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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXI Near East Region Department of State |
 118. Airgram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State/1/ A-1898 London, December 9, 1967. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 15 S YEMEN. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Political Officer Stephen J. Palmer, Jr., and approved by Political Officer William J. Galloway. Repeated to Aden, Beirut, Bonn, Dhahran, Jidda, Kuwait, Tehran, Tel Aviv, and USUN. SUBJECT 1. It is the personal view of the Foreign Office officials who deal on a day-to-day basis with PROSY affairs that the new republic's chances for holding together long under the present NLF (or for that matter, any foreseeable) regime are slight. They do not regard FLOSY as a serious threat. Nor do they think the Sharif of Beihan, even with Saudi backing, can traverse the comeback trail. 2. Rather, our sources' pessimistic estimate is based on the assumption that PROSY's cash income will prove inadequate to meet Adeni post-independence expectations and to buy continued tribal loyalties. They point out that even when the Suez Canal is open and Aden Port bustling, the country requires an annual input of sixteen to twenty million pounds merely to stand still. 3. Our contacts wonder where this money, and the additional funds the Southern Yemen authorities want in order to demonstrate they are doing something for the people, will be found. Many Labor and Conservative voters are writing to 10 Downing Street and the Foreign Office to protest HMG's twelve million pound aid to PROSY over the period ending June 1. There appears to be no public support for this assistance program. As of now, it appears unlikely to be renewed on the same scale. 4. The USG is not disposed to fill the gap. The FRG probably will not be willing to shoulder virtually the entire burden. Assuming the Saudis decide next year to seek an accommodation with PROSY, they are likely to attach unacceptable conditions to offers of assistance. Kuwait probably will hang back unless both Saudi Arabia and the UAR are favorably disposed to the Southern Yemen regime. Whether the Soviets or Chicoms can and want to subsidize PROSY indefinitely with large amounts of hard cash is problematical. 5. But if a major benefactor is not found by mid-1968, this line of reasoning goes, Southern Yemen will be subjected to serious internal stresses. Old rivalries will reassert themselves, tribal leaders will turn to outside sources of gold and rifles, and the volatile Adeni proletariat will become disenchanted with the NLF. Comment: It should be noted that the officials who privately express the line summarized above were quite attached to the Federalis, on whom so much effort and money had been expended. One Britisher who participated in the Geneva negotiations with the NLF confided that he hoped those talks would fail. We very much doubt that George Brown shares the sentiments of these officials. But the combination of their personal dispositions and the British public's distaste for aiding "those terrorists who killed our boys" augurs ill for major, long-term UK assistance to PROSY. Bruce
119. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran/1/ Washington, December 13, 1967, 1709Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 YEMEN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Walsh; cleared by Battle, Eugene Rostow, and Helms; and approved by Acting Secretary Katzenbach. Also sent to Ankara, Tel Aviv, Amman, and Jidda and repeated to London, USUN, US MISSION NATO TOSEC, Moscow, Tunis, Morocco, Beirut, Addis Ababa, New Delhi, and Rawalpindi. 83752. For the Ambassador. Developments of past weeks indicate the Soviets may have moved in a phase of heightened direct involvement and greater risks to establish a dominant position in the Southwest Arabian Peninsula./2/ In fact the character and scope of their activities suggest an intent to carry out an armed intrusion that would exacerbate the inherently unstable conditions in this troubled area. /2/Regarding current Soviet activities in Yemen, telegram 86028 to Ankara, December 18, reported the Department spokesman's statement that reports of the delivery of Soviet planes to Yemen and the arrival there of Soviet technicians appeared to be substantially accurate. (Ibid., POL 16 S YEMEN) Although the South Yemen People's Republic has achieved a degree of control and stability in the few days that it has existed, Soviet and Chicom governments have at a minimum an influential fraction in the controlling elements. In the event the civil war in the Yemen itself produces a partition between North and South Yemen, the latter seems likely to merge with the SYPR under a growing Soviet influence. The emergence of a radical South Yemen government with control of port, communications and air bases in Aden-Taiz-Bodeida triangle is an eventuality that must be realistically considered. The implications of such a development for the already strained situation in the Near East resulting from the June war is apparent. It is requested that action addressees approach host governments and express USG interest and concern in the situation and a desire for a close and continuing exchange of information on developments in the Arabian Peninsula in [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] diplomatic [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] channels. Katzenbach
120. Telegram From the Embassy in Southern Yemen to the Department of State/1/ Aden, December 15, 1967, 1000Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL S YEMEN-US. Confidential. Repeated to Jidda and London. The Embassy in Aden was established on December 7, 1967. 719. Ref: State 83660./2/ Southern Yemen. /2/Telegram 83660 to Aden, December 13, instructed the Charge to congratulate President Shaabi upon creation of the People's Republic of Southern Yemen and to extend the best wishes of the United States to the new state and its people. He was to assure the President that the U.S. Government considered the internal political, economic, and social system of each country to be its own people's affair, noting that the United States had consistently sought not to become involved in intra-Arab disputes. (Ibid., POL 16 S YEMEN) 1. Accompanied by Davis, Commander Perry and Niner I met for one hour with President Qahtan al Shaabi at presidential residence (ex-government house) after Ramadhan breakfast evening December 14. Qahtan's manner was quiet, friendly and relaxed. His approach was direct but not forward. (Illustrative of his style was recent request by Catholic Bishop in Aden for an appointment to see him to which Qahtan replied "No, I will call on you.") 2. During early part of conversation I was able to make points suggested in Department's reftel except for question of Jarring mission which we will discuss along with general Arab problems before Qahtan goes to Arab summit meeting in Rabat. In addition to polite response to USG's congratulations Qahtan seemed impressed by our stand against interference in internal affairs of other countries and he stressed that this was his govt's policy also. He also acknowledged as true my observation that USG had remained strictly outside NLF/FLOSY dispute, and he seemed aware that republican Yemen's accusations against US were false. 3. Without forcing issue Qahtan brought conversation around to Southern Yemen economic problems and hope for aid from advanced countries. In reply I outlined budgetary difficulties that made consideration of economic aid impossible at this time. On other hand Embassy and USG would hope to establish very close relations with Southern Yemen govt at all levels and would be on lookout for ways in which we might be helpful. Meanwhile we considered development aid primarily responsibility of former colonial power and oil producing states in area. 4. In response to my question re PRSYG's attitude toward neighboring states Qahtan strongly reaffirmed policy of non-intervention. He reviewed at some length his discussions with Kamal al Adham in Geneva from which he said he had received impression there would be no problem in developing good ties between his govt and "brothers" of Saudi Arabia. He could not understand why Saudi recognition was still being delayed. He smiled when I replied that we were less surprised by Saudi delay in view of statements that had been made by NLF during revolutionary pre-independence period. Although USG had found that PRSYG met criteria for recognition Saudis perhaps had reason to be more cautious and wait until all aspects of PRSY policy were defined. Furthermore we understood Kamal Adham had delayed his return to Saudi Arabia. Qahtan again affirmed brotherly feeling towards Saudis and referred to presence 250,000 Southern Yemenis in Saudi Arabia. He said he hoped that both FonMin Saif al Dhalai in New York and Labor Minister, Abdul Malik Ismail in Cairo had been able to contact Saudi representatives to reassure them re Southern Yemen's good intentions. 5. Qahtan several times referred to poverty and backwardness up-country. He asked whether we had been able to travel there to see for ourselves. When we replied that conditions have not permitted travel he said he would see to it that arrangements were made. 6. In low key Qahtan asked whether US could be of any assistance in giving special medical treatment to several NLF veterans who had lost limbs during recent fighting. I replied that treatment in US would involve long travel and considerable expense but that we would discuss matter with American doctor who is now in Aden at Queen Elizabeth hospital on temporary duty under International Committee Red Cross. 7. Qahtan mentioned hope that oil could be found in eastern regions and mentioned forthcoming visit Atlantic Richfield representative to Aden. He indicated he would welcome interest by US companies in oil exploration. 8. Qahtan said he anticipated that his govt would open an Embassy in Washington but he was awaiting return of FonMin before making definite plans. He also said it would be decided later whether an independence ceremony to which special foreign representatives would be invited, would be held after Ramadhan. 9. Before leaving I asked Qahtan whether there was any specific message he wished me to pass to USG. He replied that he could not give up hope that US as well as other advanced countries would be able to help Southern Yemen rise from its backwardness. He said he would also appreciate anything USG could do to convince Saudi Govt of his government's good intentions toward them. Eagleton
121. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/ Washington, December 19, 1967, 2326Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 16 S YEMEN. Confidential; Noforn. Drafted by Dinsmore, cleared by Deputy Director of AID's Office of Near Eastern Affairs Ruth Fitzmaurice and Cheslaw, and approved by Brewer. Repeated to Aden and Jidda. 86853. 1. British EmbOff December 18 asked DeptOff for his views re likelihood USG assistance to PRSY. Wondered whether USG might be considering something like "one or two well chosen impact projects." 2. DeptOff replied recent foreign aid cuts such that funds simply not available for kind of programs EmbOff had in mind. Our Charge had been careful not to arouse hopes of members new government PRSY and we had similarly made our limitations in this regard clear to FonMin Dhalai in New York. DeptOff added we well aware opportunity which impoverished PRSY presents for Soviets and Chicoms should they offer attractive aid programs to new state. They might consider such aid cheap price for influence in what for them might be strategic location in Near East. Nevertheless, we not now in position compete in this field. 3. View foregoing, DeptOff stressed desirability British continuing make every effort sustain an effective level assistance to new state after present six-month stop-gap help completed in order obviate full PRSY dependence on Communists for essential needs. DeptOff noted PRSY reluctance accept British military mission but speculated new regime perfectly willing rely on HMG for financial help which could well give them fewer problems than major Communist support. 4. EmbOff reminded us of tight British financial position and said that he surmised in six weeks to two months Treasury would be taking close look at future aid for PRSY in light world-wide expenditures. 5. Comment: Our impression that EmbOff's approach was prompted by Foreign Office desire elicit indications US support for continued UK aid in order strengthen its hand in later jousting with British Treasury. Rusk
122. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Battle) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, January 9, 1968. /1/Source: Department of State, NEA/ARP Files: Lot 69 D 523, Persian Gulf, POL--General, January 1968. Secret. Drafted by Sterner; and cleared by Brewer and Davies, and in draft by Cheslaw and Eliot. A copy was sent to G/PM Director of Operations for Politico-Military Affairs Joseph J. Wolf. SUBJECT Background Present intense pressures on HMG to reduce government expenditures are leading the British to an imminent decision to accelerate removal of their military presence from the Persian Gulf, perhaps by 1970 if not sooner. In an effort to head off a precipitate decision of this nature, you sent last week a personal message to Foreign Secretary Brown (attached)/2/ expressing our concern and asking that a final decision be deferred until you see him this week. His reply,/3/ relayed by Sir Patrick Dean, makes no commitments. In transmitting it, however, Sir Patrick made clear the Foreign Secretary wished you to know that our views, as expressed in your coming meeting with Brown, would be taken into careful consideration. /2/Not attached; for text of Rusk's message to Brown, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XII, Document 61. /3/Not found. While I appreciate that you will be discussing the effect of the British cuts in terms of its global implications, I believe we are justified in making a particularly strong point of our concern for British actions in the Persian Gulf. In our judgment, a total withdrawal of British military forces in the next few years would seriously undermine the Western position in the Gulf. It will take another five years at least before the economic and political development of the Gulf states has progressed sufficiently to create an indigenous base for political stability. In the interim, at least a small British military presence will be an essential stabilizing force. While a British military withdrawal from the Gulf would not necessarily mean the end of British influence, their political presence would be far less effective if it did not have behind it the implied commitment and visible capability for military intervention. Except for Kuwait, the regimes of the Gulf states rest on shaky political foundations. It would not take much to undermine their confidence to resist the encroachment of Arab radicalism. Moreover, the Western position in the Persian Gulf is almost entirely dependent on the British presence. There is no politically feasible way for the US or other Western power to step in with an equally effective presence once the British are gone. Talking Points We recommend that you make the following points to Foreign Secretary Brown when you see him later this week. --British influence in the Persian Gulf has been the principal stabilizing force securing Western interests in that area. The US has always attached a very high importance to the maintenance of that influence. In our judgment, any sudden or drastic weakening of the British position will seriously undermine the existing regimes and render the entire area far more vulnerable to pressures from the radical Arabs. --A key element of the British position is a military presence which can be deployed rapidly to support British political commitments. In our view it does not have to be large, but it would be dangerous to try to dispense with it entirely. Western "support" of a more general nature is not likely to be effective unless the Rulers have the confidence, and their radical Arab opponents the fear, that an effective military force can and will be employed. --Early British announcement of a specific date for leaving the Gulf could have particularly unsettling effects at the present time. We are witnessing a concerted Soviet attempt to make further inroads in the area. Their recent heightened support for the Yemeni republican government, the prospect that they may achieve a position in Southern Yemen (Aden), and the inviting target presented by the weak but oil-rich Gulf shaikhdoms, all combine to give us a good deal of concern. There is not quite a "momentum" behind these developments yet, but public knowledge of an early British move out of the Gulf could well create one. --We are fully sympathetic with the pressing needs of HMG to reduce government expenditures. But we wonder if, short of total withdrawal, quite substantial savings could not be effected through a reduction in the strength of the British force. In our view, maintenance of a continuing military presence will be far more important than its actual size. --We all hope the present period of international financial difficulties will be temporary. While some programs can be cut back now and started up again later without serious problems, the elimination of the UK military position in the Gulf would be an irreversible decision. The USG feels strongly that such an irrevocable act is warranted neither by present circumstances nor future prospects. Moreover, economies effected now could be penny-wise, pound-foolish if political changes in the Gulf were to bring about revisions in the terms by which the UK gets its oil. --Our own resources have been sharply curtailed by Congress. Nevertheless, we would wish to examine carefully any proposals for creating greater indigenous cohesion in the Gulf, including regional self-help measures, as a means of fostering the orderly economic and political development of the area./4/ /4/When the Secretary discussed British budget and defense cuts with the Foreign Secretary on January 11, Brown said that the post-devaluation financial crisis had forced the U.K. Government to look at cutting defense expenditures overseas. The decision to leave the Persian Gulf was dictated primarily by the fact that there would be no carriers or bases available to support or relieve the Persian Gulf after March 1971 when British forces would have been withdrawn from the Far East. Rusk responded that he was profoundly distressed by the proposed withdrawals from Southeast Asia and the Persian Gulf, particularly by the intention to announce these decisions. (Memorandum of conversation, January 11; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Kingdom, Memos, Vol. XIII, 1/68-7/68) The memorandum of conversation is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XII, Document 64.
123. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran/1/ Washington, January 12, 1968, 8:53 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 19 TRUCIAL ST. Secret. Drafted by Eliot; cleared by Dinsmore and Staff Assistant Robert G. Grey, Jr. in the Office of the Under Secretary for Political Affairs; and approved by Rockwell. Repeated to London, Jidda, Dhahran, Kuwait, and CINCSTRIKE. 98266. Subject: Iran, Persian Gulf and Middle East Situation. 1. Iranian Ambassador Ansary in call January 12 on Under Secretary Rostow raised Shah's proposal for joint Iranian-Saudi-Kuwaiti oil activities in Persian Gulf. Rostow said it useful idea but tied up with problem of median line./2/ Assuming progress on median line problem, Rostow indicated we would be willing support Iranian efforts for regional cooperation. Both efforts can proceed at same time but it important Iran take initiative on median line question. /2/Discovery of large deposits of oil under the waters of the Persian Gulf sharpened differences between the Iranian and Saudi Governments over the location of a median line to delineate oil exploration and exploitation rights between them. 2. Rostow stressed importance regional cooperation has increased in light of probable UK decision about its future presence in Gulf. He said Secretary had spoken strongly to Foreign Secretary Brown concerning importance of UK decision to security of Free World but we do not know what effect our representations will have in London or for how long. Our impression is that decision on 1971 withdrawal "not quite" final. We hope it can be changed but in meantime we all have to plan. The risk of radical Arab movements into the area and the problem of security for the Gulf will not go away. Ansary said British had indicated they were thinking of granting complete independence to some of Sheikhdoms and federating others. In this connection, Bahrein is problem for Iran. 3. Concerning future arrangements for Gulf, Ansary said GOI believes joint air and naval policing of area with participation of Sheikhdoms might be desirable. Defense pact of some kind might also be possible. He asked for Rostow's views. Rostow replied we wish encourage cooperation in area, including Pakistan, Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia, for both development and security. We are well disposed encourage sympathetically efforts in these directions including policing which are politically feasible. He said it important also in order to bring about change in Iraq's orientation in the longer run. In response Ansary's comment all this costs money Rostow said our estimate of annual local costs of British effort in Gulf is about 14 million pounds. New arrangements in Gulf need not duplicate what British have been doing, and burden would not fall entirely on Iran. 4. On other aspects Mideast situation, Rostow mentioned he will wish get Shah's reading on his visit with Feisal when Rostow is in Tehran February 7-9. We regard Feisal as key, constructive figure in our efforts strengthen King Hussein. On Jarring mission, Rostow said neither Jarring nor we are discouraged although nothing decisive has yet happened. Katzenbach
124. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia/1/ Washington, January 24, 1968, 0114Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 19 TRUCIAL ST. Confidential. Drafted by Brewer and Dinsmore on January 23; cleared by Eliot, Cheslaw, and Country Director for Turkey John M. Howison; and approved by Brewer. Repeated to Ankara, Dhahran, London, Kuwait, Rawalpindi, Tehran, and CINCSTRIKE. 103449. Jidda 2485/2/ and 2526./3/ /2/In telegram 2485 from Jidda, January 21, Ambassador Eilts reported that he had discussed Under Secretary Rostow's recent comments in a BBC interview on new security arrangements in the Persian Gulf separately with Saudi Foreign Ministry Official Mohammad Mas'ud, and the Turkish and Iranian Ambassadors, each of whom had expressed surprise that Rostow had included Turkey and Pakistan among countries having security interests in the Gulf. (Ibid.) /3/In telegram 2526 from Jidda, January 23, Eilts reported that he had discussed the U.S. assessment of the current Yemen situation with Mas'ud and urged the Saudi Government to do its utmost to encourage the Yemeni royalists to cooperate with the tripartite committee's efforts to find a peaceful political solution acceptable to all. (Ibid., POL 27 YEMEN) 1. In addition to good line reported reftels, Ambassador may draw on following in discussions with Saudi officials and diplomatic colleagues on question of readjustments in Persian Gulf following British withdrawal. 2. USG naturally concerned re implications British troop withdrawal from Gulf by end 1971. Nevertheless, while we will be studying question in detail in coming months, we have no plan, general or specific, as to future. 3. In our view, evolving situation in Gulf is one to which states of area should address themselves. It will require patience and statesmanship to develop improved relations and take other measures which may seem necessary to states themselves in order safeguard area stability. We remain sympathetic and desire be helpful where practicable in this evolutionary process, but USG is not contemplating direct role. 4. We do feel strongly that there are elements in British presence, unconnected with military position, which littoral states may find beneficial retain. Those states themselves will know best what these elements are, but in our view it is premature to suggest that the UK will have no interest or influence in the Persian Gulf after 1971. We ourselves believe there will be continuing need for constructive and mutually helpful association smaller Arab littoral states with UK and are appropriately encouraging British authorities to continue do what they can play meaningful role in Gulf. British troop withdrawal is only one step in long process of gradual emergence Gulf area in modern world and we do not believe this can take place either dramatically or overnight. Rusk
125. Research Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ RNA-3 Washington, January 25, 1968. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files, 1967-69, POL 19 MUSCAT & OMAN. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. A note on the memorandum reads: "This report was produced by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Aside from normal substantive exchange with other agencies at the working level, it has not been coordinated elsewhere." SUBJECT A newcomer among the petroleum-exporting nations, the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman may become a problem area if its anachronistic ruler fails to meet the challenges of his political rivals. With important economic interests in neighboring Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf, the US thus could become increasingly involved in the affairs of this obscure country. We examine here the Sultanate's potential problems and future role in Arabian Peninsula developments. Abstract The remote Sultanate of Muscat and Oman is about to move from obscurity into the modern world as the result of its new-found petroleum wealth. Oil income is expected to reach about $30 million per year within the near future and will alter significantly the economic circumstances of the country's 600,000-800,000 inhabitants. The ruling Sultan, Sa'id bin Taymur al Bu Sa'id, who is preoccupied with protecting his regime against his rivals, including the Imam of Oman and several members of his own family, heretofore has actively resisted modernization and reform. Armed dissidence has occurred sporadically since 1955, supported mainly by outside Arab states such as the UAR, Syria, and Iraq. The Sultan's Armed Forces (SAF), whose officer corps of 100 includes 30 seconded and 40 contract British officers, thus far has been able to contain this dissidence, both in the Dhofar and Oman regions. A recent intelligence report indicates that the Sultan's son Qabus and his half-brother Tariq may be plotting his overthrow. At a meeting in September 1967, Tariq and Qabus agreed to join forces in such an attempt; the plot's timing and bona fides are unknown, but the report alleges that Qabus intends to become Sultan and Tariq the prime minister and regent for a period of five years. Other plots involving the Imam may be in the blueprint stage, but disorganization within the Imam's camp and the temporary preoccupation of potential backers such as the UAR, Syria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia with the Arab-Israel issue make it unlikely that serious coup attempts will be made from this quarter within the near future. Although it has at present minimal political importance, the Sultanate may play a growing role in future Persian Gulf developments. The Sultanate already has certain strategic importance by virtue of its location adjacent to the Straits of Hormuz at the entrance to the Gulf. With the takeover of South Arabia (the People's Republic of South Yemen) by the National Liberation Front (NLF) and the increasing Soviet involvement in Yemen, the Saudis, Iranians, and the lesser rulers of the Persian Gulf are worried that an NLF-style revolution will spread from southern Arabia to the Gulf. Having acquired a petroleum industry and the accompanying influx of foreign workers, Muscat and Oman is now a more inviting target for such Gulf-directed activities. Anti-Sultan and anti-British propaganda attacks have long been pursued by communications media in the Arab nationalist states; recently, the USSR has turned its propaganda in this direction. The political fortunes of the Sultanate will directly influence the future of the Trucial States, Qatar, and Bahrain, as well as the policies of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. If a moderately progressive regime were to emerge, whether under the Sultan, Qabus, or some as yet unknown successor, Muscat and Oman could contribute to political stability in the Gulf; conversely, a radical Arab nationalist takeover would lead to increased agitation and instability in the states to the north. Having no diplomatic representation and virtually no political or economic influence, the US can do little to affect the course of events in Muscat and Oman. However, a treaty between the US and the Sultanate/2/ provides a basis for establishment of a diplomatic mission and possibly a small aid or Peace Corps program. The US already has expressed its willingness to provide a Peace Corps program, and is awaiting the Sultan's decision. /2/The United States and the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman signed a Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights at Salalah on December 20, 1958. The Treaty entered into force June 11, 1960. (11 UST 1835; TIAS 4530; 380 UNTS 181) Whether dissidence in Muscat and Oman will remain at the present controllable level or increase with growing public awareness is open to speculation. We expect, however, that the Arab revolutionary countries may increase their subversive efforts in this area, particularly if there is renewed infighting between the moderate and radical camps. While it is possible that the Sultan could remain in power without adapting to his new economic conditions, or that he or a successor might institute reforms sufficient to contain popular disaffection, it is more likely that outside Arab interference and the influx of foreign elements into the Oman oilfields will lay the groundwork for increased dissidence and perhaps eventually the Sultan's overthrow. [Here follows the body of the memorandum.]
126. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, January 25, 1968. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL BAHRAIN IS-US. Confidential. Drafted by David G. Newton on February 5. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Mr. Lay said he had recently returned from Bahrain. He had seen the Ruler just after Goronwy Roberts had told the Ruler of the British intention to withdraw by 1971 and had never seen the Ruler so upset. The Ruler has concluded that he can no longer count on the British and he is now trying to ally himself with King Faisal. Mr. Lay pointed out that the Bahrainis are good friends of the United States and he hoped that we could support them within reason. Right now they are looking for some small gesture of US interest. Perhaps it would be possible to open a "sub-office" of the Consulate General in Dhahran. In reply Mr. Brewer pointed out that at present we are under instructions to cut the number of our personnel overseas by 10 percent and have no resources available for any establishment in Bahrain. We feel that the Shah has no intention of pushing Iran's claim to Bahrain but he will not publicly retract it. It is important for the parties to keep cool and let the problem disappear by itself over time. Mr. Stolz noted that elimination of the "dual passport" problem would be a help and stressed that the Iranians should show good faith to the Bahrainis. Mr. Brewer pointed out that the British had acted as a de facto buffer for conflicting interests in the Persian Gulf. Now that they are leaving militarily, the Gulf countries will need to do more themselves to develop a cooperative atmosphere. Stolz observed that the area will face a much greater threat from leftists and perhaps the USG should consider giving some assurances. Mr. Brewer noted this is no time for the USG to assume new commitments. Our position is that the littoral states, not the USG, must replace the British presence by establishing new bases for cooperation. Mr. Brewer asked Mr. Stolz how he viewed Bahrain's future. Mr. Stolz thought that the country would remain independent but seek close ties with Saudi Arabia. At present Saudi-Bahraini relations were very good. Mr. Brewer observed that British withdrawal presented us with major problems, but we are still optimistic that some local stability can be developed. The recent New York Times article on the willingness of local rulers to pay for the upkeep of British troops was apparently true. However, the reason for withdrawal was not just financial; internal politics of the Labour Party were involved. Nevertheless we hope that the British will still play a role in the Gulf and that the results there will not be like those in Aden. Mr. Stolz repeated his suggestion about American assurances but Mr. Brewer reiterated that this was not a good time to suggest further American commitments. Mr. Lay suggested again that the Ruler would like something more than monthly visits by Amcongen Dhahran, but any indication of further American interest would be appreciated.
127. Telegram From the Consulate General in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State/1/ Dhahran, January 28, 1968, 1450Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 1 UK. Secret. Repeated to Jidda, Tehran, Kuwait, and London. 505. Subj: Persian Gulf. Following is from Ambassador in Riyadh: 1. When meeting with Rashad Pharaon last night, he spoke of Saudi concern re future of Gulf in view Brit withdrawal, growing Soviet activity in ME area and generally unsatisfactory Yemeni and South Arabian situations (septels--Notal)./2/ He wanted to know if HMG had talked to USG before taking withdrawal decision? I told him that to best my knowledge, Brits had done so at about same time Roberts Mission sent to brief King Faisal and other interested states, but not before. As I had told King, USG not happy about Brit decision and has urged HMG take no irrevocable steps. USG has also pointed out to Brits that, apart from military position, elements exist in Brit presence which littoral states may feel can continue to be of benefit and which we hope Brits will be willing discuss with littoral states. I suggested that Saudis should consider this same matter and talk to Brits about it (SecState's 103449)./3/ Idea seemed new one to Rashad, but he undertook give it some study. He also wondered why HMG had not accepted offer of various Trucial States to finance continuation Brit troop commitment. /2/Reference is to telegrams 503 and 504 from Dhahran, January 28. (Ibid., POL 27 YEMEN) /3/Document 124. 2. In answer my question if King had raised confederation idea with Ruler of Bahrain, Rashad said Ruler deeply disturbed by continuing Iranian claim and had asked Faisal for Saudi security guarantee. According Rashad, Faisal agreed give such security assurance if Ruler of Bahrain able get together with other Trucial rulers in some form of confederation. (Note: If Rashad's version correct, Saudi security assurance to Bahrain not as categoric as some other sources have suggested.) 3. Rashad continued that status of Bahrain is major obstacle to cooperation among principal Gulf riparian states, especially with Iran. While SAG wants to cooperate with Iran, it can do so only if Shah will publicly renounce claim to Bahrain and Iranian Majlis approves such declaration. Unless this takes place any effort on part of SAG to cooperate with Iran will incur ire of other Arabs. In past few days UAR public media have already begun to attack Iranian role in Gulf. SAG has asked its Ambassador in Tehran to sound out Iranians on possibility such public declaration. Rashad asked for my thoughts on this. 4. I said would want to query Ambassador Meyer re his views, but meanwhile wished make few personal observations. It my understanding, and King Faisal had confirmed it also his, that Shah of Iran is not actively seeking to incorporate Bahrain, but that for domestic reasons he cannot publicly say so. If this true, idea of making public renunciation approved by Majlis a condition for any Saudi-Iranian cooperation in Gulf struck me as asking too much. It would not surprise me if Iranians rejected any such suggestion and if it leaves sour taste. 5. I suggested that in exploring among themselves future of Gulf, littoral states ought to get away from such terms as "ambitions" and "designs" which connote nasty, selfish competition. Instead, littoral states should begin think in terms of legitimate "interests" in Gulf on latter there understandably considerable overlap and mutuality which should constitute basis for needed cooperation in various spheres. Instead of demanding public self-denying declaration, why not work with Iran and Kuwait in developing multilateral regional institutions in fields of economic, security, etc? Such institutions would demonstrate by practical means that each littoral state is renouncing any individual ambitions in terms of the common interest. Rashad insisted such cooperation feasible only if there is self-denying declaration by Iran since otherwise Shah's successor might jettision any arrangements now made and reassert claim to Bahrain. 6. I emphasized all littoral states are going to have to take a few "risks" in attempting develop climate of confidence which meaningful cooperation requires. Shah still young and vigorous and it seemed to me practical cooperative arrangements worked out with him now offer reasonable promise being able continue for considerable period of time. After all Shah could raise same question re King Faisal's eventual successor. A bit of good faith is essential if anything is to be worked out. 7. Although Rashad accepted point, he remained worried that in absence some public Iranian renunciation of Bahrain, broader Arab pressures would preclude SAG from cooperating with Iran. He again alluded to UAR public media attacks. I reminded him that King has succeeded in handling Nasser during five years of intensive UAR vilification for doing what Faisal considered right in Yemen. Even now UAR heavily dependent on Saudi subsidy. Seemed to me that if King persuaded cooperation with Iran and other Gulf states is right way to proceed, he able do so with minimal regard for UAR or other radical Arab states' views and indeed has few screws of his own that he can use if necessary. King has private assurances from Shah that he not seeking incorporate Bahrain. Cooperation among Gulf riparians should be possible in knowledge of this fact. Surely need for public declaration simply to satisfy radical Arab peripheral states hardly necessary. Those Arab states that want to attack Faisal will do so anyway irrespective whether Iranian public renunciation of Bahrain exists or not. While Rashad agreed in principle, he remained worried that so long as Iran maintains constitutional claim to Bahrain as one of its provinces, Saudis and other Arabs will find it difficult cooperate. 8. When asked what is alternative to cooperation, Rashad argued SAG can deal with each of Trucial States separately. All but Abu Dhabi now look to SAG and SAG in position "surround" Abu Dhabi. I suggested this scarcely statemanslike approach. If Saudis go it alone, so will everyone else. Each of lower Gulf rulers will play off one principal riparian against others for own advantage. Gulf will become cockpit of heightened differences of kind of which Commies and other subversives thrive. I urged SAG not attempt make price of cooperation with Iran for Gulf cooperation so high that Iranians cannot reasonably pay. I reminded him SAG always sensitive any suggestion of "conditions" and others might be expected be equally so. Shah's forthcoming visit offers timely opportunity explore fully and frankly all ideas re future of Gulf and I hoped that on its part SAG will take advantage of visit for constructive talks. 9. For Tehran: Would appreciate your views re likelihood Iranians agreeing such Majlis approved self-denying declaration re Bahrain. Will be in Riyadh next week or so and any message best to me via Dhahran, rptd info Jidda./4/ /4/Telegram 10787 to Dhahran, January 30, "heartily" endorsed Allen's comments to Rashad Pharaon (senior adviser to King Faisal) as reported in telegram 505 and noted that, at the Ambassador's discretion, the same points might usefully be made directly to the King prior to the Shah's arrival. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 1 UK) Allen
128. Action Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, January 31, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Iran, 1/1/68-6/30/68. Secret. SUBJECT We have an opportunity this afternoon--much sooner than we expected--to strike a blow for regional cooperation in the Persian Gulf following Britain's withdrawal. State proposes you send the attached message/2/ to the Shah tonight trying to head off trouble between him and King Faisal. The Shah's actions in the next few days could seriously damage Iran's relations with the Saudis at a time when we want the two countries to work together at filling the vacuum the British will leave behind. /2/See Document 129. The Shah planned a visit to Faisal beginning 3 February, but has decided to cancel the trip because he thinks the Saudis are trying to undermine the Iranian claim to Bahrain Island which is now a British protectorate between Iran and Saudi Arabia. If the Shah stays home, the Saudis will take it as a deliberate insult. Armin Meyer has seen the Shah several times about this, but the best he has been able to get is a delay in announcing the "postponement" of the visit. The attached message is skillfully drafted to make clear that you expect the Shah to go, but it is not so specific as to be offensive or useless if he decides not to--the only risk is a negative reaction, but this draft stops at praising his foresight and saying you are counting on his leadership. Our main concern anyway is not the immediate issue of the visit but the future of the Persian Gulf. Good relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran will be necessary to keep things under control when the British leave. The alternatives are instability with a strong chance of an increased Soviet presence. We don't want to have to replace the British, and we don't want the Russians there. So we must count on the Shah and Faisal. The proposed message concentrates on these broader issues and would be worth sending even if the visit were not an issue. Since it is, it's worth trying to get this out tonight if possible to do double duty. Walt Approve/3/ /3/This option is checked.
129. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran/1/ Washington, February 1, 1968, 0138Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files, 1967-69, POL 33 PERSIAN GULF. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Eliot on January 31; cleared by Brewer and Saunders, and in draft by Battle and Katzenbach; and approved by Rockwell. Repeated to Dhahran for Ambassador Eilts, and to Jidda, Kuwait, and New Delhi for Rostow. 108214. Please deliver following message to Shah: "Your Imperial Majesty: Now that the British have reached their decision on the future of their military presence in the Persian Gulf, I would like to share some preliminary thoughts with you on the situation there. In the first place, let me stress, as I have said before, that the United States attaches importance to the future security of the Gulf. We would not wish to see outside powers, bent on promoting their interests by creating trouble, intrude into the area. I believe you share these views. The United States interest in the security of the area does not, however, envisage that we would wish either to replace the British military presence or participate in any new regional security arrangement. The United States looks to the countries of the area to ensure the area's security. The United States is also, as you know, deeply interested in the economic and social progress of the Persian Gulf area. Here again, it is our hope that the countries of the area will take the lead in cooperating with each other to forward this progress. I am aware that there are a number of specific problems at issue between the states bordering on the Gulf. It is of the utmost importance that these problems be solved so that all concerned may proceed to work on fundamental matters looking to the future stability and prosperity of the area. Their solution will require patience, understanding and a high degree of statesmanship. In this connection, I was delighted to learn of your recent talks with the Ruler of Kuwait. Since so much will depend on the maintenance of the cordial ties and mutual understanding between Iran and Saudi Arabia which you have done so much to develop, we have welcomed plans for an early meeting between you and King Feisal. I am encouraged and comforted, Your Majesty, about the future of the Persian Gulf area because you and our Saudi friends are there. Your Majesty's leadership will, I know, continue to be directed at realizing our shared desire for peace, stability and progress. Ambassador Meyer has informed me of his conversations with you on these matters, and I look forward to hearing from Under Secretary Rostow of his talk with you next week. I hope we can continue to stay in touch as the situation unfolds. With my warmest personal regards. Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson" Rusk
130. Message From the Shah of Iran to President Johnson/1/ Tehran, February 1, 1968. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Iran, 1/1/68-6/30/68. No classification marking. Telegram 108773, February 2, which transmitted the text of the message, states that it was delivered at 3 p.m. on February 1. Dear Mr. President, Thank you for your letter which I have received today/2/ and have perused with great care, and I am happy to observe that your views correspond exactly with mine. /2/See Document 129. We have done everything to secure the stability of the Persian Gulf area in cooperation with the relevant countries of the region. We have gone very far in that direction, and as far as any one can go, but our efforts so far have, unfortunately, been answered by precisely the opposite reaction to that expected. But we will continue to show patience until the parties concerned come to their senses. The Persian Gulf is vital for Iran and is a matter of life and death to us. So long as our heart beats and there is any strength left in us, we shall do our utmost to keep it a free zone and a stable one. I am sure that your Ambassador, Mr. Meyer, has reported to you on the conversation I had with him on the thirtieth of January. It is most heartening to witness the interest that you, Mr. President, and your government evince in the safeguarding of the stability and security of the Persian Gulf and its immunity from outside intrusion, now that the British have decided to withdraw. It is also my firm conviction that no foreign power outside the relevant countries of the Persian Gulf should get involved in the maintenance of the peace of the area. I look forward to receiving Under Secretary Rostow and to having discussions with him. With my kindest regards and warmest good wishes, Sincerely, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
IRG/NEA 68-8 Washington, February 1, 1968. /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/NE (Critchfield) Files: Job 80-00105A, Box 2, IRG/NEA Working File, Communist Presence--Arabian Peninsula, Persian Gulf. Secret. Drafted by Sober on February 3. INTERDEPARTMENTAL REGIONAL GROUP Record of IRG Meeting--February 1, 1968 The major part of the meeting was devoted to a consideration of our interests in and policy vis-a-vis the Persian Gulf, with particular regard to the forthcoming British withdrawal. (The first part of the meeting, regarding the forthcoming overseas personnel reduction, is recorded in IRG/NEA 68-7./2/) /2/Not printed. The CIA member gave an intelligence briefing on the current status and prospects of subversive forces in the Gulf area, as well as of the elements of stability in the region. He said that the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM) has emerged as the dominant subversive organization in the Gulf area, and that Bahrain is probably the Gulf state most vulnerable to subversion. The CIA member concluded, however, that on balance the chances are reasonably good that general stability will be maintained in the Gulf region for the next several years, largely because of the limited capabilities of those who would foment unrest. Contingencies which he felt could change this picture include the death of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia and the entry into the Gulf area of a sizable quantity of Soviet weapons, possibly through an increase of UAR activity. The CIA member provided copies of a report just prepared by the Office of National Estimates on the new situation in the Gulf (copy attached)./3/ /3/Not attached. Reviewing the Country Directors' paper on the "Effect of British Withdrawal from the Persian Gulf and Recommended US Action" (circulated with IRG/NEA 68-6),/2/ the Group agreed that it provided a sound assessment of the problems and identification of US interests in the area. Although there were differences on some of the specific recommendations, the low-key policy approach recommended by the paper was generally endorsed. The Group agreed that although the Soviets will try to increase their presence and influence in the Gulf area, the key to the future of the region in the next few years will be developments within and among the various Gulf states themselves. It is neither politically feasible nor desirable for the US to "replace" the British presence in the Persian Gulf. Our policy should be directed along the lines of (a) encouraging the British to maintain as much of their present special role in the Gulf as they can, as long as possible (including their role as principal arms supplier to various Gulf states); (b) encouraging the Saudis and Iranians to settle their outstanding differences regarding the median line and other issues; (c) encouraging greater political and economic cooperation generally among the Gulf states; and (d) avoiding an undue military buildup by Gulf littoral states. Our very important oil and strategic interests in Iran and Saudi Arabia will require us to continue to play a leading role in those countries. It was agreed, however, that in other respects the most suitable direct US involvement, under the above policy guidelines, would be generally in low key and peripheral to the activities of the British and the indigenous Gulf states. Among other things, it would be useful to increase the American commercial presence in the region. It was agreed that the American oil companies operating in the Gulf area should be sounded out on the possibility of expanding their activities among the Gulf populations and take a more enlightened view of their role in that part of the world. The Chairman noted that a study had been undertaken within State aiming at a preliminary Department view on the security aspects of the British withdrawal and on possible alternative military arrangements. It was agreed that results of this study should be fully coordinated with Defense and the Joint Staff prior to possible preparation of a recommendation for IRG consideration. MEMBERS PRESENT Executive Chairman: Mr. Battle State (NEA): Messrs. Davies, Rockwell, Brewer, Eliot S.S. [Continue with the next documents] Volume XXI Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |