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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXI Near East Region Department of State |
 80. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, October 19, 1966. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 ADEN. Secret. Drafted by Moore on October 21 and initialed by Davies. The memorandum is Part I of II. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS 1. British Departure Plans. Mr. Everett referred to the Secretary's conversation with U.K. Foreign Secretary Brown on October 15 in which the Secretary expressed concern that British withdrawal from South Arabia might be too rapid. He asked for an elaboration of the extent of this "concern." Mr. Davies said that various foreign governments had raised with us the possibility of the British conditioning their withdrawal from Aden on UAR withdrawal from Yemen. We, among ourselves, recognized the political problems--both domestic and foreign--which this would pose for the U.K. and thus had not suggested this item in our briefing paper for the Secretary's conversation. At the same time, some of us would like to see all pressure possible put on Nasser to withdraw from Yemen. The Secretary was doubtless concerned with the chaotic situation which he could see developing in South Arabia and the general impact which this would have on affairs in the Horn of Africa. Mr. Everett emphasized that HMG had firmly stressed its withdrawal decision in Parliament and the U.N. and that it would be extremely difficult for it to shift its position even if it had decided to do so. He continued that Mr. Brown, personally, had for many years held the firm belief that the only way for ultimate solution in South Arabia was via early British withdrawal. This belief had been stressed to the South Arabians. He noted that many in the U.K. had in any event never expected Nasser to get out of Yemen so that the latter's statement that he would stay, made following announcement of British intent to withdraw, came as no surprise to them. 2. U.N. Involvement. Mr. Everett said the process of establishing a U.N. Commission for Aden had been slowed by the departure from New York of Pachachi/2/ who had been most helpful, and by the continued intransigeance of Committee of 24 Chairman Collyer./3/ However, the UNSYG is continuing to press for setting up the Committee. He has a 50% chance of being successful in getting the Commission to Aden after the end of Ramadan (mid-January) and with terms of reference which will keep it involved on a continuing basis in the birth of the new state. With SAL and Federation leaders now getting together and the expectation of U.N. involvement, HMG now feels that prospects for establishment of an independent South Arabia are somewhat more encouraging. It is hoped that the U.S., in addition to its moral support, will join the U.K. in some tangible aid to the new state for political and psychological reasons. Mr. Davies said that the Secretary's remarks could be interpreted as an indication of our concern. He also expressed the hope that other powers in the Peninsula--especially Saudi Arabia and Kuwait--would be willing to aid South Arabia. /2/Former Iraqi Representative to the United Nations and current Iraqi Foreign Minister Adnan M. Pachachi. /3/Sierre Leone's Representative to the United Nations Gershon B.O. Collyer. 3. U.K. Military Withdrawal. Responding to a query, Mr. Everett said that the British military timetable called for beginning of ground force withdrawals in June 1967, with some units being shifted to the Gulf. The intent was to lower the number of troops to a minimum level consistent with maintaining security so as to be in a position to pull out completely at any time on or after January 1, 1968. The troop numbers would be held at that minimum level until the political decision on the timing of final withdrawal had been made. 4. Nasser's Intentions. In response to a question, Mr. Davies said he thought we could not take at face value Nasser's statement of intent to stay in Yemen; that he would withdraw if he found a convenient way out. If he stays indefinitely in Yemen he will find increasing problems with terrorism directed at the Egyptian presence there. 5. Soviet Intentions. Mr. Everett asked for our assessment. Mr. Davies noted that the USSR has established an expanded position in Yemen which it will be able to maintain irrespective of UAR withdrawal and of whether a republican or Imamate regime takes over. The Soviets have a better chance of staying in Yemen than do the Egyptians. We feel that Aden, while not of major world strategic significance, is of importance, particularly in the event of hostilities when access to the facilities there might be required. While we would anticipate a South Arabian receptiveness to Soviet aid offers, we would hope that a significant Western presence could also be maintained.
IRG/NEA 66-38 Washington, November 2, 1966. /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/NE (Critchfield) Files: Job 80-00105A, Box 2, IRG/NEA Working File, Communist Presence--Arabian Peninsula, Persian Gulf. Secret. Drafted by Sober on November 4. INTERDEPARTMENTAL REGIONAL GROUP FOR NEAR EAST Record of IRG/NEA Meeting--November 2, 1966 In continuing its consideration of the Communist presence in the Near East, the Group reviewed the situation in those parts of the Arabian Peninsula not previously covered, the Persian Gulf, and Jordan. In doing so, the Group took note of the assessments of Communist activity provided by our field posts (circulated with IRG/NEA 66-36)./2/ /2/Not printed.
The Group: Noted evidence of the beginning of a pattern of subversive pressure applied from sources principally in the UAR against Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and principally from sources in Iraq against the Shaikhdoms. The sources of pressure emanate from a mixture of both Arab nationalism and pro-Soviet Communism. The Communists find it expedient to identify themselves with, and attempt to infiltrate and control, various nationalist elements seeking radical change. Noted that there is no overt indigenous Communist Party activity in the area; and that the only official Communist outposts in the area are the Soviet and Czech and Polish embassies in Kuwait. Noting the increasing strategic importance of Near Eastern oil for Western Europe, agreed that CIA should prepare a comprehensive study on the current and prospective availability of oil in the area. The study should serve to identify likely future points of subversive pressure. On Saudi Arabia, agreed that despite certain signs of potential trouble, particularly among the labor force in the ARAMCO oil-producing area, the present nature and magnitude of subversive activity do not provide cause for serious concern. The Saudi Government is determined to avoid the establishment of any Communist presence. Nevertheless, the situation bears watching because oil-rich Saudi Arabia is a natural target for subversion. On Muscat and Oman, noted the propaganda support given from abroad by the Soviets and Chinese Communists to local revolutionary movements. Agreed that we should keep under consideration the desirability of opening a Foreign Service post at Muscat in the next few years. Noted that there is virtually no known direct Communist penetration of the Trucial Shaikhdoms. Noted that Bahrain is the major center of organized subversive activity in the Persian Gulf--a fact related to the relatively high levels of education and the inadequacy of job opportunities. Noted the evidence of some direct Communist inspiration and infiltration of the active and well organized Bahrain National Liberation Front. Agreed that the situation in Bahrain should be kept under close review. [1 line of source text not declassified] In addition, our own civil (Consulate General, Dhahran) and military (Commander, Mid-East Force) representatives in the area should be alerted to the continuing need for pertinent information. Agreed on the central importance of the British military establishment in Bahrain and British security commitments for the protection of vital British and other Western interests in the Persian Gulf area; but recognized that the continuance of a strong British presence will hinge on the fiscal health as well as the political determination of the United Kingdom Government. On Kuwait, noted the fair, but limited, degree of success in establishing a legitimate presence, achieved by overt Communist diplomatic, commercial and cultural activities. [1 paragraph (3 lines of source text) not declassified] [Here follows discussion of Jordan.] MEMBERS PRESENT Executive Chairman--Ambassador Hare State (NEA)--Mr. Davies, Mr. Moore, Mr. Atherton S.S.
82. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts/1/ Washington, November 17, 1966, 5:05 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 19 ADEN. Secret. Drafted by Moore; cleared by Mary J. Sommer (EUR/BMI), Frederick H. Sacksteder, Jr. (AF/AFN), Gabriel J. Paolozzi (IO/UNP), and Atherton; and approved by Davies. Sent to Cairo, London, Jidda, Kuwait, Taiz, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Aden, Dhahran, USUN, CINCSTRIKE, and Tunis. 86582. Amman 1045 (Notal), South Arabia./2/ /2/Telegram 1045 from Amman, November 7, reported that Prime Minister Tell informed the Ambassador that, during their recent visit to Amman, the SAF Foreign and Information Ministers asked that he and King Hussein urge the United States and the United Kingdom to enter into a security defense pact with the South Arabian Federation. The ministers argued that, unless such a pact was created, the United Arab Republic would easily succeed in subverting Aden after the British withdrawal in 1968 leading to "another Yemen" in South Arabia. (Ibid.) 1. Deptel 85204/3/ outlines some current Department views on South Arabia. /3/Dated November 15. (Ibid.) 2. We continue keep in close touch with British re developments there and re extent their planned military and economic assistance to independent South Arabia. Seems abundantly clear, however, judging both from Fon Sec Brown's categoric statement to UNGA Oct 11 and private discussion with Secretary at that time, that British firm in their decision evacuate South Arabia both politically and militarily by 1968. At same time their promise of military aid at least through 1970 and their apparent expectation to provide economic assistance indicate fairly substantial UK interest in new state will continue. 3. Despite agitation in various quarters (e.g., London, Amman, Tunis, Jidda) by SAF and SAL leaders for UK (and US) security guarantee, British (and we) are not disposed to comply. Regardless of whether some security arrangement might ultimately be useful, its absence at this stage provides major pressure for conflicting South Arabian factions to coalesce in support a single state in face of need to be responsible for their own security. Contrary to SAFG argument reported reftel, a security guarantee at this juncture would probably reduce pressure for cohesion. 4. Major immediate hope for bringing progress in South Arabian situation is early establishment of active and continuing UN presence. We intend continue support British efforts bring this about and believe area states interested in future South Arabia would be well advised to give similar support./4/ /4/On December 12, by a vote of 96 (including the United States) to 0 with 3 abstentions, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 2183 (XXI) requesting the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Committee of 24 and the administering Power (the United Kingdom), to appoint immediately a special mission to be sent to Aden for the purpose of recommending practical steps for the full implementation of previous UN resolutions, in particular for UN participation in the preparation and supervision of elections. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 544-545. The United States announced that it supported the resolution because of its firm belief that a special UN mission should go to Aden. Rusk
83. Airgram From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Saudi Arabia/1/ CA-3933 Washington, November 22, 1966, 4:37 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL BAHRAIN IS. Secret. Drafted by Moore; cleared by Eliot, Sommer, and Director of the AID Office of Near Eastern Affairs James C. Flint, Churchill (PC), UN Economic Affairs Division Chief Leighton van Nort, CU Near Eastern Programs Chief David Scott, and William C. Salmon (SCI); and approved by Hare. Repeated to Jidda, London, Kuwait, and Tehran. SUBJECT 1. Shaikh Khalifah ibn Salman al-Khalifah, Director of Finance for the Bahraini Government and brother of the Ruler, made a private visit to the United States in mid-November under the sponsorship of CALTEX Oil Company. On November 17, accompanied by Deputy Finance Director Mahmud Allawi, he called on NEA Assistant Secretary Hare and left the enclosed paper/2/ as a statement of Bahrain's concerns and desires. /2/Attached but not printed. 2. The bulk of Shaikh Khalifah's oral remarks was devoted to emphasizing and reiterating the following points: a. Bahrain and all the other Gulf states are most worried over anticipated developments in South Arabia following the 1968 British departure. They fear the U.A.R. will take over in that region and ultimately threaten seizure of the Gulf. The U.A.R.'s current activities in Yemen foreshadow the nature of its possible future activities elsewhere in the Peninsula. b. Bahrain is most desirous that the British remain as protectors in the Gulf and has received strong assurances from HMG that they intend to do so. However, Bahrain feels that the same type of internal British financial and political pressures which led HMG to evacuate Aden may similarly lead it suddenly to leave the Gulf. In this contingency Bahrain most strongly hopes that the U.S. will be willing to assume some responsibility for Gulf security. c. Bahrain has close ties with Saudi Arabia, but the Saudis are, understandably, deeply involved in building up their own defensive capability and thus could not be fully counted on to assist others. d. Bahrain hopes that the U.S. will be in close touch with the British concerning developments in the Gulf and that we will begin to show a greater interest in the welfare and stability of the Gulf region. (Some possibilities for this are outlined in the paper left by the Shaikh.) 3. In responding to Shaikh Khalifah, Assistant Secretary Hare summarized the U.S. attitude toward various Peninsula states as follows: a. Saudi Arabia. We have had a long relationship with the Saudis which, despite some ups and downs, has been fruitful and cordial. As a logical outgrowth of our general policy of opposition to the use of force or threat of force in the Near East, expressed in the 1950 Tripartite Declaration and on various subsequent occasions, we have made clear our interest in preservation of the territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia. b. Yemen. Our goals, enunciated repeatedly both in public and in private, are to see an end to foreign interference and development of a situation where all Yemenis are free to decide their own future. This is the extent of our desires in Yemen. c. South Arabia. Except for maintaining our Consular post in Aden, we have not in the past been directly involved with this area in view of the dominant British position there. Since the British have decided to relinquish this position, we have had frequent and close consultations with them regarding the area's future. The British recognize the need to leave a capable security force there and to provide for economic assistance. They are taking steps in this direction. We follow their efforts with great interest and are concerned about the future of South Arabia. d. Gulf. We are now taking a new look at this region. We hope and expect that the British will remain there as long as needed. We have no direct military interest in the area although the presence of the headquarters of our Naval Middle East Force in Bahrain is a token of our general concern. We are most appreciative of Shaikh Khalifah's comments, which fall on open ears at a time when we are giving extensive consideration to what our future activities in the Gulf area should be. The time available, while not limitless, is sufficient to allow us further to ponder this subject before reaching final decisions. In general, we hope all states with a common interest in the Gulf (including Iran) will work for its stability. 4. Mr. Allawi commented that currently the American Protestant Mission in Bahrain, which has been in existence since the 1890's, is in serious financial straits and might be forced to close either or both of the men's or women's hospitals it operates there. This would be taken by the populace as an unfortunate sign of waning U.S. interest. While understanding the problems which aid to a religious sponsored group might pose, he hoped the U.S.G. could be of some assistance. (The Department is not aware of any problem in the Mission's operations, Dhahran's report on this subject would be appreciated.) 5. The enclosed paper from Shaikh Khalifah proposes some rather practical ways in which the U.S. might become more active in Bahrain. We have given a copy of it to the British Embassy in Washington and indicated that we wished to reply to Shaikh Khalifah. In view of British responsibility for the foreign affairs of Bahrain, we asked for HMG's recommendation as to the most suitable channel for such a reply and said we would welcome British views on the paper itself. 6. The addressees' comments on the Khalifah paper would be appreciated./3/ /3/Circular airgram CA-6646 to Dhahran, March 3, 1967, transmitted an informal response to Shaikh Khalifah's paper. The Consulate was instructed to make clear continued U.S. support for the British position in the Gulf as providing the best framework for peaceful progress in the region and to stress the importance for security and stability of Bahrain's cooperation with its Gulf neighbors. (Ibid.) Rusk
84. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State/1/ London, January 27, 1967, 1231Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 19 ADEN. Secret; Noforn. Repeated to Aden. 5986. Subject: South Arabia. 1. Future South Arabian developments reviewed in detail at two-hour session FonOff Jan 26 attended by Brewer (Dept NEA/ARP), Palmer (Embassy) and reps FonOff MOD, and Ministry of Overseas Development (ODM). Discussions were frank and specific, providing greater clarity on how both governments see situation developing and what can be done about it. Detailed airgram under preparation, but following gives highlights: 2. British side led by Marnham (superintending Under-Secy) and his replacement, Brenchley, made following points: A. Though HMG still interested in helping provide stable future after independence, primary British goal remains "withdrawal in good order." B. British believe security situation will continue get worse and increasingly dubious independent local government derived from present SAFG can maintain itself thereafter. While independent South Arabia authorities will be able exercise "greater persuasion" vis-a-vis suspected terrorists without inhibition Western methods, this may be offset by disappearance British technical proficiency in security field. Planned expansion Federal Regular Army (FRA) is based on blanketing into army portions police. Additional police recruitment will thus be necessary. UK plans provide police superintendent shortly (two candidates under consideration) but outlook in police field particularly discouraging. 3. Regarding expansion FRA, three-year British subsidiary expected cover: (a) build up from five battalions to nine, including armored cars but no tanks; (b) addition reasonable air components of eight subsonics for internal security uses; (c) three small naval vessels. MOD reps could not immediately provide details re breakdown subsidy but promised do so. 4. On civil side ODM reps stated two economists (Selwyn and Holland) now in final stages preparation report on future economic prospects for SAFG. ODM promised provide Embassy copy when available. British could not meet all prospective needs, but 40 percent of total UK civil aid (other than to Commonwealth and colonies) next fiscal year would be designated for South Arabia. Specific figures now before cabinet for approval. "Substantial" budgetary support envisioned at outset, but on "sharply declining scale." Long term, interest-free loans will also be offered, as well as topping-up salaries expatriate officials now employed by SAFG (of whom now some 50 British). Immediate problem will be covering SAFG April-December operating deficit. British will provide continuing assistance, but will cease covering whatever deficit may arise at end current UK fiscal year (March). SAFG will shortly be informed this unhappy prospect. 5. Re possibilities creating diplomatic enclave out of portion British base, Steamer Point already being discussed as possibility, though uncertain whether Aden local authorities or SAFG will take this over. 6. British agree accession Hadhramaut would be most helpful in strengthening new state but increasingly doubtful this will occur. Likeliest prospect may be some sort weak confederation between Saft and newly federated Hadhramaut states under Sultan Ghalib at Mukalla. 7. Brewer stressed continued USG recognition primary British responsibilities this region. Outlined Dept intentions give what support we could to SAFG in terms early establishment effective diplomatic presence and develop modest cultural and information programs. ODM reps expressed disappointment no direct USAID activity in prospect. Brewer responded by outlining Congressional and other limitations in this field and offered no hope direct aid help might be forthcoming.
8. Large British participation from three ministries indicates importance British attach to future US-UK cooperation on South Arabia problem. They seemed reassured at indications Dept intention work with SAFG after independence, but would of course have welcomed more in economic field. 9. Since some points foregoing particularly sensitive, believe should not be discussed even with British reps. Kaiser
85. Memorandum From W. Howard Wriggins of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/ Washington, March 6, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Wriggins Memos, 1967. No classification marking. SUBJECT 1. Saturday, March 4, I had lunch with Bill Brewer, who has just returned from a tour of the Arabian Peninsula. He found: (a) The Sheikdom of Abu Dabi is as reactionary as ever, though senior members of the British Foreign Office have a romantic notion that he is likely to change his spots. (b) The situation in Aden is a mess, and substantial disorders are in the wind. (c) There is no doubt in Bill's mind that Nasser is warming up to play a preponderant role in Aden. As you know, over a thousand members of a "liberation" army have returned from training in Cairo and Yemen. All they need is for arms to be given to them and for the British to withdraw. Presumably more trainees will be coming from Cairo. (d) Bill found the Saudis deeply concerned by our seeming passivity in the face of Britain's withdrawal and UAR ambitions. Bill feels we have a serious credibility problem with Faisal. (e) Bill does not think we would all take with equanimity an Egyptian move into Aden with the increased Soviet influence in this area such a move would imply. Bill is exploring in State the political implications to us of uncontested UAR control of Aden. He wonders whether it might not be possible to beef up our small naval forces off of Aden to demonstrate to the UAR that we do not favor a movement of UAR or "liberation" forces into Aden. His argument is that if we do not do something like this, Faisal, the Shah, and all the other oil rulers will feel we have abandoned them to the "revolutionary forces". (f) Combining this view with Hal's report/2/ leads me to the following tentative propositions: /2/For Saunders' report on U.S.-U.A.R. relations, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XVIII, Document 394. (i) we must find ways of asserting more unambiguous U.S. interest in the area promptly; (ii) we should proceed with some food to the UAR as a partial way of demonstrating we are not attempting to bring Nasser down; a new Ambassador may help; (iii) at the same time, we should increase our naval presence in the Aden area to demonstrate to both Faisal and Nasser that we do not expect an Egyptian take-over in Aden. Such a two-pronged policy should not be beyond our ability to define and to get accepted. We can explore this and other variations when Hal returns. 2. In the meantime, Rodger Davies is sorting out the "Food for the UAR" issue between Brewer (representing the Saudis) and Don Bergus (representing Cairo). I'll keep you informed of their recommendations to Nick.
86. Intelligence Memorandum/1/ No. 0797/67 Washington, March 9, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Saudi Arabia, Memos, Vol. I, 12/63-4/67. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; No Dissem Abroad; Controlled Dissem. Prepared in the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence. A note on the memorandum indicates it was produced solely in the CIA by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Clandestine Services. SOUTH ARABIAN DISSIDENT AND FEDERAL ARMED FORCES Summary In anticipation of the independence of South Arabia in 1968, the Adeni dissidents in Yemen are preparing a "Liberation Army" of South Arabian tribesmen. This army is being trained at Egyptian army camps in conventional and guerrilla warfare for use as a disciplined commando-type unit against the Federal Army. The Federal Army, which consists of 5,000 British-trained tribesmen, will become the security force of South Arabia after the British evacuation. The new "Liberation Army" is intended to secure South Arabia for the dissidents, who will probably form a government-in-exile, but the army's ultimate effectiveness will depend upon whether it remains loyal to the political group which formed it or whether it ultimately aligns itself with its military opponent, the Federal Army. Both forces, composed of the same type of hill tribesmen, share a contempt for the urban politicians who will dominate any independent government. [Here follows the body of the paper.]
87. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy Office in Yemen/1/ Washington, March 9, 1967, 4:27 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 19 ADEN. Confidential. Drafted and approved by Brewer and cleared by Bergus. Repeated to Sanaa, London, Cairo, Jidda, and Aden. 151922. Taiz 1231./2/ Appreciate info reftel and approve your attempt establish personal acquaintance al-Asnag. Should meeting occur, you should stress you are commenting on personal basis but may make following points: (a) with crucial phase South Arabia nation-building now taking place, those with most influence will be ones working inside rather than those who choose to opt out; (b) FLOSY's decision boycott UN Special Mission will deny it constructive role in establishing stable South Arabian state and at same time run counter UN Resolution establishing UN Mission for which almost entire UN membership, including UAR, voted; (c) terror will solve no problems in South Arabia but merely create new ones; and (d) since British definitely and finally are leaving, shrewder course for all Arab patriots would be cooperate with UN Mission and their fellow citizens in effort establish an orderly independent administration in which all Arabs could take pride. You might also discreetly suggest to al-Asnag that UAR aims and South Arabian nationalist aims may now increasingly diverge./3/ /2/In telegram 1231 from Taiz, March 9, Charge d'Affaires Dinsmore reported that during a discussion of South Arabian problems with UAR Consul al-Masri, the latter insisted that FLOSY was the sole representative of the people of South Arabia, to which Dinsmore responded with skepticism based on his own recent observations of conflict in Aden among FLOSY, NLF, SAL, and other organizations. Dinsmore emphasized U.S. Government interest in the peaceful settlement of differences among nationalist groups, which is why it fully supported the UN Special Mission. Al-Masri encouraged Dinsmore to establish a personal acquaintance with FLOSY representative al-Asnag, who was in Taiz--an effort which Dinsmore said he had initiated. (Ibid.) /3/In telegram 1236 from Taiz, March 11, Dinsmore reported that he met with al-Asnag, who expressed FLOSY's hopes for direct discussions with the U.K. Government. Dinsmore pointed out that FLOSY threats to the UN Mission were not reassuring, to which al-Asnag responded that its policy toward the UN Mission visit was one of "non-cooperation" rather than open hostility. (Ibid.) Rusk
88. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate in Aden/1/ Washington, March 15, 1967, 12:14 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 19 ADEN. Secret; Noforn. Drafted and approved by Brewer; cleared by Judd, Bergus, Wolle, and by Davies in substance. Repeated to London, Cairo, Sanaa, USUN, Amman, Athens, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, Kuwait, Moscow, Dhahran, CINCMEAFSA, and Tel Aviv. 155272. Aden 1168./2/ /2/In telegram 1168 from Aden, March 14, Jones reported that as the evacuation deadline approached, pressure was building for U.S. involvement in the defense of an independent South Arabian state. He argued that U.S. national interest dictated the avoidance of any security commitment or even the semblance thereof. (Ibid.) 1. Dept appreciates detailed analysis reftel. There is no question USG providing security commitment to new South Arabian state. As reftel indicates, protection South Arabia is matter for SAFG with such military and financial help as British may choose to provide. USG role must perforce be secondary, though we planning do what we can encourage forces moderation and stability. 2. Re paras 6 and 17 of reftel, Secretary's letter to Javits included no "warning" to UAR nor was it basis NYT item which prompted Farid's elation (London 7228)./3/ Guidance re latter article was contained State Circular 149571,/4/ while info re letter to Javits included in State 141188,/5/ both of which repeated Aden./6/ /3/Telegram 7228 from London, March 8, reported that Farid was elated that The New York Times had interpreted the Secretary's letter to Senator Javits as a "warning" to the UAR. (Ibid.) /4/Circular telegram 149571, March 6, discussed the March 4 New York Times story that reported the U.S. Government had "issued what appeared to be a warning to UAR and other outside powers not to attempt armed intervention in troubled South Arabian Federation" and that the State Department had made a "brief public statement" linking President Kennedy's May 8, 1963, press conference remarks opposing the use or threat of force in the Near East to the current situation in South Arabia. The telegram noted that the Department spokesman declined to speculate whether his remarks should be interpreted as an extension of Kennedy's statement to South Arabia. If queried, posts were to state that the Department had merely restated the general principle of U.S. Government opposition to use or threat of force in the area and there was no reason to characterize this response as a "warning" to any party or in any sense a new policy statement. (Ibid.) /5/Telegram 141188 to London, February 21, stated that Rusk's letter to Javits did not contain a warning to the UAR regarding Aden. (Ibid.) /6/Printed from an unsigned copy. In telegram 1207 from Aden, March 23, Jones reported that he had told Farid The New York Times had misconstrued remarks by a Department official and guidance from Washington made it clear that the U.S. Government had issued no warnings and that its Near East policy was unchanged. (Ibid.)
89. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State/1/ Cairo, March 16, 1967, 1150Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files, 1967-69, POL 19 ADEN. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to London, Taiz, Aden, and USUN. 5379. Ref: Aden 1168/2/ and State 155272./3/ /2/See footnote 2, Document 88. /3/Document 88. 1. As seen from here there is little possibility that SAFG with limited British support now planned will either be able maintain order after independence and withdrawal British forces or become viable government. 2. It seems increasingly clear that UAR is committed to establishment of progressive revolutionary regime in South Arabia and is prepared use force to this end. This intent was most recently confirmed by President Nasser during his final conversation with Ambassador Battle on March 4 and is evident in UARG public statements, reports of creation nationalist "liberation army" and rising pace of terrorism and extremism in Aden. 3. We believe our ability thwart UARG designs in South Arabia is extremely limited and virtual chaos which likely result from actively pursued insurgency against regime created and supported by British can only be avoided by adequate UN military and political presence during several year interim period. We do not see direct British-FLOSY talks as having much chance producing anything unless British willing sacrifice SAFG and begin working with nationalists in effort find combination acceptable to FLOSY and NLF leadership and to UAR. 4. Alternatively, all concerned including British and ourselves can let nature take its course, which we see as messy rearguard British withdrawal, period of civil war perhaps followed by de facto split of South Arabia with revolutionary pro-UAR Aden either independent or absorbed by Yemen on one hand and fragmented tribes of protectorate falling under whatever protection Saudi Arabia can afford them on the other. 5. Question we cannot answer here is whether such a situation would in truth be harmful to US political and strategic interests in area. We seem to have been able to live quite happily with UAR control of Suez Canal and Red Sea as exercised during past decade and may be able tolerate UAR presence in South Arabia without damage our position in area. In any event believe it essential we determine now what our interests are and what we are prepared to live with. 6. Also we must not forget that South Arabia is essentially an Arab problem. The conflicts in both areas result largely from Arab quarrels and except for our security guarantee and military support for Saudi Arabia and Britain's colonial role, foreign influences have thus far been minimal. Must be recognized however, that present trends if continued will probably lead to far more active Soviet involvement on side revolutionary progressive forces and Vietnam type situation could result. Nes
90. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts/1/ Washington, March 22, 1967, 1:32 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 19 ADEN. Secret; Limdis; Noforn. Drafted by Brewer on March 21, cleared by Davies and Judd, and approved by Katzenbach. Sent to Aden, Cairo, London, Jidda, Sanaa, USUN, and CINCSTRIKE. 160010. Subj: South Arabia. Re Aden 1198,/2/ 1200./3/ /2/Telegram 1198 from Aden, March 20, reported that the SAF Government had revealed to journalists on March 19 that talks with U.K. Minister of State for Foreign Affairs George Thomson had centered on Thomson's effort to win SAF approval of November 1 as independence day, which had been rejected as premature. (Ibid.) /3/Dated March 20. (Ibid.) 1. As result SAFG revelations to journalists (Aden 1198), Dept again pressed British Embassy here for authority inform posts on limited background basis of revised British withdrawal plans South Arabia communicated to us initially in London on most secret basis March 10./4/ EmbOff conveyed FonOff agreement March 21. Following summary accordingly provided for background only. /4/On March 16 U.K. Charge Sir Michael Stewart called at his request to hand the Under Secretary a copy of a British paper setting forth revised British plans for withdrawal from Aden and South Arabia, and for subsequent "offshore" British military protection of the new state for a period of up to 6 months after the date of independence, November 1, 1967. (Memorandum of Conversation, March 16, 1967; ibid.) 2. Revised UK plans conceived February-March to meet need give SAFG as much assurance for the future as possible, provide some reassurance against aggression thereafter and meet SAFG demand for control internal security Aden before state entirely on its own. 3. Specifics included proposal advance date of independence to November 1, 1967, at which time Federal security forces would assume responsibility for Aden security. British base would be closed same day but some military strength would be kept off-shore in region for limited period thereafter for sole purpose of providing some assurance against outside aggression. HMG favored SAFG application UN membership soon after independence date while UNGA in session. 4. MinState Thomson presented foregoing to SAFG in Aden March 18. HMG hoped for prompt Federal acceptance to permit announcement by FonSec in Commons March 20 but Federals balked, giving reasons Farid has furnished ConGen Jones (Aden 1200). SAFG assured Thomson they did not wish close door but hoped they could defer reply to proposals for month to permit full consideration. Thomson said he was not in position give assurance UK offer would remain open indefinitely. 5. In the event, FonSec's detailed announcement was cancelled. FonSec instead limited remarks to short general statement reported London 7591./5/ /5/Dated March 20. (Ibid.) 6. Foregoing remains highly classified British proposal, and addressees cautioned fully observe Noforn designation. Uncertain whether even British Embassies in field have been informed and earlier plans give advance word friendly rulers such as King Faisal have been dropped. Appropriate guidance will be provided when and if HMG makes public announcement. 7. At lunch with Ambassador Battle in Washington, March 21, Thomson reported on his Aden talks along lines foregoing and reftels. He said HMG had agreed to Federal request that modified British proposal could be kept under consideration for about a month. Thomson added somewhat surprising footnote that one factor in SAFG position had been telegram they had received from Sharif Beihan counselling against acceptance UK proposal. Rusk
91. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/ Washington, April 20, 1967, 2:51 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 19 ADEN. Secret; Noforn. Drafted by Brewer, cleared by Mary Sommer Seasword (EUR/BMI), and approved by Battle. Repeated to Sanaa, Taiz, Cairo, USUN, and Aden. 178848. South Arabia. Re State 177971./2/ /2/Telegram 177971 to Taiz, April 19, instructed the Embassy to pass to FLOSY leaders Asnaj and Makkawi separate oral messages that Lord Shackleton, U.K. Minister without Portfolio in Aden, wished to confirm that he would be glad to meet with them soon at a place to be determined. (Ibid.) 1. FonSec Brown had brief corridor exchange re South Arabia with Under Secretary Rostow and Assistant Secretary Battle during SEATO meeting early April 20. Brown said British now hoped to establish broadly based coalition government, though he admitted chances somewhat slim. Battle responded we thought this was right tack to take and that British should continue efforts have contacts with all South Arabian political groups. Brown said he had seen British message indicating Dept might be reluctant continue pass messages on HMG behalf to FLOSY officials. Battle assured him this not the case and said we continued willing help British on this in any way we can. 2. Brown asked whether we had info indicating FLOSY government-in-exile was about to be set up. Battle replied indications FLOSY considering this were coming in but no irretrievable step had apparently yet been taken. Brown commented establishment such government would make things far more difficult for British but then said he supposed HMG could still talk with FLOSY as political party. 3. Comment: Exchange took place just prior receipt Taiz 1376./3/ Brown's reference to Dept reluctance pass messages apparently stems from lack full information surrounding despatch State 177971. In initial discussions reported therein, Dept had taken position USG official could hardly be instructed see Makkawi without taking account latter's tendentious April 18 public anti-US reference and statement that a FLOSY government would close Straits to Israeli shipping./4/ On insistence British no such instructions included State 177971 in order maximize favorable atmosphere for passing British message to Makkawi. British Minister phoned Davies late April 19 express appreciation prompt transmission UK message but FonSec apparently not yet briefed. Brown expressed appreciation for Battle's assurance we continued ready be of whatever assistance we could to UK in seeking bring all South Arabian parties together. /3/In telegram 1376 from Taiz, April 20, Dinsmore reported that he had conveyed the British message to both men in separate private meetings at FLOSY headquarters that morning. Makkawi responded that on April 18 the FLOSY Command Council passed a formal resolution stating that FLOSY was unwilling to talk to any British minister unless the United Kingdom agreed to recognize FLOSY as the sole representative of the people of South Arabia. (Ibid.) /4/Circular telegram 178435, April 19, quoted press reports that Makkawi had stated that a future South Arabian Government under FLOSY would be anti-United Kingdom, anti-United States, and anti-Israel, and would close Bab al-Mandeb to Israeli shipping. (Ibid., POL 13 ADEN) Rusk
92. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Battle) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, May 9, 1967. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 19 ADEN. Secret; Exclusive Distribution. Drafted by Brewer and cleared by Davies. SUBJECT 1. Under cover of an Exdis letter, Embassy London has reported to us the following revised details regarding the British plan for withdrawal from South Arabia: --Independence on January 1, 1968. --A British carrier task force to remain off-shore for six months thereafter (2 of 3 British carriers are already in South Arabian waters). --No defense treaty. --Thought of South Arabia's achieving early UN membership has been abandoned. 2. In addition to the foregoing, Lord Shackleton wants an RAF squadron kept in Aden for three months after independence. The Foreign Secretary disagrees but is willing to have Shackleton state his case to the Cabinet Defense Committee. This Committee, followed by the full Cabinet, is expected to complete its deliberations on the revised plan by May 16 at the latest. The Foreign Secretary hopes for the first reading in Commons of an Enabling Act empowering HMG unilaterally to legislate South Arabian independence. (This would not require divulging details.) How much the British reveal in the subsequent Commons debate about the independence plan and the carrier task force will depend on the then existing circumstances.
93. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ JCSM-281-67 Washington, May 18, 1967. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, OSD Files: FRC 72 A 2468, Saudi Arabia 1967, South Arabia 092, 9 May 67. Secret. SUBJECT 1. (C) Reference is made to a memorandum by the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), I-22913/67, dated 10 May 1967,/2/ subject as above, which requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide an analysis of the military importance of South Arabia. /2/Not printed. (Ibid.) 2. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that: a. The anticipated UK withdrawal from Aden in early 1968 could make Khormaksar Airfield and Aden port facilities unavailable for US contingency operations. Execution of CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA's contingency plans for Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Sudan, and French Somaliland will be hampered by the loss of this staging base. Execution of these contingency plans would be simplified if en route staging bases and overflight rights were granted and if alternate staging facilities such as Dhahran, Addis Ababa, and Aldabra Island were available. A long-term implication of UK withdrawal from Aden could be the creation of a power vacuum which, if filled by forces hostile to the West, would increase the threat to nations oriented toward the West. b. Aden, if available, would be valuable, but not essential, for various contingency operations. Its military value to the United States stems from its port, airbase, and troop facilities which provide a staging base for US contingency operations in northeast Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Persian Gulf. Aden also provides an en route and refueling base for contingency operations in South Asia. Elimination of UK bases in the Persian Gulf would not alter the value of Aden as a potential base for US operations. The military significance of the elimination of British bases in the Persian Gulf is that British forces would not be readily available for contingency operations and, therefore, instability would be aggravated. A US/UK base on Aldabra Island would assist in the conduct of contingency operations into Kenya or east Africa but could require en route stops and/or overflight of various countries. Development of a base complex at Diego Garcia could also support contingency operations by providing facilities in the Indian Ocean. c. The availability of bases in Aden to the United Arab Republic (UAR) or the USSR would provide additional means for projecting UAR/USSR-sponsored subversion or military assistance into Africa and the remainder of the Arabian Peninsula. The use of Aden would also provide opportunities for extension of Soviet electronic intelligence and electronic warfare capabilities, support for Soviet ships, a means of establishing greater influence through an increased Soviet presence, and a contingency staging and logistics base. d. It is not likely that the Soviets would make an effort to establish a direct military presence in the Arabian Peninsula or the Horn of Africa through the establishment of overt Soviet bases or the development of Soviet military forces. However, the long-term Soviet goal in this area is to supplant Western influence with communist influence, leading in time to a Moscow-oriented communist political, economic, and social system. However, for the near term, provision of military advisors, as in Somalia, or economic advisors, as in Yemen, will remain the probable Soviet tactic. e. UAR or Soviet control of the southern entrance to the Red Sea would have an important military significance if the UAR or USSR attempted to exercise this control to prevent passage by tankers or other ships in conjunction with closure of the Suez Canal. If this action were taken, it would have a serious impact on shipping to the Red Sea ports of Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia, Israel, and Jordan. Such an eventuality is unlikely in view of the resultant adverse international reactions and the effect on UAR finances through loss of Suez tolls. While control of Aden might make a blockade easier, a more feasible method would be to close the Suez Canal. f. The military implications of US military assistance or security assurances to South Arabia are: (1) Drain on already taxed US military capabilities and the possible generation of additional US force requirements. (2) Possible commitment of sizable US forces in order to preserve an unstable government of questionable alignment. (3) Involvement of US military forces (possibly with the UAR/USSR) in an area of limited strategic interest. (4) Potential requirement for semipermanent US military presence. (5) Further reductions in current military assistance programs in other countries where the United States has interests. (6) Acceleration of British troop withdrawal from the Persian Gulf. (7) Reliance by the United Kingdom on US military involvement rather than on the use of British forces. g. Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iran, and Ethiopia would view additional UAR or USSR military influence in South Arabia as an increased threat. These countries probably would request increased US or other Western military aid or security commitments. Failing to receive US assistance, they would probably then turn to neutral or communist nations not involved. Iran and Saudi Arabia may provide support to opposing factions in an attempt to contain further UAR/USSR expansion. h. It is considered unlikely that UAR/USSR control of Aden's airfield or port facilities would cause a peacetime stoppage or reduction of Persian Gulf oil to Europe. Currently, very few oil-carrying tankers stop at Aden. In any case, Free World tankerage could transport, though at a greater cost, oil to Western Europe via the Cape of Good Hope or, when completed, through an Israeli-owned pipeline. 3. (S) From the above and the additional rationale in the Appendix/3/ hereto, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that: /3/Attached but not printed. a. UK withdrawal from Aden could hamper but not prevent execution of certain CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA contingency plans. UK follow-on withdrawal from the Persian Gulf would not alter this assessment. b. Use of Aden air base and port facilities by UAR and USSR military units would improve UAR/USSR abilities to project forces into South Arabia and the Indian Ocean area and provide facilities for other military or subversive activities. c. Soviet effort to establish a direct military presence in the area of the Arabian Peninsula or the Horn of Africa is unlikely. d. The military significance of UAR or Soviet control of the Southern entrance to the Red Sea lies in their capability to attempt a physical blockade; however, this eventuality is considered unlikely. e. Considering the worldwide military assistance commitments of the United States, a program which would involve additional commitments of US resources to South Arabia is not recommended at this time. Continuous efforts should be exerted to enlist the United Kingdom, United Nations, or other Western-oriented governments in preserving the internal and external security of South Arabia. It is not advisable to offer assurances of US military support to any government of South Arabia. 4. (S) In summary, the further extension of UAR/USSR influence in the Near East area would be contrary to US interests. In this connection, while South Arabia (particularly Aden) is of some military significance, it is not critical to the security interests of the United States. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Earle G. Wheeler [Continue with the next documents] Volume XXI Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |