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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXI Near East Region Department of State |
 Iraq 162. Airgram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State/1/ A-786 Baghdad, March 24, 1964. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, ORG 7 NEA. Confidential. Drafted by Strong. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, Kuwait, Taiz, Tel Aviv, Tehran, London, Paris, Moscow, Ankara, Basra, Aleppo, Dhahran, and Jerusalem. Sent by air pouch. SUBJECT Mr. Talbot's truncated and brief visit (9:15 a.m. March 21 to 2:30 p.m. March 22)/2/ was politically successful despite its brevity, despite the fact that the bulk of it fell on a Moslem "Sunday," despite the necessity for making arrangements on short notice, despite the twelve-hour delay in reaching here from Ankara, and despite the fact that his arrival coincided with an airport ceremony marking the departure of President Aref and Foreign Minister Abd al-Hamid for Pakistan and India. /2/Assistant Secretary Talbot visited a number of Near East countries on this trip. Apart from briefings and discussions within the Embassy, and mixed business-culture visits to Babylon and Iraqi museums, Mr. Talbot was able to meet several ministers and other leading military and civilian personalities at social gatherings (including the moderate Kurdish leader, Baba Ali), talk privately with the British Ambassador and Foreign Office Under Secretary Ali Haidar Suleiman, and meet with the Prime Minister and Acting Foreign Minister separately. The atmosphere, which on Friday could have been interpreted as correct but cool, warmed up considerably on Saturday in the various calls and at the Ambassador's luncheon. At this final event, which just preceded air departure, the several Iraqi ministers present spent a good deal of time arguing US policy on Israel. While more constructive conversation would have been useful, Mr. Talbot was very effective in his responses. The main event, from which several conclusions can be drawn, was the fifty-minute talk with the Prime Minister, who was pleasant and restrained in his handling of controversial subjects. Several memoranda of conversations are enclosed./3/ No effort has been made to cover all talks. /3/Attached but not printed. Conclusions: 1. Ranking officials from Washington are welcome and will be treated with courtesy (in contrast to past years). 2. The GOI is a moderate regime and does not wish to let the Palestine issue destroy mutually advantageous relations with the US, but we shall hear a good deal from the GOI about our policy in this area. 3. The GOI is expecting continuing and increasing economic and technical benefits from the US, and the field for cultural and educational cooperation is a wide one. 4. The GOI genuinely wants to handle the Kurdish problem/4/ in a fashion which will reasonably satisfy the bulk of the Kurds and isolate the extremists. The GOI is likely to want Title II surplus food. /4/A cease-fire between the Iraqi Government and the Kurdish insurgents was announced in early February. 5. The current political situation is the most hopeful in years, and there is good prospect for its continuation. The Prime Minister and President are cooperating. Robert C. Strong
163. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, April 20, 1964, noon. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL IRAQ. Confidential. Drafted by Dinsmore. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Dr. Nasir al-Hani, Ambassador of Iraq G--U. Alexis Johnson Deputy Under Secretary Johnson opened the conversation with a reference to his speech before the Citizens Committee for American Policy in the Near East,/2/ and said he had been amazed at the reaction to a statement he had thought was unexceptionable. The Ambassador said that after he had read the text he had been one of the persons in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who had tried to temper the interpretations put on it, but the damage had been done. Mr. Johnson thought reaction may have mistakenly been based on the press treatment given the speech in the United States./3/ /2/For text of Johnson's speech on January 20, see Department of State Bulletin, February 10, 1964, pp. 208-211. /3/Following Johnson's speech, which was described in U.S. press reports as a warning to Arabs against taking any actions hostile to Israel, the Department received many informal protests from Arab embassies. Mr. Johnson asked Ambassador al-Hani about Iraq's relations with Jordan. The Ambassador thought relations were quite good, and that they have improved since the Arab Summit meeting in January 1964. The Jordanians had done a "spectacular job" of improving the country's economy, he added. When Mr. Johnson commented that both King Hussein and the Shah of Iran were changing their countries by an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary process, the Ambassador merely commented that Iran still had a "long way to go", and that the Shah's "white revolution" was "a bit late." In answer to a question regarding the stability of Iraq, Dr. al-Hani replied, "We have entered a new era of moderation." He said the previous government (Ba'ath Party dominated) was almost as extreme as the communists (referring possibly to the heavy handed communist influence during the Qasim regime). Now the main task is to "put our home in order", he said. Iraq must "restore" itself economically. Once it is clear that Iraq can maintain its stability, other countries will step forward voluntarily to invest in and to assist Iraq. The country needs all kinds of investments, for large housing schemes and for industrialization. The agrarian reform program had been something of a failure, the Ambassador stated. Mr. Johnson asked about relations with the oil company (Iraq Petroleum Company). Dr. al-Hani said there is as yet no settlement of outstanding differences, but he thought the government was now ready for discussions./4/ /4 For documents relating to U.S. international oil policy, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XXXIV, Document 175ff. The Ambassador answered Mr. Johnson's question about the Kurds positively, saying the problem was "settled, finished", he hoped, for good, but added that the job of reconstruction would take a long time.
164. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to Minister of Foreign Affairs al-Hamid/1/ Washington, May 7, 1964. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 17 IRAQ-US. No classification marking. Drafted by Strong and Dinsmore on May 5 and cleared by Davies and Jernegan. Dear Mr. Minister: Following the return of Assistant Secretary Talbot from his visit to your country,/2/ I wish to thank you for the cordial reception he received. He found his talks with Acting Foreign Minister Farhan most rewarding, as well as those he had with several other of your Cabinet colleagues and leading Iraqi citizens. /2/Talbot visited Iraq March 21-22; see Document 162. Mr. Talbot has informed me of the Iraqi point of view on the issue which acts as an irritant in our relations. You may be sure that United States policy in the Near East has not changed since the tragic death of President Kennedy. President Johnson is aware of Iraqi concerns and, I can assure you, will continue to conduct the even-handed, impartial policy pursued by President Kennedy. The United States maintains a keen interest in the stability and progress of Iraq and in its tranquil existence within an area of peace. Mr. Talbot's report to me has confirmed accounts received from Ambassador Strong with regard to the improvement of relations between our two countries. I welcome these reports. We want to continue and to expand the areas of cooperation between our two countries. While we seldom are able to do all we should like to do, we will constantly be on the alert for feasible measures, including the services of private institutions, by means of which Iraq-United States cooperation may prosper. I am particularly hopeful that our two governments will keep in close touch, and that we will not allow a misunderstanding or an occasional disagreement to stand in the way of communication with each other. I wish you and your colleagues all success in your constructive efforts on behalf of the Iraqi people. Sincerely, Dean Rusk/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original.
165. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq/1/ Washington, June 5, 1964, 6:01 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 IRAQ. Secret. Drafted by Dinsmore; cleared by Officer-in-Charge of United Arab Republic Affairs and Syrian Arab Republic Affairs Curtis F. Jones, Davies, William D. Wolle (NEA/NE), Hallpress (AID/MR/ARD), and AID Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs James C. Flint; and approved by Jernegan. Also sent to Cairo and repeated to Beirut. 569. Cairo's 2924./2/ Neither Shawqat Aqrawi nor Luqman al-Barzani could advance Kurdish interests in Washington. On the contrary, delicate Kurdish-GOI situation might be irritated unnecessarily by conversations here with avowed Kurdish nationalists. Embassy Baghdad capable of serving as channel for conveying to USG subjects of concern to Iraqi Kurds and of making clear US positions. Department believes Kurdish representatives, while not unwelcome visit US, would experience only frustration to find reaction USG circles parallel to Embassy Baghdad's replies and counsel. /2/Telegram 2924 from Cairo, June 2, reported that Kurdish representative Aqrawi and Luzman Barzani, son of Kurdish leader Mulla Mustafa Barzani, met with an Embassy officer in Cairo and told him that Mustafa Barzani wanted them to go to the United States to present the Kurdish case to officers in the Department. They also asked how they could be sure that U.S. rehabilitation aid given through the Iraqi Government would reach the Kurds and if it were true that the United States had promised assistance through a third country if the Kurds were driven to renewed fighting. (Ibid.) In response numbered questions reftel: (1) United States surplus commodities are made available only after agreement with the government concerned on means to assure that the donated food will reach the intended recipients. (2) There is no truth to story reported by Kurds to Embassy Cairo officer that US has promised assistance to Kurds through third country in event fighting renewed in Iraq. Department interested in learning more about identity "new channel" mentioned reftel. Rusk
Washington, September 3, 1964, 2:49 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL IRAQ-UAR. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Dinsmore; cleared by Jones, Davies, Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs Katherine W. Bracken, Spain, and Officer-in-Charge of United Kingdom Affairs Thomas M. Judd (info); approved by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs James P. Grant. Repeated to Baghdad, Cairo, and London. 198. Begin FYI. In its assessment of UAR-Iraq unity declaration May 26, 1964/2/ Department was persuaded that President Arif, rather than President Nasser, took initiative for the move. Arif, it was felt, needed added prestige of UAR support for what he realized was not popular government. Subsequent Iraqi steps such as nationalization of number private enterprises and establishment of Arab Socialist Union were indicative of Iraqi regime's intentions make changes in traditional character Iraqi political and commercial life that would have favorable reception in Cairo. However, basic sociological and political facts of Iraq have not changed. President Arif's government must come to terms with Iraqi reality soon, or face pressures from diverse ethnic, commercial and political factions that are increasingly inimical and even hostile to his regime. Some of hostility is related directly to Arif's moves toward coordination of Iraqi with UAR institutions and concepts. /2/On May 26 President Arif and President Nasser signed an agreement in Cairo to set up a joint military command in war time and for exploratory talks on unifying the two governments. The accord was described as "the first step toward full Arab unity." Government of Iran is intimately aware of dissident elements of Iraqi society. Iranian liaison and continuous contact with anti-government Iraqi Kurds and the anti-Arif Shi'a (who comprise an estimated 55% population of Iraq) not only give Iran a very instructive (even if one sided) view of the inherent weakness of Iraq as a political unit, but, unfortunately, have tempted Iranians to consider action tantamount to subversion of Arif government. Department is aware it also increases Shah's concern that Arif cannot cope with his flirtation with Nasser. Whatever Iran may deem to be provocations for its practice of intrigue in Iraq, it should not be surprised if a weak and suspicious President Arif seeks bolster himself by alliance and ties unity with another Arab state. Further, Iraqis (as well as UAR and other Arabs) are aware of Iranian friendship with Israel. With that knowledge as take-off point, Iraqis are capable of exaggerated assumptions of content and product of that friendship. Any undue notice by foreign states of military cooperation between UAR and Iraq could help that cooperation to coalesce. According to British Embassy Washington, Foreign Office proposes British Ambassador take following line with Shah: U.K. intends leave the Shah in no doubt that UAR military presence in Iraq would be most unwelcome development. UK would expect that UAR military presence in Iraq over extended period might arouse hostile Iraqi reactions. UK would make point that outside attempts to influence situation in Iraq would only strengthen UAR-Iraqi unity. UK would point out that UAR is already heavily committed in Yemen and vis-a-vis Israel. It is not in position to send large numbers troops to Iraq to remain for long. End FYI. Department concurs generally in British line and suggests you pass to Shah the following as our assessment Iraqi situation in light reports to date. To date, limited UAR-Iraq unit has been imposed on Iraq by President Arif who estimates he needs UAR support in order maintain himself at home. The initiative appears to have been Arif's. Steps toward implementation of unity declaration (nationalization of businesses, creation of Arab Socialist Union) are unpopular in many Iraqi circles and have contributed to already widespread lack confidence in or respect for Arif. Divisive factors of Iraqi society (Shi'a-Sunni, Kurds, suppressed political parties) will weaken and erode Arif's ability impose preponderant UAR influence in Iraq. Introduction of significant numbers of UAR troops in Iraq would be an unwelcome development for us. We have no firm reports numbers UAR troops that might maneuver nor information length of time they might stay in Iraq. We have only Chief of Staff's announcement of intention hold joint maneuvers. However, we do not believe that Iraqis would permit large contingent UAR troops to remain in Iraq indefinitely. Any attempt by UAR to control Government of Iraq from position of military strength in Iraq would be resisted and rejected. Such an attempt could very well cost Arif his position of leadership. Logistical demands on UAR to maintain unwelcome military presence in Iraq would be almost insurmountable. Even in unlikely event that some UAR troops were stationed for extended period in Iraq, this would pose no threat to Iran. Any public evidence undue foreign concern over presence UAR troops in Iraq would have effect of strengthening rather than disturbing UAR-Iraq unity. British Embassy apprised of foregoing. Rusk
167. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State/1/ Baghdad, October 26, 1964, 0845Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 IRAQ. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Tehran, Aleppo, Basra, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, London, and Tabriz. 362. On October 23 Masud Muhammad, Minister of State for Northern Affairs, informed me he planned leave same day for north carrying tentative procedural agreement resulting from several meetings between himself, Interior Minister, Army division heads, Army Intelligence Chief and Northern Mutasarrifs. GOI now prepared make first move involving following steps: (1) release of all Kurdish prisoners including those convicted of military crimes; (2) return of government employees of Kurdish origin to former positions, especially in north; (3) removal of Salahaddin cavalry from north; (4) removal of Arab tribes from Kurdish areas and return of Kurds forced from their villages; (5) compensation to those who suffered during recent troubles. Following these GOI actions, Kurds to (1) withdraw Pesh Merga from major roads and stop harassment; (2) return weapons captured from Iraqi Army (Masud said token amount would satisfy GOI's honor); and (3) permit establishment local administration, made up mainly of Kurds but under GOI supervision. Once these moves completed, GOI and Kurds to sit down and tackle political settlement. Masud expects to return from north in week with Kurdish acceptance since agreement offers sound opportunity test good faith of GOI. Masud emphasized Mulla Mustafa regards USG as key to settlement of Kurdish problem and USG can get what it wants. He had told Iraqi colleagues he lunching with me to discuss tentative agreement. Comment: Although first steps by GOI do not incorporate acceptance Kurdish political demands, they do include what Kurds have always requested as proof GOI's good faith. Kurds, therefore, should find it easy accept offer provided that only nominal return of weapons will, indeed, be acceptable to GOI. If GOI and Kurds carry out their parts of bargain, political talks likely follow. Masud identified himself as prime mover in creation new situation but agreed Egypt is big factor as result of delay in unity until internal Iraqi problems met. He gives us large share of credit. In any event, that GOI willing make first move is significant, indicating tacit recognition of strong Kurdish position and effectiveness of Egyptian pressure. Given Embassy's assessment that neither GOI or Mulla Mustafa wish resume hostilities, present GOI offer may mark turning point. In essence I told Minister, who several times during conversation indicated Mulla Mustafa would heed US advice, that (1) US hopes for peaceful negotiated settlement within framework Iraq without foreign interference, (2) Kurds should cooperate, having nothing to lose, and (3) Kurds must be prepared be patient in long drawn-out negotiations over internal political settlement and must be prepared compromise their extreme demands. Also stated Kurdish cause best served by avoiding appearance of acting as agents; they should avoid entangling themselves in interests of others. At end of conversation Masud asked in all seriousness whether in event of trouble he could seek political asylum in American Embassy. I told him case would have to be judged on its merits at the time but US did not encourage such action. While he may have been trying create impression he laboring under great pressure, it is possible he believes there is chance Kurdish extremists in Baghdad may start a racial conflict which would be bloody and would endanger his life. Addendum. At end of my conversation with FonMin October 24 I said that to counteract any rumors he might hear about my luncheon with Masud. I wanted to tell him that I had told Masud (a) USG continues to advocate a peaceful, negotiated settlement of the Kurdish problem; (b) that use of force could not settle it; (c) that it was evident GOI wished avoid further military action; (d) that Kurds would be well advised concur in procedural agreement reached by Masud with GOI; (e) that it would be possible to observe whether GOI acting in good faith; (f) that if GOI acts in good faith then Kurds obligated do so; (g) that when time for political negotiations came Kurds should recognize these are complicated and must be prepared be patient; (h) and that USG intends continue avoid getting into specifics of problem. Minister commented he understood our position and he appreciated learning what I had said. He gave no sign of objecting to our role and his manner was as friendly and relaxed when I left as it had been throughout. Comment: Transfer of Iraqi 3rd division to H-3 further strengthens Kurdish position and increases pressure on GOI reach settlement. Was this one of UAR purposes in request by UAC that Iraq move 3rd division?/2/ /2/Circular telegram 765, October 28, stated that the developments reported in telegram 362 were encouraging and that the Department concurred in the line taken by the Ambassador. It commented that Masud's call on the Ambassador pointed up a situation where the United States, without seeking the role, had in effect become a psychological support in Kurdish minds. (Ibid.) Strong
168. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq/1/ Washington, December 4, 1964, 7:14 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL IRAQ-US. Confidential. Drafted by Dinsmore, cleared by Davies, and approved by Jernegan. Repeated to USUN for Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Regional Affairs John P. Walsh. 325. Baghdad's 439./2/ Department (Jernegan) called in Iraq Ambassador Nasir al-Hani December 3 to raise subject recent harassment Embassy local employees. /2 In telegram 439 from Baghdad, November 30, Strong recommended that the imprisonment of Yacub Khan, one of the Embassy's Iraqi employees, be taken up with the Iraqi Embassy in Washington and perhaps when the Secretary met with the new Iraqi Foreign Minister. He noted other recent incidents during which U.S. local employees had been interrogated, detained, or otherwise harassed by Iraqi authorities. (Ibid.) Jernegan said interrogations and arrests reminiscent Qasim period. Pointed out that Embassy given no explanations for arrests and detentions nor are persons brought to trial. We concerned since (1) as employer we interested humanely and because of adverse effects on other employees and (2) we disturbed because actions appear indicate renewed suspicion of USG and our policies toward Iraq. Jernegan recalled during period he was Ambassador Iraq devoting much time attempting assure Qasim and other officials there was no substance behind then-existing suspicion./3/ Neither then nor now did USG have any desire overthrow GOI. We had expended great effort attempting get on good terms with government and had thought since 1963 relations were gradually improving. Jernegan pointed to EXIM loans, credit on sales military equipment, encouragement American businessmen participate in Iraqi development, provision of professors for university. /3/Jernegan served as U.S. Ambassador to Iraq January 12, 1959-June 2, 1962, when he was recalled at the request of the Iraqi Government. General Abdul Karim Qassim was Prime Minister of Iraq July 1958-February 8, 1963. Recent unjustified suspicion adds up to unhappy picture. Jernegan personally disturbed and said if substituting Americans for all Iraqi-held jobs would improve relations he would recommend it. This he realized impractical. Asked Ambassador al-Hani explain Department's unhappiness and to convey to his government our absolute assurances USG in no way opposed present Iraq government or wants see it changed. Ambassador indicated he sorry hear foregoing and said he had heard Khan had been arrested. Added he assumed Khan by now had been released. Asked Department not take arrest one Embassy local as evidence change GOI's attitude towards US. "Isolated case" should not be reason for Department see change in GOI policy. "Behavior of police" towards local employee should not be taken as against USG. Jernegan said accumulation of cases begins look like 1959. Said Embassy Baghdad should be informed if there is real evidence against employees, in which case we will consider discharging them. Al-Hani said personally he hoped Khan will be released. Promised bring matter to attention his government immediately. Said he had raised question Khan this week with FonMin Naji Talib in New York. Latter had indicated his awareness Khan's arrest. Al-Hani gave no indication Talib's attitude. Jernegan said he thought Secretary might raise subject with Talib during December 9 meeting. Ball
169. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Sec Del/MC/28 New York, December 10, 1964, 4:30 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 IRAQ. Confidential. Drafted by Walsh on December 11. Approved in the Office of the Secretary of State on December 17. The memorandum is Part I of III. SECRETARY'S DELEGATION TO THE NINETEENTH SESSION OF New York, November 1964 SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS U.S. Iraq The Minister said that he had one problem which he wished to bring to the attention of the Secretary, namely, the Kurdish situation. The Minister said that the Kurdish problem fundamentally dominated the Iraqi scene. The Iraqi Government is preoccupied with this issue and has little time or energy to turn to other pressing economic and social issues. He was not sure that they were any closer to a solution now than they were before the fighting started several years ago. The Minister went on to say that he could not understand certain elements of the Kurdish problem. Manifestly there are unidentified forces supporting the Kurds. The Kurds are poor people and their land has been damaged by war. Where are they getting money from to buy staple foods, arms, and equipment? Who are these mysterious forces? What do they want? The Minister stated that his Government might be able to deal with Mullah Mostafa Barzani but the Communists and the Democratic Party were much more difficult. In his opinion, the Kurds were controlled by the Communists. If a Kurdish state were established, it would be a Communist enclave which would split the Arab world, pierce the protective CENTO belt, and shatter the stability of Turkey and Iran. He had seen Kurdish maps indicating a Kurdish state stretching from Iskendrun in Turkey to Basra in Iraq. He said that the Turks had sealed their Kurdish frontier. On the other hand, some support was drifting into Kurdish hands across the long Iranian frontier. This did not appear to be the result of deliberate Iranian Government intent but rather reflects the inability of a weak government to patrol its frontiers. He asserted that he did not wish to suggest that the U.S. was supporting the Kurds but he did wish to emphasize that his Government is sore-perplexed by the machinations of some mysterious force which is supporting the Kurds. In reply, the Secretary categorically assured the Minister that the United States was not directly or indirectly supporting the Kurdish movement. The U.S. supported the independence, integrity, and prosperity of Iraq. It had no other interest in Iraq affairs. Furthermore, he shared the Minister's concern about the dangers of Communist penetration of the Near East by means of a Kurdish independence movement. The Minister said that he was very pleased to have had this exchange of views and to receive this reassurance in respect to what he had known was American policy. He said that the U.S. could help Iraq by determining who is the financing and supplying source for the Kurds and what the motivation of this source is.
170. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq/1/ Washington, December 14, 1964, 7:44 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 IRAQ. Secret; Noforn. Drafted by Dinsmore on December 11; cleared in draft by Deputy Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs John M. Howison and by Davies; and approved by Talbot. Repeated to Tehran. 343. Ref. NIT-6583/Noforn./2/ Department is persuaded that Kurdish participation in any scheme to overthrow Iraq government would not guarantee establishment regime more sympathetic to Kurdish aspirations. Nasser could hardly be expected continue his current role in favor peaceful solution and agreement between GOI and Kurds, particularly in event plot involved Iran. Furthermore even with new government Kurds would still be faced with problem obtaining agreed settlement. /2/Not found. Kurds would have exposed themselves as willing collaborators with Iranian intrigue against government Iraq thus earning deepened Arab suspicion and resentment of Kurdish ambitions. Until now many Arabs have some sympathy for Kurds. No successor Iraqi government could be expected either deal magnanimously or leniently with Kurds or excuse Iranians. Iranian connection with plot bound be uncovered sooner or later, and in view reports recent close GOI monitoring of communist and Baathi attempts overthrow GOI (various CAS reports) there is good reason believe GOI already privy to Iranian subversive activity. Embassy's view solicited re whether it could or should find way, without revealing knowledge, let appropriate Kurds know how we would view any plans participate in coup d'etat. Attempt seems to us bound backfire and to worsen Kurdish position vis-a-vis GOI. Ball
171. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State/1/ Baghdad, December 16, 1964, 3 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 IRAQ. Secret. Repeated to Tehran and Ankara. 486. Ref: Deptel 343./2/ Kurds have told us Iranians urging them resume fighting (Embtel 458)/3/ but they understand Iranian motives. We have already told Kurds they should avoid appearing act as agents of others or entangling themselves in interests of others (Embtel 362),/4/ and would be unwise listen to those who want resumption hostilities (Akins' memcon with Aqrawi, Dec. 8)./5/ Masud Mohammad and Aqrawi understood what we meant. Should note that in my October 24 talk with ForMin (addendum to Embtel 362) this was the one point made to Masud Mohammad which I did not reveal to Subhi Abd al-Hamid. /2/Document 170. /3/Dated December 8. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 2-2 IRAQ) /4/Document 167. /5/Not found. Emb officer plans see representative Ibrahim Ahmad faction December 17 and representatives Mulla Mustafa and new political bureau December 19. Without mentioning any specific plot he will refer to their earlier statements that Iranians trying stir up Kurds; he will tell them we think Kurds have wisely resisted Persian blandishments and we hope they will continue remain calm and try work out solution with GOI--many of whose members favorably disposed toward Kurds; we think Kurds cause will be severely damaged in Iraq if Kurds appear to act as agents for interests of others. Must bear in mind that Kurds need supply line through Iran and can only be attracted by Iranian offers of material assistance, which they also need. These factors will decline in importance only if GOI shows good faith and proves willing enter into genuine negotiations. If GOI so acts, Kurds likely eschew participation in Iranian-managed plot although some city-based Kurdish nationalists might act independently. Aqrawi believes (and says Mulla Mustafa shares his belief) that Nasser wants peaceful settlement and that almost any conceivable successor regime--particularly military dictatorship--would be less conciliatory than present one. But if GOI does not soon indicate willingness open negotiations Mulla will conclude, as most Kurds have already, that GOI has been acting in bad faith since last February. He will not then need foreign encouragement to resume revolt. While impossible estimate when this conjuncture will arrive, Kurds will not stand still forever. If war starts would be too much to expect Kurds could be dissuaded accepting Iranian supplies and money including variety of strings Iranians might choose attach. Annoying Nasser or alienating Arabs--many of whom have lack sympathy for Kurds would be least of Kurdish worries. Once war recommences, current limitations on Kurdish objectives might well disappear, in which case would become international with serious implications./6/ /6/Telegram 350 to Baghdad, December 16, agreed that the Embassy should continue to urge restraint on all Kurdish factions and warned it to avoid appearing to give credence to Kurdish claims that Iran was urging them to resume fighting. (Ibid.) Strong
172. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State/1/ Tehran, April 12, 1965, 1500Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 IRAQ. Confidential. Repeated to Baghdad, Ankara, and Cairo. 1128. Man who identified himself as Shamsuddin Mofti and his colleague as Masoud Barzani appeared at Emb today with letter of introduction from Mollah Mustafa Barzani and oral message from him. It was essentially a strong plea for direct US assistance. He said Iraqi Kurds need financial and military assistance, especially heavy weapons, and would be willing receive American officials in their area and wanted be regarded as "another state of the union." He also said Barzani considers oil resources should be handled by an American firm in direct arrangement with the Iraqi Kurds. We of course gave him no encouragement whatsoever. Mofti stated Barzani asked that his message be sent to Washington and that USG henceforth use Tehran as point of contact with Barzani. Baghdad, he said, had become too difficult for Barzani to use because of recent Iraqi Army movements. He also said Barzani would like to have direct channel of communication with US rather than through Iranians whom he did not trust to report his views accurately. EmbOff pointed out steadfast US policy toward Iraqi-Kurdish dispute along lines CA-9411 of March 2, 1963./2/ Said message would be transmitted to Washington, but said could give no commitment regarding a response nor place any response might be given. Nevertheless, Mofti said he would wait in Tehran. Mofti and Barzani said Iranian authorities are unaware of their presence here./3/ /2/CA-9411 stated that the United States should continue to regard the Kurdish revolt as strictly an internal Iraqi matter in which there was no role for the United States either directly or indirectly. (Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XVIII, Document 174) /3/Telegram 938 to Tehran, April 14, instructed the Embassy to continue courteously to refuse to enter into a dialogue with "self-styled Barzani representatives," emphasizing that the U.S. policy of non-involvement in the Iraq-Kurdish dispute was unchanged. It added that through appropriate channels, SAVAK should be informed promptly of the visit and of the reply given. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 IRAQ) Herz
173. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State/1/ Baghdad, April 30, 1965, 1115Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 IRAQ. Confidential. Repeated to London, Tehran, Kuwait, Jidda, Dhahran, Taiz, Cairo, Ankara, and Karachi. 937. Embtels 804,/2/ 929./3/ Kurds and Iran. /2/Dated March 25. (Ibid., POL 15-1 TUN) /3/Dated April 29. (Ibid., POL 23-9 IRAQ) FonMin Talib had at me again last night at Japanese reception. Obviously he has not wanted to stay "set straight" very long. In presence of Education Minister Zaki he repeated old theme that Iranian policy is in fact CENTO policy, said it was vital to GOI to know what was discussed in CENTO meetings/4/ or in private talks. For first time accused Iran of giving material assistance to Kurds, and declared Shah's policy on Kurds would lead to situation which would be dangerous to Iran itself and to CENTO. He pointed out that Iran had had no issues with Iraq when both were members of Baghdad Pact and seemed to imply that an Iranian objective was to create a situation in Iraq through the Kurdish problem which would lead to government willing take Iraq into CENTO. He objected strenuously to Shah's basing of his policy toward Iraq on his allergy to Nasser. /4/The Thirteenth Session of the Ministerial Council of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) was held in Tehran, April 7-8; see Document 7. I repeated that Kurdish problem not discussed in CENTO and I unaware of any private conversations. Reminded him Pakistan member of CENTO, yet Pakistan had been doing utmost through good offices role to try bring Iran and Iraq into some degree of harmony. Pakistanis could tell GOI whether Kurds discussed in CENTO and whether Shah amenable to US advice on this matter. At my request, Talib identified Iranian material assistance to Kurds as comprising several loads of unidentified equipment transported onto Iraqi soil in jeeps without license plates. (Zaki chimed in that Shah was also sending aid to Yemeni royalists, but this was not pursued.) I then gently chided Talib for backsliding after my previous talks with him. Said would report conversation, including information about material assistance; was gratified at obvious respect Talib showed for power and influence of USG but wished assure him there were great many things US could not control or even influence. Talib said GOI felt USG could get Shah change policy if wished. As we parted, to cheer him up I told Talib our latest report was that armored personnel carriers would be delivered in May, June and July, but since this report conflicted with other information, I was seeking authoritative statement. He was pleased. Comment: Talib himself probably is pursuing CENTO scent as tactic, but some of his colleagues surely believe it. They all believe US can make Shah change policy on Kurds. Turkish Ambassador in call April 5 (reported by memcon Dept and Ankara)/5/ expressed idea that out of Iraqi Army failure defeat Kurds could come govt willing take Iraq into area pact with Turkey and Iran. In our opinion this is nonsense. If Shah thinks pro-Iranian government can be brought about by helping Kurds, believe he is as wrong as he proved to be in past on imminence of UAR-Iraqi union. /5/Not found. Action request. I still hope to see Talib in his office before long to discuss some other matters. Have about run out of arguments on Kurds-Iran-Iraq triangle except possibly pointing out Arab interference in Khuzistan cannot be ignored by Shah. Would appreciate any thoughts Department may think useful with Talib. Also would be helpful have instructions responsive to his insistent references to Secretary's private talk in Tehran. Seems useless any longer try pretend Iran not helping Kurds./6/ /6/Telegram 655 to Baghdad, May 4, stated that the Department believed the Ambassador had given the Iraqis all the arguments available to convince the Iraqi Government that the U.S. Government was not involved in Kurdish dissidence. It was unlikely that further arguments could erase the Foreign Minister's suspicions, but U.S. officials should continue to reiterate the U.S. policy line. Strong could also tell Talib that Secretary Rusk had not brought any new element into his discussion of Iranian security with the Shah. (Ibid.) Strong
174. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq/1/ Washington, May 6, 1965, 4:51 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 IRAQ. Confidential. Drafted by Dinsmore and Howison on May 5, cleared by Davies, and approved by Jernegan. Repeated to Ankara, London, Tehran, and Tel Aviv. 661. Your 956./2/ Assume Deptel 6553 received too late for use May 5 conversation with Fon Min. /2/In telegram 956, May 5, Strong reported another meeting with Talib during which the Foreign Minister again raised the question of U.S. policy on the Kurds. Talib also expressed doubt that Kurdish representative Vanli, who was attempting to establish a permanent headquarters in the United States for Kurdish rebels, could be operating there against the will of the U.S. Government. He requested that the United States preclude Vanli from engaging in political activity and expel him from the United States, and persuade Iran to cease encouraging and aiding Iraqi Kurds. Strong commented that it appeared that the Iraqi Government was reaching the point of desperation. He suggested that Vanli's visa be canceled and deportation proceedings started and that he be authorized to pass to Mulla Mustafa Barzani a U.S request that Vanli be instructed to leave the United States. (Ibid.) Additionally, you may tell GOI (1) Iranians are and have been kept fully aware of US view that Iranian and US interests dictate making every effort improve Iran-Iraq relations and avoid disruptive steps. However, as we have often said to Iraqis, we do not control Iranian foreign policy, just as we do not control foreign policies Turkey, Pakistan, Greece, India, others. We cannot recall any instance where country in free world agreed relinquish control over any element its national policy as result its relations with another nation. (2) Department recommends Embassy go ahead with procedure suggested reftel concerning recall Vanli from US by Kurds in Iraq. FYI: Meanwhile we checking regulations and implications involved possible deportation including possible bearing registration as foreign agent on deportation proceedings. End FYI. Jernegan in meeting with Ambassador al-Hani on other matter (reported separately) May 5 conveyed points in 1 and 2 above except for first sentence under 1. He reiterated that our reply to Kurdish petitions is always the same, we regard their problem an internal affair of Iraq. Jernegan said he thought Fon Min over-concerned about Vanli who has been singularly unsuccessful in US. (Ambassador al-Hani volunteered he had reported in same vein to Foreign Office.) Rusk
175. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran/1/ Washington, August 11, 1965, 7:15 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 IRAQ. Confidential. Drafted by Davies and Dinsmore; cleared in draft by Bracken and by Judd; and approved by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs William J. Handley. Repeated to Ankara, Baghdad, Karachi, and London. 138. Baghdad's 74 to Department./2/ /2/In telegram 74 from Baghdad, August 11, Charge d'Affaires J. Wesley Adams reported that Iraqi Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs Kadhim Khalaf had called him to the Foreign Office to request "in the strongest terms" that the United States intervene with the Iranians to obtain cessation of the flow of arms from Iran to the Kurds. Adams noted that he made the usual disclaimer regarding the U.S. ability to influence Iran but agreed to forward the request. (Ibid.) Iraqi request for support efforts halt flow of arms from Iran to dissident Iraqi Kurds cannot reasonably be refused. Our consistent policy has been Kurdish insurrection matter concerning only Iraq and flow of arms and men across border to bring pressure to bear against Iraqi government incompatible our goal area stability. Kurdish victory in Iraq in pragmatic terms could have only most ominous import for stability if not integrity Iran and Turkey. Indications Iraq now has fairly accurate information nature and extent Iranian assistance insurrectionists makes it probable continuance support will lead to rapid deterioration relations. At level GOIran you deem appropriate you should note Iraqi demarche and express US concern over pressures by Iraqis arising out of Iranian assistance to Kurds. US desires maintain good relations with Iraq and Department views it also to Iran's advantage that US limited potential for influence in Iraq not be weakened./3/ /3/In telegram 153 from Tehran, August 13, Charge d'Affaires Martin F. Herz reported that on August 12 he had conveyed the Iraqi demand to the Foreign Office with comments as instructed in telegram 138. The next day he was summoned by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Aram to his residence to discuss Iran-Iraq relations. Aram had insisted that Iran was not aiding the Kurds, and complained that Iraq seemed to be following a studied policy of annoying Iran. Herz commented that Aram seemed distressed that the United States had become involved in the matter. (Ibid.) For Baghdad. Embassy may inform Foreign Office Embassy Tehran instructed raise matter with GOI. For London. You may apprise Foreign Office of foregoing. Rusk
176. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq/1/ Washington, October 26, 1965, 2:01 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 IRAQ, Confidential. Drafted by Dinsmore; cleared by Staff Assistant Howard V. Funk of M, in substance by John E. Rielly in the Vice President's Office, and Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs Harrison M. Symmes; and approved by Davies. Repeated to Cairo and Tehran. 193. Embtel 255./2/ Following summary of conversations FYI and Noforn. It is uncleared and subject to amendment upon review. /2/Dated October 25. (Ibid.) 1-a. During October 8 conversation with Secretary,/3/ Prime Minister raised Kurdish question. While recognizing matter basically internal problem, noted there were also external aspects to it. Said GOI willing look at Kurdish peoples as nation, however he predicted there would never be Kurdish state including all Kurds. PM suggested progress might be made on problem if US and UK would advise Shah unwisdom his policy. /3/The Secretary's conversation with Prime Minister Abd al-Rahman Bazzaz took place at the United Nations. Memoranda of conversation recording their meeting are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2547. Bazzaz became Prime Minister of Iraq on September 21, 1965. b. Secretary reiterated US supports territorial integrity Iraq and asked PM try understand limited influence US has in such matters. He cited India-Pakistan as example. c. In response Secretary's question whether he might consider making discreet probes to learn whether there is mutual desire friendship between Tehran and Cairo, PM claimed Shah has exaggerated fear President Nasser. Nasser would like cooperate with Iran. Iran's provocations cause him react. PM contrasted Shah's professed fear Nasser's ambitions with Shah's ambitions among Arab territories in Persian Gulf. Secretary suggested Iranian Foreign Minister Aram might be engaged in dialogue but PM responded it unrealistic think anyone but Shah could change official attitude toward Egypt and Arab world. He thought only advice from friendly powerful governments could persuade Shah. d. As first civilian PM Iraq in many years, he felt atmosphere of stability. Secretary said US has elementary interest in welfare and territorial integrity Iraq adding we have no national ambitions in Iraq and that we ready explore ways assist Iraq on road to development. e. PM raised particular program in which he personally interested, namely building University Baghdad into great institution. Secretary said Department would be glad review possibility US assistance on some aspect of University scheme. f. PM agreed worthwhile examine possibilities investment guarantee agreement. 2-a. In talk with Vice President October 15,/4/ Bazzaz conveyed President Arif's highest regards to President and wished speedy recovery from operation. Stated Iraq after series revolutions is developing and in evolutionary stage as member Free World. Present government is non-aligned. Past governments had interpreted non-alignment badly. Present GOI socialistic but not Marxist or Communist. Recognizes role private enterprise. /4/The Prime Minister's October 15 conversation with Vice President Humphrey is recorded in a memorandum of conversation ibid., Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 IRAQ. b. Bazzaz stated Nasser only Arab world leader who effectively combatting communism and Marxism. Key to good relations with Arabs is good relations with Nasser. c. PM alleged Iran encouraging disturbances northern Iraq for purely destructive reasons. Shah's problem is his attitude towards Nasser. US should use good offices convince Iran stop aiding Kurds. d. Finally PM urged US persuade British adopt better attitude toward South Arabia. e. VP stated PM was speaking to sympathetic mind. Social reform in US occurs within structure mixed economy. VP emphasized distinction between communism and socialism. Real secret of freedom is right express and exchange opinions. f. VP noted he had visited UAR and had talked with Nasser as well as having brought message from President Kennedy./5/ We have differences but it is US policy try find ways agree. Recently in response strong feeling on part American people Congress reacted against Nasser. President, Vice President and Secretary had to work hard to reverse Congressional decision in order keep flow food continuing to Egypt. We appreciate frank words such as PM's, however Nasser also needs frank talk. /5/For information on Humphrey's meeting with Nasser on October 22, 1961, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XVII, Document 131. g. VP did not comment on Kurdish situation, saying he was uninformed details. Finally Vice President referred question British and South Arabia to Assistant Secretary Hare. 3-a. In call on Under Secretary Mann October 15,/6/ PM contrasted his own modern liberal interpretation of socialism with rigid views his predecessors. He eschews slogans and doctrinaire theories. Under Secretary said he could agree with PM comments, adding economic doctrines devised hundred years or more ago not applicable today without modification. /6/The Prime Minister's October 15 conversation with Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Thomas C. Mann is recorded in a memorandum of conversation. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 IRAQ) b. In response Under Secretary's question re US-Iraqi economic relations, PM said Iraq's policy is true non-alignment, that GOI would examine every case on own merits and according Iraq interests but there would be good opportunities for US cooperation and assistance. c. Under Secretary raised claims US firms pending in Iraq. Bazzaz' response provided Deptel 168 (to Baghdad)./7/ /7/Dated October 18. (Ibid., E 7 IRAQ) d. PM reiterated idea re US assistance in building new university. It would cost $30-35 million. Iraq able repay in 7-8 years. Mann said he would look into matter. e. Bazzaz raised Kurdish problem in economic sense as drain on Iraq's finances. He mentioned building loan program and said existing Iraqi institution needs capital. GOI might request $7-8 million loan from US. Mann said he would also look into this. [Continue with the next documents] Volume XXI Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |