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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXI Near East Region Department of State |
 291. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State/1/ Jidda, June 9, 1967, 1039Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Algiers, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Dhahran, Kuwait, and London. 5187. 1. In talk with Saqqaf this morning at his home, he was much relaxed. He opined that with today's cease fire acceptances, things should soon return to a type of normalcy. King's position in crisis has been very difficult. Faisal feels deeply about Palestine, but scarcely less so about Nasser and Syrians. King has been trying maintain balanced position. He has sided with Arabs, but avoided cutting his ties with US and UK. Saqqaf expressed appreciation for our cooperation. 2. King received message from Nasser yesterday, written before cease fire, explaining UAR defeat in terms of Israeli surprise attack on Egyptian airfields. As result, most UAR aircraft destroyed. However, "battle" will go on. It important that Arab world united to carry on. Great changes will have to be made in Arab world and Arab leader chosen for this purpose. (Nasser did not specify changes or who leader would be.) Had suggested King Hassan go to US and Boumedienne to Soviet Union to explain Arab cause. Also agreed to holding of Arab summit. Similar Nasser letter apparently sent to all Arab chiefs of state. 3. Saqqaf thought there good chance Nasser is finished. Certainly his prestige as Arab leader down, hopefully for good. Arabs, even Egyptians, recognize he has been all talk. Also Soviet lack of support for Arabs in their hour of need has disillusioned Arabs with USSR. In contrast, Saqqaf believes Faisal's prestige has gone up. Faisal has shown himself to be strong but wise Arab leader. Various Arab countries have urgently asked send delegation consult with Faisal on situation. First, a delegation from Iraq, scheduled arrive Riyadh today. 4. Saqqaf also believes Nasser is at the moment completely rattled and incapable making consistent decisions. He claims that on day following UAR's break of diplomatic relations with US, Nasser advised Hussein to retain diplomatic relations with US. Day later he had sent message to Hussein saying no objection if Jordan accepted cease fire, but UAR would never do so. Next day UAR also accepted cease fire. 5. Saqqaf also said SAG is now sure that there was no US collusion with Israelis in current conflict. So are other Arab states. Even Egyptian leaders aware of this. However, as usual UAR had resorted to "big lie" propaganda techniques which unfortunately have effect on Arab populace. 6. Told him I glad to hear SAG does not believe wild UAR charges. However, despite my three earlier requests to him to curb Saudi radio or at least allow US denials also to be broadcast, Saudi English language radio still as vicious as ever. Saqqaf admitted had forgotten speak to MinInfo Hujailan about this. Undertook do so right away. (Hope he will remember this time.) 7. I then again told him that, in deference King's and his wishes I not evacuating official American dependents. On my urging, American community heads also agreed stand fast. It important, however, that those private Americans who wish go on home leave or for other reasons be allowed do so. Some had reported difficulty in obtaining Saudi exit visas. If American community feels trapped, then pressures get out certain increase. If SAG wishes American community remain here, it in SAG's interest facilitate normal exit visa procedures. 8. Also told him as evidence American community's confidence in SAG and USG willingness to cooperate, Dept has waived general ban on Americans traveling to Middle East to allow certain specific employees needed by American firms working here to leave for Saudi Arabia. I ready recommend Dept continue be helpful in such specific instances, but could only do so if Amcits who wanted to leave be allowed to do so. Saqqaf was appreciative. Said he saw no reason why normal exit visa procedures should not be resumed. I intend follow up on this which is important element keeping American community calm. Eilts
292. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia/1/ Washington, June 9, 1967, 1:38 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL SAUD-US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Battle on June 7, cleared by McGeorge Bundy and Eugene Rostow, and approved by Rusk. 209632. For Ambassador from Secretary. FYI. We are making a major effort through as many channels as possible to convince King Faisal of US hope maintain good relations with him and to prevent possible break in relations between us. Toward this end we have under consideration possibility of Mr. Eugene Black visiting Jidda to see King. He is old friend of the King and of many leading figures in the Middle East. Before we proceed we would like your recommendation with respect to utility such visit. We would not wish to embarrass King by requesting audience for senior American. However, if such visit possible we believe there could be real value in such meeting. Please give us your recommendation as soon as possible./2/ End FYI. /2/In telegram 5205 from Jidda, June 9, Eilts responded that he was confident that the King did not intend to break relations. At that moment, however, Faisal was anxious to avoid being too publicly identified with the United States until the current Near East crisis calmed a bit, and the Ambassador argued that it was in the U.S. interest to respect his wish. Therefore, although he personally would be glad to see Black and was sure the King would hospitably receive him, Eilts saw no need for such a visit at that time and recommended that he not come. (Ibid.) Rusk
293. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia/1/ Washington, June 10, 1967, 4:20 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Brewer, cleared by Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Political Affairs William H. Gleysteen and Davies, and approved by Battle. Repeated to Dhahran, Kuwait, and USUN. 210102. 1. SAG Amb Soweyal called on Asst Secy Battle 12:45 pm June 10 without instructions to urge USG publicly oppose Israeli military operations. Battle noted Syro-Israeli cease-fire just agreed and UNTSO reps in process fixing cease-fire line. We hoped it would be honored. We had done all we could to prevent fighting and charges of USG military involvement totally false. Public invitation had been extended UN send investigators to 6th Fleet to ascertain true facts for themselves. 2. Soweyal asked re press reports Nasser-Husayn telecon on subject alleged USG military involvement. Battle commented papers indicated there had been tape of conversation but refused be drawn out. 3. Soweyal than said he calling as friend to make clear time had come for USG to speak out in censure of Israeli military activities. We should not continue leave initiative to USSR on this issue. Soviets had urged Israeli withdrawal in Security Council but USG had not. Friendly Arab leadership might know our true stand but emotional Arab mobs did not. To support friendly leadership such as King Faysal, USG had to make its position clear on public record. Arabs were already contrasting Soviet position favorably with that of USG, despite Moscow failure give them fullest support. Leadership in friendly Arab countries could not control emotional mobs without public manifestation acceptable USG position. We should condemn Israeli action and call for withdrawal forces. Mention longer-term issues, such as need for peaceful settlement, should for moment be avoided to let present passions cool. Battle assured Soweyal USG interest in integrity all NE countries, noting this position publicly reaffirmed in Security Council June 9. He promised give careful consideration Soweyal's views and report them immediately to his superiors. We had all been gratified with SAG private recognition allegations against USG were false, and would do all we could in months ahead to strengthen USG-SAG ties. We had had no part in the fighting and were using every possible means to get this fact across to Arab peoples. Rusk
294. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, June 13, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Cables, Vol. V. Secret. A handwritten "L" on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it. SUBJECT /2/A copy of telegram 5272 from Jidda, June 12, which transmitted an English translation of King Faisal's reply to the President's letter of June 8 is attached to the memorandum. Telegram 5272 is filed in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL SAUD-US. /3/Document 290. Faisal reiterates his desire to continue your close personal relationship and urges us to be even-handed in picking up the pieces of the Mid-East war. He has no doubt that the Israelis committed aggression and asks you to help make sure that they don't gain territorially. I pass this on only because it is typical of the strong pressures we are getting from our Arab friends to say that our support for the territorial integrity of all the states in the area means pulling the Israelis back behind the 1949 Armistice lines and not forcing a peace settlement. Mac Bundy has seen, and we will have recommendations for you soon. Walt
295. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State/1/ Jidda, June 13, 1967, 1340Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 17 US-SAUD. Confidential. Repeated to Dhahran, London, DOD, CHUSMTM Dhahran, CINCSTRIKE/MEAFSA, and Rabat. 5305. 1. Thus far SAG has stood up admirably to Arab pressures sever relations with US. We have had private (but official level) assurances that King does not intend do so. But we should not take Saudi position for granted. Much will depend on USG actions these next few weeks indicating continued US concern for Arab interests. In Saudi Arabia, as elsewhere in Arab world, our prestige and influence have suffered as result of recent hostilities and belief is widespread that stunning Israeli victory somehow attributable to US. It behooves us urgently to do what we can to arrest adverse trend and begin difficult climb try to regain broader Saudi confidence. For this purpose various US actions desirable, viz: 2. Continue strictly even-handed policy on conflicting Arab-Israel claims. While some rationalization of some Arab-Israel boundaries may be justified and ultimately necessary, emphasis should be on credibility USG assurances at highest levels re political independence and territorial integrity Arab states as well as Israel. Rightly or wrongly, some of our statements have been viewed as equivocation here and as unwillingness to speak up forcefully to criticize Israel. Anything we could do to show that even-handedness applies censuring Israel as well as Arabs, where this justified, will be helpful here. 3. Continue USG programs of support for SAG in military and other spheres. Specifically, continue Corps Engrs cooperation on TV, military cantonment and SAMP programs. Also willingness proceed with RAMP if Saudi wish. Especially helpful would be early release of long expected Sidewinders for F-86 aircraft. Equally important continue USMTM advisory effort. This is a somewhat delicate subject since at moment most USMTM activities in limbo. We should discreetly be there ready to continue help Saudi military as wanted, yet for the moment not seek to push ourselves on reluctant Saudi military recipients. We have [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] reports indicating many Saudi officers severely critical of US, along with others, for Arab debacle and we will doubtless face difficult job reestablishing rapport with them. It will take patience and understanding on part of all USMTM officers and men./2/ Desalination project should continue. /2/Telegram 5260 from Jidda, June 12, reported Prince Sultan's assurances that the men, women, and children of USMTM would be looked after like he would look after his own family, and that the Saudi Government would provide full compensation for all losses. Sultan had also said that the soldiers and civilians who had participated in the rioting and looting were now in jail and would be punished severely. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR) 4. Urge American firms continue do business here as usual, facilitate return to Saudi Arabia of their absent employees, and proceed with existing programs. Most heads of American firms have expressed willingness do so. We have done utmost keep American citizens calm during crisis and ensure adequate protection for them. It has not been easy for American citizens. However, generally speaking, they have cooperated splendidly. Barring renewed breakdown Saudi security situation, we hope this may continue. 5. Early initiation of widely publicized program of relief for Jordan. King and SAG have focused on this point. Any such action on our part would be consistent with SAG's activities. Admittedly we will receive only minimal credit for any such program and many Saudis (and other Arabs) will argue it represents blood money. Still such program would show our concern for Jordan's welfare. 6. Continue to hammer away at denials of UAR and other Arab accusations of US collusion with Israel in recent conflict. Unfortunately as result years of radio Cairo "conditioning" many Arabs want to believe worst of us, but it is essential that we actively refute all charges. All such refutations should be given fullest and continuing publicity in Arabic using VOA and perhaps BBC assistance. We were slow in starting our denials last week, which made problem more difficult. Would also recommend that in addition to US invitation send UN observers to Sixth Fleet, a request to do so might carry some impact here. Job of disseminating our denials exptremely difficult. We are having great difficulty getting USIS material published these days, hence much will depend on outside broadcasts. 7. Avoid placing King Faisal in position these next few days or weeks where he required show excessive public identification with US. However, where possible, look for ways of showing that his past policy of friendship toward US pays off, not only for Saudi Arabia but for other Arabs. It is distinctly in our interest at present time to push Faisal and other Arab moderates' causes in Arab community. 8. Continuously and quietly appeal to Saudi self-interest, this must largely be done here, but occasional helpful support may be given from outside. 9. At appropriate time resume encouraging King on need for reform program. In current Saudi mood of frustration over Arab military defense, growing sentiment appears be developing among young Saudis that an accelerated political and social reform is needed. Ironically, it also painfully evident during recent crisis that only reliable elements loyal to SAG and willing protect Americans were not young, would-be Saudi reformers, Saudi military officers or potential Saudi progressives, but National Guards comprised of strictly tribal types. King and Saudi establishment doubtless keenly aware of this and likely be more reluctant than ever move ahead. 10. Seek to be actively responsive these next few weeks to any emergent Saudi requests for help, e.g., police training, educational advisors, etc. we should try in all such instances minimize our administrative red tape and show we ready to move without delay. Eilts
296. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia/1/ Washington, June 21, 1967, 8:36 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15-1 SAUD. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Brewer, cleared by Davies and McGeorge Bundy, and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to USUN. 214082. Jidda 5496./2/ /2/In telegram 5496 from Jidda, June 21, Eilts reported that he was seeing Faisal the next day and asked if there were any special instructions. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR) 1. In addition general guidance you have re current US posture in Near East crisis (e.g. State 212576),/3/ you authorized make following points when you see King Faisal June 22: /3/Dated June 19. (Ibid.) a. The President deeply appreciates His Majesty's thoughtful letter of June 12 which was most timely in connection with continuing problems growing out of recent Arab-Israel hostilities to which he is devoting so much of his attention. Views expressed are being given careful consideration. b. As indicated in President's June 19 address,/4/ USG feels strongly situation cannot merely be permitted return to unsatisfactory state which prevailed before fighting began. We recognize that troops must be withdrawn but believe other steps must also be taken to assure that territorial integrity and political independence of all states of the Near East receive greater recognition than heretofore. /4/For text of the President's speech, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967, Book I, pp. 630-634. c. In this connection, you may wish to remind His Majesty that USG has at various times supported territorial integrity one or another Arab state against one of its Arab brethren. Our position on this question has been of longstanding and without discrimination as between Israel and the Arabs. His Majesty will recall in this connection special efforts we made in 1957 in connection resolution Suez crisis. d. At the same time, Arabs should be under no misapprehension as to degree of influence which we able exercise over Israel. Fact of the matter is that all parties will have to approach current problems in spirit of some give and take to permit any significant progress on solving outstanding issues. e. Highest levels USG deeply gratified by His Majesty's forthright statements to members diplomatic corps in Jidda June 19 as reported your 5467./5/ Faisal's obvious disbelief of totally false charges which have been directed against us, alleging USG complicity with Israel in recent fighting, is most heartening. His Majesty's courage and frankness in denouncing this canard should be most helpful in introducing greater note realism into assessment recent events. /5/Dated June 20. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15-1 SAUD) f. We continue to be gratified at maintenance of cordial SAG-USG relations and hope that by keeping in close contact during coming difficult period it will be possible make real contribution to resolution some of present difficulties. 2. If conversation permits, you may wish raise Yemen problem in effort determine Faisal's current thinking. There have been indications Lebanese and possibly Tunisian contacts with view working out some compromise between Egyptians and Saudis but we unclear to what extent these may have factual basis. This connection, we endorse line you took with Iranian Ambassador (Jidda 5319),/6/ counseling restraint on use force to expedite Egyptian withdrawal as long as it appears such action likely prompt brutal UAR military response on Saudi Arabia. Suggest you ask him how he sees Yemen problem affected by recent Arab-Israel developments. /6/Dated June 14. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR) 3. Should South Arabia come up, you should also probe King's current views re outlook for peaceful transfer power there in light recent Egyptian military reverses in Sinai. For our part, we continue to be disturbed by deteriorating security situation. Recent British decision extend additional support to present government should be most helpful, but in our view the outlook still highly uncertain. Katzenbach
297. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State/1/ Jidda, June 23, 1967, 1528Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to USUN. 5517. 1. I met with King Faisal for two hours last night. Also present were Crown Prince Khalid, Dr. Rashad Pharaon and Acting Deputy FonMin Masaud. Prior going in, Rashad sent word to me not to mention separate West Bank entity as he had previously suggested (Jidda's 5495)./2/ I had not planned to do so but as talk developed, reason for Rashad's request obvious. King wished focus on present, not future. Faisal looked fit. For first hour or so he spoke vigorously; thereafter he largely rehashed previous comments. While essentially critical some potentially helpful procedural suggestions emerged. /2/Dated June 21. (Ibid.) 2. After congratulating Faisal on his successful state visits to UK and Belgium, I spoke of President's deep appreciation for King's letter of June 12. I assured him that HM's views as expressed therein are being carefully studied by President who is devoting much of his time to Near East problem. I noted President's address of June 19 emphasized continued USG desire act evenhandedly in present Near East crisis. USG has no blueprint that it is seeking impose on area. As President's speech pointed out, USG trying to find some way in which parties themselves can constructively approach their own problems. Future of NE area largely for them to decide. Hopefully, this may lead to a permanent peace. USG would like to have views of both Arabs and Israelis how best to move in this direction. We particularly welcome Faisal's thoughts on future of area. We also most appreciative of strong stand he has taken to resist Arab pressures to break relations. 3. Before I could proceed with script sent State 214082,/3/ Faisal did what for him is extraordinary. He broke into presentation. Said he wished President had accepted friendly advice set forth in his letter of June 12/4/ on condemning "Israeli aggression." Not only is such condemnation justified, but forthright USG action along these lines would help America's friends in NE area. He complained that "policy planners" in USG do not seem to comprehend what he called "mob psychology" that prevails throughout Arab world. "You are dealing with irrational people," he stated. "This should always be borne in mind in developing tactics. Those of us who are trying to stand up for you are being let down. Your actions at UN are intensifying pressures on me and other moderate Arab leaders." He expressed appreciation for UK FonSec Brown's statement of yesterday re war not leading to territorial aggrandizement. That kind of a statement helpful. Why cannot USG take similar helpful approach? USG speaks of evenhandedness and such no doubt its purpose. To the Arab public, i.e. those "crazy people" (to whom he kept referring), it comes through totally differently. USG putting him in bad spot. There is nothing in US public pronouncements to which he can point at Arab summit or elsewhere to show genuine USG concern for Arab interests. He pleaded for some statement which would be helpful to him and other moderate Arab leaders in resisting pressure of Arab extremists and Arab public. Soviets are rapidly gaining ground throughout area simply by stating "truth," namely that Israel started aggression. Like USG Soviets also seem to want some kind of durable peace, but their tactics calculated pander to Arab public opinion and to their advantage. In contrast, USG tactics working against USG and against interests its friends. /3/Document 296. /4/See footnote 2, Document 294. 4. I told Faisal USG has made no judgment who started hostilities. We had no foreknowledge war would begin. Reports conflict on who started shooting. In any case, UAR actions in days preceding June 5 expelling UNEF, deploying massive forces to border, closing Gulf of Aqaba and bellicose radio Cairo statements equally responsible for outbreak of hostilities. I emphasized USG is seeking to avoid past recriminations and wants to look to future. This is only truly constructive way to proceed. 5. Here Faisal again broke in. He insisted there no question whatsoever that Israelis had moved first. Hence, whatever provocation may have existed, they deserve to be indicted for beginning hostilities. Apart from evidence of mass destruction UAR aircraft through surprise assault, Faisal claimed Israeli Government spokesmen have publicly admitted that Israel preempted conflict. Radio KOL Israel has broadcast statements of Israeli officers boasting how they had moved first, SYG U Thant has stated Israelis started shooting, President de Gaulle has done so, etc. Why should USG try to obscure this. He not asking USG fabricate anything. He simply asking that USG take Israel's own public statements that they started shooting and censure party which first resorted to force. 6. He readily admitted that UAR actions prior to June 5 had been provocative and as such were a significant contributory cause. He suggested that in any statement, resolution or otherwise this UAR culpability also be cited along with "Israeli aggression." This would be consistent with US policy of even-handedness. "I am not trying to defend Nasser," he insisted, "all I ask is that USG give me something to work with in forthrightly condemning what USG must also know." He rejected argument that inclusion of blanket condemnations will focus UN debate on past rather than on more important aspect of viable future arrangements. He pointed out course of current debate in UNGA is already focusing mainly on issue of who started shooting. 7. With some agitation, Faisal repeated that he unable go to Arab summit and defend USG position without something saleable to Arab public. He said he is trying to get the Arab summit postponed as long as possible in the hope that some helpful USG statement may yet develop. Without this he will be in intolerable position at such summit. What, he asked rhetorically, could he point to if an Arab summit were held today. "Nothing," he answered. 8. I insisted this not so. He had more arguments in his arsenal than he was admitting. Quite apart from Saudi self interest, there much he able point to as tangible evidence long standing USG concern for Arabs. For example, I reminded him of President's reference in June 19 speech that troops must be withdrawn and associating this with recognized rights of national life, political independence and territorial integrity of all states. To my astonishment, Faisal responded President had said nothing about troop withdrawal. After a brief "yes-no" debate, Rashad brought out both the English and Arabic texts of the President's speech. I was able point out to King President's pertinent statement. Faisal clearly puzzled and claimed it was news to him. (Khalid seemed to know about it.) I expressed surprise and recalled King had himself talked of the President's endorsement of withdrawal just a few days earlier at the Diplomatic Corps reception (Jidda's 5467)./5/ I had wondered at the time how he had gotten his information so quickly just a few minutes after the speech had ended and before I had any text. Faisal grinned broadly and said, "I made it up. I had to have something to defend myself." He explained that immediately prior to going to that reception his radio monitors had given him President's five principles of peace. He had decided that he should interpret political independence and territorial integrity as withdrawal. We had good laugh over this one, but I took occasion emphasize to him that President had indeed spoken of withdrawal. Moreover, Faisal had found this point useful at diplomatic conclave. What was more, his personal interpretation of the President' remarks showed how much he and the President understood each other. Surely this mutual understanding should convince him as much as anything that I might say that the President is genuinely concerned with the interests of the Arabs and their future. He conceded this so. But he insisted his personal confidence in the President is of little help in dealing with Arab public reaction to USG posture at UN. In any case, he added as an afterthought, what does statement mean withdraw 10 kilometers or so? Or does it mean that Arab troops should be withdrawn? In the absence of some indication as to what it means, he did not see how he could make much use of general reference to withdrawal. /5/Dated June 20. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15-1 SAUD) 9. I repeated that the President's withdrawal statement was linked to political independence and territorial integrity of all states of area. Ultimately all troops should withdraw from frontiers. Such is vital ingredient any durable peace. For this purpose Israel, just as much as the Arab states, must be taken into account. Arab states should be under no misapprehension re degree of influence which USG able to exercise over Israel. Notwithstanding, I wanted him to know in confidence that we have been in close touch with Israelis since crisis began. As result of these contacts, we believe that Israel is more interested in peaceful settlement than in territorial aggrandizement (SecState 212295/6/ and 212330/7/). This seemed to be a further reason to think of some viable peace settlement. He listened with interest. He then stated that, in addition his earlier point of public condemnation Israeli aggression, some public USG endorsement of the principle that Israel should withdraw to the GAA frontiers is essential. He dismissed the contention that the USG unable pressure Israel to withdraw. "If you want to do so", he said "you can." I emphasized that, whether he believed it or not, our influence with Israel is limited. It can only be constructively exerted if Arabs, on their part, show some genuine interest in durable peace. /6/Dated June 17. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR) /7/Dated June 19. (Ibid.) 10. I asked that our talk get away from exclusive focus on past and that we discuss future. We anxious have his thoughts on that all-important aspect of problem. Faisal said he not able speak for all the Arabs. Speaking for Saudi Arabia alone, he wished USG to know that SAG will (a) never make peace with Israel, (b) never recognize Israel, (c) never accept new Israeli territorial aggrandizement by force of arms, but also (d) never attack Israel. As for any broader Arab interest in a future settlement, this will have to be discussed and decided at Arab summit. That was why he did not wish to talk about future. His immediate and pressing concern is present, i.e. creating an optimum atmosphere for that summit. The extremist Arab states will seek to use Arab summit to achieve their ends. They will attempt to whip up anti-American public sentiment for this purpose. Unless the USG takes a public posture, which will help the Arab moderates to resist these pressures, he could not predict what outcome might be. It might not be good for us or for him. Again, he asked rhetorically, what can I say at an Arab summit to defend your position and mine? 11. I responded that, in addition to withdrawal statement of President, Faisal might attack the "big lie" tactic which UAR, Syria and others have so blatantly used these past few weeks to conceal their own blunders. He wanted to know how? I reminded him that one recent UAR "big lie" against Saudi Arabia involved charge that American airbase exists at Dhahran. I had myself heard him tell UAR Ambassador to go to Dhahran and see for himself. Similarly, USG has invited UN or other impartial investigators to check logbooks, etc., of carriers, but no one has taken up invitation. They have not done so because UAR and others know their charges are utterly false. Why not take leaf from his own book by reminding Arab leaders who make such charges that they are free to accept USG invitation. 12. Additionally, Faisal able use numerous examples of USG support over the years for territorial integrity of all Arab states against other Arab states as well as Israel. As he aware, Saudi Arabia has benefited from this. So has UAR which might well recall USG efforts of 1956-57 in connection with resolution of Suez crisis. Faisal conceded these points of use, but insisted they not enough. 13. He recapitulated that what he and other Arab moderates need is (a) some public USG condemnation of "Israeli aggression" even if coupled with parallel condemnation of UAR (or other) contributory action, (b) some public USG endorsement that Israel should return to GAA frontiers. He did not want USG to assume the role of policeman in the area or anything of that sort. However, in making these two points, USG might further its aim of working for durable peace by adding to these provisos any conditions, proposals, or anything else" which it thinks might be helpful. All of these items could be concurrently discussed, if necessary, by a UN representative or any other acceptable mediator. However, to defend his own position of friendship to US he needs some public US recognition of above two fundamental aspects of the problem. Without such recognition, neither he nor other Arab moderates can be sure they able contain situation. He hoped USG would take his observations as an old friend who had many times fought US battle in Arab counsels, but now needs some "positive USG support" if he is to resist major onslaught of Soviets and Arab extremists on Western and moderate Arab positions. He could say that USG had too long disregarded his many warnings, but did not wish to cast blame. He simply looking to present out of which future must flow. He explained that as an Arab he could never accept Israel. However he was trying put himself in our shoes in search some mutually acceptable approach. He agreed our two governments should keep in close touch on this matter. 14. Comment: Faisal visibly agitated about USG posture. He feels we are deliberately seeking to avoid censuring Israel. He considers it both necessary and right that we do so, but has no objection coupling this with related censure of UAR deployment of troops, Syrian terrorism, etc. He also considers that some public USG endorsement of return to GAA frontiers necessary. As seen from here, his position is not unreasonable. His idea of linking such public pronouncements with recommended proposals for future settlement is intriguing. It deserves careful study. He and other Arab moderate leaders have a very real domestic public relations problem which should not be ignored. While Faisal certainly overstated his alleged lack of ammunition for use at an Arab summit (no doubt for our benefit) he could use sharper weapons. Our reading of Saudi public opinion indicates that US tactics at UNGA continue to be totally misunderstood here and have won US few supporters. Eilts
298. Memorandum for the Special Committee/1/ Washington, July 11, 1967. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 72 A 2468, Saudi Arabia 400, 11 Jul. 1967. Secret. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates the Secretary of Defense saw it on July 13. SUBJECT /2/After the Six-Day War began, the U.S. Government stopped all aid shipments to countries that broke relations with the United States. For Middle Eastern countries that did not break relations, it let the arms pipeline continue to flow but blocked any new approvals. On 30 June the President approved the following actions as described in the memo of 21 June from the Control Group to the Special Committee: 1. The $15 million sale of 4 C-130 aircraft to Saudi Arabia. 2. The $9.9 million program for weapons maintenance and repair in Saudi Arabia./3/ /3/In a July 8 action memorandum for the NSC Special Committee, the Control Group recommended: (1) resumption of the $120 million Saudi Mobility Modernization program under the September 1965 sales agreement; (2) issuance of a Munitions Control export license for commercial sale of 10,000 pistols, holsters, and ammunition for the Saudi police; and (3) shipment of F-86 spares to Saudi Arabia under the $500,000 cash sale agreement of May 11, 1967. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Committee, Control Group Meetings, Minutes) 3. The negotiation and programming of the $14 million arms credit arranged between the President and King Hassan. McGeorge Bundy
299. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia/1/ Washington, August 4, 1967, 2232Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Noforn. Drafted by Brewer, cleared by Deputy Director of the Office of Fuels and Energy in the Bureau of Economic Affairs James E. Akins and David L. Gamon (NEA/ARN), and approved by Battle. Repeated to Dhahran and Beirut. 16312. Jidda 274 (Notal)./2/ /2/Dated July 22. (Ibid.) 1. Aramco representative here in brief talk with DeptOff August 4 characterized MinPet Yamani meeting New York area August 1 with Aramco parents/3/ as "devoted oil, not politics". Yamani apparently did reiterate in plain terms his view that USG has lost much ground in Arab world which will take considerable time recover. However, most of discussion devoted oil problems/4/ which representative promised go over with DeptOff on basis written record meeting when this received from New York. /3/Telegram 163 from Jidda, July 13, reported tentative plans for Yamani to meet with Aramco board members in the New York area July 24 or 25. (Ibid.) /4/Most oil-producing nations in the Middle East, including Saudi Arabia, had embargoed oil shipments to the United States and the United Kingdom immediately following the Six-Day War. Telegram 163 stated that Aramco had informed Yamani that the estimated loss of revenue to the Saudi Arabian Government from continuation of the embargo on oil exports to the United States and the United Kingdom would be $9 million per month; from continued stoppage of the Tapline, $1.5 million per month. Aramco had also pointed out that even after the Saudi embargo was lifted, it might take some time before normal contracts could be resumed. 2. Re Tapline, Aramco rep said line still closed despite activation IPC line for all exports except US, UK and GFR. Speculated one reason Saudi go-slow policy may be SAG desire make clear it "doing more" for Arab cause. Chief reason, however, is no doubt Yamani interest in what would amount to "bonus" for permitting resumption Tapline operations. Representative indicated Aramco parents had manifested no receptivity to Yamani discussion this point. 3. So far there seems have been no publicity Aramco/Yamani meeting which all parties continuing handle on most discreet basis. Rusk
300. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State/1/ Jidda, August 27, 1967, 1230Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret. 781. 1. I met with King Faisal for two hours Aug 26. Rashad Pharaon and Acting DepFonMin Mas'ud also present. Explained that following Essga and Khartoum meetings, I thought it might be useful have further exchange views on Middle East situation and where we go from here. In particular, with his departure next few days for Arab summit, I wanted be sure he understood fully USG position. I had earlier discussed this on number of occasions with Dr. Rashad, Saqqaf and Mas'ud and was confident they had conveyed substance our talks to H.M. Nevertheless some questions might remain and I would be happy attempt to answer them. 2. Drawing on SecState 14226/2/ and 19843/3/ I then recapitulated USG views. Recalled President's June 19 speech which had been drafted in knowledge Faisal's much appreciated letter of June 12. While USG has not attempted suggest specific details any settlement, five principles contained therein remain basic guidelines which USG believes essential for durable peace. Speech had noted Israeli troops must be withdrawn. Such withdrawal remains integral part principle of policy independence and territorial integrity to which both USG and SAG subscribe. /2/Telegram 14226 to Jidda, July 29, instructed Eilts to assure Faisal that the U.S. Government had in mind his comments regarding the need for it to adopt a public position to which Faisal could point at the Arab summit or elsewhere to show genuine U.S. concern for Arab interests. Nor had it ignored his procedural suggestions of June 23. As Faisal was aware, the United States had repeatedly stressed the need for Israeli withdrawal linked to the end of belligerency. However, withdrawal was hardly feasible when one party insisted it was still at war and refused to accept the right of the other party to exist as a state. The Department also instructed Eilts to assure Faisal that the U.S. Government fully recognized the current threat to Arab moderates from irresponsible Soviet actions and heedless radical Arab moves. (Ibid.) /3/Dated August 12. (Ibid.) I explained Faisal's procedural suggestions of June 23 had been carefully considered as are all of Faisal's views. It had not been possible follow these since (a) situation too fast-moving in Essga and (b) as I had earlier told him, USG does not believe simple public condemnation of Israel, UAR and others involved in recent conflict would really help achieve Israeli withdrawal. As Essga debates had shown, crux of issue is to find some mutually acceptable formula for durable peace. We had made clear during debates that, in our view, Israeli withdrawal should be linked with Arab renunciation of rights of belligerency. Notwithstanding their cynical public comments, even Soviets had in final days Essga joined US in espousing similar concept as evidenced by US-Soviet draft resolution which Soviets had unsuccessfully attempted sell to Arabs. My understanding UAR and Iraq had privately indicated agreement, but Algerian and Syrian adamance had aborted project. USG continues believe that such linkage formula offers only meaningful prospects proceed toward just and equitable peace. USG cannot dictate to Israel any more so than it can to Saudi Arabia or any ME state. We can use such influence as we have to help achieve a settlement and are ready to do so, but initiative must in first instance come from parties directly concerned and must be based on realism. 3. USG fully appreciates Arab no less than Israeli feelings. It does not want settlement that will humiliate Arab states or require them give up any legitimate rights or interests. However, Arabs can hardly claim rights of belligerency for themselves and object if Israel exercises same claims reciprocally. Abandonment Arab rights of belligerency would not necessarily entail formal recognition of Israel or formal peace treaty, although these obviously desirable in long run. I thought we ought to be clear, however, that renunciation of rights of belligerency should include inter alia rights of passage in both Straits of Tiran/Gulf of Aqaba and Suez Canal. Also implicit in any state of peace is some agreement on boundaries. Our support for US-Soviet draft resolution based on understanding it would be so interpreted (SecState 27525)./4/ I said USG encouraged by apparent tone of realism at Khartoum and Baghdad meetings which we attributed to statesmanlike attitude of Arab moderate participants such as Saudi Arabia. With FonMins session now reconvened and Arab summit imminent, we hope Arab moderates will continue exercise constructive influence so that some means may be found to move ahead on resolving problem before respective positions rigidify still more. /4/Not found. 4. Faisal listened attentively. After I had concluded, he immediately picked up reference to boundaries and wanted to know what boundaries would need to be agreed upon. Were we talking of areas overrun by Israel? I reminded him that USG wants Israeli withdrawal, but said precise boundaries would obviously have to be agreed upon by parties directly involved. He nodded but did not pursue point. 5. He then said wished to make some general observations: He could not speak for all Arab leaders who will first have to meet at Khartoum and discuss situation. Speaking for himself, he saw two difficulties, first, Arabs have not yet shared fully and frankly with each other their views on how problem should be handled. His recent talks with King Hussein, PriMin Mahjoub and President Arif had once again showed this. They had identified problem, but had been chary on suggesting solutions. Second, quite apart from views of individual Arab leaders, they have to take into account fact that people in street, farmers and tribesmen in every Arab country unanimously regard Israel as threat that has to be eliminated. Referring to my comment that USG cannot dictate Israeli policy, he agreed but noted that all Arabs firmly believe USG is responsible for Israel's existence and development and can, if it wishes, exercise sufficient pressure to require Israel accept an equitable settlement. When I demurred, Faisal said did not want to rehash past history as immediate question is where do we go from here. Arab public sentiment about Israel limits scope of action for any Arab leader. For this reason, every Arab leader reluctant take initiative urge settlement based on renunciation of rights of belligerency and everything latter entails. 6. Given this domestic sensitivity which Arab leaders must take into account, Faisal felt Arab moderates are limited in what they can say or do. They, and particularly he, already under strong attack from Arab extremists for failing to react strongly enough to situation. Even many Saudis criticizing him on this score. In his view, therefore, question of solution should in first instance be decided by those Arab states who were directly involved in the conflict, specifically, UAR, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. USG should work on them. If they agree, other Arab states will go along. I reminded him that USG has no relations with UAR and Syria, but recalled that UAR had privately acquiesced in US-Soviet draft resolution. This was hopeful sign. Lebanon had hardly been directly involved in conflict, but I knew USG also urging GOL use its influence for moderation. I did not see how anything but obstruction could be expected from present Syrian Govt. However, having often heard King's views on Baath govt in Syria, I hardly thought he would want to be guided by Syrian views. He laughed and agreed. This left Jordan with whom USG is discussing problem along similar lines. 7. Faisal noted that King Hussein badly wants some settlement. Hussein had told him of his talks with President and USG officials and of his earlier desire that USG "mediate" between Jordan and Israel. He recalled Nasser had told Hussein UAR recognizes Jordan's need try to make some settlement and that USG could help him. Faisal said he cautioned Hussein latter should not go it alone. Nasser's advice might be sincere, but no one could be sure. He referred to his earlier statement that first Arab leader who moves toward bilateral settlement with Israel, even if arranged through UN, could find himself in serious domestic difficulties. Jordan and UAR, with widest possible Arab approval (which might leave out Syria and Algeria), should do it together or at least concurrently along parallel lines. 8. Continuing on subject of Jordan, Faisal said Rashad has passed on my message that US economic aid to GOJ is continuing. They very good and very necessary. However, Hussein also urgently needs military aid. I noted all arms sales and grants to Middle East area now under review. Both Congress and Executive Branch concerned over ME arms race. President had mentioned need for ME arms control and registration. USG has never been major arms supplier in ME. Current Congressional debate re arms question will affect what USG able do in future about matter of arms shipments and it not possible now give clear answer. I could assure Faisal, however, that USG aware of Jordan's problems and deeply interested in King Hussein (SecState 27534)./5/ Faisal said hoped it might be explained to Congress that Hussein needs resupply of arms, perhaps for his very survival. If he does not get them from USG and soon, Faisal expressed concern that Hussein might turn to Soviets who have offered arms. I suggested King should exercise restraining influence on Hussein in this regard, at least until the picture somewhat clearer. I also suggested SAG should assist Hussein in this matter. Faisal claimed SAG doing so, but its capability provide military aid severely limited. /5/Dated August 26. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 SUDAN) 9. Speaking of forthcoming Arab summit, Faisal said USG knows his moderate views. He will do what he can at Khartoum Conference. He reiterated that USG posture does not make it any easier for Arab moderates. He hoped moderation will prevail at Khartoum, but could not be sure. Much will depend on how Israel acts. Its refusal extend deadline for returning West Bankers had been most unhelpful. I pointed out USG has publicly urged that deadline be extended. Faisal said "you must do more than urge, you must insist." I said was sure USG doing everything feasible, but Arab leaders should use their influence that returning East Bankers act as law abiding citizens. Otherwise, Israelis have no choice but take disciplinary measures similar to those which Faisal had himself taken against Yemeni saboteurs. 10. I then mentioned briefly oil embargo and adverse effects its continuation will have on Arab states. Faisal responded SAG very aware of this, but Arab extremists are calling on Arab states make "sacrifices" in order recover overrun territories. Even Arif had spoken of need for sacrifices and cited Iraqi actions. I reminded Faisal that Iraq had long ago made mess of its oil industry, hence Iraqi comment on alleged oil sacrifices hardly germane to Arab-Israel conflict. Faisal agreed and said SAG still hopes be able lift embargo before long. He hoped USG would continue show patience with SAG on this score, including not canceling naval contracts. I said that on latter point US naval requirements are continuing and urgent and we could not wait indefinitely. Current ad hoc arrangements might soon freeze into long-term contracts, but I had heard no suggestion contracts being broken since earlier message I had passed on to him through Rashad (Jidda 5581/6/ and State 216455/7/). /6/Dated June 28. (Ibid., PET 17 US-SAUD) /7/Dated June 26. (Ibid.) 11. As I was leaving, I congratulated King on apparent agreement worked out by Mahjoub to move ahead on Yemen problem. I said all friends of Saudi Arabia pleased hear that progress might be made on this issue. Faisal quickly responded that, as I knew, he wants settlement Yemen problem. He cautioned that only general principles had been agreed upon, and he could not yet be sure what Nasser may have in mind in working out details. Saudi position unchanged, viz: (a) quick evacuation UAR military, (b) cessation Saudi aid, and (c) allowing Yemenis to decide their own future form of govt without any outside interference. He might know more of Nasser's intentions after Khartoum meetings. 12. Comment: Meeting was cordial and as always frank. On my arrival, King looked drawn and tired but as talk developed he became more animated. However, entire talk had listless quality about it. Faisal obviously very alive to domestic political sensitivity any Arab leader moving first to suggest settlement and is not disposed place himself in forefront any such effort. Same time I believe he will support it if Jordan and UAR indicate they want such settlement. I am confident he will in general use his influence for moderation. He has long wanted another Arab summit meeting, but is now slightly apprehensive about situation which has finally catalyzed it and about collective Arab pressures which he will most likely have to face there. Eilts [Continue with the next documents] Volume XXI Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |