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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXI Near East Region Department of State |
 104. Memorandum From the Country Director for Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen, and Aden (Brewer) to the Director of the Office of Regional Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sober)/1/ Washington, October 13, 1967. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, NEA/RA Files: Lot 71 D 218, Holmes Study, 1967. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. SUBJECT /2/See Document 22. REFERENCE Your Memo, September 22, 1967/3/ /3/Sober's September 22 memorandum to IRG/NEA members reported that the Chairman of the SIG had asked IRG/NEA and IRG/AF to propose actions that might be initiated immediately in the Holmes Study area, even with present limited resources. (Department of State, NEA/RA Files: Lot 71 D 218, Holmes Study, 1967) The Holmes Study made no suggestions for any major courses of action to be taken in the region of the Arabian Peninsula at this time. Nevertheless, as your memorandum recalls, even with our present limited resources there are certain actions already underway and others whose relevance to the Study deserve mention. In Kuwait, for instance, a $50 million loan has been approved by the Export-Import Bank to the Kuwait National Petroleum Company for partial financing of a refinery. The loan is a further evidence of United States support for this important small Persian Gulf State whose continued development is a key factor in the maintenance of stability in the area. The United States Government is following through with planning to elevate its Consulate General in Aden to an Embassy when South Arabian independence follows British withdrawal (possibly before the end of 1967). This, of course, assumes that a viable government will be established which we will find it in our interest to recognize. With reference to the Study's repeated mention of the desirability of our contributing to a multinational naval task force for the area, NEA/ARP suggests that improvement of US Naval capacity for the region might be more realistic. There are increasing numbers of isolated groups of US citizens in the Peninsula for whose welfare and protection we have some responsibility. The region's vast oil reserves remain important to us. NEA/ARP therefore urges that further study now be given to this question. The particular thrust of this effort should be to flesh out what is meant by the need to develop an "on call" military capability, including naval forces operating in waters contiguous to the area as is suggested in Annex B, Section V.C and D of the Holmes Study. As a basis for discussion, we would favor the immediate examination of the possibility of increasing the strength of our Middle Eastern naval forces from two destroyers to four. This would appear particularly useful right now, due to the much longer time required to support and reinforce COMIDEASTFOR due to the closure of the Suez Canal.
105. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State/1/ Tehran, October 25, 1967, 0830Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33 PERSIAN GULF. Secret. Repeated to Jidda, London, Kuwait, Dhahran, and CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA. 1835. Security of Persian Gulf. 1. Shah evening 24th indicated he intends speak in strong terms re British Mideast policies when British Minister of State Roberts (successor to Thompson) visits Tehran in November. 2. Noting he had that day received telegram from Iran Amb Aram in London to effect there is likelihood British will recognize Sallal regime, Shah said he will ask Roberts what is motivating incomprehensible UK policy. Shah's remarks were extension GOI's expression of concern re what it considers unseemly British efforts to woo Nasser (Tehran 1711)./2/ /2/Dated October 17. (Ibid., POL 27 YEMEN) 3. Shah said he has received another report re move to merge Yemen and Aden. This in his view opens prospect of either Nasserist or, even worse, Communist-dominated country at mouth of Red Sea. He noted Russians increasingly active in Yemen. 4. Shah said he cannot understand Britain's so cavalierly letting down so many friends, i.e. Arabian Peninsula sheikhs, who had placed their faith in British. Each sheikhdom, he said, seems to have some London School of Economics leftist leaders ready to manipulate the destinies of these desert principalities. 5. Obviously concerned by what he considers vacuum in sheikhdoms as British influence diminishes in area, Shah said Iran not interested in additional land. In fact, it clear Iranian attempts to exercise domination over Arab areas would be failure. Obviously one solution would be Saudi hegemony over anachronistic sheikhdoms. However, Saudis in Shah's view are having enough trouble controlling their own patriarchal society. 6. I took occasion to mention that in informal discussion some of us held some months ago, my distinguished colleague in Kuwait Ambassador Cottam voiced suggestion there might be established some sort of economic consortium of all riparian countries on Gulf. This idea seemed to intrigue Shah. He thought perhaps some sort of Persian Gulf development bank might be practical vehicle for developing regional cooperation in Gulf Area. He likened such project to RCD. 7. From British Ambassador I had already heard that British are sending State Minister Roberts to Tehran. In response to HMG inquiries, Iranians made clear they would like formal discussions and came up with agenda of four points, three of which are Mideast, Persian Gulf security and Iran oil production. Meyer
106.Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State/1/ Jidda, October 28, 1967, 1130Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 19 ADEN. Confidential. Repeated to London, Kuwait, Aden, Dhahran, and Tehran. 1647. Subj: Apprehension of Persian Gulf Rulers. Ref (Notal)./2/ From Seelye. /2/Not further identified. 1. King told UK Ambassador Man in connection King's criticism UK policy in South Arabia (Jidda's 1646)/3/ that Persian Gulf rulers have expressed considerable concern to him re prospect UK will disengage from Persian Gulf as peremptorily as they have from South Arabia. King told Man that he shared this concern and that he was worried also that UK would undercut existing regimes by handing over authority to nationalists prematurely. /3/Dated October 28. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 19 ADEN) 2. Man states he endeavored to disabuse King of this belief, assuring King that any UK withdrawal from Gulf would not occur for sometime (Ustaqbal ba'eed). King probed Man as to precisely what this meant. Would it mean next year? Man affirmed that it assuredly did not, but, he confides, he was not authorized to tell King that British have in mind staying at least until 1970. Man endeavored to persuade King that he must have faith in British and expressed hope that King would pass his reassurances along to Gulf rulers. (Man states that political resident Stewart Crawford reports from Bahrein aroused their apprehensions by warning that British will pull out of Gulf sooner rather than later.) 3. [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] King acknowledged he had exchanged letters with Zaid re Buraimi but noted that a misunderstanding had developed. He had expected Zaid in initiating correspondence to make specific proposals re settlement Buraimi dispute but, instead, Zaid had asked King to initiate proposals. King had thereupon tossed ball back at Zaid by asking Zaid to make first move. 4. Comments: Ambassador Man expressed belief that he had succeeded somewhat in reassuring King that UK planned no peremptory disengagement from Gulf but he expressed personal reservations re determination of present UK Government remain in Gulf through 1970. Should nationalist uprising occur in Bahrain before then, for example, he doubts whether UK would intervene militarily to support regime./4/ /4/Telegram 61726 to London, October 30, expressed the Department's puzzlement over the reference to British plans to remain in the Gulf "at least until 1970," noting that a British decision might have been taken that the U.K. Ambassador was not yet authorized to communicate. The telegram noted that the U.S. Government believed that the United Kingdom intended to remain in the Gulf to protect its interests there for the foreseeable future, i.e., well beyond 1970. (Ibid.) Eilts
107. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, November 1, 1967, 10 a.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 16 ADEN. Confidential. Drafted by Brewer on November 3 and approved in the Office of the Secretary of State on November 7. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Sir Patrick called at 10:00 a.m. on November 1 to inform the Secretary in advance of the November 2 British announcement on withdrawal from South Arabia. Sir Patrick said that withdrawal would be completed "within the second half of November" but that the exact date still remained open. In announcing this in Commons on November 2, the Foreign Secretary would also make clear that the previously scheduled naval and air deterrent forces for South Arabia were being cancelled due to the changed situation in both Yemen and South Arabia. The Foreign Secretary would also announce that decisions on post-independence British military and economic support to South Arabia would have to be taken at a later date. London simply had to suspend judgment until the future could be seen more clearly and an opportunity provided for discussions with a new government. Mr. Brown would also underline the continued readiness of the High Commissioner in Aden to negotiate if the nationalists wished to do so. However, British withdrawal would go forward whether or not such negotiations took place. Sir Patrick added that it had also been decided that Perim and Kamaran Islands would go to South Arabia, subject to any UN action on internationalization of Perim. The Kuria Murias would be ceded to Muscat. No announcement on these points would be made on November 2. The Secretary asked what would happen following the British withdrawal. Sir Patrick replied that the UK simply did not know. The NLF/FLOSY talks in Cairo were apparently not going well. No government might be formed. However, if serious trouble broke out, it now looked as if it might be contained within South Arabia. The Secretary wondered whether the nationalists might ask, and receive, Egyptian troops. Sir Patrick replied that he thought not, noting that the UAR withdrawal from Yemen was proceeding. The Secretary asked about post-independence naval dispositions by HMG. Sir Patrick said that naval forces now in Aden waters (two carriers) would cover the final withdrawal phase. He had no information regarding subsequent dispositions but undertook to inquire of London. The Ambassador stressed that these British actions in no way reflected on HMG's determination to remain in the Persian Gulf. The Secretary observed that, even though the Egyptians were leaving Yemen, this did not mean that their forces could not turn up in South Arabia, or that other foreign elements might not intrude. We would very much hope that the UK would continue to support the South Arabian Army, one of the few elements of stability in the current situation, until the local situation became firmer. Sir Patrick said that a Military Advising and Training Mission would be standing by to take up its duties with the South Arabian Army on fourteen days' notice, but that it would not be sent without a further decision. For Sir Patrick's information, the Secretary went over brief Department press guidance designed to meet expected questions on November 2, following the British announcement. The Ambassador indicated that he thought the comments would be helpful. On leaving, the Ambassador said that the British were similarly informing King Faisal, the Shah and the Amir of Kuwait in advance. He was uncertain whether the UN Mission on Aden was also being informed. In response to the Secretary's question, the Ambassador said that King Faisal did not seem to have much influence in South Arabia but was most concerned about the current British policy. After leaving the Secretary, an opportunity was provided to go over the British guidance in detail. Mr. Urwick made clear that the British would decide on November 13 the exact date on which withdrawal would be completed and said that it would fall in the period November 22 to 30. He said that the removal of the air deterrent referred specifically to the proposed stationing of V bombers on Masirah Island. In the event that no government was formed prior to the British departure, Mr. Urwick opined that the British position of suspending judgment on future financial aid to the new state would continue to obtain. Negotiations on the subject could be initiated by the future British diplomatic mission in Aden whenever an acceptable government was established.
108. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Regional Organizations/1/ Washington, November 1, 1967, 1444Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 16 ADEN. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Brewer on October 31; cleared by Davies, William Dixon Boggs (EUR/RPM), and Seasword; and approved by John I. Getz (EUR/RPM). Repeated to London, Aden, Jidda, and Tehran. 62888. NATUS. Deliver Wilson 0900, Thursday, November 2. Subject: Recognition of New Government in Aden. Re USNATO 164./2/ /2/Dated October 31. (Ibid.) 1. Dept agrees in principle re desirability early recognition South Arabia by number Western countries, including USG. For present, however, absence of any government in the state and uncertainty as to whether one, and if so what type, will be in charge on independence makes it difficult speak today in concrete terms. 2. Furthermore, international acceptability new state would, in our view, be enhanced if several regional governments were to recognize it ahead of most Western powers. This does not, of course, apply to UK which we would think should recognize at once assuming successor government in place. 3. You should take line at POLAD meeting that prompt recognition by Western countries is desirable, depending on local circumstances at time and assuming earlier comparable action by several area states. Should Communist countries themselves extend immediate recognition without, as seems more likely, waiting for area states, fact British had already recognized would reduce impact. View fluidity situation and to coordinate actions as closely as possible, would appreciate British keeping POLAD currently informed re attitude London as independence date approaches. Rusk
109. Memorandum From John W. Foster and Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/ Washington, November 7, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, South Arabia, Vol. I, 7/67-11/67. Secret. SUBJECT The British Cabinet decided last week that, come what may, British forces will pull out of South Arabia sometime November 22-30. No one--least of all the Brits--pretends to know what will follow. But this will at least describe the main elements in the situation. The intelligence community's guess today is that the National Liberation Front (NLF) has the best chance of taking over. This is the most home-grown of the nationalist groups, having opposed both the UAR-backed FLOSY and the Saudi-backed South Arabian League. The NLF has already taken over fairly easily in most of South Arabia, and in the past week's fighting continues to appear stronger than FLOSY in Aden. Nasser's pullout in Yemen apparently weakened FLOSY's base. This would mean a short-term victory for one nationalist group rather than establishment of the broader coalition which Nasser and Faisal envisioned at Khartoum. South Arabian nationalist leaders have been in Cairo trying to negotiate the composition of a post-independence government. But the NLF in Aden seems to have pre-empted. Renewed fighting between the NLF and FLOSY and the army's announcement yesterday that it will back the NLF in forming a government probably make any Cairo agreement meaningless. The army remains the big question mark. Until now it has played a mediating role, trying to enforce a cease-fire on all contending groups. As long as it kept on that tack, its leaders were able to keep its own contending factions together. The next couple of days will tell whether the army is mainly pro-NLF or whether it will split into substantial factions that will end up on opposite sides in a civil war. If the army stands firm, then we may have seen the worst of the bloodshed. If it splits, the fighting in Aden could be severe, and even the up-country sultans might be tempted to reclaim the domains which the NLF has recently taken over from them. No one--including the British--is sure that the NLF can form a viable government, or how such a government will act. Having fought rather than negotiated its way to near-power, it will be vulnerable to continued opposition. The survival of any government will depend for a time on outside aid, and the British have suspended any decision on continuing aid until after they see what government they're dealing with. Others appear to be waiting too. Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Iran and probably the USSR all appear to be waiting for the dust to settle before doing anything. Faisal, despite his feeling that the British have dumped his up-country conservative friends, will probably stand aside for fear of creating any excuse for Nasser to delay his withdrawal from Yemen. Faisal's final position will depend on which faction of the NLF appears to have come out on top--the radicals or a relatively moderate group. We and the British had hoped to line up an impressive string of early friendly recognitions for the new state, but we're temporarily stymied by the absence of any government to recognize. State has contingency plans for recognizing and getting an ambassador out, but they're holding back too. They may have to evacuate our people instead. Despite the potential disruption and danger to our people, we shouldn't ignore the positive elements in this situation. Much as we may hate to admit it, the June war has probably made the South Arabian transition easier for us and our friends. Nasser's role there is diminished, and we long ago decided--as we thought Faisal would, too--that we could live with any regime that did not have his hand in it. The new government may well be hostile to us, but unless there is an unexpected amount of Communist activity we can probably ride it out. John
110. Paper Prepared in the Department of State/1/ Washington, November 8, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Saunders Files, Aden & South Arabia, 4/1/66-1/20/69. Confidential. Drafted by Brewer. Prepared for a meeting of the Interdepartmental Regional Group for Near East and South Asia on November 16 at 3 p.m. Attached to a November 9 memorandum from Sober to IRG/NEA members (IRG/NEA 67-43) noting that the forthcoming meeting on November 16 would be devoted to a review of developments since the last meeting on the subject and further consideration of U.S. policy toward the emerging new state of South Arabia. He suggested that the attached paper might serve to focus the discussion. SOUTH ARABIAN PROSPECTS (Paper prepared by State--NEA/ARP) Introduction Almost everything that could have happened in South Arabia to impede its orderly transmutation to independence has already occurred. By early November, 1967, the conservative regime on which Britain had earlier built its hopes had collapsed, feudal rulers in the Adeni hinterland had taken refuge in Saudi Arabia, a low-key civil war between local radicals (FLOSY and NLF) had put the NLF in control of most provincial centers, the collapse of sultanic rule in the Hadhramaut had made it likely that this vast area would join with the rest of South Arabia on independence, and "agreement on all issues so far discussed" was announced by NLF and FLOSY delegations in Cairo while their supporters were engaged in an armed struggle for the control of populous sections of Aden proper. Meanwhile, the UAR withdrawal from Yemen had reduced the external threat and the British had announced plans for an accelerated withdrawal, to be completed by December 1. London is holding in suspense plans to finance and train the South Arabian Army (SAA) and otherwise assist the new state pending the formation of a viable central government. Periodic Department Assessments IRG/NEA from time to time has reviewed developments in South Arabia. The Holmes Study/2/ included the area in its purview. A year ago, October 1966, IRG/NEA reviewed the potential threat to US interests as the UK prepared to withdraw from South Arabia and agreed, among other things, at the time that it was in the US interest that the West retain a significant influence in South Arabia and that dominant communist influence in the area could be prevented./3/ /2/See Document 22. /3/See Document 79. AID/NESA was asked by IRG/NEA to make an assessment of the potential requirements of an independent South Arabia for external assistance. This paper/4/ concluded that if the UK continues after independence to provide financial support to the South Arabian military and if Saudi Arabia performs on an earlier offer of economic assistance, the shortfall in a restricted South Arabian budget would be small. Prior to informal discussions with the British Foreign Office by the ARP Country Director in January, 1967, an inter-agency paper4 was prepared which assumed that an effective independent government in Aden would succeed the British in a year's time. On that assumption, the paper concluded that: (a) prompt USG recognition should be forthcoming; (b) our Consulate General should be raised to Embassy status with an Ambassador, Defense Attache and small staff; (c) a one-man USIA operation should be set up; and (d) normal cultural and similar programs instituted. The paper pointed out that, since no AID or MAP help could be assumed, it would be important for us to establish a normal presence early as a means of maximizing our influence with the new state at an early stage. /4/Not found. In May 1967 IRG/NEA again reviewed the situation and agreed that "the outcome of the struggle for control of South Arabia following imminent withdrawal of the UK is of considerable importance for US interests."/5/ A paper prepared by the Department for a scheduled NSC meeting of May 24, 1967/6/ conveyed the foregoing case and suggested several moves the US might make in consideration of the future of South Arabia. Among them were: a greater military presence in the Red Sea-Arabian Sea area and a willingness to undertake a full range of normal USG contacts with the new state. /5/See Document 95. /6/Document 97. A Joint Chiefs of Staff study prepared for the Secretary of Defense in May 1967/7/ regarded that if Aden were available to us it would be valuable, but not essential; that it was unlikely the Soviets would try to establish a military presence in the Arabian Peninsula or on the Horn of Africa; that the implications of US military or security assistance would be largely unfavorable to US interests. While a combination of UAR/USSR influence in the area would be contrary to US interests, South Arabia was adjudged not a critical area for our security interests. /7/Document 93. On July 26, 1967 IRG/NEA agreed that policy and specific actions must depend on circumstances, that tentative planning should go forward for recognizing the new government, elevating the Consulate General to Embassy status, and appointing a resident Ambassador./8/ Preliminary steps have been taken in implementation of these proposals. Further consideration was recommended for possible limited programs including Peace Corps volunteers, several MAP training spaces, and cultural exchanges should a new government voice an interest. /8/See Document 100. Following the November 2 UK announcement that withdrawal would be completed by the end of the month, the Department's spokesman told the press: "The British announcement that their withdrawal from South Arabia will be completed relatively soon is not unexpected, although the timing for independence is somewhat earlier than originally planned. With the day of independence approaching for South Arabia, we desire to extend the hand of friendship to all that country's people, with every good wish for their future prosperity, stability and orderly development." On the recognition question, the spokesman noted that local groups had not yet agreed on a successor government and questions of the USG attitude towards it were premature. Congen Aden reports that the USG announcement received wide and favorable coverage in South Arabia. Outlook What is going from South Arabia is much clearer than what is coming. Both the Egyptians and the British are withdrawing militarily from the region. Far from driving the disparate nationalist groups in South Arabia together in some viable coalition, recent developments have only prompted further splits in their serried ranks. The key element is the unity of the SAA, which so far has fortunately withstood serious tendencies to split along tribal and faction lines. It is by no means certain that a coalition can be put together by November's end to take over from the British. If no such government is formed, the SAA will be the only representative South Arabian body to which responsibility can be transferred. In talking with the British Ambassador on November 1, the Secretary said that we hoped HMG would continue to support the army until some local stability could be established. What the independent regime may look like is still an enigma. NLF leader Qahtan al-Shaabi has stated that its orientation will be "progressive," i.e. that the regime would take a radical view of regional and world events. On broad outlines, this may be true. But, in the inevitable sorting out process, much will depend on who actually emerges as head of NLF and whether the UK decides to continue subsidizing the SAA, since such help would make the army both a more united and a more moderate element of influence. Saudi Arabia watches developments closely. King Faisal would prefer to see a conservative regime take over, preferably one headed by tribal leaders, whose desire to preserve their own status would provide some sort of guarantee to him that radically inclined groups would not be allowed to influence affairs. Faisal already recognizes, however, that NLF and FLOSY possess power which cannot be overlooked, and Saudi sources suggest that an army take-over by the SAA is the most acceptable, realistic alternative. If this does not happen, SAG may seek to undermine a government of "progressive" Adenese by assisting South Arabian tribal leaders. The degree of interest the Soviets have in an independent South Arabia cannot be gauged, but they have been and continue to be active in Yemen, providing substantial economic and some military aid. It would appear reasonable for the USSR to extend its contact and influence in the Peninsula by recognizing the new South Arabian state and offering it assistance. Communist China probably has similar plans (there has been one report of Chicom arms arriving in the Hadhramaut, allegedly for the NLF). There is no reason to think that the South Arabians would refuse communist offers. The British have asked NATO states to consider prompt Western recognition of the new state to get in ahead of communist countries. Influence of the latter is more likely to be curtailed, however, by a British decision to support the new state financially. Pacification and consolidation of the country's hinterland will be a long drawn out process. Indeed, the formula for the amalgamation of Aden city with its primitive neighbors was never found by the British, nor do their successors have any easier time ahead of them in their search for a mutually satisfactory arrangement. Whether or not the Saudis offer encouragement to unruly tribes, there is likely to be trouble upcountry for a government in Aden made up largely of non-tribal, or detribalized young men. Conversely, any attempt to establish a government solely made up of these provincials would be opposed by the Aden city-based organizations. South Arabia, particularly in Aden, has the ingredients for a capable, if modest, government bureaucracy. The British have been there since 1839 and have created systems and routines as well as an experienced cadre of civil servants. There is a small army and a central police force, both of which, although made up of diverse city and tribal elements, have so far maintained their unity. South Arabia is better equipped now with trained human resources than is Yemen, a much older, independent state. Once the state is launched there is reason to believe that South Arabian nationalism may develop its own character, and its own loyalties, some of which may be uniquely local. Adenese and their back country cousins may well join wider Arab ranks, but perhaps on their own terms. With the UAR for the present curtailing its activities in the Peninsula, South Arabia will be spared at least some of the pressure, guidance, and manipulation associated with UAR interventionist tactics. It remains to be seen whether the Saudis will resist their own inclination to arrange matters as they would like them to be. While the new state can be expected to find its place within the Arab world, joining its causes, Arabism may be less a concern than the immediate problem of the creation of a unified nation. Assuming a viable government is formed, the USG ought not delay recognition for long lest we create an appearance of reluctance and indecision to do so because of the complexion of whatever government is established. Moreover, our failure to act would no doubt cause the regime to expel our consular staff, thus closing our remaining post in Southwest Arabia. Since the Soviets, Eastern Europeans and the Chinese will be in a position to be forthcoming with economic and military assistance, our prompt recognition could be a positive act of friendly intentions which might help offset our inability to do likewise. If no government appears, but local security is adequately maintained by the SAA and police, both we and the British would expect to keep our diplomatic staffs in place. Should security break down, British warships will be available offshore for the prompt evacuation of our staffs.
IRG/NEA 67-47 Washington, November 16, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Saunders Files, Aden & South Arabia, 4/1/66-1/20/69. Secret. Drafted by Acting Staff Director John F. Buckle on November 17. INTERDEPARTMENTAL REGIONAL GROUP Record of IRG/NEA Meeting--November 16, 1967 The meeting was devoted to a further consideration of our policy towards South Arabia, in the light of the developments since the IRG/NEA meeting of July 26, 1967 (see IRG/NEA 67-24, 7/26/67, for a record of agreements reached at that time)./2/ The Group: /2/Document 100. Reviewed recent significant developments in the rapidly moving situation as noted in the paper prepared for the meeting by the Country Director (IRG/NEA 67-43)/3/ and as elaborated by him. /3/Document 110. Agreed that, although our previous tentative planning with respect to an independent South Arabia might prove to be basically valid, there was now more reason to be concerned regarding the viability of the emerging government than anticipated last July and we should be convinced that the government in power was going to be able to govern successfully and intended to honor its international obligations before we extended our recognition. Should we decide to do so, we might prefer initially to establish our mission at the Charge level. In this connection, the Group agreed that we should keep in close consultation with the British and the Saudi Arabians both regarding their assessments of the new government as it emerges and their intentions towards it. Agreed that we should certainly not be ahead of the British in the matter of recognition and would also look for prior action by some of South Arabia's regional neighbors. The Saudi attitude would be important but her decision not to recognize would not necessarily cause us to withhold recognition. MEMBERS PRESENT Executive Chairman--Mr. Battle JFB
112. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/ Washington, November 17, 1967, 1556Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 19 ADEN. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Brewer on November 16; cleared by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Walter J. Stoessel and Looram; and approved by Brewer. Repeated to Beirut, Amman, Tehran, Kuwait, Jidda, Aden, USUN, Rome, and Addis Ababa. 70917. Subject: Recognition of South Arabia. 1. Dept aware British in throes preparations for Geneva UK/NLF talks and no doubt still uncertain what their final attitude will be toward regime likely arise Aden. Questions British attitude towards NLF government and extent to which HMG may be willing extend it tangible support are nevertheless important keys to basic question of South Arabian regime's survivability and international recognition. We accordingly hope Embassy will remain in closest touch with British in effort provide as timely readings as possible of evolving British policy. 2. Will also be desirable seek assure that Saudi attitude as understanding as possible re Western position, in event UK and others decide have dealings with NLF regime. We assume HMG intends keep Saudis, and no doubt Iranians, abreast of British intentions, particularly with reference financial support to South Arabian Army (SAA). 3. For Rome and Addis: State 62888/2/ being repeated you separately gives our tentative attitude on recognition question. While we do not think it necessary at this stage to initiate contacts with host governments on this subject, it will be appreciated if Embassies can be alert to any signs host government attitudes on South Arabian recognition issue. /2/Document 108. Rusk
113. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Battle) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, November 20, 1967. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 33 PERSIAN GULF. Secret. Drafted by Dinsmore and Brewer on November 17 and cleared by Davies and Cheslaw. SUBJECT You will recall that Sir Patrick Dean, in his meeting with you on November 1, made it clear that British withdrawal from South Arabia would not affect HMG's determination to remain in the Persian Gulf. This is further encouraging evidence that this remains the British view, in fact stemming from the trip to the Gulf this month of the new UK Minister of State at the Foreign Office, Goronwy Roberts (vice George Thompson). Roberts' trip was primarily for purposes of area familiarization but HMG is using the occasion to seek to counter speculation on the part of Gulf states that the ouster of the Sultans in South Arabia is a harbinger of things to come in the Gulf. These local leaders have felt that the British were willing passively to allow this to happen, and that they were in fact prepared to abandon traditional friends in order to make a deal with the activist insurgents. The Saudis have been particularly bitter in their criticism of what they regard as British policy, i.e. that the UK is turning its back on conservative, traditional elements in the peninsula. In response to our London Embassy's queries on the subject, Foreign Office representatives have also recently confirmed that the UK intends to maintain a military presence in the Gulf at least until the mid-1970's. One qualified spokesman assured us that HMG intends to remain in the Gulf as long as needed, i.e., until adequate local security arrangements are devised. Roberts has been renewing expressions of British support in order to preserve the Gulf States relations with, and dependence upon, Britain in the years immediately ahead. In the British view (with which we concur), should the Gulf States lose the incentive to cooperate with the UK (for fear of losing control), the Rulers would take whatever courses seemed most likely to preserve their position. Their moves might well obstruct modernization and initiate restrictive practices which would stimulate growth of the very opposition they fear. Meanwhile, the Saudis, who want the British to remain engaged for sometime longer, view themselves as their logical successors in the role of the major stabilizing factor in the area. However, the Saudis do not want to deal with the multitude of petty shaikhdoms which now exist. They are already thinking in terms of one or more federations of peninsula states with which they could more easily deal. SAG is talking with the British about a possible 100 million program to build up the Saudi navy, primarily in the Gulf. Such action is presumably directed to improving the Saudi bargaining position vis-a-vis Iran. The evident British intention to soldier on in the Gulf is reassuring. We believe every opportunity should be taken to encourage them in this direction, since no power on the horizon is likely to replace the security and stability the British now provide. We should also take advantage of opportunities as they arise quietly to encourage: (a) greater Saudi/Iranian understanding on Gulf problems, and (b) more cooperation among Gulf mini-states to improve changes for regional stability after the British go.
114. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts/1/ Washington, November 22, 1967, 0021Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 16 ADEN. Confidential. Drafted by Brewer and Dinsmore on November 21, cleared by Brown, and approved by Brewer. Sent to Aden, Amman, Beirut, Jidda, Kuwait, London, Tehran, Tel Aviv, and USUN. 72852. 1. Report of UN Special Mission on Aden was circulated at UN November 20./2/ Conclusions were summarized USUN 2306,/3/ which being repeated Tel Aviv, Beirut, Amman, Kuwait and Tehran. They are strongly biased against British. Committee of 24 decided Nov 21 to pass Mission report on to UNGA without comment. Following line may be used by addressees in event subject raised by others during normal contacts. /2/The Special Mission reported on November 10 that it was not able to meet with representatives of all political groups in the territory because conditions were not conducive, for which it blamed the United Kingdom. The Mission reported it made clear to the United Kingdom that negotiations for forming a caretaker government should include representatives from both FLOSY and NLF, but that the army, which was under British control, had announced on November 6 that it recognized only the NLF. (UN doc. A/6700/Rev. 1, Ch. VI, Annex III) /3/Dated November 16. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 19 ADEN/UN) 2. UN Mission's claim that its efforts make contact with South Arabian political groups were obstructed by British overlooks fact that both NLF and FLOSY refused for long period to cooperate with Mission. When FLOSY finally did offer talk with Mission, events had overtaken their efforts. When NLF asserted its supremacy over FLOSY through para-military struggle, British had no choice except to deal with changing situation on the ground. Until recently FLOSY/NLF agreement seemed likely but this no longer the case due further fighting for which both radical groups to blame. Idea that NLF victory in South Arabia was made possible through British-South Arabian Army collusion overlooks both indigenous strength and dynamism of NLF and fact NLF responsible for more terror killings of British than any other group. Furthermore it is our impression South Arabian Army is political power on its own and British Commander has only tenuous control, particularly over political activities of Arab officers, as UK prepares to depart. 3. In making foregoing points, addressees should make clear we hold no particular brief for either NLF or FLOSY and particularly deplore impact on innocent South Arabians, as well as foreigners, which terror tactics both organizations have caused. There is enough blame in South Arabian situation for all. UN Mission made extended effort to bring parties together; it is to be regretted that Mission in its report seems to have preferred dwelling on past rather than focussing pragmatically on situation as it exists in South Arabia today. Rusk
115. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate in Aden/1/ Washington, November 27, 1967, 2247Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 16 ADEN. Secret. Drafted by Brewer, cleared by Robert H. Newman (L/NEA), and approved by Battle. Repeated to Addis Ababa, Beirut, Jidda, London, Asmara, COMIDEASTFOR, and CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA. 75257. Aden 640./2/ /2/In telegram 640 from Aden, November 27, Eagleton reported that in a discussion with U.K. officials as to whether it was appropriate to meet NLF Leader Qahtan al-Shaabi at the airport when he returned from the Geneva negotiations, he stated that the position of the United States was different since it did not want to take any action that might imply official recognition. Eagleton informed the Department that he had made plans to meet informally with NLF Command Council member Abdullah al-Khameri, a former U.S. consulate employee, that evening, with the purpose of establishing a channel to the NLF command to use prior to official recognition of the new government. (Ibid.) 1. Congen quite right (para 4 reftel) no action should be taken which might imply official recognition. At same time, there no objection personal or unofficial evidences of cordiality which could assist in developing contacts with new regime. Because of fast pace of developments, we leave to your judgment those circumstances when such personal acts would be appropriate without implying recognition. As example, we see no objection to your greeting Qahtan at airport should you believe this desirable and other members Consular Corps in attendance. 2. Welcome your efforts establish channel to NLF command for use during period before recognition of new government (para 5 reftel). In course such contacts, you may assure local representatives that Americans friendly and well disposed newly independent state but that your official position must accord with international practice as long as formal recognition not yet established. In particular, formal written communications on government-to-government basis must be avoided. Rusk
116. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, November 29, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, South Arabia, Vol. I, 7/67-11/67. Secret. SUBJECT Just a word on what we're doing about the independence of South Arabia--the new People's Republic of South Yemen. British negotiations with the National Liberation Front concluded in Geneva yesterday, and for the first time we have a fairly clear picture of the post-independence government. We are not recognizing immediately. Today and tomorrow we'll respond to press queries by welcoming South Yemen to the family of nations. Then if the NLF continues in firm control for a week or two and acknowledges its international obligations, Secretary Rusk will recommend to you that we recognize. We want to be more sure first of Saudi views and of the ability of the NLF to act like a government. The new government will take the usual anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist, suspicious-of-the-West line. We expect it will proclaim a Nasser-style or Algerian-style "socialism," but so far don't have any evidence of extensive Communist ties. The NLF itself probably doesn't know yet what its policies will be. Its only policy so far has been to get the British out and win power. The government will face two main problems--staying in power and keeping afloat economically. South Arabia is still a collection of tribes--not a nation--and is vulnerable to a number of disruptive influences. The Saudis may exploit tribal opposition. The pro-Egyptian nationalists, who lost to the NLF in the final drive to power, may fight on. The South Arabian Army has backed the NLF so far, but it could turn to opposition. We still don't know what kind of continuing aid the British have agreed to, but that will be crucial in determining whether the new government has to look to Cairo or Moscow. The situation is still uncertain--and a good target for Moscow--but Nasser's pullout in Yemen has made the transition to independence easier than we thought it could be earlier this year. We don't look to the new government for much, but this is probably as good an outcome as we could have hoped for. Walt
117. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/ Washington, December 4, 1967. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 16 S YEMEN. Secret. SUBJECT Recommendation: That you approve in principle USG recognition of the People's Republic of Southern Yemen which became independent on November 30. Southern Yemen's application for membership in the UN could come before the Security Council as early as December 4. We would not want its admission to the UN and our own recognition to become too widely separated in time, lest we appear reluctant or indifferent. Accordingly, if you approve in principle, I will be glad to authorize an implementing telegram to Aden, instructing our principal officer to communicate the fact of recognition to the Foreign Minister of the new state./2/ /2/The approval line is checked and handwritten notations indicate that on December 7 instructions were sent to Aden in telegram 81196. (Ibid.) Discussion: British colonial rule in South Arabia formally ended on November 29, and independence took place the following day. The new state, called the People's Republic of Southern Yemen, has an area of some 112,000 square miles and a population of about one million. Its government is expected to be radical Arab nationalist in character and will follow socialist policies internally and non-alignment internationally. The new state is also expected to make clear that it will pay due regard to existing international obligations and will seek prompt admission to the UN. The regime in charge (the National Liberation Front or NLF) has fought its way to power during the last six months against both conservative and other radical groups. It seems to have established itself securely, notably by personnel transfers which assure the loyalty of the 9,000 man army. Border tension and threats to stability may be expected after independence, but we believe the new state will survive. HMG has recognized the new state. The Southern Yemenis would like more aid over a longer term than the British are prepared to commit. The regime would also like a compromise over several islands which have been retroceded by the British to neighboring Muscat and Oman but which were administratively a part of the new state's territory. It appears that British military and economic aid will be provided for at least the first six months of independence, at about the level of $29 million. This should stabilize the situation and encourage the local armed forces to use their influence in the direction of stability and moderation. One NLF official recently raised in Beirut the question of closing the southern end of the Red Sea to Israeli shipping. This has not, however, been enunciated as the regime's official policy nor has it been suggested by NLF officials in Aden. Meanwhile, Foreign Secretary Brown stated in Commons on November 29 that the NLF in Geneva had agreed to accept the international obligations the British had extended to Aden. One of these was the Geneva Convention which applied to Bab al-Mandab. Should the new government on assuming power nevertheless espouse closure of the Straits as a matter of policy--which we doubt--we would then of course have to review our whole attitude. USG recognition will help balance expected early recognition by the USSR and other Communist countries. It will thus aid in maintaining the Western position in an area of considerable importance to the Arabian Peninsula as a whole. We have ourselves been represented in Aden since 1880. Were we to fail to establish relations with the new state, or to be seen to defer our decision for a protracted period, the NLF itself might well close our Consulate General. We would thus lose our single remaining listening post in the southern half of Arabia, now that relations with Yemen have been broken off. Dean Rusk [Continue with the next documents] Volume XXI Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |