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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXI Near East Region Department of State |
 132. Background Paper Prepared in the Department of State/1/ Washington, February 2, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Kingdom, Visit of PM Harold Wilson Briefing Book, 2/7-9/68. Secret. Drafted by Sterner and cleared by Brewer. VISIT OF BRITISH PRIME MINISTER WILSON PERSIAN GULF Prime Minister Wilson announced in the House of Commons on January 16 that British military forces would be withdrawn from the Persian Gulf by the end of 1971. The forces involved, consisting of air and naval units as well as ground troops, at present number 6,000-7,000 men. Some 1,500 men associated with the limited British security commitment for Kuwait may be withdrawn sooner, but the remaining force will probably be lifted out in one operation about three months before UK troops leave the Far East at the end of 1971. The Persian Gulf littoral comprises both independent nations and dependencies greatly varying in size, economic resources, and power. Two states--Iran and Saudi Arabia--dominate the scene. Only these two, and to some extent Iraq, have any real capability to extend political influence beyond their present borders. One small state--Kuwait--is reasonably stable and secure. The other ten entities--Bahrain, Qatar, the seven Trucial States, and the independent Sultanate of Muscat and Oman--are politically weaker with regimes dependent in one degree or another on British protection. While the British announcement will give radical political movements in the Gulf a psychological shot in the arm, we do not expect it to lead to any dramatic political changes in the immediate future. Internal security is reasonably sound in most of the Gulf dependencies. Much will depend on the vigor with which the British now move to reassure the local rulers and give credible evidence of their intention to continue political and other forms of support. In the longer run, stability will depend on whether more viable indigenous political and economic mechanisms can be created, and this will probably only be possible if a greater measure of regional cooperation can be established among the weaker Gulf states. There will be an increasing need for regional mechanisms to allow the have-nots to benefit to some extent from the area's wealth. Long-range stability will also depend on whether (a) the Iranians and Saudis can be persuaded to restrain their competition for influence in the weaker Gulf states so that orderly political and economic development can take place, (b) the Iraqis can limit their support for radical splinter groups down the Gulf, and (c) the Persian Gulf does not become the scene of proxy activities in larger disputes (e.g., between the US and USSR or between Iran and the UAR). In broadest terms, the US objective is to prevent the Soviets or Chinese from gaining positions which might help them undermine our strategic interests in the Middle East, and to maintain unimpeded access to Gulf oil on commercial terms. This can best be accomplished by: (a) encouraging the British to maintain as much of their present special role in the Gulf as long as possible; (b) encouraging the Saudis and Iranians, in particular, to settle outstanding differences (sure to be an uphill struggle); (c) encouraging greater regional economic and, as feasible, political cooperation among the Gulf states; and (d) avoiding any undue military build-up by Gulf littoral states while recognizing that some increase in indigenous forces is no doubt inevitable. While the basic British decision to withdraw UK forces by 1971 probably cannot be reversed, we think we should urge the British to maintain certain elements of their position beyond 1971--particularly in providing leadership and technical assistance for indigenous security forces.
133. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) and Edward Fried of the National Security Council Staff/1/ Washington, February 2, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Kingdom, Visit of PM Wilson, 2/7-9/68. Secret. SUBJECT I have refrained during previous Wilson visits from pressing any of my concerns because I realize that higher priority items are on the agenda for these talks. However, this time I would like to make a plea for one sentence in your Memorandum for the President on the Persian Gulf. I should imagine this would not distort the agenda you are planning since it is part of the larger subject of British retrenchment. The point I would like to see the President make is: We hope the British will retain a substantial political position in the Persian Gulf and not dismantle its present network of political posts and treaties. Our reasoning is that the British, even if they may have to pull their troops out, can still do a lot to encourage new political and economic relationships in the Gulf. They have the influence and the experience where we do not. I also want to strike one note of caution. I understand that the following sentence now appears in the Secretary's Memo to the President: "The President may want to urge the Prime Minister to insure that the UK Government does everything possible to promote regional security arrangements in Southeast Asia and the Persian Gulf."/2/ If you haven't seen the reaction to Gene Rostow's offhand comment in a BBC interview about new security arrangements in the Persian Gulf, you ought to know that this got every major country in the region up in arms against us. The fact is that we have no intention of participating and want to make this clear. Any equation of Persian Gulf and security arrangements in Southeast Asia will do more harm than good, although we obviously want the nations of the Persian Gulf to unite on their own initiative in a variety of ways to ward off Soviet penetration. /2/The language in the Secretary's February 3 memorandum to the President reads: "In the case of Southeast Asia, urge that the UK concert with the countries of the area to promote regional security arrangements prior to the British departure. In the case of the Persian Gulf, stress importance of maintaining other elements of British position thereafter." (Ibid., Visit of PM Wilson Briefing Book, 2/7-9/68) Hal
134. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Southern Yemen/1/ Washington, February 3, 1968, 0055Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL S YEMEN-US. Secret. Drafted by Dinsmore and Brewer on February 2; cleared by CU Near Eastern Programs Chief David Scott, McCloskey, and Quinn (DOD/ISA); and approved by Brewer. Repeated to Jidda. 109563. Aden 924./2/ /2/In telegram 924 from Aden, January 31, Eagleton reported that he thought it was time to see al-Shaabi again, since much had happened since his courtesy call on the President on December 14 (see Document 120), and suggested that it would be useful if he could ask to see him "under instructions from the Department." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL S YEMEN-US) 1. Concur would be useful again seek meeting with President al Shaabi. Believe preferable you not request appointment "on instructions," however, but rather state you interested maintaining close contact and assuring highest level PRSY fully informed USG views on number subjects on which you have current guidance. 2. Concerning Yemen you should take following line: USG disappointed over lack success to date of Arab Tripartite Committee to bring conflicting sides together. USG continues hold view that settlement Yemen's problems should be arrived at peacefully by Yemenis themselves. Despite allegations in some quarters, USG is not involved. There no Americans on either side current conflict and USG not extending support to either. We have clearly stated our opposition foreign intervention, position which NLF should understand and appreciate. USG has no chosen instrument in Arab world nor is type of government in Yemen our concern. We hope President Shaabi and his government who are in position establish truly independent and non-aligned state themselves will not be misled by unsubstantiated allegations re US policy. 3. Line you have taken in previous meetings with President and with cabinet Ministers in response request for assistance has been correct. We have little to add. You may wish again refer to Peace Corps but should not push view apparent PRSY lack of interest. You should avoid discussing question military training spaces since no decision yet taken and favorable action cannot be assumed. You may of course reiterate offers (as per 1968 allocation sheets sent to Embassy) of cultural exchange scholarships and leader grant. 4. With respect Persian Gulf, you should make clear USG has no intention replacing British. We hope littoral states themselves will seize opportunity to resolve differences and to establish relationships mutually acceptable to them which will contribute peace and orderly development of Gulf region./3/ /3/In telegram 1010 from Aden, February 20, Eagleton reported that on February 19 he met alone with President al-Shaabi, who was friendly and whose delivery was calm and moderate in contrast to his fiery stance on public occasions. Eagleton noted that the main purpose of the meeting had been to clarify U.S. policy in the area, particularly U.S. nonintervention in the internal affairs of North and South Yemen. (Ibid.) Rusk
135. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, February 6, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Iran, 1/1/68-6/30/68. Secret. SUBJECT The Shah replied immediately to your message on the Persian Gulf (attached)./2/ He had already made his final decision to postpone his visit to Saudi Arabia, but your letter let him know you expect him to act the statesman in developing local cooperation in the Gulf. /2/Document 130. The Shah says he agrees with your view of the Gulf, and, although he tries to throw the blame for recent disagreements with Faisal on the Saudis, Armin Meyer thinks the Iranians are feeling guilty and will be especially good for a while. The quickness of the Shah's reply is one indication of how he takes your views. This doesn't mean clear sailing ahead in the Gulf. The Shah may be feeling a bit overconfident, and his muscle-flexing may be part of the Gulf scene for some time. Also, local feuds and suspicions have long histories. But we have injected a sobering perspective at a heated moment. Fortunately, King Faisal--although deeply hurt by the Shah's actions and more distrustful than ever--is being much more patient than anyone expected. The next step we will propose in your efforts to foster an orderly evolution in the Gulf is a word to Prime Minister Wilson./3/ The main point is: Don't rock the boat any more than you already have; help us buy time for the locals to work out their own arrangements for the future. /3/For a record of the President's meeting with Wilson February 8-9, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XII, Document 69. First, we want the British to leave their treaties and political relationships intact to help calm local rulers' feelings of being deserted. Second, we want to keep the British from rushing around trying to arrange security pacts and other deals that won't work because they'll have an obvious "made in the UK" label. We think the best tack is for them to sit tight with their present relationships and let the locals come up with their own scheme for the future. Walt
136. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts/1/ Washington, February 12, 1968, 1649Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 1 UK. Secret. Drafted by Davies, cleared by Sisco, and approved by Battle. Sent to London, Jidda, Tehran, Aden, Kuwait, and Dhahran. 113711. Subject: Discussions with British re Persian Gulf. 1. Assistant Secretaries Battle and Sisco, in course discussions with Greenhill (UK Fonoff) and British Embassy officers had brief exchange on Britain's future role in Gulf. 2. Battle noted that although British military presence being phased out, USG hoped British political presence and ties with Gulf states will remain. To this end, and in view of our major interests in Arabian Peninsula, USG hopes that it can participate in British planning for future. 3. Greenhill said that British economic interests in Gulf were "profound and enduring." HMG would use time to 1971 to seek to leave an orderly political situation behind and is keen to get moving in this direction. As thinking evolves British will want to discuss planning with USG and to enlist US help as possible. Rusk
137. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts/1/ Washington, February 21, 1968, 2104Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 19 BAHRAIN IS. Confidential. Drafted by Brewer on February 20; cleared by Rockwell, Davies, Hartley, Eliot, Assistant Legal Adviser for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Donald A. Wehmeyer, Cheslaw, Murray (DOD/ISA), and Colonel Herbert J. McChrystal (G/PM); and approved by Battle. Sent to Beirut, Amman, Jidda, Aden, Dhahran, Kuwait, Tehran, London, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, and COMIDEASTFOR. 118823. State 116285 (Notal)./2/ /2/Telegram 116285 to Dhahran, February 16, noted that in responding to queries about the U.S. position toward the future status of Bahrain, the Department believed it important to continue to avoid any possible erroneous impression that the United States was planning to "replace" the British in the Gulf or that it favored certain specific solutions to Gulf problems. The response to any such questions should be that the U.S. Government had considered Bahrain an independent state in a special treaty relationship with the United Kingdom, and that it could not comment on the situation as it might evolve in the future. (Ibid.) 1. Reftel dealt with USG position regarding status Bahrain. In light evolving situation in Gulf generally, notably reported announcement "federation" Abu Dhabi and Dubai (Jidda 2921, Notal),/3/ addressees may find following guidance helpful with respect USG attitude toward Gulf problems generally. We would not wish publicize our position at this time but following paragraphs may be drawn on in response queries. /3/Dated February 20. (Ibid., POL 7 TRUCIAL ST) 2. With respect various small Arab states in Persian Gulf, US has considered them independent states in special treaty relationship with UK. We cannot at this time comment on the situation as it may evolve in the future. For example, it would be premature for US to take position regarding UN membership for any of these states at this time. 3. Re arms supplies, we believe these states should continue to fill their legitimate arms requirements from their traditional British supplier. The UK has long provided these items for the Persian Gulf states and British officers have been closely associated with many of them, both in operational and training capacities. Continued reliance on British procurement will therefore, among other things, serve to reduce maintenance and spare parts problems. 4. With respect political evolution among these Arab states, we believe strongly this is matter for states themselves to determine without outside interference as part evolution their previous special relationship with British. We have noted with interest communique re possible federation of lower Gulf states, notably Abu Dhabi and Dubai, and would wish any such arrangement well. We have, however, no plan regarding developments in this region and do not expect to be consulted by the states concerned as to any political arrangements which they may find useful or desirable for themselves. We are maintaining our interest in this region and hope developments will provide for maintenance of stability and orderly progress there. 5. For Beirut: Do not believe you should make any direct response to Kazzan (Beirut A-704, Notal)./4/ Should he again raise question assistance to Qatar, you may comment along foregoing general lines. /4/Dated February 16. (Ibid., DEF 12 QATAR) Rusk
138. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Battle) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, February 22, 1968. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33 PERSIAN GULF. Secret. Drafted by Brewer on February 9 and cleared by Davies and Eliot. Copies were sent to Country Director for Soviet Union Affairs Malcolm Toon, Country Director for United Kingdom, Ireland, and Malta Affairs J. Harold Shullaw, Sober, and Director of the INR Office of Research and Analysis for Near East and South Asia Granville S. Austin. Secretary Rusk's initials on the memorandum indicate he read it. SUBJECT Background By the end of 1971, British troops totalling some 6,000 ground units and small air and naval components will have been withdrawn from the Persian Gulf. Existing special UK treaty relationships may have then been renegotiated to remove any implication of British "protection." Decisions have not yet been taken re post-1971 UK subsidies to local security forces in the area, nor policies with respect to secondment of British officers to such forces. With luck the British may be willing to carry on this type of role for a limited additional period. Several states--Bahrain, Qatar and Abu Dhabi--are expected to opt for full independence. The smaller Trucial Shaikhdoms may evolve into one or more federations. Irrespective of the precise course of developments, the opportunity for direct contacts around the Gulf by major foreign powers will vastly increase. Strategic Significance The Gulf's importance in the world oil picture often obscures its fundamental strategic significance. Together with the Iranian plateau, the region forms the keystone in an arch of non-Communist countries stretching from Africa to South Asia. Here Russia is closest to access to the wide seas. Russian agents and emissaries were active in Kuwait and down the Gulf in the 1890's. The Molotov/Ribbentrop correspondence of 1939 makes clear that the Persian Gulf has remained a center of Russian aspirations. With the British hold in the Gulf loosening, a new opportunity will arise for the USSR to "leapfrog" over Iran and establish positions for the first time in the Gulf itself. Attitudes of Smaller Gulf States Towards USG The concern of Gulf littoral states at the British announcement has already prompted significant gestures in our direction. Kuwait has suddenly become receptive to renewed visits by the US Navy (COMIDEASTFOR) and is urgently seeking to buy naval craft from us. Bahrain has inquired as to our attitude towards the island's independence and has asked hopefully for information on COMIDEASTFOR's dispositions beyond 1971. Even Muscat, still slumbering in primordial isolation, has addressed a congratulatory message to Ambassador Bohlen on his new appointment. In their search for powerful protectors, it seems clear that the Gulf states would prefer a greater role on the part of the US, but they will trim their sails in any direction that future circumstances may dictate. USG Role The NEA IRG examined implications of the foregoing on February 3 [1]./2/ The IRG agreed that the key to the future of the region in the next few years will be developments within and among the various Gulf states themselves. Our policy should be directed to: (a) encouraging the British to maintain as much of their present special role as they can, (b) fostering greater political and economic cooperation generally among the Gulf states, and (c) seeking to avoid an undue military buildup there. /2/See Document 131. Some strengthening of the USG presence was discussed. There are now no USG officials posted anywhere in the Horn of Arabia, from Dhahran around to Aden. We have in the past considered opening posts in the Trucial States, in Muscat (where our former Consulate was closed in about 1912)/3/ and on Bahrain, but budgetary limitations presently preclude action. /3/The Consulate was closed in 1915. The IRG agreed that it would be useful if the American commercial presence in the region could be increased. We will be sounding out the oil companies on the possibility of expanding their activities among the Gulf populations. There are suggestions that the IBRD might consider helping the littoral states establish a regional economic development institution, using funds from the oil rich among them. An informal proposal to this effect emanating from the Chase Bank is already before the IBRD. We will do what we can quietly to encourage such initiatives, bearing in mind both the severe limitations on our own capabilities and the fact that undue support from major non-Gulf powers could well reduce indigenous enthusiasm for any particular scheme. With due regard for our important interests in Iran and Saudi Arabia, we will continue to examine what we can do ourselves with respect to the Gulf states, now that this region is rapidly becoming both more active politically and attractive economically.
No. 0582/68 Washington, March 1, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East, Vol. I, 6/65-3/68. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared in the Directorate of Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency. A note on the first page of the memorandum indicates it was "produced solely by CIA" in the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of Strategic Research and the Clandestine Services. SECURITY AND SUBVERSION IN THE PERSIAN GULF Summary The Persian Gulf is one of the least known corners of the globe, parts of it virtually unchanged since the 15th century. Only two or three of the states in the area deserve to be called countries--Iran, Saudi Arabia, and possibly Kuwait. Most of the rest are shabby sheikdoms with a few square miles of territory and a few thousand inhabitants. But the entire area lies above some 67 percent of the world's known oil reserves, much of it exploited by US companies and vital to Europe's economy and to Western defense. British troops have been stationed in the gulf area for over a century. Air, naval, and ground contingents in Bahrain and Sharjah were, until last November, backed up by even greater troop strength in Aden. Now, Aden has become the radical independent "People's Republic of Southern Yemen," and the UK has announced its intention to pull its remaining troops--some 9,000 at present--out of the gulf area before the end of 1971. In an attempt to plan for the future, the nine protectorates in the area--Bahrain, Qatar, and the seven Trucial sheikdoms--have agreed to federate this March, although few details have been worked out. The British apparently also plan to sever their semipaternalistic ties with the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman. Whether British political advisers and seconded officers will continue to work with the governments and security forces in the region is still an open question. Except for Iraq, with its minuscule border on the Persian Gulf, all of the states in the area are conservative--some medievally so--and are vulnerable to agitation for change. Iran can certainly take care of itself, however, and Saudi Arabia may prove able to do so despite a growing threat in its Eastern Province. So far, subversive activity in the Trucial States is minimal. But open revolt has already broken out in Muscat and Oman, and Southern Yemen is making revolutionary noises on its border; Bahrain and Kuwait are sitting on top of highly developed networks of subversion; and the ruling regime in Qatar seems to have thoroughly alienated the population. Whether the indigenous security forces are capable of coping with such problems--with or without British assistance--is far from certain. What is certain is that they can expect no help from radical regimes in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, whose agents have been working for years to spread the "Arab revolution" to the gulf. [Here follows the body of the report.]
140. Memorandum From John W. Foster of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/ Washington, March 21, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Yemen, Cables & Memos, Vol. 11, 7/64-12/68. Secret. SUBJECT We still don't have a clear picture of the situation in South Yemen, but there are a few things that can be said. Prior to yesterday's events,/2/ we knew there was a struggle for power within the government and the National Liberation Front, and we felt--on the basis of sketchy evidence--that the moderates supported by the British trained army were winning over the radicals. The two groups have been at odds since the country became independent late last year, and matters came to a head at a party convention earlier this month. Our limited information on the convention suggested that a compromise was worked out which left the moderates in control at the price of adopting radical policies. If this reading is correct, the latest developments could be a moderate attempt to renege on the agreement, possibly because of pressure from the military. /2/On March 20, in response to a series of radical pronouncements by the NLF party congress and a March 18 purge of the civil service, the Southern Yemen army and internal security forces imposed a curfew in Aden and arrested a number of NLF radicals, including the Defense and Information Ministers. If the moderates win, South Yemen could swing away from its current efforts to develop close relations with the Communist nations. This doesn't mean that the government will be easy to deal with, and the government still has to solve tremendous financial problems. A number of side issues will probably prevent the current troubles from developing strictly on moderate-radical lines, and we will still be dealing with some radicals. More important, the moderates are moderate only in South Yemeni terms. They are Arab nationalists and socialists whose outlook is basically anti-Western. Yesterday's activities led to some sort of compromise, but we don't even know the specific issues the new agreement is supposed to settle. Guessing is that the NLF has resolved none of its problems, and that South Yemen is in for more trouble. It would be hard to argue that any American initiative would be worth the effort, and even if we wanted to influence events there is little we could do. State isn't planning to do much more than to watch the situation and hope for the best. John
141. Intelligence Note From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ No. 214 Washington, March 22, 1968. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files 1967-69, POL 3 TRUCIAL ST. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Limdis. No drafting information appears on the source text. SUBJECT Gulf Shaikhs Announce Unity Plan for Persian Gulf. The Federation of Arab Amirates (FAA), consisting of Bahrain, Qatar, and the Trucial States (Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, 'Ajman, Umm al Qaiwain, Ras al Khaimah, and Fujairah), is scheduled to come into existence on March 30. The union was proposed at a meeting of the ruling shaikhs in Dubai in late February "to promote regional cooperation, coordinate development and welfare plans, and regulate collective defense measures." According to a February 27 communique, the FAA will have a Supreme Council consisting of the 9 rulers; this Council will draw up a permanent charter and future legislation as required. Leadership of the Council will rotate annually among its members, any one of whom may veto proposed legislation. A Federal Council will be formed to execute Supreme Council decisions. Persistent rumors suggest that Shaikh 'Isa of Bahrain will be the first to lead the FAA. The next Federation meeting is scheduled to be held in Bahrain in late April, but Qatar has asked for a change of venue because of Iranian sensitivity to the issue of Bahrain sovereignty. UK Withdrawal Plans Inspire Gulf Unity Efforts. Prime Minister Wilson announced on January 16 that the UK intends to withdraw its military forces and thus terminate its special position in the Persian Gulf by 1971. Fearful of Arab nationalist agitation and possible Soviet inroads, Iran and the Arab littoral states (except Iraq) have been apprehensive about the effects of the UK decision./2/ Opportunities for cooperation between the Shah and traditionalist Arab leaders, however, were blighted [by] the Shah's irritation over Saudi and Kuwaiti statements concerning the "Arabism" of Bahrain, his subsequent cancellation of a state visit to Saudi Arabia, and concurrent exacerbation of the Saudi-Iranian Gulf median line dispute. Basically, the Shah perceives for Iran a major role in Gulf affairs following Britain's departure, and believes that present Arab attitudes indicate a rejection of Iranian offers of military and economic cooperation. Shortly after the Wilson announcement, the Shaikhs of Abu Dhabi and Qatar offered to finance a continuing British military presence; Shaikh 'Isa of Bahrain quickly joined in the offer. The UK rejected it, indicating that its decision to leave the Gulf was based on more far-reaching policy considerations than troop costs. On February 19, Shaikh Za'id of Abu Dhabi and Shaikh Rashid of Dubai announced the union of their two states. This union probably will continue to exist after inauguration of the FAA. The UK has encouraged continuation of the union because it appears more potentially viable than the loosely knit FAA. Shaikh 'Isa contends that the FAA was proposed by Qatar as a means of scuttling the Abu Dhabi-Dubai Union. Qatar's relations with Dubai are close because of the intermarriage of the ruling clans and their use of a common currency, but Qatar has a long-standing territorial dispute with Abu Dhabi and is its traditional rival for regional influence. The Saudi role in the formation of the FAA remains obscure, but King Faysal allegedly has backed Qatar's efforts to form the FAA to protect Bahrain from Iranian irredentism by having it absorbed in a regional Arab entity. In any case, the ambitious Shaikh 'Isa, who is described as unenthusiastic about the FAA, wishes to obtain full independence for Bahrain with UN and Arab League membership. Kuwait thus far has indicated enthusiasm for the FAA. /2/For more extensive discussion of Gulf unity problems see: RNA-6, "Persian Gulf Leaders Search for Regional Cooperation as Britain's Stabilizing Influence Begins to Wane," February 23, 1968 (Secret/No Foreign Dissem/Controlled Dissem/Limdis). [Footnote in the source text. This document is ibid., DEF 6 UK.] FAA Faces An Uncertain Future. According to the Lebanese Foreign Minister, "coordinated Arab action" is under way to recognize the FAA, presumably on its March 30 birth date. On the other hand, the Pan-Arab, socialist-leaning Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM) sharply attacked the nascent Federation in the Beirut newspaper al Hurriyah on March 18. The ANM position is a fair example of what can be expected from the Arab socialist states, which view the FAA as an artificial, "imperialist" creation. A UK Foreign Office source has indicated that March 30 would be "without significance" as far as Britain's relations with the Gulf states are concerned; as before, the UK will treat the nine members as separate, British-protected states. The Shah of Iran, however, is angered over the Arab position toward Bahrain and the general attitude toward "Arabism" in the Gulf which the traditionalist Arab regimes have taken. He has indicated that he will react to the Federation with a "formal denunciation of the FAA and British trickery." The Shah's attitude reflects his conviction that the FAA was engineered by the UK to protect Bahrain and disputed mid-Gulf islands against Iranian claims. His stance will make Iranian cooperation with such conservative states as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait much more difficult and may even lead to a considerable cooling of Irano-British relations. Considering that the traditionally quarrelsome and mutually suspicious member states must approve all FAA legislation unanimously, that the Federation will be opposed by Iran as well as the radical Arab regimes, and that the UK appears indifferent, the FAA is unlikely to be a successful venture in Gulf unity. Nevertheless, it represents a realization by the traditionalist leaders of the Arab littoral that the vacuum created by Britain's withdrawal will attract outside hostile elements that can only be resisted by unified action. Whether the Federation will be a useful stepping stone to more meaningful cooperation or merely another monument to the elusiveness of Arab unity remains to be seen.
142. Paper Prepared in the Department of State/1/ Washington, April 15, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, IRG/NEA 68-24 Files: Lot 70 D 503, U.S. Policy and Future Military Presence in the Arabian Littoral, 7/10/68. Secret. Drafted by Robert H. Neuman (L/NEA). Attached to an April 22 memorandum from Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs Philip J. Farley to Battle noting that the study was prepared by G/PM with assistance from an Interdepartmental Working Group in response to Battle's memorandum of January 10. In G/PM's opinion, the study in its present form represented the closest point that could be reached in obtaining an "agreed" paper. Farley recommended that Battle place the study before the NEA/IRG so that it might decide whether it was appropriate to forward it to the SIG for consideration. THE POLITICO-MILITARY PROBLEM FOR THE US Summary Over the next few years the US will face a potentially difficult situation in the Arabian Sea littoral (see map following page 3)./2/ This situation is the product of several factors. /2/Not reproduced. First, this is basically an unstable area. The Arab nations generally are underdeveloped; many of the regimes are highly conservative, lacking in modern administrative machinery; and there is wide disparity in the division of wealth. To these problems must be added century old suspicions between states and deep religious and ethnic cleavages. Radical nationalist movements are beginning to make themselves felt; some with outside instigation and support, but others with mainly nationalistic drives. Second, the radical Arab states, particularly the UAR, and the Soviet Union pose a threat to exploit the latent instability in the area. Nasser will most likely concentrate on using such exploitation to reinforce his position of leadership in the Arab world. The Soviet Union will probably work toward expanding its trade, political presence and general influence in the area with the primary purpose of denying other outside powers the option of securing a preeminent position such as the British have enjoyed. The Soviets might, based on the reaction to their efforts, seek to project a military presence into the area. Third, the British, whose military presence has acted as a factor for stability and a check on outside exploitation, have announced their intention to complete the withdrawal of their military forces by the end of 1971. The principal US interest is in maintaining US access to and influence in the area. In short, the US seeks to deny to potentially hostile outside powers, particularly the Soviet Union, a position of dominance in the area. Such a position could be used to put pressure on Western Europe, for which Near East oil is vital, and would complicate our own trade with, peaceful entry into, transit through, or ability to influence the various states concerned. Because of the strategic location of the Arabian Sea littoral as a vital crossroad connecting Europe, Africa, and Asia, denial of US access to this area by a potentially hostile power would constitute a blow to US interests considerably beyond those involved in the immediate area. In addition to this principal interest, the US has the traditional interests in this area of protecting both US citizens and the substantial US oil investment and trade with area states. The US also has a formal bilateral security agreement with Iran, has agreed to cooperate with the signatories of the Baghdad Pact (CENTO), and has given certain assurances to Saudi Arabia. There are a number of steps in the political, economic, and sociological fields which the US can take to assist in maintaining access to and influence in the area. These are being considered in other studies and may prove to be the most effective steps open to us./3/ The purpose of this study is to analyze certain politico-military approaches which may also be useful in meeting the security aspect of the problem. /3/A number of these were considered in the paper, "Effect of British Withdrawal from Persian Gulf and the Recommended US Action," which was considered by the NEA/IRG on February 1, 1968. The NEA/IRG approved the broad policy recommendations contained in the paper. [Footnote in the source text. For a record of the February 1 meeting, see Document 131.] In the politico-military field, a spectrum of alternative approaches have been considered, ranging from withdrawal from the area, through maintenance of our current policy, to seeking to assume the full British military role. Of the alternative approaches considered, those which appear to have practical value are limited. In summary, they are: a. To encourage the British to continue to play as full a role as possible in the Arabian Sea littoral, particularly in the political, economic and military spheres. b. If and when politically feasible, to consider supporting in a low-key fashion efforts on the part of the local states to form mutual security arrangements which show any promise of reducing the incidence of locally induced instability. We should not encourage any particular arrangement nor should we delude ourselves as to the real security value which such arrangements would represent. c. To manifest a reassuring military presence in the area, offshore and largely "over the horizon," to strengthen the confidence of the local moderate states to evolve and progress free of concern that hostile outside powers might exploit local tensions through the use of military force. We should be clear that such a presence is not intended directly to affect the course of political events within or between local states, nor, for that matter, would it prevent efforts by outside powers to enhance their influence through peaceful means. What it can do is provide a signal to hostile outside powers that attempts at exploitation through military means carry risks which may well exceed the benefits likely to accrue. To be reassuring, the presence would have to be somewhat larger and more flexible than that represented by the current MIDEASTFOR. It should either contain or have rapid access to some limited air and ground capability in addition to the naval capability of MIDEASTFOR. d. As a corollary to manifesting a reassuring military presence in the area, to undertake on an urgent basis a reappraisal of the proposal to use Diego Garcia, or another of the islands previously considered, for an offshore fueling and staging base for possible operations around the Arabian Sea littoral, along the East African coast and in the Indian Ocean in general. With the British no longer willing to maintain a military presence in the region, this reappraisal should be primarily a USG concern. e. While continuing current "show the flag" visits by MIDEASTFOR, as possible, arrange for additional "show the flag" visits by US military forces which may be transiting the area. [Here follow the body of the paper and two annexes.]
143. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Schwartz) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke)/1/ I-22215/68 Washington, April 22, 1968. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 72 A 1498, Persian Gulf 000.1--1968. Secret. SUBJECT When the British announced on 16 January that they would, by the end of 1971, withdraw their forces and commitments in the Persian Gulf, a US spokesman said publicly that we would "not fill the vacuum." It has been ISA's position since that we will indeed not "fill the vacuum." We will, of course, continue our relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran. Relations between those states, and ours with each of them, involve us quite enough without becoming further involved with other riparian states. When this subject was discussed in February at the IRG/NEA,/2/ there were proposals from the State Department that we might consider selling arms to some of the riparian states other than Iran and Saudi Arabia. I objected on the grounds that this is a good way to begin a process contrary to our publicly stated, as well as intended, position. What finally was put in the IRG record was the following paragraph: /2/See Document 131. "The Group agreed that although the Soviets will try to increase their presence and influence in the Gulf area, the key to the future of the region in the next few years will be developments within and among the various Gulf states themselves. It is neither politically feasible nor desirable for the US to `replace' the British presence in the Persian Gulf. Our policy should be directed along the lines of (a) encouraging the British to maintain as much of their present special role in the Gulf as they can, as long as possible (including their role as principal arms supplier to various Gulf states); (b) encouraging the Saudis and Iranians to settle their outstanding differences regarding the median line and other issues; (c) encouraging greater political and economic cooperation generally among the Gulf states; and (d) avoiding an undue military buildup by Gulf littoral states." Now we have a request from Kuwait for 60 "open troop carriers." The telegraphic exchange is attached./3/ The working level at State just can't bring themselves to say "no." Regardless of what we say, I believe we should sell no arms to these states. Since I know your views on this subject, this memorandum is largely informational. Given Paul Nitze's work load, I hate to bother him now and suggest we could go to him when and if necessary for support on this policy. /3/Not found attached. Approve above/4/ /4/Warnke initialed this option on April 23. Harry H. Schwartz
144. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Southern Yemen/1/ Washington, April 24, 1968, 2358Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-9 S YEMEN. Secret. Drafted by Brewer and approved by Davies. Repeated to Beirut, Jidda, London, CINCSTRIKE, and COMIDEASTFOR. 152721. Aden 1261,/2/ 1266,/3/ 1272 (Notal)./4/ Southern Yemen. /2/In telegram 1261 from Aden, April 22, Eagleton reported that on April 21 a South Yemeni he did not know had asked to see him, said he represented those in the NLF who could not accept its drift toward extremism and communism, and asked for U.S. assistance. Eagleton responded that the U.S. Government could not in any way become involved in the internal affairs of Southern Yemen. (Ibid.) /3/Dated April 23. (Ibid.) /4/In telegram 1272 from Aden, April 24, Eagleton reported that an NLF official had twice interrogated a part-time Embassy translator regarding the U.S. reaction to an anti-NLF document left with the Embassy on April 21. The employee responded that he had not been given the document to translate and was unable to comment. (Ibid.) 1. Appreciate full reporting reftels indicating new Army/radical NLF confrontation may be impending. You, of course, took right line in telling source USG could in no way become involved in internal political affairs PRSY (para 4 Aden 1261). 2. Re source's curiosity as to reaction USG (para 2 Aden 1272), Embassy should continue policy of refusing be drawn into further elaboration our standard position. Should source again approach you, you will no doubt wish continue play him for maximum intelligence value while making clear USG deals with duly constituted government authorities PRSYG. As source aware, our contacts with PRSYG continue be correct, despite expulsion DATT in aftermath March 20 events./5/ /5/On March 26 the People's Republic of Southern Yemen Government had declared the U.S. Defense Attache persona non grata after alleging that he was implicated in the army's attempted counter-revolution on March 20. Despite U.S. protests, he was ordered to leave the country by March 28. Rusk [Continue with the next documents] Volume XXI Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |