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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXI Near East Region Department of State |
 68. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, February 4, 1966. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 3 ISLAMIC. Secret. Drafted by Moore on February 9. SUBJECT PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS United Kingdom United States Observers United Kingdom United States [Here follows section I: Nasser-Faisal Relations and Yemen.] II. Aden and South Arabia Sir Roger stated that the British decision to withdraw from the Aden military base would be officially announced in the Defense Review White Paper February 23./2/ While at present uncertain of the form of the announcement, he thought it might be phrased very simply along the lines of, "We do not intend to seek base facilities after the independence of South Arabia." It might contain some reference to British intention to continue economic aid to South Arabia after independence. At present, HMG contributes &#pound12 to 15 million annually. The High Commissioner is insistent that this be continued since, if the SAF leaders thought they were being abandoned, it would be difficult to obtain their agreement to any constitutional progress. Defense Minister Healey believes it necessary to continue paying for the South Arabian Federal Army. Additionally, HMG might keep a military mission under the aegis of its Embassy. It is expected that the British will simply move out of their present facilities in Aden at the appropriate time although they might try to retain limited staging and communications facilities. This has not yet been finally decided. Responding to Ambassador Hare's question, Mr. Brenchley said that the British would try to keep the refinery operating since this was the main British asset in the area. /2/The U.K. Government, faced with a serious balance-of-payments problem, was undergoing a defense review. It had previously informed the U.S. Government that the British base at Aden would be evacuated in 1968 and that British forces overseas would be reduced by one-third over the next 4 years. On February 22, it issued a Defense White Paper formally announcing these decisions. The current British timetable calls for first obtaining the approval of the Rulers of Bahrain and Sharjah to expand base facilities in that area. (This has just been obtained, although the Rulers have not been informed about Aden withdrawal.) The Hone-Bell draft constitution will be taken to Aden on February 10 and formally presented to the Rulers on February 12; Lord Beswick will travel to Aden on the 15th and inform the Federal Supreme Council on the 16th of the decision to withdraw militarily from Aden; Faisal will be informed on the 16th. Sir Roger said that Nasser's continued presence in Yemen presented a grave problem with respect to military withdrawal from Aden. Nasser continues strongly to support terrorist activities and HMG has evidence that he is currently training some 300 terrorists in Taiz. With announcement of British military withdrawal it is expected Nasser will increase these activities in order to hasten the departure and multiply its disorder. The announcement may well encourage him to stay in Yemen. The announcement, said Sir Roger, is certain to have a bad effect on the situation in South Arabia. Some of the Federal leaders will no doubt consider switching their full support to Nasser; others may more strongly push their demands for immediate control of Aden town. The Adenis, in turn, will stiffen their opposition to greater Federal control. If Nasser were to withdraw from Yemen it is very possible that the Federal Army would move into Aden and liquidate the Nationalist leaders. In contrast, so long as Nasser's troops are present in Yemen they could move into Aden under the pretext of protecting the Nationalists against Federal Army incursions. In response to Ambassador Hare's question, Sir Roger said that once the British had departed it was doubtful if Nasser would have any continuing interest in the Federation. He might maintain some concern for Aden town, probably in the form of indirect support to Nationalist politicians. However, the area would not in general be of much value to Nasser. Ambassador Hare posed the theoretical question of what would occur if the British made no proposal for a constitution but merely departed. Sir Roger predicted increased disorder and, on the completion of the British withdrawal, the full control of Aden town by Federal troops. He said, leaving Nasser aside, there was little affinity between Yemenis and South Arabians/Adenis. In response to a question from Mr. Symmes, Sir Roger said categorically that, even if asked, the British would not give any security guarantee to the SAF after independence. Responding to a further query by Ambassador Hare, Sir Roger said that some consideration had been given to bringing in the UN. However, this was ruled out so long as Great Britain continued to be responsible for law and order. The UN, judging by its past attitude toward Aden, basically reflected only an extension of Egyptian policy. At present, the UN could be expected to be only trouble makers rather than contribute to a solution. Nonetheless HMG did not rule out UN intervention at some stage. ("Matters could get so bad we might throw the subject into the UN.") Mr. Brenchley indicated he would spend the next two days in New York studying the feasible role of the UN but did not consider UN participation to be possible at present. Sir Roger said that prospects generally were exceedingly gloomy in Aden and that it was difficult to foresee the necessary progress to enable the British peacefully to hand over the reins of power in 1968. Sir Roger admitted that it was conceivable the Russians and Chinese Communists might take interest in Aden if a vacuum developed but doubted that this was an actual danger. Ambassador Hare suggested that Nasser would not react favorably to the Communists' getting a firm foothold there. Mr. Brenchley said there were only a few Leftists in Aden and the Hadramaut at the present time; while their proportionate size would probably increase in the future as the overall population of Aden shrank due to emigration because of worsening economic problems, it was doubtful that the Leftists in the area would offer a conceivable base to facilitate Soviet encroachment. III. Persian Gulf
Sir Roger stated that, as a result of the withdrawal from Aden, HMG was now seeking added facilities in the Gulf in order to maintain in some fashion its commitments to Kuwait and to the Rulers of the Gulf Shaikhdoms. If HMG were to maintain its present level of commitment to Kuwait it would need an added 11,000 troops in the Gulf--impossible on both political and financial grounds. Therefore it now must modify its Kuwait commitment to offer only air assistance unless given sufficient warning for it to be able to bring in additional troops prior to any attack. This change must now be discussed with the Kuwaitis; it is not unexpected that the Kuwaitis may use this shift as the basis for letting lapse their arrangement with the British. It is currently contemplated to add 600 troops in Bahrain and 2000 in Sharjah. No buildup is planned at Masirah and it is quite possible that the current strength at Salalah will be decreased. The new troops can be accommodated in Bahrain with no new land acquisitions above the 3000 acres presently held. It will be necessary to construct a new battalion camp outside of the airfield at Sharjah and add a few new hangars. The Sharjah airfield will not need to be enlarged. At present it can take Canberras and similar aircraft. Bahrain would continue to be the main staging point for troop movement further east and would form the link between Kuwait and Sharjah. (A detailed British list of proposed troops in the Gulf is attached.) The British hope that their troop increases in the Gulf will mitigate in the Arab World the impression of weakness which may be implied in their withdrawal from Aden and will underline their determination not to relinquish their position in the Gulf. They have informed the Shah of their contemplated moves in Aden and the Gulf and have assured him of their intention to maintain their Canberra bomber force in Cyprus. The Shah accepted the changes cheerfully and seemed to have no doubts about their future determination to remain in the Gulf. They doubt however that Faisal will react in the same accommodating fashion. [Here follows discussion of Kuwait, Iran, and Dubai.]
69. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/ Washington, February 19, 1966, 5:36 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 19 ADEN. Secret. Drafted by Moore on February 18; cleared by Hare, Symmes, Russell, and Judd; and approved by Ball. Repeated to London, Aden, and Jidda. 4691. 1. On Feb 18 British Ambassador Dean delivered to Under-Secretary Ball message to Secretary from FonMin Stewart requesting USG use publication of British Defense White Paper on 22 Feb as opportunity urge Nasser adopt more constructive policy toward South Arabia. Message made following supporting points: a. UK troop withdrawal from Aden will add to tremendous difficulties foreseen in bringing area to independence by 1968. Extent of difficulties will depend on attitude of UAR. b. In past UAR has made clear its intention frustrate any constitutional advance except on terms of "unrealistic" UN resolutions and has used terrorism and intimidation to support this goal. c. Hope US Ambassador in Cairo can make strong approach to Nasser as soon as possible after Feb 22 making plain that South Arabia is common US-UK concern and that he speaking for USG not HMG (since Canada is protecting power for latter). d. Believe announcement UK decision withdraw from Aden gives perhaps last opportunity influence Nasser. Suggest that, in view absence incidents since January 18, stress not be placed on terrorist aspect, but rather on positive approach that announcement base withdrawal has removed Nasser's main objection UK policies in Aden and should enable him adopt more constructive attitude. It in Nasser's interest that South Arabia enjoy stable independence rather than become another Yemen. e. Anticipate Nasser's reaction will be he does not control attitudes South Arabians; any UAR support given is justified by alleged British support royalists in Yemen; UN resolutions provide ready-made solution. HMG willing supply additional detailed factual material counter these arguments if desired. 2. UnderSec pointed out we had made similar approaches in past to UAR and would be most happy repeat them directly to Nasser unless our Ambassador has strongly overriding reasons for making presentation at lower level UARG. 3. Request you take action in accordance with foregoing unless strong objections perceived. Rusk
70. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State/1/ Cairo, March 8, 1966, 0810Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL UAR-US. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to London, Jidda, Aden, and Taiz. 2268. My conversation with Foreign Minister Riad last evening, his Chef de Cabinet and my DCM being present, covered Yemen, Aden, Ghana and US assistance to UAR. Latter two subjects will be reported separately. 1. I opened by commenting favorably on Sadat visit saying all reports and press comments seemed to indicate it had been highly successful. Riad agreed and confirmed GUAR very gratified by manner and level his reception. 2. Turning to Yemen I said had just come from call on Hassan Sabry al-Khouly who had informed me of new GUAR initiative (Embtel 2267)./2/ As result, this subject could be taken off agenda. Expressing great relief and pleasure at UAR effort break impasse through new constructive proposals I said this act of real statesmanship. /2/See footnote 2, Document 392. Foreign Minister stated that Yemen frankly very serious question for UAR and new proposals should make it clear President Nasser sincerely desired its resolution. Key was improved UAR-Saudi relations and were progress achieved here Yemen settlement would no longer pose problem. In effect it was not really a question of Jidda agreement or its implementation but what King Faisal wants. Latter has been acting on false assumption that UAR beset with serious internal problems and so can be pushed around. Unless this attitude changes Yemen problem would not be solved regardless of what UAR offered. 3. I then raised Aden in context situation created by British Defense White Paper and made following points: A. South Arabia is a common US-UK concern. We have no military or economic interest in area but believe that instability there contributes to instability throughout the Middle East. B. British are irrevocably committed evacuate their military base at Aden by 1968. They have no plans to leave any troops whatsoever behind. C. Constitutional proposals which British have put forward for South Arabia are basis for discussion and not final proposal which must be either accepted completely or else rejected. British are sincerely interested in leaving behind stable and independent South Arabia and believe this can best be done by working out in advance constitutional arrangement acceptable to majority of people involved. They welcome participation of all political elements of South Arabia in reaching this agreement. D. We believe announcement of British plans withdraw from Aden removes UAR's main objection UK policies in South Arabia. UAR, because of its connection with nationalist groups there, now has responsible role play in helping assure that transition from colonial government to independent state is performed peacefully. Alternative is likely be political chaos and economic stagnation. We assume UAR wishes avoid another situation like Yemen and hope we can count on UAR use its considerable influence toward rational and peaceful transition. Riad reviewed again Thompson talks and said British base was not main question but genuine independence. UK must negotiate with key nationalist leaders on basis UN resolution and self determination. I suggested provisions UN resolution already being complied with or shortly would be as result British actions on ground. We wanted stable, viable, representative government in area. This is all British wanted and we assumed it UAR objective also. Riad agreed but reitereated situation would be greatly eased were UK formally to accept UN resolution and begin talking directly to FLOSY. He recognized that forthcoming British elections made any progress virtually impossible at present.
On Yemen Foreign Minister clearly feels his govt has now made optimum gesture and future is up to Faisal. With Aden he got the point namely that we are interested in peace and stability in area and UAR activities which are not conducive to this objective will inevitably adversely affect US-UAR relations. Battle
71. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/ Washington, March 18, 1966, 6:49 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 ADEN. Secret. Drafted by Moore; cleared by Judd, Russell, and Symmes; and approved by Davies. Repeated to Aden, Cairo, Jidda, Taiz, and CINCSTRIKE. 5494. Embtel 4367, Aden./2/ /2/In telegram 4367 from London, March 16, Ambassador Bruce reported that in reply to his direct question as to what could be done to combat erosion of the security situation in Aden, Brenchley had responded that in spite of the evidence that the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY) had considerable indigenous support, the terrorist campaign itself could be called off immediately from Cairo. Thus, his government had placed its greatest hope in the possibility that the United States might be able to influence Nasser toward moderation following the British announcement regarding the Aden base. (Ibid.) 1. In any forthcoming conversations following points might be used with Brenchley and other FonOff officials: 2. USG in full agreement on importance strong U.S. demarche Cairo that UAR pursue moderate course in Aden-South Arabia. Ambassador Battle has already made extensive presentation UAR FonMin Riad (Cairo tel 215 to London)/3/ whom we consider increasingly effective channel, and is currently seeking appointment Nasser to discuss this and other items of concern. /3/Document 70. 3. As British aware (e.g., Hare-Allen talks February), US-UAR relations complex matter; actions in South Arabia are but one of variety indices we use to judge Nasser's over-all performance. However, South Arabia of sufficient concern that we singling it out (together with Yemen) for specific mention to Nasser as among factors to be weighed in considering any future PL-480 program. 4. While UAR doubtless playing major role instigating disturbances South Arabia, it would scarcely have been so successful without extensive indigenous support. Latter appears increasing as reported Aden tel 117 (67 to London)./4/ /4/Dated March 16. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-ADEN) 5. We continue fully willing do all possible bring UAR to moderate its activities. However, cannot hope for success without concurrent and continued British willingness use appropriate opportunities continue discuss constructive settlement with South Arabian nationalists. (Perhaps further opening given in Charge Clark's talk with Makkawi and Asnag, Taiz tel 141 to London.)/5/ /5/Telegram 348 from Taiz, March 16 repeated to London as telegram 141. (Ibid., POL 13 ADEN) Rusk
72. Telegram From the Consulate in Aden to the Department of State/1/ Aden, May 18, 1966, 0345Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 19 ADEN. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Cairo, Jidda, London, Taiz, and CINCSTRIKE. 147. Contel 145./2/ South Arabian Search for a Security Guaranty. /2/Dated May 18. (Ibid.) 1. Foreign Minister Farid told me May 17 his government has not yet given up hope of securing post-independence defense agreement with UK. He leaves May 20 to join South Arabian delegation which will argue this point as well as negotiate for military assistance. 2. Farid criticized Wilson and Beswick for playing politics in Commons--twisting words of South Arabian ministers in their efforts to get off the hook on which Sandys has impaled them. 3. Farid asked my personal reaction to suggestion that, if UKG adheres to its decision to terminate defense agreement with independence, SAFG ask it to intercede in interest of defense agreement from US./3/ /3/Circular telegram 2452, June 13, transmitted press guidance for embassies to use in response to questions regarding a newspaper report that the South Arabian Federation was planning to ask the U.S. Government for a security guarantee. The guidance stated that no such request had been received, quoted President Kennedy's May 8, 1963, statement that the United States was "strongly opposed to the use of force or threat of force in the Near East," and expressed the hope that the people of South Arabia would be successful in setting up a government with the broadest possible base when becoming independent in 1968. (Ibid.) 4. I expressed personal view that USG, unlike UKG, has endeavored to maintain constructive relations with both extremist and moderate states in Near East and to this end sought to minimize special ties with any one faction. USG had not signed defense agreement with Saudi Arabia, and would be unlikely to do so with any other Near Eastern state. 5. However, repeated statements on UAR intentions toward Saudi Arabia showed US refusal to tolerate aggression from any quarter. 6. Farid observed that it would be very helpful if US could make similar statements with specific reference to South Arabia. 7. I expressed view that USG is further inhibited from categorical statements of this nature by difficulty in distinguishing between aggression and intervention in civil war--as UAR has done in Yemen. (Later in conversation, in a different context, Farid said Aden would undoubtedly fall under UAR influence if Egyptian troops remained in Yemen after South Arabian independence.) 8. Farid inquired about US attitude toward latest Egyptian wheat request. I said as far as I knew no decision had been taken. USG recognized that continued wheat shipments could be construed as encouragement to UAR to stay in Yemen, from which it could threaten SAF. Whereas cutting off wheat sales might bring UAR to terms, it might also force UARG into taking desperate actions detrimental to interests of more than one country. 9. Farid said he felt UARG would have to give in to US pressure unless Soviet Union bailed them out--an unlikely prospect. I suggested that much depended on what Soviets stood to gain; Aden Radio had repeated rumors of Soviet request for naval base in Egypt. Farid said he hoped UARG would grant Soviets a base and thus expose the hollowness of their claim to being neutral. 10. In any event, Farid concluded, he was not personally disturbed. If the Egyptian troops stay in Yemen, he could easily take refuge in his home state. What he regretted was that continued Egyptian presence in Yemen would undoubtedly destroy the South Arabian Federation. Jones
73. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/ Washington, June 29, 1966, 7:39 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 19 ADEN/UN. Confidential. Drafted by Campbell; cleared by Moore, Brown, and Judd; and approved by Sisco. Also sent to USUN and repeated to Cairo, Taiz, and Aden. 7856. Ref: Embtel 6243./2/ /2/Telegram 6243 from London, June 28, reported a discussion between an Embassy officer and Foreign Office officials regarding the most recent UN resolution on Aden. On June 15 the Committee of 24, meeting in Cairo, had adopted a resolution calling on the Secretary-General to appoint immediately a special mission to Aden for the purpose of recommending practical steps necessary for full implementation of previous UN resolutions on Aden. It also deplored any defense arrangement the United Kingdom might enter into with "the unrepresentative regime" in Aden. (UN doc. A/6300/Rev. 1, ch. VI, par. 382) The Embassy officer urged the British to try to work out a formula that would provide for a mission led by Omar A.H. Adeel, appointed on June 9 by the UN Secretary-General as his Special Representative for the question of Aden. The Foreign Office response was that the real sticking point was the direct tying of the mission to the Cairo resolution, which was less acceptable than previous UN resolutions on South Arabia. (Ibid.) 1. We would feel better about FonOff recommendations on Aden if we could discern any alternative to UN role in solution of Aden problem. Unless UN steps in in some acceptable manner, it seems to us, British have no alternative to continuing unpromising policy of trying to turn over power to Federation Government whose access to power as independent state may well be signal for civil strife involving not only Aden, but UK, Yemen, UAR, and Saudi Arabia. 2. We understand British difficulties with Committee of Twenty-four resolution and HMG's commitments to SAF rulers. We do not, therefore, wish to press HMG too closely on Aden problem. 3. However, if occasion presents itself Embassy might try out one additional suggestion for UK consideration: Would it be possible for UKUN to inform the Secretary-General that the UK would be willing to receive a Special Mission, provided that composition of that Mission was acceptable to HMG, and provided further that it was understood in advance that while HMG would be prepared to consider recommendations of Mission, it would be in no way bound, in advance, to implement all of its recommendations, particularly those involving the safety and security of populations in South Arabia for which HMG would continue to feel responsible until independence (this refers to paragraphs 7 and 8 of June 23 resolution). 4. Problem of paragraph 2 (relative to "unrepresentative regime") remains, but conceivably this problem would diminish if acceptable role for UN supervision of elections could be worked out. Ultimately, it seems to us, this matter depends on whether Federation rulers can indeed control the hinterland vote (note Aden Consulate telegram 174 to Department on this subject).3 If Federal rulers cannot control tribes, their government is doomed to failure in any case. 5. It seems to us, line suggested in para /3/ puts British in more favorable position than out-and-out rejection of Special Mission "so long as its terms of reference are those of Committee of Twenty-four resolution" (Embtel 6192)./4/ For USUN--You may also offer UKUN the above as informal suggestion if appropriate occasion arises. /3/Dated June 15. (Ibid.) /4/Dated June 24. (Ibid.) Ball
74. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate in Aden/1/ Washington, August 5, 1966, 3:48 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL ADEN-US. Secret. Drafted by Korn; cleared by Held (NEA/ARP), Judd, NEA Director of Regional Affairs Sidney Sober, and Director of the AID Office of Near Eastern Affairs James C. Flint; and approved by Davies. Repeated to London, Cairo, Jidda, Taiz, and CINCSTRIKE. 22442. Ref: Aden's 128./2/ /2/In telegram 128 from Aden, August 4, U.S. Consul Curtis F. Jones reported that Foreign Minister Muhammad Farid called on him August 3 to discuss ways the United States might help meet some of South Arabia's needs and suggested his traveling to the United States to meet with U.S. officials. Farid said that it would not be necessary for him to go as a guest, formal or informal, of the U.S. Government. Jones noted he reiterated to Farid and other South Arabian officials that there seemed little possibility of even token U.S. aid to the South Arabian Federation, particularly in light of increased British contributions. (Ibid.) 1. FYI. While Dept naturally prepared see Farid if he insists on visiting US, talks at this time would be of limited usefulness. As you told Farid Aug 3, there is at present little possibility of even token US aid to SAF. Re SAF security we unable go beyond June 13 press guidance (Deptel 2452,/3/ para la) reiterating Kennedy May 8, 1963, statement opposing use or threat of force in the Near East. /3/See footnote 3, Document 72. 2. Dept will be undertaking in coming months extensive review South Arabian question in framework IRG. Would hope be better able discuss SAFG problems early 1967. End FYI. 3. You should inform Farid we sympathize with SAFG efforts in face many problems posed by forthcoming independence. We would of course be happy to receive him and exchange views if he desires visit Washington but feel talks at this time would have little to offer either as regards SAFG aid needs or security concerns. Assume SAFG will continue to look to HMG, as South Arabia's long-time friend, for primary assistance in both fields. USG would hope possibly be in better position discuss South Arabian situation in coming year. 4. Dept informing British Emb Farid proposal visit US and substance para 3 above. Emb London should convey same to FonOff. Rusk
75. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/ Washington, August 8, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Saunders Memos. Secret. WWR: Since it might cause a little noise, you ought to have the background on the latest UAR-UK clash in South Arabia. The UN Security Council is meeting on it this afternoon. The British claim that two Egyptian MIGs last week bombed a town (Nuqub) well within South Arabian borders. They have Soviet-made shell casings to show as evidence but nothing else except eye-witness reports. Our intelligence indicates that two planes were in a position to make this raid but can't produce tracking. Cairo denies that any of its planes were in the area. New Zealand may try to break the deadlock by proposing a UN investigation, but the UAR opposes. Motives are hard to assess. The UAR may be trying to intimidate some of the local tribal leaders to swing to their side by demonstrating British inability to protect them. To prove their mettle, both to the locals and to their own Parliament, the British had to do something. They went to the UN in hopes they could avoid retaliating. However, if they don't get results there, they may still feel compelled to strike back. There is no planned relationship between this incident and the longer range British problem of getting the UN to lay down satisfactory terms for a UN group to monitor the process of setting South Arabia free. However, they are coincidentally negotiating with U Thant to put together a responsible observer team. So their resorting to the UN is partly to establish good faith there./2/ /2/The UN Security Council met August 4-16 to consider the British complaint concerning an "unprovoked and indefensible attack" on the town of Nuqub in the South Arabian Federation. The United Kingdom stated the evidence showed the attack was carried out by two MIG aircraft belonging to the United Arab Republic and operating out of an airfield in Yemen. UAR and Yemeni representatives categorically denied the charges. On August 16 the President of the Security Council read a consensus statement noting that the Council had not been able to produce a constructive solution and asking the parties concerned to contribute to lessening the tension in the region and to invite the Secretary-General to continue his good offices. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 543-544. Hal
76. Paper Prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff/1/ Washington, August 9, 1966. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL MUSCAT & OMAN. Secret. Attached to a note from Sober to Ambassador Hare, Deputy Assistant Secretary Davies, and NEA/ARP that reads: "The attached assessment by the JCS of US Military Interests in South Arabia and Aden has been forwarded to me by Brig. Gen. Sibley, JCS member of the IRG/NEA, at my request in anticipation of IRG consideration of the South Arabian situation." US MILITARY INTERESTS IN SOUTH ARABIA AND ADEN US security interests in the area are: a. Access to Aden facilities. Periodic bunkering for COMIDEASTFOR ships (there are three), periodic fueling and logistic support of trans-Indian Ocean ships and aircraft and a few other flights constitute the US cold war needs. In limited war and area evacuation plans, Aden is an area of primary importance, although there are alternates which are somewhat less acceptable. The Gemini/Apollo plan for forcible recovery of astronauts and capsules designates Aden as a primary staging area for MEAFSA. The loss of the availability of Aden for US military operations will: a. Require revision of current plans. b. Hamper but not prevent attainment of objectives envisioned in present plans by means of alternate and, in some cases, not quite as convenient routes and facilities. c. Lend emphasis to expeditious construction of alternative US/UK military facilities in the Indian Ocean area. The appendix to this paper sets forth a discussion of the more important US military interests in Aden, oil for Europe, communist penetration, the availability of British forces and the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning Aden and support of US military operations in the area. It is concluded that Aden serves as a useful US military enroute and staging area but US military interests can be met by other alternatives. [Apparent omission] British to remain as long as possible. From an operational point of view, the loss of the availability of Aden for US operations will: a. Require revision to current plans. b. Hamper but not prevent attainment of objectives envisioned in present plans by means of alternate and, in some cases, not quite as convenient routes and facilities. c. Lend emphasis to expeditious construction of alternative US/UK military facilities in the Indian Ocean area. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have addressed the problem of US security interests in the midst of continuing instability in the Near East and Africa in connection with contingency planning in the area. They conclude that the instability will continue notwithstanding all the efforts to prevent it and that rights of any sort will probably be more difficult to obtain and, if obtained, of uncertain tenure over the coming years because of this instability. Instability would be present with or without Soviet influence, but is often aggravated by Soviet support. Thus, the US ability to project forces into the area should focus on more reliable alternatives than "rights" which one day may be granted and the next denied. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have provided guidance to CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA in this regard concerning the development of contingency plans which involve operations through or in the area. Over the years Aden has lost much of its strategic importance except in case of general war. Ships rely less upon enroute support facilities. Development of the French port of Djibouti, but a few hours from Aden, has further reduced Aden's importance to shipping. The increasing number of ships which cannot be accommodated by the Suez Canal (the largest US carriers and the newer super tankers of 79 feet draft) reduces further Aden's importance. From the standpoint of air traffic, longer range, faster and larger aircraft have lessened Aden's importance. US access to air facilities in Ethiopia, Dhahran, Bahrein, and Sharjah, Masirah as well as planned facilities in the British Indian Ocean Territory when developed will lessen still further the impact of the British withdrawal from Aden upon US military interests. [Here follows the body of the paper.]
77. National Intelligence Estimate/1/ NIE 30-1-66 Washington, September 8, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NIEs, 30, Middle East. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Helms and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on September 8.
THE OUTLOOK FOR SOUTH ARABIA Conclusions A. The British-sponsored Federation of South Arabia, comprising the prosperous port of Aden and the backward states of the Protectorate, is opposed by many Adeni politicians and by many sheikhs of the hinterland. Nonetheless, the UK has stated publicly that it will grant South Arabia its independence by the end of 1968, at the same time closing its base in Aden and ending its obligation to defend the area. London will almost certainly pull out by the appointed date, and may even do so earlier. B. The British withdrawal will end the ten-year boom in Aden that has greatly increased the economic activity of that port and swollen its population by 50 percent. Closing the British base will cause a decrease of at least 25 percent in Aden's income. Political unrest could further reduce the use of Aden's port, leading to the loss of another quarter of Aden's income. There is likely to be little change in economic conditions in the hinterland of South Arabia. C. Local political forces are now jockeying for power and seeking the backing of other Arab states. Saudi Arabia is giving some help to conservative elements, especially in the eastern part of the Protectorate. More importantly, the UAR and Yemeni republicans are supporting dissident elements, especially in Aden, and are sponsoring subversive and terrorist campaigns there which make continued turbulence likely. In the circumstances we believe it unlikely that the Federation will long survive the British withdrawal. D. Even in the period before independence, the chances of an accommodation between the Protectorate rulers and Aden are not good. There is little likelihood that the British could bring to power an Aden government sufficiently conservative to be acceptable to the Protectorate rulers without its being unacceptable in Aden. If the British permit the tribal leaders to control Aden, nationalist violence would be likely; and if they permit the nationalists to regain a voice in the government, the sheikhs would be disturbed. The nationalists themselves might even refuse to participate. In any event, the issue could probably not be solved without violence. In either case, the Adenis would need, and probably get, outside support for their cause. [Here follow the Discussion section of the estimate and an annex.]
78. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/ Washington, October 12, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Saunders Files, Aden & South Arabia, 4/1/66-1/20/60. Secret. SOVIET ACTIONS IN RESPECT OF POSSIBLE SUCCESSOR /2/This memorandum was prepared by the Near East Staff of the Office of National Estimates and coordinated with the Office of Current Intelligence for presentation to the IRG/NEA. It is to be read in conjunction with NIE 30-1-66, "The Outlook for South Arabia," 8 September 1966. [Footnote in the source text. NIE 30-1-66 is Document 77.] 1. Soviet actions in the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula will be governed in large measure by the nature of the successor regime that the British are able to leave in South Arabia, although the Soviets will have little to do with shaping that regime. The USSR's activity will also be influenced, though to a lesser degree, by such external factors as the outcome of the Saudi Arabian-UAR dispute and the consequences of Egyptian efforts to run Yemen as a colony, which could serve either to increase or decrease the options available. The course of Soviet rivalry with the Chinese Communists may also have some effect on Soviet activity in South Arabia. 2. There are three broad categories of successor arrangements which might emerge in South Arabia, each embracing a number of possible variants. In the first instance, the South Arabian Federation or some similar entity may survive, perhaps ruled by a tribal or military strong man. As NIE 30-1-66 states, the chances of survival of such a state are not bright, but neither are they nonexistent. Any such regime would probably retain an essentially conservative outlook, friendly to the West--at least as long as the latter provides assistance (as Britain has promised to do until 1971). Saudi Arabia would probably have considerable influence over this sort of state, which would in any event almost certainly be antagonistic to any radical Yemeni state. In this situation, Moscow would probably not find a receptive field for its activity in South Arabia and extensive relations are unlikely to develop. 3. The second--and somewhat more likely--general category of possible developments in South Arabia is for the Federation to fragment. While this could mean splitting into as many parts as there are states in the Federation, the small size and lack of resources of many of them would argue against such a development. It seems more likely that two broad groupings might appear--one conservative and one progressive or radical. In such an eventuality, Aden might become an independent entity, or it might join in a greater Yemen along with some of the westerly sheikhdoms of the Federation which are contiguous to Yemen. (This greater Yemen might be a truncated version of the present state, involving only the southern Shafa'i part.) The willingness of such a "nationalist" Aden to join Yemen or to seek UAR support would depend in large measure on developments in Egyptian handling of Yemeni affairs. The Adeni "nationalist" leaders are in many cases close and long time associates of the Yemenis who have been ousted from government and jailed by the UAR, and they are not, on the whole, working to hand Aden over to Egypt but to free it from foreign domination. Thus the radicals may even be wary of receiving Soviet military equipment from the UAR if this entails a substantial Egyptian military presence in Aden. 4. The third possibility is that virtually all of South Arabia would fall under the domination of a radical nationalist regime. In view of the scarcity of radical talent in the sheikhdoms and the fact that the more conservative elements have most of the military power while the town radicals have virtually none, the prospects for this are not likely. Such a government probably would not have a very firm grip on internal security and would probably want external assistance, and the USSR would be an obvious source of aid. However, the same constraints in respect of association with Yemen and of assistance from the UAR would apply here as in category two. 5. In virtually all of the imaginable cases in which South Arabia might develop, the USSR and other Communist countries will have an official, diplomatic presence, providing them cover for clandestine activities. (A possible exception would be a conservative Federation, heavily influenced by the Saudis, but even this is quite remote.) In the event of some version of categories two or three evolving, a radical or a progressive regime would probably seek assistance from the USSR--and from anyone else willing to contribute. The Soviets would probably be willing to expend what for this area would be significant amounts of money, say some tens of millions of dollars annually, but they might have some difficulty in finding a government sufficiently effective to be worth aiding. Aden without its hinterland is tiny, vulnerable to harassment, and of itself of very little value. A "Greater Yemen" state would be more attractive, but would be under siege from north and east and might be an expensive proposition to support. Military aid might be part of a Soviet assistance package, and this would probably involve a Soviet training mission. 6. In general, the Soviets are considerably limited in the range of options open to them in South Arabia, and, at least initially, would probably work with the UAR if the latter was still maintaining a significant presence in Yemen and was on good terms with the South Arabian radicals. Likewise an effort by the USSR to take precedence over the UAR in the area would risk such a disruption of UAR-Soviet relations that Moscow is unlikely to try it. Over the years, the USSR has invested so much energy and effort into castigating the West for its "imperialist" presence in under-developed countries that the option of replacing Western with Soviet bases is almost certainly foreclosed. Further, the Soviets are constrained by their distaste for any conflict between Middle Eastern powers which might lead to direct US intervention. For Moscow does not want to be faced with the necessity for any direct confrontation with the US.
IRG/NEA 66-35 Washington, October 14, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Saunders Files, Saudi Arabia, 4/1/66-2/31/67. Secret. INTERDEPARTMENTAL REGIONAL GROUP FOR NEAR EAST Record of IRG/NEA Meetings--October 5 and October 12, 1966 In considering the prospects for, and our interests in, South Arabia, the Group: Noted the general assessment contained in National Intelligence Estimate 30-1-66,/2/ and the Joint Staff evaluation of our military interests in the area/3/ circulated with IRG/NEA 66-34. /2/Document 77. /3/Document 76. Expressed its general agreement, subject to certain modifications, with the analysis contained in the State (Country Director) paper on the "Future of South Arabia" circulated with IRG/NEA 66-34, a revised copy of which is attached./4/ /4/Not attached. Reviewed the potential threat to US interests as the UK prepares to withdraw from South Arabia in 1968, as the UAR seeks the establishment of a local government responsive to its wishes and as the USSR--working to a large degree through the Egyptians--aims at achieving significant influence (although probably not military bases) in the area. Noted the statement by the UK Foreign Minister at the UNGA on October 11, 1966 reiterating British intent to withdraw and further welcoming UN participation in effecting the transition to an independent South Arabia. Agreed that it is in the US interest that the West retain a significant influence in South Arabia; also that dominant Communist influence in the area be prevented, and that major regional disputes (such as a Saudi-UAR confrontation) over the area be avoided. Recognized, however, that any attempt to pre-empt the area for the West and to ensure its political and economic stability would require a major commitment of resources, the justification for which has not been established. Agreed that we should support British efforts to bring the conflicting local factions to an agreement on the future government of South Arabia; and that particularly the conditions for establishing an expanded--and perhaps continuing--UN presence in the area should be explored. Agreed that we should encourage continued British support of the South Arabian security forces; in this connection, we should consider the advantages and disadvantages of extending explicitly to South Arabia our general security assurances against the use of force or the threat of force in the Near East. Agreed that we should, in early discussions with the UK, seek to obtain a detailed British assessment of the future viability of South Arabia, determine current British intentions concerning economic aid to the area, and explore the conditions under which the British might increase their security and economic commitments to South Arabia. Agreed that we should keep under review and consult from time to time with the Saudis and the Iranians, as well as other nations friendly to us, on the extended security threat which they claim to see in UAR/USSR encroachment into South Arabia. Agreed that it would also be desirable to consult with the UAR, on appropriate occasions, on the desirability of a peaceful transition in South Arabia; and to explore the scope for useful exchanges on this subject with the USSR, perhaps in the context of our other security concerns in the Near East. Agreed that we should be prepared to elevate our present Consulate General in Aden to an Embassy, when South Arabia becomes independent. Agreed that AID should make an assessment of the potential requirements of an independent South Arabia for external economic assistance, and of the conditions under which such assistance might be obtained and administered. While the study should not preclude an official US aid effort, it should also examine the feasibility of developing an assistance effort limited to non-USG sources such as the UN or other international agencies, oil-producing countries of the Middle East, and private Foundations, as well as the UK and other third countries. Agreed that potential requirements for expanded US cultural exchange and information programs in South Arabia should also be explored. Noted, finally, the desirability of proceeding with such steps as are now appropriate, but that our general course of action can be only tentative at this stage and must be kept under review in the light of future developments as South Arabia moves toward independence. MEMBERS PRESENT Executive Chairman: Ambassador Hare State (NEA): Mr. Davies; Mr. Moore; (S/P): Mr. Brewer S.S. [Continue with the next documents] Volume XXI Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |