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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXI Near East Region Department of State |
 Saudi Arabia 221. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State/1/ Jidda, January 12, 1964. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL SAUD-US. Secret; Priority; Limdis. No time of transmission is on the telegram. Repeated to Dhahran. Received on January 13 at 5:37 a.m. Passed to the White House at 10:15 a.m. 729. Faysal-Johnson Correspondence. Following is letter from Crown Prince to President Johnson which was delivered to me January 11 by Saqqaf. Translation moderates where necessary for clarity some of more flowery examples of Arabic style. "Your Excellency: I have received with great pleasure Your Excellency's letter dated 19 December 1963./2/ I appreciate the heaviness of Your Excellency's responsibilities at the present time following the tragic death of your great predecessor. I also fully appreciate the pleasant gesture represented by your personal interest in the relations between our two countries and your re-examination of the past and study of the future of these relations. I am firmly convinced that the strengthening of understanding between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United States of America is imperative and that frank exchanges of views between them is most desirable. /2/President Johnson's letter is printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XVIII, Document 389. I in turn emphasize my sincere desire that the frank rapport which existed between the late President John F. Kennedy and myself still continue between Your Excellency and me. For such rapport would strengthen the friendly ties between us and be the means raising the relations between our two countries to new heights. I share with Your Excellency the conviction that the relations between our two countries and peoples have not been confined to the mere utterance of words. These relations have often manifested themselves in deeds, facts and achievements which have filled the long history of relations between our countries--that history whose foundations were laid by his majesty, the late King 'Abd al-Aziz and the late Presidents Franklin Roosevelt and John F. Kennedy; it is a history which continues to the present. Your Excellency's assurances that your only purpose in regard to Yemen/3/ is to protect Saudi Arabia's integrity have given me great satisfaction. For my part I should like to explain very frankly that the guarantee of the safety of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the single matter which dominates our thinking in these difficult circumstances. Without that safety we would not be able to devote all our efforts to attaining happiness for our people and to leading them in the path of progress that they might assume their place in the march of civilization and might attain the stature merited by their country's time-honored significance as the recipient of divine inspiration and the fountain of light. /3/See Document 319ff. We fully realize that the present course followed by the UAR is benefiting no-one, and that the UAR is losing much after it caused, by its persistent acts of interference, numerous calamities and mishaps which have resulted in havoc being wrought upon thousands of the Yemeni people and in the devastation of their means of subsistence. It is our conviction that all these calamities have had no justification save the desire to satisfy deeply rooted arrogance and conceit. I hope that Your Excellency will permit me to explain why I find it difficult to understand the viewpoint which holds that cutting off aid to the UAR would push it more dangerously in the direction of the Soviet Union. I have never been, nor will I at any time be, against the people of sister Egypt receiving aid from any quarter which wishes to offer it. But I am certain that Your Excellency discerns, as I do, the clear distinction between directing those aids towards their intended goal, namely the raising of the standard of living of the Egyptian people and directing it, indeed dedicating it, to the service of aggression and the imposing of calamities on others. As a country which loves peace and justice and always desires to spread them as widely as possible, we have exerted our maximum effort towards support of the United Nations. There is no greater proof of this than our favorable response to the mediation of your late predecessor manifested in our signing of the disengagement agreement. Your Excellency, of course, knows that I acceded to the agreement only after long discussions with your predecessor's representative, Ambassador Bunker, and with your Ambassador, Mr. Hart. Those discussions embodied clear assurances that the United States of America would work for the implementation of this agreement in letter and spirit. It had never occurred to me that six months after the signing of the agreement, and eight months after we cut off aid to the Royalists, the situation in the Yemen would remain without any change worth mentioning. Neither did it occur to me to agree to the renewal of the agreement beyond the fourth of November last without there being conditions therein to terminate the Egyptian presence in the Yemen within a specific period or without its including the necessary guarantees for accomplishing that termination. The greater part of the people of sister Yemen are undergoing ordeals and great suffering while being denied even the means of subsistence. They are appealing to humanity at large to help remove aggression from their home. Indeed, they look up to Your Excellency's efforts filled with prayer and hope that peace and safety will quickly return to their country. We do not err when we consider that the only solution which is compatible with logic, justice and international law is to leave the Yemenis to decide for themselves the fate of their country in an atmosphere assuring them of all the necessary guarantees of their freedom to do so without external intrusions and in the absence from the country of any foreign forces. Yet, in memory of your great predecessor and confident in Your Excellency's efforts, and in order to prove our good intentions, we have agreed to extend the validity of the disengagement agreement for two months starting from the fifth of January. I have benefited greatly from the spirit of candor and friendship which Your Excellency has inaugurated. The sure confidence which I have in Your Excellency's good intentions makes it incumbent upon me to cooperate with you truthfully and honorably, deeply believing in your personal friendship and support as well as the support of the friendly American people. I express to Your Excellency my sincere good wishes and the good wishes of the Saudi people for your happiness and prosperity and that of the American people. I further wish Your Excellency every success. Sincerely, /s/ Faysal January 5, 1964" Comment: Saqqaf stated he drafted this message and that Faysal made no changes whatever in text. (Sabbagh however is convinced this arabic is above Saqqaf's style and probably a staff job under Saqqaf's supervision.) Remarks on significance this letter follow in separate message./4/ /4/Not further identified. Hart
222. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State/1/ Jidda, January 30, 1964, 3 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 1-4 SAUD. Secret. Repeated to Dhahran, CHUSMTM Dhahran, and CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA. Passed to DOD for ACSI. 791. Department pass DOD for ACSI. Presentation Air Defense Survey. This is Country Team message (coordination delayed by transmission difficulties). At six hour meeting January 20 at Ministry of Defense Riyadh DOD team composed of Colonels Toliver and Taylor and Mr. Quinn presented Air Defense Survey report/2/ to Saudi group headed by Minister Prince Sultan and including Chief of Staff Mutlaq. US group attending included CHUSMTM Colonel Wilson, Richard Murphy, Air Attache Scott and myself. /2/In April 1963 the United States offered Saudi Arabia assistance in expediting the build-up of Saudi air defense capabilities to be financed from Saudi resources, and agreed to conduct an air defense survey. The U.S. Air Defense Survey Team transmitted its report on Saudi air defense requirements to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on October 4, 1963. A summary of the Team's recommendations (undated, ca 1/30/64) is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Saudi Arabia, Memos, Vol. 2, 12/63-4/67. Presentation received with keen interest by Saudis who compared operational concept, troop structure and broad equipment requirements with air defense annex of Saudi "Armed Force Defense Plan Number 1." Saudis were obviously pleased to find there was close correlation. Prince Sultan reacted most favorably and wound up by requesting US team confer with Saudi Army/Air Force team to finalize as far as possible detailed equipment list and construction requirements. Stated he would study point committee recommendations and asked for twice daily progress reports while committee in session. Asserted he would present his findings to Supreme Defense Council as soon as definite figures furnished him. Mentioned twice he desired buy best equipment available and wanted to be sure cost considerations had not prevented survey team from recommending latest design in optimum hardware. Team emphasized repeatedly their recommendations based on best estimate of what SAG able support both financially and with Saudi personnel over next five years. Sultan seemed to accept equipment requirements for communications, radar and aircraft without particular reservation. He was told if he bought F-86 aircraft GAR air to air missiles could be installed immediately. He asked specifically for US recommendations as to whether Northrop F-5A or Lockheed F-104 should be selected. Our reply stressed comparative costs and characteristics, avoided plugging either. Sultan accepted generally requirements for modernizing army air defense equipment expressing doubts, however, on need for 54 Twin-40 mm M-42 "Dusters," feeling these would be expensive and apt to have only limited value in future. Missiles. Sultan seemed to accept justification non-inclusion surface-to-air missiles at this time because of great expense higher priority need for other air defense elements and long lead time needed to prepare candidates to even begin training. Nevertheless he and his staff showed persistent interest in same. Sultan specifically asked how many units of Hawk would be needed to protect Saudi Arabia's four main urban areas. (Was told it would require one battalion each area, at estimated cost of 25 million dollars each.) Maintenance. Sultan evidenced interest in idea of maintenance contract with single company for all communications and radar equipment as well as for aircraft. Apparently intends secure such bids from Lockheed and Northrop. Credit. From several remarks made by Sultan and staff it apparent that credit terms available from US sources will be major consideration. At one point he said he had been offered favorable terms on wide range equipment by several countries, including offer of pilots to fly Saudi aircraft even in combat, until Saudis were ready. Comment: Sultan and his staff were stimulated to surprising degree by detailed and thoughtful presentation. Sultan said he knew SAG lagging behind other Arab countries in modernizing armed forces but asserted "today we think in terms of seconds not minutes." Hopefully we may have reached turning point in galvanizing Saudi energies for new effort at modernizing armed forces. Atmosphere distinctly encouraging. Recommendation: That DOD promptly support CHUSMTM in any requests he may make for technical assistance from Air and Army Air Defense representatives to develop answers to questions arising from joint committee's review of report. Important that momentum gained at this stage not be dissipated. Hart
223. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia/1/ Washington, February 5, 1964, 8:57 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 SAUD. Secret. Drafted by George C. Moore (NEA/NE); cleared by Davies, Bunte, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Regional Affairs Frank K. Sloan; and approved by Jernegan. Repeated to London, Dhahran for CHUSMTM, and CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA. 571. Joint State/Defense Message. In course US-UK talks January 29-30/2/ (full memcons being pouched) US again repeated arguments against supplying overly sophisticated weapons to Saudis (waste of Saudi money, strain on scarce personnel resources, lack of capability to maintain and operate). UK spokesmen noted our mutual agreement to principle of opposition to introduction offensive weapons, but indicated FonOff problems in seeking discourage British arms salesmen from supplying these or overly sophisticated items to Saudis. FonOff could not forbid British firms from trying sell when these firms aware that Saudis would turn to Swedes, Swiss or French if UK were banned from competition. Also was not possible to confine sales to White Army only. Thus, in British view, burden is clearly on US, with its Military Training Mission and position of primacy, to dissuade Saudis from purchase unneeded or undesirable items; UK fully expected US to do this. /2/A memorandum of conversation recording the January 30 U.S.-U.K. talks on arms sales in the Arabian Peninsula is ibid., NEA/ARP Files: Lot 69 D 547, CHRON 1964, Telegrams to Aden. Concerning British Aircraft Corporation attempts sell Canberras (which BAC proposed to Saudis as part of "package" together with Lightning interceptors and Thunderbird missiles), British said FonOff position against licensing their export would be greatly strengthened if US able state it would refuse export licenses for Douglas A-4E's. Department position was that, while we not able make flat commitment at this time, it probable that USG would refuse license export of A-4E's to Saudis since they do not have characteristics to perform any mission which would be meaningful in terms of Saudi air defense requirement (in contrast to shorter range, supersonic F-5A and F-104H type recommended in Air Defense Survey Report); and since their acquisition, together with other aircraft, would result in further proliferation different types of weapons in Saudi arsenal, additionally complicating the increasingly severe logistics and maintenance problem. Comment: British, while acknowledging validity of reasons for excluding offensive and overly sophisticated arms, have emphasized that they see US as having the responsibility for curbing Saudi appetites. Additionally, although Douglas has received license for export technical data on A-4E's, it apparent that SAG decision purchase this aircraft would seriously complicate our arms supply program for Saudi Arabia. Thus Embassy and CHUSMTM should continue efforts wherever possible to dissuade Saudis from endeavoring purchase inappropriate items of whatever national origin. In this context suggest you re-emphasize to Saudis multi-mission capability of F-5A and F-104H as close support aircraft in addition to interceptor role, a fact which would seem to preclude need to purchase other types aircraft such as A-4E or comparable foreign configuration. (In this regard, we pleased to note from USMTM message CH 64/3/ that MODA Joint Committee recommends deferring consideration acquisition surface-to-air missiles.) /3/Not found. Rusk
224. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia/1/ Washington, April 3, 1964, 6:38 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 1-4 SAUD. Secret. Drafted by Moore; cleared by Quinn (OSD/ISA), Bunte, George L. Warren (G/PM), and Deputy Director of the Office of Munitions Control John W. Sipes; and approved by Davies. Repeated to Paris for DEFREPNAMA, Dhahran for CHUSMTM, and CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA. 641. Joint State/Defense Message. Air Defense Survey. Realize Saudi leaders have had little time available in last two weeks to consider Air Defense Survey package. However, with settlement political crisis, hope Embassy and USMTM will again be able encourage SAG in whatever ways appropriate make early decision accept Air Defense recommendations and request US assistance in their implementation. In view backing initially given last year to F-5 by US authorities (in order assist MAP production program), might now be particularly useful for CHUSMTM to remind Saudis that F-104H as well as F-5 was included in Survey recommendations, that both aircraft meet Air Defense interceptor requirements, and that US would not object to Saudis' purchase of either. (FYI. Hope that early selection will be made between the two US-produced aircraft rather than continue possible risk that foreign aircraft might be chosen. End FYI.) With regard selection of aircraft Department has just received formal note from Saudi Embassy/2/ indicating that Lockheed has presented proposal to SAG on F-104H; that SAG understands (correctly) F-104H is same as F-104G minus certain electronic packages; that "because F-104G more capable carrying out required mission RSAF", SAG requests approval consider offer F-104G from Lockheed. (Lockheed has submitted application through normal US Government channels for approval export technical data on F-104G.) This request obtain 104G being strongly pushed by SAG Assistant Attache Washington, but unclear if represents reasoned desire on part MODA or perhaps only request from lower echelon Saudi military. Department strongly doubts advisability selling more advanced model to SAG in view initial price difference (approximately quarter million dollars per plane), heightened maintenance problems and cost (difference between G and H estimated at quarter million dollars per plane per year), and problem for general Middle East arms balance presented by increased limited all-weather attack capability. We are inclined, however, to approve export technical data this model (with caveat that decision reserved on approval export aircraft itself) on basis that this information useful in order dissuade Saudis from increased expenditure for this much more complicated aircraft. /2/Not found. Appreciate Embassy and CHUSMTM comments and, as appropriate, attempts dissuade Saudis from going beyond recommendations Air Defense Survey. Rusk
225. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State/1/ Jidda, May 11, 1964, 4 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 SAUD. Confidential; Priority. 1050. Saqqaf Visit to US. Deptel 706;/2/ Embtel 1030./3/ /2/Dated May 7. (Ibid., POL SAUD-UAR) /3/In telegram 1030 from Jidda, May 6, Ambassador Hart reported that Deputy Foreign Minister Saqqaf would arrive in Washington on May 12 and transmitted his recommendations for the visit. (Ibid., POL 7 SAUD) One of strongest aspects our position Saudi Arabia has been relationship personal trust and confidence developed between President and Prince Faysal. During Kennedy administration this stemmed from highly satisfactory personal contact of President with Crown Prince in October 1962 which was maintained and strengthened through letters exchanged in ensuing months. Similar Johnson-Faysal relationship commenced by President's cordial letter December 19, though since then we have not had another appropriate occasion for full length exchange views through letter and there has, of course, been no opportunity for face to face meeting. Saqqaf's visit Washington seems offer chance which should not be missed for further building kind of personal ties and friendship to which Faysal attaches great importance and which could stand us in particularly good stead during weeks ahead. Call on President by Saqqaf, who is probably Faysal's closest and most influential advisor, would provide excellent substitute for President-Crown Prince meeting and would be more effective than Presidential letter for which in fact we see at moment no appropriate peg. Saqqaf would be immensely complimented by being granted brief interview, his confidence and friendship for US would be doubly reinforced, and his influence with Faysal as spokesman for strong ties with US and policy of restraint and cooperation with other Arab countries would be materially strengthened. Should Department, White House find possible work brief Saqqaf interview into President's schedule suggest President Johnson might wish take opportunity send to Faysal through Saqqaf expression warmest personal regards and admiration for Faysal's leadership and determination carry Saudi Arabia on road social, political, economic progress. Faysal's endeavors adapt hallowed values, traditions and principals of ancient society to evolving needs and challenges modern times attracting increasing public sympathy and interest in US. President hopes CP will feel free communicate with him directly on matters mutual interest. In closing President might express to Saqqaf his appreciation Saqqaf's own role in aiding evolution statesmanlike Saudi policy toward Yemen problem. US sincerely believes CP took wisest step in withdrawing from involvement Yemen civil war and in providing active support to UN instrumentalities seeking resolution difficult Yemen problem. We realize from our own experience value of inexhaustible patience and ingenuity in dealing thorny seemingly insoluble situations. We confidently hope Saudi Arabia, which has demonstrated these qualities in such large measure with regard Yemen problem, will not be deflected from present policy of disengagement from Yemen struggle to return to role active support for Royalists. This would distress USG which for its part is loyal to disengagement principle and has recently renewed its representations to UAR on this subject. It is confident that disengagement will eventually be completed. Hart
226. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, May 15, 1964, 3:30 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 SAUD. Secret. Drafted by Seelye on May 18 and approved in S on June 2. The time of the meeting is taken from Rusk's Appointment Book. (Johnson Library) SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS The Secretary His Excellency Omar Saqqaf, Saudi Arabian Deputy Foreign Minister Mr. Saqqaf mentioned his mission as Arab emissary in connection with the Jordan Waters diversion and stated that he was asking an aide to make a presentation to working officials in the Department. He enumerated three current concerns in the Middle East as Syria, Yemen disengagement and Khrushchev's visit to Cairo. In Syria the conservative wing of the Baath party has taken over and appears to command the support of the majority of Baath party members. In response to the Secretary's question, he said that Iraq, Jordan and the UAR all desire the overthrow of the present Syrian regime. Regarding Yemen disengagement, he expressed an interest in hearing the Department's latest views. He called attention to the danger to our mutual positions of Khrushchev's visit to Cairo. The Secretary said we are watching Syrian developments closely. He commented that Khrushchev's successful visit to Cairo flows from the Soviet Union's commitment some ten years ago to build the Aswan Dam. We have to admit that the Soviet performance in building the Dam has been good. He saw two reasons behind the Khrushchev visit: (1) an effort to strengthen the Soviet position vis-a-vis the Western world and (2) competition with the ChiComs. He thought it unwise to take too much comfort, however, from the latter. Following Khrushchev's departure we will have a better opportunity to assess accurately the impact of his visit. Mr. Saqqaf expressed the view that Nasser did not fully approve Khrushchev's speeches and noted that Communism is outlawed in the UAR. The Secretary noted USG interest in maintaining good relations with the Arab world and referred to the strong USG commitment to the independence and territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia. He said that we would disapprove of Arab unity if it comes about as a result of pressures; however, if reached by free choice, we could not disapprove. He asked Mr. Saqqaf for his views as to what posture the USG should take toward those Arab states who wish to remain independent. While the United States would come to Saudi Arabia's assistance if it were attacked, is there not a danger that such Western military moves would be resented in the area? He characterized our objectives in Yemen as (1) to enable the Yemenis to decide their own future and (2) to prevent Yemen from becoming a base for pressures against Saudi Arabia. While our disengagement plan has not produced full disengagement, it has reduced the threat to Saudi Arabia. Mr. Saqqaf agreed. The Secretary noted that Saudi Arabia is stronger than it was two years ago and that Prince Faisal is forging ahead on a constructive program to develop the country. Mr. Saqqaf commented that every Arab wants Arab unity, but in his own way. He alleged that Nasser could have "had the Arab world" after the Suez crisis of 1956 had he acted in the right manner. He failed because Arabs as a whole, by nature and by religion, are opposed to socialism. While Syria, Iraq and Algeria have socialist tendencies, each system differs from Nasser's. Arab unity requires one belief. Mr. Saqqaf felt that the USG should protect countries who are fighting Communism and backing the West. Saudi Arabia wants "radical progress through evolution". He saw no indications that the UAR would change but, despite the current dangerous situation, he considered the future of Syria as hopeful. The Secretary inquired after Saudi Arabia's relations with other Arab states. Mr. Saqqaf said that Saudi Arabia enjoys good relations with all Arab states, including the UAR. Saudi Arabia has nothing against the UAR if the latter leaves Yemen and stops attacking Saudi Arabia. In response to the Secretary's query, Mr. Saqqaf said that UAR propaganda attacks against Saudi Arabia had discontinued. Mr. Saqqaf asserted that Prince Faisal had been too busy to go to Cairo, needing a month or so to clear up internal matters. He noted that President Arif has asked Prince Faisal to be present in Cairo while Arif was there, but that Faisal had declined. He said that the Prince would visit Cairo "if the Egyptians behave". The Secretary recalled reports received before and during Nasser's recent visit to Yemen indicating that morale among Egyptian troops in Yemen was poor. Did Mr. Saqqaf believe the UAR was determined to stay in Yemen? Mr. Saqqaf said that the UAR wishes to leave but is looking for "a solution". He said that Anwar Sadat and Hakim al-Amer had not hidden from him the fact that the UAR faces a difficult situation in Yemen. When Prince Faisal had asked their views as to a solution, they had turned the question back to the Crown Prince. He said the Egyptian visitors had suggested that an Arab League army be sent to Yemen and that Faisal had countered with the proposal that an Arab "mission" be dispatched to Yemen. Mr. Saqqaf acknowledged that the UAR cannot be expected to withdraw its army from Yemen "at once" because, as admitted by Sadat and Amer, this would "be dangerous for the UAR regime". According to Mr. Saqqaf, Prince Faisal had agreed that it would probably not be in Saudi Arabia's interest for the UAR regime to fall and, therefore, he would not insist on an immediate withdrawal of all UAR forces from Yemen. The Secretary noted that the USG had worked hard on the UAR to curtail its propaganda attacks and had also helped force the discontinuance of UAR air attacks mounted against Saudi supply depots a year or so ago. He inquired as to the prospect of an agreement between Saudi Arabia and the UAR on modifications to the Yemeni regime. Mr. Saqqaf replied that Saudi Arabia is "ready to help" but cannot do anything which requires "the use of force". He said he had never lost hope concerning reaching a solution with the UAR on the Yemen problem. The Secretary inquired whether the Western presence in the area--for example, the important USG facility in Libya and the British base in Aden--were helpful to Saudi Arabia or whether this caused Saudi Arabia concern. Mr. Saqqaf replied that while Saudi Arabia "says" it disapproves of the presence of "foreign troops," at the same time it believes that as long as the country in which the bases are located is independent and does not oppose these bases, then the matter is of "no concern" to Saudi Arabia. While Saudi Arabia "says" that the British base in Aden must go, the Government knows that this is impossible. Speaking personally, he felt that the British should remain in Aden unless some alternative stabilizing presence could be arranged. There is the ultimate danger that Communism, which has been effectively prevented from penetrating the Near East from the north, will infiltrate from the south and prosper on the backwardness and weakness of the people of South Arabia. In response to Mr. Rusk's question, Mr. Saqqaf stated that Communism is making headway in Yemen. He said that Communist propaganda is not currently being aimed at Saudi Arabia. Mr. Saqqaf conveyed to the Secretary Prince Faisal's best regards and said the Prince looked forward to the opportunity of seeing the Secretary some time in the future. The Secretary said that he held Prince Faisal in the highest regard and had long been one of his admirers. He commented that we are strongly encouraged by current developments in Saudi Arabia. Mr. Saqqaf said that the Prince is still not wholly satisfied by the progress that has been achieved so far and hopes to move faster now that the Royal Family problem has been solved./2/ /2/On March 28 Saudi Prime Minister Crown Prince Faisal, with the support of other members of the Royal family and the uluma, assumed the powers of the monarchy and reduced King Saud's role to that of figurehead.
227. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to the Special Group (Counterinsurgency)/1/ Washington, May 18, 1964. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 68 D 451, Special Group (CI), 5/28/64-7/10/64, May 28, 1964. Secret. Drafted by Edward A. Padelford (NEA/NR). The memorandum was sent through Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs W. Averell Harriman. SUBJECT I. General Statement of Threat The threat to internal stability in Saudi Arabia arises more out of the weakness and exposure of stabilizing forces than out of the presence of easily identified powerful subversive elements. Stability is dependent upon the will and the strength of the Royal Family, or, more precisely, upon Crown Prince Faysal. [4 1/2 lines of source text not declassified] The danger of instability and violent change within Saudi Arabia is heightened by the inherent instability in the region as a whole. The success of any search for internal stability will depend, in unusual degree, upon the achievement of satisfactory external relationships, as well as upon the strengthening of the internal fabric of the country. Hence this paper, while not examining in detail the international situation of Saudi Arabia, does take into account in analyzing the problem and presenting recommendations. At the height of the Yemen crisis in the months following the revolution of September 1962, there were tensions in Saudi Arabia flowing from Saudi involvement in support of the "Royalists." These tensions placed a strain on the fabric of government [1 line of source text not declassified]. There was also much concern that the UAR would capitalize on these weaknesses to unleash its subversive assets. Negotiations of the disengagement agreement removed the immediate UAR threat, alleviated the tensions and strengthened Faysal. The latter is now in firm control of the governmental machinery in Saudi Arabia, and shows every evidence that he intends to keep this control. The stripping of all effective power from King Saud has eliminated a potential source of conflict, and will enable Faysal to concentrate even more on financial, educational, and social welfare problems. At the same time, Faysal seems to be somewhat more aware of the desirability of developing an esprit de corps in the military. Also, particularly since the Arab Chiefs "summit" conference, there has been a lessening of UAR-Saudi tensions. The disruptive Yemen problem remains, but the current focus by the UAR is directed against Great Britain, rather than Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, [1 line of source text not declassified] the basic UAR threat to Saudi Arabia remains as explained in detail in Section II. We consider that the removal of Crown Prince Faysal from the scene would probably present the most serious problem for the regime. His driving influence behind present reform and development programs has had a considerable stabilizing influence both on the political situation and on the economy. His successor has not been designated. While there are certain other vigorous and experienced members of the Royal Family who, if selected, could provide needed stability in the country, [4 lines of source text not declassified]. [Here follows sections II and III.] IV. U.S. Policy Objectives and Courses of Action United States policy aims at strengthening and preserving the Faysal regime. We seek to achieve this objective by urging the regime to proceed in timely fashion on its program of political, social, and economic progress; and by assuring that it eschews involvement in foreign military or semi-military ventures. The United States desires to maintain its present dominant position, particularly in the military sphere (through the United States Military Training Mission) and in the economic sphere (through Aramco). However, we also believe it is desirable for the Saudis to have a good working [relationship] with the United Kingdom Government. The following are some more specific objectives:
As much as possible, the United States desires to minimize the subversive potential of the UAR. To achieve this end it is essential to minimize the potential for UAR-Saudi conflict. Disengagement of the Egyptian forces from Yemen, the continuing bar of Saudi support of the Royalists, and the containment of UK-UAR conflict contributes to this objective.
The Country Team suggests expanded exchange of persons efforts, including those in law and medicine, to improve Saudi education. The University of Texas English language teachers program is an example of the type project that might be most constructive. Our Country Team also asks that we review thoroughly the possibilities for establishment of an American-sponsored medical or educational institution in Saudi Arabia.
Efforts should be made to further contacts with important Saudis, including young people, by all possible means, including the USIS Cultural Center in downtown Jidda. As the Center progresses, plans should be developed for the teaching of English to selected educators and other important individuals. We should increase information among target groups about the U.S., its institutions, and policies through circulation of periodicals and books in both Arabic and English; through lectures and other events; and by placement of selected materials in the Saudi press and on Radio Mecca when possible. The United States should promptly fulfill the commitment made under the recently signed United States-Saudi agreement to supervise installation of two telecasting stations and should provide programming assistance and appropriate television materials to Saudi officials responsible for the stations.
With advice from USMTM, the Saudis drafted a plan for the improvement of their defense forces. This plan contains an estimate of the external threat and proposes a five-year program for equipment purchases and training at an estimated cost of two billion riyals (some $450 million). USMTM also prepared a basic document recommending both organizational reforms and changes in basic attitudes in the Saudi Armed Forces. Neither of these documents has yet been adopted. More recently, a special DOD team carried out a detailed survey of the Saudi air defense requirements, which has just been presented to the Saudi Government. The air defense survey recommends improvement in anti-aircraft artillery and purchase of up to 36 United States interceptor aircraft (F-5A or F-104H). Conclusion of a United States-Saudi cooperative logistics supply agreement has also been proposed. The relationship of the Saudi prepared plan and the United States air defense survey remains to be clarified. With a number of signs of greater Saudi interest in improvement of the military forces, it is particularly important that the U.S. military training and advisory effort in Saudi Arabia be developed to maximum effectiveness. In this connection, it is essential that key USMTM officers serve longer tours. King Saud assured President Kennedy in 1962 that he desired that a U.S. military training mission remain indefinitely in Saudi Arabia. A new mission training agreement is under negotiation. The Country Team strongly recommends that there be no decrease in the size of the USMTM since a sharp cut would be viewed as an indication of lessening United States interest. It also recommends several other modifications respecting United States officers assigned to the USMTM, including longer tours for some officers and more advanced Arabic training for United States Air Force officers. The Country Team recommends additional use of mobile training teams in Saudi Arabia, as well as additional training of Saudis in the United States. The five MTT's which visited Saudi Arabia in 1963 were considered highly successful. A further intensive review is suggested on the possibility of a civic action program for Saudi Arabia. Both MTT's and civic action should be financed by the Saudis.
The Country Team recommends, if the Saudis request it, United States support aimed at improving the Saudi police, including training in the United States. [11 lines of source text not declassified]
The Country Team recommends that the United States assist the Saudi Government in whatever way we can in improving Saudi Arabia's economic development effort, particularly in meeting requests for technical advisors on a reimbursable basis. If the opportunity is presented, the Country Team believes a follow-up to the 1962 economic development survey conducted by Professor A. J. Meyer of Harvard should be considered.
A U.S. Contingency Plan is now in the final stages of development which sets forth the course of U.S. actions in the event of an attempt to overthrow or actual overthrow of the Saudi Government, either with or without assistance from the United Arab Republic. The plan considers a range of possible U.S. responses to safeguard important western oil and security interests in the Arabian Peninsula. It defines the U.S. intent to prevent military intervention by outside parties either to support any of the conflicting groups in Saudi Arabia or to seize Saudi territory. It also emphasizes the U.S. aim of deterring foreign intervention rather than accepting an open confrontation and foresees no U.S. military force involvement within Saudi Arabia except to prevent the imminent entrance of foreign forces or to safeguard American lives. V. Recommendations A. The United States should continue to support Prince Faysal, while at the same time encouraging him to promote political and social reforms, as well as economic development. [3 lines of source text not declassified] B. The United States should continue to play a principal military role in Saudi Arabia. Every effort should be made to increase the confidence of the members of the armed forces in the regime, both by utilizing the now planned television network and through other means including civic action. The following specific recommendations in the military sphere are particularly important:
The Country Team has suggested that further intensive review be given to the possibility of a civic action program for Saudi Arabia. The Country Team recommends that an expert in civic action programs be sent to Saudi Arabia for temporary assignment to review in detail civic action possibilities. We recommend that this be done.
The USMTM, which now numbers 239, should be continued at about the same level. Urgent consideration should be given to extending the tours of selected key officers at the USMTM from one to two years in order to enhance their impact. Also, it is recommended that the Air Force consider providing USAF officers with a level of Arabic training comparable to that of the U.S. Army officers. Consideration should also be given to the movement of USMTM Headquarters from Dhahran to Riyadh.
MTT's have been utilized successfully in Saudi Arabia. The USMTM believes that their use can be expanded. It is recommended that USMTM wishes in this field be implemented to the extent possible.
Assuming Saudi acceptance of the Air Defense Survey, the United States should be prepared to expeditiously implement the survey.
The United States should be prepared to provide a limited amount of credit for military sales, both for materiel in the Air Defense Survey, and for other military items. For FY 1965, credit requirements are roughly estimated at $20 million. Such credit should be at a rate of interest competitive with foreign interests. C. If requested and if a survey reveals a requirement, support should be provided the Saudi police and internal security forces. D. Various agencies of the United States Government should be prepared to respond promptly to Saudi requests for technical advice and assistance, particularly in the economic, social, labor, and public administration fields. The labor administration field will become increasingly significant, as the organized labor force increases. Periodic visits by our regional Labor Attache and also U.S. Department of Labor technicians should be considered. E. Special attention should be directed towards the evolving Saudi youth. USIS activities aimed at influencing youth in Saudi Arabia should be wholeheartedly supported. As feasible, efforts should be made to orient Saudi educational practices towards the United States. The USMTM should within limitations devote special attention towards selecting well-qualified Saudi non-commissioned and junior officers for training in the United States. F. In so far as possible, any assistance (military, police, technical, labor, etc.) should be on a reimbursable basis in keeping with Saudi Arabia's improving economic status. However, in event of a high priority U.S. objective, the U.S. should be prepared to provide assistance on whatever terms are considered necessary. G. [7 lines of source text not declassified] H. The U.S. Contingency Plan should be fully integrated with the Internal Defense Plan and necessary action taken to provide for quick implementation in event of necessity. VI. Recommendations for the Special Group (CI) A. We recommend that the plan, as submitted and as modified by the recommendations and observations in this memorandum, be approved as a basis for internal defense planning. B. The Country Team in Saudi Arabia should be commended for the preparation of the plan. The Country Team should be encouraged but not required to submit modifications to the plan, as the Team feels are necessary.
228. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, May 28, 1964, 2:30 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 68 D 451, Special Group (CI) Minutes of Meetings (cont'd), Jan.-June 1964. Secret. SUBJECT PRESENT Governor Harriman, Mr. Bell, Mr. Rowan, Mr. Forrestal, Mr. Solbert vice Mr. Vance, General Anthis vice General Taylor, Mr. Karamessines vice Mr. McCone, Mr. Nolan vice the Attorney General Governor Williams was present for Item No. 2 [Here follows discussion of other subjects.] 3. Internal Defense Plan for Saudi Arabia Mr. Jernegan reviewed the salient points of the Internal Defense Plan for Saudi Arabia/2/ adding that the US does not consider the situation critical. He said that there is always the danger of the UAR stepping up its activities in Saudi Arabia. He explained that at the beginning of the Yemen crisis, the stability of the present regime had been threatened by the UAR, but that the agreement reached between Saudi Arabia and UAR has eased the situation. He discussed the internal political influences of other Groups noting that there is very little Communist influence, but any internal strife would be an invitation to Nasir to reinstigate his activity. He discussed Faysal's assets and ambitious programs, emphasizing US interest in assisting Faysal in the implementation of these programs. He pointed out that it is in our best interest to maintain the present regime since Faysal is the best leader available. /2/Document 227. Mr. Jernegan indicated that it is very important that we continue our military training mission in Saudi Arabia and also our interest in the economic sphere (through Aramco). He informed the Group that the Country Team will continue to try to find ways to develop youth and labor programs, areas which today are barely existent. He added that USIA recently opened a cultural center and library in Jidda, the first of this kind in Saudi Arabia, which will assist in reaching the youth. Mr. Bell observed that the US community is split between Jidda and Dhahran, with hardly anyone in the city of Riyadh. Part of the military training mission is being moved to Riyadh, but we are having difficulty in moving part of the mission. He reminded the Group that we have no AID economic program in Saudi Arabia and that in view of the country's sound finances, it would be a departure for us to institute one. [1 paragraph (3 lines of source text) not declassified] The Group approved the Plan and suggested that the Country Team be directed to take the required action. The Group also requested that it be kept informed, in the form of a letter from the Ambassador every six months, or earlier, as significant developments arise. [Here follows discussion of Bolivia and civic action assessment.] C. G. Moody, Jr.
229. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia/1/ Washington, June 15, 1964, 2:27 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 USSR. Secret. Drafted by Seelye; cleared by Davies, Curtis F. Jones, and Komer; and approved by Jernegan. 759. Embtel 1082/2/ and Cirtel 2210./3/ Following is letter from President to Prince Faisal for delivery by Ambassador. Ambassador should draw on appropriate portions of Cirtel 2210 in supplementary oral exposition of USG assessment of Khrushchev's visit to UAR: /2/Dated May 22. (Ibid.) /3/Dated May 27. (Ibid.) "Your Highness: "Secretary Rusk has spoken to me of his satisfaction at his recent meeting with your Deputy Foreign Minister. He noted that your able emissary expressed your concern over various aspects and implications of Mr. Khrushchev's recent visit to the UAR. We have now had an opportunity to assess the import of this visit, which I wish to share with you in all candor. "The Soviet Union has achieved a short-run propaganda advantage but I do not for a moment believe that Khrushchev's visit has appreciably enhanced--or will enhance--Soviet influence in the area. On the contrary, by his own statements he has spotlighted the fundamental incompatibility between the Communist concept of class unity and the Arab doctrine of national unity. His disparaging remarks on Arab unity have not gone unnoticed by the very Arab nationalists whom he has sought to befriend. He blundered by attacking Kuwait. "It is true that the UAR has found a temporary coincidence of interest with the Soviet Union. Since the USSR is helping to build the High Dam, the UAR could hardly deny Khrushchev a visit to the celebration. Nevertheless whatever Nasser's own ambitions in the Arab World may be, he hardly desires to share them with Khrushchev. The UAR continues to ban Communism in Egypt and I suspect will continue to recognize the advantages of seeking to maintain good relations with other Arab states. Nasser, still desiring good relations with the United States, has given no indication whatsoever of moving into the Soviet camp. I have asked Ambassador Hart to give you a more detailed account of our assessment of the Soviet threat in the Near East. "While you and I may not entirely agree on the best way to deal with certain other forces in the area, we stand firmly together in a mutual desire to combat Communism and Soviet penetration, and to live in freedom. As you know, we are dealing with the Soviet problem constantly, intimately and on a worldwide basis; it is currently our primary concern. "We are resolved as ever to stand solidly and steadfastly beside our valued friends in the area, including Saudi Arabia. I have the highest regard for Your Highness' firm and enlightened leadership and have been impressed by the course of reform you are charting for Saudi Arabia. This is the true road to national unity and strength. As you proceed on this course, you may be assured of full United States support. Progress for the benefit of all the people is the best insurance against the spread of extremist doctrines in Saudi Arabia or elsewhere in the Arab world. "With regard to events occurring in South Arabia, I am both disturbed and encouraged. I am disturbed at the pressures being placed on the British position in Aden to which we attach considerable importance. Yet I cannot refrain from pointing out that you and we, by a policy rather different from the British, greatly reduced the immediate threat to Saudi Arabia from the same source. I am encouraged at signs that the Yemeni republican leaders are now seeking actively to widen their popular support and are continuing to express a desire for peaceful relations with Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom. I would urge your Government to take special note of these developments. "We stand by our commitment to obtain the disengagement of foreign forces from Yemen. We shall continue our efforts. The process has been slow but I remain confident of ultimate success. Meanwhile, I know I can count on your characteristic patience, forbearance and magnanimity. "I wish you success and send you my warm personal regards. May God keep you and the Saudi people and grant you peace." FYI: Re possible discussion of USG confrontation with SovBloc in key world trouble spots (suggested reftel), you might wish draw Faisal's attention to fact that Dept gave Saqqaf two-hour briefing this subject and latter may wish give Faisal report. If you wish have further material, Department happy to provide. End FYI. Rusk [Continue with the next documents] Volume XXI Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |