NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.
| The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001. Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date. This site is not updated so external links may no longer function. Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein. |
 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXI Near East Region Department of State |
 145. Memorandum From John W. Foster of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/ Washington, May 21, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Yemen, Cables and Memos, Vol. II, 7/64-12/68. Secret. SUBJECT Yemen and Southern Yemen are so confusing that we thought a word might be in order. We don't foresee any US involvement, but what's going on does affect the general balance of forces in the area. After a month of confused maneuvering during which the military seemed to be moving closer and closer to a coup, the situation in Southern Yemen has taken a turn for the better. The pro-Western army has put down a revolt of the extremist wing of the radical NLF, giving the NLF moderates a firmer hold on the country, and the military a fairly good grip on the government. This shift to the right will make the South Yemenis less eager to rush into the arms of the Soviets, and ought to make the regime somewhat more acceptable to the Saudis--at least, Faisal isn't likely to intervene, and he might even bring himself to recognize the government. Despite this apparent shift, there are still more than enough personal, ideological, tribal and regional rivalries to upset things easily. The basic cause of many of the problems--the lack of money--is no nearer a solution, and solving it may force the regime into political affiliations it would rather avoid. Whatever its politics, any Southern Yemeni government will have to get foreign assistance--and from any willing source. The British are out of the picture now that aid negotiations have broken down. (The Southern Yemenis wanted $144 million in the next five years, the UK offered $3 million in the next nine months.) The government thinks the Russians are its best bet, and rumor has it that President Qahtan plans to leave for Moscow shortly. We just don't have the money--or the interest--to buy in, and the Saudis are still too skeptical of even this latest shift to be ready to pick up the burden themselves, though that would be the ideal from our viewpoint. Farther north in Yemen, the civil war drags on. The Republicans are winning this month, but there isn't much chance that they--or the Royalists--will win the war. On the Republican side, the moderates are still in control, but differences with the Soviet-backed leftists could lead to an open break. In the other camp, there is a definite split between the Royalist tribes and the followers of the Royal family. An effort is underway to bring the tribal Royalists and the Republican moderates together, but there is no guarantee that it will be successful. The Egyptians have been out of the picture for six months, and the Saudis have had about all the Royalist feuding they can take. The Russians are still there, but the pace of their activities has slowed sharply since their early December rush to replace the Egyptians. John
146. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ I-23190/68 Washington, June 12, 1968. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 73 A 1250, Persian Gulf 800, Persian Gulf 1968. Secret. The memorandum indicates it was seen by the Secretary of Defense on June 15. SUBJECT 1. Long before the October Revolution of 1917, the Russia of the Czars was restlessly seeking warm-water ports in which their shipping would not be bottled by narrow waterways. The last few years have seen a large increase in the Soviet navy and its appearance in the Mediterranean. The last few months have seen expressions of Soviet interest in the Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean, and adjacent seas. These latest expressions of Soviet interest in the Persian Gulf have coincided with the recent announcement of the UK that by 1971 they would withdraw their forces from that area, and their protection from the sheikdoms of the Gulf. To the states bordering the Gulf as well as to the Soviet Union, this British statement is practically tantamount to withdrawal, and there has been among the various states and sheikdoms a great deal of confused activity as they seek, ineffectually so far, to rearrange their lives without Great Britain. The Soviets brought a cruiser, a destroyer, and an oiler all the way from the maritime provinces to this area only two weeks ago, and visited Indian, Pakistani, and Iraqi ports, and one Iranian port (the Shah's invitation reportedly "reluctant"). The Soviet ships are now headed for East Africa. It has been a "Show the Flag" operation highly comparable to the visits paid to ports in the area by our own Mideast Force of three ships, stationed in Bahrein. 2. The significance of threat to the US of these phenomena is being debated throughout the government. Some see these Soviet activities as a large and growing threat to US world-wide interests; others are more inclined to view it only as a natural movement out onto the seas of the world of a large and powerful nation which can now afford that sort of activity. I am more inclined to the latter view, particularly as the Soviet Union whose naval ships are now appearing in these southern waters--although it still does not wish us well--is not the Soviet Union of the 1950s. The Soviet Union of today simply has too many problems at home, with China, with the states of Eastern Europe, and with the communist parties outside the Soviet Union, to be dangerously aggressive in the overt manner of the past. 3. Our view in ISA has been that US policies and actions in the general area of the Persian Gulf should rather precisely correspond to our public statements that we have no intention of "filling the vacuum" left by the British withdrawal. By this, we mean that we should undertake no new programs in the area, nor get involved in the affairs of the small Arabic states that stretch along the southwestern littoral of the Persian Gulf. The reasons are several: a. We already have a fairly high degree of interest in and close relations with Saudi Arabia (i.e., King Faisal and ARAMCO), and with Iran, whom we have just agreed to sell during the next five years $600 million worth of additional arms. b. Aside from that, we think that the people of the area can manage their lives better without additional interference from us than they can with it. c. We anticipate that the small states and sheikdoms of the Gulf will rather naturally look to us to take the place of the British, and that it is easier to avoid this temptation at the outset than it would be later to attempt to extricate ourselves. d. In effect, we are placing our money on a modern Persian Emperor to keep open the Persian Gulf; and I advocate that we sell arms to no one else on the Gulf except Saudi Arabia. 4. Although it is difficult to make predictions about such matters, my own guess would be that the Soviets have begun a diplomatic game highly reminiscent of the ones played by both the Russians and the Western European powers during the last century. Although we should keep an active eye on our present investments in the area, a fine restraint of exuberant activism would best serve our long-term interests. While it is quite possible that Iran's "peacekeeping" in the Persian Gulf may become from time-to-time a rather messy operation, I doubt that a large role by the United States would be any more effective--or less messy. I think that we are already sufficiently immersed in Arab affairs with respect to those states immediately surrounding Israel. Any or all of the above thoughts which you adopt as your own can, of course, be declassified for use as background with the New York Times. Paul C. Warnke
147. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ JCSM-380-68 Washington, June 19, 1968. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 73 A 1250, Persian Gulf 092, 19 June 68, 1968. Secret. SUBJECT 1. (C) In view of the announced decision of the United Kingdom to withdraw its military forces from the Persian Gulf in 1971, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA has submitted a study concerning the political and military impact of this withdrawal as it relates to his responsibilities. A copy of this study is attached hereto./2/ /2/Attached but not printed. 2. (C) The study has been reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and determined to be a timely and useful document for consideration in future policy actions in connection with the UK decision. Because of the wide range of the recommendations in the study, the contingent nature of some, and the time frame during which actions might become appropriate, it is not considered necessary, at this time, to forward recommendations on all matters addressed by the study. With the exception of those considered to be of a more immediate nature and addressed below, the recommendations will be considered when time and events determine such action to be appropriate. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will forward any resultant recommendations requiring your attention. 3. (S) The recommendations which are considered appropriate for attention in the near future are: a. Establishment of a US arms policy for the lower Persian Gulf States and Kuwait. b. Establishment of a Defense Attache Office in Kuwait. 4. (S) With regard to an arms policy for the area, we should continue to regard the United Kingdom as the primary arms supplier for the lower Gulf States and Kuwait (Iran and Saudi Arabia are not included in this grouping). However, if we were unwilling even to consider requests for purchase of arms to assist in their self-defense, we could soon find those states turning to radical Arab or communist sources to meet requirements not filled by the British. Therefore, it is recommended that, while we should continue to look to the United Kingdom as the principal arms supplier in this area, the United States should be prepared to consider favorably on a case-by-case basis limited sales of arms to Kuwait and the lower Gulf States to meet legitimate defense needs not met by the United Kingdom. 5. (S) With respect to the establishment of a Defense Attache Office in Kuwait, there will be a definite need for such representation by the time British military forces depart the area. Even now, increasing Soviet and radical Arab activity in the area and the loss of the Attache Office at Baghdad call for more complete intelligence collection capability. (Three Soviet Navy ships have visited Persian Gulf ports during the past 2 months.) In view of the lead time required and the current need for representation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the Department of State be requested to undertake negotiations with the Government of Kuwait for approval of a Defense Attache Office. 6. (S) For your information, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA has been informed that action by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on his proposal for upgrading the ships assigned to the Middle East Force will be held in abeyance until such time as the threat may warrant and the Middle East Force has a higher relative priority for available resources. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: J. O. Cobb
IRG/NEA 68-27 Washington, July 10, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, IRG/NEA 68-27 Files: Lot 70 D 503, U.S. Policy & Future Military Presence in Arabian Sea Littoral. Secret. Drafted by Sober on July 15. INTERDEPARTMENTAL REGIONAL GROUP FOR NEAR EAST Record of IRG Meeting--July 10, 1968 The IRG met to consider U.S. policy and future military presence in the Arabian Sea littoral. The discussion was focused on a paper (see IRG/NEA 68-24)/2/ which had analyzed our continued interest in the area and made certain action proposals. /2/Document 142. The IRG noted a recent decision by the Department of Defense, approving in principle the concept of constructing a modest military facility at Diego Garcia./3/ It would provide certain capabilities for communications and POL storage, and include an 8,000-foot runway. It could provide a potential backup site in the event that MIDEASTFOR cannot be based at Bahrein after the U.K. withdraws. British agreement is to be sought to fly a British flag over the facility and to obtain whatever financial and manning participation may be possible. /3/See Document 48. The IRG agreed that new problems will arise as the British withdraw militarily east of Suez, including the Persian Gulf, by the end of 1971. The recent Soviet naval calls at ports in India, Pakistan, the Persian Gulf, East Africa, and Aden presumably foreshadow the Soviet Union's intentions to expand its naval presence in the years ahead. Focusing on the Persian Gulf area, the IRG reaffirmed its view that the key to the future of the region in the next few years would be developments within and among the various Gulf states themselves, and that it is neither politically feasible nor desirable to "replace" the British presence in the Gulf; our policy should be directed along the lines of encouraging greater cooperation among the Gulf states themselves, and particularly between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The IRG agreed that MIDEASTFOR continues to serve a useful purpose in "showing the flag" and in manifesting a continued U.S. military presence and interest in the region. Militarily, MIDEASTFOR has a potential role in evacuating American citizens in an emergency and could perform certain other limited functions. Its main mission, however, will probably continue to be defined very largely in political and psychological terms. The IRG agreed that, in connection with future decisions on MIDEASTFOR, we should keep in mind the importance of avoiding any impression that the United States Government was backing out of the area. The IRG decided to defer action on a proposal for a modest expansion of MIDEASTFOR (which currently consists of one tactical command vessel and two destroyers) pending a further study of MIDEASTFOR's mission. This study, to be undertaken by Defense and Joint Staff representatives with participation by State and by other agencies as may be appropriate, should consider MIDEASTFOR's capabilities and limitations, in both a military and political sense; the future requirement for a U.S. naval presence in the area; and the question of whether a force of the present size is appropriate to its mission. This study should be submitted to the IRG for its consideration. S.S. MEMBERS PRESENT
149. Memorandum From the Country Director for Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen, and Aden Affairs (Brewer) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Battle)/1/ Washington, July 30, 1968. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15 S YEMEN. Secret. Drafted by Dinsmore and Brewer. SUBJECT Anti-regime turbulence in the PRSY hinterland commenced about July 23. Since then, clashes with the military, in Aulaqi tribal districts, and in upper Yafai, Dathina, and adjacent Lahej, Radfan and Haushabi areas of Southern Yemen (see attached map)/2/ have posed the first substantial threat to the National Liberation Front (NLF) regime in PRSY since its founding November 30, 1967. A serious complication for the government arises from a sizeable element of Aulaqi officers in the Army whose sentiments parallel those of their kinsmen in the hinterland. According to one report, some hundred Aulaqi officers have been suspended as the result of their petition to the Army High Command in favor of "national unity" (see below). Aulaqi officers have long been lukewarm to the NLF, and were known before independence to harbor some sympathy for FLOSY. /2/Attached but not printed. Southern Yemenis have plenty of reasons for unhappiness, no doubt including a growing sense of possible economic disaster ahead of them. There is, moreover, growing impatience with single party government as represented by the NLF and an attempt by anti-government groups to broader representation. This reflects the political ambitions of factions in the country which have been excluded from a share in ruling the country. An interesting aspect of the situation has been the call by various disparate groups for "national unity", presumably envisaging a coalition government. It is not clear to what extent the up-country disturbances are indigenous in origin, or to what extent they may reflect organization from outside, but signs suggest something of the latter. Representatives of FLOSY, the PRSY Army, and the South Arabian League (SAL) have reportedly been meeting in Beirut since July 23. They are said to be seeking an agreeable basis for a coalition government to take the place of the present single party (NLF) regime, with some moderate NLF participation. The PRSY Foreign Minister went to Taiz, Yemen, on July 29 for urgent discussion with the YARG. Both FLOSY and emigre elements recently returned there, and we surmise the PRSY mission is aimed at getting the YARG to neutralize their possible cross-border activities. Aden radio on July 28 carried a PRSYG communique alleging that Saudi Arabia, "international imperialism" and its intelligence service (read CIA), agents of the Sultans, the SAL and the remnant of FLOSY are behind the trouble. More serious, "NLF Commandos" and "People's Guard" members were asked to report to NLF headquarters to pick up weapons, an indication of less than full Army support for the Government and an act implying there is a lack of security resources available to the PRSY and NLF establishment. On July 29, the regime also called for "general mobilization". While the NLF has not yet shown any readiness to share the seat of power, President al-Shaabi had, since March, moved toward the center politically in response to Army pressures against the extreme leftist tendencies of some NLF leaders. Now that tribal opposition has broken out, the regime may be faced with its most serious crisis yet. Whether the tribes are only responding to the outside stimulation mentioned above, or whether their move is strictly their own response to what they must consider to be an increasingly intolerable situation, is not clear. Unruly as they are, even under normal conditions, it takes leadership to mount sustained and effective tribal actions. It will take money and more leadership to keep them going if their efforts to assert themselves are not successful. On balance, it would appear more than likely that there is an organization with a pointed objective behind the reports of tribal skirmishes, probably including some Saudi encouragement. There is just a chance, given the relatively demoralized state of affairs in PRSY at the moment, that a move for power by a combination of anti-radical forces could succeed in either forcing President al-Shaabi to accept a moderate coalition of political forces or to step down. If, on the other hand, he and his regime are able to weather this threat, he will be in debt to the radicals for stemming the opposition. He seems already to be turning to the radicals (i.e. People's Guard) for help. The crucial question now seems to be whether the bulk of the Army will remain loyal and thus succeed in continuing the increasingly divisive inter-tribal disturbances. We have advised the Office of News in case a question is raised to label as sheerest fancy any reference to PRSY claims that the US is involved in these events. Interested posts have been so informed. We are counselling our Embassy to maintain a low profile and have asked London and Jidda for their host government's assessments of the situation.
150. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)/1/ Washington, August 2, 1968. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 73 A 1250, Persian Gulf 092, 2 Aug 68. Secret. SUBJECT I refer to your memorandum JCSM 380-68,/2/ dated 19 June 1968, forwarding a study on the Persian Gulf by CINCSTRIKE and requesting appropriate action to (a) establish a U.S. arms policy for Kuwait and the lower Persian Gulf states, and (b) establish a Defense Attache office in Kuwait. /2/Document 147. Over the past months U.S. policy and possible action in the Persian Gulf after British withdrawal have been carefully considered in the IRG as well as by the appropriate agencies. As a result, the U.S. Government has publicly announced that we should not "fill the vacuum" caused by the British withdrawal. By this we mean we should undertake no new programs in the area nor become involved in the affairs of the small Arab states on the Persian Gulf. Instead, we should continue to concentrate our principal efforts to support Iran and Saudi Arabia. The reasons are several: a. We anticipate that the small states and sheikdoms of the Gulf will naturally look to the U.S. to take the place of the British as a thoroughly enmeshed protector, and it is easier to avoid this role at the outset than it would be to extricate ourselves at some later point. b. We think that the people of the area, particularly those in Iran and Saudi Arabia, can better manage the situation in the Gulf without additional involvement by the U.S. c. We already have a high degree of interest in and close relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran. We have in fact just agreed to sell the latter $600 million of additional arms. Therefore, the U.S. should avoid selling arms to the small states in the area and should permit them to rely on the British or other Western European sources for whatever military equipment or other assistance they may require. (In this connection, General Hall of the British MOD recently surveyed Kuwait's defense forces and found that their materiel requirements were of a low order of priority.) However, even in the event that they turn to non-Western sources for arms, it is preferable that we not become involved in an effort to make the sales ourselves. I have asked the ISA staff to consider with your office, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Department of State the need for a Defense Attache in Kuwait. I will furnish the results of these considerations to you at a later date. Paul H. Nitze
151. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran/1/ Washington, August 2, 1968, 2350Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 19 BAHRAIN IS. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Eliot; cleared in draft by Brewer, Wehmeyer, Assistant Legal Adviser for UN Affairs Herbert K. Reis, and Officer in Charge of UN Political Affairs Betty-Jane Jones; and approved by Rockwell. 214602. Subject: Bahrein. Ref: Tehran 5903./2/ /2/In telegram 5903 from Tehran, July 30, Ambassador Meyer reported that during a July 29 discussion of Bahrain Island, the Shah suggested taking the issue either to the UN Security Council or to the International Court of Justice. Meyer said he tried to discourage the Security Council action, and secured the Shah's approval of having U.S. legal experts determine the feasibility of seeking an ICJ opinion. (Ibid.) 1. FYI. We believe it would be preferable have British continue take lead in attempting resolve problem of Iranian claim to Bahrein. As you know, Ambassador Wright has instructions to probe Shah's intentions and desires (CA-9741)./3/ We understand he has requested audience with Shah for next few days. We see real risks in our becoming involved in terms of our relations with all parties to dispute. We also do not wish undercut British efforts find solution. We believe preferable for us remain on sidelines urging parties be flexible in interest finding permanent solution. /3/Dated July 29. (Ibid.) 2. In this context our pursuing idea of ICJ role in solving dispute appears inadvisable. In addition it is highly unlikely using ICJ to promote solution would be feasible. Statute of court provides that only states may be parties in cases before court. Acceptance Bahrein in such role would have direct implication concerning issue to be litigated, i.e., Iran's claim to sovereignty over island. While Iran would thus presumably prefer UK as adversary, believe we must be particularly careful not to stimulate Shah in this direction since question what UK might be willing consider obviously highly sensitive. While UK has accepted compulsory jurisdiction of ICJ (Article 36(2) of Statute of ICJ annexed to UN Charter) Iran has not and (in absence special agreement with UK for reference this case to court) would be required to do so in order to proceed against UK. Should Iran go this route UK could conceivably find itself in court, but UK in all probability would argue it not a party to dispute and Bahrein would insist UK take such a position. Bahrein would in any case not accept a court decision on Bahrein in which Bahrein not consulted. End FYI. 3. In light foregoing you should inform Shah we believe best way to handle Bahrein problem is by continuing discussions with British and that we doubtful that ICJ can play role in dispute. You might wish brief Ambassador Wright on this exchange. 4. Re Security Council consideration, you should continue as appropriate discourage any Iranian ideas that resort SC would be helpful. It our view public debate problem of this nature, in which parties tend state positions in extreme terms, likely make solution more, rather than less, difficult. 5. Ansary has not mentioned ICJ possibility in meetings with Department officials since his return although he had opportunity during brief discussion on FAA and Bahrein with Under Secretary Rostow, July 30./4/ /4/In telegram 5967 from Tehran, August 5, Meyer responded that although he shared the Department's view that the U.S. Government should not get involved, he hoped that some face-saving device regarding Bahrain could be provided to the Shah before December. (Ibid.) Rusk
152. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Italy/1/ Washington, August 2, 1968, 2354Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-9 S YEMEN. Confidential. Drafted by Brewer and Dinsmore, cleared by Rush W. Taylor, Jr., of EUR/AIS, and approved by Rockwell. Repeated to Aden, Jidda, and London. 214612. State 213375./2/ /2/Telegram 213375 to Aden, August 1, instructed the Embassy to tell Foreign Office Permanent Secretary Rashad that although his private assurances that he recognized that there was no U.S. involvement in the current disturbances in Southern Yemen were welcome, the U.S. Government could not ignore the tendentious radio and press items accusing the United States of complicity in anti-regime activities without expressing its concern. (Ibid., POL S YEMEN-US) 1. FYI. As Embassy no doubt aware, PRSY and other Arab media have alleged USG involved in current unrest in PRSY. Embassy Aden's 1544/3/ (being repeated Rome) suggests PRSY regime may even see advantage in using USG as scapegoat for its troubles and break diplomatic relations. Moreover, PRSY FonMin Dhalai has been in Taiz and may well have been filling YARG officials full of lurid and unsupported allegations. End FYI. /3/Dated July 30. (Ibid., POL 7 S YEMEN) 2. Since Italians looking after our interests in Yemen, we believe you should inform FonOff of substance para 3 below. You should add that we would have no objection Italian authorities passing this info to YARG Ambassador Rome, and to YARG in Taiz, in event they believe this useful. 3. There has not been, nor is there now, any USG connection with recent turbulence in Southern Yemen. Recent Arab broadcasts, and any other reports YARG may have received to contrary, are inaccurate and should be carefully re-examined. USG, of course, unaware what allegations PRSY representatives may be making in private as to alleged USG involvement but wishes to set the facts straight. Allegations that USG backing or participating PRSY's tribal troubles are sheerest fancy. Current YARG leaders should particularly appreciate this, since they familiar with events in spring 1967 in Yemen when previous Government of YAR leveled similarly baseless charges against USG. Rusk
153. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Battle) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, August 5, 1968. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-9 S YEMEN. Secret. Drafted by Brewer on August 2 and cleared by Rockwell. A copy was sent to Austin (INR/RNA). Rusk's initials on the memorandum indicate he read it. SUBJECT The serious tribal dissidence which broke out in the People's Republic of Southern Yemen (PRSY) on July 25 has introduced considerable fluidity in that quarter of Arabia. It could have important implications for solution of the Yemen problem. Dissident groups in PRSY comprise disparate tribal and political elements with apparently little direct outside support. But the Saudis have no doubt privately been giving mild encouragement to dissident exile groups. In the Yemen Arab Republic (YARG), Prime Minister al-Amri has for more than a month permitted anti-PRSY elements to take up residence in Taiz, knowing full well that they would mount efforts to undermine PRSY. Parallel to these developments in the PRSY situation have been renewed indications that both the Saudis and the YARG would like to settle the Yemen conflict. The Saudis were notably disheartened by the failure of their efforts last spring to make the Royalist regime more unified and effective. Al-Amri is worried by radicals in his own government and army, as well as by their connections with the NLF regime in Aden. The resultant situation is both complex and confused. We do not believe that any direct coordination exists between the Saudis and al-Amri nor do we think the Saudis are in any major way responsible for PRSY's current turbulence. But one key factor has emerged: both King Faisal and al-Amri have important reasons for wishing to see the demise of the NLF regime in Aden. Al-Amri may well have calculated that, by permitting PRSY exile groups to operate from Yemeni territory, he would increase his chances of working out some meaningful compromise with Saudi Arabia which would end the longstanding Yemen civil war. It is too early to predict what may come of this, but at least the Saudis and al-Amri have a common interest in hoping that the Government of President Qahtan al-Shaabi in Aden will soon be overthrown. Should events in PRSY not require al-Amri to trim his sails in the Aden regime's direction, the likelihood of some movement on the Yemen issue would seem to be enhanced.
154. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Southern Yemen/1/ Washington, August 5, 1968, 2232Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL S YEMEN-US. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Brewer; cleared by Rockwell, Chief of the Office of Operations Evacuation and Relocation Staff James P. McDonnell, and Director of the Office of Special Consular Services Allyn C. Donaldson (paragraph 6); and approved by Battle. Repeated to Jidda, Asmara, London, Addis Ababa, and Beirut. 215394. State 213375 (Notal)./2/ /2/See footnote 2, Document 152. 1. In addition recent anti-US propaganda by PRSY media, Dept has noted with concern August 5 ticker item from Aden, carried on Cairo MENA, to effect FonMin Dhalai at rally August 4 at al-Hawtah in Lahej, directly accused USG of complicity in current troubles. According report, Dhalai stated USG "closely involved in the current events in PRSY" and "certain elements taking part in the mutiny have been in contact with the US Embassies in Beirut and Asmara". Dhalai then apparently referred to fact Ali Gallas and Asnaj had called on US Consul in Asmara and that another individual (he indicated al-Aswadi) maintained contact with US Ambassador in Beirut. 2. Question endemic PRSY suspicion USG has been raised by Dhalai and Qahtan with Charge periodically during last two months (Aden 1409, 1442 and 1528--Notal)./3/ On each occasion Charge has denied reports of any such improper USG activity. Dhalai told Charge June 5 that he would let Charge know "if there were any proofs" that we should discuss but failed to do so other than allege that Asnaj present when Asmara officer saw Gallas (para 5 Aden 1442). Charge categorically denied these reports to Qahtan July 24 (Aden 1528). In circumstances, we assume PRSY seeking scapegoat for its upcountry problems and may be planning either PNG someone from Aden or possibly breaking diplomatic relations with us. /3/Telegram 1409 from Aden, June 5; telegram 1442 from Aden, June 17; telegram 1528 from Aden, July 24. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL S YEMEN-US) 3. While we have little influence over PRSYG leaders in their current mood, we would prefer remain in Aden if this can be done with dignity. Accordingly, Charge should request appointment with FonMin to convey orally personal message/4/ in para 4 from USG. /4/Telegram 219105 to Aden, August 12, instructed the Embassy to change "personal message" to "message from USG." (Ibid.) 4. "Excellency: In context current situation in PRSY, USG has been concerned to note number/5/ public references implying some USG role in current situation. We have been particularly disturbed to note one press report to the effect that Your Excellency may now have given public acceptance to such unsubstantiated charges. Your Excellency is reported to have described the USG as being closely involved in these events, and to have said that certain elements unfriendly to your government have been in contact with US Embassies in Beirut and Asmara. The USG wishes categorically to assure Your Excellency that it is in no way involved in the current situation nor have our Embassies engaged in any improper activities. Our Charge fully explained to you in June the innocuous nature of Consulate Asmara's contact with former local employee of the then Congen in Aden. In the interest of maintaining normal relations between our two countries, we earnestly hope that Your Excellency will accept this assurance that our officials are in no way involved in the current difficult situation. Should you receive allegations to the contrary, we would hope that these might be discussed with the US representative in Aden before there is a public airing of unsubstantiated charges." /5/Telegram 219105 instructed the Embassy to change "number" to "continuing." 5. In the event addressee posts contacted by press, you should limit your response to denying that USG officials in any way involved in current events in PRSY. 6. In view uncertainties re PRSY actions, Embassy Aden may wish take preliminary steps internally which would facilitate closing post and transferring American interests to protecting power. We assume this would be British but would appreciate your recommendation./6/ /6/In telegram 1608 from Aden, August 14, Acting Charge d'Affaires Thomas W. Davis, Jr., reported that he just met with Foreign Minister Dhalai to deliver the Department's message. Dhalai had expressed no regret for his recent anti-American comments, but discussed the subject in a conciliatory manner and expressed his desire for good relations with the U.S. Government and for U.S. support in regard to the external dangers facing Southern Yemen. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL S YEMEN-US) Rusk
155. Briefing Memorandum From the Acting Country Director for Iranian Affairs (McClelland) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Handley)/1/ Washington, August 28, 1968. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files, 1967-69, POL 33 PERSIAN GULF. Secret. Drafted by Acting Country Director for Iranian Affairs Walter M. McClelland. SUBJECT During his 11-12 June 1968 visit,/2/ the Shah of Iran expressed concern to the President about the security of the Persian Gulf after the 1971 British withdrawal and asked the President what types of weapons the US would recommend that he obtain for the most effective defense of the Straits of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf area. The President agreed to look into the matter and later decided to offer the Shah a comprehensive military study of the problem. This offer was conveyed to the Shah by Ambassador Meyer on July 29 and was promptly accepted. /2/For documentation on the Shah's visit, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XXII, Documents 290-300. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have drawn up the Terms of Reference for a military survey to be carried out by CINCSTRIKE (attached)./3/ A team of seven CINCSTRIKE officers headed by Major General Richmond, USAF, will call at the Department for a briefing a few hours before departure to Iran for an on-the-spot survey. /3/Attached but not printed. You may wish to make the following points for your briefing of the CINCSTRIKE team: 1. Background. This study is extremely sensitive and could have important implications not only for Iran but also for the other States of the Gulf area with whom we have good relations. a) Our close diplomatic relations with Iran are to a large degree dependent on our military cooperation so that the study must take into account, in its conclusions, other than strictly military factors. Iran has reasonable but not unlimited financial resources, and its ability to absorb and maintain new complex equipment is limited. Our position continues to be to discourage large military expenditures that would adversely affect Iran's economic development and not to recommend equipment that could not be effectively utilized. b) Our policy in the Gulf is one of encouraging maximum cooperation among the Persian Gulf riparian States to work out the problems there. (We have been encouraged by the recently reported Median Line agreement.) The following factors must therefore be taken into account: i) Iran's armaments should not be so augmented as to frighten other riparian states and thus endanger prospects for Arab-Iranian cooperation. (By 1971, Iran will have 2 squadrons of F-4's, a Radar Warning net, a destroyer, and several small craft in the area.) ii) Conclusions should take into consideration the international character of the Persian Gulf. c) We do not consider that there is an imminent threat to Iran in the Gulf (although the situation could deteriorate); nor do we believe that Iran could successfully meet a real Soviet threat by itself. What we believe is needed is a reasonable augmentation to the forces the GOI will have in the Gulf in 1971--if such an augmentation appears necessary--to improve Iranian defense of its "lifeline" and legitimate interests there. 2. Team Activities in Iran. We would hope that the team would be very guarded in any discussions with Iranian officials, give them no papers, and not indicate the directions in which their conclusions and recommendations tend. The team should take the attitude that it is going to Iran to learn and listen and will bring data back for technical evaluation before writing the report. (Para 7 of attachment covers the points of sensitivity of the study and prohibition of discussion with the Iranians.) Any problems or questions should be resolved with the Ambassador in cooperation with the Country Team (Para 6 of attachment)./4/ /4/For a record of Deputy Assistant Secretary Handley's briefing of the CINCSTRIKE Survey Team, see memorandum of conversation, August 29. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33 PERSIAN GULF) [Continue with the next documents] Volume XXI Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |