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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXI Near East Region Department of State |
 230. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State/1/ Jidda, June 23, 1964, 8 a.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 US-Johnson. Secret. Repeated to Lagos for General Adams, Dhahran and CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA. 1164. Deptel 759;/2/ DepCirctel 2210;/3/ CA-12519./4/ Presentation President Johnson's letter to Crown Prince Faysal; discussion of Dhahran Airfield, General Adams participating. /2/Document 229. /3/Dated May 27. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 USSR) /4/Dated June 2. (Ibid., DEF 19-4 US-SAUD) Details extensive conversation with Faysal June 17 based on President Johnson's letter are being covered by airgram. Highlights of this and accompanying discussions attendant on General Adam's visit follow: 1. President Johnson's letter was appreciated and I believe served very useful purpose of (a) re-establishing personal contact between President and Faysal; (b) reassuring Faysal of President's continued interest in welfare and advancement Kingdom; and (c) giving strong support to continuance disengagement. 2. At same time Faysal did not agree with all points made in President's letter. In particular he took exception to implication at end paragraph six that he should be responsive to desire YAR leaders to make contact with SAG. Remarking that while Khrushchev did not gain 100 percent success from visit to UAR, impact on Middle East should by no means be discounted, Faysal again insisted at length that source of infection and instability throughout Middle East was Nasir, and again urged us to recognize this fact and at very least stop supporting a malignant influence. 3. General Adams expressed to Faysal appreciation for current US military use (landing and take-offs) of Dhahran International Airfield. He hoped this use would continue. Faysal queried Prince Sultan, who had entered meeting late, and confirmed that US use was permitted and asked if there were any problems. General Adams indicated that perhaps there some facilities and working arrangements could be devised whereby if US had to come to Saudi Arabia's aid at some future date, all would go smoothly. Faysal apparently took this as referring to secret understanding of 1963 constituting US-SAG advance ground-rules for Hard Surface (which at Faysal's request were not to [be] disseminated in either government). He replied that US military should not misunderstand precautions taken by SAG to avert possible criticism; it implied no absence of trust. This particular probe of Faysal's reactions was not pursued further. 4. However, during lengthy discussion which followed my presentation re Soviet threats in Near East, Faysal expressed alarm over Soviet-directed fishing fleet which will operate out of Egyptian base Ra's Banas. He expressed such concern over Saudi exposure to this first Soviet presence in Red Sea that with CA-12519 in mind I used opportunity to make strictly personal observation: In retrospect I entertained divided feelings over American exit from Dhahran Airbase 1962. On one hand base had become irritant between US and embarrassment to SAG; on other hand it had afforded American military presence. Faysal nodded his agreement and made reference to his late 1960 talk with my predecessor, Ambassador Heath. He commented that during conversation he had suggested to Heath that USG take initiative to reduce embarrassing and overt aspects of its position at Dhahran Airfield so as to abate criticism which SAG was incurring from other Arabs. Since I remembered record this conversation quite differently, i.e. that Faysal had urged that USG take initiative to withdraw completely from Dhahran Airbase before SAG forced into embarrassing position of requesting withdrawal,/5/ I felt that Faysal intentionally or unintentionally was changing the record. Again in strictly personal vein I asked Faysal whether he felt in retrospect that it might have been good idea if SAG and USG had agreed that instead of completely withdrawing US forces from Dhahran we had reduced our presence and after handing over DAF to SAG had retained under umbrella of USMTM some arrangement which would have kept a US military cadre on hand. Faysal backwatered gently, saying Nasir could always make mountain out of molehill. I responded Nasir did not need the molehill and he agreed. I was left with feeling that door not entirely shut to CINCSTRIKE needs, although chances not good. /5/For Ambassador Heath's November 28, 1960, conversation with Faisal regarding the Dhahran airbase, see Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, vol. XII, pp. 768-769. During subsequent session with General Adams I asked latter to outline to me his desiderata which are as follows: Category 1. Preposition at Dhahran International Airfield under US control: Starting machines (to be tested periodically and routinely by starting USMTM aircraft). Tools and equipment. Repair equipment. Few vehicles, including perhaps two tank trucks. Extra wing tanks. Volume this category: 2 or 3 boxcar loads. Category 2. Preposition at DIA under US control: Conventional aircraft ammunition including: 750 and 500 lb. bombs (500 iron bombs) 2000 rockets; 50 caliber ammo. ("For training purposes"; to be expended and replaced in training of RSAF.) Volume this category: around 10,000 cu. ft. (Bunkers available at DIA) Category 3. One USAF fighter-bomber squadron to periodically visit Saudi Arabia from Turkey for training and familiarization. Three or four days each visit. Cover for operation: "Training of RSAF." Would involve around 70 men in each squadron. This would be a work force. Category 4. Annual joint Saudi-US air-ground combined exercise, a smaller "exercise Delawar." Combined HQ. Would serve as instrument for training Saudi forces and require full year's preparation. Political timing to be determined by USG and SAG. This would be open demonstration and could be used to make US intentions clear. While I am by no means sanguine that all or any these items are obtainable from Faysal it is conceivable that in his present mood he might agree to Categories 1, 3 and 4 without as much trouble as to Category 2. If State and DOD wish me to make further sounding I suggest following tactic: I would request private interview and pick up this portion our June 17 conversation on very informal basis. I would say General Adams had expressed to me privately his interest in Categories 1 through 4 but had as yet no instructions; and that if Faysal saw merit in some such arrangement well camouflaged by USMTM I was prepared ask Washington whether highest level US Govt might be interested. Hart
231. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom1 Washington, September 21, 1964, 5:49 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 SAUD-UK. Secret. Drafted by Moore; cleared by Bunte, Colonel Evans (G/PM), Quinn, and Officer in Charge of United Kingdom Affairs Thomas M. Judd; and approved by Davies. Repeated to Jidda, Dhahran, CHUSMTM Dhahran, and CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA for Ramsey. 2027. Joint State/Defense Message. Embtels 1130,/2/ 1208;/3/ UK Offer of Thunderbirds to SAG. /2/Dated September 7. (Ibid.) 3 In telegram 1208 from London, September 15, Bruce reported his discussion of possibility of a U.K. sale of Thunderbird missiles to Saudi Arabia with Assistant Under Secretary Crawford. (Ibid.) At appropriate level you should voice our strong concern at reported renewed offer HMG sell Thunderbird surface-to-air missiles to SAG. As described in Deptel 3760, December 18, 1963 (480 to Jidda)/4/ and detailed to Harrison and Brenchley in Washington in January, our view continues to be that Saudis have a low priority requirement for SAMs, that their purchase of such overly-sophisticated weapons would represent foolhardy drain on their financial resources and useless diversion of their scarce personnel and skills from badly needed development program. Both US and UK have basic interest in Saudi stability and orderly development which far exceeds any concern either of us has for selling weapons in that region. Encouraging SAG to put resources into extremely technical and expensive hardware of relatively marginal military value for them, particularly in face of latent internal nationalist discontent, is not the role of a friend nor is it in our mutual enlightened self-interest. As the British know, we removed the recommendation for SAMs from our technicians Air Defense Survey Report for these reasons. We believe they are valid independent of any concern that the SAG should look to us for its equipment desires in view of our training commitment. /4/Dated December 18, 1963. (Ibid., DEF 1-4 SAUD) FYI. In face FonOff demurral that HMG position different from that stated in January, we see nothing to be gained by pressing for clarification of Harrison statement to Talbot in March (London tel 4270)./5/ /5/Dated March 3. (Ibid., DEF 12-5 SAUD) We continue deeply concerned over prospects introduction SAMs to Saudi Arabia from any source. Nonetheless, if Saudis become more responsive to British persistence in pressing Thunderbirds it would face us with necessity, albeit reluctantly, of reviewing possible US offer of Hawk to Saudis. However, pending further developments, do not wish to suggest to British at this time that we could be forced to make Hawk competitive with Thunderbird. End FYI./6/ /6/In telegram 1558 from London, October 2, Bruce reported that he had made the demarche to Crawford as instructed. Crawford responded that the U.K. Government had not offered to sell Thunderbird missiles to the Saudi Arabian Government, but told British manufacturers it had no objections to such a sale, which it was prepared to license. (Ibid., DEF 12-5 SAUD-UK) Will forward separate cable re Iranian Hawk question. For Jidda: On target of opportunity basis, you and CHUSMTM should continue dissuade Saudis from acquisition SAMs, drawing on numbered points Deptel 480. Ball
232. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia/1/ Washington, October 7, 1964, 7:18 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 1-4 SAUD. Secret. Drafted by Moore; cleared by Stoddart, Padelford, and Warren; and approved by Davies. Also sent to Dhahran and CHUSMTM Dhahran and repeated to London and CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA for Ramsey. 188. Joint State/Defense Message. Should Saudi arms evaluation team, currently in US, raise question of surface-to-air missiles, DOD and State plan reply as follows. (Similar statement contained Deptel 516 to Jidda of December 31.)/2/ If SAG officials broach subject, you should use same approach. /2/Not found. "Surface-to-air (SAM) missiles were seriously considered by Air Defense Survey Team for inclusion in report. Although they have not been recommended for initial stages of development of an air defense capability in Saudi Arabia, SAM's are logical future addition which might be added after the proposed defense system is operational. Complexity and sophistication of SAM acquisition and control systems, dearth of sufficient trainable personnel even for operation of system presently proposed, adverse impact on development program of absorption large number skilled men into static defense set-up, and the considerable expense of a SAM system are main barriers to recommending such a system for Saudi Arabia. The air defense program presently proposed consists of the basic steps which must be taken towards establishing an adequate air defense. These are the communications nets, the early warning and control radar nets, and the fighterinterceptors required for identification, interception, and destruction, if required. "In view our continued interest in assisting in developing a viable air defense for SAG, US will of course be willing consider Saudi request for purchase SAM's at appropriate future time." Rusk
233. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ JCSM-904-64 Washington, October 28, 1964. 1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 69 A 7425, Saudi Arabia 686, 28 Oct. 64. Secret. SUBJECT 1. Reference is made to:/2/ 2 The references are attached but not printed. a. American Embassy, Jidda, message 133, Control 15663, dated 19 August 1964. 2. At a meeting on 17 June 1964, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA and the American Ambassador to Saudi Arabia discussed utilization of Dhahran Airfield with Crown Prince Faysal. The references contain details of that meeting, the political background, and a request that the Joint Chiefs of Staff: a. Obtain DOD approval in principle for installation of an Instrument Landing System (ILS) and for repair/replacement of the Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN) facility at Dhahran Airfield, conditional on substantial Saudi agreement to US approaches for increased military cooperation. b. Forward such conditional approval, via Department of State channels, to the Ambassador for possible use in his forthcoming approaches to the Saudis toward obtaining increased Saudi-US military cooperation encompassing prestockage of ground handling equipment at Dhahran Airfield, periodic visits by a US fighter squadron, and an annual Saudi-US joint exercise. c. Furnish preliminary views concerning the appropriate program approval authority and source of funds for purchase, installation, and support costs. 3. The TACAN and ILS are of concern only as bargaining instruments. The basic question is whether or not there is a sufficient need for the increased use of Dhahran Airfield, as expressed by CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA, to warrant US provision of an ILS and TACAN. 4. Should the United States be denied Wheelus, the requirement for Dhahran Airfield as a substitute staging base to the East Africa area would be most urgent. There is a current requirement for staging rights into Dhahran Airfield for improved access into Iran and Pakistan. An alternate route into the East Africa area is also required should Wheelus be temporarily denied because of weather or other factors. The possible loss of Wheelus and the peacetime training that would be obtained under this proposal by both the US and Saudi military are factors which make Dhahran Airfield base rights a highly desirable commodity. 5. Current US military operations into Dhahran Airfield consist principally of three scheduled MATS flights a week. Although existing navigational aids are considered adequate to support these flights (weather conditions permit visual flight rules/instrument flight rules approach and landing operations 96.8% of the time), the availability of an ILS and TACAN would contribute to increased operational capability and safety aspects of both MATS and commercial carriers transiting Dhahran Airfield. Additionally, the existence of such fixed aids would reduce planned US Air Force mobile support requirements for this base. 6. From the Saudi Arabian point of view, the modernization of Dhahran Airfield resulting from these two navigational aids would undoubtedly contribute to Saudi prestige by providing an all-weather capability comparable to that of other international airports. Furthermore, the TACAN would be a primary instrument approach aid for any Saudi military aircraft of US origin. Thus, it is hoped that the Saudi Arabian Government will be favorably disposed to the acceptance of improved navigational aids at Dhahran Airfield as at least a partial quid pro quo for expanded Saudi-US military cooperation. 7. The US military services have both ILS and TACAN equipment which could be diverted to Dhahran Airfield. Neither the equipment nor the required installation and maintenance funds for Dhahran Airfield is included in current military programs. All items in current military programs are considered to be of equal or greater military priority than those in the CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA proposal; therefore, funds are not available from the military services for this purpose. 8. Nevertheless, it is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the United States should agree, in principle, to the rehabilitation/ replacement of the TACAN and installation of an ILS at Dhahran Airfield and to recurring maintenance of both facilities, subject to Saudi agreement as outlined above. Since funds are not available from the Services and since the political benefits to be gained by increased US presence in Saudi Arabia could equal or exceed the military benefits, consideration should be given to the possibility of accomplishment of this program by the Department of State. Informal working level coordination with the Federal Aviation Agency Office of International Aviation Affairs indicates the possibility that, upon request by the Department of State, the Federal Aviation Agency may provide the required equipment, installation, and maintenance. This approach would have the added benefit of reducing the military connotation which might otherwise be apparent should the ILS and TACAN be installed and maintained by military personnel. 9. Accordingly, it should be determined if the Saudi Arabian Government is favorably disposed toward the acceptance of improved navigational aide at Dhahran Airfield in exchange for expanded Saudi-US military cooperation, generally as outlined in reference 1 d, above. 10. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that: a. The United States agree, in principle, to the rehabilitation/replacement of the TACAN and installation of an ILS at Dhahran Airfield, subject to Saudi agreement on substantial Saudi-US military cooperation. b. The Department of State be requested to consider funding arrangements. c. The Department of State convey the US position to the Saudi Arabian Government. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: J. W. Davis/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that indicates Davis signed the original.
234. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, December 3, 1964, 2 p.m. 1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 68 D 451, Special Group (CI) Minutes of Meetings, July-Dec. 1964. Secret. Drafted on December 4. SUBJECT PRESENT Governor Harriman, General Wheeler, Mr. McCone, Mr. Rowan, Mr. Solbert vice Mr. Vance, Mr. Gaud vice Mr. Bell, Mr. Brubeck Mr. McElhiney was present for Item 1.b [Here follows discussion of the counterinsurgence intelligence summary.] 2. Saudi Arabia Ambassador Hart informed the Group that Saudi Arabia/United States relations are good and that the present government is attempting to build for the future from a good base rather than pointing its program towards an immediate threat. He said that the danger comes more from forces within Saudi Arabia, rather than externally. He pointed out that the present plan of the Government of Saudi Arabia is "for the people," and there is no evidence that the people oppose the plan at this time. He said that for all practical purposes Saudi Arabia runs a welfare state, though the government is anti-Socialist, anti-Ba'athist, and certainly anti-Communist; they do not maintain relations with any Communist nation. He reminded the group that Nasser's failure to achieve upheaval in Saudi Arabia in '62 and '63 has given the government renewed confidence in its own ability. Ambassador Hart continued by saying that Faisal's image abroad has suffered because of his recent deposed brother's reputation, but that his image at home is definitely improving./2/ He suggested that correspondents visiting the country can assist in improving his image by observing and reporting progress and giving credit where it is due. He commented also on the sensitivity of the Saudis to absence of public support by the United States and requested that any visiting US dignitaries to the Near East who go to Cairo not by-pass Saudi Arabia. /2/On November 2 King Saud was deposed and Crown Prince Faisal proclaimed King. Ambassador Hart strongly recommended that a high-ranking labor advisor be assigned to assist in the organization of emerging labor forces. He suggested that we look favorably on such requests for technical assistance as managerial, administrative, and technical advisors. He informed the Group that we have been asked to assist in the English language training program and to provide advisors for the new University of Jidda, which they will finance. He pointed out that the Country Team wishes to expand its cultural center in Jidda in order to provide our own English language training facilities and hoped that the necessary $5,000 can be found for this purpose. He recommended continued US military assistance for the regular armed forces and that the British continue to advise the National Guard (White Army) and provide police training. He suggested that we consider assistance for some proposed engineering projects, which in the long run might stimulate US-Saudi trade. General Wheeler observed that Saudi Arabia could prove to be the key to the entire peninsula, that this new Arab approach in developing free enterprise will be a good example to the others if it succeeds. Mr. McCone pointed out that we should consider Saudi Arabia in its true perspective, recognizing that enormous progress has been accomplished in the last 25 years both physically and culturally. Ambassador Hart agreed, but emphasized that progress must proceed slowly because the elder generation is very conservative; the young people are coming along fine and being trained for the future. The Chairman thanked Ambassador Hart for appearing before the Group, requesting that he leave a list of his requests and stating that they would receive sympathetic consideration. C. G. Moody, Jr.
235. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State/1/ Jidda, December 18, 1964. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 SAUD. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Dhahran. No time of transmission appears on the telegram. 458. King's Interest in Visit to US. In interview with Kermit Roosevelt December 16, King Faysal talked of his interest in visiting US. King said he had thought of possibility of going in spring of 1965 but now felt there were so many pressing matters which would over next few months require him remain Saudi Arabia that he would not be able to go until later. Faysal mentioned also that he had already received several invitations travel to other friendly states and that he had to take into consideration in order in which he made official visits abroad. It apparent to Roosevelt, however, from King's remarks that he deeply interested in early trip to US and that he desires very much develop warm personal understanding and sense reassurance from contact with President Johnson of kind to which Faysal attached so much importance result his meeting with President Kennedy in Oct. 1962. In talk later with Faysal's son, Prince Mohamed, and Mohamed's brother-in-law, Omar Azam (who is very much member of family's inner circle), Roosevelt found both affirming Faysal's desire to visit US, although neither seemed to have any idea as how King hoped visit could be arranged (informal, official, or state). Embassy officer who good friend of Abdulla Thanayyan, young sportsman and pilot who is close to Mohamed Faysal and other members of Royal family, has received broad hints of Faysal's interest in travel to US. Few days ago Thanayyan said he understood Faysal believes he could not, in view his elevation to kingship appropriately travel US again unless officially invited. Apparently topic has been considerably discussed in Royal family recently. Dhahran's 156/2/ is evidence of this also. /2/Not found. Faysal's dwelling on possibility of visit to US indicates his continued preoccupation with US-Saudi relations, his sense of dependence on US and his desire strengthen ties on which he places great reliance. Official or state visit would seem logical and mutually beneficial endeavor from several viewpoints: 1. Faysal as monarch will be undertaking state visits to various countries using this traditional means reinforce relationships important to success his policies. Appropriate that strength of US-Saudi link should be particularly emphasized by early visit to US. 2. Visit would seem fit well into pattern our present policies toward Near East as whole. Faysal seems uncontroversial figure among US public and has received generally favorable US press. While regarded by radical Arab elements as symbol of "outworn" regimes, yet Faysal presents in reality image of modern Saudi desire for progress and reform as new leader sharply contrasting in outlook and reputation to King Saud. His presence in US would reflect our clear intention encourage sincere endeavors of a tradition-rooted regime meet in orderly, evolutionary fashion inevitable challenges of modern Western civilization. 3. As continuing demonstration US interest and friendship for Arab world, Dept may be considering invitations to one or two Arab leaders for visits in 1965. Since Faysal has never before been official US guest, he would seem highly eligible candidate. 4. Lastly and most fundamentally, USG invitation to Faysal would be worth more than almost any other gesture we could make in terms strengthening US-Saudi relations, establishing favorable atmosphere in which we could move ahead with variety of measures we would like see implemented strengthen prospects of secure and stable future for Faysal regime. In suggesting Faysal visit to US we are, of course, fully aware many complex policy and programming problems which must be resolved permit it to take place. With, no doubt, many other official visits by heads state and government under consideration question timing may be specially difficult one. Barring any sharp deterioration situation here or in Near East generally, believe Faysal would be inclined go at almost any time convenient for President despite his remarks to Roosevelt. However Faysal would find it difficult be away for period of annual Muslim Haj (pilgrimage) extending this year from about six weeks before to one month after April 12 when Saudi monarch traditionally receives visitors coming for pilgrimage and performs key role in holy rites. Hopefully by end of Haj, Yemen situation, for whose resolution his presence here indispensable, would be nearer solution. Hope foregoing can be reviewed with Ambassador Hart before his return Jidda. Thacher
236. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia/1/ Washington, December 23, 1964, 6:52 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 SAUD. Secret. Drafted by Moore; cleared by Davies, Komer, Hart, and Harriman; and approved by Jernegan. 304. Following is oral message from President to be delivered to Faisal by Ambassador Hart following his return to Saudi Arabia December 28. "Your Majesty: "Ambassador Hart's return to Saudi Arabia after a series of fruitful discussions here in Washington concerning your country gives me the opportunity again to express, through him, my personal good wishes and respect. Since assuming office over one year ago, it has been my constant aim to further the harmonious relations that continue to exist between our two countries and to strengthen our personal understanding. I consider the historical and current friendship between our countries and ourselves to be a basic foundation on which our policies in the Near East rest. The frank and friendly messages we have exchanged in the past year have amply sustained our relationship. It has thus been with particular pleasure that I learned of the orderly processes by which you ascended to the throne, with the promise that this brings of a continuation of your wise leadership. The many signs of devotion and loyalty that this move elicited amply attest to the high respect accorded you by your people--a respect which I also share. "Your reaffirmation of policy at the time of assuming the kingship showed that we both feel a strong concern for preserving a peaceful world in which free peoples may follow their own national destinies. It is clear that we share the objective of halting the spread of Communism by providing individuals throughout the world with clearly superior and freely chosen alternatives. This calls for a continued vigilance in the face of threats to our interests and a measured and responsible use of the powerful implements placed in our hands to meet such threats. With the spread of weapons of mass destruction, I shall need your help and that of all the leaders of the Free World to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war while defending our freedom. "It is of great importance for the whole world that we also strive to halt strife and bloodshed in specific countries so as to preclude dislocation in these areas from becoming the means by which world Communism extends its area of influence. It was thus with great gratification that I heard of your agreement with President Nasser to mediate between the conflicting groups in Yemen to put an end to the struggle there. I realize, as you do, that a final solution to the Yemen problem must depend on the Yemenis themselves and that with such conflicting interests among them there may arise a series of problems before the end is reached. The great advance in the situation, however, in which your statesmanship has played so great a part, is that a solution now is to be sought by the road of peace, internationally as well as nationally. "Of equal importance are our efforts to bring the tangible benefits of our national well-being to our individual peoples. Thus it is with great interest that we in this country have been following the progress in your program of economic development and social reform for Saudi Arabia. The efforts to broaden educational opportunities for your people and better enable women to contribute to the general productiveness of the country are ones of which I am especially aware. These problems also occupy much of my time in America. Your success in preserving the fundamental guiding religious principles, while at the same time modernizing social relationships, draws our respect and admiration. "I have welcomed, Your Majesty, this opportunity again to exchange views with you. I hope you agree that these exchanges are valuable. "May God keep you and your people and grant you prosperity and peace, Lyndon B. Johnson" Rusk
237. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia/1/ Washington, January 4, 1965, 6:17 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 SAUD-UK. Secret. Drafted by Moore, cleared by Judd and Quinn, and approved by Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs Harrison M. Symmes. Repeated to Dhahran, London, CINCSTRIKE for POLAND, and CHUSMTM Dhahran. 319. British Arms Sales Saudi Arabia. Acting on instructions, British Embassy officer Jan. 4 stated Foreign Office wishes keep us informed its action with respect arms sales policy to Saudi Arabia. HMG continues recognize and support US position of primacy with respect training and maintenance facilities in Saudi Arabia. At same time UK balance of payments problem has become particularly acute, especially with respect to aircraft industry, and HMG is under great pressure assist actively in foreign sales. HMG thus required give British Aircraft Corporation full support throughout world. Acting under this pressure, HMG has recently again reassured Saudis that, if requested by SAG, it would be willing issue licenses for sale Thunderbird missiles, Lightning aircraft and radar facilities. In last few days, Labor Member Parliament Cronin (who formerly in Aviation Ministry but does not now have official position in Government) has gone to Saudi Arabia under BAC auspices in attempt to sell equipment. Responding informally Department officer noted inherent conflict between British assurances for support U.S. primacy in training and maintenance of Saudis and attempts sell British equipment on which U.S. markedly less able provide such training and maintenance. Would appreciate reports any indication from Saudi Arabia of renewed British arms sale activities. Rusk
238. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State/1/ Jidda, March 2, 1965, 6 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 SAUD-US. Secret; Priority. Sent also to CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA and repeated to Dhahran, London, Paris, CHUSMTM Dhahran, DEFREPNAMA Paris, DIA, DOD, and 1127th USAF FAG Fort Belvoir, Virginia 643. Saudi Air Defense Survey. Deptel 400 to Jidda./2/ /2/Telegram 400 to Jidda, February 17, instructed the Ambassador to approach Saqqaf and Prince Sultan to discuss Saudi air defense needs, noting that the U.S. Government had attempted to maintain neutrality between the F-5 and the F-104 and was reluctant to favor one U.S. manufacturer over another. Since both aircraft were capable of providing an adequate air defense for Saudi Arabia, it seemed advisable for the Saudis to choose the one with the greatest ease of maintenance and the lowest accident rate. With this approach, it should be possible to make the U.S. position clear without specifically recommending the F-5, but rather by recommending its virtues as those that should be most important to the Saudis. (Ibid.) On 28 Feb, I met with Prince Sultan to introduce DEFREPNAMA Hooper. We were accompanied by Adm Sweeney and CHUSMTM Gen. Leahy. Among other subjects we discussed air defense for Saudi Arabia at length. Our opening remarks were based on Deptel 400 and covered certain desirable features in an aircraft such as twin-engine reliability, maintenance characteristics, accident rate comparison, degree of difficulty in pilot training and performance characteristics. These remarks included advantages of F-5. It was stated USG desired to help Prince Sultan solve his air defense problem. Sultan indicated information received from various aircraft manufacturers contained proposals beyond recommendations in Air Defense Survey. He stated his air defense evaluation teams report compared Lockheed, Northrop, British Aircraft Corporation (BAC) and French Government proposals and had rated aircraft in the following priority to satisfy Saudi air defense requirement: 1. Lockheed F-104G Discussion then centered around comparisons of F-104 with Sidewinder and Sparrow weapons, Lightning with Fire Streak and Red Top weapons, Mirage III with Metra IR and radar missiles. Prince Sultan indicated Egyptians had MIG-21 equipped with a weapon equivalent to Sparrow. He asserted Saudi military air needs were purely defensive in character and noted that threat from neighboring countries consisted of MIG-21 and Mirage III. Therefore he concluded, Saudi Arabia must have the F-104G, preferably with Sparrow. He emphasized Saudi Arabia requests a US weapons system to counter threat of its neighbors and pointed out cost differential not important where safety of country at stake. In reply Hooper pointed out to Sultan that this was first time USG representatives had received official Saudi request for F-104G model and that this request was beyond aircraft recommended by Air Defense Survey and that request would be passed to Washington immediately for study. (Officers attending meeting however took immediate occasion to indicate F-104G with Sparrow should not be considered further since combination not developed. Radar development could change aircraft characteristics. Sultan was told that several NATO countries found F-104G equipped with Sparrow to be too expensive a weapons system.) Sultan revealed that complete Lockheed package proposal with ground environmental (GE) radar and communications including 36 F-104G with Sidewinders would cost 180 million dollars. At this point in meeting we were joined by additional US representatives from Embassy, ISA (Feigl), DEFREPNAMA's party and USMTM. Sultan was then asked if he would be interested in F-104H with latter conversion to G model, after training completed. He made no direct response but stated he wanted to buy one package, under USG supervision or under BAC or French Government. He did not want a mixture of aircraft and GE equipment from differing national design. He then requested that, through USMTM, a reassessment of original SAG Air Defense Survey and of Saudi evaluation team report be arranged. He will provide USMTM with first review these packages to ascertain what qualified personnel would be necessary to conduct assessment. Subject to STRICOM approval, USMTM will review material made available to it and subsequently request: 1. Qualified personnel beyond its resources to establish necessary review board. 2. Necessary policy guidance to assist review board in drawing up its recommendations. 3. Final approval by DOD and State of Review Board's recommendations prior to submission to SAG. 4. Intercession with US manufacturers by DOD to suspend sales promotion contact with SAG or USMTM during period this review. Comment: Additional comments by DEFREPNAMA will follow from Paris. Embassy also preparing comments. Meanwhile, Embassy sees no objection to STRICOM authorizing USMTM to review materials which Sultan is going to make available. Hart
239. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia/1/ Washington, March 16, 1965, 7:32 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, PET 10-3 SAUD. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Officer in Charge of Economic Affairs in the Office of Near Eastern Affairs George M. Bennsky; cleared in draft by William D. Wolle (NEA/NE) and Chief of the Fuels and Energy Division in the Bureau of Economic Affairs Office of International Resources Andrew F. Ensor; and approved by Davies. Repeated to Dhahran. 458. Embtel 654./2/ We do not think there is any significant lack knowledge on part American petroleum industry concerning fact Saudis in market for offers in available oil concession areas./3/ We believe initiative re bidding for concessions best left to companies. Any indication USG interest likely be misunderstood and taken as official encouragement that they enter the competition. /2/Telegram 654 from Jidda, March 10, reported that Saudi Petroleum Minister Shaykh Ahmad Zaki Yamani had asked an Embassy officer why U.S. oil companies were not showing interest in available Saudi petroleum concession areas. (Ibid.) /3/For documents relating to U.S. international oil policy, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XXXIV, Documents 175ff. FYI. Occurs to us relative lack interest by American firms derives from some or all following factors: (1) generally poor results oil exploration efforts Red Sea area to date; (2) focus of interest on proven Persian Gulf area; (3) rumors that Robert Ray geophysical work for Saudis either improperly done or has produced unpromising results, or both; (4) unwillingness attempt match French (RAP) offers at time when French known be seeking new production sources assiduously and therefore probably willing offer extremely generous terms. Informal discussion with Aramco officials here has established their agreement this analysis. End FYI. Rusk
240. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Davies) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot)/1/ Washington, March 23, 1965. /1/Source: Department of State, NEA/NE Files: Lot 69 D 547, Defense Affairs, Saudi Arabia, 1965. Secret. Drafted by Moore and cleared by Bunte. SUBJECT Problem: We are faced with some apparent Saudi distrust of the honesty of our recommendations in the Air Defense Survey that they purchase Northrop F-5 or Lockheed F-104H aircraft rather than the electronically more complex F-104G. They also suspect our advice against their purchasing Hawk surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) at this time. The problem is compounded by heavy British and French sales efforts, including offers to supply advanced aircraft, three-dimensional radar, SAMs, and pilots to fly the aircraft even on war-time missions. This is coupled with Saudi uncertainty about our willingness to support US equipment, if they should select it, in view of our position concerning their reinvolvement in Yemen. It is thus feared that they will accept the French or British offers. The result would be a significant set-back for our long-term position of primacy in Saudi Arabia and would have adverse repercussions on our gold-flow difficulties. To meet this threat it has been proposed that we alter our offers to the Saudis to indicate willingness to supply more advanced equipment. Discussion: The Saudis have still made no decision on purchase of the aircraft and ground environment systems recommended in our 1963 Air Defense Survey. The Saudi Minister of Defense recently informed us that his choices of aircraft were, in order, F-104G, British Lightning, French Mirage, F-5, and F-104H. We had recommended only the latter two, and had advised the Saudis that, in terms of their needs, the F-5 was probably the most suitable. The F-104G is much more expensive to purchase and maintain and would give them an unnecessary low-level attack bombing capability. Similarly, for reasons of economy of money and trained manpower, we have been reluctant to see them purchase SAMs at this stage in their development. The Minister of Defense also asked us for advanced air-to-air missiles (the Sparrow), which are precluded from sale to the Saudis for security reasons, and requested a further US evaluation team to review current US offers, and possibly, at a later date, those of the British and French. We see little point to such an exercise, although would be willing to comply if the Saudis continue to request it. While we could not meet the reported British and French offers to supply pilots to fly the aircraft in combat, we are able immediately to deliver a squadron of twelve F-5's and train present Saudi jet pilots so that the Saudis themselves could have their own combat group in six months' time. Another element is the report from a Northrop representative that Faisal would like an aircraft-missile combination, such as the F-5/Hawk package, for internal political purposes. With the planes in the hands of the Air Force and the missiles under Army control, all of his air defense would not be in the hands of a single service in case of defections. Both services would also be mollified at receiving advanced equipment. Northrop is preparing such a combined proposal for presentation to the Saudis if US Government approval is given. The economic and technical arguments against advising the Saudis to obtain SAMs or the F-104G still appear valid. However, the US went on public record following announcement of the Hawk sale to Israel that it would also consider selling Hawks to the Arab countries. There is also a very good possibility that if we dispel Saudi suspicions by making a clear statement of our willingness to sell the F-104G, Hawks and three-dimensional radar, and couple it with a specific recommendation from us for less complicated equipment, they will accept our recommendation. Any offer such as this would have to be accompanied by the clear caveat that much of the equipment (e.g., components of the Hawk, F-104G and the radar) is subject to US security controls. Its sale would be subject to Saudi agreement to a US security survey and compliance with security measures set forth in such a survey. (We should honestly recognize that these requirements might ultimately prevent consummation of sale of much of the equipment.) In view of the numerous representations we have made to the British against selling SAMs to the Saudis, some difficulty from them might be expected. However, their specific statement to us on January 4 (see Deptel 319, attached)/2/ that they had reassured the Saudis of their willingness to license the sale of Thunderbird missiles (SAMs) should relieve us of any obligation to them. /2/Document 237. Peter Solbert has requested a meeting with you in the next few days to discuss this subject. It is suggested that we and Col. Bunte brief you orally in advance of such a meeting. Recommendation: It is recommended:/3/ /3/Talbot initialed his approval of both recommendations. 1. That you approve as the NEA position for discussion with DOD and other interested Department Bureaus our telling the Saudis, preferably at the Faisal level, that (a) to dispel any questions they may have we are willing to sell them the F-104G, three-dimensional radar, Sidewinders and Hawk missiles if they so desire; (b) sales of much of this equipment to any country in the world, including Saudi Arabia, are subject to a US security survey of the country and Saudi compliance with the security measures recommended in that survey; (c) our strong and specific recommendation in view of Saudi capabilities and requirements is that they purchase the Northrop F-5; (d) we will support whatever equipment is purchased with spares, training assistance and other appropriate services; (e) our original Air Defense Survey represents an honest US view of what the Saudis need and are able to maintain and operate, but if the King still desires further evaluation group study we will accede to his wishes. 2. That you approve the attached draft cable for coordination with Defense.
241. Letter From Secretary of Defense McNamara to Minister of Defense and Aviation Prince Sultan/1/ Washington, April 5, 1965. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, Saudi Arabia, 381, 3 Mar. 65. Secret. The text of the letter was transmitted to Jidda on April 5 in telegram 509. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 SAUD) Your Royal Highness: I should like to express my appreciation to you for your very kind reception of my personal representative, Mr. John Hooper, and members of his staff during their recent visit to Saudi Arabia. Mr. Hooper has informed me of your meeting with him and the discussions regarding your air defense program. Furthermore, I am aware of the recent conversation which you had with our Ambassador about your desire to improve rapidly the defenses of Saudi Arabia along its border with Yemen and that you are concerned with the possibilities of both ground and air attack. The President has been made fully aware of your deep concerns in this matter and has asked that I give part of the reply to you, offering suggestions and recommendations with regard to the defense of Saudi Arabia. I am addressing myself to the military factors of your air defense and not to any of the political aspects of the problem which only you can evaluate. The Air Defense survey prepared for your country by the United States last year concluded that either the F-5 or the F-104H equipped with proven air-to-air missiles of the Sidewinder variety is capable of meeting the military threat facing your country. Since either aircraft can perform the air defense mission and additionally can play a tactical or ground support role, all factors, including military capability, maintenance and other technical problems, training problems, economic impact and delivery dates must be considered in selecting one of the two aircraft. After careful review of these, I am strengthened in my belief that the recommendation initially given you in the summer of 1962 was sound and that if I were asked to make a present choice for your country, I would select the F-5 for the following reasons: The F-5 was specifically designed as a dual purpose supersonic air defense and ground support aircraft offering maximum combat readiness and reliability through its relative design simplicity, ease of maintenance, and flight safety. In your present border situation, ground support capability is particularly important. This gives the F-5 a great advantage over a plane designed solely for interception./2/ Moreover, operational readiness can be obtained much earlier in the F-5 than in the F-104 because it is easier to learn to fly. I doubt the complex electronic equipment of the F-104G which adds greatly to cost and maintenance is necessary for your mission. The lower attrition rate of the F-5 is another important factor. /2/Telegram 514 to Jidda, April 6, instructed the Embassy to delete this sentence from the letter to avoid a possibly misleading implication. (Ibid.) In addition, the twin engine reliability of the F-5 is, of course, a major consideration when flying over large expanses of desert. When the F-5 was selected as the modern follow-on aircraft for Norway, Greece, Turkey, Spain, Iran, Korea, Thailand, Ethiopia, the Philippines and the Republic of China, the various factors mentioned above were taken into consideration. For defense against bomb-carrying aircraft attacking your country, either the F-5 or the F-104 will be effective. In the light of your recent expressions of grave concern about the threat facing the kingdom, I will do my utmost to expedite deliveries of either type of aircraft and related equipment such as mobile radars to be stationed on your southern borders. At this time I can state that we believe we can deliver up to twelve F-5 aircraft within three to four months. I expect combat training time for Saudi pilots may require at least this long. While I am fully aware that in defense of one's country no expense should be spared, it is the belief of myself and my staff that the additional capabilities of the F-104 would not justify the difference of nearly $35,000,000 between the cost of three squadrons of F-5s and a like number of F-104Gs. That difference could, in my judgment, be used more effectively to cover some of your other requirements. In analyzing your air defense requirements, and in order to provide a greater overall air defense, you might wish to use the difference between the initial cost and the maintenance and operational costs of F-5s and F-104Gs to supplement the F-5 with some HAWK batteries of surface-to-air missiles, which we are still prepared to sell to you for deployment to defend Jidda and possibly other areas in Saudi Arabia. These missiles have an all-weather defense capability. The F-104 is, of course, also an excellent and fast aircraft. If you consider that you require an F-104 series aircraft, we would gladly supply you with the F-104G or, as previously offered, the F-104H. I have noted your interest in acquiring the Sparrow missile for the aircraft you select. Neither the F-5, the F-104G nor the F-104H has been designed to carry the Sparrow, the ultimate adaptation to either of these aircraft is questionable. Accordingly, I would recommend for your use the Sidewinder, which is an excellent air defense weapon. At the time you inform me of your decision on your choice of aircraft we will be prepared to follow up promptly the other recommendations in the air defense survey required to develop an integrated air defense system. These include the communications facilities, ground radar and RSAA air defense weapons recommended in our survey. With respect to your stated interest in 3-D radar, I understand that various proposals have been made to you. However, I recommend the more reliable and proved FPS 100/FPS 89 combination, which replaces the FPS 20/FPS 6 respectively, recommended in the air defense survey. Most 3-D radar systems are still under development. Our experience has shown that the height or altitude of a target is not generally required on every sweep of the search antenna and reliability and simplicity are more important. In fact, it is the third dimension of height finding which is still unsatisfactory. A radar operational for a maximum part of the time under all conditions is much more valuable in defense than a more complicated system requiring more frequent repair and maintenance. I hope the foregoing is helpful. I assure you that General Leahy and the staff of the United States Military Training Mission stand ready to advise you not only on training but on the immediate and longer range problems relating to the defense of the integrity and security of Saudi Arabia, for which my government has so often demonstrated its concern. If I can be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me./3/ /3/In telegram 771 from Jidda, April 6, Hart reported that he had delivered McNamara's letter to Saqqaf that morning. (Ibid.) Telegram 778 from Jidda, April 7, reported that the Embassy had sent the amended page to Saqqaf, who had not yet delivered the letter to Sultan. (Ibid.) Sincerely, Robert S. McNamara/4/ /4/Printed from a copy that indicates McNamara signed the original. [Continue with the next documents] Volume XXI Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |