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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXI Near East Region Department of State |
 257. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia/1/ Washington, November 8, 1965, 7:56 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 1-4 SAUD. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Moore and Quinn; cleared by Warren, Judd, Feigl (DOD/ISA/ILN), Colonel E. Dreiss (DOD/DDRE/OAD/DS), Symmes, Colonel Byrd, and Stoddart; and approved by Davies. Repeated to London, CHUSMTM Dhahran, Paris, CINCSTRIKE, Dhahran, and Paris for DAUSRO. 239. Embtel 344./2/ Saudi Air Defense. /2/In telegram 344 from Jidda, November 3, Seelye reported that the King was "somewhat irritated" that, in view of the special U.S.-Saudi relationship, the United States had not revealed in advance of the British the nature of the combined U.S.-U.K. proposal. On November 3 at a meeting with Sultan, U.K. Ambassador Mann, and U.K. Ministry of Aviation officials, Sultan noted that he wanted the United Kingdom to understand that Saudi Arabia relied primarily on U.S. Government military support and on its undertaking to maintain Saudi Arabia's integrity. He said he would be inclined toward the combined package if he could be assured: 1) that the Hawk system could be integrated effectively with British components; 2) that the U.S. Government fully endorsed it as being a viable air defense for Saudi Arabia, and 3) that the United States could provide the same credit terms as the United Kingdom. (Ibid.) 1. You may assure Sultan that US Hawk missile system is completely autonomous system and can be effectively integrated with British air defense warning radar (e.g., 3-D radar) and Lightning aircraft, provided UK does not attempt substitute UK components for US Hawk system components. If Saudis desire, US prepared to send OSD and/or Raytheon rep to answer technical questions or present price proposal, respectively. 2. We do not believe we would have great difficulty in equalling UK credit terms for our portion of combined package. Suggest you so inform Sultan jointly with UK reps on Wednesday when they expected present their credit offer. (UK MinAv official Christie suggested this.) 3. Providing Lightning aircraft, ground radars and Hawk system radars use Mark 10 IFF interrogator/transponder equipment and manual command control is used, the proposed joint US-UK air defense package consisting of Lightnings, 3-D radars, Hawks and communication systems does appear to constitute a viable air defense system. Categoric assurance can only be given after US and UK technical experts discuss detailed composition of UK package elements. Discussion expected within next two weeks. 4. Raytheon currently preparing cost estimates on basis Col. Vaughn's survey. Unable at this time to determine when such estimates will be available. However, will attempt have Raytheon ready to submit costing data within ten days. Advise how you think this data best submitted, i.e., through Lockheed, BAC, UK or US Embassy, or directly by Raytheon. 5. Lockheed rep Hansen ETA Jidda Nov. 10. 6. Re your 349,/3/ agree that if SAG accepts combined package we and British faced with much sorting out our respective roles Saudi Arabia. While it perhaps not worthwhile delve into details until Saudi decision known, we hope Dep Asst Sec Davies will have opportunity initial discussions with British during London trip toward end this month. /3/Dated November 4. (Ibid., DEF 12-5 SAUD) 7. For London: We have informed Brit Emb. of paras 1-3 above. You may also inform HMG. Rusk
258. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, February 16, 1966, 11:30 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Saudi Arabia, Memos, Vol. I, 12/63-4/67. Secret. Saudi Visitor. Here is yet another plea that you receive an Arab special emissary./2/ King Faisal wants to send his brother Prince Sultan, we think to talk about Yemen. What probably triggered this is the pending visit of Anwar Sadat, the No. 3 Egyptian, which Faisal fears is a play to get us to back the UAR. /2/In telegram 691 from Jidda, February 16, Eilts reported that Deputy Foreign Minister Omar Saqqaf had informed him that the King wanted to send his brother, Prince Sultan, to Washington with a special message from him to President Johnson, and had asked if the President could see Sultan either February 21 or 22. The Ambassador had responded that the President's schedule was always very full, but that he would immediately send the King's request to the Department. Saqqaf said he did not know the nature of the message, but suspected it would have to do with the Yemen situation. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 SAUD) We keep trying to get these clients to realize that a letter will do the trick just as well and no need to send a dignitary to present it. But kings and emperors do these things differently. So State urgently recommends that you agree to see him. It would only take 15 minutes, and Faisal is a very good friend. However, we'd tell Faisal not to worry about the Egyptian or to embarrass us by sneaking his man in first. R. W. Komer/3/ /3/McGeorge Bundy initialed below Komer's signature. Approve /4/Johnson added a third option by hand: "I may not be here. Call me--L."
259. Telegram From the Consulate General in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State/1/ Dhahran, February 20, 1966, 1454Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 SAUD. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Jidda, London, and Cairo. 235. From Ambassador Eilts. Contel 234./2/ /2/Dated February 20. (Ibid., POL 23-7 NEAR E) 1. After trade mission had withdrawn, King and I had lengthy, two-hour private discussion attended only by Saqqaf. I first conveyed substance Deptel 470 to Jidda/3/ that President will receive Prince Sultan noon February 21. King expressed real pleasure and outlined background Sultan's mission as follows: /3/Dated February 19. (Ibid., POL 7 SAUD) 2. As I knew, King had long been worried about growing Communist threat in Middle East area. Admittedly this threat still largely latent, but something should be done nip it in time before situation degenerates into open conflict as it has in Southeast Asia. He had therefore decided send his brother, Sultan, even though he could ill afford to spare him, in order to convey to the President his deep personal concern and his belief that the USG and SAG cooperate to meet the threat. 3. In first instance, the King spoke of the large number of Soviet and ChiCom technicians in the area. He reiterated his often expressed belief that the UAR is providing a protective screen for Soviet influence to gain foothold and spread. He did not think Nasser is a Communist, but he noted Nasser is ambitious and sometimes allows his ambition to further Communist purposes. 4. It not only foreign Communists, the King continued, but also steady growth of "local" Communists that worry him. Such indigenous Communists have already been identified in South Arabia, the Persian Gulf, Iraq, the UAR, Syria, and elsewhere (he did not mention Saudi Arabia). Here again their strength is still limited, but unless they are nipped now, their capability will steadily grow until they are able to subvert Western interests in the Middle East as well as governments friendly to the West. The King said he hoped Sultan would be able to explain his concern to the President and obtain some reading on how the USG views the problem and what might be done about it. 5. I again reminded Faysal that there is no government which has been consistently anti-Communist as the USG. I observed that greater part of his eloquent disquisition could have been made by an American official. Said I found this encouraging since it again underscored our community of interest in this as in so many other matters. I had in all frankness to tell him, however, that USG does not at present share his view that the UAR is for all practical purposes Communist. We may be worried about UAR tolerance of Soviet and ChiCom presence in various parts of the Middle East, including Yemen, but have had no real evidence to justify suggestion that the UAR deliberately furthering Commie objectives. I hoped we could agree that this was an area where we might have to continue to disagree, but that it not be allowed obscure our very real identity of interest in guarding against Communist subversion. I also hoped it might be possible explore in the future ways in which our two governments could cooperate in combating the incipient Communist threat. 6. King reiterated his belief that UAR is for all practical purposes Communist. Referring to UAR national charter, he claimed it reads like Marxist Communist Manifesto. Entire UAR economy, education, etc. is socialist which King equated with communism. I suggested that while UAR economy might be operated on socialist basis, this was still a far cry from political communism. As far as I aware, UAR has shown no tendency to be any more subservient to Moscow than to anyone else. King disagreed. Nasser and Moscow, he contended, are working together more and more. He professed be puzzled why USG seemed to ignore fact that Nasser and Egyptians largely responsible for introducing Soviet and ChiCom presences into Middle East. 7. King then assured me Sultan's mission intended present Faysal's anxiety about Communist threat in general terms rather than in specific Yemeni terms. I said I thought Sultan's meeting with President and other top level USG officials in Washington could be helpful to SAG in clarifying USG's assessment of the Communist threat. I reiterated to King that he would never find USG blind to dangers of communism, although USG may differ on some aspects of problem. In this context, I cautioned King not to accept exaggerated estimates of numbers or activities of Soviets or ChiComs in various parts of Middle East without first carefully checking facts. It neither in his nor our interests to try to tackle problem on basis grossly exaggerated figures. Soviet and ChiCom activities in Middle East and particularly Red Sea area may indeed be reaching point where they require closer surveillance, but they have also to be kept in perspective in terms of magnitude and numbers and the intentions of the governments of the area. 8. King reiterated SAG wants USG help to combat Communist threat and expressed strong hope that Sultan's mission will be successful. In answer my query if Sultan carrying any specific ideas or suggestions, King was vague. I rather suspect about best he may come up with will be do something about Yemeni situation. I hope, however, that we may be able to make some proposal to him calling for joint USG-SAG analysis of Communist threat in Middle East area and ways and means coping with it. Eilts 260. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, February 21, 1966, 12:06-12:26 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Saudi Arabia, Memos, Vol. I, 12/63-4/67. Secret. Drafted by Moore. The meeting was held at the White House. The time and place of the meeting are taken from the President's Daily Diary. (Ibid.) SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS The President Prince Sultan ibn Abdul Aziz, Saudi Arabian Minister of Defense The Prince expressed King Faisal's high respect for the President and said that the King had sent him, on His Majesty's behalf, to express his views on certain problems and to present a sealed letter. The President opened the letter and Mr. Sabbagh translated it verbally as follows (full translation attached):/2/ We appreciate the great efforts you are making for the cause of peace in the world and for opposing the tide of Communism which threatens the future of the entire free world. The United States has shouldered specific responsibilities to stem this tide in Asia and Africa through its economic assistance to raise the standard of living of the various countries concerned. This is done to enable those countries to fight Communism, just as we fight it on the basis of our religion, and you fight against it as a doctrine. Communism in the Middle East aims at setting up bases in that area to advance the aims of a broad plan of world domination. In view of the cordial ties of traditional friendship between our two countries, I would like to exchange views with you concerning our joint efforts to halt the Communist advance. I have sent my brother to convey to you the details of these views. He has my fullest confidence. /2/Not attached; see Document 262. The President said he would give the letter careful study. The Prince said that His Majesty had wanted to come in person but that various circumstances, which he would subsequently explain, had prevented him from having this pleasure, which he would greatly look forward to at a future date. The Prince continued that a great danger was posed in the Middle East by intrigues hatched by the Communists to give them a foothold in the area. The Arabian Peninsula was particularly threatened at this time. Saudi Arabia strongly opposed Communism because of its religious principles. Thus, Faisal had sent him (the Prince) to explain certain concepts. The Prince continued that the Arabian Peninsula had never felt the closeness of the Communist presence until the outbreak of the Yemen conflict brought it sharply to focus as an immediate danger. In the King's view, the Communists seem to be using Nasser as an implement to carry out their aims in the area. Last year the Government found several Communist cells in Saudi Arabia and took vigorous steps to eliminate them. However, this has not dispelled Saudi fears, in view of the strong Communist desire to establish bases in the Middle East. The King hoped the U.S. would help Saudi Arabia in its attempts to thwart these efforts. The President said he would be glad to have the Secretary of State and Mr. Komer review the subject with the Prince and further study what the Saudis had in mind. He understood that the Prince was seeing Secretary Rusk today or tomorrow; the Secretary would be able to discuss the subject in detail. The Prince responded that he appreciated this reasonable suggestion. He added the assurances that King Faisal continued to adhere to the sensible policies with respect to Yemen which the President had in the past suggested; and that the King would continue to exert his efforts to eradicate the Communist problem in Yemen.
261. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, February 21, 1966, 4:30 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Saudi Arabia, Memos, Vol. I, 12/63-4/67. Secret. I'll be giving Prince Sultan a sympathetic ear for an hour or so Tuesday. He'll see Rusk, McNamara, and others too. What the Saudis would really like is US backing if they resume the war in Yemen. We can't go this far--it would put us right back in the middle between the UAR and Saudis. But we'll all give the Saudis a sympathetic hearing--and gently try to dissuade them from doing anything foolish. To this end, I'd like to say the following sympathetic non-things on your behalf. 1. You greatly appreciate Feisal's sending Prince Sultan here to discuss these matters directly. 2. You have ordered a prompt and careful re-examination of risk of Communist takeover in Yemen. 3. You will reply to King Feisal's letter shortly./2/ /2/For the text of Faisal's letter and Johnson's response, see Document 262. 4. You want to send your warmest regards to his brother King Feisal and to reassure him of our continuing deep interest in the progress and integrity of Saudi Arabia--you feel as strongly on this as all of your predecessors since FDR met Ibn Saud in 1944 on the destroyer in the Red Sea./3/ /3/President Roosevelt's meeting with King Ibn Saud was in February 1945. A memorandum of conversation recording the meeting is in Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. VIII, The Near East and Africa, pp. 2-3. R. W. Komer Approve/4/ /4/This option is checked.
262. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia/1/ Washington, February 26, 1966, 2:22 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-7 NEAR E. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Moore on February 25, cleared by Komer and Symmes, and approved by Davies. 484. 1. Following texts letters exchanged President and King. Following FYI only. Noforn. 2. Letter from Faisal dated Feb 16, delivered by Prince Sultan to President Feb 21: "Your Excellency: "I have the greatest esteem for the efforts which you have undertaken in order to establish world peace and your firm stand in the face of the Communist current which is affecting the future of the free world and its destiny. "The United States has borne the responsibility of stopping the Communist advance in the countries of Asia and Africa. It has done this by extending a helpful hand to the various states and by participating in economic development and raising the standard of living in the countries which stand against the Communist current which we combat on religious grounds and which you combat for doctrinaire reasons. Our aims are the same in this matter. It is my belief that the Communist elements in the Middle Eastern area regard it as only a part of the broad scale Communist plan for establishing bases for itself in the various parts of the world in order to spread out therefrom to carry out its aims and to realize its intentions. "In view of the many ties and the traditional friendship which bind our two countries, I take the liberty of exchanging views with Your Excellency in order to coordinate our joint efforts aiming at putting an end to the spread of Communism in the world as a first step toward eliminating it. "For this reason I have deemed it useful to send His Highness my brother Amir Sultan ibn Abdul Aziz bearing a special letter from me to Your Excellency. He will also give you a detailed explanation of the situation as I see it. He enjoys my confidence in all matters he will discuss with you. "I take this opportunity to express to Your Excellency my high esteem and to wish Your Excellency good health and happiness, and for the people of the United States increased prosperity and progress. Your friend, Faisal" 3. Letter from President dated Feb 24,/2/ given Saudi Emb Feb 25 for Prince Sultan to deliver to King: /2/In a February 24 memorandum to the President, Komer wrote: "State strongly urges that we give Prince Sultan a presidential letter to take back to his brother King Faisal. Since these Saudis are staunch friends, and we can't give them the answer they want--that we'll back them against Nasser in Yemen--a warm non-letter makes sense. State has carefully drafted it to skirt the prickly Yemen issue, but gently plug for a statesmanlike political compromise. Recommend your signature, so we can get it to Sultan in New York." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Saudi Arabia, King Faisal Correspondence, Vol. I) "Your Majesty: "I was glad to receive in Washington your distinguished brother, His Royal Highness Prince Sultan ibn Abdul Aziz. In meetings with me and members of my Cabinet/3/ and my personal staff he most ably and eloquently explained your views. I thank you for sending him and for the personal message from you which he delivered. /3/See Document 389. "I share your concern that international Communism and Soviet and Chinese imperialism not extend their sway over free peoples. An abiding principle of our policy in the Near East, as elsewhere in the world, has been to insure that the peoples and governments have an alternative to Communism in support of their own efforts to develop in freedom. We have had this principle in mind with regard to the situation in Yemen. Accordingly, Your Majesty, we would welcome the opportunity to share our analysis of the present and potential threat of Communism in the Near East. After we have further studied your views, as presented by Prince Sultan, I will request Ambassador Eilts to discuss this subject in detail with you. "With respect to the other aspects of our talks with Prince Sultan, we feel that the Jidda Agreement negotiated between Your Majesty and President Nasser represented an act of statesmanship which still affords the best approach for peaceful resolution of the Yemen conflict and hope that a way can be found to move toward peace on this basis despite certain difficulties which have arisen. Since we fully share your view that renewal of hostilities in Yemen would be inimical to the best interests of all concerned, would seriously threaten the stability of the area, and provide further opportunity for Communist exploitation, I hope and pray that every effort will be made to avert this dangerous situation. "His Royal Highness Prince Sultan has kindly offered to deliver this letter to you. With it he also brings my warm personal greetings and my prayers for your continued good health, and the prosperity and peace of the people of Saudi Arabia. Your friend, Lyndon B. Johnson." Rusk
263. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Hare) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, March 17, 1966. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 SAUD. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Moore and Korn; cleared by Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs J. Harold Shullaw, Meyers, Colonel Byrd, and Symmes. SUBJECT Discussion: 1. In my memorandum of March 12 (Tab B)/2/ I apprised you of a note received from the British Embassy on that day informing us of the U.K. decision to provide Saudi Arabia with certain fighter aircraft to be manned by British pilots, and of their subsequent readiness, if required, to move in an RAF squadron of Lightning supersonic interceptors for a short period./3/ They noted that the possibility of military operations could not be ruled out and sought our assurance on an urgent basis that the United States would come to the aid of Saudi Arabia if that country were attacked. /2/None of the tabs is attached. A copy of Hare's March 12 memorandum to the Secretary is ibid. In it, Hare states that the British offer was in response to a request from Sultan, and that, according to the British, the decision was an effort to ensure successful conclusion of the arrangement to sell Lightning MK IIIs under the US/UK Joint Air Defense Proposal. /3/Telegram 520 to Jidda, March 12, reported that when in London recently Sultan had requested that the U.K. Government supply an RAF fighter squadron to fly under Saudi colors if fighting resumed in Yemen. In response to a discouraging reply, Sultan asked that the United Kingdom supply Lightning aircraft urgently, even without crews, and strongly hinted that conclusion of the previously negotiated Lightning sale depended on U.K. readiness to comply. (Ibid., DEF 1-4 SAUD) 2. We understand from Embassy Jidda that the Saudis are apparently satisfied with the offer to supply a limited number of fighter aircraft and civilian pilots at an early date and that the provision of an RAF squadron no longer seems required. 3. We have also learned from London (telegram at Tab C)/4/ that British decisions to assist the Saudis and to query us concerning our intentions of honoring our commitment to the Saudis were made by the Cabinet. Foreign Office experts tend to feel it is unrealistic to expect a clear reply from us regarding our commitment since so many hypothetical factors are involved. We therefore anticipate the British Embassy will not press us on this matter. Nonetheless, the Ministers have not rescinded their request for a response from us, and in the circumstances we believe it desirable to reply to the original letter. /4/Telegram 4324 from London, March 14, is ibid. 4. There is attached (Tab A) a proposed response to the British/5/ expressing our concern over the effects of introducing RAF units into Saudi Arabia at this time or the employment of British subjects to fly Saudi aircraft which might be engaged in combat operations, and stating that our commitment to the Saudis does not extend to protecting them in hostilities arising from their provocatory actions. /5/See Document 264. Recommendations: 1. That you sign the attached letter to the British Ambassador. and if: 2. Ambassador Dean raises this subject during his call on you at 3 p.m. March 17 that you respond along the lines of the attached letter.
264. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia/1/ Washington, March 22, 1966, 2:14 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 SAUD. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Korn; cleared by Symmes, Judd, Colonel Byrd, and Meyers; and approved by Davies. Repeated to London, Cairo, Taiz, and CINCSTRIKE. 548. Re Deptel 520./2/ Following is summary Secretary's March 17 letter to British Ambassador in reply UK demarche March 12 (text being pouched): /2/See footnote 3, Document 263. 1. USG shares UK desire that UK/US air defense sales Saudi Arabia be carried out without change. 2. However sending squadron RAF aircraft to Saudi Arabia under present circumstances would have seriously disturbing effect on Saudi-UAR negotiations regarding Yemen. Could be disservice to SAG since would invite hostile propaganda attacks by UAR and others. Introduction RAF units or employment British subjects to fly Saudi aircraft in combat operations would not be in US, UK or Saudi interest. 3. US would naturally be most concerned should Saudi integrity be threatened. However, US commitment is of strictly limited nature. Has been made clear to Faisal it does not extend to providing military cover for Saudi operations in support of hostilities in Yemen or to any Saudi actions of provocative nature. 4. We hope report Prince Sultan's apparent satisfaction at UK offer supply limited number Lightning MKI and Hunter MK6 aircraft at early date is indication that Saudis will not press for RAF units or put forward other request which could disturb current delicate balance in Near East. Rusk
265. Telegram From the Consulate General in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State/1/ Dhahran, April 23, 1966, 1805Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 SAUD. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Jidda, London, CINCSTRIKE, and CHUSMTM. Passed to White House and USIA. 297. From Ambassador: Meeting With Sultan re Hawks. 1. Had two and half hour meeting with MODA Prince Sultan today in Riyadh. UK Ambassador Man, with whom I flew to Riyadh, met with Sultan just before me since he required take early afternoon plane back to Jidda be present at Queen's birthday reception. Able have only brief snatch of conversation with Man when he came out looking very distressed. Told me Sultan in bad humor and had insisted he must have operational Thunderbird battery in five weeks and specifically made this a condition for signing of BAC contract. 2. I then saw Sultan who was most affable although at times became quite excited. I first recalled his urgent request of several weeks ago for loan or sale Hawk battery and accelerated naval visits and mentioned in passing USS Thomas visits to Yenbo and Jidda had been success. While we had had to tell him no Hawk battery available on off-the-shelf basis due US military's operational requirements elsewhere, we had continued look at how we might help as next best thing. In this context, US had now authorized Raytheon indicate availability one Hawk battery, capable of split deployment, in October, about six months' time. Said we aware his request to Brit's for Thunderbirds and, as I was sure he understood in matter involving joint US-UK air defense package, had been consulted by Brits who had indicated availability two Thunderbird batteries in four to six months' time, i.e. about same time as battery of Hawks now available. Added I wished him clearly understand that October delivery of Hawk battery was USG's response to his request to it and not to Raytheon's request be allowed schedule earlier deliveries. It being made at some sacrifice US military commitment, but we hoped it would satisfy his immediate requirements. In this connection, I noted his frequently expressed desire for standardization in Saudi army and undesirability moving his SAMs systems which will only cause problems in training, logistics maintenance, etc. Stressed Hawk and Thunderbirds not interchangeable. I also reiterated USG estimate UAR will not attack Saudi Arabia unless there provocation and noted that current Kuwaiti mediation effort appeared be of interest to Egyptians as well as Saudis and, hopefully, makes entire problem of early establishment SAMs capability slightly less urgent than it seemed to be several weeks ago. Noted Hawk battery would have additional advantage of being in context contract SAG presently negotiating with Raytheon and should obviate need spending on SAMs additional monies which might better be used elsewhere. 3. Sultan replied by again relating SAG's concern over UAR intentions. Recalled he had first gone to his "best-friends", USG and only after they unable help had he approached Brits. Some of UAR talk might be mere sabre rattling, but he under pressure from his officers provide early SAMs capability protect coastal region between Jizan and Jidda and also Riyadh. He agreed SAG desire is standardize if at all possible and said he would prefer Hawks if first battery for Jidda be made available in five weeks and second battery for Riyadh by October. Claimed Brits told him Thunderbird battery could be available in seven weeks. When I commented dummy missiles not likely be of much use to him, he said had insisted to Brits they must be operational missiles. I said knew of HMG instruction which expressed hope SAG would find advance delivery schedule for Hawks agreeable. He acknowledged this had been done by Man, but insisted BAC representative (Edwards, who was in outer office) had yesterday assured him operational Thunderbird battery could be available in seven weeks. He had therefore let it be known to Brit Ambassador Man that signing of BAC contact conditioned on early availability operational Thunderbird battery. (He said this with broad smile as if to indicate this likely be helpful spur to get Brits respond positively.) He reiterated that if USG could provide Hawk battery in five weeks, he would much prefer Hawks. He appreciated effort make Hawk battery available in October, but asked if USG could in meantime guarantee safety of Jizan area. He felt there 80 per cent chance Egyptians would not attack Jidda, but Jizan perhaps yes. 4. I said would pass on his remarks, but I wished make few personal observations. Saudi Arabia's friends in USG have worked hard try to be helpful, but it sometimes very hard when SAG seemed to have almost complete disregard for problems confronting its friends. USG involved in shooting war in Vietnam against Commie enemy who as King had told me equally repugnant to SAG. Understandably this conflict had first priority on allocation our resources. Despite this real effort had been made be responsive SAG's concern. USG could obviously not guarantee there would be no attack on Jizan, but in our view best way avoid such contingency is, as I had told him before, if SAG exercise restraint. Sultan surely aware of US security commitment to SAG which qualified only by need avoid provocation. King and Sultan had assured me SAG has not resumed arms aid to Yemeni royalists. So long as this true I would have thought Sultan would have greater confidence in long established friends than his present remarks seemed to suggest. There ample evidence UAR aware of US security interest in Saudi Arabia, which I personally believe probably main deterrent thus far rash Egyptian actions. My remarks took Sultan somewhat aback. After some more comments on his possible security problems next few months, he said wanted amend his earlier request on Hawks. [5.] He would welcome having Hawk battery delivered by Raytheon in October and appreciates USG's help in making this possible. However, he also wished ask USG consider lending him another Hawk battery to be available in late June or July which might be for training purposes. Such battery would in his view, be effective deterrent to UAR attack and would ease pressure of Saudi officers and Saudi public on SAG for adequate defense capability. If this could be provided, and if no attack on Jizan takes place, he ready drop Thunderbird idea. Meanwhile, pending USG's reply, he will put off Brits. He hoped might be possible let him have answer by end coming week. He again remarked with chuckle Brits working under pressure because of his threat not sign BAC contract unless operational Thunderbirds are made available five weeks. When I said hoped he was not also attempting pressure US this way on Raytheon contract, he quickly assured me he was not. 6. Told him I would report his comments and request, but that I could make no commitments. Would let him have answer soon as possible. 7. Comment: Sultan obviously in one of his more difficult moods. He seems to have panicked Brits by threatening withhold BAC contract signing, but I cannot be certain Edwards may not have put him up to this tactic as best way get HMG agree to quick BAC sale of two operational Thunderbird batteries. Although my personal comments shook him somewhat, his amended request to me is really no more than what some of his officers have told us he really wants, namely one battery of SAMs available by July from whatever source. Unless we can stop Brits from running scared on this one, recommend we explore whether there any way getting Hawk battery here by July or shortly thereafter. Perhaps we could airlift to Jidda one or more sections of such a battery which might cut down transport time and make August delivery date feasible. Alternatively, we might review General Leahy's earlier suggestion deploy Hawk battery to Saudi Arabia for EP-90 days' training purposes pending October delivery first battery actually sold to Saudi Arabia. Would appreciate Dept/DOD's preliminary reaction above proposals soon as possible since, if we willing explore these courses, I may be able conduct holding operation. But we should reckon with BAC pressuring HMG very hard be responsive Sultan's latest request Note: Since today's SDI flight back to Jidda cancelled, I will not be able return until tomorrow night. Hence, am sending this message to Dhahran through General Leahy with request Dhahran forward immediately to Dept. Other subjects discussed with Sultan will be reported from Jidda following my return. Allen
266. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts/1/ Washington, May 2, 1966, 6:31 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL SAUD-UAR. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Korn and Atherton; cleared by Bruce Buttles (NEA/P), Special Assistant in the Bureau of Public Affairs James B. Freeman, and Officer-in-Charge of Aden, Iraq, Jordan, UAR, and Yemen Affairs in the USIA Office of Near Eastern Affairs Robert T. Curran; and approved by Davies. Sent to Jidda and repeated to Cairo, Athens for Ambassador Hare, Taiz, Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad, Amman, Tel Aviv, Dhahran, CHUSTM Dhahran, CINCSTRIKE, London, Paris, and Moscow. 2138. 1. NY Times reporter (Finney) at Dept noon press briefing May 2 referred to Nasser's May 1 threat attack Saudi Arabia/2/ and asked Dept spokesman if there exists valid agreement pursuant to which USG would come to Saudi assistance should UAR threat materialize. /2/In his May 1 speech Nasser threatened that, in the event of any Saudi infiltration or aggression against Yemen, the United Arab Republic would not only strike Saudi bases of aggression, but would occupy them. 2. Though no formal press statement being made, Dept replying Finney as follows: Every U.S. Administration since that of President Truman has indicated its concern over the territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia. While we have no mutual defense treaty with Saudi Arabia or any other Near Eastern state, we remain as President Kennedy declared in his May 8, 1963, press statement, "strongly opposed to the use of force or the threat of force in the Near East". 3. If specifically pressed by Finney regarding form US opposition would take in context Saudi-UAR conflict, Dept spokesman would say that decision in this respect would obviously have to be taken in light of circumstances at the time. 4. Jidda should inform SAG of Finney query and Dept reply soonest. Other addresses may use foregoing as appropriate./3/ /3/In telegram 1048 from Jidda, May 3, Eilts reported that Saqqaf had asked him how the U.S. Government had reacted to Nasser's May 1 speech. The Ambassador replied that he had no official U.S. reaction, but had given Saqqaf the substance of the Department's expected reply as reported in circular telegram 2138. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL SAUD-UAR) Circular telegram 2164, May 4, reported that the question of U.S. assurances to Saudi Arabia had been raised at the Department's press briefing that day and the Department spokesman had replied along the lines of paragraph 2 of circular telegram 2138. When asked whether Kennedy's October 25, 1962, letter to Faisal contained language which could be construed as a guarantee of Saudi territorial integrity, the spokesman had replied affirmatively. (Ibid.) For text of Kennedy's letter, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XVIII, Document 88. Rusk
267. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State/1/ Jidda, May 4, 1966, 1247Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-7 NEAR E. Secret; Limdis. 1056. Ref: Embtels 857/2/ and 922./3/ /2/Dated March 24. (Ibid.) /3/In telegram 922 from Jidda, April 9, Eilts reported that he met with Saqqaf to continue discussing the U.S. Government analysis of the Communist threat in the Middle East. He had stressed that the most important stage lay ahead: development of programs which the U.S. and Saudi Governments might undertake separately and jointly to counter the threat. (Ibid.) 1. Met with Saqqaf today to complete USG analysis Commie threat in Middle East. In country by country review, covered Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. On completion, told Saqqaf that if SAG has specific questions over and above info already provided, we would be pleased try be of help. After thanking me Saqqaf told me he will now prepare overall report of USG analysis based on our several meetings and send it to me for factual accuracy. Thereafter, he will transmit it to King since he believes growing Commie threat in Middle East is one item King will wish discuss while in US./4/ /4/Telegram 678 to Jidda, April 29, stated that the President had approved a state visit for King Faisal June 21-23. (Ibid., POL 7 SAUD) 2. Saqqaf noted our overall estimate of Commie threat much lower than what he has heard in King's Majlis. He called it more in line with his own estimate than with exaggerated ones which King is receiving. In answer my query where King gets his info, Saqqaf replied somewhat laconically "from the Syrians around him". He mentioned no names. I stressed USG's estimate based on extensive world-wide info and we have great confidence in it. 3. Saqqaf pointed out major point of disagreement between us is whether UAR and Syria are Commie or not. King and others around him have persuaded themselves they are. Claimed he shares USG view that while UAR and Syria walk hand in hand with Commies, neither UAR or Syria are Commie governments. 4. We agreed that after King has seen report Saqqaf and I will meet to discuss what USG and SAG might singly and jointly do to counter growing Commie threat. Eilts
268. Intelligence Memorandum/1/ No. 0827/66 Washington, May 26, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Saudi Arabia, Memos, Vol. I, 12/63-4/67. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Background Use Only; CIA Internal Use Only. Prepared in the Directorate of Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency. SAUDI ARABIAN ARMS PURCHASES 1. During the last few months long-standing US-Saudi Arabian military aid discussions have come to a head. The stepped-up pace of the negotiations has reflected King Faysal's rising concern over the Egyptian threat in Yemen. A good part of Faysal's requests now have been met by combined US and UK efforts. However, Faysal may well refer to these matters when he visits the US beginning on 20 June. The following detailed roundup may prove useful for background on where we stand at the present time. 2. From 1957 to 1965 Saudi Arabia obtained $119.3 million in military assistance from the US; in addition, from 1954 to 1965 it obtained $24.1 million from all other sources, but none from the Communist bloc. 3. For at least two years Saudi Arabia has been dickering with several agents for a military aid package. The make-up of this package has varied, as has the nationality of the agents. The US was always predominant, the other bidders being French, British, Swiss, and German. By last fall the US (Lockheed) had won out over all other bidders. 4. At this point the British approached the US and asked if we would agree to offer a joint defense package with them as a means of offsetting British balance-of-payments problems. We agreed, with the condition that the all-US bid also remain in the competition. In the end, the joint UK-US bid was accepted, and the letter of intent was signed in late December. The joint package contracts were signed on 5 May 1966. 5. Under the joint arrangement, the British were to furnish 40 M3 Lightning supersonic jet fighters with Firestreak air-to-air missiles and 25 Provost jet trainers (British Aircraft Corp.) at about $155 million; a radar system, Type 40, with data-handling equipment (Allied Electrical Industries) at about $70 million; and training, technical operations, and maintenance work (Airwork, Ltd.) at about $76 million. Total British sales are thus about $301 million. The US portion of the package consists of ten batteries of Hawk ground-to-air missiles (Raytheon) at about $100 million. 6. After the first of this year, relations between Saudi Arabia and Egypt became tense, and Saudi Arabia sought immediate interim purchases of air defense weapons. King Faysal told the US ambassador on 20 February/2/ that he "understood" the US position vis-a-vis Egypt and would not ask the US for such interim assistance. /2/See Document 259. 7. On 28 March the British stated that Saudi Arabia had purchased six subsonic Hawker Hunter jet fighters and two T4 Lightning trainers, and has requested four additional Lightnings. Airwork, Ltd. was to provide maintenance and civilian pilots for "instructional" purposes. The four extra M2 Lightnings were eventually provided. This contract, in excess of $35 million, was also signed on 5 May 1966, and on 7 May two Hunters landed in Saudi Arabia. 8. In early April we learned that Saudi Arabia was negotiating with Britain for the purchase and delivery of two Thunderbird ground-to-air missile batteries by late June or July, at about $42 million. The US, attempting to avoid undue Saudi expense and multiplicity of weapons, offered to advance delivery of one Hawk battery to October 1966. Saudi Arabia said it had expected partial early delivery and still wanted delivery by July or at least the loan of a training Hawk battery from July to October. The US said it could not do this. 9. Saudi Arabia has continued to negotiate with the British for Thunderbirds. However, as time passes and an Egyptian attack fails to materialize, the Saudis may have second thoughts about Thunderbirds. The most recent report indicates that the Saudis now feel that two batteries are too expensive and have asked if one battery could be had at a reduced price. The British will probably try to oblige.
269. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, May 30, 1966, 10 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Saudi Arabia, King Faisal Trip to U.S., 6/21/66-7/1/66. Confidential. SUBJECT We have been exploring ways of stepping up the dignity of state visits and will have more to report later. But Faisal's visit in late June is not a good place to start, as the attached State Department memorandum/2/ makes clear. /2/Attached is an unsigned, undated memorandum on the subject "Downplaying Faisal's Visit." 1. A big show for Faisal might intensify his struggle with Cairo and worsen our own poor relations with Nasser who has already read certain of our moves as an effort to back Faisal in a bloc against him. 2. Faisal has made good progress in developing his country since 1962; but it is still a mighty backward place. Moreover, he has not worked for a Yemen settlement with 100% good faith. I recommend, therefore, that we play this visit correctly, and save any Billy Rose upgrading for a less ambiguous guest. Walt Play it correct and low key/3/ /3/None of the options is checked.
270. Background Paper Prepared in the Department of State/1/ KFS/B-2 Washington, June 7, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Saudi Arabia, Faisal Visit Briefing Book, 6/21-27/66. Secret. Drafted by Korn and cleared by Symmes, Davies, and Hare. VISIT OF KING FAISAL OF SAUDI ARABIA U.S. POLICY ASSURANCES ON SAUDI SECURITY The U.S. interest in the territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia was first expressed by President Truman and has been reaffirmed in varying terms and intent by each succeeding Administration. Behind these assurances lie our considerable economic and political interests in Saudi Arabia, which are to a significant degree bound up with the fate of the Saudi dynasty, in the absence of a suitable alternative. Saudis Fear Israeli Expansion From 1948 until the late 1950s Saudi Arabia's main security concern was of attack by Israel. The Saudis sought and were given assurances that we would oppose any expansion by Israel at the expense of its neighbors. It was with Israel in mind that President Truman wrote King Abdul Aziz on October 31, 1950 that aggression or the threat of aggression against Saudi Arabia would be a matter of "immediate concern" to the United States. These assurances were reiterated by President Eisenhower in letters to King Saud. President Eisenhower again told Crown Prince Faisal, in a meeting at the White House in September 1957, that we would "allow no aggression on the part of Israel against the Arab nations". U.A.R. Becomes Major Potential Adversary Saudi concern shifted from Israel to the U.A.R. in the late 1950s and particularly following the Yemeni revolution in September 1962. We responded to Saudi requests for support in the event of U.A.R. attack with public and secret statements designed: a) to encourage the Saudi Government along the path of internal reform and development; b) to secure Saudi disengagement from Yemen; and c) to deter U.A.R. aggression on Saudi Arabia and prevent the Saudis from taking actions which might provoke U.A.R. attack. In the public domain are: --President Kennedy's October 25, 1962 letter to Faisal stating that in pursuit of his modernization program the Crown Prince "may be assured of full United States support for Saudi Arabia's integrity". --Secretary Rusk's March 8, 1963 press conference statement that "we are very much interested in the security of our friends in Jordan and Saudi Arabia". --President Kennedy's May 8, 1963 press conference declaration of U.S. opposition to the threat of force or use of force in the Near East. --A Department press spokesman statement on August 4, 1965 that "we have clearly indicated our support for the maintenance of Saudi Arabia's integrity". Almost all the many letters exchanged secretly by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson with Faisal contain some mention of our interest in or concern for Saudi integrity. What Do U.S. Assurances Mean?
The Saudis place considerable reliance on our assurances. There may be some tendency within the Saudi Government to overestimate the extent to which the U.S. is actually committed to defend Saudi Arabia, and perhaps at times even a temptation to use our assurances to provoke a showdown with the U.A.R. Faisal however seems to understand the dangers of such a course and appears to realize that he cannot count on an unconditional U.S.G. security commitment.
Our security assurances to the Saudis represent a continuing expression of U.S. policy designed to protect our interests in the Arabian Peninsula. Our statements have been vaguely worded and, with the exception of an offer (which was accepted) of the presence in Saudi Arabia for eight months of a squadron of U.S.A.F. interceptors, "Operation Hard Surface", in the framework of the Bunker Yemen disengagement negotiations, have never included specific promises of military action. Our assurances to the Saudis have never been submitted for Congressional consideration. We have on frequent occasions in past years (most recently in Ambassador Eilts' conversation with the King on March 23)/2/ sought to impress upon the Saudis that our assurances cannot be used as a shield behind which they could stimulate hostilities in Yemen or provoke an attack by U.A.R. forces there. /2/See footnote 2, Document 396. The intent of our assurances was defined most clearly in an instruction from President Kennedy to Special Ambassador Bunker in March 1963 stating that we "should seek to avoid giving the impression of an open-ended U.S. commitment to defend Saudi Arabia under all or any circumstances, or for an indefinite long term period. . . . we want to avoid future misunderstandings and to preserve U.S. freedom of action". [Continue with the next documents] Volume XXI Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |