cannot be taken for granted and there is undoubtedly deep dissatisfaction with U.S. policies and the King's policy of friendship for the U.S. at grass roots, military, intelligentsia and perhaps even some Saudi "establishment" levels. [Here follow sections II-VIII of the airgram.] IX. Recommendations 1. That we continue to seek to strengthen U.S.-Saudi bilateral relations wherever possible, continuing the present high-level exchange of views, and reiterating where appropriate the expression of our interest in Saudi Arabia's security from unprovoked outside attack. 2. That we continue to urge the King and his advisors to seek a peaceful, negotiated settlement of the civil war in Yemen, and avoid actions tending to intensify or prolong it. 3. That we encourage the Saudi leadership to abstain from embarking on adventurous attempts to overthrow the present government of the People's Republic of Southern Yemen. 4. That we maintain discreet consultation with the Saudi Government concerning arrangements for the security of the Persian Gulf region upon withdrawal of the British, encouraging the Saudis to make a constructive contribution to a viable agreement among Gulf riparian states. 5. That we continue to be responsive to Saudi Government requests for military advice and for a reasonable amount of arms purchases for purposes of defense. 6. That we work to promote expansion of U.S. exports to Saudi Arabia, and continue to encourage the Saudis to manage their reserves in such a way as to ease the U.S. balance of payments deficit. 7. That we respond selectively to requests for assistance in improving the effectiveness of the Saudi internal security forces, without becoming too openly identified with them. 8. That we continue to take opportunity to stress to the King and his advisors the importance of moving more rapidly in social reform, and in satisfying popular aspirations to participation in Saudi Arabia's political affairs. 9. That we continue to schedule regular visits of U.S. Navy vessels to Saudi ports, as a visible indication of U.S. interest in the security of Saudi Arabia. 10. That we explore means whereby scholarship aid for study in the U.S. by a strictly limited number of Saudi students, where a specific U.S. interest would be served. 11. That we keep under review circumstances in which a visit to the U.S. by Prince Fahd bin Abdul Aziz, Second Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior, might be arranged. 12. That we consider arranging for a visit to the U.S. by the Saudi Minister of Commerce and Industry, Shaikh Abid Shaikh. Eilts/2/ /2/Initialed for Eilts in an unidentified hand.
310. Memorandum From the Director of Military Assistance of the Department of Defense (Heinz) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Schwartz)/1/ I-5794/68 Washington, April 29, 1968. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: 72 A 1498, 091.3 Saudi Arabia, 29 April 1968. Confidential. Copies were sent to Director for Operations Joseph J. Wolf in the Department of State's Office of Politico-Military Affairs and Deputy Director of Military Assistance James D. Dunlap in DOD. SUBJECT Over the past three years Congress has questioned with increasing intensity the rationale for a grant program to Saudi Arabia. Basically the concern is not with providing training or a training mission to Saudi Arabia, but why Saudi Arabia should not pay the expenses when they are so rich in oil and can afford to spend large amounts to purchase military equipment as well as to aid Jordan. Each year the grant program has become more difficult to defend. Insofar as student training is concerned, we have used the argument of having more control over the program and being able to select the students. This argument is getting weak, particularly since Saudi Arabia does purchase large amounts of other training. Insofar as support of the USMTM is concerned, we have stated that Saudi Arabia does provide assistance-in-kind of about $1.4 million for the Mission. Congress wonders why they cannot pay it all, and I find it difficult to justify, in view of Saudi Arabia's increasing expenditures and cash assets. The MAP costs of maintaining USMTM will be about $600 thousand in FY 69, and will probably decrease in the future as we reduce the size of the training mission. As MAP is reduced, it will become more and more difficult to justify MAP funds of $600-$800 thousand annually for Saudi Arabia. Therefore I propose that we undertake to have Saudi Arabia pick up all of its student training on a sales basis, and to provide either a cash payment or contributed currency in the amount of MAP costs associated with the support. The Ambassador probably would resist such an effort on the basis that it would disturb the current relationships we have with Saudi Arabia, and that it is hard to explain why the U.S. can't afford this amount. The trouble is that while the U.S. can, MAP can't. My opinion is that we will have to bite this bullet sooner or later, and the sooner we get started the better. Saudi Arabia has freely picked up the tab for training missions in connection with sales contracts. We have a large Army Engineer group there in connection with the vehicle sales program. There are other trainers there supporting the Hawk program. In fact, each sales contract with Saudi Arabia carries with it costs for training. If we start now we should be able, for FY 70, to arrange to have Saudi Arabia pick up all student training costs on a sales basis and to provide contributed currency to offset USMTM costs. I note that Ethiopia provides contributed currency to offset MAAG costs and I see no reason why Saudi Arabia cannot do the same. There should be a way of approaching this diplomatically without rocking the boat. Saudi Arabia has always contributed assistance-in-kind toward the Mission costs, and a new arrangement would require only that they also provide contributed currencies. We would then be in a position to justify USMTM before being forced to do something about it by Congressional action. Request your reaction to this proposal. Luther C. Heinz/2/ /2/Printed from a copy that indicates Heinz signed the original.
311. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, July 1, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Saunders Files, Saudi Arabia, 1/1/68-1/20/69. Secret. SUBJECT Your main reason in seeing Crown Prince Khalid is to reassure King Faisal of our continued friendship. Faisal is disillusioned by what he considers our support for Israel. He fears we have washed our hands of the Middle East. The Crown Prince is less strong than Faisal. But he is intelligent and can talk substance if you get him going. I suggest the following leads: 1. You have the highest respect for King Faisal. You recall with pleasure his visit here. You continue to regard him as one of your best friends in the Middle East. How is he? 2. You know that the King is deeply concerned about Israel's continued occupation of Arab territory. You want him to know that we are doing everything we can to bring about a settlement that the Arabs as well as the Israelis would find honorable. This hasn't been easy, but a fair settlement remains our objective. Would he like to say anything about this? 3. You have just had a good talk with the Shah of Iran and would like to hear about the Shah's recent stopover in Saudi Arabia. You would be interested in anything the Crown Prince has to say about the future of Saudi Arabian relations in the Persian Gulf. 4. You would like to explain your purposes in South Vietnam and at the Paris talks. (The Saudis are interested because they see our steadfastness in Vietnam as a measure of how seriously we'd stick by the security assurances we have given Saudi Arabia over the years.) 5. You hope the Crown Prince has received all the medical help he wished. (He had a routine medical checkup at Bethesda last week.) The Crown Prince had dinner at the White House with President Roosevelt in September 1943 when he was here with then Foreign Minister Faisal as an advisor./2/ One ice-breaker might be to ask him about that or to recall yourself a little bit about President Roosevelt at that time. /2/For documentation on the 1943 visit to the United States of Prince Faisal and Prince Khalid, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. IV, pp. 840-852. The Crown Prince speaks only Arabic. An interpreter, Luke Battle, and his Country Director, will be available. W. W. Rostow/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
312. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, July 2, 1968, 12:03-12:24 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 SAUD. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Brewer, approved in S/S on July 11 and by Saunders at the White House the same day. The meeting was held at the White House, and the times are taken from the President's Daily Diary. (Johnson Library) SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS The President His Royal Highness Crown Prince Khalid Ibn Abdul Aziz Interpreter--Camille Nowfel The President welcomed Crown Prince Khalid, expressed pleasure that he was able to visit the US and asked how long he would be here. Prince Khalid explained that his final tests at the hospital would not be completed until Friday (July 5); so that his onward plans were still uncertain. He had talked the other day by telephone with King Faisal who had particularly asked that his respects be conveyed to the President. On his own behalf, he wanted to express appreciation for all the facilities extended, including the medical checkup at Bethesda. The President offered to arrange for any further help which His Highness might require. The Crown Prince then referred to his first visit to the White House 25 years ago, during President Roosevelt's Administration. The late President had been a great friend of his own father, the late King Abdul Aziz. There had been a meeting of the minds between these two leaders on the Middle East. Perhaps if both had lived longer the situation might have been different. The President said the situation in the area was indeed difficult and he hoped His Highness would be having detailed discussions with Assistant Secretary Battle while here. Mr. Battle confirmed that he would be seeing the Prince separately. The President continued that he was very troubled regarding the Near Eastern situation and had spent a good deal of time going over it with Mr. Battle. He had a high regard for our Saudi friends. We would like to do things which would resolve problems. The difficulty was that what we wanted to do often could not be done because our friends would not be responsive to our suggestions. Prince Khalid replied that King Faisal had the greatest appreciation and respect for the efforts the President had made in this difficult situation. The President remarked that some people believe that major actions are possible simply on the basis of an indication from the US Government. We had found, however, that even our strong indications to both sides had not been enough to bring our friends around. Prince Khalid said he hoped that the President would continue to do what he could to reach a solution. The President confirmed that USG actions would continue to be impartial and fair but one could not control one's friends. Right now he had a difficult problem even in controlling his own grandson. The President said he had strongly urged Premier Eshkol and Foreign Minister Eban not to move last June but they had not heeded this advice. He stressed to His Highness that we had been in no way involved, despite unfounded allegations which had misrepresented our position and our inability to convince Nasser at the time. We had tried to get an immediate ceasefire but the parties had not promptly agreed. Noting that the Saudi Government appreciates the problems which the President has faced, Prince Khalid said it was still the Saudi hope that UN resolutions on the problem could be enforced so that the entire area would not be lost to the radicals, and ultimately to the communists. King Hussein right now was in a predicament involving pressures from his people, from Egypt, from Israel and from the communists. He hoped that the USG under the President's wise leadership would induce Israel to accept the UN resolutions, notably with respect to withdrawal and Jerusalem. The President said that we had endeavored to be helpful. We continued to support the efforts of Ambassador Jarring to bring the two sides together but his success would require the cooperation of both sides. His Highness responded that it would be impossible for any Arab leader to arrange a face to face encounter with Israel. Nasser would like to see Hussein take this step but simply could not do so. The Crown Prince concluded that he did not want to take too much of the President's time but would hope to continue his talks with Mr. Battle. The President asked the Crown Prince to convey his greetings to King Faisal, to assure him of America's continued high esteem for his leadership and to remind him that, while the USG is preoccupied with Viet Nam and other problems, the United States intends to stand by its commitments there as well as our assurances to Saudi Arabia and our other friends. The Crown Prince promised to do so and said that he wanted simply to sound one note of warning: Saudi Arabia feared being surrounded by "communists" from various quarters, north, south, east and west. The President expressed understanding of the Crown Prince's views and thanked him again for his call. On the way back to his hotel, Prince Khalid commented to Ambassador Sowayel on the President's statement that the USG cannot impose its will on other nations by saying: "Perhaps, after all, this is true. Israel has a mind of its own, and it is conceivable that the USG is not able to sway her in any way." Ambassador Sowayel reportedly demurred. [Continue with the next documents] Volume XXI Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |