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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXI Near East Region Department of State |
 177. Airgram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State/1/ A-424 Baghdad, October 30, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 13-3 IRAQ. Confidential. Drafted by Strong and Duncan on October 29, and approved by Duncan. Repeated to Adana, Aleppo, Ankara, Basra, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, London, Tabriz, and Tehran. SUBJECT Enclosed is an analysis in outline form of the Iraqi Kurdish problem prepared by Ambassador Strong./2/ The analysis sets forth the many and varied competing interests and motivations involved and should be helpful to all concerned with United States policy on this problem. /2/Attached but not printed. The central conclusion from the standpoint of the United States is that a high degree of autonomy or independence for the Iraqi Kurds would be disruptive of area stability and inimical to our interests in the long run. Neither is the continuation of the fighting in United States interests, although the consequences do not, at least for the time being, warrant a major initiative by the United States. That the communists and Soviets will gain control of a large-scale insurrection seems unlikely, as is Kurdish ability to establish an autonomous or separatist regime. The analysis brings out that while the United States, Soviet and UAR postures advocating a peaceful, negotiated settlement are superficially parallel, the positions are differently motivated and, especially in the United States and Soviet cases, based on different assumptions as to probable results. Similarly, the Iranians and Israelis--and perhaps the British--appear for varying motivations to favor continuation of the conflict for its debilitating effect on Iraq. Continued Iranian/Israeli intervention is a threat to the United States position in Iraq but, unfortunately, neither country is likely to be heedful of United States interests in the matter. For the immediate future, neither the Kurds or the GOI appear able to force a military solution. Similarly even a negotiated solution is not likely to be permanent. The Kurdish problem is long-term. The current United States policy stance seems the most suitable--that the problem is an internal Iraqi one for which a negotiated political solution is desirable. For the Ambassador: Enoch S. Duncan
178. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq/1/ Washington, January 6, 1966, 6:22 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 IRAN-IRAQ. Confidential. Drafted by Officer in Charge of Iraq-Jordan Affairs Lucien L. Kinsolving, cleared in draft by Symmes and Howison, and approved by Hare. Also sent to Tehran and repeated to London. 330. Iraqi Ambassador Hani called on Assistant Secretary Hare 6th to register Iraq's complaint against Iran re recent border incidents. In restrained vein Hani covered main points of public Iraqi note of 4th. Stated alleged Iranian action not only harming Iraq-Iran relations but endangering peace in entire area. Therefore Iraqis are also raising issue with other states in area such as Saudi Arabia. Turks cooperative on issue in interests their own security. Iraqi rep at UN will inform UNSYG of situation. Iraq exercising restraint, but "there is a limit." Iraq hopes USG, in view of mutual concern and friendly relationship with both sides, can do something helpful. During presentation, Hani repeatedly went out of his way to stress Iraq's desire for good relations with Iran, comparing their situation with US and Canada. Hare replied he gratified by Hani's statement Iraqi Government trying to keep situation under control and prevent it from reaching explosion point. Hoped Iraq would continue to maintain this policy, since problem cannot be solved by force. We would take similar attitude towards Iran, which also close friend of US. Nature of question such that we have not drawn up "balance sheet." We not sure we should attempt to be judge of rights and wrongs in matter. Would hope Iraq and Iran could resolve difficulties by own means without allowing issue to become further overheated. Rusk
179. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State/1/ Tehran, January 20, 1966, 1440Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL IRAN-IRAQ. Secret. Repeated to Ankara, Baghdad, Jidda, and London. 1044. Iran-Iraq Relations. 1. Shah Relaxed. When I suggested 20th that he must be confident Iran-Iraq situation under control or he would not be making his planned trip to Europe, Shah answered affirmative. He said he felt Iran's main aim been accomplished, i.e. to let Iraqis know that any military action across Iran border would meet with vigorous response and that Iran meant it when it said it would "silence" sources of any such activity. 2. Long Range Aims. Shah said at no time has Iran objective been acquisition any Iraqi territory, two countries have everything to gain by neighborly relations. He mentioned they both oil producers. They have common water resources which should be utilized equitably. Shia community in Iraq inevitably has close affinity for Iranian Shias, etc. 3. Kurdish Problem. Shah indicated he has no intention antagonizing his Kurds by actions against Iraq's Kurds. He described Kurds as "purest Aryan" segment of Persian race. Shah's point was that problem of Kurds in Iraq is an internal Iraqi problem, not solvable by "butchering" Kurds and not exportable to Iran. 4. Shatt in Perspective. While this might be moment, Shah said, to exploit tension with Iraq to force solution of Shatt issue, clearly this not Iran's intention. This question has history of many decades, he said, and Iran can afford to wait few more years. In fact, in few years with development Iran's Persian Gulf ports, Iran will be virtually independent of Shatt. At that time, when few ships come to Iranian ports, Iraqis will have increasing difficulty with financial burden of keeping Shatt navigable. Shah predicted at that time, Iraqis will come to Iran in hope of sharing this burden, and dividing Shatt between them. Shah noted, however, that without some discussion Shatt differences issue likely be source of unending trouble between two countries. 5. Recent Progress. Referring to my lengthy chat (Embtel 1034)/2/ with Hassan Dujaili, new Iraqi Ambassador to Iran, I told Shah that although I had not seen this friend for eighteen years I quickly had recalled what a sincere and constructive fellow he is. I told Shah Dujaili made sense to me when he said no Iraqi Govt. could discuss question like Shatt under duress. Dujaili seemed completely earnest in wanting reduce tensions and develop neighborly ties. /2/Dated January 19. (Ibid.) 6. Give Bazzaz a Chance. Noting that evidence seems to be coming in almost every day that while Iraq Govt. still has long way to go to attain competence and constructive purpose of pre-1958 days, I gave as my impression that Bazzaz, now that he is in chair of responsibility, is acquitting himself relatively well and that Iranians ought to give him fair chance. Shah appeared to agree and noted that since Labor government took over in England it has behaved much more responsibly than what one would have expected from its declarations when it was out of power. Shah seemed also to have better realization than previously that Bazzaz and IRWP are not necessarily subservient to Cairo. He characterized Aref as pro-Nasser and "crazy." He referred this time merely to Iraq's Egyptian "friends." He also agreed that even Nasser must realize that Iraq could prove more indigestible than Syria. 7. Three-point Program. Shah said Iran had tried to move half way by accepting Bazzaz's three-point proposal but he said three points must be reciprocal. Be third point, he said Iran did not wish Iraqis to be left with impression that payment of compensation which joint investigating commission might determine would resolve all outstanding Iraq-Iran differences. Door must be left open for discussion other problems such as Shatt and also distribution of water resources, 65 per cent of which rise in Persian highlands. 8. Comment. My impression is that Shah is leaving here with instructions to his govt. that Iran not take any initiatives to cause resurgence in Iraq-Iran tensions. Re long-range issues, he considers both question of Iran aid to Kurds and Shatt-al-Arab question unresolved, but resolution not imperative now. Purpose of my remarks was to encourage Shah to leave his Ministers in no uncertainty as to his wish that situation remain calm during his absence. Meyer
180. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State/1/ Baghdad, May 17, 1966, 1240Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 IRAQ. Confidential. 688. Subject: Call on President Aref./2/ Ref: Embtel 677,/3/ Deptel 538./4/ /2/President Abdul Salam Aref was killed in a plane crash on April 13 and succeeded on April 16 by his brother, Major General Abdul Rahman Aref. /3/Dated May 16. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 IRAQ) /4/Telegram 538 to Baghdad, May 14, instructed Strong to reiterate the President's congratulations on Aref's assumption of office and noted that the initial call should be primarily a courtesy call, although the Ambassador could discuss specific subjects at issue between the two governments if he felt it appropriate. (Ibid.) 1. Had 35 minute talk with President Aref noon May 17. After my delivery of President Johnson's personal best wishes to Aref and for well being of Iraq, Aref expressed sincere appreciation and asked that his personal best regards and best wishes be transmitted to President Johnson. He then recalled our frequent friendly contacts before he became President and said he wished our relationship to continue on same basis. 2. Briefly described main feature of my mission as further development of US-Iraqi relations and US cooperation in promoting stability and political, economic and social development of Iraq to extent desired by Iraq and within means available. Aref expressed understanding and appreciation and turned conversation to Iranian aid to Kurds. 3. I explained in detail USG position on Kurdish problem, outlined Iranian concerns, recounted our efforts to encourage Iran and Iraq to find way to settle differences peacefully and said I thought only Iran and Iraq could settle their mutual problems. Aref said Iran had nothing to fear from Iraq or from UAR-Iraqi relations, but if Shah, who alone responsible for Iranian hostility to Iraq, for whatever reason persists in helping Kurds, then Iraq will be obliged make as much trouble for Iran as possible (airgram being submitted with more detailed account)./5/ /5/Airgram A-959 from Baghdad, May 18. (Ibid., POL 2 IRAQ) Aref expressed gratitude for frank discussion which he said he would hold in confidence. Said he wished our talks to be as friend to friend rather than President to Ambassador. I said I looked forward to quiet, friendly talks from time to time. 5. Comment: Aref was friendly, relaxed and mild throughout. He showed good sense of humor several times. In no way did he place blame on US for Iranian actions and he acknowledged USG not helping Kurds. When I referred to great principles for which US fighting in Vietnam he expressed understanding and agreement. Interpreter was used throughout except for several brief exchanges of personal nature at beginning and end of talk. His English is adequate for ordinary conversation. 6. Consider talk to have confirmed earlier belief that Aref well disposed toward US, although we cannot expect him to take cordial public posture and there inevitably will be events which will embarrass our relations somewhat. Strong
181. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq/1/ CA-39 Washington, July 1, 1966, 7:42 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 1 IRAQ-US. Confidential. Drafted by Kinsolving; cleared in draft by Stoddart (DOD/ISA), G/PM Director of Operations Howard Meyers, Colonel Billy W. Byrd (NEA/NR), and Symmes; and approved by Hare. Repeated to Amman, Ankara, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, Kuwait, London, Tehran, and CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA. SUBJECT REF /2/See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XVIII, Document 216. The instruction contained in the airgram under reference continues to constitute the basic U.S. policy guidance on the sale of arms to the Government of Iraq. However, recent developments in the arms build-up in the Near East warrant certain minor revisions of that instruction. Accordingly, the specific provisos on page 3 of the instruction are modified and restated herewith as follows: The U.S. should: 1. Avoid sale to Iraq of any heavy military equipment or sophisticated weapons, including napalm and other chemicals, tanks, military aircraft (except unarmed helicopters), and naval vessels classified as anything higher than a "craft". 2. Agree to requests for reasonable quantities of small arms up to and including machine guns, but not preclude consideration on a case by case basis of requests for small numbers of light and medium artillery guns provided the latter are no heavier than 105 MM. 3. Be willing to sell quantities of transport vehicles, communications equipment, engineering equipment, and other "non-shooting" material. 4. Continue the present program of grant aid non-combat training, consider requests for additional training on a reimbursable basis, but not preclude additional grant aid training if U.S. interests would be served. 5. Interpose no objection if the British sell Iraq military equipment of a type which does not violate USG arms policy, though we would also bid on these items ourselves if asked to do so by the Iraqis. If the Iraqis should seek to negotiate a military sales package with the British, the U.S. would be willing to cooperate with the British and furnish those items of military hardware not precluded by our arms policy. 6. Agree to continue to sell Iraq spare parts and ammunition for equipment of U.S. origin still employed by the Iraqi Army. 7. Given Iraq's relatively favorable foreign exchange position, undertake only cash sales to Iraq. 8. Sell nothing classified to Iraq. 9. Consult with the Iranian and Turkish Governments before concluding agreements for major arms purchases by Iraq. 10. After informing the UK and French Governments of the foregoing, acquaint the Iraqi Government informally in the near future of the essentials of this policy as restated above. Ball
182. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State/1/ Baghdad, July 2, 1966, 1300Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 IRAQ. Secret. Repeated to Cairo. 12. State 396./2/ /2/Telegram 396 to Baghdad, July 1, noted that the Department was considering whether it might be useful for the Embassy to convey U.S. congratulations quietly to President Aref or Prime Minister Bazzaz on successful thwarting of the recent coup attempt. It also asked for the Embassy's analysis of the degree to which that attempt had been triggered by announcement of the Kurdish settlement. (Ibid.) 1. Rather than delivering congratulatory message from USG on thwarting of coup, propose use suitable occasions to express orally to Iraqi leaders USG (a) regret that Iraq has had to suffer another outbreak of violence, (b) hope that GOI efforts maintain stability and proceed with development will be successful, (c) congratulations on GOI political program for Kurds and on gaining Kurdish acceptance, and (d) hope that settlement will be implemented promptly, consistently and in good faith by both GOI and Kurds. Believe foregoing will be appreciated and avoid possibility of embarrassment./3/ /3/Telegram 1207 to Baghdad, July 3, stated that the Department concurred in the Ambassador's proposed course of action. (Ibid.) 2. Timing of coup attempt could possibly in part have related to Bazzaz June 29 announcement of Kurdish settlement. Coup leaders perhaps hoped other elements such as military officers originating Mosul, many of whom anti-Kurd, would join movement to overthrow regime which "betrayed Iraq by capitulating to Kurds." Participation of Moslawi commander of fourth division Attarbashi perhaps secured this basis (but GOI apparently already aware his unreliability since Brigadier Adnan Abd al-Jalil several days ago said to have been named to replace him). On other hand coup leaders' first radio announcement accepted Kurdish settlement. Fact settlement being reached and general outline of terms widely known more than week before coup attempt. These points lead to belief that other factors more important in selection of time. For example, Bazzaz due leave for Turkey July 1. Also, afternoon June 30 was eve of two-day holiday, government establishments close 1:30 p.m. and by 3:10 p.m. when ruckus started siesta is general rule, and large numbers of officers and troops normally given weekend and holiday leave. 3. From speed and smoothness of reaction by loyal forces seems evident GOI aware of coup plans and preferred catch leaders redhanded rather than try to round them up ahead of time and have them on GOI hands without proven case. This quite in keeping with way Iraqis look at things, particularly when they confident of winning. Strong
183. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State/1/ Baghdad, August 19, 1966, 1015Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 IRAQ. Confidential. Repeated to Tehran, Algiers, Amman, Ankara, Basra, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Dhaharan, Jerusalem, Jidda, Khartoum, Kuwait, London, Moscow, Rabat, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, Tunis, and CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA. 241. Subject: Talk with New Prime Minister./2/ /2/Bazzaz resigned as Prime Minister on August 6 and was succeeded by Naji Talib. 1. I saw Talib for 50 minutes August 18. Much of time spent on Kurdish question and Iran at his initiative. I told him USG prepared work with present GOI as with previous Iraqi Governments in pursuit of fundamental goal of stable prosperous Iraq; explained in detail our concern over lack of progress on claims of contractors; and explained basic facts of Vietnam situation, its meaning to free world, and firmness of US purpose; expressed deep disappointment at Bazzaz's alignment of Iraq with Soviet position. Talib made a note to look into handling of claims. He avoided further discussion of Vietnam by saying cabinet absorbed in domestic affairs and had no time, as had Bazzaz in Moscow, to concern itself with world issues such as Vietnam and German question. 2. Talib declared GOI would implement Kurdish program fully, but he dwelt extensively on difficulties and gave no hint how GOI to proceed. Most serious problem he identified is three-way split among Kurds, with Barzani insisting GOI deal only with him; GOI cannot ignore Kurds who sided with GOI or those of old KDP. Talib said Barzani wants to be "King of Kurdistan," but apart from that nobody knows what he really wants. 3. Talib asked my views, whether Kurds serious, what GOI should do. I said GOI had real opportunity settle problem. Kurds not likely start conflict unless GOI failed act. I urged GOI take very generous attitude over extended period of time in order create confidence in good faith of GOI. As Kurds see GOI serious, support for armed rebellion likely decline. Talib listened, but he again stressed difficulties and need for Kurdish cooperation. 4. Talib expressed conviction Iran still supplying arms to Kurds. He did not ask that USG take action with Iran nor did he imply USG helped Kurds. I said I thought arms supply from Iran cut off sometime after June 29; possibly other types supplies moving in but if so this would stop if GOI would drop economic blockade of north as it promised. Talib took very hard line, asked what Iran wants of Iraq and compared Iranian attitude with that of Turkey. He said GOI wants good relations with Iran; Bazzaz and Taher Yahya had not wanted bad relations but Iran had created them. Now Iran tries to impose impossible conditions; no GOI can even discuss Shatt al-Arab. I explained Iranian concerns and then noted that in past few weeks opportunity has arisen for Iraq to move toward better relations with Iran. I urged Talib to try to capitalize on it. Talib responded neither aye nor nay but listened carefully. 5. I pointed out that Iran gave limited help to Kurds for limited objective, whereas USSR keeps stirring up Kurdish aspirations and so-called clandestine broadcasts hostile to GOI continue from Eastern Europe. These things ultimately more dangerous to Iraq; Soviets have longstanding ambitions in direction Persian Gulf; their agitation of Kurdish question targeted at this objective. Talib admitted this but went on that USSR is friend of Iraq which needs Soviet help. 6. Comment: A. Talib revealed nothing of general lines of policies to be pursued. He said ministerial policy statement will be issued in few days. It is still too early for evaluation of current GOI. Next few weeks should provide clues as to character and direction. B. As Shi'a, Talib may deem it necessary be extra hardboiled with Iran. He has been antagonised by Iranian Ambassador Pirasteh who has told Talib that as a Shi'a he (Talib) is practically an Iranian and should cooperate closely with Iran. I still hope Iran will patiently keep door open to genuine efforts toward improvement in relations. C. Talib was physically tired. He was business-like but friendly in attitude. He failed raise question of PL-480 wheat or relief program for north. Strong
184. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq/1/ Washington, October 8, 1966, 3:56 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 IRAQ. Secret. Drafted by Kinsolving, cleared by Atherton, and approved by Handley. Repeated to Beirut and Tehran. 62624. FYI. Following summary of Secretary's meeting with Pachachi October 5/2/ is drawn from uncleared memcon and is FYI, Noforn and subject to review. /2/The Secretary's meeting with Foreign Minister Pachachi took place at the United Nations. The memorandum of conversation recording their discussion of the Arab-Israeli problem is in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XVIII, Document 323. Other memoranda of conversations are at the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 67 D 305, CF 83. 1. Kurdish Problem. Pachachi stated Iraq had been able solve this. Iraq had hoped US could do something about Iranian assistance to Kurds. Pachachi will meet with Aram in New York. Stated, "It would be gesture of great help if US could aid in reconstruction in Northern Iraq." 2. Economic Affairs. Pachachi stated GOI hopes ratify Investment Guarantee Agreement. Hopes USG will work with HMG and US companies involved in IPC to press them to seek agreement with GOI. 3. Arab-Israel Problem. Pachachi complained US arms sales to Israel made US appear pro-Israeli. Stated his Govt rather unhappy about further US reductions in its contributions to UNRWA. Re refugees themselves, noted no genuine attempt had ever been made to ascertain refugees' own views. Attempt by Joseph Johnson good effort, but weakened by linking consultation with implementation. End FYI. Rusk
185. Memorandum From the Country Director for Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs (Atherton) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Hare)/1/ Washington, November 1, 1966. /1/Source: Department of State, NEA/RA Files: Lot 71 D 218, Papers re Communist Presence in the Middle East, 1966. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. SUBJECT The following discussion and recommendations provide suggested talking points for your use in tomorrow's IRG meeting./2/ They are focussed on the nature of the Communist presence in Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon and its policy implications for the USG. Although limiting the discussion in this way is admittedly somewhat arbitrary, we have not therefore attempted to cover the entire range of possible U.S. policy initiatives with the countries concerned. /2/For a record of the IRG/NEA meeting on November 2, see Document 81. The Group discussed the Communist presence in the Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf (except Yemen and South Arabia) and Jordan. It did not discuss the situation in Iraq. IRAQ A. Communist Presence in Iraq The Communist presence in Iraq is large, centering more around Soviet official missions than an indigenous Communist Party. Soviet and Communist assets include 1) the acceptance by the Iraqi Government of a large-scale military and economic aid program that gives the Soviet Union influence with the Iraqi Government and entree for its personnel into Government operations and plans; 2) Dependence of the Iraqi Armed Forces on supplies and replacement parts from Russia for their largely Soviet equipment; 3) The image of the Soviet Union as a counterbalance to the "imperialists" in diplomatic and economic relations; 4) Iraqi resentment and fear of Western support for Israel in particular; 5) The close association of the U.S. and the UK with "reactionary" Arab states and Israel and the belief that the U.S. and the UK are fundamentally hostile to revolutionary Arab regimes. On the other hand, the weaknesses of the local Communist position are numerous and deep and include: 1) Iraqi hatred of local Communists stemming from the latter's excesses during the Qasim period; 2) Iraqi Government resentment of clandestine Soviet support for Kurds and local Communists; 3) The failure of some Soviet aid projects; 4) The cultural affinity of educated Iraqis for the West; 5) Iraqi preference for Western goods, travel, contacts and higher education, and the poor calibre of Soviet products and personnel; 6) Iraqi dread of USSR "great power" dominance; and 7) Mutual antipathies (Arabism, Islam vs atheistic communism, etc.) B. Policy Considerations and Opportunities Since 1963 there has been a gradual but continuing swing of the pendulum back toward moderation in the policies of successive Iraqi Governments. There is also a broadly based desire in Iraq to preserve and develop Iraqi national identity and to avoid overdependence on the USSR or an overly close tie with the UAR. The USG should pursue policies designed to strengthen the foregoing tendencies and those elements in the power structure who support them. The problem of limiting the Communist presence in Iraq is long range--there are no gimmicks--and consists essentially of devising policies and actions which will maintain an effective western presence. C. Recommended IRG Decisions 1. Continue within current availabilities to offer the Government of Iraq relief assistance for the devastated north in the form of surplus food, and otherwise attempt to offset Soviet influence in the Kurdish area by maintaining a friendly though correct relationship with the main body of the Kurds, who constitute a sizeable proportion of the population and hold strategic Iraqi territory. 2. Encourage Iran to pursue a more friendly, flexible policy toward Iraq in Iran's own interest. 3. Maintain the program for military training in the U.S. and offer other courses such as counter-guerrilla training when appropriate. 4. Continue police training. 5. Maintain the educational and cultural exchange program at the highest feasible level. [Here follows discussion of Lebanon and Jordan.]
186. Draft Message From President Johnson to President Aref/1/ Washington, undated. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 IRAQ. No classification marking. Sent to the White House with a November 25 memorandum from Read to Rostow stating that the message had been drafted by Ambassador Strong, who recommended that he be authorized to convey a brief oral message from President Johnson to President Aref when he paid an expected formal call on Aref in the near future. I was delighted to have the opportunity to talk to Ambassador Hani November 17/2/ and when I learned of Ambassador Strong's call on you I wanted to use the opportunity to send you my personal greetings. I have been impressed with your efforts to create stability in an atmosphere of moderation and to strengthen national unity by conciliating all elements. Your achievement of peace in the north is a monument to your leadership. I have noted with pleasure the development of Iraqi-United States relations on a sound basis and look to even more mutually beneficial relations in the future. I offer you my best personal wishes for your continued success and the well-being of your country./3/
/2/According to the President's Daily Diary, Ambassador Hani and Lebanon Ambassador Ibrahim Hussayn el-Ahdab called on the President, who was recuperating from surgery, at the U.S. Naval Hospital in Bethesda, Maryland, from 12:10 to 12:15 p.m. on November 17. (Johnson Library) /3/Telegram 91650 to Baghdad, November 25, authorized the Ambassador to convey the oral message to President Aref. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 IRAQ)
187. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State/1/ Baghdad, November 30, 1966, 0830Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 IRAQ. Confidential; Limdis. 1022. Call on President Aref. Baghdad 964,/2/ State 91650./3/ /2/Telegram 964 from Baghdad, November 22, contained Strong's suggested text for an oral message from the President to President Aref. (Ibid.) See Document 186. /3/See footnote 3, Document 186. 1. Called on Aref for 50 minutes November 29. Aref obviously very pleased at message from President Johnson and at my initiative make call. Gave him text of oral message on plain paper. 2. Aref asked me transmit to President his appreciation for message, his best wishes for speedy recuperation and good health in future, his best wishes for President's personal success, his hope that American people will enjoy increasing prosperity and happiness, and his hope that US will continue its tradition of helping the weak and will continue to assist in development of underdeveloped countries; if US does this without hidden purpose, US will benefit immensely and its position in world will be enhanced far beyond any costs involved. 3. I gave Aref impressions from trip to north and indicated that appeared best way USG could help at [apparent omission] obtain USG approval. Aref expressed satisfaction./4/ /4/The detailed account of the meeting in airgram A-383 from Baghdad, December 1, reports the Ambassador's statement to Aref that it seemed to him that the most promising way the U.S. Government could be of assistance with reconstruction in the short term would be food-for-work programs, whereby people would return to their villages and be paid mostly in food to rebuild houses, schools, clinics, etc. and to repair roads. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 IRAQ-US) 4. Reviewed other ways US cooperating in Iraq development: We encourage reputable companies seek contracts and others enter joint ventures such as sulfur, vehicle assembly and tires, but absence investment guarantee agreement is serious barrier. Aref understood but avoided commitment. 5. Aref proposed US assistance for Euphrates and Eski Mosul Dams. I explained background of US offer on Eski Mosul and said USG uninterested in less important Euphrates Dam. At his request made suggestions for Iraqi first steps toward consortium for Eski Mosul pointed to necessity for good Iraqi relations with potential contributors, and discussed claims of contractors. Aref pointed to Iraqi potential to help meet prospective world food shortage. I indicated USG interest in Iraqi agricultural development and particular need for training technical-level manpower. 6. I referred to numerous rumors and press comments accusing USG and Embassy of nefarious actions. Said I could assure Aref neither USG nor Embassy working against Iraqi interests and had no intention doing so. US concerned to support Iraqi search for stability and prosperity. Aref said he aware of this but went on that in zeal know what is going on "boys at Embassy" sometimes in contact with "suspicious elements"; Embassy knows whom he means (he said this in all good humor). 7. Comment: Meeting was cordial, timely and achieved purpose. Was careful avoid committing USG to anything new. Appreciate having message from President to deliver; it was very valuable. 8. Detailed account of meeting being sent by airgram./5/ /5/Airgram A-383 from Baghdad, December 1. (Ibid.) See footnote 4 above. Strong
188. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, January 21, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Iraq, Cables & Memos, Vol. I, 12/63-7/68. Confidential. SUBJECT Attached/2/ is a special recommendation from Secretary Rusk that you briefly receive the Deputy Chief of the Iraqi Army on January 23, 24 or 25 just long enough for a few words and an exchange of gifts. /2/Attached but not printed. This is a rather unusual request but one that warrants serious consideration. General Sabri is here at the Pentagon's invitation for an orientation tour with four other senior officers who have considerable political power in Iraq. But President Aref at the last minute took advantage of his trip to have him bring you a personal gift (a carpet) and message. I wouldn't normally recommend you spend your time this way--nor would Secretary Rusk. However, we both feel strongly this is an opportunity we shouldn't miss. Iraq is at a crossroads. If its moderates--headed by Aref--can win out, Iraq could break out of Nasser's sphere and become stabilizing influence. In the short run, this is important to our oil companies which are trying to work their way out of the box Syria has them in. A more radical government in Iraq might threaten to nationalize them. In the longer run, our objective in the Middle East is to encourage governments like Aref's to stand on their own--and not to get sucked into the more radical Arab nationalist movements that cause us (and Israel) so much trouble. We have considered inviting Aref here for a visit but so far have judged that would do him more harm than good in his own sensitive political situation. However, by this gesture he is reaching out to strengthen his relationship with you. This is unexpectedly encouraging. I believe we ought to reciprocate by receiving his emissary. Secretary Rusk, to save you, has suggested only that you receive General Sabri. It would spread the advantage we gain to receive all five of the generals because the corps commanders in Iraq are often the keys to political stability. I recommend you receive the entire delegation. Walt I'll see General Sabri /3/This option is checked. According to the President's Daily Diary, the President saw the five Iraqi senior officers from noon to 12:09 p.m. on January 25. (Johnson Library)
189. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/ Washington, February 16, 1967. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-9 IRAQ. Secret. Drafted by Kinsolving on February 14 and cleared by Davies and Country Director for Lebanon, Jordan, Syrian Arab Republic, and Iraq Robert B. Houghton. SUBJECT /2/Attached but not printed. Enclosed is a letter from the leader of the Kurdish insurrection in Iraq, General Barzani, to the President. The letter was brought to the United States by one of General Barzani's chief supporters, Dr. Osman. It was delivered to the Department of State at the desk level, where Kurds and Kurdish emissaries are received. The letter requests the United States to employ its influence to urge a final and just settlement of the Kurdish question in Iraq, and also requests material help for the destitute Kurds. In fact, our Ambassador in Iraq, Robert Strong, has discreetly but repeatedly urged the Iraqi Government to take more steps to satisfy legitimate Kurdish requests within the framework of Iraqi sovereignty. Since 1964 we have been carrying on a program of supplying surplus US food to Kurdish refugees in Iraq. Since June 1966 a de facto truce has existed between the Kurdish insurgents and the Iraqi Government pending an over-all settlement. Toward the end of 1966 Barzani sent a memorandum to the President of Iraq, a copy of which he also enclosed in his letter to the President, complaining that the Iraqi regime has not been acting in good faith in implementing the truce arrangements. In view of the fact that Barzani has technically still not submitted to the Iraqi Government, we recommend that no written reply be sent to Barzani's letter to the President. Instead, we recommend that a Department of State officer at the desk level orally acknowledge receipt of the letter on behalf of the President and reassure the Kurds of United States Government's concern on a humanitarian basis as evidenced by the continuing flow of surplus foods to the destitute Kurds in Iraq. Such a reply would be consistent with our previous handling of messages from Barzani./3/ /3/A notation typed on the memorandum dated May 9 states that the White House determined that no action or reply was necessary. BR
190. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq/1/ Washington, April 5, 1967, 12:32 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15-1 IRAQ. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Houghton, cleared in substance by Country Director for Iran Theodore L. Eliot, Jr., and James E. Akins (E/OR/FSE), and approved by Davies. 168758. Baghdad 1696 and 1719./2/ /2/In telegram 1696 from Baghdad, April 3, Strong reported that he would meet with Aref to discuss U.S.-Iraqi relations, Kurdish affairs, and the IPC problem. He hoped to use whatever prestige he had to promote on a personal basis the idea of an Iraqi settlement with the IPC (the Iraq Petroleum Company--a consortium of foreign firms in which British, French, Dutch, and U.S. companies held various shares). The Ambassador asked the Department to advise him of anything it wished him to take up with Aref. (Ibid.) In telegram 1719 from Baghdad, April 5, Strong reported that he was meeting with Aref on April 6 and would appreciate having the authorization he had requested. (Ibid.) 1. Dept concurs subjects you intend discuss in your April 6 meeting with Pres Aref. We have discussed with Mobil your intention raise IPC problem and company concurs in full confidence your judgment. If opportunity arises discuss idea of settlement (para 2 Baghdad 1696) you should not give Aref impression company would accept settlement significantly different from that defined 1965 agreement. Dept believes would be most useful your examining oil problem with President in effort determine his thinking on subject and make sure he understands efforts IPC made accommodate Iraqi requirements. 2. Dept would also be interested any comments President might make concerning his recent Tehran visit. For example, what steps are now being taken or what steps does he think should be taken as result visit to further improve relations between two countries. In this connection you might also mention that we impressed wisdom his efforts build bridges of good will with his neighbors. 3. You should also inform him USG pleased with improvement US/Iraqi relations and would welcome any comments he may have as to future trends these relations. Rusk [Continue with the next documents] Volume XXI Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |