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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXI Near East Region Department of State |
 191. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State/1/ Baghdad, April 8, 1967, 1000Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15-1 IRAQ. Confidential. Repeated to London, Amman, Ankara, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, Kuwait, Tehran, Tel Aviv, Basra, and Dhahran. 1744. Call on President Aref. State 169615/2/ and 168758./3/ /2/Telegram 169615 to Baghdad, April 6, instructed the Ambassador to convey the President's congratulations to Aref on having had his term of office extended by the cabinet and defense council. (Ibid.) /3/Document 190. 1. Aref welcomed me in usual friendly fashion. I expressed appreciation for his receiving me and said I wished to present congratulations of diplomatic corps on removal of previous limitation on his term of office; members of corps look forward with pleasure to the continuation of relations with him. I went on that USG was happy to note this development and is looking forward to further development of our relations basis of mutual interests. I added my personal congratulations. 2. Aref said he wanted to thank President Johnson, Secretary of Defense, US Army, USG generally and me for highly successful visit of Iraqi military mission. Visit left deep impression on members of mission and mission was able to create favorable impression of Iraq in US. I concurred, expressed delight, promised to transmit this thanks, and said my government had instructed me to say it is happy with improvement in US-Iraqi relations in recent months and would appreciate any comment Aref wants to make on how he thinks this trend can be further developed. 3. Aref responded at some length, referring to widespread efforts of Communists and Ba`this to subvert Iraq, interference Iraq has suffered from other countries, numerous difficulties Iraq has had to face and price it has had to pay in struggling against them. He said aim of his government is to develop Iraq to point that its people could have dignity, jobs, homes, better things and some money in their pockets. While Iraq cannot rightly think of becoming another US, it must do more for its people. Iraq has proved its anti-communism. He himself has worked hard to promote stability in Iraq and stability in area. He is doing his best to improve relations with Iraq's neighbors so that all can benefit from tranquility to devote themselves to development. He does not want to have to spend tremendous sums on farms but to use money to build his country. Iraq is doing what it can with its own resources. 4. Aref went on that he hoped continued development would lead to greater assistance from the US toward this objective. Iraq particularly needs to draw on the scientific and technical know-how of the US. He hopes US will respond to Iraq's needs and thus help Iraq continue to defeat forces of communism and other extremism which are trying to create anarchy in Iraq. 5. I referred to long list which I provided him some months ago of USG and private activities in Iraq all targeted at this objective. I said the USG's principal interest in Iraq is creation of stability, economic development and social reform, and prosperity. My government had instructed me to state that it has observed with gratification Aref's efforts to improve relations with Iraq's neighbors and to express hope that this process will continue. The means available for direct USG assistance to Iraq are limited; the means of private American companies and foundations are greater and we continue to encourage them to work there. There are many American companies interested in investing capital and know-how in joint ventures in Iraq, but this of course raises the question of investment guarantee agreement which the companies feel must exist to [garble] capital. If IGA can be considered from economic viewpoint, there should be little problem in signing it. It is not political agreement. Aref interjected that IGA is now before the Council of Ministers and added that he understands it is necessary. 6. I went on to explain measures USG is proposing to assist in the reconstruction of the north (food for work, village development expert, and Ex-Im loan of $[2?] million for materials and equipment); these proposals are limited in size and scope. Situation in north continues to develop favorably, if this small program is successful. If there is organization and money devoted to north, and if new arrangement with Italy to use Italian consultant to plan reconstruction and development works then further measures of cooperation will come to light and can be examined sympathetically; agriculture will be extremely important and there are many things that can be done in this field. 7. Aref expressed appreciation. He went on to say there are forces at work harmful to Iraq. Some of these forces he had already explained. Another force is oil companies which prefer to overlook conditions in Iraq, which fail to understand efforts by other baneful forces to destroy country. Oil companies of course are interested in increasing their profits, but he has had to conclude there is something more behind their attitude; there must be a political motive. (From here on for [the better?] part of an hour we discussed oil problem which is dealt with in separate messages.) 8. In conclusion I reported that I would be leaving for US on April 13 for just over two months and would return in mid-June with my wife. Hopefully to remain for another year or two. I said Aref could count on me constantly to look for feasible ways to improve US-Iraqi relations and to increase US-Iraqi cooperation. It is my fondest hope that before my assignment in Iraq is completed Iraq and IPC will have settled all issues and that Iraq will be well on the road to stability, development and prosperity. Aref responded that he always appreciates my attitude, he shares my hopes and he wishes me a nice vacation. 9. Comment: A. Aref was serious and more preoccupied than usual during our talk. He gave more impression of bearing heavy burdens than in past. However, he responded well to my occasional efforts to lighten atmosphere and showed his usual good humor and friendly personality number of times. He intently followed my words and interpretation of his remarks into English as though working to improve his comprehension of English. A number of times he understood clearly what I said and reacted before interpretation; and occasionally he made brief comments in English. I was unable to find suitable opportunity to work in question about Iraq's future relations with Iran without diverting from main issues undesirably. B. Interview was valuable both in content and in terms of maintaining periodic contact with Aref. C. Addendum: State 169615 authorizing delivery of an oral message from President Johnson to Aref did not arrive until the evening of April 6 and therefore was not in hand for my meeting with Aref. An inquiry might be made into reasons for delay in transmission. I am having the message delivered to Aref through master of ceremonies on April 8. Strong
192. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, May 31, 1967, 8:45 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Iraq, Cables & Memos, Vol. I, 12/63-7/68. Secret. SUBJECT Attached is Sec. Rusk's recommendation that you see Iraqi Foreign Minister Pachachi./2/ Since he has just been in Cairo and is a responsible man, he could turn out to be one of our better channels to the Arabs. /2/Rusk's May 31 memorandum stated that Pachachi had come to the United States in hope of seeing the President in connection with the Arab-Israel crisis, and argued that Johnson's reception of an Arab statesman of this caliber would help balance any Arab reaction to the visit of Foreign Minister Eban of Israel. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 IRAQ) We shall aim to tie him to the same kind of commitment to secrecy we got from Eban. Sec. Rusk would see him before you, but Pachachi would probably have to be told before he'd come down from New York that he had an appointment with you. I believe you should give serious consideration to seeing him. In Arab eyes, we are completely committed to Israel. It would be healthy, if we are to salvage any of our Arab interests from this crisis, if a responsible Arab could carry away an impression of both your resolution and your good will for Arabs who are trying to restore peace. My recommendation is that he carry away a firm sense of how deeply meant were all aspects of your May 23 speech. Walt I'll see him/3/ /3/Johnson completed the statement by writing: "only if you get same promises of secrecy as we got from Eban & under same conditions." The President's Daily Diary records that Johnson and Rostow met with Pachachi and Ambassador Hani on June 1 at the White House from 7:26 p.m. to 8 p.m. (Johnson Library) No record of their conversation has been found. Telegram 207808 to Baghdad, June 2, stated that the President requested that there be no publicity on his meeting with Pachachi, and Ambassador Hani had agreed, stating that he understood that Pachachi also desired no publicity. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 IRAQ) /3/See footnote 6, Document 173.
193. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq/1/ Washington, June 2, 1967, 1:09 a.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by David L. Gamon (NEA/ARN), Houghton, and Eugene Rostow on June 1; cleared by Davies; and approved by Rostow. Repeated to Cairo, Beirut, Amman, Jidda, Tel Aviv, London, Jerusalem, and USUN. 206672. 1. Foreign Minister Pachachi met separately with Under Secretary Rostow and Secretary afternoon June 1 immediately prior to meeting with President. Following points emerged: 2. The Under Secretary said two fundamental principles not directly related to Israel-Arab dispute were involved in present situation which had been precipitated almost by accident following SYG's sudden withdrawal of UNEF particularly from Sharm el Sheikh. These were (a) freedom of seas which US defended all over world and (b) territorial integrity and political independence of states. 3. Rostow pointed out that US commitment to territorial integrity and political independence of states in Middle East had been clearly demonstrated in 1956 when US action in effect saved Nasser. Pachachi reply that this US action in 1956 was something which Arab States will never forget. Rostow commented that of all States in area, UAR was one which should be most aware of this. 4. Rostow pointed that freedom of passage through Strait of Tiran was affected by arrangements reached in 1957. At that time Israel withdrew from Sinai with the assurance that we and other maritime nations would support the international character of these waters. At the same time, the Ambassador of Israel stated in the United Nations that Israel would regard any violation of this principle by armed force as a hostile act justifying retaliation under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Our Ambassador "took note" of this statement. The Government of Israel has recently reaffirmed the view that it regards its rights of passage through the Strait, as they have been exercised for ten years, as a vital national interest. In present situation, USG had successfully exercised maximum diplomatic pressure to restrain Israel from a strike to which GOI felt entitled as a result of Nasser's action in announcing blockade of Strait of Tiran. It had not been easy to achieve as Israelis believe they have strong legal position. As result, time had been bought. During this breathing period peaceful settlement might be arranged. In this context it was encouraging to note that Nasser, while he had announced closing of Strait, had not yet used force to do so. 5. Pachachi said arrangements USG made in 1957 did not bind UAR and that Nasser had simply returned situation to that which had existed before "aggression of 1956." Egypt's move was not an offensive act. He questioned whether desire to secure freedom of passage through Tiran Strait was based on legal principles because maritime nations had been silent on issue prior to 1956. One thing on which all parties agreed was importance of providing for breathing spell during which modus vivendi could be worked out. SYG had informed him that he had proposed and Nasser had agreed that for a two week period the UAR would refrain from search and seizure at Strait, provided no Israeli flag ship and no petroleum tanker bound for Eilat attempted passage. Israel had refused. He thought SYG's proposal offered reasonable formulas for breathing period. 6. Under Secretary said nub of problem was right of freedom of passage through Strait on which US position was firm. Any use of force to interfere with that right could constitute the first shot in a war which would be disastrous to all concerned. US and UK were in agreement that if hostilities occurred Israel would win and win hard. It was this war that USG sought to prevent. 7. The Foreign Minister said that the Arab states had often repeated that they would take no offensive action against Israel. The closing of the Strait was not an offensive act. War would be averted if Israel could be prevailed upon to refrain from using force to open the Strait. Mr. Rostow pointed out that the only way this could be achieved would [be] if everybody agreed not to use force during the breathing spell, and specifically if UAR agreed not to use force to close the Strait. On the basis of some such understanding, which would leave the situation as it was before Nasser's announcement, the problem could be solved by agreement, or the UAR could take the matter to the International Court. 8. The Foreign Minister replied that Mr. Rostow's approach was different from that of Ambassador Goldberg, who talked in terms of belligerent rights. Perhaps a resolution based on the idea that neither side would use force during the breathing spell could work, if supplemented by private understandings about the actual movement of ships during the period. 9. Mr. Rostow said he was not aware of differing from Ambassador Goldberg. The essence of the problem was that we could see grave risks of war, given the GOI position on Article 51, and the support it would attract, unless the UAR agreed not to use force to carry out its threat to close the Strait. 10. The Foreign Minister observed that all agreed that there should be a breathing spell. The question was what conditions would prevail during that interim. Either Egypt could be asked to restore the situation to what it was before May 22 and thus surrender completely to Israel's demands or the present situation could be frozen and tacit understanding reached on the details of traffic through the Strait while efforts were made to reach a more permanent solution. Mr. Rostow said this led to the key issue on which agreement should be reached. The US position was very clear. He did not suggest the withdrawal of Egyptian troops nor did we wish to humiliate the UAR. At the same time he admitted that there were grounds for discussion on the appropriateness of the Secretary General's action. He was not suggesting any surrender of principle by either side, but the prevention of war. 11. In conclusion Under Secretary said speaking personally that he would go along with any combination of public or private words that accomplished the result and preserved things as they were. The strength of the US position on this point should not be underestimated. We were against aggression, and against the first shot. The US would remain loyal to its commitments. He noted as a matter of fact that no Israeli vessels were scheduled to pass the Strait during next two weeks. If force were not used to curtail freedom of passage, a breathing spell acceptable to all might be worked out. 12. In his conversation with Secretary, Pachachi covered essentially same ground as above. He emphasized again importance of two week breathing period in which to explore possibilities longer term arrangement. He maintained arrangements for two week period must be based on practical considerations with principles held in abeyance without prejudice to position either party at end period. Secretary stressed importance USG attached to maintaining freedom of passage through Strait of Tiran. Our position involved a principle which we defended in similar situations all over world. 13. In this talk, however, he seemed to back away from the hint he gave Under Secretary Rostow that oil shipments might be accepted on the ground they were "economically necessary." Rusk
194. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State/1/ Baghdad, June 6, 1967, 2315Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 17 US-IRAQ. Confidential; Flash. Repeated to London, Tehran, USUN, DIA, CINCEUR, and CINCSTRIKE. Passed to the White House. 2111. 1. Fon Min Under Sec Nuri Jamil called me in 0120 a.m. local time June 7 inform me Iraq has broken diplomatic relations with United States and Great Britain for alleged air and other aid to Israel. Iraqi memorandum had no further details. I asked for assurance re protection premises and personnel. He suggested I raise any question with protocol. I mentioned damages our installations June 5 and June 6. He suggested claims would be received and indicated paid through protecting power. 2. I probed for any time factor in winding up affairs and he merely replied "reasonable period" in accordance established practice. 3. Please advise intended protecting power and confirm where personnel should be sent. Assume Tehran. While Jamil typically vague about timing, I note other countries gave 48 hours. Our time may get shortened. Request instructions. 4. Dependent convoy departed at 0135 local time June 7. Jamil assured me they would be protected through to border. Duncan
195. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State/1/ Baghdad, June 8, 1967, 1600Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-9 IRAQ. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to USUN, Beirut, Tel Aviv, Jidda, London, Moscow, Paris, CINCSTRIKE, and DIA. 2143. Iraqi Situation--Assessment. 1. The Iraqi regime entered present crisis reluctantly. Moderates were in saddle. They were carried deeper and deeper by events. First military demonstrations then commitment to action. Then concessions to some extremists in name national unity such as release notorious plotters. Measures on oil probably taken to safeguard own position but would not be surprised they now consider this essential weapon, et cetera./2/ /2/Following the outbreak of war in the Middle East on June 5, Iraq severed diplomatic relations with the United States, suspended oil shipments, refused to permit U.S. aircraft to overfly Iraq, and announced a boycott of U.S. goods. 2. Iraqi's position hardening, both official and private. Reflects disillusion with US not only on part those who believe story our military involvement (which very credible in Iraqi eyes given way it developed) but also on part great majority who feel our concern for Israel has dominated our statements and actions both inside United Nations and out. References to opposing aggression by either side were early dismissed as barest lip service to impartiality. They now claim our avoidance acknowledgment Israel initiated hostilities and our reference Israeli interests Aqaba Gulf while cease-fire in question are further proof our partisanship. 3. While obviously our information resources have sharply declined, we sense from press and a few other sources that an internal Iraqi political confrontation may be shaping up behind the scenes. Such plotters as Aref Abd al-Razzaq and Subhi Abd al-Hamid were released. The press is beginning to criticize different conservative elements for not contributing to the national cause. The long silent Shia Divine Muhsin Hakim has finally spoken out to support the cause (possibly motivated by fear of consequences if he doesn't). The cautious and deliberate techniques of most of the cabinet members and President Aref probably cannot satisfy these extremists as the military situation becomes more critical. If UN efforts fail to calm situation soon, a major blow-up here is a real prospect. 4. Today is first in some time without reports of significant demonstrations, which government efforts, sometimes frantic, have so far contained. This may be breathing spell based on today's newspaper reports British and American Embassies closed down and personnel departing within five days (we have only newspapers' word on time limit however). All media continue blare reports of "tripartite aggression." American professor checking out Baghdad University today told by girl cashier he lucky be leaving because "we're going to kill all of you." Asked by British Air Attache about disposition of British pilot instructors, Iraqi Air Force contact said he would prefer see them hanging from lamp posts. These instructors hope go out on British convoy tonight. Two captured Israeli pilots scheduled go on Iraqi television tonight. 5. Foregoing has somewhat grim ring. I think it about right for this traditionally violent and divided country which is only just now beginning to come to grips with the trauma of the outbreak of hostilities and subsequent Israeli gains. We think most Iraqis can still accept the concept of a compromise; but the longer the crisis continues, the worse the Iraqi internal situation is likely to become, both from the standpoint of public security and the survival of the forces of moderation. 6. In the broader area context as viewed from here, it seems to us that the various opportunities to compromise area issues in the broader interest of ourselves and the international community generally have each time been accepted too late or not at all. We think it is becoming critical to catch the next such opportunity and exploit it, or if necessary to generate some compromise proposals. While as noted above we think Iraqis can still think in terms of compromise, they along with several other Arabs are now beginning to make fatalistic sounds of accepting their losses and settling in for a long war. They presumably hope for Soviet resupply and believe they can exploit the obvious Arab strategic advantages of great distances and dispersed population. Duncan
196. Memorandum From the Ambassador to Iraq (Strong)/1/ New York, June 29, 1967. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 IRAQ. Confidential. Drafted by Strong. Copies were sent to the Secretariat, Davies, and NEA/ARN. SUBJECT I ran into Pachachi this noon, telling him of my departure from New York tomorrow, thanking him for his cooperation and assistance during my tour in Baghdad, expressing deep regret at our official differences, and doubting that I would be seeing him again. Pachachi expressed regret that our mutual efforts in Baghdad seemed in process of being obliterated. Admitting to personal bitterness, Pachachi said that the Arabs had been misled as to what they could expect from the United States, or they had misled themselves. He noted that in the Suez crisis of 1956 the United States had immediately and forcibly publicly stated that Israel would not be allowed any territorial gains. This time the United States had not done the same thing and had shown an utter lack of concern for the Arabs or consideration for their feelings. In addition the United States had gone right ahead with a food agreement with Israel as though nothing had happened. The United States position is so close to that of Israel that there is no meaningful distinction to make. He can only hope, he said, that in time the United States will realize that its interests require a better balance, and that improvement in relations can then occur. At this point we were interrupted.
197. Intelligence Note From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ No. 709 Washington, September 1, 1967. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-9 IRAQ. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. SUBJECT In addition to its many other problems, the Near East may have to face a new round of fighting between the Kurdish guerrillas and the Iraqi army during the next three or four months. Mulla Mustafa's followers are growing restive. Minor clashes are occurring more frequently between the rival Kurdish factions, and between Mustafa's bands and isolated small army units. The Kurds probably would not move in force before late September, when the harvest is in, but action could be triggered earlier by government miscalculation or by outside pressures. Kurds Feel That They Must Be Militant. Several factors, both local and regional, tempt the Kurds to reopen hostilities at a time of their own choosing. Locally: The government is defaulting on peace promises. The financial strain of the oil cutoff, first in November-December and then during the war with Israel, paralyzed the Iraqi government's plans for extensive reconstruction in the Kurdish area, which were part of the peace agreement with the Kurds. The Kurds distrust Tahir Yahya, the new Prime Minister who took office July 10. The Kurds feel that he played them false in earlier dealings. Yahya further angered Barzani by appointing as Kurdish minister in the present Cabinet one Abd al-Fattah al-Shali, an opportunist who is soft on the rival Kurdish faction of Jalal Talabani. The Arab defeat encourages Kurdish militants. Younger Kurdish militants must want to seize the opportunity to pounce on the defeated Arab armies, and Mustafa may be concerned to hold their loyalty. The government is weak. The Iraqi Cabinet and regime are very shaky. Mulla Mustafa believes that only by demonstrating his readiness and ability to fight can the Kurds make their weight felt politically now or with a successor government. Also, he must maintain his standing against Talabani. Kurds May Receive Israeli and Iranian Support. Unsupported, the Kurds would probably not attempt full-scale hostilities, even of the guerrilla type. Mustafa's outside supporters, however, seem now in the mood to sustain some limited Kurdish action. At least, they apparently wish to keep alive Mustafa's capability and will to fight. An Israeli second front? Just before the war started an Israeli agent reportedly visited Mulla Mustafa to arrange, if possible, some Kurdish action to tie down the Iraqi army. He did not succeed. However, convoys of materiel to the Kurds resumed around the end of April. For some months before that time, assistance had been limited to relief supplies. Israel may now be urging on the Kurds in order to keep up pressure on the Arabs. In view of Syrian intransigence they might now want to extend the agitation to Syrian Kurds who had begun to take a minor part in the revolt just before the truce. Iran suspicious. The Iranian government, once a strong supporter of the Kurdish insurgency, was pursuing a slow and delicate rapprochement with Iraq before the June war. This policy has been shaken by Iraq's extreme pronouncements during the war, and by the appointment of Tahir Yahya, whom Iranians regard as pro-Nasser. Moreover, SAVAK reportedly believes that Nasserite subversive activities have increased since the war. The Iranian government is said to believe that neither Mulla Mustafa nor the Iraqi government has the confidence for a major showdown at this time, but it does not rule out strong harassing action on the part of the Kurds. Iran shares Mulla Mustafa's view that the Iraqi regime is in serious trouble and it may well be tempted to renew its aid to the Kurds in an effort to help topple the present government and get a successor regime more sympathetic towards Iran. A New Kurdish Rising Potentially Dangerous. Kurdish guerrilla activities against the Iraqi government have occurred periodically for a long time. Just now, however, renewed fighting in the Kurdish area could be a further unsettling factor in an already brittle situation, particularly if unrest were to spill over into Syria. Should any Israeli or Iranian involvement become known, Arab radical propaganda would no doubt claim that this is a new "plot" against the Arabs instigated by the US.
198. Telegram From the Embassy in Belgium to the Department of State/1/ Brussels, June 7, 1968, 1643Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 17 IRAQ-US. Confidential. Repeated to Beirut, London, and Tehran. 7128. Dept pass Cairo./2/ Subject: RepIr: Resumption of US-Iraqi relations. Ref: Department's CA-8354./3/ /2/A note on the telegram indicates it was not passed to Cairo by OC/T. /3/Circular airgram CA-8354 to Brussels, May 29, stated that if the Iraqi Government raised questions as to the U.S. position on resumption of U.S.-Iraqi diplomatic relations, Ambassador Dupret could indicate that the United States was prepared to resume relations whenever the Iraqi Government signified that it had a genuine interest in so doing. The only U.S. requirements would be that Iraq agree to compensate the U.S. Government for damages to its Consulate in Basra and Embassy in Baghdad, that the United States have unimpeded access to U.S. properties in Iraq, and that the Iraqi boycott of U.S. goods and services and ban on U.S. overflights be rescinded. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL IRAQ-US) 1. Contents of Refair passed to Belgian Foreign Office (Callebaut) Wednesday, June 5. Foreign Office told us they would pass substance to Ambassador Dupret immediately and that we could expect a reply shortly. 2. Callebaut commented that requirements as listed in Refair would probably be unacceptable to Iraqis. Specifically he believed Iraqis would not be able to rescind entirely general boycott on US goods and services, even though they now recognize they committed mistake in breaking relations and want to restore them. Knight
199. Memorandum From John W. Foster of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/ Washington, July 17, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Iraq, Cables & Memos, Vol. I, 12/63-7/68. Secret. SUBJECT Until things sort themselves out, and until we get better information--we have no representation in Baghdad--it's impossible to tell what the effect of last night's coup/2/ will be. We can't even be sure that the coup leaders' claim of military support is true. A counter-coup tomorrow is conceivable. /2/An almost bloodless army coup overthrew the regime of President Aref at dawn on July 17. The new Revolution Command Council assumed absolute powers at 7 a.m. and unanimously elected former Vice President and retired Major General Ahmed Hasan al-Bakr, as President. Baghdad radio subsequently announced that former President Aref had been retired on pension and deported to "join his family" in England. (Intelligence Note 561, July 17; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-9 IRAQ) The intelligence community's initial reading is that the new group--apparently Baathists--will be more difficult than their predecessors, but at this point no one knows how radical they will be. So far, their communiques have taken a fairly moderate line by Iraqi standards, promising economic reforms, honest government, a "wise" solution of the Kurdish problem,/3/ and Arab unity against the Zionist and Imperialist threats. On the other hand, if these people are Baathists, their tendencies will be towards moving Iraq even closer to Fatah, the Syrians and the Soviets. From our point of view, the most important question is whether they will continue Iraq's support for King Hussein. Iraq has about 25,000 troops in Jordan and could easily make life difficult for the King. /3/The Aref government had made little progress on implementation of the June 1966 cease-fire agreement. Barzani had refused to disband his army until the Iraqi Government made good on its promises for limited Kurdish autonomy in the North, Kurdish proportional representation in the still unreconstituted Iraqi Parliament, and disbanding of the government's anti-Barzani Kurdish irregulars. In the meantime, Barzani's forces maintained de facto control of the North and had recently secured renewed military and financial aid commitments from Iran and Israel. (Intelligence Note 488, June 20; ibid.) This is just to give you the best reading we have before you leave. John
200. Memorandum From John W. Foster of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/ Washington, July 22, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Iraq, Cables & Memos, Vol. I, 12/63-7/68. Secret. SUBJECT While you were gone, the situation in Iraq became much clearer. The new government could still be a little harder for us to deal with than the old--if we ever have a chance to deal with it--but if we had to have a Baathist government there, this is probably the best we could expect. The Baathists are from the right-wing of the party--the opponents of those in control in Syria--and non-Baathists are playing a major role in the new government. The Syrians had nothing to do with the coup; in fact, one of the most interesting questions raised by the coup is whether the Iraqi example will encourage the moderate Syrian Baathists now in exile to take a crack at the Syrian regime. The inability of the Aref government to deal with Iraq's domestic problems was the reason--or excuse--for the coup, and the new government is talking mainly about economic reforms, eliminating corruption and solving the Kurdish problem. They have made the usual statements about Zionism, Imperialism and Arab unity, but so far there have been no indications that Iraq's foreign policy will become more radical. It's too early to know whether there will be progress on a Kurdish settlement or more trouble--a key determinant of how free Iraqi troops will be to menace Israel. Until we see these people in action, we won't know for sure what problems we might face, but there seems to be less cause for concern over anything radically different now than there was last Wednesday. John
201. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, October 23, 1968, 12:33-1 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL IRAN-IRAQ. Confidential. Drafted by McClelland and approved in the Office of the Secretary on October 29. The memorandum is Part VI of VI. The meeting was held at the Department of State and the time is taken from Rusk's Daily Diary. (Johnson Library) SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS H.E. Ardeshir Zahedi, Foreign Minister of Iran The Hon. Dean Rusk, Secretary of State In response to a question from Ambassador Hart, Mr. Zahedi said that no one knew the real situation in Iraq since it changes from day to day. The new Iraqi Government has been pleasant toward Iran and has not attacked it with propaganda, but the Iraqis never seem to take any action to carry out their "good words." It appears that there is no strong hand at the top and that the government is trying to keep everyone happy--Nasserites, Baathis, and Mulla Mustafa. This is impossible. Mr. Zahedi said each succeeding government just tries to see how long it can last and can make no progress. Mr. Zahedi added that Iran has tried to maintain good relations with Iraq. There have been reciprocal visits and talks between Foreign Ministers, etc. Iran is interested in Iraq's remaining independent, but Iran can only hope--it sees no positive signs. Mr. Zahedi said there were no pilgrims from Iran to Iraq last year, but that this year the situation will be back to normal and Iranian pilgrims will be permitted to go. [Continue with the next documents] Volume XXI Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |