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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXI Near East Region Department of State |
 242. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia/1/ Washington, April 16, 1965, 8:04 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, ORG 7 NEA. Secret. Drafted by Moore; cleared by Symmes, Frank M. Tucker (EUR/BNA), Officer in Charge of Iranian Affairs M. Gordon Tiger, and Bunte; and approved by Jernegan. Also sent to Cairo. 541. For Talbot and Hart. Propose following talking points for Assistant Secretary Talbot meeting with Faisal,/2/ which we hope could be on most informal level with minimum number of people present. Presidential letter (now in clearance process)/3/ and Deptels 439/4/ and 489/5/ perhaps useful as background. /2/Assistant Secretary Talbot met with Faisal on April 21 in the course of visiting several countries in the Middle East; see Document 367. /3/See Document 245; the President's letter was sent subsequent to Talbot's visit. /4/Dated March 9. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 27 YEMEN) /5/Dated March 26. (Ibid., DEF 12-5 SAUD) Assume you first will deliver Presidential letter with appropriate remarks. Further to set broad framework for talk, suggest you then mention you have just come from NE Mission Chiefs conference where broad aspects Near East situation were discussed. King might be interested in summary of these discussions particularly as they pertain to Saudi Arabia. Such initial presentation could then lead to following specific points: 1. Oft repeated US concern for, and friendship with, Saudi Arabia remains unabated. Thus we disturbed over Saudi fears of UAR aggression from Yemen. Our prime concern Yemen has always related to maintenance security and stability Saudi Arabia. This has dominated our actions there. We aim at peaceful solution area disputes and at same time continue willing assist SAG against unprovoked attack. However, Saudi aid to royalists poses problem. Saudi restraint on border would enable us more easily come to SAG assistance, if need be, without complications posed by Saudi assistance to movement in opposition to government in Yemen which we recognize. 2. Similarly we continuing urge Nasser exercise restraint and resume discussions with Faisal. (Talbot may wish inform Faisal re his recent meeting with Nasser as appropriate.) 3. In addition continued efforts our Military Training Mission, we endeavor remain responsive to Saudi defense requirements and have offered supply aircraft and ground environment systems (including Hawk surface-to-air missiles if Saudis desire). In response urgent request MinDef Sultan, we now doing utmost obtain C-130 transport on urgent basis despite limited world-wide availability in view great demand for this plane to support US commitments Vietnam and elsewhere. 4. We greatly encouraged at positive aspects Saudi international relations as reflected in recent SAG-Iran moves to demarcate median line in Gulf. We currently exploring ways in which USG can be helpful in this effort. 5. Although we not directly involved in problem, we hope similar peaceful solution will be possible to long-standing Saudi border problems with Gulf states and Muscat. (FYI. Suggest Ambassador Hart's advice be followed on whether to make foregoing point.) 6. Saudi development program is particularly bright spot and provides basic strength for long-term maintenance Saudi independence. We pleased to be of assistance through such activities as US Geological Survey project and Corps Engineers television construction work. King's son Prince Muhammad now in Washington discussing with Department of Interior further steps implementation construction plans for desalting plant Jidda. Understand talks are promising. We impressed by planned integration, as described by him, of desalting plant with new Jidda refinery and steel-rolling mill--petroleum fuel to be obtained for former and electricity to be supplied to latter. Hope SAG will be able proceed rapidly with desalting project with our technical assistance. Rusk
243. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, April 19, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Saudi Arabia, 1965-March 1966. Secret. McGB: Talking with Lockheed. You'll recall past annoyance of McNamara, Rusk, and yourself about US aircraft manufacturers causing USG trouble by overselling. Worst offender has been Lockheed with F-104, and worst case has been Saudi Arabia. I volunteered some time ago that WH would probably have to talk with Lockheed if it needed turning off. I believe I checked this out with you. Now the time has come. McNamara has directly advised Saudis that, if it were up to him, he'd buy the Northrop F-5./2/ Regrettably this letter was leaked to Lockheed, so we want to turn off: (a) any Lockheed effort to undermine this deal; (b) any publicity here that we're interfering with free enterprise. /2/See Document 241. Our pitch ought to be made at the top, to Courtland Gross, and I'd urge by you. Here's a full brief, but the key selling point isn't mentioned. It is that USG does so well by Lockheed (of $1.6 billion in 1964 sales 44.4% was to USG) that it has no need to keep pushing for an extra few bucks by selling F-104s to countries that can't handle 'em. With Polaris, C-130, and all sorts of other big deals on (Lockheed got largest government contracts in whole aerospace industry for last three years' running), it should get off our backs in trying to sell F-104s to peanut countries. In fact, we've done mighty well by Lockheed on F-104 itself (European consortium, Japan). What say?/3/ /3/An April 26 memorandum from Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs Harrison Symmes to Talbot states that Bundy had telephoned Lockheed Chairman of the Board Courtland Gross requesting that Lockheed cease its sales efforts for the F-104 interceptor aircraft in Saudi Arabia in light of the U.S. political decision to recommend to the Saudis purchase of the competing Northrop F-5. Gross reportedly had agreed, but asked for assistance in consummating a $15 million sale of four C-130 transport planes to the Saudis. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, NEA/ARP Files: Lot 69 D 547, Defense Affairs--Saudi Arabia--1965, DEF 12-5-a-1, Aircraft (January-June)) R. W. Komer/4/ /4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
244. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, April 23, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Saudi Arabia, King Faisal Correspondence, Vol. I. Secret. Here is another flowery, but essentially bread and butter letter which we urge you send to King Faisal of Saudi Arabia in lieu of inviting him for an early visit here./2/ Faisal has been angling to come. /2/Document 245. Our Saudi friends need recurrent massage of this sort because of their nervousness over attack by the UAR troops in Yemen. We see little evidence that this is likely (and are just as happy to have 50,000 UAR troops in Yemen rather than deployed against Israel), but we see merit in periodically reassuring Faisal. We also want to sell about $200 million in US planes and other hardware to the Saudis instead of letting the UK and France get the sale. Finally, we want to protect our billion dollar oil investment. I've carefully gone over this non-letter. It says nothing we haven't said before, and will be strictly private. The length arises from custom of the country. We beg your indulgence. R. W. Komer/3/ /3/McGeorge Bundy initialed below Komer's signature.
245. Letter From President Johnson to King Faisal/1/ Washington, April 24, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Saudi Arabia, Presidential Correspondence. Secret. Transmitted to Jidda in telegram 559, April 27. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 US/JOHNSON) The signed original was sent by pouch. Your Majesty: The recent visit to Saudi Arabia of Assistant Secretary Talbot was a further indication of our continued great interest in you and your country. The long history of our friendly relations bears witness to the ties between our countries. We are further linked by mutual goals of opposing the spread of Communism through encouraging free peoples to develop their own potentials. Your leadership in guiding the people of Saudi Arabia forward on the road to progress and in ensuring the wise use of resources for development is a most hopeful augury for the future. Defense of one's country is also an absolute requirement. Unfortunately, diversion of national wealth to this essentially unproductive field is one of the inescapable demands which we all must face so long as the state of the world remains as uncertain as it is. We will seek to be helpful in your effort to modernize your military forces. Secretary McNamara has written to your Minister of Defense, Prince Sultan, giving further recommendations and specific suggestions concerning equipment to meet your security needs. I want you to know that we are greatly interested in the safety and security of Saudi Arabia and sincerely desire to assist you in your defense arrangements, as in your development measures. Ambassador Hart has reported to me your continuing concern over the presence of large numbers of United Arab Republic troops in Yemen and the threat which you believe they present to your country. This is a concern we share. As you are aware, our goal continues to be to bring about a withdrawal of these troops and a cessation of foreign interference in Yemeni affairs. In pursuing this goal, the security of Saudi Arabia has been uppermost in our mind. We have at no time espoused a policy toward the United Arab Republic which we believed was in any way injurious to the interests of your country. On the contrary, our actions throughout the Near East have continued to be aimed only at promoting harmonious dealings and the reduction of frictions among the countries there. The statesmanship and patience that you have shown during our long search for a solution by peaceful means in Yemen have been most gratifying. I realize that in seeking to resolve the Yemen dispute, you, as well as we, have frequently met with an uncompromising rigidity. This indeed makes the path of negotiation difficult. But only by our continued joint efforts to follow this path can we hope to develop peaceful relations among all peoples of the Near East. It is in such peaceful relations that Saudi Arabia will find the most lasting assurances for its safety. I have found exchanges of messages with Your Majesty most valuable. Believe me, your explanations of your position have not fallen on deaf ears. I have welcomed these contacts and hope for the continuation of the spirit of frankness which has marked them. In this spirit I trust we can continue to explore our mutual concerns in the world and deepen the already strong friendship which exists between our two countries. May God preserve you in good health and grant peace and prosperity to you and your country. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson
246. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State/1/ Jidda, May 7, 1965, 1205Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19 US-SAUD. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Dhahran, London, CHUSMTM Dhahran, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, and DEFREPNAMA Paris. 872. Deptel 558./2/ US-SAG Military Relationship. /2/Dated April 27. (Ibid.) Background. On May 3 I met with Saqqaf and delivered to him for advance study copy of President's message to King./3/ Saqqaf read it carefully and remarked it was "good letter." I then delivered to him summary list of measures we had taken to be helpful to SAG, in particular MODA, which contained Deptel 558. Saqqaf looked it over, commented it was important. I then asked his advice whether I should detail this list orally to King when I saw him. Saqqaf suggested that instead I might wish inform King I had delivered it to Saqqaf. /3/Document 245. May 5 Meeting with King (Embtel 869)./4/ /4/Dated May 6. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15 YEMEN) Upon delivery Presidential letter (signed original and Embassy translation) to Faysal in presence Saqqaf, I noted President had made general reference to US Govt desire be helpful to Saudi effort modernize its military forces. While I had delivered to Saqqaf comprehensive list of what we had done, I wished draw HM's attention to certain specifics: 1. USG was now prepared to transfer to SAG without cost the F-86 aircraft currently on loan to SAG after completion overhaul and repairs at US expense. I would be discussing details of this with Saqqaf in near future. King seemed pleased, commented he was surprised to hear this since had understood these aircraft were to be taken out of Kingdom. I said this would be only for purpose repair, which could not be accomplished in Kingdom. 2. USG now ready sign military construction agreement, as US reply to Sultan's requests for changes in draft text were now in hands Foreign Ministry or MODA itself. 3. Noted CHUSMTM had been informed by Sultan during meeting same day that MODA definitely wanted DOD evaluation team to weigh Lockheed and Northrop package offer re fighter aircraft and related ground equipment. Secretary McNamara had said in earlier letter to Sultan he was prepared send team and I would therefore notify Washington immediately that it was desired. 4. Noted MODA request made to General Adams (CINCSTRIKE) one year ago for survey military vehicle requirements. We had performed survey immediately and delivered final report to MODA followed by letter of offer December 1964./5/ This was under study in MODA. /5/Not found. 5. Noted we had presented Air Defense Survey Report in Riyadh January 1964. I then commented that so far as I could determine US had answered all Prince Sultan's requests. However, I stood ready to check into any matters King might feel were outstanding. King thanked me, saying "We appreciate all your efforts and will try to find the road to cooperation with you in all respects." He had no specific questions but noted there were two considerations he wished mention. First, there was no use buying military equipment which Saudis could not operate. "We are lying to ourselves if we think we are ready to use certain equipment. We need help." Secondly, Faysal noted prices for much of equipment were very high. While SAG was obliged to buy equipment, since it could not just look on when it was being attacked, he wanted expenditures to benefit his people and country as a whole. I assured him we were not interested in urging him to spend heavily on military equipment and that Secretary McNamara's letter drew particular attention to costs. King responded Secretary McNamara had talked only about technical matters. "More important even than price is that we be able to make use of this equipment. McNamara did not touch on this, he turned it over to you, the politicians." As Faysal was being purposely vague at this point, I felt it much the better course not to ask him to be more specific and turned to other matters separately reported. Comment: I draw two interpretations from Faysal's remarks, which were made in low key. First, he leans toward American equipment and backing, is not yet satisfied with UK or French relationship and hopes USG will assist, directly or indirectly, in operating his air defense equipment, particularly by facilitating or at least not impeding the hiring of pilots and technicians for supersonic aircraft and related ground equipment. Secondly, I believe Faysal has always been more conscious of price tag involved in developing modern military forces than has Sultan and that cumulation of military budgeting at this point has become rather staggering. Recent relaxation in Yemen threat, coupled with his own desire to avoid wasting money, makes him reluctant grant early approval for major air defense expenditures unless package is sound and represents "force in being." Recommendations: 1. That DOD evaluation team be sent as soon as possible to Riyadh, giving earliest advance notice to CHUSMTM for clearance with Sultan. 2. That Lockheed be informed by Dept now that Lockheed team, which will soon be handling terms C-130 sale at Riyadh (Deptel 574)/6/ should stay away from discussion with MODA of terms of defense package fighter aircraft plus ground environment, and if approached by MODA staff on such matters it reply it understands DOD evaluation team at (or about to begin) work and while company stands ready study any Saudi requests discussion thereof would be best postponed until evaluation team has rendered report and latter fully studied by MODA; lastly that Lockheed team leave Saudi Arabia as soon as C-130 sale papers signed, to avoid or cut down overlapping presence at Riyadh with DOD evaluation team and thereby obviate basis legitimate complaint by Northrop. /6/Dated May 6. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 SAUD) 3. That Northrop be informed of foregoing procedure and be asked to stay clear of Saudi Arabia until evaluation report rendered and studied. 4. That thereafter both companies await further indication from MODA or USG before again visiting Saudi Arabia on air defense packages. 5. That foregoing procedure be explained by me to Saqqaf for relay to Sultan, CHUSMTM following up and discussing details with MODA as required. Hart
247. Airgram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State/1/ A-332 Jidda, May 15, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 US/JOHNSON. Secret. Drafted by Political Officer Richard W. Murphy, and approved by Deputy Chief of Mission Nicholas G. Thacher. Repeated to Dhahran. SUBJECT REF /2/See footnote 1, Document 245. /3/Dated May 6. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15 YEMEN) /4/In telegram 911 from Jidda, May 15, Hart informed the Department that the Embassy was forwarding by pouch the King's letter in response to the President's letter of April 24, and commented that the Embassy found the message to be a courteous reaffirmation of Faisal's basic policy. He noted that the lack of any implied disagreement with U.S. views might be taken as an indication that the King was in a much more relaxed frame of mind than a few weeks earlier when he was much concerned with the possibility of a UAR attack from the south. (Ibid., POL 15-1 US/JOHNSON) The Embassy forwards as an enclosure to this airgram the original text of a letter from King Faysal to President Johnson dated May 11 acknowledging the President's letter of April 24. Following is the Embassy's informal translation of this letter: "His Excellency President Lyndon B. Johnson Excellency: Ambassador Hart conveyed to me, upon his return from Washington, Your Excellency's noble feelings towards this country and its leadership. I thank Your Excellency for your letter expressing your praise for the progress of the Saudi Arabian Kingdom and for its wise exploitation of resources in the service of economic progress which, God willing, will promote the country's welfare and future. There is no doubt that an exchange of viewpoints is always useful to attain our joint goal of combatting Communism in the world. The contacts and visits undertaken by responsible officials of your government aid in the attainment of this goal. I was pleased with the recent visit to my country of Mr. Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State. It confirmed to me the extent of Your Excellency's concern and that of your government for this country which is bound to the U.S. by friendly and historic ties that become increasingly stronger. It gives me pleasure to hear from Your Excellency that you are concerned with the security and peace of the Saudi Arabian Kingdom, that these are at the forefront of the problems which preoccupy you, and that you sincerely wish to aid the Kingdom in its defense planning and in its economic development. We are studying with great care the recommendations and suggestions Secretary McNamara sent to Brother Sultan pertaining to the equipment which we need to protect the integrity and security of our country. Ambassador Hart informed you of the worries which the current situation in Yemen causes us, and which apart from the direct effect on our country, provides a foothold for the growth of doctrines we are both combatting and which also block achievement of a peaceful and just solution bringing peace and security to beloved Yemen. I am convinced that the policy which the United States of America is following towards our country is dictated by our historical friendship and by our joint desire to combat the spread of Communism in the world. There has not entered our mind for a single moment that the friendly United States of America might initiate any project harmful to our country's interest. We also esteem highly the assistance which the USA provides the people of the developing countries if it is spent correctly to raise living standards of peoples inside the frontiers of their countries. Your Excellency also noted that we have been zealous since armed conflict began in the Yemen to find a solution for this problem in peaceful ways and that we used patience and self control despite the various types of meddling and provocation to which our country has been exposed. We have demonstrated continuously a friendly intent for everyone whose concern was the return of peace and security to Yemen. However, all of these efforts failed to give the desired effect in view of our meeting--as Your Excellency noted--an uncompromising rigidity which kept us from reaching a solution. It is our firm hope that by continuation of our joint efforts and our continuous contacts, marked by frankness of spirit, we will be able to conquer the difficulties to which the road to a peaceful just solution has been exposed and, by so doing, to strengthen the good relations between our brothers in the region. There would be among its fruitful results the growth of economic development in an atmosphere dominated by peace and stability. Mr. President, I am happy that this opportunity has been given me to speak with you and to exchange opinions with you in such frankness. This frankness will no doubt have the greatest effect on our joint study of our common aims: resisting Communism and strengthening the historic friendship which binds our two countries. Wishing health and succor for Your Excellency and progress and prosperity for the people of the United States, Sincerely, Faysal 11 Muharram 1385h 11 May 1965" For the Ambassador:
248. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, June 16, 1965, 9 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. I. Secret. A handwritten note on the memorandum indicates it was received at 10 a.m. A notation on the memorandum indicates it was seen by the President on June 22. Saudi Arms Talks. Given the occasional press flurry,/2/ I want to keep you briefed. This is quite unlike the Jordan arms deal: (a) there's no problem of pre-empting the Soviets; (b) there's little real threat to Israel involved--Saudi Arabia is too far away and too incompetent; (c) we're not running after this business--it's the Saudis who are coming to us. /2/On June 2 Komer sent Bundy a draft memorandum for the President commenting on "quite inaccurate" weekend press stories stating that McNamara had sent a letter to the Saudis pushing U.S. arms sales. He pointed out that the Saudis had been interested in air defense for more than a year because of their fears that Nasser would launch air attacks across the border. The United States had not been pressing the Saudis to buy arms, but had simply decided that if they were going to buy it might as well be from the United States. McNamara's letter had not been a sales pitch, but merely an attempt to resolve Saudi doubts about the F-5 versus the F-104. (Ibid., Komer Files, Saudi Arabia, 1965-Mar. 1966) McNamara's letter is Document 241. The Saudi desire for modern air defense is aimed at the Nasser threat from Yemen, not at Israel. The issue arose way back to early 1963, when as bait for the Bunker mission effort to get a Yemen disengagement, we offered to help the Saudis develop an air defense system. We gave them our views in September 1963, and they've been hemming and hawing in typical Arab style ever since. Meanwhile the British, French, and two US companies have been actively seeking the business, so at Saudi request we're sending yet another survey team to help them make up their minds. Our goal is to keep our oil-rich Saudi friends happy and to insure that if they finally do buy anything we get the sale. We've recommended against fancy aircraft and Hawk because Saudis couldn't handle them; but we're willing to sell if they insist. The total package could range from $110-210 million over several years, but we think Faisal will end up buying only the lower figure, if that. We've made other sales to Saudi Arabia. In 1957 we offered a $100 million credit to facilitate extension of our Dhahran air base rights. Since 1961 we've extended two small credits totalling $18 million. The Saudis also bought four C-130s for $15 million cash this spring. The Israelis have never objected to these sales, since they recognize the Saudis are too far away and too ineffective to be a threat. The one problem in the current deal is that if we sell F-104s, the Jordanians and then the Israelis might press for them. This is one reason (the other is that F-104s are just too complex for Saudis) why McNamara wrote recommending the F-5. I personally doubt the Saudis will make up their minds soon on anything./3/ /3/Telegram 102 from Jidda, August 11, reported that the Saudi Government had decided to purchase the F-104G. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL SAUD-UAR) R. W. Komer/4/ /4/McGeorge Bundy initialed below Komer's signature.
249. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia/1/ Washington, August 1, 1965, 10:48 a.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 31-1 SAUD-UAR. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Moore, cleared by Hart in substance, and approved by Davies. Repeated to Cairo, Taiz, London, Dhahran, CHUSMTM Dhahran, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, and COMIDEASTFOR. 47. Embtel 60./2/ Agree it unlikely UAR plans bomb Saudi territory while al-Khouli in Jidda. However, you should report immediately any added evidence confirming UAR overflights. /2/In telegram 60 from Jidda, July 31, Seelye wrote that Saudi aviation technicians had reported that UAR aircraft, allegedly MIGs, had been overflying Jizan in recent days. He noted that this was one of several recent indicators that the United Arab Republic was either engaged in a campaign to make Nasser's July 22 threat against Saudi Arabia appear credible or that it in fact was planning an imminent air attack on Saudi supply depots in Jizan and Najran. If the latter, Seelye noted that it was unreasonable to expect that such an attack would be carried out while al-Khouli was negotiating with the Saudi Arabian Government. (Ibid.) UAR aware our continued support Saudi integrity. This point reiterated to UAR Ambassador Washington on three occasions during past week. He claims to have reported this to Cairo in strong terms. Embassy Cairo is also to discuss with UAR FonMinistry. Concur your recommendation American pilots continue fly SDI flights as usual. Will comment subsequently on proposed contingency position with SAG. Rusk
250. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, August 5, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 70 D 503, Internal Defense (inc. Meeting 7/13/66). Secret. Attached to an August 13 transmittal memorandum from Alexander Rattray of S/S-S to various Department of State bureaus. SUBJECT PRESENT Governor Harriman, Admiral Raborn; General Wheeler, Mr. Rowan and Mr. Marks, Mr. Komer, Mr. Gaud vice Mr. Bell Ambassador Hart, General Anthis, and Messrs Davies and Maechling were present for the meeting [Here follows discussion of the counterinsurgency intelligence summary and the chairman's trip to Europe.] 3. Report on Security Situation in Arabian Peninsula Ambassador Hart briefly reviewed the situation in Saudi Arabia and the peninsula, pointing out that there is no serious internal threat as long as King Faysal remains in power. He said that the immediate threat is internal, stemming from the Yemen situation and Nasserist activity in neighboring states, and that the long term threat comes from the possibility that the Government of Saudi Arabia will be unable to modernize fast enough to meet the rising expectations of dissident groups. Ambassador Hart reviewed US efforts in the youth, labor, military and police fields in Saudi Arabia. He informed the Group of the Minister of Agriculture's request for the assistance of four US agricultural specialists. The possibility of providing such specialists was discussed and the Chairman requested that the State Department look into this. The Group discussed the recommendations contained in the memorandum and suggested that the US Government consider what action it would be prepared to take in the contingency of an eruption in the Yemen situation. The Group agreed with the desirability of providing a police survey team as recommended, and requested that the feasibility of funding such a team be reconsidered by AID and CIA. Mr. Komer suggested that a visible demonstration of US interest in the security and stability of the Arabian peninsula, such as visits by US Navy ships and possible helicopter demonstrations, be made now before Egyptian provocation against Saudi Arabia becomes more flagrant. [Here follows discussion of a miscellaneous item.] C. G. Moody, Jr.
251. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia/1/ Washington, August 19, 1965, 9:06 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL SAUD-US. Secret. Drafted by Moore, cleared by Davies, and approved by Hart. Repeated to Cairo, London, Dhahran, CHUSMTM Dhahran, and CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA. 83. Following is based on uncleared memcon and is FYI-Noforn and subject to revision. Saudi Ambassador Sowayel, acting under instructions, called urgently on Secretary August 18 and expressed appreciation our August 4 press statement reaffirming US support Saudi integrity./2/ He referred to recent Saudi requests for US Navy and Air Force visits and noted Charge Seelye's response that US destroyer now scheduled call Jidda on 17th and 25th, but that Air Force unit presented problem. Ambassador continued that another idea came up concerning possibility US aircraft visiting Saudi Arabia as part of combined US-Saudi training demonstration, that SAG would very much like such visit and hoped USG would implement it. /2/Telegram 22 to Taiz, August 4, reported the Department spokesman's statement reiterating U.S. support for the maintenance of Saudi Arabia's integrity. (Ibid., POL 27 YEMEN) Secretary responded that we continued our support for Saudi Arabia, but that we found some problem with visit of US Air Force element, particularly in view Saudi involvement in border area. In any event would have to discuss idea of US training exercise with President before replying Sowayel. Expressed hope reported early Faisal-Nasser meeting would be fruitful. Noted Saudi progress in recent years of relative calm and said deterioration in US-UAR relations during this period to some extent attributable our support of Saudis. Rusk
252. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, October 8, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 SAUD. Secret; Exclusive Distribution. Drafted by Moore. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS 1. Saudi Arabia. Mr. Stewart said that Sir Donald Stokes of Leyland Motors, who is spearheading the effort to promote sales of British arms abroad, had recently approached Secretary McNamara concerning sales of British Lightning aircraft to the Saudi Air Force. Mr. McNamara had told him that the United States would see no objection to such British sales, provided the U.S. had not already entered into a commitment to sell American aircraft. British Ambassador Dean had subsequently (October 6) called on Secretary McNamara at which time the Secretary had confirmed his remarks to Stokes. Mr. Stewart asked if the Department knew whether the Saudis had reached a decision concerning what aircraft they desired to purchase. Mr. Symmes responded that our latest information was that the Saudis were still considering the matter. Mr. Stewart stressed that if the U.K. is to continue to shoulder its share of the Western defense burden it must meet its balance of payments problem. Sales of Lightnings to the Saudis were part of this problem. [Here follows discussion of aircraft sales to Jordan.]
253. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State/1/ Jidda, October 13, 1965, 0700Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 SAUD. Secret. Repeated to Dhahran, London, Paris, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, CHUSMTM Dhahran, DIAAQ, CSAF, DA, and DEFREPNAMA Paris. 287. Air Defense Purchases. On October 12th Acting Deputy Foreign Minister Mas'ud handed me copy of letter dated October 11 and marked "Secret" from MODA Prince Sultan to Secretary of Defense McNamara./2/ Mas'ud explained original of letter (in Arabic) being transmitted to DOD via Saudi Embassy Washington. /2/A copy of Prince Sultan's letter is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 3717, 381, Jordan, 10 Nov. 65. In letter Sultan refers to Secretary McNamara's April 6 [5] letter/3/ and expresses his appreciation for Secretary's interest in Saudi air defense program and for dispatch of review team to assist Saudi military in choosing best equipment for air defense of Kingdom. /3/Document 241. Sultan then refers to joint recommendations submitted by US and Saudi members review team and states that SAG has now decided to implement these. At same time Sultan requests USG obtain ammunition for use with F104G for training, operational, and war reserve purposes. He also asks USG to supply Saudi Arabia with any additional arms now developed or to be developed for F104G such as Sparrow and Falcon missiles. Sultan, after emphasizing friendly relations and mutual cooperation existing between USG and SAG, asks Secretary McNamara to exert his influence to reduce prices of aircraft and related equipment involved in sale, although neither dollar amount nor percentage of reduction desired specified. Sultan also seeks Secretary's assistance in obtaining credit terms permit SAG pay for package over ten-year period in view of heavy drain on Saudi resources resulting from SAG development and reform programs in all sectors. Specifically, Sultan proposes five percent down payment at time contract signed with remaining ninety-five percent to be paid in twelve installments beginning ten months after arrival aircraft and related basic equipment in Kingdom. Letter concludes with Sultan's hope to receive positive reply from Secretary McNamara as soon as possible. Embassy preparing translation to be pouched October 16. Comment: Mas'ud expressed hope USG would move rapidly in servicing order. I assured him that this would be the case. Seelye
254. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, October 19, 1965, 4:30 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 SAUD. Secret. Drafted by David Korn (NEA/NE) on October 21 and approved in S on November 12. The memorandum is Part III of IV. Part I is Document 382. The time of the meeting is from Rusk's Appointment Book. (Johnson Library) SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS The Secretary said he would like to ask a delicate question. Is Saudi Arabia still troubled by agents from abroad? Mr. Saqqaf replied that foreign agents are no longer a problem and explained that the people are satisfied with King Faisal's policies and give him full support. One of the reasons for this is that the King spends no money on himself and sets aside as much as possible for economic development projects. Mr. Saqqaf said that in line with this policy the SAG wished to ask the United States for help in the purchase of American supersonic aircraft, Hawk missiles and radar equipment, as proposed in Defense Minister Sultan's letter of October 12 to Secretary McNamara./2/ The Saudis need payment facilities because the King insists on spending every available cent on development. /2/See footnote 2, Document 253. Mr. Saqqaf said the SAG had gotten offers of good terms from the UK and France. Now that the Council of Ministers had been persuaded to buy the US planes and equipment, he hoped the US would move rapidly to help them. Mr. Saqqaf again made a plea for rapid action and said he hoped that for once the Saudis could ask the US for something and have it done rapidly, without getting bogged down in negotiations. The Secretary remarked that modern aircraft are very expensive but promised to look into the matter and get in touch personally with Secretary McNamara. He said a problem might arise if the Saudi request involved military assistance credits, as these were already overdrawn.
255. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia/1/ Washington, October 29, 1965, 7:18 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 SAUD. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Moore; cleared by G/PM Director for Operations Howard Meyers, Judd, Officer in Charge of Politico-Military Affairs in the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Regional Affairs Lieutenant Colonel Billy R. Byrd, Symmes, and Stoddart; and approved by Davies. Repeated to Beirut, Amman, Dhahran, Paris for DAUSRO, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA POLAD (by pouch), CHUSMTM Dhahran, and London. 213. Joint State/Defense Message. Ref exchange letters UK Min Aviation Jenkins/2/ and McNamara/3/ and separate Cirtel/4/ (being repeated to addressees). /2/On October 25 Jenkins wrote McNamara concerning their joint problems in meeting the defense requirements of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Lebanon. As part of an over-all program, he suggested a joint U.S.-U.K. proposal to Saudi Arabia of a defense package consisting of British Lightning aircraft together with U.S. Hawk missiles and a U.S.-U.K. combination of ground environment equipment, with U.S. concentration on communications and U.K. concentration on radar. (Telegram 1902 from London, October 27, ibid., DEF 12-5 NEAR E) /3/On October 28 McNamara responded that since he had received a letter from Prince Sultan the previous week indicating his government's decision on an F-104G package if arrangements for financing and missiles could be worked out, it was already late for reconsideration of the Saudi Arabian program. Nevertheless, there was merit in the tri-country program Jenkins had outlined and the United States would be willing to agree to inclusion of U.S. equipment in such a proposal if it was absolutely clear that the United States was also willing to stand by its original offer of F-104G aircraft to Saudi Arabia. (Letter from Secretary McNamara to Minister Jenkins, October 28, 1965; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, Saudi Arabia 381, 3 Mar. 65) /4/ Circular telegram 782, October 29. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 NEAR E) 1. You will note in developing combined package with British we have insisted that we cannot withdraw our own F-104G offer without risking serious damage US-SAG relations. We intend proceed with own presentation, as witnessed by McNamara response to Sultan. At same time we willing join with British in making available to Saudis another choice of equipment mix. (Latter may have pricing advantage in comparison with Lockheed offer, although this unclear until precise comparison of components can be made.) 2. We have insisted that new package be presented by British as having been formulated at their initiative; that they had obtained authorization from us for inclusion US equipment in this proposal. 3. After combined proposal presented to SAG by British, you should confirm to Saudis that we in fact have agreed to inclusion US equipment and stand ready supply full logistic, training and other requisite support for this equipment should Saudis choose combined proposal. At same time you should make absolutely clear we remain fully ready and willing supply completely US package, as reiterated in McNamara response to Sultan./5/ /5/Telegram 207 to Jidda, October 29, transmitted McNamara's letter to Prince Sultan. (Ibid., DEF 1-4 SAUD) In telegram 342 from Jidda, November 2, Seelye reported that on that day he had informed Acting Deputy Foreign Minister Mas'ud that the U.S. Government had authorized inclusion of U.S. equipment in the latest U.K. proposal, but that the United States remained fully ready and willing to supply a completely U.S. package. He added that if the Saudi Arabian Government decided to opt for the combined package, the U.S. Government was prepared to supply the requisite equipment, training, and support. In response to Mas'ud's query as to why he had not communicated this when he met with Sultan the previous day, Seelye responded that he had not been authorized to do so until after the U.K. presentation. (Ibid., DEF 12-5 SAUD) Rusk
256. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State/1/ Jidda, November 2, 1965, 0645Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 SAUD. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, London, Paris for DAUSRO, Dhahran, CHUSMTM Dhahran, Amman, and Beirut. 338. MODA Prince Sultan summoned me, together with Acting Deputy Foreign Minister Mas'ud, to Ministry of Defense Office in Jidda November 1. (HMG Aviation representatives saw Sultan five hours later.) Purpose of meeting was discussion Secretary Defense McNamara's letter to Sultan/2/ received Jidda October 29. Sultan said he gratified by letter and welcomed its "spirit." He then asked we go over letter together paragraph by paragraph. /2/See footnote 5, Document 255. After completing paragraphs one through four, he went into long dissertation re USG-SAG relationship. Recalling his five-hour conversation with Ambassador Hart earlier in year, he emphasized importance SAG regime be enabled demonstrate that SAG's primary reliance on USG sound and productive. He referred to MTM relationship with SAG and noted that other Arab countries had questioned benefits derived from USG-SAG military relationship. He cited fact SAG pays most of costs of MTM, excluding salaries USG advisors. He commented that recent visit to Jordan had impressed him with fact USG financing purchase all Jordanian military equipment which, he contended, Jordanian people fully recognize and appreciate. Sultan continued that in Saudi Arabia there are elements both in military as well as in Council of Ministers who are unfriendly to U.S. What SAG needs and wants is tangible evidence USG desire be helpful Saudi Arabia in order to help validate in eyes of public SAG determination continue its close relationship with USG. (What Sultan appeared be driving at was that USG should pick up portion of defense package tab.) Addressing specifics of letter, Sultan said he taken aback by [$]600 million figure cited as maximum possible cost of defense package. He claimed that few months before arrival USG Air Defense Review Team Lockheed had quoted figure of some $200 million as cost of package exclusive Hawk missiles. Adding estimated cost of Hawk missiles as provided by review team plus additional amount for unforeseen items, SAG had come up with total of $330 to 340 million. This had been figure presented to King and on basis of which he had authorized Sultan proceed with negotiation defense package. I indicated my understanding that cost of labor in U.S. had risen since initial quotations and that considerable portion of 600 million figure included estimate of cost of simultaneous construction of all facilities. If construction phased, costs would be less. Lockheed had also indicated it might be prepared to adjust this figure downward now that it had had an opportunity to undertake further on-site survey. I emphasized fact only way Lockheed could hire and keep top flight technicians on job in Saudi Arabia was by providing them with housing equivalent to US standards as well as accustomed recreational facilities. I said further that once Lockheed had had opportunity cost out each item, Sultan would probably find that cost of hardware, including aircraft, not unreasonable. In any case we would urge Lockheed reduce its prices as much as possible. With regard to Sultan's oblique suggestion that USG finance portion of air defense package, I noted extreme difficulty Executive branch USG having these days in obtaining Congressional support for additional--let alone existing--military and economic aid programs. Re generous credit terms, I expressed view Secretary Defense letter showed that USG making extraordinary effort to satisfy SAG request. I said that while true SAG not receiving USG grant assistance, His Highness might wish to remind "unfriendly elements" in Saudi Arabia of fact USG provides most important assistance of all, namely, clear, public undertaking to support and preserve integrity of Saudi Arabia. Sultan did not pursue point further. Sultan then asked whether would be useful invite into our meeting Lockheed representatives who waiting outside his office. Since latter had just completed round of discussions with RSAF committee resulting in agreement Lockheed would work up price lists on basis two alternative time-phased programs, I suggested any further discussion of details await Lockheed's completion its financial estimates. Sultan indicated this agreeable and asked that USG official be present during next round of discussions. He said he had spent most of night discussing two alternative Lockheed proposals. He tentatively favored second proposal which would phase in program over 4-5 year period since he said he recognized need first train Saudi personnel adequately. Meanwhile, he asked his military staff to draw up third alternative time-phased program. I noted Lockheed had indicated would take two weeks complete financial estimates. When Sultan commented this too long, I offered undertake urge Lockheed complete estimates in one week and to assure that USG official either from Washington or from Country Team would be present during next round. Sultan expressed desire that highest priority be attached to installation of Hawk missiles. Finally, Sultan asked that I convey to Mr. McNamara on King's and his behalf two points: (1) their gratification with SecDefense's latest letter and (2) their desire to continue maintain special relationship with USG and their belief that forthcoming USG response in implementing defense package would reflect reciprocal USG desire. Meyers of Lockheed briefed re portions of foregoing including 1) request financial estimates be prepared in week instead of two weeks; 2) SAG concern re high prices and our hope Lockheed can reduce; 3) Sultan desire USG official attend next round of discussions. I have been in close consultation with CHUSMTM, who now in Jidda and endorses foregoing. Comment: Hope that DOD can persuade Lockheed complete its financial estimates in less than two weeks and arrange have representatives in Saudi Arabia prepared discuss and cost any alternative time-phasing proposed by Saudis. Welcome suggestions as to who from USG side might attend next round Lockheed-MODA-RSAF discussions. Seelye [Continue with the next documents] Volume XXI Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |