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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXI Near East Region Department of State |
 Kuwait 202. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Kuwait/1/ Washington, January 2, 1964, 4:45 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL IRAQ-KUW. Secret; Immediate; Limited Distribution. Repeated to COMIDEASTFOR. Drafted by Seelye; cleared by Davies, NEA/NR Officer in Charge of Politico-Military Affairs Donald W. Bunte, and Judd (BNA); and cleared by Jernegan. 169. Embtel 292./2/ You should, as you propose, play customary COMIDEASTFOR visit to Kuwait in low key. Should Amir query re future USG role in support Kuwait integrity, you should state that view UK-Kuwait defense treaty, we consider UK has primary responsibility for military protection Kuwait's integrity (Deptel 21)./3/ You may call attention to past USG public statements of support for Kuwait's integrity (made in UN in connection Kuwait's application for UN membership) and record of cordial relations between two countries. In event Amir probes further, you authorized indicate USG always in close consultation with UK and supports UK position in Gulf. /2/In telegram 292 from Kuwait, January 2, Ambassador Cottam asked for instructions on how to deal with likely query of the Amir on January 6 about U.S. intentions to defend Kuwait in the event that the United Kingdom was unable or unwilling to do so. (Ibid., DEF 1 KUW) /3/Dated July 31, 1963. (Ibid., Central Files 1961-63, DEF 4 KUW-UK) You should not question Amir as proposed numbered paras 1 and 2. We do not consider appropriate for us to question Amir on aspects and implications GOK-UK defense commitment. Re para 3 (Jordan waters), you will receive separate instruction./4/ /4/See circular telegram 1176, January 2. (Ibid., POL 33-1 JORDAN RIVER) Rusk
203. Airgram From the Embassy in Kuwait to the Department of State/1/ A-209 Kuwait, March 26, 1964. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, ORG 7 NEA. Secret. Drafted by Cottam. SUBJECT In two days, Assistant Secretary Talbot/2/ had an intimate and wide exposure to Kuwait, its royal family, its bureaucracy, its business oligarchy, its oil industry, and its modernization. Two main themes of the discussions were: 1) US policy in the Middle East and 2) modernization of Kuwait. Every principal official directly or indirectly queried Mr. Talbot about US views and intentions on the Palestine issue: The Amir, the Foreign Minister, other officials, members of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Assembly and 25 prominent businessmen. Mr. Talbot sought to assure them of the evenhandedness, the continuity and the friendly understanding of the United States and the personal ardent desire of the President for peace in the Middle East and elsewhere. /2/Assistant Secretary Talbot visited a number of other Near East countries on this trip. The Amir asked for understanding and flexibility in US policy toward the Palestine question, implying that he expected unreasonable and uncontrollable actions which, if dealt with too abruptly by the US, might have disastrous results. The Foreign Minister and other officials more explicitly stressed that fear and affirmed Kuwait's intention to aid and abet the inevitable unification of the Arab states. What Kuwait expected was a federation which will preserve independence of each (i.e., Kuwait could retain its higher standard of living). The Foreign Minister affirmed that while cooperation in cultural, educational and economic matters would proceed rapidly, political association was even more important. While he was less explicit about how political unification would be achieved, he acknowledged that many present Arab governments would fall as would others after them. In the meantime, the Arab people would accelerate cooperation in every possible way. The Foreign Minister maintained that many Arab problems such as Yemen could be settled by Arabs themselves if left to their own devices. UAR, Saudi Arabia and Yemen had made considerable progress toward a settlement. US assistance was no longer needed there, the Foreign Minister affirmed. While GOK's aid program permitted loans, it did not permit grants to Arab brothers (except for education and health through GUPAC). Kuwait aid and US aid programs to Arabs are not alike. Kuwait must treat brother Arabs as equals; hence, no grants. US should continue its grant aid to Jordan and to Palestine refugees. However, money alone would not be enough for the refugees, UN Resolution 194, Article 11/3/ had to be implemented. Mr. Talbot's mention of other aspects of the resolution fell on deaf ears. /3/Article 11 of UN General Assembly Resolution 194, December 11, 1948, called for repatriation of Palestinian refugees and compensation for those who did not choose to return. The Foreign Minister asked how long US would continue its "foolish" policy toward Peiping, China. Kuwait would be evenhanded and non-aligned. Mr. Talbot gave an effective defense, but Sabah still felt GOK could handle two-China policy up to point of who would get the UN Security Council seat. The Minister implied that the UN General Assembly would have to meet the issue when it arises. UK Ambassador Jackson told Mr. Talbot that GOK hadn't recently raised question of the UK-GOK treaty. Jackson volunteered information that GOK had been spending too much and drawing down its reserves. With respect to Israel and oil, Jackson felt GOK would not cut off its nose to spite its face. The Prime Minister had told him recently that Arab world would be better off if it admitted that Israel exists. Mr. Talbot's visit served US interests effectively by providing an intimate dialogue on emotionally-toned subjects and by demonstrating US interest in Kuwait. He was well received and appreciated by everyone. Howard R. Cottam
204. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Kuwait/1/ Washington, September 10, 1964, 2:25 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 KUW-US. Confidential. Drafted by Moore on September 9; cleared by Bunte, and Colonel Evans (G/PM), and in substance by Steve Koumanelis (G/MC) and Quinn (DOD/ISA); and approved by Davies. Also sent to London and repeated to CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA for Ramsey. 52. Embtels 76/2/ and 88,/3/ US Arms Sales Kuwait. Basic guideline concerning US and UK military sales in Kuwait continues to be as stated Deptel 112, November 1, 1963./4/ That is, tacit understanding that we are prime supplier to Saudi Arabia while British have same position in Kuwait. This does not preclude US companies trying sell Kuwait but it does mean we will keep British informed whenever approval is given for such sales attempt. Embassy is of course authorized accord usual commercial assistance to US firms which have received prior Departmental approval required under munitions control regulations. /2/In telegram 76 from Kuwait, September 2, Cottam asked for guidance on handling the possibility of Kuwaiti arms purchases from the United States in commercial or official discussions, saying that the Embassy had been approached by a Douglas aircraft representative. (Ibid.) /3/Telegram 88 from Kuwait, September 9, reported that Douglas had made a package offer of six jet planes, including training, which the Government of Kuwait was apparently ready to accept. (Ibid.) /4/Not printed. (Ibid., Central Files 1961-63, DEF 12-5 KUW) Douglas (in March 1964) and Northrop (in September 1963) received appropriate authorization to make unclassified sales presentation on A-4E and F-5, respectively. (No authorization given for Sidewinders, Hawks, or other missiles.) Douglas representative Washington confirms present company sales plans as reported Kuwait tel 88. Kuwait and London should inform British Embassy and FonOff, respectively, of foregoing. We are informing British Embassy Washington. Rusk
205. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Kuwait/1/ Washington, January 14, 1965, 7:24 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 KUW. Secret. Drafted by Moore, cleared by NEA/NE Officer in Charge of Economic Affairs George M. Bennsky and Special Assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs Windsor G. Hackler, and approved by Davies. Repeated to London. 136. Embtel 296./2/ Appreciate your telegraphic summary our recommended response should GOK officially follow up Jabir Ali's remarks concerning Security Guarantee and other arrangement with US. (Department recalls Jabir Ali in past has tended be outspokenly pro-West and speak personally without prior clearance GOK.) We look forward promised Embassy airgram analysis and will no doubt have more detailed comments. Should be noted now, however, that possibility official visit for Ruler is practically nil this year because of tight Presidential schedule. Thus, you should give no encouragement for such trip. If other ranking Kuwait personages wish travel US on own, we would naturally take steps insure they received at as high level and with as much ceremony as possible and appropriate. /2/In telegram 296 from Kuwait, January 13, Cottam reported that Acting Prime Minister Jabir Ali had proposed a "red carpet" visit to the United States by the Crown Prince or Finance Minister, to culminate in an agreement affirming U.S.-Kuwaiti amity and cooperation, preferably including a security guarantee. (Ibid.) Department notes that Embassy already has authority approach GOK concerning Investment Guarantee Agreement (A-18, February 13, 1964)./3/ With reference Embtel 277,/4/ forthcoming message will also describe situation regarding possible Consular Agreement. /3/Not printed. (Ibid., FN 9-3 KUW-US) /4/Dated December 31, 1964. (Ibid., POL 17-2 US-KUW) Rusk
206. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Kuwait/1/ Washington, May 3, 1965, 6:31 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 KUW. Secret. Drafted by Bunte; cleared by Quinn, Stevens (ILN), Moore, G/PM Office of Politico-Military Affairs Director for Operations Howard Meyers, G/MC Policy and Intelligence Division Chief J. Harold Darby, and NEA/NR Director of the Office of Near Eastern, South Asian Regional Affairs Guy A. Lee; and approved by Jernegan. Repeated to London, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, and CINCSTRIKE POLAD for Ramsey. 221. Deptel 67 October 16, 1964./2/ Embtels 492,/3/ 500./4/ Douglas Washington Rep reported same info Embtel. Department told Douglas Nike-Hercules classified and introduction this missile would entail security survey. We doubt GOK can meet requirement U.S. security standards. Although Douglas authorized talk GOK about aircraft, we did not authorize discussion missiles and related equipment. We did not wish encourage sale Hawks, sidewinders or any other type missile. Informed Douglas that if GOK made Government to Government request we would study problem. You authorized respond along foregoing lines to any further queries Douglas agent Kuwait. /2/Not printed. (Ibid.) /3/In telegram 492 from Kuwait, April 28, Cottam reported that the Douglas aircraft representative in Kuwait had told the Embassy that Kuwait wanted to purchase U.S. Nike-Hercules or Hawk defensive missiles immediately. (Ibid.) /4/Dated May 3; not printed. (Ibid.) FYI. GOK not eligible purchase mil equipment under Military Assistance Sales Program. In view tacit understanding with UK that we are prime supplier to Saudi Arabia while British have same position Kuwait, we have not asked that GOK be added eligibility list. We do not intend sell Nike-Hercules to Douglas to make them available GOK. In view (1) necessity security survey and unlikely event GOK can meet US security standards and (2) current problems arms sale this area vis-a-vis Israel, we do not wish sell this type equipment GOK. Rationale Deptel 67 applicable. If approach made by GOK you should endeavor discourage their requesting such equipment. End FYI. Rusk
207. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, February 25, 1966. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 6 KUW. Confidential. Drafted by David A. Korn (NEA/NE). SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Hare said he was pleased to note that U.S.-Kuwaiti relations are very good. He hoped that the current conversations between the oil companies and the GOK were working out well./2/ /2/For documentation on U.S. international oil policy, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XXXIV, Documents 175ff. Mr. Ateegi said the oil question is a very irritating and delicate problem. The companies must make an effort to understand the situation in Kuwait and be prepared to reach a compromise. The companies, Mr. Ateegi stressed, must be very careful. They think the Kuwaiti Minister of Foreign Affairs and Finance is taking an extreme position. This, Mr. Ateegi emphasized, is a dangerously false assumption. Mr. Ateegi complained that, while oil offtake was rising in Saudi Arabia, Iran and other countries, it had increased hardly at all in Kuwait. The companies had furnished no satisfactory explanation for this. Despite these difficulties, Mr. Ateegi felt that there was some hope for an agreement. Ambassador Hare said experience had taught him that such matters as oil offtake were very complicated. As far as details were concerned he felt that the oil companies were best qualified to speak for themselves. However it might be noted that even the Shah of Iran, despite an increase in Iranian offtake, was dissatisfied with the oil companies on this score. Offtake depends upon an extremely complex set of factors which only an expert can understand. For this reason it is necessary to have thorough talks before reaching any conclusions. Mr. Ateegi said the oil companies' failure to increase offtake would not really be an issue if conditions between the GOK and the companies were normal. However, under present circumstances people in Kuwait interpret the companies' action as punishment or pressure, thus making it a very sensitive issue. Ambassador Hare said that while there had always been and will always be differences of views, over the years the company-Government relationship in the oil producing countries had been a very constructive and beneficial one. This is another reason we hope the dialogue can be maintained. Mr. Ateegi said the GOK wished to maintain the dialogue but felt that the matter would be made much easier if the companies showed greater understanding. The GOK does not want to enact laws or regulations which would "upset" the companies. Mr. Ateegi suspected, however, that the fact that the companies had not sent their highest level representatives to the current talks in Kuwait meant that they are not thinking seriously about solving the problem. While he could not state categorically that this was the case, Mr. Ateegi said that the companies sending their "third ranking" representatives might be interpreted to mean that they are not really ready to come to an agreement. Mr. Ateegi indicated that the Kuwaitis did not regard the company representatives currently in Kuwait as of sufficient rank to negotiate with a Minister. Mr. Symmes remarked that while Gulf Oil's Elston Law may not be the highest level of company representation he is probably more knowledgeable and better able to negotiate on the matters at issue in Kuwait than someone more senior.
208. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/ Washington, June 7, 1966, 7:14 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 KUW. Secret. Drafted by Moore; cleared by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Townsend Hoopes, NEA/NR Officer in Charge of Politico-Military Affairs Lieutenant Colonel Billy R. Byrd, Meyers, Officer in Charge of United Kingdom Affairs Thomas M. Judd, and Symmes, and in substance by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Logistics Negotiations Henry J. Kuss and Dwight M. Cramer (G/MC); and approved by Davies. Repeated to Kuwait and USCINCMEAFSA and pouched to Jidda and Dhahran. 7326. Joint State-Defense message. Ref: Deptels 6906 (Kuwait 191)/2/ and 6923 (Kuwait 192)./3/ /2/Telegram 6906 to London, May 18, instructed the Embassy to approach the British Government and request that it give urgent consideration to meeting Kuwait's combat aircraft needs. (Ibid.) /3/Telegram 6923 to London, sent as telegram 192 to Kuwait, May 19. (Ibid.) Begin FYI only. 1. Following are basic aspects of decision not license sale US arms (including combat aircraft and SAMs) to Kuwait: a. Conclusion recently announced aircraft sale to Israel (and anticipated HAWK sale to Lebanon) marks end of a cycle in arms acquisitions Near East where we trying halt added capital weapons purchases. New US sale to UAC member Kuwait would threaten further escalation, renewed pressure from Israel for purchase US arms, and heightened opposition by Congress (where Jordanian and Israeli deals have already brought expressions of grave concern over recent sale of arms to area of tension). b. We do not desire introduce US arms into Kuwait in any way which would (1) undermine Britain's ability perform on its defense commitment to Kuwait, (2) encourage British relinquish that commitment, (3) give Kuwaitis renewed idea of turning to US for defense of country, or (4) result in US-UK friction which could limit our efforts work with British for orderly political development in Lower Gulf or lead to UK hindering our commercial activities in that region. (In long run, anticipate Lower Gulf market will be of greater significance for US balance of payments than sale US arms Kuwait.) c. Kuwait revenues enormous but not unlimited. It is of more importance for US world interests to encourage Kuwaitis increase their assistance programs in other countries (e.g., South Arabia) than purchase sophisticated weapons. 2. At same time, for purpose gaining maximum benefits from UK in connection with collaborative US-UK arm sales Near East under F-111 offset arrangement, or at least some moral credit for an assist in Britain's balance of payments problem as a means of encouraging accelerated UK payments to US on the F-111 sale, we do not wish categorically inform British or Kuwaitis at this time re our negative decision on US arms to Kuwait. End FYI only. 3. Request you approach Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Aviation at appropriate level along following lines: a. Recently British Ambassador Sir Patrick Dean undertook to inform Secretary McNamara of Iranian overtures to UK arms manufacturers, and to sound out US attitude toward UK participation in military sales to Iran. USG appreciates UK consideration and cooperation in this regard. b. In similar manner, USG wishes inform HMG that Government of Kuwait has made official requests for purchase of US combat aircraft, and that several US aircraft firms are pressing for approval of export licenses. c. US has no desire undermine UK defense commitment to Kuwait through introduction of American equipment, and is willing not press sale of US aircraft. However, request from Government of Kuwait and strong interest of US manufacturers may impel USG give practical consideration this matter. d. In these circumstances, we would welcome expression of view by HMG on this matter. Ball
209. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Kuwait/1/ Washington, April 27, 1967, 6:03 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 32-1 IRAQ-KUW. Secret. Drafted by Korn; cleared by Quinn and Thieberger (DOD/ISA), G/PM Assistant for Special Facilities Joseph J. Wolf, Judd, NEA/RA Political-Military Adviser Colonel Edgar J. Fredericks, and Brewer; and approved by Rockwell. Repeated to London, Baghdad, Tehran, COMIDEASTFOR, and CINCSTRIKE/ CINCMEAFSA. 183614. Ref: Kuwait's 1099./2/ /2/In telegram 1099 from Kuwait, April 25, Cottam reported that he had tried to discourage Foreign Minister Shaikh Sabah al Ahmad from expecting the United States to sell Kuwait sophisticated weapons, and had expressed U.S. support for Kuwait's treaty with the United Kingdom and the primacy of the British-Kuwaiti defense relationship. (Ibid.) 1. Appreciate your efforts steer Sabah toward UK as supplier Kuwait's air defense needs. It quite correct underscore stringent USG security protection requirements in connection with any Hawk missile sale. While Sabah may choose overlook these now, GOK might well have serious second thoughts when time came sign agreements and carry out investigations. 2. Dept/DOD see no basis for Sabah statement para 6 reftel that UK unable supply stationary defensive rockets. UK Thunderbird as fixed-installation surface-to-air missile (of type emplaced around US cities) might be even more appropriate to Kuwait's needs than Hawk, which is mobile field system. Since Kuwaitis have already contracted for UK Lightning fighter aircraft, British Thunderbirds would appear be natural complement to their air defense system. 3. You should inform Sabah we sympathetic Kuwaiti concern re air defense but believe Kuwait's best defense assurance lies in continued close military supply arrangement with UK. Believe GOK should fully explore possibility of obtaining Thunderbirds from UK before proceeding any further to discuss possible availability of Hawks, which in any case may be less appropriate to GOK needs than Thunderbirds. 4. For London: Agree Embassy's suggestion (London 8829)/3/ we take advantage Sabah approach to build F-111 offset case with British in event successful UK Thunderbird sale to Kuwait. Embassy should inform appropriate HMG officials we have been approached by Kuwaiti Govt with request for sale Hawk missiles. In view UK-Kuwaiti defense tie, we are suggesting to Kuwaitis that they first explore possibility acquisition Thunderbird surface-to-air missile system. FYI. For purpose making our case for including an eventual Kuwaiti sale in offset arrangement, Embassy should leave our ultimate intentions re Hawk sale to Kuwait vague and avoid anything indicating USG has reached firm decision refuse Kuwaiti request. End FYI. /3/Dated April 26. (Ibid., DEF 12-5 KUW) Rusk
210. Telegram From the Embassy in Kuwait to the Department of State/1/ Kuwait, June 7, 1967, 1130Z. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Cables, Vol. IV. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Repeated to London. Another copy of this telegram is filed in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Handwritten notations on the telegram read: "Mr. President--This is good news! Walt" and "Another place to hold the line." 1275. 1. In frank, friendly talk with Foreign Minister Sabah al Ahmad, he reiterated promise full security for all Americans, including homes of those somewhat isolated. He noted that Kuwaitis have volunteered for national guard and that labor unions have volunteered to help protect oil communities. 2. After reaffirming US not supporting Israel during hostilities, I asked Sabah for his personal view. He asked me to understand the reasons Kuwait had participated in the propaganda war and had cut off oil to US-UK./2/ I told him that I had understood pressures, politics, psychology and tactics, and that I had reported them fully to Washington. What was missing, I said, was first-hand knowledge of GOK's attitude and hence its intentions. I had assumed personally that Kuwait was doing effectively, even cleverly, what it had to, under extremely difficult circumstances. I was faced with an immediate decision. Washington had instructed me to start evacuating official dependents and advising other Americans to leave. I was not asking Sabah for advice, but trying to ascertain Kuwait's intentions. Were I to act from what I saw and heard, we would start evacuations at once. /2/Telegram 208481 to Kuwait, June 6, reported that the Kuwaiti Ambassador telephoned at 11:30 a.m., saying he had been instructed urgently to convey to the Department that the Government of Kuwait had adopted two resolutions: 1) to stop all oil exports to the United States and the United Kingdom; and 2) to accept Iraq's invitation to hold an urgent meeting of Arab Foreign Ministers. The Ambassador said it was his understanding that the decision to stop oil exports was based on the conviction that Cairo's reports that U.S. carrier-based aircraft were assisting Israel were correct. (Ibid.) For documentation on the Arab oil embargo following the Six-Day War, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XXXIV, Documents 228ff. 3. Sabah reiterated Kuwait's problems, the pressures from other Arab states, and its desire for continued good relations with the United States. He hoped that the oil would be flowing again in a few days. Again he promised absolute security for all Americans, and added that the decision on evacuation is, of course, your own. Please tell your government that and ask them to bear with us. 4. I said these assurances were not sufficient. I had to know GOK attitude and intentions, whereupon Sabah confided personally and privately that he did not believe US planes had accelerated the flow of supplies immediately prior to the hostilities. I thanked him for the information, but said I would have to report it, and that I had been instructed to ascertain the views of His Highness the Amir. Sabah said that his views reflect official opinion and that it would be unnecessary for me to see the Amir. He again asked that what he had said be kept confidential. I assured him that it would not be thrown back at him. I also agreed to defer my request for an audience with the Amir until further instructed. 5. Sabah assured me of full GOK cooperation in event we should evacuate dependents and other Americans. He would not object to our chartering planes. At this point he made a grand gesture: "You can use our planes." I told him we may have a thousand people to go, to which he replied "That doesn't matter, we are at your disposal." To my query, Sabah said he disapproved of cease-fire at this time, but noted that the point of cease-fire was up to those most directly involved. He acknowledged disappointment with the military situation. He asked where all the planes Israel had used could possibly have come from. Again I said not from US; perhaps your intelligence estimates were low. I referred to an earlier private conversation with Bishara in which I said "Israel has much more capability than you think." Bishara, who was present, recalled it. 6. Seeking to underscore the importance of maintaining diplomatic relations with us, I mentioned the likelihood of UK and US working together on post-war reconstruction. Sabah said Kuwait would certainly do her duty, but this was no time to talk about it. 7. The idea of an Arab Foreign Ministers meeting in Kuwait beginning June 8 was not his. Baghdad was the sponsor and had made the agenda. Sabah thinks it untimely. However, when I pressed him on his long-standing reliance on summitry, he agreed that the meeting might be useful. Replies have not come in from all of the possible participants. 8. Comment: In view of assurances for security and unlikelihood that Kuwait intends to break relations, I will postpone the evacuation of dependents. UK Ambassador taking similar position. Morale of entire staff and dependents high. I reiterate opinion Kuwait may be place we can hold on and look to future. Cottam
211. Telegram From the Embassy in Kuwait to the Department of State/1/ Kuwait, June 10, 1967, 1020Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Algiers, Amman, Beirut, Jidda, Rabat, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, Tunis, London, USUN, Paris, Moscow, Dhahran, COMAC POLAD, and COMIDEASTFOR. Passed to S/S-O, the White House, and USIA. 1299. Ref: State 209821;/2/ Kuwait 1290./3/ /2/Telegram 209821 to Kuwait, June 9, instructed the Ambassador that his approach when meeting with the Amir should be to emphasize: 1) the U.S. Government's military non-involvement in recent hostilities, which it had striven to prevent; and 2) the urgent attention that now had to be given to the many post-hostilities problems, which would require major efforts from all interested countries. (Ibid.) /3/In telegram 1290 from Kuwait, June 9, Cottam reported he had asked to see the Amir that day or in any event before the Kuwaiti cabinet meeting the next day. He added that the Acting Under Secretary had assured him that Kuwait certainly would not break relations with the United States. (Ibid.) 1. Amir received me in cordial and relaxed manner, reflecting his belief, which emerged during conversation, that for Kuwait worst of crisis has passed. He insisted I finish my tea before talking business, and we chatted about how we both had had postpone vacation plans. I reminded him that this was my first call since becoming Dean in Kuwait. 2. When we turned to business, there was immediate and full acceptance of my affirmation that US had not participated in the hostilities. He had had no doubts and never any intentions of breaking relations. He was surprised to learn that Americans had doubted Kuwait's intentions or capabilities to protect them. He gave a long explanation of his objectives and tactics, including declaration of war, martial law, cutting oil, and participation in the Arab propaganda war. He hoped we would understand. I told him that we had understood the psychology, the politics and the tactics, including the cutting off of oil, but that we had hoped for some secret assurances of Kuwait's intentions. It was for that reason that I had gone to the Foreign Minister on June 7. 3. I thanked the Amir for the clarity with which he now assured me of a desire to maintain, and even to improve relations with US. He returned several times to the sequence of events, repeating his reasons and his tactics. He wanted more approbation than I proffered. I congratulated and thanked him for the effective security and hoped that he could soon turn off the propaganda and turn on the oil. He had already started on the radio programs, he said. He also assured me that Kuwait does not want to lose any more income than necessary by its oil restrictions. (I will report more after I discuss with UK Ambassador what Amir told me at end of my interview.) 4. The Amir asked what I thought of the situation; what would happen. I said it depended upon, first, implementation of the cease-fire, second, upon the attitude of the belligerents, and upon the actions of the United Nations, particularly the Security Council. I hoped that GOK would support forcefully strengthening of the peacekeeping machinery. I then explained the US and Soviet draft resolutions which had not yet come to his attention. I also offered him detailed US intelligence on the war situation. I passed on some authorized [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] information which Amir appreciated and asked for more. I found him surprisingly uninformed about the Kuwaiti troops. He implored me to pass on any new information that we might obtain. 5. Amir thought it unnecessary for Kuwait to say anything about cease-fire. He observed that Saudi Arabia had said nothing. 6. To my query about the Amir's view of the situation, he agreed with the importance of the cease-fire and build-up of peacekeeping. My efforts to interest him in post-war reconstruction were not very productive, but he is aware of Kuwait's responsibilities. 7. Amir dismissed the interpreter. Even with my limited Arabic capability, I understood that he had telephoned President Nasser to reiterate his allegiance and best wishes. I also learned that designee Zakaria Muhyi-al-Din had not made a good impression on His Highness during the recent visit. Unfortunately, I could not get the nuances. 8. I then called on Deputy Grand Chamberlain Ibrahim Shatti, political advisor, to arrange [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] for passing [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] information and to plant some ideas about settlement. I found him open-minded, but it was evident that he has not yet given consideration to this aspect of the present situation. 9. Comment: I am fully convinced the Amir and GOK want an increasingly intimate association with US and that the Amir will move rapidly to restore the status quo ante in public relations and oil. Strong security will be continued in expectation of backlash demonstrations. As I left palace, a demonstration was forming and my route was prescribed by a chamberlain who later telephoned the Embassy to see if I had arrived safely. Cottam
212. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Kuwait/1/ Washington, June 15, 1967, 4:09 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Brewer on June 9, text revised in the White House; cleared by Davies, Battle, Saunders, and Eugene Rostow; and approved by Herbert B. Thompson (S/S). 211350. Deliver following personal message dated June 15, 1967 from the President to His Highness the Ruler:/2/ /2/A June 14 memorandum from Rostow to the President reads: "We are taking advantage of all quiet opportunities to keep our lines open to those moderate Arab leaders who have resisted Nasser's pressure to break with us. They hope we'll soon be able to make some pro-Arab gesture that will justify their policy. Except for limited humanitarian actions, this will be hard, and any hand-holding we can do is so much to the good." Rostow noted that the attached message to the Amir of Kuwait was a general response to the Ruler's assurances to Ambassador Cottam that Kuwait would not break relations and would protect our people. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Saunders Files, Kuwait, 4/1/66-1/20/69) "Your Highness: During these difficult days it is important for us to understand one another's views on the rapidly changing situation in the Middle East. Above all, I want to be sure that Your Highness has no doubt that the United States continues to value its relations with all Arab countries. I regret very much that our formal ties with some of them have been cut, especially since the charges which prompted that break are totally invented. I can assure Your Highness categorically that no US aircraft have been involved in any way against the interests of the Arab countries. We particularly value the long and friendly relationship between our governments and peoples. Therefore I respect Your Highness' statesmanship, which has helped maintain this relationship throughout this trying period. We will continue to work for the establishment of peace in the Middle East on the basis of mutual respect and cooperation. I hope the cease-fire can in fact become a first step toward peace and progress for all the peoples of the area and pray that God may grant us all the wisdom and courage to bring this about./3/ /3/In telegram 1370 from Kuwait, June 17, Cottam reported that he had handed the President's message to Shaikh Khalid al Ahmad, President of Amiri Diwan, early on June 17. The Ambassador warned that every Kuwaiti official had affirmed that Kuwait would follow the will of all Arabs to her last drop of blood and of oil. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR) With personal greetings and high regards, Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson" Rusk
213. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach to President Johnson/1/ Washington, June 27, 1967. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 KUW. Secret. Drafted by Korn. SUBJECT Recommendation: I recommend that you receive the Foreign Minister of Kuwait, Shaikh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir al-Sabah, brother of the Kuwaiti Prime Minister, at a time of your convenience between now and July 2. The Foreign Minister, in New York for the UNGA, has asked to call on you briefly to deliver a reply from his first cousin, the Ruler of Kuwait, to your letter to the Ruler of June 15, a copy of which is enclosed./2/ If you approve, a briefing memorandum with talking points for the meeting will be submitted./3/ /2/See Document 212. /3/The approved option is checked. Discussion: While hewing to the Arab line on Israel, Kuwait has nevertheless played a fundamentally constructive role during the recent crisis. The Kuwaiti Government assured us privately in the early days of the crisis that it did not believe UAR charges of American and British participation in the fighting and that it had no intention of breaking relations. Oil production was shut down briefly and shipment of oil to the Continental US and UK remain banned, but full protection was given to installations of the Kuwait Oil Company (half-owned by Gulf Oil) and to American citizens residing in Kuwait. At the Arab Foreign Ministers meeting in Kuwait which immediately preceded the UNGA, Shaikh Sabah as host is understood to have played a moderate and constructive role. A brief meeting with the Foreign Minister would give you an opportunity to underscore our hope that Kuwait will continue to play a moderating role in Arab councils during the weeks and months ahead. Nicholas deB Katzenbach [Continue with the next documents] Volume XXI Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |