NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.
| The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001. Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date. This site is not updated so external links may no longer function. Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein. |
 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXI Near East Region Department of State |
 280. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, July 14, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Saudi Arabia, Memos, Vol. I, 12/63-4/67. Secret. You will be interested to know that King Faisal since his return to Saudi Arabia has told a number of people that he considered his visit here a "complete success." He has spoken glowingly both publicly and among his own advisers of his meeting with you and reiterated that his main reason for coming was to become personally acquainted. He deeply appreciated our hospitality and easily shrugged off his brush with Mayor Lindsay. Ambassador Eilts reports that the visit boosted the King's spirits and has decidedly enhanced his prestige at home. One of the most interesting indications that you really got through to him was his explanation to the British Ambassador after his return of your views on civil rights, education and Vietnam. He even took the British to task gently for criticizing any aspect of your Vietnam policy. The King's eagerness and ability to expound at some length on your policies indicates that everything you said registered loud and clear. The problem now--as always with these visits--is how to capitalize on the momentum we have generated. You have established a rapport with him that will be helpful for some time to come. But there will also be misunderstandings as we urge Faisal to give a little to get Nasser's troops out of Yemen. However, we are already moving ahead on two fronts: 1. We are renewing our efforts to persuade him to give a fair look at Nasser's latest offer on Yemen. We are not overly optimistic that anything new will come of this, but we do feel the King is in a specially receptive mood as a result of his talks with you and Secretary Rusk. 2. Ambassador Eilts has offered to pick up his discussions with the Saudi Government on how we might continue the exchange of views on Communist penetration in the Mid-East, and the King has jumped at this./2/ Our chief goal is, by working with his people, to bring him to a more realistic view of what Communism is. /2/In telegram 66 from Jidda, July 7, Eilts reported that he had discussed with Faisal the desirability of closer cooperation in meeting the Communist threat, and had urged that discussions as to what the U.S. Government and the Saudi Arabian Government might do individually and jointly in that sphere be undertaken expeditiously. The King emphatically agreed and instructed Saqqaf to proceed as soon as possible with the talks. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 SAUD) Walt
281. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts/1/ Washington, September 1, 1966, 1:30 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19 US-SAUD. Confidential. Drafted by Korn; cleared by Thieberger (OSD/ISA/ILN), Edward A. Padelford (NEA/RA), NEA Public Affairs Adviser Daniel Brown, Symmes, Captain Castillo (DOD/ASA/PA), Quinn, Warren, and Director of the Office of News in the Bureau of Public Affairs Robert J. McCloskey; and approved by Davies. Sent to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Taiz, Aden, Dhahran, Tel Aviv, Cairo, Kuwait, Tehran, Ankara, Paris, London, Jidda, CINCSTRIKE, and MED DIV ENGRS Livorno. 39172. 1. Negotiations between Saudi Arabia MinDef and US Department Defense for purchase by SAG of mobility modernization package designed provide Saudi Armed Forces with modern vehicle fleet concluded with signature of contract August 28 by Saudi DefMin Prince Sultan. US SecDef signature contract anticipated about September 2 at which time Embassy Jidda and SAG will issue joint announcement. FYI only: Implementation of mobility program will extend over approximately five years and will involve some training by US military of Saudi personnel. Cost of program about $120 million. End FYI. 2. Department/DOD not planning any publicity re contract but will answer queries as follows: a. Agreement is result of study by Saudi Min of Defense and Aviation and is designed provide Saudi armed forces with fleet of modern military vehicles (mainly trucks) and spare parts together with related workshops, maintenance facilities and other installations required for logistical support. b. Transaction in line with long-standing US policy of confining sales to Near Eastern countries within limits essential for defense and internal security. 3. If queried re price and other terms contract, we will state that, in deference to friendly government, USG traditionally prefers not discuss details of such agreements. 4. Posts may answer queries along lines paras two and three above. Rusk
282. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia/1/ Washington, December 5, 1966, 6:24 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19-4 US-SAUD. Confidential. Drafted by Moore and Korn; cleared by Quinn, Sterner, Fredericks, Warren, Colonel Cochran of the Corps of Engineers, Assistant Legal Adviser for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Donald A. Wehmeyer, and Thieberger in substance; and approved by Brewer. Repeated to Dhahran, CINCSTRIKE, CHUSMTM Dhahran, and DIV ENGR MED Leghorn Italy. 96790. Ref: Jidda's 2074./2/ Subject: Mobility Modernization. /2/In telegram 2074 from Jidda, November 29, Eilts reported his conversation with Mansouri, a legal adviser to Prince Sultan who had played a key role in negotiating the Mobility Modernization package. Mansouri had been asked by Sultan to seek the Ambassador's assistance in helping the Saudi Arabian Government to avoid the political stigma arising from purchase of equipment from U.S. firms on the Arab boycott list. Eilts had responded that the U.S. Government too was sensitive to the boycott issue and could not condone or approve it. He stressed that the vehicles were being purchased by the Saudi Arabian Government from the U.S. Government and not directly from U.S. manufacturers. He also emphasized that if the Saudi Government attempted to exclude boycotted firms, delivery schedules would be retarded and prices would rise. (Ibid.) Documentation pertaining to the Arab boycott of Israel is ibid., FT 11-2 ISR-ARAB. 1. Realize difficulties faced by Sultan if, as probable, Mobility Modernization purchases include items from boycotted firms. However, Saudis must realize boycott issue also of sensitivity in US and recent decision on Ford, Coke, RCA could in fact trigger action in next session Congress seriously damaging to broad USG policies in Near East. In face this situation we particularly desire avoid any appearance acceptance boycott decisions which could arise from, for instance, removing Ford nameplates as suggested reftel. (In any event latter action would be only of marginal usefulness since Ford parts, clearly labeled, present in many US-procured military vehicles even though chassis may be product another firm.) 2. Believe your best approach under these circumstances continues lie in emphasizing Mobility Modernization equipment being procured from USG and thus is outside boycott framework. In this regard we note from Amman 1348/3/ that Jordan obtained specific Boycott Committee exemption for continued import of Ford military trucks. Similarly Saudis may be able justify their purchases under provisions "public purchase sanctuary" for which there are precedents. (e.g., Various messages sent inter alia to Jidda in spring this year re problem Emb Taiz import Jeep showed Jordan, Syria, UAR and Saudi Arabia all allowed some importation of either Jeeps or Jeep spares for army use.) /3/Dated December 1. (Ibid.) 3. Dept/DOD will do all possible eliminate publicity on names of suppliers but obviously USG does not have complete control over question publicity. 4. Dept Army has cabled in AMC 48720, Dec 2,/4/ list potential suppliers Mobility Modernization package. Suggest if at all possible you avoid giving Mansouri specific names at this time when boycott taking such prominent place in Arab concerns. /4/Not found. Katzenbach
283. National Intelligence Estimate/1/ NIE 36.6-66 Washington, December 8, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NIEs, NIE 36.6, Saudi Arabia. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Helms, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on December 8. Paragraph references are to the Discussion portion of the estimate, not here printed. THE ROLE OF SAUDI ARABIA The Problem To estimate the outlook for Saudi Arabia during the next few years, particularly its role in the Arabian Peninsula. Conclusions A. Contention with the UAR dominates Saudi Arabia's foreign affairs. Yemen is currently the principal area of confrontation. Each will continue to support elements in Yemen opposed to the other, but both will be anxious to avoid a renewal of large-scale civil war or a military clash between themselves. Faisal looks to the US to protect him though he recognizes that the US commitment is only in case of unprovoked aggression. (Paras. 1-6) B. Faisal believes that the UAR is determined to dominate Aden and South Arabia when the British leave in 1968; thus Faisal will continue to help anti-Nasser elements in that area. Faisal also fears that Nasser is aiming to replace UK influence with his own in the Persian Gulf. When the UK leaves, Faisal may try to take over its role as protecting power of Qatar and the Trucial Sheikhdoms, and might even try to annex them if that seemed to be the only way to forestall Nasser's aims. (Paras. 7-11) C. The prospects are poor for real accommodation between Faisal and Nasser. Each will continue to work against the other, not only on the Arabian Peninsula but in the Arab and Muslim world generally. Though a meeting or pact between Islamic leaders is unlikely, Faisal will continue to promote the idea of Islamic solidarity as a means of countering Nasser's influence. Faisal will recurrently seek support from the US and the West. Nasser will look to the Soviets for help and, in addition, will both blame the US for encouraging Faisal and urge that the US curb him. (Paras. 12-17) D. Faisal's domestic position is strong. He has the support of the nation's principal political forces and of the military. Mounting oil revenues will bring continued prosperity and economic advance. The latter will be inhibited, however, by the shortage of skilled and educated Saudis. As more sectors of society are modernized, discontent with traditional Saudi rule will increase, but this is not likely to become a significant factor in the nation's political life for some time. (Paras. 18-30) [Here follows the Discussion section of the estimate.]
284. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State/1/ Jidda, January 10, 1967, 1314Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL SAUD-US. Confidential. 2684. Subj: USG-SAG Relations. 1. Toward end four-hour session with Dr. Rashad Pharaoun Jan 6 on various matters reported previous telegrams, Rashad made general observation that SAG regrets what it considers USG's apparent reluctance cooperate more closely with SAG on matters of mutual interest. If USG attitude were less standoffish, he professed believe SAG could and would be more responsive assisting in matters of specific interest to USG. When I asked him what he had in mind, he spoke generally of USG's reluctance support SAG in aid to Mali and other African countries; its tepid view Islamic solidarity; its apparent continued reliance on Nasser; its apparent disinterest in Syrian situation; its failure pressure HMG retain its responsibilities in Aden area; its failure recognize Commie threat in Near East in proportions Saudis see it; its policy in Yemen where USG shoring up decrepit, discredited, despotic and puppet government, etc. He added SAG has also had recent reports from Washington and Cairo that USG intends resume concessional food aid to UAR. For SAG, USG policy in NE all rather disheartening. 2. I told him could not agree that USG attitude toward SAG standoffish. USG has been cooperating closely with SAG on many matters of mutual concern and will continue do so. USG's interest in security of Saudi Arabia deep and sincere. I recalled had just reiterated to him USG assurances against unprovoked aggression. Earlier in week I had offered MinInt Prince Fahd six training places for police training in US. These and many other past actions attest to USG interest in and high regard for Saudi Arabia. 3. As for Islamic solidarity, this by definition hardly a subject where USG can be directly involved. I acknowledged we sometimes regret Islamic solidarity is yet another factor contributing to current polarization of Arab world and resultant tensions, but noted USG neither disapproves nor approves of concept. As he knew we have [been] accused by UAR and others of instigating Islamic solidarity but, as he also knew, this charge absolutely baseless. 4. As for additional FFF Food for UAR, I called his attention to recent Department press officer statement that UAR request still under study and no decision yet reached. However, two things ought be noted: first, contrary widely-held belief in Saudi circles prior termination PL-480 food to UAR, termination has not forced UAR withdraw its troops from Yemen. On contrary, it seems have strengthened UAR's resolve remain there. Second, termination of food aid to UAR had curtailed still more limited leverage which USG is able use with UAR on area problems, including those of Saudi Arabia. Any such development hardly in USG and SAG's long-term interests. Moreover, UAR had now been able obtain some wheat from USSR. 5. In some cases, as in aid to African states, direct cooperation scarcely in SAG's interest. USG, quite wrongly but as inescapable fact, is unfortunately associated in minds some emergent African states with old colonialist states of UK and France. This not so in case of SAG which in various Muslim areas of Africa appears to have especial appeal. Fact is our respective efforts in Africa and elsewhere complement each other and, as such, are in our mutual interest. 6. As for our Yemen policy, he well aware USG view as expressed personally by Secretary to King during latter's state visit in June that we believe highest priority ought to be given to arranging evacuation UAR troops so that Yemeni people can themselves decide. This had to be done by peaceful means since experience of past four years should have proved conclusively military victory not possible for either side. I also recalled King's only recently applauding to me our determination to stay in YAR, despite all difficulties, in order give Yemenis at least some counterpoise to complete reliance on USSR, ChiCom or UAR aid. 7. Somewhat tepidly Rashad accepted this, but he obviously far from convinced. He still felt USG should consider channeling some of its aid through SAG which he believed might achieve greater impact. I twitted him that SAG beginning learn what USG has been experiencing since World War II, namely it costs money and much money for any state to pursue an active foreign policy. He laughed and ruefully agreed. 8. Comment: My impression is that, largely as result its current security frustration, SAG is again in one of its feeling sorry for itself moods. Inevitably whenever in this state of mind, SAG seems to like to believe USG pursuing standoffish policy toward it. SAG also of course feels we are putting intense pressure on it to continue policy of restraint in Yemen, but are not pushing UAR, Kuwait or anyone else commensurately. Report that new FFF program for UAR again contemplated has doubtless added to SAG's worries. We shall have to continue intensive hand holding operation and seize opportunities where we can feasibly cooperate with SAG if our urgings that SAG continue policy of restraint in Yemen are to be heeded. Eilts
285. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia/1/ Washington, January 16, 1967, 7:06 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL SAUD-US. Secret. Drafted by Moore, cleared by Brewer and Bennsky, and approved by Davies. Repeated to Cairo. 119317. Jidda's 2684./2/ /2/Document 284. 1. We were surprised Pharaoun's complaints re insufficient USG cooperation with SAG and fully endorse your able responses. In future discussions US/Saudi relations with Pharaoun or other ranking Saudis you may also wish use following points. 2. US diplomacy in Middle East follows principle of developing best bilateral relations possible with each country. Area of mutuality of interests varies from state to state but our aim is work with each state to maximum extent possible in that framework. We have no chosen instrument in Middle East (including UAR and Saudi Arabia). 3. We and Saudis are fortunate to have broad range mutual interests. This includes major USG concern for area tranquility which will permit SAG maximum opportunity develop in atmosphere stability. Area conflict threatens this stability and thus is not in Saudi or US interest. For this reason we have continued strongly urge Saudis exercise restraint in Yemen. We feel any resumption open hostilities there, with potential for spreading to include SAG-UAR, is not in interest any of the parties. Our "pressure" in favor of restraint reflects no intent get Saudi support for strictly US policy, but arises from what has been our understanding of mutual Saudi and US interests. (FYI--We suspect Faisal very much aware restraint is in his interests, not only until his defense sites in Najran can be completed but also in longer range. End FYI.) 4. Your remarks on Islamic solidarity (para 3 reftel) were particularly apt. Suggest you continue where suitable indicate that, as non-Muslim, non-area state, we have not in past felt it appropriate comment on Islamic solidarity concepts. However, insofar as movement tends contribute to polarization and friction in Arab World, we question whether Saudi Arabia or any of countries involved really profit from it. What might be useful aim in tranquil times seems hardly have served buttress solidarity concept in current charged atmosphere among key Islamic states. We aware this may not be SAG view but would hope our Saudi friends would not expect us to be less than candid on points where we may differ. 5. We concerned over Russian and Chicom imperialism in Near East no less than are Saudis. However, to extent Communism may have any regional popular appeal, it can be countered successfully in longer term only by efforts to work constructively with peoples concerned to attain their legitimate desires for economic, social and political development. Regional differences clearly hold back such efforts. This is, for example, among worrisome aspects Yemen imbroglio. Such general considerations continue important in USG attitude toward Republican YARG. Our dealings with YARG are designed to keep western presence in Yemen and not vacate field to Communists, originally brought into Yemen under royalists and at particular behest then-Crown Prince Badr. 6. Pharaoun and other Saudis need only recall discussions they participated in last June in Washington to realize extent our concern with future of South Arabia. We have hoped that powers in area would express their pleasure at ending foreign control by themselves offering continued and constructive help to preserve political and economic viability of new nation. We understand SAG has already made such offer and hope that it will continue appropriate help to fledgling SA state. 7. Comments on Pharaoun's views re aid to Mali sent separate tel. Rusk
286. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State/1/ Jidda, February 20, 1967, 0625Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 SAUD-UAR. Secret. Repeated to Cairo and Moscow. 3373. Para 4c Cairo's 4649./2/ /2/Dated February 16. (Ibid., DEF 17-1 US) 1. From time to time King Faisal has said to me that he needed clear indication USG position in event Saudi Arabia attacked to enable him make adequate contingency arrangements. Prince Sultan has also occasionally stated that if USG unable or unwilling help SAG, Saudis will have to look elsewhere. In making such statements to me, neither King nor Sultan has ever specified turn to Soviets. However, I am told by UK Ambassador that in making similar statements to him, Sultan has once or twice spoken of turning to Soviets if necessary. Both UK Ambassador and I are inclined dismiss this kind of a statement as typical "Sultanism" without great deal of meaning. Sultan has occasionally spoken of UAR urgings Saudis could obtain Soviet arms more cheaply. 2. In recent call on me by Saudi Ambassador in Ankara, he claimed Soviet Ambassador to Turkey has in past two months or so called on him several times to indicate USSR would like to have better relations with SAG. Soviet Ambassador allegedly deplored Saudi anti-Soviet policies and fact that no diplomatic relations exist between two countries. Soviet Ambassador also told Saudi Ambassador that in present circumstance USSR will support UAR as needed. Understand similar approach has been made during past year by Soviet Ambassador in Paris to Saudi Ambassador there. I assume Saudi Ambassadors have reported this kind of nibble to Riyadh, but no suggestion to date Saudis are biting. 3. Faisal's deep concern with spread of Soviet influence in Near East and concomitant Islamic solidarity policy which he considers to be a barrier against Commie inroads have until now shaped his area policy. We see no present signs of any change in Faisal's strong anti-Soviet stand. As long as he remains on the throne, we believe chances are good that SAG will wish to keep Soviets at arm's length. However, while no Saudis have specifically so stated to us, we have no doubt that there are Saudis who believe that closer relations with Soviets may be desirable, perhaps as some sort of protective unbrella or as means obtaining cheaper arms. At such time as Faisal goes, we would certainly not exclude possibility that a successor regime might wish to explore possible advantage of closer relations with Soviets. Eilts
287. Paper Prepared in the Department of State/1/ Washington, April 6, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Saunders Files, Saudi Arabia, 4/1/66-12/31/67. Secret. Drafted in NEA's Office of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen, and Aden Affairs. The paper was apparently prepared for discussion at the IRG/NEA meeting on April 12. USG ASSURANCES AND ACTIONS VIS-A-VIS SAUDI ARABIA IN Development of US Policy Assurances The body of our assurances to Saudi Arabia has grown gradually. As early as 1943 the Saudis sought US backing in their rivalry with the Hashemites of Jordan and Iraq. Our first explicit statements of interest in the Saudi security were made in response to Saudi concern, in the late 1940s and early 1950s, relative to Israel. It was against this background that President Truman wrote King Abdul Aziz on October 31, 1950 that aggression against Saudi Arabia would be a matter of "immediate concern" to the US./2/ /2/For text of President Truman's letter to King Saud, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. V, pp. 1190-1191. When, in the late 1950s, the UAR became the main threat to Saudi security, the SAG again turned to us for reassurance. With the advent of the Kennedy administration and the onset of the Yemen war, our commitments were directed at stimulating the Saudis to attain specific goals. These were: a) to encourage the SAG along the path of internal reform and development; b) to secure Saudi disengagement from Yemen; and c) to deter UAR attack and prevent the Saudis from taking actions which might provoke the UAR. As an inducement for Saudi cooperation in settling the Yemen civil war, Ambassador Bunker was authorized to offer Faisal a pledge of US military support in the event of aggression. The Bunker proposal was the high-water mark of our assurances to the Saudis. Because of the SAG's failure to sever its ties with the Yemeni royalists and Nasser's refusal to withdraw his troops from Yemen, the Bunker offer of a military guarantee never went into effect. Our experience in the emplacement of a squadron of USAF fighters in Saudi Arabia during the second half of 1963 (Operation Hard Surface) brought home to us the difficulties involved in the stationing of an Amerian fighting force on Saudi soil. The restrictive rules of engagement placed upon Hard Surface in the interest of avoiding involvement in hostilities with the UAR left American pilots almost defenseless in certain situations and gave the Saudis the impression our planes were running away from the Egyptians. The close of the Bunker effort witnessed an attempt to define our assurances more precisely, as fears grew that we might become drawn into the Yemen conflict by an overly-aggressive stance on the part of the Saudis. Faisal was informed repeatedly in 1964, 1965 and 1966 that we would support him in case of "unprovoked attack" but would not serve as a shield behind which the Saudis could stimulate hostilities in Yemen. It was also suggested to Faisal that if UAR attack were to occur or appear imminent he take the matter to the UN. Nature of Our Assurances With the exception of the abortive Bunker proposal, we have never given the Saudis a specific promise of military help against an attack. Our assurances have been conveyed by Presidents and Secretaries of State in private meetings with Saudi leaders, in written and oral messages, and in Departmental instructions and public statements (see attached listing)./3/ They have ranged from very general statements of interest in Saudi Arabia's "well being" to fairly specific declarations of "full United States support for the maintenance of Saudi Arabia's integrity" (Kennedy letter October 25, 1962)./4/ Some mention of our interest in or concern for Saudi security is contained in almost all the several dozen letters exchanged with the Saudi rulers by Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson. /3/Attached but not printed. /4/For text of President Kennedy's letter to Crown Prince Faisal, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XVIII, Document 88. Our assurances to the Saudis have never been submitted for Congressional consideration and cannot be construed to be a formal US defense commitment. They have been sufficiently vaguely worded to allow us to interpret our response according to the circumstances. In practical terms, however, these statements do constitute a commitment, though of a purposely ill-defined nature. Our contingency planning has stressed diplomatic action to forestall and arrest a UAR-Saudi conflict. US military intervention (except to evacuate American citizens) has been contemplated only in the most extreme circumstances when we might consider our fundamental interests directly threatened. US Interests and Programs Saudi Arabia is important to the United States as a source of oil for free world use, a site of sizeable American investments, a growing market for American merchandise and a transit area for US military aircraft and forces. US exports to the Kingdom amounted to $138.7 million in 1966, as opposed to imports from Saudi Arabia of $95 million. The Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) alone has a fixed investment of more than one billion dollars in Saudi Arabia. Its operations contribute significantly to our balance of payments. Saudi Arabia and the other Persian Gulf oil producers furnish about 60 percent of our petroleum requirements for Vietnam and East Asia (80 percent in the case of aviation gas). Since before World War II, the House of Saud has been one of our best friends in the Middle East. The Saudis have turned a deaf ear to repeated Soviet overtures for diplomatic and trade relations and have staunchly opposed Communist penetration of the Peninsula. A violent overthrow of the monarchy would, in all likelihood, destroy our position of primacy in Saudi Arabia and open the door to the establishment of Communist bloc presence and influence. A revolution would probably not deny us Saudi oil (any government would be dependent on oil revenues) but could jeopardize our investments and make the terms of access to oil less favorable. Our interest in the security and stability of the Saudi monarchy has been given expression through a variety of USG programs: a. US Military Training Mission: The 235-man USMTM was first established in 1951 pursuant to an agreement with the SAG. The MTM is supported by an approximately one million dollar yearly MAP grant which in addition finances training in the US for approximately 100 Saudi officers yearly. Until recently the MTM effort was located primarily in Dhahran, but now more officers are regularly quartered in Riyadh. With the Yemen war, the need to preserve a distinction between training advice and assistance in combat operations has become important. We have taken the position that teams of up to 5 MTM officers may visit the border areas for short stays, on prior approval of the Ambassador and Washington concurrence as to timing. b. Military Sales: Our last MAP arms grant program for Saudi Arabia was completed in 1962. Since that time we have sought to respond to Saudi requests for legitimate defense needs through sales programs, assisted when necessary by MAP credit or credit guarantees. Current major military sales programs are the $121.5 million Hawk missile contract signed by the SAG with the Raytheon Company in May 1966 and the $120 million Mobility Modernization Agreement signed by Secretary McNamara and Prince Sultan in August-September 1966. Some ten Raytheon American civilians are now in Jizan helping the Saudis to establish an operational Hawk missile site there. c. Corps of Engineers Construction: The Army Corps of Engineers has undertaken on a reimbursable basis to contract for and supervise construction of military cantonments ($140 million) and a television network ($22 million). The Corps also supervises the Mobility Modernization Program. d. Efforts to Promote Economic Development: We have underway a variety of programs in the civilian field (all on a reimbursable basis) to assist the Saudis in economic development. Chief among these are: a US Geological Survey mineral exploration and mapping project, our November 1965 agreement with the SAG to assist in the construction of a desalting-electric power plant at Jidda, assistance in agriculture, and the supplying of technical experts for specific projects. Saudi-UAR Rivalry a Quasi-Permanent Factor The Saudi-UAR conflict has been a major element on the Near Eastern scene for almost ten years, since the Iraqi revolution removed the Hashemites as serious rivals to the House of Saud. Hostility between the Saudis and the UAR has flared over Yemen and could intensify with the struggle for supremacy in South Arabia. A multitude of other factors, however, are equally or more important: the personal contest between Faisal and Nasser for leadership in the Arab and Muslim world, incompatibility between the UAR's radical Arab socialism and the conservative Saudi monarchy with its commitment to capitalism, and a fundamental historical rivalry between Egypt, the focus of present day Arab culture and civilization, and Saudi Arabia, the site of the Muslim holy places. Though we may expect periods of detente, underlying differences between Riyadh and Cairo are likely to be with us as long as the regimes which now rule those two capitals remain in power. Where the US stands between the two Near Eastern rivals will continue to be a major problem in our relations with each as well as with other Governments in the area. The Saudis place considerable reliance on us and have sought to involve us more actively in their defense. The assurances and assistance we have given have permitted us to exercise some restraint on the SAG's actions in Yemen and encourage Faisal along the path of reform and development. While there may in the past have been some tendency within the SAG to over-estimate the extent of our commitment (and possibly a temptation to use our assurances to provoke a showdown with the UAR) the limited nature of our assurances has been made clear to Faisal. Our refusal of the Saudi Defense Minister's request, following the January 27 UAR bombing of Najran, for the dispatch of US Army Hawk SAM units caused some disillusionment within the SAG./5/ While this may be salutary to some extent, Saudi disenchantment limits our leverage with the SAG and has reportedly prompted the growth of a "go it alone" philosophy in SAG councils. /5/See the Yemen compilation for documentation on the U.S. response to the UAR bombing of Najran. Our interest in Saudi Arabia's security has been made almost as clear in Cairo as in Riyadh and Jidda. There is evidence that the UAR is attentive to the signals we send out. While our statements of support for the SAG have not prevented the Egyptians from occasional bombing of Saudi villages in the Yemen border area, they have probably helped deter the UAR from larger-scale actions. Our open backing of the Saudis probably heightens Nasser's antagonism toward Faisal and strengthens his determination to overthrow the SAG by subversion. However, any indication of a lessening of US support for the SAG under present circumstances would probably encourage the UAR to step up its military and subversive activities against Saudi Arabia. Courses of Action Our long-term aim should be a Saudi Arabia friendly to the West but sufficiently strong internally and externally to stand by itself short of full-scale aggression by a larger power. Achievement of this goal may take a decade or more. During this developmental period protection of our economic and political interests in Saudi Arabia will require continuing US support for the SAG's security and integrity. Our concern over the stability of the Saudi regime should not cause us to lose sight of the fact that US and Saudi interests are not invariably identical or of the dangers of undue US military involvement in Saudi defense. At the same time, the UAR should remain aware that we intend to fulfill our commitment to assist the Saudis, by military means if all others fail. This policy will require walking a very fine line between friendship and support of the SAG and over-identification with the Saudis which could be as dangerous to us as to themselves. It will necessitate a degree of fence-straddling which is bound to create occasional dissatisfaction in Riyadh without winning us any real favor in Cairo. Recommended actions toward this goal are: a. Diplomatic action to forestall or arrest a Saudi-UAR conflict. While direct recourse to the UN Security Council may not be advisable, we should encourage the SAG to communicate directly to the President of the Security Council the facts of any new UAR attack on Saudi territory, for prompt circulation to Security Council members. b. Military training activities, through USMTM and CONUS training of Saudi officers be maintained at about their current level over the next few years. A fundamental distinction should be made between USMTM's training and advisory role in standard training areas as opposed to areas of potential hostilities. Anything which might tend to promote a permanent or quasi-permanent USMTM presence in the sensitive Yemen border area should be avoided. Guidelines contained in State 166314 (attached)/6/ for USMTM travel to the Yemen border area should be kept under review, although significant relaxation of border area travel restrictions is unlikely to be possible in the immediate future. /6/Attached but not printed; a copy of telegram 166314 to Jidda, March 31, is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 19-8 US-SAUD. c. SAG purchases of US military equipment should continue to be consummated when legitimately required for the Saudi defense. MAP credit or credit guarantees should continue to be made available for certain items or programs. This relatively inexpensive form of assistance permits us to demonstrate our interest in Saudi Arabia's security and helps ward off pressure for more direct USG action. d. Saudi internal reforms and development programs should be encouraged with particular emphasis on the implementation of Faisal's promise to establish local government councils. e. New USG assurances, even the reiteration of past statements, should be avoided or at least clearly limited to cases of unprovoked attack. f. Token US military forces should not be ordered to Saudi soil unless it is previously determined that such units will be backed by all necessary force in the event of hostilities. Our unsatisfactory experience with Operation Hard Surface (July 1963-January 1964) demonstrated that, without prior assurance of backing, the dispatch of token forces risks involving us in hostilities for which we are unprepared or, alternatively, raising doubts about the credibility of our deterrent. g. Mindful of the pitfalls described in subparagraph f above, be prepared to recognize a long-range need to strengthen our naval presence in the Red Sea-Arabian Sea area to improve our diplomatic leverage and enhance our ability to make good, if necessary, on existing assurances to the Saudis. One possible course might be to augment COMIDEASTFOR from its current force level of two destroyers. A more numerous US Red Sea-Arabian Sea squadron would enable us to react rapidly to any SAG requests for help without the need to station vulnerable forces on Saudi soil. It is recommended that the IRG request DOD and the Department of the Navy to prepare plans on a contingency basis for such increases in US naval strength.
288. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, April 12, 1967. /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80-R01580R, DCI Executive Registry Files, IRG. Secret. Drafted on April 17. SUBJECT 1. The State/2/ and Defense papers prepared for this meeting have previously been sent to the DD/I and ONE. What follows is the report of the IRG/NEA meeting chaired by Ambassador Battle. /2/Document 287. 2. Before turning to the agenda item, Ambassador Battle said that he was "IRG-minded," wishes to continue the active use of the IRG, desires to have the IRG participate in policy formulation when possible and always to be informed of what is going on. [Here follows discussion of another subject.] The USG Commitment to Saudi Arabia 5. The White House (Harold Saunders) thought the President's statement to Faysal during his last visit--"we will not let that fellow (Nasser) gobble you up"--was probably the best point of departure for examining our USG commitment to Saudi Arabia./3/ /3/See Document 275. 6. In a lengthy discussion there gradually evolved a consensus that: (a) the USG commitment was to preserve the integrity of a regime in Saudi Arabia that was friendly to the U.S. and prepared to assist the U.S. in protecting its interests, (b) the USG was not committed to the Saud regime, to Faysal as an individual, to the Monarchy as such or to the protection of the geographical area of Saudi Arabia, (c) it would be unwise to define the specific types or acts of aggression which would lead the USG to the decision to act to protect the Saudi regime and (d) the viability of the Saudi regime, the internal political and security situation and the impact of aggressive actions on the stability of the regime would always have to be considered, ad hoc, in evaluating a current threat. 7. We noted that the UAR air attacks on Nejran, Jizan and Khamish Mushayt combined with the psychological impact of the parachute drop near Yenbo and the weakness of King Saud's regime had led the USG to the decision to put Hard Surface into Saudi Arabia. At the same time, we took note of the improved internal security situation and the social-economic progress under Faysal as being related to our low-keyed reaction to more recent aggressive actions by the UAR, including air attacks and the terror bombings carried out by Yemeni trained by the UAR in the Yemen. 8. Initially, there was evident an inclination to limit our IRG examination to overt military threats; in the course of discussion I drew upon the history of President Kennedy's recognition that friendly governments are more often threatened by subversion, sabotage, propaganda, terror etc.--all of which led to the building of the massive house of cards known as the "counterinsurgency" programs and that the Chairman of the IRG was explicitly the inheritor of this residual "Special Group CI" responsibility. It seemed to me that the Chairman had a special responsibility, stemming from NSAM 341,/4/ to examine the non-military threat to Saudi Arabia as well as the U.S. military commitment based largely on an overt UAR military threat. This comment led to questions and discussions about the nature of "insurgency" in the Peninsula; Hoopes (ISA/Defense) wondered whether we were able to detect foreign influence and distinguish foreign-influenced "insurgency" from genuinely nationalist pressures for change. Also, he wondered if there was any evidence that externally-influenced insurgency was growing in the area. I responded that in Saudi Arabia, as elsewhere in the area, one found a local variety of nationalism, a second with the Cairo coloration and a third with a Soviet overlay. Watching foreign influence move into genuine nationalist forces in the Peninsula and the Gulf was, I said, like watching a tide come in; every time you looked the water was a few more feet up the beach while here and there one discerned deeper pools that had filled more rapidly--Aden for example. This produced a general discussion of our posture in a number of Middle East countries where "insurgency" problems were a factor, what we were able to do, where we fell short etc. The USG actions on Jordan after the Samu raid by the Israelis in November 1966 was reviewed as having some relevance to the problem of Saudi Arabia. Ambassador Battle expressed some surprise at the extent of the USG actions in Jordan, including the crash program to help the security authorities and the measures aimed exclusively at the attitudes of the military. From Cairo, he had missed much of the traffic on all but the military assistance package. /4/See footnote 3, Document 271. 9. Turning to the question of U.S. capabilities to respond, Ambassador Battle sought the views of the JCS and the State Arabian Peninsula Director, William Brewer. Brewer thought we should now reenforce COMIDEASTFORCE with two destroyers, keeping them active in the Red Sea as a deterrent. JCS, supported by the majority of the members, thought we should either do nothing right now or start planning to put a carrier force into the area. Ambassador Battle asked a number of highly relevant questions about the availability of forces, time factors etc. The JCS offered no specifics but thought that a carrier force was not available and that the USG would be hard-pressed to put much into the area. It was noted that CINCMEAFSA and JCS maintain a Middle East Plan and that the CCPC had done a study on a Saudi-UAR confrontation. Ambassador Battle asked to be briefed on these. The IRG finally agreed that at this time no decision to move U.S. Forces into the area should be sought. 10. There was some discussion about the courses of action open to the UAR and what UAR current intentions vis-a-vis Saudi Arabia seemed to be. I suggested that the most likely course of action would be an attack on the Hawk Battery in Jizan--most likely by a guerrilla attack such as that at Pleiku. We might be thinking about what we would do if, say, eight or ten of the Americans at Jizan were killed in such an attack. 11. There was also note taken of the general trend toward "mercenaries" in the area--ranging all the way from the British and French mercenaries in the Yemen to the employees of Air Work and Raytheon who were fairly exposed. Also, note was taken of the trend among the Turks, Iranians, Saudis, Jordanians, Paks and others to collaborate in military matters--outside of any arrangements with the USG and in particular in the pooling of arms procured from non-U.S. sources. James H. Critchfield/5/ /5/Printed from a copy that indicates Critchfield signed the original.
289. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia/1/ Washington, June 2, 1967, 11:23 a.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 SAUD. Confidential. Drafted by Brewer on June 1, cleared by Wehmeyer, and approved by Davies. Repeated to Amman, Cairo, Beirut, Damascus, Kuwait, Baghdad, Sanaa, Aden, and Dhahran. 206728. 1. During brief June 1 call on DepAsstSec Davies, Prince Muhammad ibn Faisal, son of Saudi King, made following points: a. SAG had to support UAR in current crisis/2/ and, like Hussein, Faisal might have to go to Cairo if situation deteriorated; /2/Documentation on the Middle East crisis is in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XIX. b. USG action on Aqaba problem should be clearly based on world-wide legal considerations rather than as support for Israel; c. Any "action" USG might take should be clear, quick and effective; and d. Saudis would have "to do everything we can" oppose such action. 2. Davies stressed USG acting in accordance basic policies support for integrity every state in region and support for principle free international traffic through international waterways such as Aqaba. Prince Muhammad felt our actions so far had appeared unduly onesided in favor Israel and suggested more stress be laid on world-wide US policy on international waterways. 3. Comment: Prince Muhammad's remarks add up to suggestion USG should act strongly against Nasser and accept adverse consequences such action at hands Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia, since these would by implication not be of gravest character. We question whether Saudis could, in extreme circumstances Prince Muhammad had in mind, in fact so circumscribe their response. 4. We recognize Arabs will equate USG position on international straits with USG support Israel but addressees should nevertheless make every effort draw distinction between two. Dept plans send circular cable near future summarizing US legal position which may be helpful this respect. Rusk
290. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia/1/ Washington, June 8, 1967, 4:37 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL SAUD-US. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Brewer on June 5, cleared by Battle and Bromley Smith, and approved by Secretary Rusk. 209305. 1. Ambassador requested immediately deliver to King Faisal following personal message from President Johnson dated June 8: "Your Majesty: In the light of my own high regard for Your Majesty, as well as the long-standing close and cordial relations between our two governments, I want to assure that you are fully informed regarding the views and policies of my government at this delicate juncture in the history of the Near East. The United States Government had been engaged for several weeks in the strenuous attempts to reduce tensions in the Near East when, despite our best efforts, hostilities broke out on June 5 on a broad front. We had been in close touch with the parties and had received no indication that such fighting was in prospect. It is not clear to us how it started. In this situation, the policy of the United States must be to seek urgently for concerted action through the United Nations to bring about an end to the current hostilities. We are bending all our efforts to this end. Far from seeking to become involved in this new conflict, we are doing our best to stop it. In so doing, we will strive to steer an even-handed course. Our sole endeavor will be to seek the earliest feasible return to peaceful conditions so that the underlying problems of the region can be addressed in relative calm. As the situation evolves, I realize that we may not always see eye to eye on every issue. I recognize the imperatives of your position, just as I hope you will recognize those that govern our own. We continue to support the integrity and independence of all states involved in the current hostilities. We are opposed to efforts to change frontiers or resolve problems by force of arms. But this is not favoritism for any single state in the region, it is simple realism. The purpose of the United States Government must remain the prevention and limitation of hostilities which otherwise might well expand outside the Near East. Such has been our settled policy under four Administrations of both political parties since the end of World War II. At the same time I want to assure Your Majesty that it will be my firm determination that events in the present crisis not be permitted to affect the long-standing interest of the United States Government in the closest possible relations with the Government of Saudi Arabia. I hope that Your Majesty will understand and appreciate the current efforts of the United States for peace within this unchanging context. It would be tragic if misunderstandings between us, or ill-conceived efforts on the part of others, were to weaken the enduring relationship between our two countries from which both have derived such benefit for so long. In this connection, I want to give Your Majesty my own solemn assurances that the charges being circulated in the Near East alleging that the United States has given military support to operations against the Arab countries in this crisis is totally false. I deeply regret that some of our Arab friends have seen fit to break diplomatic relations with us, particularly in view of the groundless nature of the charges and because of the urgent need for us to remain in close communication with all sides in the present difficult situation. You will have seen that my Ambassador to the United Nations has publicly invited the UN to send investigators to the 6th Fleet to establish for themselves the baselessness of these accusations. I must tell Your Majesty frankly that I have been disturbed at reports on June 7 of mob action against American citizens in Dhahran. My Ambassador, Mr. Eilts, in whom I have the fullest confidence, has reported to me the assurances given by you and your senior officials that adequate protection will be afforded for all citizens./2/ I welcome this consideration and assure you that it is not my desire to take any action which would focus attention on your problems. /2/In telegram 5119 from Jidda, June 7, Eilts reported that he had seen Saqqaf at the Foreign Office to inform him of the attack that day on the U.S. Consulate General in Dhahran and to request immediate and adequate protection. Saqqaf expressed the Saudi Arabian Government's regrets at the incident and telephoned Minister of the Interior Prince Fahd, who said that the demonstrations had already been stopped and the ringleaders apprehended. Eilts told Saqqaf he had received instructions to begin evacuation of U.S. dependents and non-essential personnel and to advise private citizens to leave as soon as possible. Saqqaf had been deeply disturbed and reiterated his assurance that American citizens were in no danger. (Ibid., POL 23-8 SAUD) In telegram 5124 from Jidda, June 7, Eilts reported that Prince Mishal, Governor of Mecca, had called on him, saying that King Faisal and Prince Fahd had instructed him to express their deep regrets over the attack on the Consulate. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR) In this difficult time, I take comfort from the continued maintenance of cordial relations between us and our two Governments. As a continuation of our friendly talks in Washington a year ago, I would of course consider most carefully any views which you might wish to send me on the current situation. Meanwhile, Ambassador Eilts has been instructed to remain in particularly close contact with your Government throughout the present crisis. If God wills, the fighting will soon stop, now that the Security Council has acted, so that we may address the underlying problems of peace and development in a more normal atmosphere. All best personal regards, Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson" 2. In delivering foregoing, you should suggest that USG desires ensure privacy this message and any subsequent exchange. You may add orally that Dept has instructed you make clear continued interest highest levels USG in maintaining closest contacts with His Majesty and top level SAG officials throughout the present critical period./3/ /3/In telegram 5180 from Jidda, June 9, Eilts reported that he had asked Saqqaf to arrange an audience for him in Riyadh to deliver the President's letter to King Faisal. Saqqaf had advised that in the present "somewhat confused situation" it would be better if he sent the letter to the King by special messenger. He thought it likely that Faisal would come to Jidda before long and would want to see the Ambassador there. Eilts said he had deferred to Saqqaf's judgment, but asked that the King be informed that he was ready to see him in Riyadh or anywhere else at any time. (Ibid.) Rusk [Continue with the next documents] Volume XXI Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |