1964-1968, Volume XXI
Near East Region
Department of State
Washington, DC
| FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXI Near East Region Department of State |
 94. National Intelligence Estimate/1/ NIE 30-1-67 Washington, May 18, 1967. /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Director of Central Intelligence Helms, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on May 18. THE PERSIAN GULF STATES The Problem To estimate probable developments and trends over the next several years in the Persian Gulf. Note Though our basic concern in this estimate is with the prospects for Kuwait and the British-protected states--Bahrain, Qatar, the Trucial States/2/ and Muscat/Oman--we will also consider the ambitions and capabilities of the larger states bordering the Gulf--Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia--to control or influence developments, as well as the role of countries outside the area, particularly the UAR and the USSR. In addition, we will examine the likelihood of a British withdrawal and its consequences for the Gulf. /2/The seven Trucial States are Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al Qaiwain, Ras al Khaimah, and Fujairah. [Footnote in the source text.] Conclusions A. Massive oil revenues and the accompanying influx of people and ideas are bringing change and ferment to the Gulf. At the same time, the UK, as part of its retrenchment from east-of-Suez commitments, is reassessing its role there. It seems likely that it will be at least three to five years before the UK abandons its special military and political position in the Gulf. But increased trouble in the Gulf or economic problems at home might hasten British departure. B. The UAR is the most influential of the regional forces working against the British position and other Western interests. Nasser enjoys some support in the area among reformist and dissident elements, and Cairo Radio has a wide audience. Nasser will continue to aid local forces of discontent, though this will not be as easy as in South Arabia. Nasser will receive little support from other radical Arab states. The USSR, while supporting Nasser and generally encouraging movements directed against Western interests, will be wary of direct or open involvement in Gulf maneuvering. C. Nasser will be strongly opposed by both King Faisal and the Shah, and less openly by the Kuwaitis. They all fear that UAR influence in the Gulf would be a threat not only to their interests but also to the stability of their own governments. D. So long as the British remain, we would expect general political stability in the Gulf. Kuwait is likely to preserve its security and independence by a policy of neutrality in Arab affairs and of financial handouts to potentially predatory Arab states. Qatar and some of the Trucial States that enjoy large oil revenues may successfully follow Kuwait's example after the British leave; the others will probably look to Saudi Arabia for protection. E. In Bahrain, the situation is more volatile, and instability and occasional violence are likely. Terrorism is likely to mark at least the final stages of a British withdrawal, and some form of radical regime will probably emerge in Bahrain after the British depart. F. The oil-producing states in the Gulf will continue to press the Western oil companies for a greater share of the profits, and recurrent crises in country-company relations are probable. Although these efforts will reduce the share of profits to the companies, they will not materially affect the flow of oil to the West. G. A British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf would provide the USSR with some opportunities to expand its influence there. However, the USSR's course would be complicated, requiring a careful balancing of regional forces. On the whole, we do not think it likely that the Soviets will make dramatic advances. H. The US will be urged to take over some of the British responsibilities in the Gulf. If it did so, it would become the principal target of Arab revolutionary propaganda and subversion and would become involved in a variety of dynastic rivalries and troublesome political disputes. [Here follow the Discussion section and an annex.]
IRG/NEA 67-18 Washington, May 24, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Saunders Files, Saudi Arabia, 4/1/66-12/31/67. Secret. INTERDEPARTMENTAL REGIONAL GROUP Record of IRG/NEA Meetings--May 13, 16 and 20, 1967 The series of three meetings was devoted to a further consideration of our policy towards South Arabia, in the light of developments since the IRG/NEA meetings of October 1966 (IRG/NEA 66-35, 10/14/66)./2/ The Group: /2/Document 79. Reviewed relevant information on (a) the present situation in South Arabia itself, (b) current British planning concerning the timing and conditions of South Arabian independence, (c) the attitudes and possible future actions of other area states, especially the United Arab Republic, and (d) the current and prospective United Nations role in the matter. Reviewed the military aspects of the South Arabian problem. In this respect, the Group noted the JCS assessment of May 18, 1967 that while South Arabia (particularly Aden) is of some military significance, it is not critical to United States security interests. Agreed, however, that apart from the military aspects, the outcome of the struggle for control of South Arabia following the imminent withdrawal of the United Kingdom is of considerable importance for United States interests. Seizure of control by elements hostile to the West would be at least a serious psychological setback to moderate states in the area (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Ethiopia) with which we maintain friendly relations. United States acquiescence in UAR domination of South Arabia would be interpreted as a decision on our part to play a diminishing role in the Near East generally. It is in our interest to see a peaceful transition of power through the creation of a broadly based government in South Arabia. Noted, however, that current prospects are not substantially in favor of the establishment of such a broadly based government, but point rather to the creation in the first instance of a post-independence government either fairly subservient to Cairo, or else subject to very severe pressures (including terrorism and subversion) from elements supported by the UAR and probably the USSR. Agreed that continued consideration will have to be given to possible courses of action to protect and promote our interests in South Arabia as the date for independence approaches. In this regard the Group agreed to the submission of a paper, "Future of South Arabia," as a basis for a discussion scheduled by the National Security Council for May 24, 1967. The paper, a copy of which is attached,/3/ identifies the key issues facing us, suggests possible courses of action, and raises some principal questions which still need to be answered. It was expected that guidance would emanate from the NSC discussion for further IRG consideration of our policy on South Arabia. (Subsequent to the IRG meeting, the NSC discussion of South Arabia scheduled for May 24 was postponed.) /3/Document 97. MEMBERS PRESENT Executive Chairman--Mr. Battle State (NEA): Messrs. Davies, Brewer, Bergus; (IO): Mr. Campbell; (M): Mr. Enders S.S.
96. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, May 23, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File, Briefing Papers for NSC Meeting, May 24, 1967. Secret. Attached to a May 23, 7 p.m., memorandum from Rostow to the President noting that although the regular May 24 NSC meeting was scheduled to discuss problems the United States faced in South Arabia, Rostow recommended that following Nasser's move against Israel the President use the NSC meeting to discuss the Middle East crisis instead. A record of the May 24 NSC meeting is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XIX. SUBJECT The main issue in the Middle East today is whether Nasser, the radical states and their Soviet backers are going to dominate the area. A related issue is whether the US is going to stand up for its friends, the moderates, or back down as a major power in the Near East. Two weeks ago, we expected South Arabia to provide the test. The gulf between moderates and radicals has been getting wider for over a year. But with the British pulling out of South Arabia next January, Faisal, Hussein, Haile Selassie, the Shah and Eshkol were watching closely to see whether we and the British would stand for a Nasser takeover there. The current Arab-Israeli crisis has brought the test sooner than we expected, but the South Arabian problem will still provide the follow-up to the current showdown. The policy question in South Arabia as on Israel's borders is how far we can and should commit ourselves to block Nasser and his Soviet supporters. Our dilemma is that we have no stake in South Arabia itself--no immediate reason for involving ourselves in the uncertain political process there. However, the effect of the outcome on the broader confrontation makes it impossible to ignore what happens. An active attempt to stave off a Nasser takeover would amount to a sharp shift in our Middle East policy. Since 1961, we have tried to avoid splitting the area into two camps. Given all of our conflicting interests, it has seemed wiser to build a good working relationship in all capitals. Now Nasser has all but forced us to choose sides. As your message to him/2/ said, we don't want to give up entirely our effort to build some kind of relationship with him. But the time may already have come when we must make him respect us first. /2/President Johnson's May 22 message to Nasser is scheduled for publication ibid. I believe our first step must be to keep the British on the ground. They're intimately involved in working out a political solution, and we can't afford to see them walk out in despair. I originally scheduled this discussion (a) to give you a sense of the problem before you see PM Wilson and the Shah and (b) to give our planners a sense of your desires. The underlined portions of the attached State paper,/3/ detail the problem. /3/Document 97. Walt
97. Paper Prepared in the Department of State/1/ Washington, undated. /1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File, Briefing Papers for NSC Meeting, May 24, 1967. Secret. Prepared in the Office of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen, and Aden Affairs of the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs for a May 24 meeting of the National Security Council. Attached to Rostow's May 23 memorandum to the President (Document 96). FUTURE OF SOUTH ARABIA (For NSC Meeting of May 24, 1967) (Note: The following paragraphs were prepared independent of the current Arab-Israel crisis, resolution of which will no doubt shed considerable light on, among other things, Egyptian and Soviet intentions.) I. Background The current contest for South Arabia has meaning far beyond its size or importance. For 20 years the US has managed to maintain in the Near East its major interests of access to oil, freedom of air and sea transit and prevention of the dominance of the area by any one power. However, our significant political influence in the Arab Near East is now confined to the Arabian Peninsula and Jordan. There it already is undermined by the running sore of the Egyptian presence in Yemen. US acquiescence in UAR domination of South Arabia would be interpreted in the Peninsula, and elsewhere, as a decision by Washington to play a diminishing role in the Near East. II. Summary Outlook The British will grant independence to South Arabia in the first half of January 1968. They are willing to leave a military presence in the area for six months thereafter as an assurance against external aggression. The complexion of the successor government is unclear. We share the British hope that the United Nations Special Mission will be instrumental in setting up a broadly-based regime. If this happens, the South Arabian problem will be much reduced. At present, there is no confidence between conservative and radical elements in South Arabia and the two radical groups, FLOSY and the NLF, have been at each other's throats. FLOSY operates from a headquarters in Yemen and may set up a government-in-exile. It is backed by the Egyptians and includes some Soviet-oriented communists. The NLF has a trade union base in Aden, suspected ties with the British and represents the leftist, Marxist wing of the Arab National Movement. The UAR has put its money on FLOSY. Cairo is helping to train a FLOSY "Liberation Army" and will probably do everything it can, short of military invasion by Egyptian units from Yemen, to assure FLOSY domination of the newly independent state. III. The Alternatives The evolution to independence in South Arabia will probably develop along one of the following lines: --A broadly-based coalition worked out under UN aegis which might be quite radical (even with substantial initial FLOSY participation) but would not be under the Egyptian, or any other, thumb. --A British-sponsored coalition which might, or might not, include FLOSY. More likely it will not. In that case, the government might have to fight for survival against a FLOSY government-in-exile backed by UAR and probably the USSR. Its military strength, coupled with UK military support, might be successful in preventing a major invasion, but terrorism and subversion would be difficult problems. --A FLOSY-dominated radical government which had fought its way to power with major Egyptian support, thus making its leaders more beholden to Cairo than otherwise. IV. The Oil Problem Domination of South Arabia by unfriendly powers would not cut off oil movements from the Persian Gulf to Western Europe. It would nevertheless represent a threat to the more economic oil lifelines and would have implications for the longterm future of the Western (predominantly British) position in the Persian Gulf. That area contains more than 60 percent of the free world's petroleum reserves. It currently supplies 55 percent of Western Europe's oil needs. This percentage will decline slightly in the next five years, but the absolute amount supplied will increase by 1/3 to 330 million metric tons a year, by 1972. According to a 1967 OECD study, Western Europe could withstand loss of up to 60 percent of oil "East of Suez" in a peacetime situation and by drawing on other world sources. A period of up to six months of dislocation would be undergone, and some oil from the Near East would still be required. The extreme situation of a cut-off of all Persian Gulf oil would clearly be more damaging but is also a much remoter contingency. V. US Interests Our most important concern is not with respect to South Arabia itself but with the implications of the transition for neighboring regimes friendly to us, notably Saudi Arabia, Iran and Ethiopia. These implications will be less disturbing if the transition is relatively peaceful and takes place with a minimum of outside intervention, since the resultant South Arabian regime is more likely to be able to reflect the strong impulses of independence and nationalism which exist. Our primary interest is how the transfer of power occurs rather than to whom among internal elements the transfer is made. We do not want to become involved in internal squabbles in South Arabia but we do want to discourage adventures by external powers, notably the UAR and the USSR. We do not want to get overly involved but we must make clear that we have a legitimate and continuing interest in South Arabia if we are to have any influence in what happens there. VI. US Military Considerations The JCS have concluded that South Arabia (particularly Aden) is of some military significance to us but is not critical to US security. Its port and airfield, if available to us, would be valuable for various contingency operations but they are not essential. VII. The British Role The British are willing to provide insurance against a UAR attack for six months after South Arabian independence. They should be urged to extend this period if this seems necessary. It is in our view essential for the British to give enough support to the new South Arabian government to get it on its feet, as well as to remain in the Persian Gulf. We believe the British can remain in the Persian Gulf for an indefinite period provided the government at home does not yield to domestic pressure. We are for our part continuing our strong support to Saudi Arabia and would want to take other steps to oppose further extension of UAR influence by subversive or other military means. VIII. The Iranian Position The Shah regards Aden as the backdoor to the Gulf. He exaggerates but is quite right in regarding South Arabia as a major test of strength between Arab radicals and Arab moderates. Because the Iranians are not Arabs and come from a different Moslem sect from most South Arabian Moslems, it would be counterproductive for Tehran to seek to exert certain types of influence on the situation. Iranian clandestine involvement with particular groups should be avoided, since this would prompt a higher level of activity by the UAR, and the UAR has more going for it to win such a contest. Iranian support, including economic assistance, should be actively solicited for any independent South Arabian government that seems likely to be able to maintain itself. IX. The Israeli Position Israel is concerned at FLOSY assertions that it would close the southern straits of the Red Sea to Israeli shipping if it came to power in South Arabia. This is largely a propaganda ploy designed to help FLOSY in its bid for power. The South Arabian government will have no significant military capability in that region, and the straits are clearly international waters. Israel should encourage its Ethiopian and Iranian friends to give strong support to the new South Arabian government regardless of its coloration. In this way they will have influence on that regime which otherwise will be abdicated to radical powers, notably the UAR. X. US Action Considerations Efforts to achieve a peaceful transition through creation of a broadly-based government are in our interest. We should do what we can to foster these efforts, making clear to South Arabian radicals, and to the UAR, the risks of opting out, proclaiming a government-in-exile, and seeking to take over the area by force. The following moves illustrate what might be done to encourage our friends and increase our own influence: --A greater US military presence in the Red Sea-Arabian Sea area, particularly in support of our existing assurances to Saudi Arabia. --USG willingness to undertake a full range of normal USG contacts with the new South Arabian state provided it is able to maintain itself (any economic aid would require a high-level political determination). --Adoption of a blunter line in Cairo, and development of international support for the position, to emphasize concern that any new South Arabian regime not be threatened with aggression from outside its frontiers and that the internal political situation be permitted to evolve without outside interference. --Consideration of the utility of discussing South Arabia with the USSR to signal our concern lest outside forces seek to exploit internal stresses there that seem inevitable. --Continued efforts with the British to assure: (a) that everything feasible be done to create a broadly-based coalition, including UK willingness to extend its six-month security assurance as may be necessary; and (b) that the current British military build-up in the Persian Gulf is sustained. --Discussion with the Saudis to focus their attention on this problem and develop additional tangible Saudi support for a moderate solution, if possible, or for more conservative elements if a civil war-type situation occurs. --Continued support for a UN role in the situation, including specifically encouragement to the UN Special Mission to hold a roundtable conference and develop a coalition of all major South Arabian political elements. XI. Some Key Questions --Is US military strength sufficient to assume additional tasks in the Red Sea-Arabian Sea region? --Is it realistic to contemplate constructive discussions with the Russians on South Arabia? --How far should Prime Minister Wilson be pushed to maintain a British military commitment to South Arabia?--in the Persian Gulf? --How much pressure should be exerted on the Shah to discourage him from counterproductive efforts to oppose radical Arab nationalism in South Arabia? What positive lines of action should he be encouraged to follow?
98. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Battle) to Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach/1/ Washington, June 19, 1967. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 19 ADEN. Secret. Drafted by Brewer. A copy was sent to Director of the INR Office of Research and Analysis for Near East and South Asia Granville S. Austin. SUBJECT 1. Foreign Secretary Brown announced the following British decisions for South Arabia in the House of Commons on June 19: --Independence for "all South Arabia" early in January 1968. --Early application to Aden of an independence-type constitution which would replace the current Federal constitution for the whole country as soon as possible. --Additional British financial help to the SAFG military establishment, continuing support for the Hadhrami Bedouin Legion in the Eastern Protectorate for two years after independence and establishment of a British military aid mission to assist the organization and training of the SAFG forces. --Measures to tighten up against terrorism (e.g., suspension of trial by jury) combined with measures designed to facilitate political reconciliation (e.g., lifting the ban on the NLF). 2. The foregoing announcement confirms that HMG has decided to give full support to the SAFG as the only means at hand of assuring any kind of logical and, hopefully, orderly transfer of power. Several points in the British proposals are of interest: a. Constitutional: The British have decided to adopt the constitutional proposals contained in the Hone-Bell report of February 1966. Various changes are designed to bring the draft nearer the desiderata of the UN resolutions. The constitution is to provide for country-wide elections on the basis of universal adult franchise, which in turn will be based on liberal nationality legislation giving the vote to genuine "belongers" of various races. This provision would appear not to cover the very substantial population in Aden of Yemeni origin and, accordingly, will not be acceptable to FLOSY and other opposition groups. b. Aden: A "capital territory" is being established which will include Aden and its environs, including the present Federal capital. It is indicated that this arrangement will be made prior to independence. It might thus be possible to deal with the vexing issue of giving the SAFG some responsibility for security before 1968. However, the UK plans to take care of the constitutional problem (Aden will remain a Colony until independence) by "reservations" with respect to certain fields of continuing responsibility. One of these may well prove to be security. c. Defense: The UK will reportedly increase by ten million sterling the amount previously committed to the SAFG military for the first three years of independence. The funds will be devoted to additional arms and equipment for the Federal Army, as well as the establishment of a British military aid mission to help organize and train the Federal forces and to supply key personnel for those forces' base and medical service. No line officers are apparently to be seconded. A number of Hunter aircraft will be supplied to give the SAFG a small operational air force. An additional squadron of eight armored cars will also be provided, as well as eight additional 25-pounders. These will be in addition to the off-shore British naval force which will be in the area for six months after independence. To this force, a unit of V bombers has been added which will be stationed at Masirah Island for at least six months and longer if the UK so decides. These forces are to deter and, if necessary, repel external military aggression. d. Hadhramaut: The British proposals seem to accept that this area will not join the SAFG prior to independence. To assist in maintaining stability, the UK has now decided to finance the Hadhrami Bedouin Legion until 1970. The hope is that this will provide sufficient calm for the SAFG to work out terms for the Hadhramaut's eventual accession to the new Republic of South Arabia. 3. These unilateral British proposals are likely to be seized upon by the moribund UN Special Mission for South Arabia as the excuse to terminate its activities. While it is true that the British proposals pre-empt the constitutional processes envisaged by the UN Resolutions, the Special Mission's inability to obtain the cooperation of all South Arabian groups has made it difficult for London to envisage any other course. The British hope to meet the expected criticism from South Arabian radicals on this point by including in the new constitution a special provision calling for the formation of a "central caretaker government" if and when this becomes possible. This is unlikely to mollify the radicals who will contend that they are not in a position to join a regime whose constitution they had no hand in forming. 4. The outlook is thus for continued polarization in South Arabia, with the British giving greater military and political support to the conservatives. They clearly hope that, by so doing, the terrorist threat from elements in Yemen can be contained until the new government finds its feet. They recognize, however, that this is a gamble, and it seems virtually certain that the political scene in South Arabia will become even more tense as these arrangements are now put in train on the ground.
99. Intelligence Memorandum/1/ No. 1368/67 Washington, July 24, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, South Arabia, Vol. I, 7/67-11/67. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; No Dissem Abroad/Controlled Dissem. Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency's Directorate of Intelligence. A note on the memorandum indicates it was produced solely in the CIA for the use of the CIA representative on the Interdepartmental Regional Group, Middle East. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of National Estimates and the Clandestine Services. SOUTH ARABIA Summary Britain has taken the first step toward forming a representative government to succeed the South Arabian Federation government. On 5 July the Supreme Federal Council, the governing body of the federation, appointed an Adeni moderate, Husayn Bayumi, as prime minister-designate to form a caretaker government until independence, now scheduled for 9 January 1968. According to present plans, elections will then be held and a permanent government established. British carriers will be stationed offshore for six months to ensure that the fledgling state is not overthrown by the Egyptians in Yemen. Despite the anarchy of recent months, the British hope not to leave behind "another Congo." The vital question, however, is whether it is not already too late to achieve any kind of order out of the present chaos of tribal feuds, ethnic prejudices, social backwardness, and political machinations by other Arab states such as Egypt. 1. Aden is today an armed camp, with assassination and terrorism commonplace. In June there were 445 incidents in Aden alone, compared with 376 in April and a peak figure of 80 per month last fall. Known casualties due to incidents in Aden for the first half of 1967 are 116 killed and 527 wounded. Egyptian Involvement 2. The force behind this terrorism is the Egyptian intelligence organization in Yemen. Egypt's proclaimed purpose was to eject the British from Aden, but Cairo has continued its operations even though London has long since announced its intention to grant independence by 1968. Although Egypt has asserted that the terrorism is punishment of the British for their tyranny, the great majority of casualties have been Arab. Egypt has also boasted that Britain will no longer grow wealthy on Aden's trade. Terror and destruction have almost reached the point where Aden will soon have no trade, nor will it have the bankers or traders needed to revive commerce after peace is restored. The Terrorist Groups 3. Now even the Egyptians appear to have lost control of the situation. Cairo deserted its original terrorist group, the National Liberation Front (NLF)--which it had used earlier in back-country dissidence--for a more broadly based group backed chiefly by the Aden labor movement, the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY), when the target of terrorism was switched to the city of Aden in 1965. The NLF, however, continued to be strong in the 16 other states of the federation, as well as in the federation army, the federal guards, the police, and many workers of back-country origin employed in Aden. Despite the lack of Egyptian support, the NLF fought a bloody back-alley war with FLOSY, and at present seems to hold a slight edge in Aden and a definite advantage in the hill states. 4. Not much is known about the amazingly successful leadership of the NLF, even by British intelligence in Aden. It is known, however, to have ties with the Arab National Movement (ANM), another successful terrorist movement with branches in many Arab countries. The ANM is supposedly supported by the Egyptian Intelligence Service (EIS), but on several occasions has bucked the EIS with impunity. Occasional reports link leading AMM members with Arab Communist movements. 5. Both FLOSY and the NLF have refused to talk with the British, or even with the UN Mission to Aden, about taking part in any independent government which Britain might be able to establish. Furthermore, FLOSY has taken the extreme view that it alone speaks for the people of South Arabia. Consequently London has been left to deal with the existing federation government--made up primarily of hill-country sultans despised by most liberal Adenis. Efforts to Resolve Differences 6. When conditions in South Arabia began to deteriorate swiftly, all parties involved began to search for some compromise solution. Several states tried to intervene and the UN sent missions to assess the situation, all to no avail. With the onset of the Arab-Israeli war, the situation became even more murky. Many South Arabians, believing that Britain and the US were behind Israel's success, were even more antagonistic about negotiating with Britain. 7. On 19 June the British Foreign Secretary announced that independence, long scheduled for the end of 1968, would take place on 9 January 1968. He said that London would increase its commitments of military aid to about $168 million over a three-year period and would station a naval force for six months and a bomber force for perhaps longer to protect South Arabia against "open external aggression." London said it fully supported the present government and welcomed its intention to form a caretaker government "if and when cooperation with others makes this possible." On 5 July Bayumi, an Adeni moderate with shadowy connections with the NLF, was appointed prime minister-designate. He announced on 18 July the formation of an eight-man interim administration--five Adenis and three from other states, whose ability and affiliations are not impressive. 8. These actions are remarkable especially because they were carried out during open mutiny by the South Arabian security forces and during the Arab-Israeli war. The real time of testing for the administration is yet to come, however, and numerous problems remain. Attitudes 9. The blood feuds engendered by the terrorism have built up a residue of bitterness, and there are many scores to settle. With arms readily available, public security will be exceedingly difficult to restore, particularly the stable type which had made Aden almost unique in the Middle East. Nasir, moreover, has not yet given any solid evidence that he is prepared to cooperate in building a viable state in South Arabia, and the EIS may be capable of subverting any new state, with or without the assistance of the present nationalist groups. Finally, disillusionment and apathy have set in, and those who could once have ensured South Arabia's future viability are giving up. The Somalis, Hindus, Jews, and British who built and carried on Aden's trade are leaving, and the present situation does not encourage new investment. 10. Britain's role is a critical factor. London has been trying to encourage those Adenis who might be able to salvage something. The continued recalcitrance of all parties, however, has hampered British efforts to establish a successor government. At the time of the uprising in the Crater district, there was strong sentiment in Britain for pulling out early. Even if London hangs on until 9 January, as now seems likely, the successor government may well take on an increasingly pro-Nasir tinge. Britain might in that case reconsider contributing $168 million to arm a pro-Nasir army in South Arabia, whatever commitments may have been made. 11. The lack of British assistance and trade would sharply limit the future of South Arabia. Egypt does not possess the economic strength to fill the vacuum, however easily it may fund and supply the large-scale terrorist campaign. To date no other state has shown any interest in bailing South Arabia out of its political and economic mire, and the UN is unlikely to accept large-scale responsibility there.
IRG/NEA 67-24 Washington, July 26, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Saunders Files, Saudi Arabia, 4/1/66-12/31/67. Secret. Drafted by Sober on July 27. INTERDEPARTMENTAL REGIONAL GROUP FOR NEAR EAST Record of IRG/NEA Meeting--July 26, 1967 The meeting was devoted to a further consideration of our policy towards South Arabia, in the light of the developments since the IRG/NEA meetings of May 1967 (see IRG/NEA 67-18, 5/24/67, for a record of agreements reached at that time)./2/ The Group: /2/Document 95. Reviewed recent significant developments, including the announcement by the United Kingdom that it would give independence to South Arabia on January 9, 1968, as noted in the paper prepared by the Country Director (State) for the meeting (see IRG/NEA 67-23, 7/21/67)/3/ and as elaborated by the CIA member. /3/Not found. Agreed that, although our previous tentative planning with respect to an independent South Arabia remains basically valid, the recent Middle East hostilities and the break in our diplomatic relations with various Arab countries, especially the UAR, were important new elements to be taken into account as we formulate our policy. The UAR's continued military presence in the Yemen, although below the pre-hostilities level, and its activities in Aden, remain critical. The success of efforts by the British to extricate themselves gracefully from South Arabia, and to leave behind a reasonably independent and viable regime, also remain critical. The Group agreed that our planning must continue to be tentative for the time being, and that our policy and specific actions will have to depend on developments and on circumstances as the new South Arabian state comes into being. It recognized that our actions would necessarily be influenced not only by our own assessment of our interests but also by the willingness of the new South Arabian government to work with us. Agreed that, meanwhile, our tentative planning should include: 1) Recognition of the new South Arabian state and elevation of our Consulate General at Aden to Embassy status, with assignment of a resident Ambassador. 2) Assignment of Defense Attache staff and opening a one-man USIS operation as the Embassy is established. 3) Consideration of possible limited programs including, for example, Peace Corps volunteers, MAP training in the US, and cultural exchanges, should local conditions justify and the new government voice an interest. [1 paragraph (2 lines of source text) not declassified] Agreed that we should maintain our close contacts with the British on developments in South Arabia, endeavoring to influence their moves in the direction of greater post-independence stability in the region. We should also continue to consult with Saudi Arabia and other friendly states to foster greater interest in South Arabian stability. During the Shah's visit to the United States in August 1967, we should solicit his views on developments and prospects in Yemen and Aden; we should take sympathetic note of his concern over the area and encourage him to play a responsible role in promoting stability in South Arabia. Agreed, finally, that the situation in South Arabia and the formulation of our policy with respect to it need to be kept under close review, although it would not be desirable to reach decisions until much closer to the time of independence. MEMBERS PRESENT Executive Chairman--Mr. Battle State: (NEA) Ambassador Strong, Mr. Brewer; (IO) Mr. Campbell Sidney Sober/4/ /4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
101. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, August 9, 1967. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UK-US. Secret. Drafted by Michael Sterner (NEA/IAI). US-UK TALKS ON UN AFFAIRS ADEN-YEMEN GAS PARTICIPANTS United Kingdom United States Ambassador Goldberg Aden Ambassador Beaumont offered to give a briefing on the latest situation in Aden. He said British objectives were (1) to extricate British forces from Aden in good order, and (2) to leave behind a viable and unified independent state. The first objective he described as "imperative"; the second, although less imperative, was one that the British were trying very hard and sincerely to achieve. The HMG offer to provide a deterrent naval force after independence (the date for which, Beaumont said, was still January 9, 1968) was designed to give confidence to the new state. The British would also keep a bomber force on Masira Island and continue to support the Bedouin Legion in the East Aden Protectorate. The British remained faced with a political deadlock in Aden resulting from the intensification of extremism in Adeni political groupings brought about by outside pressures and the intimidation of the population caused by terrorism. Today it was hard to say who controls Aden. The British believed, however, that the Federal Government, with its backwoods tribal support, represented a genuine political force which would have to be recognized in any post-independence government. The British were having a hard time convincing the UN Special Mission of this. The British felt strongly that the rural component of the population must have appropriate representation in the new government if the new state were not to disintegrate. The danger of giving the urban elements an overwhelming voice was borne out by recent defections from the Federal Army. There was a real danger that if the post-independence government was of an extremist nationalist complexion the Shaikhs would withdraw their forces from the army and civil war would ensue. The British believed that FLOSY had lost ground to some extent to the NLF in recent months and that the NLF, although still primarily a terrorist organization, was nevertheless developing some political leadership capability. The trade unions, which used to be the most important force in Aden politics, were now split between FLOSY and the NLF. The South Arabian League contained able men but the organization seemed to fall between two stools--not radical enough for the urban nationalists and too radical for the up-country rulers. Also, most of the SAL leaders were in exile. Beaumont wished to put two requests to the USG in the interest of facilitating the transition to a viable independent South Arabian state. First, it would be helpful if the US could make some kind of statement in support of the territorial integrity of the new state. Secondly, it would also help if the US could in the near future make a decision to offer some kind of economic assistance to the new state. The British appreciated the problems that the US would have in extending economic aid of any magnitude. However, even a token gesture along these lines would help to steer the situation in a constructive direction. The aid offer would not have to be specific, and it could be directed to the newly-created state rather than to the present government. HMG itself was planning to extend economic assistance to the new state in the amount of $140 million spread over three years. Beaumont emphasized that the British adhered to their timetable for withdrawal from Aden. In fact the withdrawal of military forces was slightly ahead of schedule. Ambassador Glass said that so far as the UN Mission was concerned HMG's objectives were to achieve a caretaker government which would provide for a cooling off period and a coalescing of political forces. The original effort of the Mission had been a great disappointment to the HMG. Now British efforts were concentrated on keeping the Mission from "becoming a nuisance." In recent days the Mission had become somewhat more constructive. HMG had hoped that the nationalist political groups would agree to meet with it in Geneva but FLOSY had now said it would not, and the NLF had done likewise. High Commissioner Trevelyan had urged that the Federal Government send representatives to meet with the Mission. Responding to the two British requests of the USG, Ambassador Battle said that both would pose difficult problems. This would be particularly true in terms of Congress, which recently had expressed criticism of our extending our commitments to additional territories. We would look into the question of whether our existing statements concerning support for the territorial integrity of the states of the area could somehow be defined to include South Arabia. On aid, he did not wish to leave the British with unjustified expectations. Given existing pressures on foreign aid generally, it would be difficult for the US to do anything substantial in South Arabia. Perhaps some technical assistance would be feasible. Ambassador Battle assured the British officials that their requests would receive careful consideration. Use of Poison Gas in Yemen Ambassador Beaumont said there were two aspects to this issue. First, the UAR's use of poison gas, now pretty well established, had shocked people on humanitarian grounds in Britain. Secondly, it seemed to offer an opportunity to attack the double standard that prevailed in the Afro-Asian world whereby the "imperialist" powers came under constant criticism for "atrocities" but apparently the Afro-Asian states could never commit any sins. Ambassador Beaumont saw an advantage in raising the issue in various forums so as to bring some pressure to bear on the UAR to stop this practice and also to adopt moderate policies generally in Yemen. Ambassador Glass said unfortunately the Arab-Israel conflict had made it more difficult to condemn the UAR for its use of gas. Such a move could now be labelled by the Arab extremists as an anti-Arab tactic. The most feasible tack might be to get the GA's third Committee to consider a general resolution condemning the use of gas (without specifying the UAR). The trouble was the Third Committee tended to be erratic. The General Assembly had adopted a resolution in 1966 condemning the use of gas in wartime, and it might be possible to introduce another resolution extending this condemnation to use under any circumstances. This resolution had been dealt with in the First Committee with disarmament questions. Ambassador Battle said it was difficult for us to do anything in the UN when the parties most directly concerned were unwilling to push a charge against the UAR. Of late the Saudis had not been willing to break Arab solidarity by pushing this issue. At present we didn't see any other group that would be willing to take the lead on it. Sir Patrick Dean wondered whether the Scandinavians might not play this role. He pointed out that the Scandinavian Foreign Ministers would be meeting in a week or so and that perhaps the UK and US might wish to stimulate them to take the lead on this issue. Mr. Sisco said he was doubtful that they would, adding that one problem with bringing up the gas issue in the GA was that it might tend to unify Arabs on the broader Arab-Israel question. Ambassador Goldberg said that personally he had been shocked at the use of gas, and that American public opinion was outraged. It was becoming increasingly difficult for the US because of Congressional and private pressures, not to make some move. However, he saw that the US could not bring the issue up formally but he thought we should actively stimulate either the Scandinavians or the Latin Americans to raise it. Mr. Sisco said that as a fallback position we might want to organize certain states to take the lead in preparing documentation on the case. It was left that the US and UK delegations in New York would consult on the matter inter alia to consider means of moving ahead if Saudi Arabia remained reluctant to give active support. It would be necessary to be in touch with the Scandinavians and the Saudis.
102. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate in Aden/1/ Washington, September 22, 1967, 2057Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 13 ADEN. Confidential. Drafted by Brewer and approved by Davies. Repeated to Jidda and London. 42401. Aden 344./2/ View uncertainties South Arabian situation, Dept does not believe action should be taken which might convey impression either USG special interest in particular South Arabian group or certainty early recognition any government which may emerge (re final para reftel). With these caveats, however, we perceive no objection your letting it be known on appropriate occasions to representatives various South Arabian groups that USG hopes circumstances will permit establishment friendly relations with whatever government emerges in South Arabia, but that this will of course depend on attitude such government toward USG. /2/In telegram 344 from Aden, September 21, U.S. Consul William Eagleton described a meeting with NLF representative Ali Nasser in Aden and stated that an NLF-dominated South Arabian Government would probably find its place in the radical Arab nationalist camp, although opportunism might keep it on reasonably good terms with the British as long as the United Kingdom was a major source of aid. Eagleton concluded that as long as the NLF political orientation was fluid, it would be in the U.S. interest to make it known that the establishment of friendly relations with whatever government emerged in South Arabia would depend on that government's attitude toward the United States. (Ibid.) Rusk
103. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/ Washington, October 2, 1967, 2150Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 19 ADEN. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Brewer and Dinsmore on September 29; cleared by Irving Cheslaw (EUR/BMI), David W. McClintock (INR/RNA), Edward A. Padelford (NEA/RA), Brewer, and Davies; and approved by Battle. Repeated to Aden, Dhahran, Jidda, Kuwait, Tehran, and CINCSTRIKE/MEAFSA. 47358. London 2384./2/ /2/Telegram 2384 from London, September 27, described a recent Foreign Office circular instruction contrasting the situation in South Arabia with that of the Gulf states and emphasizing the advantages of the latter. The circular pointed out that the Gulf rulers were recently assured by public statements of U.K. ministers, that the United Kingdom intended to stand by its commitments in the Gulf while there was a need for them. (Ibid.) 1. US continues attach great importance to UK presence in Gulf. We support current British position and will encourage HMG to continue maintain military forces in Gulf equal to task of providing security for Shaikhdoms. 2. We also concur in UK estimate which sounds experienced note of caution against too facile comparison between situations in South Arabia and Gulf States. Radical Arab organizations will without doubt increasingly direct attention to Gulf states and attempt erode hold of traditionalists over their populations. But we believe there smaller base on which build organized revolutionary activity in Gulf States than there was earlier in such cities as Aden, Taiz, Hodeida, while rapidly rising oil income in some states may reduce dissident pressures. 3. Addressees may accordingly, as circumstances warrant, make clear to appropriate British contacts that we continue believe UK can play major stabilizing role in Gulf area for indefinite period without encountering irresistible pressures from radical groups. Katzenbach [Continue with the next documents] Volume XXI Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |