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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXI Near East Region Department of State |
 271. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, June 8, 1966, 2:30 p.m. /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80-R01580R, DCI Executive Registry Files, Box 1, IRG. Secret. Drafted by James H. Critchfield, Chief of the CIA's Near East and South Asia Division on June 9. SUBJECT 1. There were two items on the agenda for discussion--Policy for Faysal Visit and Soviet-Syrian Relations. Faysal Visit 2. The policy paper prepared by State/2/ called for the USG to use Faysal's visit to emphasize (a) the dangers of polarization in the NE, (b) the importance the USG attaches to maintaining our ties of mutual interest with all the States of the Near East, including Egypt, (c) that Faysal should not contribute to polarization, (d) that we assess the Communist penetration of the NE to be less than Faysal's assessment (Faysal has declined a State briefing), (e) that he should be flexible on Yemen and avoid provocation and (f) that Saudi assistance to formation of as broadly based a regime as possible in South Arabia is desirable but that such assistance should be through multi-national organization to avoid impression that it is directed against any specific group. /2/"Proposed Strategy for Visit of King Faisal," June 1. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S Visit Files: Lot 67 D 587, Visit of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, June 21-23, 1966, Vol. II, Memcons, Admin and Sub. Misc.) 3. Macomber (AID) took general exception to the paper. He urged State not use the term "progressive" in describing the radical Arab regimes, implying a desirable alternative to "conservative" regimes such as Faysal's monarchy. Also, he disagreed with the principle that we should be impartial in our relations with friendly governments and those hostile to us. He thought the paper was negative, could have been written in 1962 and did not provide the basis for a positive approach. 4. Critchfield (CIA) said that in the brief 24 hours available, preliminary staffing of the paper in the Agency had produced a consensus that this approach, used by the President, would "go over like a lead balloon". The implication throughout the paper was that Faysal was somehow a principal contributor to the tension of the area, had an exaggerated view of the Communist threat to the area, was being inflexible and obstructive vis-a-vis the Yemen, would be well advised to concentrate on internal economic and political reforms to keep the Communist wolf away from the door and that Faysal did not understand that polarization in the area, to which he was contributing by his policies, was dangerous. There was no suggestion that there are principles, objectives and interests in the area to which the USG attaches importance which could be identified quite separately from the issue of the radical revolutionary regimes versus the conservative regimes. We could and should identify the dilemma we face in the current polarization of forces in the area and the dangers to world peace and our interests that we could see in a deepening of the division of the two camps. We could acknowledge that there was a Soviet-sponsored threat to the area, and that the USSR was giving support to the revolutionary regimes for its own pragmatic purposes. We could point out that, whatever Faysal's original intent, the Soviet Union had elected to distort the Islamic solidarity issue to suit its own purposes and anxieties and, for better or worse, it had become an element in the growing schism between Cairo and Jidda. Having shared our dilemma with Faysal, we could invite him to give us the benefit of his assessment and guidance. We could state that we had attempted to preserve a relationship with every Arab country--regardless of the character of its regime--as a means of preserving peace in the area. We were reluctant to abandon this policy, regardless of its weaknesses, in the absence of an alternative that accommodated our basic interest of peace and some stability in the Near East. 5. (USIA) said that the visit basically offered USIA problems since the mere fact of Faysal's visit would provide an issue for the hostile press in foreign areas. USIA found it a difficult subject to deal with in its output. The fact that the President has ordered the full protocol treatment of a State visit made the USIA task even more difficult. Rodger Davies thought the treatment given Faysal would not be obviously that much better. The White House (Saunders) was quite firm that the form of the visit had been decided. 6. Hoopes (Defense/ISA) was interested in how the visit came about. Davies said that the invitation was extended by Ambassador Eilts when he presented his credentials. The idea dated back to the summer of 1965 when the Faysal-Nasser rapprochement and the Jidda Agreement provided the right atmosphere for a Faysal visit. Hoopes' main interest was that the visit not result in any strengthening of our public commitment to "preserve the integrity of Saudi Arabia". 7. Macomber thought that it was counterproductive to argue with Faysal about the character of the Communist threat. Hoopes recalled that Critchfield had indicated at the Iran session that our intelligence on the Communist threat was weak. Critchfield corrected this recollection; the statement was that our information on the threat to the immediate areas of Kuzistan and the areas of the Upper Gulf which the Shah felt were threatened was weak. For the area as a whole, we felt reasonably confident. Hoopes thought it would be good if the IRG were better informed. Symmes said that a statement of the threat had been sent out to Jidda for Faysal which represented the views of the community. Critchfield said that this was not the case; the version sent to Jidda was uncoordinated, incomplete and not entirely accurate. However, Faysal had been exposed to a good deal of briefing over a period of time and probably had a reasonably accurate understanding of the Communist threat. What he lacked was current intelligence on the Soviet presence, leaving him vulnerable to false reports on Soviet military activities in the area. The secretary of the IRG recalled the language of the NSAM setting it up required that the IRG keep the President informed of impending crisis./3/ Critchfield said that it was the Agency's intent to have appropriate intelligence memoranda on potentially critical problems which would be brought to the attention of the IRG--related where possible to items on the agenda. Scheduling of the agenda well in advance would be helpful for this reason. /3/NSAM 341, "Direction, Coordination, and Supervision of Interdepartmental Activities Overseas," March 2, 1966, set up the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) and the Interdepartmental Regional Groups (IRGs). (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, NSAM Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 341) NSAM 341 is scheduled to be printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XXXIII. The first IRG/NEA meeting took place on March 17, 1966. 8. Rodger Davies recalled that Nasser had apparently been prepared to leave the Yemen when he went to Jidda. I questioned that there was any real evidence of this. Nasser was pressed at the time, was probably reassessing his chances for ultimate success and might have been simply seeking a break in an increasingly rough game. We had no reliable evidence that he had reached a decision to disengage--all the UAR statements to U.S. officials notwithstanding. Turning back from the Yemen would be a very tough decision for Nasser and not one that he would be likely to come to until convinced that chances of success were nil. Davies also noted that we should keep in mind that the single greatest overseas investment that U.S. business holds anywhere in the world is in Saudi Arabia and that it is an important factor in our gold balance. He thought we should distinguish in our thinking of what we would really do if Saudi Arabia were threatened and what we indicated to Faysal, the Arabs and the world we would do. He personally thought we would end up intervening in a real crunch. This was obviously not something to convey to Faysal in the upcoming visit. Mr. Davies seemed to have unanimous support in the views he expressed on this point. 9. At the end of the discussion on Faysal's visit it was agreed that, with AID and CIA dissenting, the paper would have to be re-drafted. The White House was also associated with this requirement--less on substance than on the point that it contained little usable for the President. State invited the CIA representative to provide any comment or ideas in writing. [Here follows discussion of Syria and the Soviet Union.]
272. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, June 18, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Saudi Arabia, King Faisal Trip to U.S., 6/21/66-7/1/66. Secret. King Faisal's visit will depend--more than usual--as much on the tone you set as on the substance. He is apprehensive--largely because he has been fed a variety of myths about our motives in the Middle East. For example, he has never completely believed that we have not made Nasser our "chosen instrument" there. He is suspicious of Zionist influence in Washington. These are not chip-on-the-shoulder views--probably because he knows better. But they are deep-seated enough to make him uneasy about what he will find here. There is also real substance to talk about. Your first look may make you feel it will be hard to hit it off with this bearded, robed desert king. But Faisal is a lot more modern than he looks. Under those robes, you will find a sharp mind and deep devotion to educational and social progress. I am sure he will warm to your sincerity and frankness. I would be surprised if you do not find him a man you can like and draw out. It is worth the effort. Our largest single overseas private enterprise is the Arabian-American Oil Company's $1.2 billion investment in Saudi Arabia. In addition, all our other Middle East interests--from blocking Communism to preserving Israel--depend heavily on gradual modernization under moderate leaders like Faisal who oppose the revolutionary methods of Nasser and Communism. Nasser's propaganda machine will have a field day with this visit. After two years of relative harmony, the Middle East is splitting again into two camps centering around Faisal and Nasser. The Egyptians see moderate leaders like Faisal, the Shah and King Hussein as "imperialist tools" and accuse us of conspiring with them and the Israelis to undercut him. So State recommends we keep the public part of this visit low-key. While I agree that we do not want to throw our arms around Faisal, I feel the tone of State's briefing papers is too negative. We have invited Faisal for good reason, and we realize that some Arabs will give us a hard time for it. But within reason, we want to treat him like the friend he is. Faisal comes with two worries. First, he believes the Communists are intensifying their push into the Middle East. Second, he sees evidence of this in his rising tension with Nasser over Yemen. He sees Nasser as Moscow's pawn. He has never understood why we have tried to get close to Nasser and feels we overlook the real menace. He is uncertain that we will stick by him in a showdown. I will give you a brief talking paper Monday night, but here in outline are the points we want to get across: 1. We share his opposition to Communism. --We do not define Communism as broadly as he does. We do not see Nasser, for instance, as a Communist. But we know full well how Moscow can exploit Nasser's kind of local nationalism. --We think the main Soviet objective is to split the Middle East into two camps--the revolutionaries (UAR, Syria, Iraq) and the evolutionaries (Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon). --One way to undercut this Soviet strategy is to keep Moscow from posing as the only champion of modernization by proving that the methods of the moderate regimes offer better hope of effective social and economic development. --Another way is for Faisal and Nasser to patch up their dispute over Yemen. Although we sympathize with Faisal's grievances about Nasser's behavior there, we think it would be worth considerable effort and maybe even a little loss of face to reach agreement and undercut the Soviet effort to divide the Middle East. 2. We have not made Nasser our chosen instrument. --You can be quite candid in admitting we are disappointed with our effort to get closer to Nasser. Faisal has always felt we judged Nasser wrong, and he will appreciate your not being defensive. --However, we still feel our objective is right. We still do not see how slamming the door on Nasser--much as we sometimes feel like it--would help anybody but the Communists. We doubt cutting off aid completely would change his policies. 3. We will not let Nasser swallow up Saudi Arabia. --We will continue to "support Saudi integrity." We have often restated that purposely vague assurance, but Faisal may want to pin us down. He would like to know whether we will send troops or aircraft. We cannot give that kind of assurance (a) because we do not want to give him a blank check for triggering a showdown with Nasser and (b) Vietnam makes us more wary than ever of involvement. The best way to answer him is to repeat our general assurance but to say that it is impossible to say exactly what our response would be. It is in his interest as well as ours that we retain maximum flexibility and not commit ourselves to jump in militarily when other tools might be as effective--and better both our interests. 4. We hope Faisal will play a constructive role in South Arabia and the Persian Gulf as the British retrench there. --That area is the prime candidate in the Middle East for the kind of sub-regional cooperation we are pushing in Africa and the Far East. The British pull-back will leave a vacuum which Nasser is trying to fill. There is room for cooperation among the moderates--Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran and even Pakistan and Afghanistan--to help financially and politically as the shaky new nation emerges in South Arabia. --If you could capture Faisal's imagination on steps he might take to promote these developments, this could be the top accomplishment of the visit and a big step forward for our Mid-East policy. I recommend you take a good look at the strategy and talking points papers in the smaller State Department briefing book (Tabs A 1 and 2)./2/ If you have time to look at a few of the background papers (under Tab II in the larger book), I would start with the rundown of our security assurances (Tab C) since you may have to discuss this in some detail. Beyond that, it might be worth glancing over Tabs A (Saudi objectives in the Middle East), B (Yemen) and D (South Arabia and the Persian Gulf). /2/None of the tabs is attached. Briefing material for Faisal's visit is ibid., King Faisal Visit, Briefing Book, 6/21-23/66; and National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S Visit Files: Lot 67 D 587, Visit of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, June 21-23 1966--Volume I--Briefing Book. Walt
273. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, June 20, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Saudi Arabia, King Faisal Trip to U.S., 6/21/66-7/1/66. Secret. Our goal with Faisal is to persuade him not to break with Nasser and split the Middle East. We also want him to feel you are his friend without thinking he has a blank check to pick a fight with Nasser. Suggested talking points: 1. You would like to outline your views on the Middle East and then hear his. You will be frank and hope he will. --You assume Nasser is Faisal's most immediate concern. You have problems with him too. You are discouraged with trying to get closer to him, but you want to keep the door open. --You share his concern over Communist penetration, and you know how Moscow exploits local nationalists like Nasser. --Our goal is to keep Moscow from splitting the Middle East into radical and moderate camps. Slamming the door on Nasser would help only the Soviets. A Yemen settlement would thwart them. --Economic and social progress is the best check on Communism. You are making our own reform programs the base for a worldwide attack on poverty, illiteracy and disease. 2. You would like to hear Faisal's views--on the widening Middle East split, Yemen mediation, and social and economic progress. 3. You would like to hear how Faisal plans to fill the gap the British will leave in South Arabia and the Persian Gulf. (I hope you can get Faisal excited about cooperating with his moderate neighbors, either through the World Bank, the UN, or an Arab Development Bank. You can cite how we push the Asian Development Bank, Mekong Valley development, the Ganges-Brahmaputra River projects.) 4. You want to reiterate our support for Saudi Arabia's integrity. If he asks exactly what we would do if Nasser attacked him, your best answer is that we do not think either of us should be committed in advance to any specific course. But we will not let Saudia Arabia get swallowed up. For flavor, I am attaching a short summary by our Ambassador, Herman Eilts. You might also want to review State's fuller talking points. Walt Attachment/2/ /2/Confidential. KING FAISAL'S VISIT The King is reserved and modest, but proud. A devout Muslim and conservative, he has much natural wisdom. He believes in evolutionary progress. He is sensitive with an occasional streak of stubbornness. He is pro-American and a great admirer of the President. He has long wanted to meet the President. Now, with the moment at hand, he is slightly apprehensive that he may be rebuffed or be unable adequately to convey his concerns. These are the growth of Communism in the Near East, Nasser (whom he equates with Communism), Yemen, and the security of Saudi Arabia. We share a considerable community of interest on all these points, but do not entirely see them as the King does. In talks with him, it may be helpful to know that he reacts positively to warmth, candor and confidence. A good way to get him to unbend is to ask his views. He usually gives them frankly, even in dissent. Where he agrees, his word is his bond. Somewhat greater flexibility on Yemen would be helpful on his part. The President may wish to ask him about the Kuwaiti mediation effort, and impress on him our interest in an honorable settlement for all. He has moved ahead on internal reform, but should be encouraged to do more. The subject is sensitive. A good approach would be for the President to tell him of our own efforts in areas of social reform, such as civil rights, etc., then casually ask him how his program is progressing. He, too, has his domestic obstacles, and sympathetic appreciation of them will show our continued interest and spur him on. Above all, the King is a good friend. He would like to be reassured that his friendship is appreciated. Our ability to continue to influence him constructively in the months ahead, including in matters where we reap tangible benefits, will depend in part on whether we can make him feel that, despite certain differences of emphasis, our friendship for Saudi Arabia is real, that we appreciate his problems and that he can count on us to give appropriate help to try to solve them.
274. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, June 21, 1966, 4:45 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Saudi Arabia, King Faisal Trip to U.S., 6/21/66-7/1/66. Confidential. Secretary Rusk has briefed me on his discussion with King Faisal./2/ We jointly recommend that you raise the following points with him at 5:00 this afternoon: /2/Rusk telephoned Rostow at 4:30 p.m. and said that Read had told him that the President wanted to know what to say to Faisal at 5 p.m. He said he told the King at lunch that the President would want to get Faisal's own analysis of what was going on in the Arab world. Rusk recommended that Johnson suggest that their two governments discreetly keep in closer touch on this as well as on major questions outside the Arab world. The Secretary agreed with Rostow's suggestion that the President ask for the King's ideas about working with the South Arab Federation. Rusk also thought that Johnson should emphasize U.S. interest in having a Yemen settlement which would return Egyptian troops to Egypt. (Record of Telephone Conversation Between Rusk and Rostow, June 21, 4:30 p.m.; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 72 D 192, Files of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, 1961-1969, Rusk Telcons) 1. Ask for his appraisal of the forces at work in the Arab world. 2. Suggest that we both have an interest in the return of Egyptian troops to Egypt; and that it is a common interest that we achieve a Yemen settlement. 3. Indicate your knowledge and support for Secretary Rusk's suggestion at lunch that we discreetly keep in closer touch about developments in the Arab world--and, indeed, elsewhere where we have common interests. 4. Indicate your knowledge that he has been carrying out important economic and social development programs in Saudi Arabia; ask him to discuss these; and encourage him--perhaps with some talk of your own Great Society plans in the U.S. 5. Ask the King to discuss the future of the South Arabian Federation; the possibilities of constructive work in that region in collaboration with the World Bank and other international institutions./3/ /3/A handwritten notation in the President's handwriting reads: "W--I followed this point by point--all 3 papers attached. L" Two of the papers referred to are printed as Document 273 and its attachment. Walt
275. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, June 21, 1966, 5:05-6:25 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Saudi Arabia, Memos, Vol. I, 12/63-4/67. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Sabbagh on June 22. The time of the meeting is from the President's Daily Diary. (Ibid.) The memorandum is Part I of II. Part II is Document 276. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS The President Mr. Isa Sabbagh, Interpreter Before going into the Cabinet Room the President and King Faisal had spent one hour and 20 minutes in a personal chat and an exchange of views of a general nature at first with increasing emphasis on social reforms in the United States of America and in Saudi Arabia. The President opened the personal tete-a-tete by once again assuring His Majesty of a warm welcome as an honored guest, adding how much the President had been looking forward to this visit. The President emphasized how heads of states had their own problems, some of which were very similar in nature and he went on to enumerate what he subsequently crystallized as "my bill of rights". These, if the President has the longevity of life and the tenure of office and the good health, would assure every citizen of equality, of a decent home, of a decently paying job, of fresh air and water, adequate education to the highest levels possible, medical facilities from infancy to old age, and the beautification of the United States of America. At this point, he invited the King to enumerate what he had been doing for his own people, given his acknowledged wisdom and determination. The King described at length the increasing efforts exerted during the last 3 or 4 years in the field of education with the result that in Saudi Arabia a school is being built every 3 days or less. Here, the President expressed his appreciation of this "wonderful work" particularly since "I started my working career as a school teacher". As to the problems that Saudi Arabia faced and is still facing in this field, the greatest of these is the shortage of teachers who, of necessity, have had to be imported from neighboring Arab countries. Problem number two was the need to revamp the educational curriculum for elementary schools because the original education plans were drawn up with the assistance of non-Saudi experts, mostly Arabs from other parts of the world, particularly Egypt. At this point the King said, "we have discovered that some of the subjects suggested according to those old plans included matters which would fashion the tender young minds of our youth in a way prejudicial to the interests of our country. In view of these two problems, we have come to the decision that it would be unwise to our future generations to place these easily molded minds in the hands of strangers who do not share with us the genuine interests of our country". Turning to the field of medicine, the King mentioned that his Government was doing its utmost about providing hospitals and clinics even in the remote parts of the vast Kingdom of Saudi Arabia but that there too Saudi Arabia faced the problem of the inadequacy of doctors, nurses, and professional people in their field. Here also, Saudi Arabia has had to resort to the importation of doctors and specialists from neighboring Arab countries, because it would be impossible to import a large number of non-Arabic speaking doctors without providing each doctor with a translator between him and the patient. King Faisal admitted, however, that all that has been done is not, in his opinion, enough. He was also looking forward to the time when they could feel that they have achieved self-sufficiency in this regard. As to the pace of progress and development, King Faisal thought that the pace was consonant with the smooth evolutionary development of that country given its built-in peculiarities and checks. In fact, some well wishers who had re-visited the country recently after the passage of some ten years expressed their opinion that progress was moving at too fast a rate. King Faisal said he did not think so but in any case there was no room for comparison between what the country now had and what it did have or, in fact, did not have ten years ago. At this point President Johnson expressed his deep admiration for what King Faisal and his Government were trying to do for their own people because, to the President, social advancement and meaningful development were the only reply to the Communist ambitions of infiltrating and gaining control of a country. The President noted that he was very pleased that he and King Faisal shared the same views as to the Communist dangers to the area and the tactics the Soviets resort to. The President told King Faisal "Even before you say it, Your Majesty, I would like you to know that we are aware of Nasser's tactics, ambitions, propaganda and designs". "I have my problems with the fellow." In elaborating, the President expressed his opinion that the U.S. considers it in the long run prudent to leave room for a dialogue with somebody like Nasser because once you slam the door in his face you might heave him into the lap of the other side and, as a consequence, you might have another Dominican Republic develop in that area. As His Majesty is aware, the President said, we had to go in with armed forces into the Dominican Republic to put a stop to the Communist takeover of that country and to make sure that free elections were carried out. On the question of the U.S. relations with the U.A.R. the President mentioned that we seek reasonable relations and maintenance of our limited influence with President Nasser. The President said we are actively reviewing the extent of our future assistance, taking into consideration various actions of Nasser including his attitude toward and relations with Saudi Arabia. With respect to the area generally, the President admired King Faisal's restraint in the face of all the intrigues, accusations and propaganda campaigns levelled at him and his country. Coupled with this admiration the President urged the King to keep up this attitude of self-restraint because "we both want to see a peaceful settlement of the Yemeni problem". At this point the President referred with appreciation to the King's restraint in replying to questions posed by a BBC representative lately. The President expressed his knowledge of and support for Secretary Rusk's suggestions at lunch that "we keep discreetly in closer touch about developments in the Arab world and indeed elsewhere where we have common interests". The President said that he felt sure he could benefit and learn a lot from such a wise man as King Faisal whose word "my people tell me" is his bond. The President would therefore welcome the views of His Majesty on the following points (the President said maybe the King would wish to take a little time to ponder these points, therefore he did not have to answer right away). The points were: 1. Appraisal of the forces at work in the Arab world. 2. The possibility of helping such areas as South Arabia and the Gulf in developing peacefully. The President wondered what His Majesty felt about the possibility of Saudi Arabia cooperating with moderate elements and governments in the area for the purpose of helping those two regions such as the establishment of an Arab development body. 3. The areas where redoubled efforts could be exerted for increasing development in Saudi Arabia. As to the President's remarks about Faisal's wisdom and the President's ability to learn therefrom, Faisal replied that such a generous remark indicated modesty which in this case was synonymous with greatness. It staggered Faisal's imagination to think that such a person, one human being, could really find time, energy and dedication to the solution of tremendous problems internally, to the carrying out of such terrific advances in the fields of civil rights and social development as the President had crystallized in his "bill of rights" and at the same time to keep up the healthy American leadership of the Free World, because "whether you like it or not" you are the leader of the Free World. To Faisal it was a sign of God's blessings that he granted the United States of America such an intelligent, determined and dedicated President. Heaven forbid that His Majesty should seek to malign the memory of the late President Kennedy, whom he admired greatly, but looking back on those days His Majesty felt that during President Kennedy's latter period in office and because of President Kennedy's bigness of heart and goodness of nature, there were a few areas where, if unchecked, social reforms might have tended to slip into the abyss of increasing socialism which in itself would in the long run almost automatically develop into Communism. His Majesty noted that since President Johnson's tenure of office that tendency had been firmly checked. The President wished to take the opportunity to reassure His Majesty of our previous expressions of help and support for the wise programs that he and his Government were carrying out. He wanted His Majesty to know that he, the President, appreciates what King Faisal and his Government were trying to do for their own people and that such efforts were bound to forestall any Communist ambitions in the direction of Saudi Arabia. The President wished to reiterate the assurances given by the U.S. Government to Faisal of our concern for the safety, integrity and well being of your country and yourself. "As long as I am in office" said President Johnson, "I will not permit your country to be gobbled up by the Communists. And now, after I have had the pleasure of meeting you and knowing you, and especially after this rewarding conversation, I would like you to know that I appreciate Your Majesty personally much more this evening than I did even this morning, and I would like you to know that I wouldn't permit you to be gobbled up either." The President emphasized that it was precisely because we took this kind of attitude towards our loyal friends that he related with sorrow, that since World War II America has sacrificed something like 170,000 casualties in our fight for freedom and liberty and the betterment of mankind and in standing up to the Communist encroachments. King Faisal reacted almost emotionally to this by saying "We deeply appreciate the sacrifices and the efforts expended by the U.S. in behalf of humanity." Reverting to the subject of President Nasser, President Johnson said that he doubted very much if Nasser, in the absence of any provocation on the part of Saudi Arabia, either directly or by helping the royalists in the Yemen to commit any provocative act, "would dare attack Saudi Arabia". The President said we have sold arms and equipment to Israel as we have sold similar material to Jordan and to Saudi Arabia, but it was not the policy of the U.S. to be the major supplier of arms to that area. Since time was running fast the President suggested that King Faisal and he join "our colleagues" in the Cabinet Room where, if he thought possible, King Faisal would give his observations on the President's remarks.
276. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, June 21, 1966, 6:25-7:10 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Saudi Arabia, Memos, Vol. I, 12/63-4/67, Secret. Drafted by Moore on June 22. The time of the meeting is from the President's Daily Diary. (Ibid.) The memorandum is Part II of II. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS King Faisal The President (The President and the King rejoined the others in the Cabinet Room after over one hour's private session.)/2/ /2/See Document 275. The President said they had had a delightful talk together. They spoke of what they both hope to do in the development field, of US interest in the integrity of Saudi Arabia, of events in Southeast Asia, of possibilities for use of the World Bank, of their mutual problems with Communism and their attempts to build up their own systems as bulwarks. He said he did not know when he had so enjoyed such a visit and that he and the King had established real rapport. He said the King had expressed his views during the first part of their talk and that he had spoken during the second part. The King now had some comments to make. The King emphasized that he was fully aware of US good intentions, good will and willingness to support Saudi Arabia. He was so reassured of the US position that he felt he should apologize for having even thought there was a need to mention it. The King's major question related to our joint concern over the danger Communism presented for the whole world and for the Near Eastern area, which in turn could have great ramifications for the rest of the world. Communism was like a germ which, if allowed to grow, ultimately destroyed the whole body. South East Asia was a good example. It was his personal view that if firm decisions had been taken there in 1954 the present sacrifices of the flower of American youth would not be necessary. He recalled that many people, even in the US, used to refer to Mao Tse-tung as merely a reformer. The President interjected that we still had deluded people, the Near East had no monopoly on these. The King continued that where situations, such as Vietnam, develop as the result of views of such naive, misguided people, it was lamentable when firm measures were not taken sufficiently early. While he does not favor the principle of military intervention, the US position is clear. It must intervene in all areas to stop the growth of such problems in their infancy. The President said that the 170,000 US casualties since World War II were proof of our interest in stopping such developments. The King, after expressing deep appreciation for and sympathy with the US for such sacrifices in US lives, urged that we not allow such a development as Vietnam to be re-enacted in the Near East. The King referred to the President's remarks about the Saudis cooperating with others in the area to stem the tide of Communism and stated that such was precisely his aim, whether on the Arab or Islamic level, to make people conscious of this danger. The King, referring to the President's comments concerning US-UAR relations, asked that he not be considered as advocating that we not aid any needy people, Arab or otherwise. It was up to the US, on the basis of its expertise, to determine how far it wished to go with such aid. He was sure that the US was aware of the need to help countries which were still young, to enable them to resist the still-immature Communist danger and eradicate it. He emphasized that he was not referring to Saudi Arabia. The question of US assistance in various ways to Saudi Arabia is one strictly between the two of us. He found it lamentable to hear so many people saying, "If you want help from the US, the quickest way is to speak out against the US." This of course was not true, but was frequently said and influenced a great majority of the people. The King referred to the President's remarks on Yemen concerning the avoidance of provocative acts such as helping the royalists. He wished strongly to reassure the President that since signature of the Jidda Agreement he had done nothing provocative. It was the other side which had continued provocative actions. (The President interjected to say that he had spoken of the climate for a settlement being enhanced by the King's continued restraint, not resuming arms shipments and such.) The King continued that he wished only to show that there were only two possible alternatives for the resumption of hostilities: 1) consistent acts from the other side could finally force the royalists to retaliate; or 2) the other side could finally take action on the pretext that they had been provoked. In these cases, what could Saudi Arabia do to establish the fact that it had not undertaken any provocative acts? Saudi Arabia will continue to exercise self-restraint, but developments might force it to take action. This was not to imply that he had anything else in mind, however, other than continued restraint. However, every day that passed with the Egyptians still in Yemen meant one further day of Communist gains there. The King, referring to South Arabia, said the British had made a major mistake by failing to develop, during the years of their presence, a cadre of competent local personnel who could run the country. Now they had suddenly announced their intent to withdraw completely in two years, including the military base, which left the country with little capability for government. The King was most happy to see independence come to these Arabs, but he feared that chaotic conditions would result. He hoped that the US and the UK could prevent this chaos. All he asked was that the US act to keep external aggression from the area. Concerning aid to South Arabia, Saudi Arabia was ready to help, just as it was helping the Trucial Shaikhdom of the Gulf, but it did not wish to interfere in local affairs or try to dominate them. The President's idea of an international aid entity of some type was a good one, but he feared that if it were an Arab Development Bank or some such body it would be dominated by the UAR, Syria or such countries for their own purposes. Mr. Rostow suggested that to begin development in South Arabia and the Gulf, concentration should be placed on smaller, specific projects. The King agreed that local aid of limited scope was a sound approach. The King agreed in principle with Mr. Rostow's view that, for US aid, the first requirement was that the Governments and the peoples in a given area should request our help. But the King said that as a result of the avalanche of propaganda from the UAR, Syria and similar sources, there were few people willing to ask the West for aid. They were afraid for their own lives. Current terrorism in South Arabia, instigated by the UAR from Yemen, resulted in this. The methods pursued by the UAR and Syria there were clearly Communist methods. Not that the people involved are convinced Communists--they are believers in nothing--but their actions serve only to enhance the spread of Communism. The President noted the recent success of peoples in asserting their rights in the Dominican Republic, Indonesia, and Ghana, and then suggested, because of the late hour, that they continue their talks at dinner and on the following day.
277. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, June 22, 1966, 10 a.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 SAUD. Secret. Drafted by Sabbagh and approved in S on July 14. The meeting was held at Blair House. The time and place of the meeting are from Rusk's Appointment Book. (Johnson Library) The memorandum is Part II of II. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS The Secretary Mr. Isa Sabbagh, Interpreter Before leaving, Secretary Rusk asked His Majesty for a private audience which would take up only a few minutes. The interpreter was asked by the Secretary to remain. The Secretary then told His Majesty that, as His Majesty was doubtless aware, our PL 480 Agreement with the U.A.R. would come to an end by the end of this month. It was, however, unfortunate that the decision the U.S. Government has come to with respect to that agreement coincided with His Majesty's visit to the United States. The decision is that the U.S. Government was not going to renew the PL 480 Agreement with regard to wheat for Egypt, but that instead we would be inviting the Egyptians if they so wished to buy what they want, like anybody else, according to the C.C.C. system (Commodity Credit Corporation). The Secretary expressed his belief that the reaction in Cairo will be a violent one and that not only the U.S. but also King Faisal himself would in all likelihood be subjected to a fresh tirade of propaganda from Cairo. The Secretary wished His Majesty to know of this development straight from him (the Secretary) rather than via Cairo's propaganda. The King said that he had been so hardened to the Cairo propaganda outbursts and attacks against him personally that he was not worried. "They could not possibly say worse things than they have already said." Faisal added, "As I said yesterday, as a person and a human being I do find it very difficult to actually suggest that people be deprived of food in any way, but I also added that it was up to the giver to determine in his own best interests what to give, to whom, how much and when." King Faisal expressed the opinion that, of course, this kind of human sentiment President Nasser would not understand nor would he believe it as having been expressed by Faisal. On the contrary, Nasser was most likely to accuse Faisal of all sorts of wicked designs which he, according to Nasser, would suggest to the U.S. to carry out. [1 paragraph (8 lines of source text) not declassified]
278. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, June 22, 1966, 5:05-5:35 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Saudi Arabia, Memos, Vol. I, 12/63-4/67. Secret. Drafted by Moore on June 24 and approved by Walt Rostow on July 11. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room at the White House. The time and place of the meeting are from the President's Daily Diary. (Ibid.) SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS King Faisal The President The President first ascertained that the King approved the draft joint communique. Commenting that he had another meeting scheduled at 5:30, he asked if the King had any further matters to take up. The King said that they had closed their meeting of the previous day while discussing cooperation between certain states in the area. He wished to affirm that this cooperation was possible if it were confined to states whose policies were consonant with those we all share. A disturbing element was that many people in those countries with whom we would wish to cooperate were filled with fear of propaganda and other activities of the states who wish to make trouble. However, these presently fearful states would be greatly encouraged if they clearly understood that the U.S. was willing to ward off threats against them, to assist them and give them guidance. Unfortunately, those who fish in troubled waters have spread the impression that the U.S. is not ready to oppose evil actions, but turns a blind eye to certain events, for example, those in Zanzibar and Yemen. The King, continuing his comments on Yemen, said all the leaders on the republican side are Leftists, whether or not they have specific ties to Moscow or Peking. He recalled that in 1962, after the Yemen revolution, he had pleaded with his friends in the U.S. Government not to rush into recognition, but to give events time to clarify and show the real tendencies of the new government. The King said he did not advocate that the U.S. use armed forces to interfere in the domestic affairs of other states but recommended that a clear indication that the U.S. supported the endeavors of like-minded states would stiffen the spines of those people who were presently fearful. Saying that he was loathe to bring up the subject, the King noted that those who opposed our principles continued to argue that U.S. assistance to Israel was proof of American opposition to all Arabs. This greatly hindered the actions of states which in fact would desire to cooperate with America. Even the King had undergone tremendous abuse in the area for his continuing with his visit to the U.S. in the face of the recent U.S. announcement of its arms sale to Israel. It was claimed that this proved that the King and the U.S. were conspiring against Arab interests. However, the King ignored these attacks since he knew they were intended only to prevent his coming. The President responded that it was the price of leadership that not all the 120 nations with whom we have relations are friendly with us. He agreed that it was not easy for us to use our influence wisely in every part of the world. He assured the King that we would carefully consider his comments and admonitions, and added that we cannot encourage other countries too much without being ready to back up our encouragement with military force if necessary. We were not able to use our military power everywhere in the world, but the 170,000 U.S. casualties since the end of World War II were proof that we used our power to oppose aggression, both direct and indirect. Just as President Kennedy had assured the King, we would continue to support those leaders who shared with us the principles of freedom, of working for the betterment of their own people, and of peaceful settlement of disputes. He told the King that our concern for the integrity of his country was no less now than had been expressed to him by President Kennedy. Concerning arms sales, the President said that we supplied certain countries when we did not want them to obtain arms from other sources (e.g. Jordan, Israel) and when we thought that, by helping them with their own defense, we could ultimately keep them from fighting. Concerning our relations with the U.A.R., we hope to maintain some influence with Nasser, particularly with respect to what he does in Yemen. In conclusion, the President said that it is not easy to use our influence wisely in every part of the world. As you say, we cannot use our military power everywhere--we should not. We do, however, work on certain principles: (1) oppose aggression, direct and indirect; (b) support those who work for their people; (c) try to encourage peaceful settlement of disputes. It is not always easy to decide how to apply these principles. But His Majesty can be assured his views will be taken into account--and we are his friend--because he stands for all three principles. He thought the King's visit had been most useful and he was greatly appreciative that the King had come so far to see us. The King responded with an expression of gratitude for all the warmth of the President's welcome and the meeting of minds which they had. While saying goodbye on the way to the car, the King asked the President to visit Saudi Arabia, saying it would be the realization of a precious dream which he had. The President responded that he would most like to make such a visit when the pressures of his work allowed.
279. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts/1/ Washington, June 27, 1966, 5:07 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 SAUD. Confidential. Drafted by Korn and Moore; cleared by Bruce Buttles (NEA/P), Symmes, James B. Freeman (P), Thomas J. Hirchfield (EUR/GER), Country Director for Italy, Austria, and Switzerland Wells Stabler, Robert E. Barbour (EUR/WE), Country Director for Northern African Affairs John F. Root, Judd, Country Director for Turkey John M. Howison, and Officer in Charge of Political Affairs in EUR's Office of Atlantic Political and Military Affairs Edward G. Boehm; and approved by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs William J. Handley. Sent to Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Cairo, Taiz, Aden, Kuwait, Baghdad, Tel Aviv, Khartoum, Tripoli, Tunis, Algiers, Rabat, Ankara, Jidda, Dhahran, Tehran, Paris (also for USRO), Rome, London, Bonn, CINCSTRIKE, USUN, and Mogadiscio. 2550. 1. Following FYI represents Dept preliminary assessment Faisal visit: a. Visit successful and US aims in inviting Faisal generally accomplished: (1) Faisal and President established good personal rapport which will be asset in our future relations. Faisal's public statements revealed extraordinary impact President made on him (e.g. at press luncheon June 22 King said hours he had spent with President were among most precious of his life). (2) We apparently successful in focusing Faisal's attention on importance vigorous pursuit his economic and social development programs. Subject was dealt with extensively in meetings with President. King devoted bulk his remarks at press luncheon to development efforts. (3) USG welcomed King warmly and was successful in reassuring him of our continued friendship and concern for safety his country. In effort avoid contributing to further polarization of Near East into Soviet and Western-supported blocs, we did not give any new security assurances. Cairo press reaction has been relatively moderate. Close reading of communique and US officials' public statements should make clear US does not seek chosen instrument in area. b. Visit marred somewhat by events stemming from Faisal's extemporaneous press luncheon remarks June 22 that "Jews of the world aid Israel . . . In our situation we consider those who aid our enemy as our enemy." (Press did not find so quotable Faisal's further clarification that he opposed not to Jews but to Zionists.) Remarks were made in response several baited questions on Israel, the Jews and Arab boycott. While unfortunate, statement reflects Arab view and King could not retract or apologize without severe damage to his position in Near East. King not particularly concerned re cancellation Lindsay dinner and Gov Rockefeller's call/2/ and is understood be planning remain New York as scheduled until June 30 departure. He has reportedly received hundreds telegrams from Americans apologizing for Mayor's and Governor's actions. End FYI. /2/In response to the furor over the King's remarks on Jews and Israel during his June 22 press conference in Washington, New York Mayor John Lindsay announced on June 23 that the dinner scheduled in Faisal's honor that evening had been canceled. Later that day New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller canceled his scheduled call on the King. 2. Addresses may draw on following as appropriate in answering host govt, press or other queries re visit: a. As reflected in final communique, visit afforded opportunity for King and President to become personally acquainted, discuss broad range of world issues and strengthen long-standing cordial relations between two countries. b. Both President and King were much interested in discussing internal development efforts. We greatly encouraged by progress Saudi Arabia making and King's determination energetically pursue his development program. c. Question of security guarantees exaggerated by press. USG for many years has had strong interest in security and territorial integrity Saudi Arabia, as expressed by President Kennedy in his Oct 25, 1962 letter to Faisal./3/ (If questioned whether timing of visit does not demonstrate that US taking sides in inter-Arab disputes, you should make clear that visit planned months ago when atmosphere in Near East quite different from present; timing of visit unrelated to area developments.) /3/For text of President Kennedy's letter to Crown Prince Faisal, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XVIII, Document 88. d. Re Faisal remarks on Jews and US public reaction, Dept spokesmen stating it not appropriate comment on statements made by King while he guest of USG. Our differences with Arabs on Israel well known to all sides. It not necessary have identity of views on all issues in order entertain friendly relations. Mayor's dinner and Governor's call were scheduled on their initiatives; decisions to cancel were made by them. No other events on King's New York schedule have been cancelled. Ball [Continue with the next documents] Volume XXI Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |