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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXI Near East Region Department of State |
 214. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Kuwait/1/ Washington, June 30, 1967, 8:48 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 KUW. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Brewer on June 29, cleared by Saunders, and approved by Davies. Repeated to USUN. 220347. Following summary FYI only and Noforn. It is uncleared and subject to revision upon review. 1. Following FonMin Sabah al-Ahmad's delivery oral message from Ruler (reported separately),/2/ President expressed appreciation and said he would give it serious study. He noted problems exist on both sides but said he appreciated the fairness, moderation and judiciousness which has characterized Ruler's approach. Saying there enough blame to go around, President noted that Israelis had not been the ones to close Gulf of Aqaba which immediate cause hostilities, but suggested that was a bygone and we should look ahead. President stressed USG had in no way participated with Israel in fighting as UAR alleged. /2/Telegram 218799 to Kuwait, June 29, reported that Kuwaiti Foreign Minister's Sabah al-Ahmad had called on the President on the evening of June 28 to deliver the Ruler's oral message, which stated that Israel had initiated aggression and that the community of nations had long accepted the view that acquisition of territory by force should not be recognized. (Ibid., POL 27 ARAB-ISR) 2. FonMin said he wished speak frankly as representative friendly country. Arabs were human and not infallible. At same time they did not want to see one wrong followed by another. Many responsible Arab officials continued look to USG. Sabah stressed his hope that measures USG might take in present situation would not "force" them away from that position. 3. President reacted to notion that US actions "forced" moderates to take any position. He responded not USG intentions, but Nasser's actions which had led to fighting, should be Arab concern. Sabah cautioned against taking Nasser "as point of reference." Officials would come and go, but attitude Arab common people what counts. President replied USG would do what is right but could do little as long as moderates continue to follow Nasser's misguided leadership. FonMin again asked USG do what it could remove "encroachments on our territory." Sabah indicated our failure would leave moderates open to serious threat on part USSR. 4. President said solution could not be one-way proposition. Sabah replied all problems could be solved after withdrawal, to which President rejoined all problems should be considered together. Sabah said this very difficult and not question of one or two Arab leaders. Arab masses simply would not accept any package deal. President inquired whether masses seriously expected Israel withdraw without achieving right of passage. FonMin suggested authority could be given to UN or SYG to examine specific issues and work out settlement. 5. Noting we would be glad have detailed Kuwaiti views on latter point, President said we respected Kuwait and liked way Kuwaitis had handled their affairs. If FonMin submitted further thoughts, we would carefully consider them. Our rule was never to leave a friend, though regrettably a friend sometimes left us. 6. FonMin expressed warm appreciation President's frankness which bore witness our continuing friendship and mutual respect. These factors explained why GOK had not broken relations with us. Sabah nevertheless pleaded that USG avoid actions which would put Arab moderates in position where they would be vulnerable "outside" pressure. President assured FonMin we would not do so but noted that others might and reminded Sabah that USG lacks power to control events. 7. In subsequent talk with Presidential Assistant Rostow, FonMin again voiced concern lest USG actions force moderates abandon moderation. Rostow noted Soviet policy appears aimed at Israel but in fact is aimed at Arab moderates. Problem was how USG could help moderates while still doing what is just and feasible in situation. Clearly troops must be withdrawn but Syrian heights, Aqaba and other specific issues would have to be worked out. FonMin said Arabs could not accept conditional Israeli withdrawal but would be willing have SYG given certain powers in wake withdrawal resolution to work out specific issues. Russians for own reasons were already taking advantage situation by warmly espousing Arab cause. Unquestioned Arab support for Nasser modified by recent events but, for this be meaningful, USG must take helpful position. Rostow said Soviets in recent discussions had noted they had ended war with Japanese 10 years before they signed peace treaty. He wondered whether this might be example for Arabs. FonMin rejoined that USG now had opportunity strengthen Arab moderates and encourage realism in Arab councils if we wished. Rostow concluded we would welcome additional suggestions. We had tried hard to prevent war but failed which indicated limits USG influence. Peaceful conditions in Near East depended mainly on peoples of Near East. President's five principles designed be helpful but USG could not alone provide solutions. 8. Comment: Exchange with President was warm and friendly despite expression of sometimes opposing views. Kuwaitis subsequently expressed pleasure at meeting, indicating they might have further specific suggestions following FonMin's speech at UNGA afternoon June 29. Rusk
215. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Kuwait/1/ Washington, November 25, 1967, 1942Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL KUW-US. Confidential. Drafted by Brewer, cleared by UNP Director Elizabeth Ann Brown and Davies, and approved by Rusk. 74837. 1. Charge requested deliver to FonMin following personal message from Secretary: "Excellency: Thank you for your recent letter which I have just received through Ambassador Cottam./2/ I appreciate your taking the time in these difficult days to bring your views directly to my attention. I fully share your view that relations between Kuwait and the US are based on solid friendship, mutual interest and fruitful cooperation, and share your determination to keep these ties firm and enduring. /2/An unofficial translation of the Foreign Minister's undated message is attached to a November 24 memorandum from Battle transmitting a draft of telegram 74837 to the Secretary for his signature. (Ibid.) The recent debate at the UN on the Near East has been a difficult and trying time for us all. I know that you and we have done everything we can to assure that moderation prevails and a climate is created in which a mutually acceptable settlement can be envisioned. It is a source of great gratification to me that these efforts have now been rewarded. The unanimous action of the Security Council on November 22/3/ in approving a resolution on the Near East gives us all a particular opportunity, which may not recur, to try to resolve outstanding problems on a basis acceptable to both sides. /3/Reference is to Resolution 242; for text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pp. 616-617. Documentation on the Six-Day War and Resolution 242 is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XIX. The fact that the Council approved unanimously a set of principles including withdrawal of armed forces from occupied territories, termination of claims or states of belligerence, secure and recognize boundaries, and other points which have been the focus of recent discussion in New York, is a clear manifestation of world opinion. It should materially assist the Secretary General's Special Representative in his efforts to help the parties in the working out of appropriate solutions. The Council's action, and what we understand to be the willingness of the parties to cooperate with the Special Representative, are encouraging. For its part, I wish to assure Your Excellency that the US Government is prepared to use all its diplomatic and political influence to assist the Special Representative in helping to establish lasting conditions of peace in the region. It was a pleasure to see Your Excellency in Washington last summer. I would like to thank you again for your recent letter. With warm regards, Sincerely, Dean Rusk" 2. Dept planning no publicity here and suggests there be none in Kuwait. Suggest you make this point to FonMin. Rusk
216. Airgram From the Embassy in Kuwait to the Department of State/1/ A-150 Kuwait, February 21, 1968. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 1 KUW-US. Secret. Drafted by Cottam, Deputy Chief of Mission John N. Gatch, Jr., Political Officer Robert H. Carlson, Public Affairs Officer John W. Vonier, and Economic Officer James A Placke; and approved by Cottam. Pouched to Arab capitals, Ankara, Karachi, London, Moscow, New Delhi, Paris, Tehran, Tel Aviv, Tokyo, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA for POLAD, and USUN. SUBJECT REF /2/Not printed. (Ibid.) SUMMARY Since the Embassy's last policy assessment three events, the Arab-Israeli war, the devaluation of sterling and the UK announcement of military withdrawal east of Suez, have severely tested the ability of Kuwait's leaders to sustain the country's sovereign independence and to maintain its impressive pace of modernization. These same events had a profound effect on the ability of the U.S. to pursue our objectives in Kuwait, and added a new factor in the equation which suggests that a third, broader objective be included in our basic policy which we now would describe as: 1. To maintain maximum free-world access to Kuwait's resources and to limit access to Communist and other nations who actively espouse systems different from ours. 2. To obtain maximum support from Kuwait for the free world and its basic institutions. 3. To convince Kuwait that its future progress and (even its survival) as an independent nation depend on its willingness and ability to cooperate in regional efforts to maintain area stability. U.S. capabilities in Kuwait were eroded by the Arab-Israeli war and its aftermath. It is widely believed that Israel owes its military and political successes to U.S. support, and that the U.S. is the main enemy of Kuwait and the rest of the Arab world as far as Israel is concerned. The U.S. is still tacitly regarded in Kuwait, however, as the protector against the spread of communist influence. The U.S. also continues to be the prime market and source of technical skill, equipment and capital. Thus hate and distrust intensified while awareness of the need for the U.S. increased. Kuwait became extremist on the Palestine issue, remained committed but dubious about pan-Arabism and turned towards cautious moderation on matters concerning oil and money. U.S. tactics must be accommodated to the sharper ambivalence, but we should continue to identify mutual interests and to urge Kuwait to support its national interests in free world institutions and systems, with special emphasis on regional cooperation. [Here follows the body of the paper.]
IRG/NEA 68-21 Washington, June 4, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, NEA/IRG Files: Lot 70 D 503, IRG/NEA 68-21--Record of IRG Mtg June 4 on Current Near East Military Problems. Secret. Drafted by IRG Staff Director Sidney Sober on June 6. INTERDEPARTMENTAL REGIONAL GROUP Record of IRG Meeting--June 4, 1968 The meeting was devoted to several current Near East military problems, as outlined in IRG/NEA 68-19./2/ /2/Not found. Possible Arms Sales and Presidential Determination for Kuwait The IRG noted recent requests by the Government of Kuwait to purchase military equipment (patrol boats, helicopters, armored personnel carriers and 155mm howitzers) from the USG. The Defense member expressed the view that the Kuwaitis hoped for some kind of USG involvement in their security going beyond the mere supply of arms, in anticipation of the British military withdrawal from the Persian Gulf by the end of 1971 and the prospective termination before that time of the British defense commitment to Kuwait. He thought a decision to sell arms to Kuwait would be followed by requests to us by other small states in the Gulf (e.g., Qatar, Abu Dhabi) for the supply of arms. The Defense member expressed concern over the dangers of our taking steps to "fill the vacuum," by selling arms to states with which we do not now have a military supply relationship, as the British withdraw. The CIA member remarked that we had to take into account the possibility that Kuwait might seek to buy arms from the Soviets, if it could not meet its requests from the British or, failing that, from other Western sources. He recalled that "deal" of 1963 when the USSR succeeded in getting GOK approval for the establishment of a Soviet Embassy in Kuwait in return for Soviet agreement to remove its blackball on Kuwait's entry into the United Nations. The CIA member said the Soviets would almost certainly wish to introduce military personnel into Kuwait in connection with any supply of Soviet arms. The establishment of such a relationship by the USSR and Kuwait would inevitably tend to damage our interests in the area. The Chairman said he saw the issue in terms of our broad interests in the Persian Gulf area. He recalled that the IRG had recently agreed on the general outlines of our policy vis-a-vis the Gulf, and it was entirely consistent with that policy that we should encourage Kuwait to continue to look to the UK as its source of arms./3/ However, in cases where the United Kingdom could not adequately meet Kuwait's requests, it could be in the U.S. interest to sell certain things to the Kuwaitis. The Chairman said he appreciated the concern expressed on this point, but it was his view that if we should decide that it was in our interest to sell some arms to Kuwait in accordance with our current restrictive policy, we could do so without involving ourselves deeply in the question of maintaining Kuwait's security. In any event, we would have to have more information--including a clear idea of British views--and a specific transaction in mind before proceeding further. If we eventually decide that we should agree to any Kuwaiti request for arms, we should be prepared to seek the President's approval at that time, spelling out the basic policy issues (e.g., close collaboration with the British, the requirements of legitimate defense, avoidance of an unnecessary arms race, the Soviet angle, etc.). The Chairman stated it would be premature at this time to seek a general Presidential Determination under Section 521(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act, which would be required to make Kuwait eligible for purchases through Department of Defense channels. /3/The following is a paragraph from IRG/NEA 68-8, the record of the IRG meeting of February 1, 1968: "The Group agreed that although the Soviets will try to increase their presence and influence in the Gulf area, the key to the future of the region in the next few years will be developments within and among the various Gulf states themselves. It is neither politically feasible nor desirable for the US to `replace' the British presence in the Persian Gulf. Our policy should be directed along the lines of (a) encouraging the British to maintain as much of their present special role in the Gulf as they can, as long as possible (including their role as principal arms supplier to various Gulf states); (b) encouraging the Saudis and Iranians to settle their outstanding differences regarding the median line and other issues; (c) encouraging greater political and economic cooperation generally among the Gulf states; and (d) avoiding an undue military buildup by Gulf littoral states." [Footnote in the source text. For a record of the February 1 meeting, see Document 131.] It was agreed that there should be further staffing of the pending Kuwaiti requests. This should include consultation with the British, seeking the UK's views on the reasonableness of Kuwait's requests and on the UK's ability to meet them; we should also seek a general British view on the future development of the Kuwaiti armed forces. [Here follows discussion of other subjects.] MEMBERS PRESENT Executive Chairman: Mr. Battle State (NEA): Messrs. Davies, Dinsmore, Houghton, Atherton S.S.
218. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/ Washington, December 3, 1968. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 KUW. Confidential. Drafted by Brewer; cleared by William H. Hallman (NEA/IRN), Atherton, Hart, Officer in Charge of UN Political Affairs Betty-Jane Jones, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for ISA/NESA Harry H. Schwartz, and Heyward Isham (EA/VN). A typed notation reads: "Signed original to Amir of Kuwait briefing book 12/5/68." SUBJECT Shaikh Sabah al-Salim al-Sabah This is Shaikh Sabah's first visit to the United States as Amir of Kuwait. When he was Prime Minister, he visited New York briefly in 1963 when Kuwait was admitted to the UN. You have not met the Amir, but his cousin, Foreign Minister Sabah al-Ahmad (who will be in the Kuwaiti party), called on you in June, 1967, during the special UNGA session on the Arab/Israel crisis. Shaikh Sabah succeeded to the Amirate in 1965 on the death of his elder brother. Kuwait has a constitution and a parliament but almost all key positions are still held by members of the ruling Sabah family. At present, the Salim and Ahmad branches of the family govern in tacit alliance. The Amir is head of the Salim branch. The Foreign Minister's elder brother, Crown Prince and Prime Minister Jabir, heads the Ahmad branch. To Americans who know him, the Amir is something of a bantam--short, cocky, unctuous and protocol-conscious. This attitude seems in part to reflect a basic lack of confidence and, as a result, the Amir responds very warmly to flattery and full recognition of his position. What Shaikh Sabah Wants Shaikh Sabah has for years craved an official visit to this country. Now that he is Amir, he no doubt sees it as giving him, and his small nation, additional stature on the world stage. The Amir was nevertheless ambivalent about coming now because of Arab concern at USG policy on issues growing out of the June war. We think he checked with several other Arab heads of state before accepting, rationalizing to them his desire to come as a way of exerting influence on both the outgoing and incoming US Administrations. He is disappointed that his desire to meet with President-elect Nixon has not been granted (Mr. Nixon has taken the position that it would be inappropriate for him to see any visiting heads of state or similar leaders during the transition period). In addition to wanting to discuss Arab-Israel issues, Shaikh Sabah will probably inquire as to the USG attitude towards Persian Gulf problems in the light of the scheduled British withdrawal by the end of 1971 and heightened Soviet interest in the region. Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Iran have recently exchanged Heads of State visits and relations are cordial. There is nevertheless considerable historical and religious suspicion between the Arab Sunni Moslems on the Western side of the Gulf and the Persian Shi'a Moslems across the way. In fact, the Arabs steadfastly refer to the Persian Gulf as "the Arab Gulf". We therefore generally use the simple term "the Gulf" in talks with Arab leaders. Despite differences over Israel, Kuwait is interested in cultivating USG interest in Gulf affairs as a counterpoint to Soviet interest and as a means of furthering local stability and helping assure Kuwait's continued independence. The Kuwaiti attitude was made particularly clear in January 1968 after the British withdrawal announcement. The Kuwait Government had earlier been dragging its feet on a routine US naval visit request but, immediately on hearing the announcement, asked how soon the visit could take place. Kuwait has since then been concerned at the Soviet naval visit to Iraq in May, 1968, the first Gulf visit by a Russian squadron since 1903. Subsequent to the British announcement, the Kuwaitis have approached us several times regarding their desire to purchase modern US arms. We took the position that Kuwait should continue to look to the UK as its principal arms supplier but said that we would be prepared to discuss any legitimate requests which the British could not meet. The British have subsequently concluded some arms sales with Kuwait, but the Amir may conceivably raise this subject with you. What We Want 1. We have not previously had a high-level visit from Kuwait, though it became independent in 1961. This visit will thus be useful in marking the cordiality of USG/Kuwaiti relations which have existed (except for Arab-Israel issues) since the state's independence. 2. No Eastern Arab Head of State has paid an official visit here since the June war. The Amir's trip is thus useful to us in stressing publicly that there are moderate Arab regimes with which we still enjoy close relations. We hope publicity about the visit will have a favorable impact throughout the Arab world, particularly at a time when Arabs accuse us of undue support for Israel. 3. We are concerned regarding stability in the Gulf area after the British go. Kuwait's financial strength and past mediatory role on Gulf problems make it a force for stability in the region which we are hoping to encourage. Additionally, we hope the USSR will not fail to note the visit as an indication that the USG will continue to have an interest in Gulf affairs after 1971. Assistant Secretary Hart and Country Director Brewer will stand by during your meeting with Shaikh Sabah following the arrival ceremony. Talking points are at Tab A./2/ We also transmit (Tab B)/3/ a draft communique which is under discussion with the Government of Kuwait. We will replace it with the final version as soon as possible. /2/The tabs are attached but not printed. /3/For text of the joint communique issued on December 11, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book II, pp. 1182-1183. Dean Rusk
219. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, December 11, 1968, 11:56 a.m.-1 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Kuwait, Cables & Memos, Vol. I, 11/63-1/69. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Saunders on December 17 and approved by the White House on December 31. The meeting was held in the Oval Office. The time of the meeting was taken from the President's Daily Diary. (Ibid.) SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS His Highness Shaikh Sabah al-Salim al-Sabah, Amir of the State of Kuwait The President The President opened the conversation by expressing pleasure that the Amir was here and had brought some of his beautiful sunshine with him. He hoped the Amir would enjoy his stay. He was honored to have the Amir for his last State visit. As he had said in his arrival statement, the people of America are enthusiastic about Kuwait and its willingness to share its treasure with its fellowmen. He would be pleased to hear the Amir's views on anything of common interest. The Amir thanked the President for his invitation, for his kind words of welcome and for the warmth of his reception. He trusted that their conversation would be "as clear and cloudless as the weather." He wished the President continued health and prosperity. As for his views on substantive issues, he said he would like to discuss matters of direct concern to his area. As for the "Arab Gulf," he said he would like to hear what plans the US might have in view of the British withdrawal from the area. In response to the President's request for comment, Assistant Secretary Hart said Gulf affairs would continue to be of great interest to the United States. The US has no plan to take the unique place the British once held. The British position developed under circumstances that do not exist today, and it is the people of the Gulf themselves who will determine the future of the Gulf area. The Amir said he realized that the people of the area would have to carry a larger share of the burden, but he would like to reiterate his question about exactly what position the US plans to take. In response to Mr. Hart's question about precisely what the Amir meant by "position", the Amir said that there is no threat to the Gulf from the "Arab area." The danger is from outside the area and the threat may be military or subversive or in unknown forms. Mr. Hart said that if he had to look into the future, he would say that we will be just as greatly concerned with the independence and integrity of states of the Gulf as we are with the independence and integrity of states all over the world. We have demonstrated this beyond doubt. The Gulf area is no exception. We have strong ties with all the peoples on the Gulf shores. The Amir said, "Suppose there is an armed attack on any countries of the area, could we expect armed support?" The President said that that is a matter that would have to be considered through the Constitutional procedures of the US, taking into account the circumstances, the recommendations of the President at the time, the attitudes of the Congress, the existence of treaties, the justice of the causes involved and the American people's views of the situation. He emphasized that one President could not bind another and, therefore, he could not speak for future Presidents. The President continued, saying that we are very anxious that stability prevail in all parts of the world. We are anxious to make no statement that would encourage aggression. We have not had to deal with aggression by force in that part of the world, but the Amir knows of our friendship for the people of that area. The US will under its Constitutional procedures face whatever situation may develop and act accordingly. The Amir shared the hope that no such situation would arise. He believed that problems of aggression should be solved "by men's minds rather than by force." However, he could not help but think about the problem and wanted to know what he could count on. The US is a symbol of peace in the world, and he just wanted to know what the attitude of the US would be in such a situation. When the President asked Mr. Hart whether he wished to raise anything else, the Assistant Secretary asked about the meetings in Kuwait with the Shah of Iran. The Amir called them "100% successful." Disagreement remains as far as Bahrein is concerned. He said that "we" are looking for a solution and doing "our" best to reach a settlement. The Shah "assured us that he has no ambitions," but he has an old claim. The Amir expressed his view that the Shah is "seeking a way out." He said the Shah had asked him to "help him find a way out." The Amir realized the Shah's difficulty. The Amir said he would like to ask the President's opinion of the Federation of Arab Amirates. The President asked Mr. Hart to comment. Mr. Hart said we feel this was basically a good idea. It will help the states of the area work together in using their resources to best advantage. The main problem is the Shah's problem with respect to the inclusion of Bahrain in the Federation. The main question is whether a solution can be found for the Shah. The Amir said that Iran would "undoubtedly oppose" the inclusion of Bahrain. The Government of Iran is seeking a way out of this problem. The Amir felt that the US might possibly use its influence to help and encourage Iran to find a way out with dignity. He hoped the problem could be solved with US help. Mr. Hart said that we would encourage this in an informal way. We understand the problems of both sides. We are encouraged that there have been recent meetings among the Saudis, Iranians and Kuwaitis and that some of the Shaikhs of the lower Trucial Coast have visited Iran. Considering the fact that there was little communication not too many years ago, we view this as progress. The Amir said that Kuwait had tried to increase contact between Iran and Bahrain. Representatives of the two sides had met in Geneva two months ago and "we hope there will be another meeting soon." The Foreign Minister said that as one looks at South Arabia one cannot but fear for the rest of the area. The "Soviets and the Communists" have established footholds in the area. Is the United States happy about this? When Mr. Hart answered quickly that we are "most unhappy", the Foreign Minister said, "Then we find a meeting point." He went on to say that he hopes the US would use its good offices with Iran to help settle the Bahrain issue. Mr. Hart said he believes the Shah is aware of the problem and has just as much interest as anyone else in defending the area against outside interests, but he has a problem on Bahrain. "We all have to help him find a solution." The Shah is dealing with a tradition of long standing, and it is not easy to bury a tradition. It is in the interests of all of us that he finds a solution. The Amir said that it would only be through the joint efforts of the US, Iran and Kuwait, that a favorable settlement would be found. Mr. Hart nodded and said, "Quiet diplomacy." The President said that he had asked Secretary Hart to respond to the Amir's questions because Mr. Hart is a career officer deeply involved in the area. The President felt that Mr. Hart's judgment would be called on "long after I am gone" from office. Generally speaking, the President felt that his record on aggression was well known. He and his administration have looked with great disfavor on any power that tried to impose its will on others by might. Our position has been made clear all around the world. On the Federation, we encourage regional cooperation and foster the association of neighbors in efforts to strengthen their economies. We have done this in Latin America, Africa and on continents all over the world. The President expressed his pleasure that the Amir's meeting with the Shah had gone well. He felt that "whoever sits in this chair" will do everything possible to encourage just solutions to problems of this kind. The President said that, at the White House dinner in the evening, leading citizens from all over the United States would come to welcome the Amir and to pay their respects. He had had "fewer declines" on this dinner than on any other and he was looking forward to seeing the Amir in the evening. The Amir said there were other points that could be covered, but he knew the President's time was limited. He would like to mention in parting the Palestine issue. The President said that we are "alert to it". We believe that the people of the area should work out a solution. We support the UN efforts to help them. We are anxious to do anything we can on our side to help. If the Amir had any specific suggestions on how we might help, he might wish to take them up with Secretary Rusk. The Amir asked how soon the US might resume relations with the UAR. The President said that would be a problem that Mr. Nixon would have to act on. He said that we have been "anxious to resume relations right along." We had been concerned that the record of our erroneously alleged involvement in the June 1967 war be corrected. We had let the Egyptians know that, if they would correct that record, we would be glad to resume relations. But that is now an issue which the new Administration will have to take up. The Scranton mission/2/ had created some hope in this direction, and he hoped something would come out of it. He would like to see a genuine move toward better relations. "We would be glad to resume tomorrow if they would just state for the record that we did not attack them." The President reiterated that he could not bind his successor, but he hoped and believed that relations would be resumed. /2/Former Governor of Pennsylvania Scranton visited the United Arab Republic December 6-7 as part of a six-nation fact-finding tour of the Middle East undertaken on behalf of President-elect Nixon. Documentation on the Scranton mission is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 US/SCRANTON. The Amir pointed out that the UAR government had made a statement to Look magazine for the record. The President, smiling, replied that maybe we have resumed relations with Look magazine, but not with each other. He said he had seen and was aware of the Look article, but felt that the best way to clear up misunderstandings of this kind is to talk directly to each other. The President repeated that we would like to see relations resumed, that we regretted their having been broken. He said we had not attacked the UAR and as soon as the UAR had made a statement directly to us, we would be happy to resume relations. The Amir asked what the US position would be should Cairo request resumption. The President said that, as he had just stated, "we would be very glad to resume." When the Amir said that there had been an understanding that the Look statement was tantamount to an Egyptian admission of the error of its charges, the President said he did not have much to add to what he had already said, except to say that if we can have that statement in Look, why not have it in a cable? The Amir said he had not been asked to pursue this issue. He was just personally interested in it. The President reiterated that we are very much interested in resuming relations. We are sorry they were broken and would be happy to resume under the conditions he had described. In parting, the President said he looked forward to seeing the Amir in the evening. Comment: Toward the end of the meeting, there was much conversation among the Kuwaitis in Arabic. Presumably the Foreign Minister and Ambassador Ghoussein were urging the Amir to get to the Palestine issue. At that point, the President was running behind on his schedule and was under some pressure to meet his next appointment.
220. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Kuwait/1/ Washington, December 13, 1968, 1344Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 KUW. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Brewer on December 12; cleared by Cottam, Eliot, and Davies; and approved by Hart. Repeated to Tehran, Jidda, London, and Dhahran. 286622. Persian Gulf. Following based on uncleared memcon and subject revision on review. FYI only and Noforn. 1. Summary. Amir of Kuwait took up at length with Secretary GOK concern at security situation in Gulf in wake British withdrawal, as well as problem created by Iranian claim Bahrain. Secretary reaffirmed our interest in region and said we would see whether there anything constructive USG might do to help resolve Bahrain issue. End summary. 2. Secretary met with Amir of Kuwait for two hours December 12. Kuwaiti Foreign Minister, Minister of Finance/Oil Affairs, Kuwaiti Ambassador to US, Ambassador Cottam, Assistant Secretary Hart and Country Director Brewer also present. Amir referred at outset, as he had with President previous day, to uncertainty as to USG position re Gulf affairs following UK withdrawal. 3. Secretary responded this primarily matter for new US Administration. On personal basis, he noted if there were group Gulf states which arranged give each other mutual support in case attack, any USG support would not have divisive effect which unilateral USG assurances to any one area state would have. Secretary stressed our strong interest in security of Kuwait and recalled USG action in moving destroyers towards Kuwait during Iraqi crisis in 1961. Secretary also noted our continuing support for CENTO, importance of close Iran/Kuwait/Saudi Arabia ties and opined some UK role in Middle East perhaps not ended. 4. Amir asked if USG interests or regional stability in Gulf threatened by outside power would USG take some action. Secretary responded answer to this most solemn question could only come from next President under our Constitution. Personally he would like say yes but this would be like giving check without funds in bank. If there were major Soviet threat, this would no doubt be major East/West crisis involving totality our relations to which we could not remain indifferent. If threat came from neighboring state, then solidarity among Kuwait and its neighbors would provide basis on which outside support might be provided. 5. FonMin explained GOK did not have in mind conclusion mutual defense treaty but rather wished know whether USG interested in regional stability and territorial integrity each state there. Secretary said he could give categorical response. USG was deeply interested both as matter general policy and specific USG interests. Secretary then cited our actions in Middle East since World War II, noting record made clear general policy USG is to support territorial integrity and political independence all states in region. Secretary noted, however, most USG actions to which he referred had reflected general policy considerations rather than specific textual commitments. It one thing to act when situation requires it but, under our system, much more difficult make promises in advance. Thus, though USG has serious interest in independence and security of Kuwait, it constitutionally difficult explain what we might do in specific circumstances. 6. Amir then raised question Iranian claim to Bahrain. Secretary said thing that most concerned American people on such territorial disputes was wishes people concerned in this case on Bahrain. We did not think Iran sought solution by force but there is historical Iranian claim. Secretary hoped "quiet diplomacy" would produce acceptable compromise. 7. Amir said Shah had made clear during November visit Kuwait GOI desire find peaceful solution. Question was how. Amir felt USG help needed. Kuwait doing what it could, such as being instrumental in arranging quiet Iran/Bahrain meeting at Geneva two months ago. Two sides would meet again. Secretary congratulated Amir on this development and said we would be glad examine problem further and see whether we could come up with some constructive suggestions. Amir expressed appreciation and said he hoped we could keep in touch on issue. In response question from Hart, Amir said he believed Bahraini people fully support Ruler. While in principal anything like plebiscite unacceptable, perhaps there could be effort collect info re wishes people, e.g., through some UN mechanism. Minister of Finance noted opposition plebiscite not based on fear outcome but rather that it would be "a form of submission to a claim". 8. Comment. Kuwait clearly concerned both at future Gulf stability after British go and apparent intractability Bahrain problem. Dept planning take advantage concurrent presence here Ambassadors Meyer and Cottam for full review subject in effort see whether there anything useful we might propose. Rusk [Continue with the next documents] Volume XXI Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |