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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXI Near East Region Department of State |
 Arabian Peninsula 51. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, January 30, 1964, 10 a.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, NEA/ARP Files: Lot 69 D 257, POL--Political Affairs & Rel., 1964, Middle East General, POL 3-a, US-UK Talks, January Position Papers, January 29-30, 1964. Secret. Drafted by Seelye on February 3. US-UK TALKS SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Sir Geoffrey Harrison, Deputy Under Secretary of State, British Foreign Office NEA--John D. Jernegan 1. Saudi Arabia Mr. Jernegan said that despite the Saudi family squabble and the unpopularity of the Saud regime in certain circles in Saudi Arabia, Crown Prince Faisal's position remains quite strong. While there is the ever-present possibility that a cabal of princes could cause trouble, Faisal has emerged successfully from his power struggle with King Saud. Sir Geoffrey Harrison agreed with this assessment. Mr. Jernegan expressed the view that Faisal might be even better off now had he attended the Cairo Summit Conference. It appeared that the King's prestige may have risen a bit as a result of his attendance. Sir Geoffrey inquired whether the Department had any information indicating that the King had "given anything away" at Cairo. Mr. Jernegan said the King had been effusive in his response to Nasser's cordial reception but that he had not been in a position to commit himself to anything. At least Nasser is now disposed to improve his relations with Saudi Arabia. Sir Geoffrey thought Faisal had lost nothing tactically by not going to Cairo. The British had heard from Saqqaf that there was a possibility of a continuation of the Saudi-UAR dialogue. Mr. Jernegan said that Saqqaf had indicated to our Ambassador at Jidda a Saudi desire that UAR representatives visit Saudi Arabia. However, the Department has the impression from reports emanating from Cairo that the UAR will probably not agree to send anyone to Saudi Arabia. Mr. Jernegan hoped that Mr. Spinelli, who has proceeded to Jidda from Cairo, might lay the groundwork for further talks. Mr. Jernegan said we are pleased with the cessation of UAR propaganda. Sir Geoffrey expressed the view that it would take some months to overcome the unsettling effects in Saudi Arabia of past UAR propaganda attacks. Mr. Jernegan thought that Faisal personally appeared to be more affected by these attacks than the Saudi public. Mr. Seelye said the Department has received reports in the last year that UAR propaganda has been considered somewhat of a joke in some Saudi circles. Sir Geoffrey cautioned against underestimating the effects of Nasser's propaganda. Mr. Jernegan commented that the Department is encouraged by recent signs of more rational economic development in Saudi Arabia. He thought that there had been an important "take-off". Sir Geoffrey said he was struck by the incredible incompetence of the Saudi Government machinery. Mr. Davies said that the situation in the Government has improved compared to what it was some ten to fifteen years ago. There is now a semblance of modern government. Sir Geoffrey acknowledged that there had been some progress in this regard. If the Saudis can agree increasingly to accept foreign advice, they can make more rapid progress. Mr. Davies said the Ford Foundation is under contract to modernize the administrative apparatus of the Government. Sir Geoffrey commented that the greater the natural resources of a country such as Saudi Arabia, the more waste there is likely to be. Mr. Jernegan inquired as to the latest British information regarding the size of the White Army. Mr. Brenchley said that the figure being "used in the planning stage" is 10,000 or ten units composed of 1,000 men each. Mr. Davies said that our figures indicate that the present size of the White Army is between 16,000 and 20,000. Mr. Jernegan recalled a recent report suggesting that the White Army is three times this size. Mr. Seelye said that the report to which Mr. Jernegan referred emanated from the chief British advisor to the White Army; the figure of 50,000 which he is quoted as citing, however, may have been garbled in transmission. Mr. Brenchley said that the British advisors favor decreasing rather than increasing the size of the White Army to make it more mobile. The Foreign Office has no recent report on its current size. Mr. Davies expressed the hope that our two military advisory missions can keep in close contact and follow "parallel lines". Mr. Brenchley noted that the British do not have representation in the Eastern Province, as does the United States, and therefore information available to the Department on Saudi Arabia is likely to be more complete. Mr. Davies said that the size of Saudi Arabia and the dispersion of the populace makes it difficult always to feel the pulse of public opinion. In reference to earlier discussion, he wished to call attention to a message which had just come in from the field reporting that the UAR has been dropping leaflets over Yemeni royalist territory showing pictures of King Saud meeting with Sallal, Nasser and Hussein in Cairo. 2. Aden and the Persian Gulf Switching to Aden and the Persian Gulf, Mr. Jernegan commented that it is the Department's understanding that HMG considers Aden as the key to its commitment in the Persian Gulf. He said that the Department has followed recent developments in Aden with interest and anxiety. Sir Geoffrey said, "So have we." He said that since he had to leave the meeting briefly in a few minutes he would at this point prefer to talk about the Persian Gulf and return to Aden later. Sir Geoffrey recalled the Persian Gulf US-UK talks held in London in April 1963/2/ and said that the British have little to add at this time. The UK political and military presence in the Gulf accomplishes the twin objectives of fulfilling the British obligations to the Persian Gulf states and to Kuwait. Aden is the base which gives the British commitment in the Gulf political and military "substance". If the British political and military influence were removed, anarchy would result. This would have two dangerous implications: (1) it would open the Gulf to the influence of other powers, such as the USSR (Mr. Brenchley interjected to include Saudi Arabia in this connection, noting that the Saudis have still not cut their links to the Omani rebels) and (2) it would threaten the flow of oil to the West. Disruption of the oil could be "inconvenient". If all the Gulf oil resources fell under one state, it would be difficult to keep the price of oil within reasonable limits. Sir Geoffrey said that while the form of the British relationship with the Gulf states appears anachronistic, it is important to remember that the rulers are backward and conservative and it is difficult to get them to move forward as fast and as far as one would like. Nevertheless, HMG is conscious of the need to do so. /2/For documentation on the April 1964 talks, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XVIII, pp. 559-561. Sir Geoffrey said that the basic British philosophy is to preserve order and stability in the Gulf while at the same time encouraging progress at a rate circumstances will allow. It is not in HMG's interest to encourage developments which threaten the traditional society. HMG recognizes that the pace of change in the Gulf will not satisfy the Afro-Asian powers and that the issue may be raised in the UN. He said the Labor Party thinks HMG should move faster. Mr. Jernegan inquired whether the British have an overall plan for dealing with the Gulf states. He recalled mention a few years ago of a federation. Mr. Brenchley replied that HMG is thinking of a federation of Trucial States (excluding Bahrein, Kuwait and Qatar) but this would be difficult to achieve. Sir Geoffrey said that to produce coherence in an area which is so fragmented is an intractable problem. 3. Kuwait With regard to Kuwait, Mr. Brenchley said HMG is encouraged by the recent rapprochement with Iraq. Kuwait's admission to the United Nations, Iraq's recognition of Kuwait and agreement on the Kuwait-Iraqi border are good signs which remove the immediacy of the Iraqi threat. There had been no change in Iraq's policy toward Kuwait following the recent change in the Iraqi Government. The British know from talking with the Emir of Kuwait that he is extremely cautious in dealing with Iraq. He considers the 1961 agreement with the UK/3/ as the key to safeguarding Kuwait's integrity. /3/On June 19, 1961, the United Kingdom signed a new treaty with Kuwait recognizing its independence and providing for U.K. military assistance if Kuwait were threatened and the Amir asked for protection. Following a June 26 Iraqi claim that Kuwait was "an indivisible part of Iraq" and what seemed to be an imminent Iraqi invasion, the Amir asked the United Kingdom for military assistance and U.K. military forces were sent back to Kuwait. Mr. Brenchley said that HMG is determined to maintain its capability to come to Kuwait's defense. In order to be able to do so, British forces must be kept on the alert and be available on short notice. The commitment of British troops to East Africa complicates the picture somewhat. In addition, Iraq, for internal reasons, recently moved a tank regiment to the Basra area. This regiment could conceivably capitalize on any internal coup effort in Kuwait and move in a matter of hours. Mr. Brenchley said that the available British military force has two functions: (1) its very existence encourages Kuwait to undertake an independent policy, and (2) it serves as a deterrent to Iraq. The critical military element consists of one battalion of troops and Hawker Hunter aircraft located in Bahrein. The British do not know to what extent the Iraqis are aware of the need for backing up the Bahrein military contingent with troops from Aden. Mr. Brenchley asserted that the UAR political support for Kuwait's independence is of considerable importance. Obviously, the UAR would not wish Iraq to swallow up Kuwait. While UAR teachers exercise influence in Kuwait, it is the British view that Nasser has no intention of subverting the Kuwait Government. If Nasser so desired, he could "do a lot" in Kuwait. His influence there is much stronger than Baathist influence. Mr. Sloan noted that this seemed to indicate that the UAR was using "more subtlety" in its dealings in Kuwait than elsewhere. Mr. Brenchley agreed. Kuwaitis are satisfied that the UAR is not using its assets against the Kuwait Subah family. Meanwhile, the Kuwait Government undertakes to maintain good relations with the UAR by doing such things as financing UAR-approved projects and by hard currency deposits in the UAR. Mr. Jernegan asked to what extent HMG tries to influence Kuwaiti policy. Mr. Brenchley replied that since the treaty of 1961 the British have been careful not to seem to be endeavoring to exert influence on Kuwait policy. HMG proffers advice only in response to Kuwaiti initiative. The British have the potential to influence Kuwait more and would do so if the stakes were high enough. The British are confident that any lingering Kuwaiti suspicions of the UK will subside and that the "pendulum will swing back" in the direction of increasing Kuwaiti solicitation of British advice. "A known devil is preferable to the unknown." 4. Southern Gulf With regard to the southern Gulf, Mr. Brenchley said the British have been devoting attention to getting rid of "the anachronisms". This flows from a desire to bring about modernization and because of the prospect that the UN will give increasing attention to the Persian Gulf. He noted that the British are responsible for the defense and external affairs of these states. In certain respects HMG is involved in internal affairs--for example, in exercising legal jurisdiction over foreigners. Since 1960 the British have been pressing the rulers to set up the necessary machinery for dealing with non-Muslim foreigners. This policy of "retrocession" has progressed furthest in Bahrein. Mr. Jernegan inquired how the British exercised legal jurisdiction in these states. Mr. Brenchley replied that jurisdiction is exercised by British Political Agents and special British judges. British courts apply Indian law. In addition to Bahrein and Qatar, the policy of retrocession is now being applied in Abu Dhabi in the form of turning over traffic matters to the local administration. In all cases the British make the appointment of a qualified judge as a sine qua non for the turnover. Mr. Brenchley said that a council of Trucial States exists which meets under the chairmanship of the Dubai Political Agent. The British have suggested to the Trucial State rulers that an executive committee be formed composed of their deputies which would meet regularly and concern itself essentially with economic development. As an inducement, the British have doubled the previous amount of British funds earmarked for economic projects in the Trucial States. The momentum toward federation is difficult to generate since each ruler tends to hate his immediate neighbor. Mr. Brenchley said that some progress had been made in resolving frontier problems. Negotiations are taking place with regard to the "one remaining undemarcated border" between Abu Dhabi and Muscat. 5. Buraimi Mr. Jernegan asked whether the Buraimi question were quiescent. Mr. Brenchley said that this was not entirely the case. He recapitulated the UN step-by-step approach to the problem envisaging the return of the refugees. By October 1962 Mr. de Ribbing's work was virtually completed. However, the Saudis "went back on their promise" to allow the refugees to return, setting a condition that there be a modus vivendi. By this they meant the establishment of an international body to oversee Buraimi. This was not acceptable to the Sultan of Muscat since it threatened his sovereignty. The Saudi representative, Azzam Pasha, keeps reminding the Secretary General that the next move is up to the British. HMG has frankly dragged its feet since it wishes to keep up UN interest in the matter while at the same time recognizing that in view of the Sultan's adamant position the British reply must be negative. Mr. Brenchley thought that the reason the Saudis had recently become more interested in the problem was because the British oil company in Abu Dhabi recently drilled a well close to the modified Riyadh line. The location is in the so-called "standstill" area, which the British do not consider applicable. Mr. Jernegan wondered what Aramco's response to this development had been. Mr. Seelye said that Aramco has reflected Saudi concern with the British company's drilling of a well in the "standstill" area but is not itself operating in this area. Mr. Brenchley preferred the term "ex-standstill" area and stated that in any case this area is not in the Aramco concession. 6. Muscat and Oman With regard to Muscat and Oman, Sir Geoffrey said that the British have acquainted the Committee of Five in detail with the history and nature of British relations with the Sultan of Muscat and Oman. He expressed the hope that the US would also provide the Committee with the details of its treaty relationship. Mr. Jernegan said he was under the impression we already had. Mr. Seelye said that we had earlier made a statement before the Committee of Twenty-four and that we would be happy to explain our treaty relationship with the Sultanate before the newly-formed Committee of Five. Sir Geoffrey said that HMG will decline to act as a channel of communication between the Sultan and the UN. The British have found the Secretary General to be understanding of British difficulties with the Sultan. The SYG saw an analogy between the situation of the Omani rebels and internal chieftains in Nigeria. Mr. Jernegan wondered why the General Assembly had shown so much voting enthusiasm on the subject. Sir Geoffrey said there has been a great deal of "mystification" over the UK-Sultan relationship. It is the British view that if the Sultan would be more forthcoming, he might be able to make a good case before the Afro-Asian Bloc. HMG regrets that the Sultan cares so little about the UN. Mr. Jernegan inquired whether the Sultan is an Arab. Sir Geoffrey responded in the affirmative. Mr. Seelye said it was his understanding that the Sultan is half Indian. He said the problem is that the Arabs do not regard him as an Arab. Sir Geoffrey acknowledged that this was why the British hoped that no Arab would be appointed to the Committee of Five. Mr. Brenchley noted that the question is sometimes asked why the British bother with the Sultan. They do so for the following three reasons: (1) the desire for stability in the area; (2) the fact that if the British rupture relations with the Sultan, the confidence of the other rulers of the Persian Gulf in the British would be undermined; and (3) the British have important staging rights at Salalah and Masira, essential links in their Persian Gulf defense chain. Sir Geoffrey noted that the American Consul in Aden has responsibility over Muscat and Oman and wondered whether the Department has any plans to establish a resident Vice Consul in Muscat. Mr. Seelye recalled that six or seven years ago the Department had seriously considered appointing a resident Consul in Muscat. However, because he would have little to do and in view of the difficulties of living in Muscat, the Department had decided against doing so. Mr. Davies said that the Department has been considering the possibility of assigning two Arab specialists to Dhahran who would develop special expertise in the Persian Gulf area. Sir Geoffrey hoped the Department would bear in mind the need to build up the image of the sovereignty of the Sultanate. 7. Aden Mr. Brenchley, while noting that Aden comes under the jurisdiction of the Colonial Office, said that Aden as a colony presents the UK with difficulties. A large portion of the population is Yemeni. The internal situation is complex. The Yemen revolution has "complicated things". Recently, there has been a certain "swinging back" as the Adenis have recognized the ineffectiveness of the YARG and the fact that Yemen is "no bed of roses". The resolution of the moderates has been weakened. One of the problems being tackled is that of the franchise. Britain's principal interest continues to be the free use of the military base. Mr. Brenchley identified three sources of trouble for Aden: the nationalists, Yemeni threats from across the border, and the UAR. Pressure from the direction of the UAR has increased in recent months, including propaganda and incitement. He referred to a report just received concerning the ambush of a Federal Regular Army patrol by Yemeni dissidents masquerading in Yemeni Republican National Guard uniforms. He said that the Army had been attempting to intercept a camel convoy headed into Radfan from Yemen. The Yemeni dissidents had apparently been trained in Yemen. Mr. Seelye noted that those troubles in the Aden-Yemen border areas which appear to have been stirred up from outside have occurred only in recent months. He suggested the possibility that they had been inspired by reports, some accurate and some inaccurate, of arms shipments from Aden to the royalists. It seemed unfortunate that the Federal Regular Army, while tracking an incoming caravan, failed to intercept caravans headed outward into Yemen. Mr. Davies commented that reports of shipments of arms from the Sharif of Beihan to the Yemeni royalists were first received last October, before the border troubles began to mount. Mr. Brenchley thought that the stepping up of outside-inspired incidents may have been connected with forthcoming elections in Aden. In any case, these developments complicate steps which might be taken in the direction of independence. HMG has not yet reached a decision on this matter and the matter of franchise is now being considered. Mr. Davies commented that the organization of the SAF appeared to have progressed fairly well. He noted the complex problem of endeavoring to meld the less advanced protectorate shaikhs with the more advanced Aden Colony residents. The security measures taken in Aden following the deplorable grenade-throwing incident appeared to have been dictated by the shaikhs, who oppose the forces of change. Mr. Brenchley noted that the SAF Council decided on these measures and Aden State has a representative in this Council who voted in favor of the strict measures taken. Aden must accept the consequences of the federal government being responsible for the state of emergency.
52. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/ Washington, February 7, 1964, 8:01 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL ADEN-UAR. Secret. Drafted by Seelye on February 6; cleared by Davies and Officer in Charge of U.K. Affairs Thomas M. Judd; and approved by Jernegan. Repeated to London, Jidda, Taiz, Dhahran, and Aden. 3631. During recent US-UK talks HMG requested USG use its influence with Nasser to desist from campaign of propaganda and subversion directed against Aden. We were non-committal at time, noting that this campaign appears to have occurred in last 2-3 months since circulation of reports that Aden (Sharif of Beihan) source of arms shipments to royalists. We have decided to respond positively to HMG request. In so informing British Embassy here February 7, we have expressed strong hope that HMG will redouble its efforts to prevent Aden territory from being used for activities in support of Yemeni dissident elements. Accordingly, Cairo should at appropriate UARG level (1) express USG hope that, in consonance with spirit of Summit Conference and in interest of easing Yemen-Aden tensions, Cairo will desist from further propaganda and other types of inflammatory attacks against Aden; and (2) indicate that although USG has already been assured by UK that latter doing utmost restrain Adeni rulers from aiding Yemeni royalists, we have requested HMG to make further special effort frustrate any such activities which may be occurring./2/ /2/Telegram 1816 from Cairo, February 12, reported that an Embassy officer had met with Presidency Director Hassan Sabri al Khouli to discuss the question of UAR propaganda attacks on Aden. Al Khouli responded that such attacks had been purely defensive but that in view of the recent British release of political detainees in Aden, UAR propaganda attacks on Aden had ceased. (Ibid.) For London: You should inform Foreign Office of foregoing. Rusk
53. Research Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Acting Secretary of State Ball/1/ RSB-40 Washington, April 13, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Aden, 1964-1966. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. SUBJECT The way in which the Soviet Union has been handling three events--the Cyprus crisis, Yemeni President Sallal's visit to the Soviet Union, and Khrushchev's scheduled visit in May to the UAR--provides evidence of renewed initiatives by Moscow in the Arab world. This paper assesses the pattern, probable direction, and scope of the Soviet moves. Abstract The British position in the Near and Middle East, specifically the base at Aden and the South Arabian Federation, appears to have become the principal target of Soviet policy in the region. Moscow has followed two paths to this end. The first has been direct, consisting of increased propaganda against British interests and based in "unliberated" areas of the Arab world, support of Arab charges of British "aggression" against the Yemeni Arab Republic, consolidation of direct influence in Yemen as a result of YAR President Sallal's visit to Moscow, and the use of the Cyprus crisis to undercut the British position in the area. The second has been indirect, designed, by removing distractions, to concentrate Arab attention on the British. The Soviets have advised the Arabs against violence towards Israel and have muted previous stimulation of inter-Arab rivalries between "progressive" and "reactionary" regimes. Apparently, Moscow believes that the British position in southern Arabia is vulnerable to a combination of border harassment, internal subversion, and pressure in the UN. Khrushchev, we believe, will try to exploit these weaknesses during his visit to Cairo in May, by encouraging Nasser to use the UAR presence in Yemen to support a "national liberation" struggle. He will take care not to involve the Soviet Union directly and will advise Nasser not to make any reckless moves. [Here follows the body of the memorandum.]
54. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/ Washington, April 25, 1964, 4:33 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 19 ADEN. Secret. Drafted by Seelye on April 24, cleared by Davies and Judd, and approved by Jernegan. Repeated to Jidda, Taiz, Aden, London, Dhahran, and USUN. 1990. 1. Important you bring to attention UARG authorities concern with which USG views Nasser's speech April 23 in Yemen violently attacking UK position in Aden./2/ You should point out not only fact that such public statements by UAR President serve exacerbate tense situation already existing between Yemen and Aden but, insofar as they relate to important Western interests, threaten to place strain on UAR-US relations. You should recall that on several occasions in past 18 months USG has made clear to highest UARG levels that USG considers Aden, no less than Saudi Arabia, an important Western interest (see Presidential correspondence; also Cairo tels 655, 671, and 726 Oct-Nov 1962)./3/ At same time on at least two occasions UARG gave us assurances that it had no intention subvert territory surrounding Yemen (Cairo tels 655, 671) and at other times has acknowledged our interests in Peninsula. While USG favors progress and eventual independence for Aden (SAF), it would deplore any radical action which seeks to force peremptory and premature UK withdrawal from Aden base. This the UARG should clearly understand in following any future course of action re Aden. /2/On a surprise visit to Yemen, Nasser made a speech on April 23 stating that the people in Aden and the neighboring British protectorates were suffering from the "harshest form of tyranny, oppression, and torture at the hands of British colonialism" and vowing to expel Britain from all parts of the Arab world. (The United States in World Affairs 1964; Harper and Row, New York, 1965) /3/Telegram 655 from Cairo, October 18, 1962, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XIII, pp. 184-186. Telegram 671 from Cairo, October 22, 1962 is not printed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1961-1963, 786H.02/10-2262) Telegram 726 from Cairo, November 9, 1962 (786H.00/11-962), is Document 289 in the microfiche supplement for Foreign Relations, 1961-1963: Near East; Africa. 2. Also you should note that speech appears to contradict public official UARG statement of December 18, 1962./4/ Latter commenced, "UAR confirms and supports the full contents of the communique released by the Government of the YAR". YARG communique stated inter alia "We hope to live in peace and harmony with our neighbors to the extent that they share our hope". While UARG might argue that Yemen's southern neighbor has not manifested desire live at peace with YARG, you should take stand this is not in fact the case. While HMG has failed to recognize YARG, nevertheless we convinced HMG wishes "live at peace" and avoid tensions with YARG as reflected, for example, in HMG desire work out satisfactory pull-back arrangements along Yemen-Aden frontier./5/ /4/See the editorial note in Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XVIII, pp. 268-269. /5/In telegram 2660 from Cairo, May 10, Ambassador Badeau reported that he had met with Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad that day to discuss the Yemen-Aden situation. Badeau said he had emphasized that he was speaking on behalf of the U.S. Government's independent interest in the tranquility and orderly progress of the Arabian peninsula and Aden area and not on behalf of the British position. The Ambassador said that he had argued that the British presence in the Persian Gulf had been a stabilizing factor and that rapid British withdrawal could only result in chaos, of which the situation in Yemen was a disturbing current example. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 19 ADEN) 3. We intend to call in UAR Ambassador early next week and make similar approach./6/ /6/Circular telegram 2022 to Cairo, April 29, reported that Jernegan met with Ambassador Kamel on April 27 to discuss prospects for defusing the Aden-Yemen dispute. Jernegan said that Nasser's call for expulsion of the British from the "Arab South" sounded like political war against a Free World base. Kamel responded that Nasser's speech did not reflect a calculated campaign to oust the United Kingdom from the Arabian peninsula, but a heated reaction to U.K. non-recognition of Yemen, infiltration, and the Harib attack. Jernegan emphasized the need to take steps to avoid confrontation, such as resumption of efforts to separate SAF and YAR forces and initiation of UK-UAR talks. (Ibid., POL 32-1 ADEN-YEMEN) For Ambassador Hart's discussion of Yemen with Nasser on May 7, see Document 336. Rusk
55. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, April 27, 1964. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 19 ADEN. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Davies. The text was coordinated with Patrick Wright of the British Embassy. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS British Side United States Side Mr. Butler noted Nasser's recent attacks in his Yemen speeches against Britain and Israel and said there was no doubt now that he is a major enemy of Great Britain and, he believed, of the United States. He recalled that a previous speech had created problems for the United States and Great Britain in Libya. In addition, he has ambitions against the British in Arabia and is guilty of resuscitating the Israel problem. Clearly he is our enemy. Therefore, we must frame a joint Anglo-American policy to cope with him. The British Cabinet doubts that continuing Western aid to Nasser is in our interests. It also doubts that any attitude of friendliness toward Nasser is appropriate in present circumstances. Mr. Butler noted that an intelligence paper on subversion had been provided the Department. This paper was well documented. It was quite clear that UAR subversive activities against the South Arabian Federation (SAF) will have to be fought by countersubversive measures. In Yemen itself, instead of a reduction of UAR military strength as agreed by Nasser, there are now more than 40,000 UAR troops in the country. The position seems to be in stalemate. It is true that the Royalists cannot take the country but they can harass the YAR sufficiently (e.g., by cutting roads) to tie down 40,000 UAR troops. Mr. Butler noted that Hafiz Wahba in London had said there was increasing collusion between the UAR troops and the Royalists in that, hungry for food, the soldiers were trading arms for supplies. Efforts to establish an "intermediate, moderate, government" have failed and it is obvious that we cannot deal with Sallal. The British Cabinet is determined to maintain the Aden base since it is vital for Britain's position in the Near East and the Gulf. The British economy is dependent on Gulf oil. If the supply were disrupted, there are alternate sources but not at reasonable rates./2/ Therefore, the Aden base and the hinterland constitute a vital interest to the British Government which must be preserved at all costs. Nasser's power to undermine this base must be stopped. A variety of steps can be taken. We should, at the outset, recognize the link of the UAR, the YAR and the USSR. With agreements reached during Sallal's recent visit to Moscow, the Russians are in a better position to set up a pincer movement based on states they are helping: Yemen, Somalia and the UAR. It was clear that this movement created a situation of utmost delicacy and danger for us. /2/For documents relating to U.S. international oil policy, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XXXIV, Documents 175ff. Mr. Butler said the British would like to concert action with the U.S. in using the United Nations to bring about a demarcation and demilitarization of the Aden frontier and a dispatch of observers to the area. Sir Patrick Dean considered a major move in the United Nations with U.S. support could bring this about. Without U.S. support, little could be done. Ambassador Beeley in Cairo thought a British approach to Nasser was no longer necessary before making a move in the Security Council. Mr. Butler said that it must be made clear that HMG is not willing to let the YAR get away with what it is doing. The British will not see the Royalists go down. The government intends to see that the Royalists are provided money covertly to supply their needs. This would preferably be channeled through Saudi Arabia. In summary, the British felt they must take action in the United Nations and mount countersubversive activities against hostile YAR actions. The Secretary said he would ask Assistant Secretary Talbot to comment on UAR-Saudi Arabian relations, particularly insofar as Saudi Arabia might not be sufficiently resilient to withstand pressures that might arise from reactivation of the Yemen problem. The USG had no illusion about the disengagement agreement insofar as the reduction of UAR troops is concerned but quite clearly it had contributed in large degree to Saudi Arabia's present stability. We are concerned at Nasser's activities which are certainly not helpful to our area interests. However, insofar as the threat to Israel is concerned, at this point this is mostly talk. This is a gambit to mobilize Arab opinion, Israel being the only subject on which Arabs can agree. Insofar as Libya is concerned, Nasser's February 22 speech inflamed the issue, but we think the situation is manageable. There are strong indications that the King and the Prime Minister are seeking a solution. Our ability to restrain Nasser's propaganda will be helpful in bringing this about. The problem in the area basically comes down to Aden and South Arabia. The Secretary asked Mr. Cleveland to give his estimate of the possibility of gaining Security Council endorsement along the lines proposed. Mr. Cleveland replied that we might get a general "standdown" on threats. In the last go-around on Yemen, the atmosphere had been inflamed by Britain's Harib raid, and there was a reluctance on both sides to involve the UAR. On another round, now that the issue of the raid is out of the Security Council's system, it might be possible to get some kind of machinery on the ground in South Yemen. The Secretary asked about the problem of delimiting the Federation-Yemen boundary. Mr. Crawford replied that in the West the border is marked, but that the greater part of it in the East is not. Since 1934, Britain has attempted to gain Yemen's cooperation in demarcating the Eastern section but Yemen has consistently dragged its feet. The line agreed on in 1934 sets the status quo line in the area and is regarded by Britain as the frontier. Mr. Cleveland noted that Yemenis oppose demilitarization efforts since this connotes acceptance of some frontier line. Mr. Talbot said that last fall some progress had been made on a drawback agreement. It is worthwhile pressing to see if this affords a possible means for progress now. In response to the Secretary's query as to the ability of Aden Federation spokesmen, Mr. Crawford replied that the Minister of External Affairs had made an exceedingly good impression in corridor conversations in the UN. It was difficult for him to speak in open forum, however, because the UK is responsible for the Federation's foreign relations. Nevertheless, the UK were trying to arrange for him to tour various Arab capitals. Mr. Talbot said the situation in Saudi Arabia had improved greatly over last year. Faysal's personal position was better and the position of his Government within the country was stronger. There was a semi-rapprochement with the UAR. Faysal had said he would go to Cairo although since Nasser's Yemen speeches this may now be less likely. If the Yemen conflict is reactivated and Faysal is reinvolved in support of the Royalists, his position might well be impaired. Mr. Butler said that he was not suggesting overt British aid to the Royalists. The Saudis themselves had been giving a lot of covert assistance. The Secretary responded that in the Near East, covert activities seem rapidly to become overt. The Secretary then asked why the British felt Nasser had gone to Yemen. Mr. Butler said he thought with 40,000 troops tied down, he needed to bolster morale. He noted that Ambassador Spinelli had said there was trouble among the troops in Yemen and also among their families in Egypt. The Secretary said we thought Nasser would have a problem with his troops and that his speeches were designed to bolster morale among them. He asked whether there were any indication that he was contemplating more than just propaganda attacks at this juncture. Mr. Butler replied that the bulk of UAR troops are still in the north of Yemen. What concerns the British is subversion in the Arabian Federation. Recent indications were that the UAR would increase its subversive activities, and assassination of British officials in Aden has even been mentioned. There are, however, no indicators of contemplated UAR military action against Aden but rather active UAR encouragement in centers of dissidence within the Federation. A new turn has been the introduction of more sophisticated weapons. In response to Lord Harlech's question as to what Saudi Arabian reaction would be to the collapse of the disengagement formula, Mr. Talbot said that it had been our presumption that the UAR would move to renew UNYOM's mandate. In view of Nasser's recent speeches, Faysal might well not agree to continuation. The Secretary inquired as to Saudi Arabia's attitude toward Aden and the Federation. Sir Harold Caccia noted Hafiz Wahba had said that Faysal seeks to restore the same relations that his father, Abdul Aziz, had maintained with the British. Faysal saw clearly that his support to Nasser in 1956 had been a serious mistake. He had also said that he saw no prospect of the UAR withdrawing its troops from Yemen or agreeing to a real coalition government. He seems content with the British position in Aden and the Gulf. In response to the Secretary's questions as to whether the Royalists had access to seaports and what value money would be to them, Mr. Crawford said the tribes were very venal and money would buy support as well as arms which could be brought over borders. The Secretary asked Mr. Butler whether he had the actual figures on U.S. aid and thought that the British should know actually what is involved. The USG was concerned over its relations with the UAR: If we start actions which will annoy and antagonize Nasser, we have not helped our situation but have hindered it by closing a channel of communication to him and losing what little influence we have in Cairo. Mr. Butler said that the question of aid is less essential than that Nasser understand clearly that the U.S. is displeased with his performance. The Secretary said that, in brief, he understood the British were suggesting that we support British initiative in the UN to bring about disengagement and demilitarization on the Aden-Yemen frontier, and desired our comments on possible British extension of covert aid to the Royalists, and aid to the UAR. Mr. Butler said the UK would not mind taking the initiative itself in the Security Council although it wanted U.S. support. Sir Patrick Dean thought that the non-permanent members of the Security Council, particularly Brazil, Morocco, and Norway would support any moderate move to improve the situation in Yemen and it was important to gain their support. Mr. Talbot said that insofar as the UNYOM was being financed by Saudi Arabia and the UAR, he assumed that any extension to the South would be financed by the UK. Mr. Butler thought this would probably be the case. He noted that if he were "in the hands of the extremists in the Cabinet", the position he expounded would be much more radical. At present, the Cabinet had decided to give aid covertly to the Royalists although some members favored more direct action. He did not wish to put too much emphasis on the question of covert support for the Royalists, but he considered it vital that the U.S. know what is in HMG's mind. He wished to make clear that what he had presented reflected Sir Alec Home's view. The Secretary said that we have told Nasser more than once of our interest in both Saudi Arabia and Aden. If augmented support to the Royalists generates pressure against Saudi Arabia, a major problem would be created for us since Saudi Arabia is not the best place to confront Arab nationalism. Quite clearly, the British suggestions would have to be discussed with the President; he would also raise the question of aid to the UAR. He inquired whether the British were in contact with Nasser. Mr. Butler replied that Ambassador Beeley had planned a meeting with Nasser, but had suggested, after Nasser's latest speech, that an approach through the Security Council would be more effective. If the USG were interested, however, HMG would consider an approach in Cairo first. For the record, Mr. Butler wanted to note that the British have in mind improvement schemes for the Federation initially involving around three million pounds. Similarly, it is ready to examine the question of independence. He wanted to make clear also that the British would have to take military action to put down insurrection within the Federation. The first instance was likely to be action against the Dhala tribe. The Secretary asked whether Adenese constituted the bulk of the Federal Army and police and, if so, whether they were loyal. Mr. Crawford replied that they were, in principle. However, if worked upon they would be unreliable. The allegiance of tribal leaders was important, but all tribes were venal.
56. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/ Washington, May 5, 1964, 6:25 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 19 ADEN/UN. Confidential. Drafted by Briggs; cleared by Seelye, EUR United Nations Adviser Richard Friedman, Francois M. Dickman (NEA), Colonel Robinson (G/PM), and Buffum; and approved by Sisco. Repeated to USUN. 5164. Ref: Cairo's 2536;/2/ USUN's 3689 rptd info Cairo 221./3/ Subject: Committee of 24--Aden. /2/Telegram 2536 from Cairo, April 29, asked for information regarding the U.S. position on the resolution on Aden adopted by the UN Committee of 24 (the Special Committee on the Situation With Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples) on April 9. (Ibid.) The resolution, which urged early removal of the U.K. base at Aden, was adopted by a vote of 19 to 3 (Australia, United Kingdom, United States) with 2 abstentions (Denmark, Italy). For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 716-717. For information on the U.S. position on the UN Security Council resolution of April 9 condemning U.K. reprisals for Yemeni attacks on the South Arabian Federation, see Documents 325-330. The text of the resolution is printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 715-716. /3/Dated April 24. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, UN 10-4) US voted against Aden res in Comite of 24 as it not conducive settlement difficult Aden problem and contrary our general position of support UK this issue. However, we did not make statement during Comite debate in effort avoid overexposure our differences with Afro-Asians. Embassy will recall US voted no on similar Comite of 24 and General Assembly resolutions in 1963. We particularly opposed to para in recent res calling for removal UK Aden military base because of importance we attach maintenance base as protection for special UK position in Persian Gulf. We also highly doubtful that Comite subcommittee visits to Aden called for by res would be desirable in present circumstances./4/ /4/Following a number of incidents along the Aden-Yemen border, the Committee of 24 passed a resolution on May 11 stating that recent British military actions in the region endangered international peace and security and urging the United Kingdom to cease all military measures against the people of the territory. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 18 to 3 (Australia, United Kingdom, United States) with 2 abstentions (Denmark, Italy). For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 718-719. Believe your discussions with UARG re Aden will be more productive in general context than in specific terms Comite res. UAR, which not member Comite of 24, has not raised question our Comite vote with Dept. Re discussion with UAR on over-all Aden issue see cable to follow./5/ /5/See Document 57. Rusk
57. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts/1/ Washington, May 5, 1964, 7:59 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 19 ADEN. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Seelye; cleared by Davies, Curtis F. Jones, Judd, Buffum, Colonel Robinson (G/PM), and in substance by Quinn (DOD/ISA), and Colonel McKinnon (NAVY/OPS-611); and approved by Jernegan. Sent to Cairo and London and repeated to Jidda, Taiz, Aden, USUN, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Kuwait, Tehran, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, and Dhahran. 2064. Depcirtel 1990;/2/ Cairo's 2572,/3/ 2585/4/ and 2586/5/ to Department. /2/Document 54. /3/Telegram 2572 from Cairo, May 2; not printed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 19 ADEN) /4/Telegram 2585 from Cairo, May 3, reported the Embassy's view that Nasser's frustration at his inability to resolve the Yemen imbroglio lay at the heart of his motives for unleashing violent attacks on the United Kingdom's position in Aden. (Ibid., POL 1 UAR-UK) /5/Telegram 2586 from Cairo, May 4; not printed. (Ibid., POL 7 UAR) Concur in your assessment re Nasser's motives for unleashing attack on British position in Aden. Agree also he has been operating on basis tactical rather than strategic considerations. For this reason we suggest in your forthcoming call on Nasser/6/ you have confidential and forthright discussion re Aden making points along following lines in manner you deem most likely to have impact (assume in addition you will draw on ref Depcirtel): /6/See Document 336. 1. As long as British maintain dominant influence in Persian Gulf, considered necessary for British have military base at Aden. In short run and at this stage of primitive political development of most Persian Gulf principalities problem is who is to replace British in Gulf and occupy vacuum created by abrupt withdrawal? UAR certainly does not have this capability and US has enough other worries. Nasser must realize that if British pulled out precipitously, neighboring states, each of whom harbors separate designs, would try step into breach. Result would be build-up of tensions, chaos and perhaps local war. Only USSR would ultimately benefit therefrom. 2. At same time not in Nasser's or our interests that chaos and instability prevail in South Arabia. If British left Aden suddenly, what would result? Neither YARG nor presumably UARG has capability to control for long large assortment of primitive, unruly and venal tribes stretching from Gulf of Aden to Yemen-Saudi border. UAR's current problems in Yemen in obtaining and keeping loyalties of tribes would only be multiplied. Without arguing pros and cons of nature of political entity British endeavoring to create and sustain in South Arabia (i.e., South Arabian Federation), must be admitted British administrative and security umbrella there tends to keep lid on. We would submit to Nasser that reasonably orderly change in South Arabia, rather than uncontrollable chaos which would ensue in wake of sudden British withdrawal, in our mutual interests. 3. If Nasser examines history of British program for "constitutional advance" in South Arabia, he will note that British have promised independence and that in their own way British endeavoring train Adenis take over government. Therefore, while case could perhaps be made that path toward self-government too slow, no denying that British on right track. Recognition that British military base at Aden important link in UK commitment to Persian Gulf does not preclude possibility of negotiation of satisfactory base terms with emerging South Arabian Federation government. 4. Best way now to move toward desirable objective of independence, progress and stability of Aden area is to give British chance to sit back and take fresh look at situation. Unquestionably recent developments have pricked HMG to an increasing awareness of necessity to be more accommodating to forces of change. However, in these circumstances HMG, like any other country, can hardly be placed in position of seeming to succumb to outside pressures. Accordingly, further UARG drum-beating on subject should be avoided. At same time Nasser can be assured that USG will continue its efforts at persuading British to acknowledge existence of YARG and to curtail any unorthodox operations from SAF territory. UN offers current best prospect for damping down Yemen-Aden border tensions. FYI. You may also, if you feel useful, continue to plug theme of US subsidiary naval interest in Aden base. US naval visits to Aden occur on average of one per week. US Naval Liaison Officer to Aden Consulate being assigned. However, you should keep in mind that US naval consideration secondary. Beyond this, fact that our allies place such stress on importance their position is something we cannot ignore, as Nasser must appreciate. End FYI. For London: You may inform Foreign Office that we are making another demarche to Nasser re importance of Aden to our interests and urging an end to UAR drum-beating re British position there. Also, drawing on appropriate material contained in Cairo reftels 2585 and 2586 to Department, rptd 154 and 155 to London, request you stress importance HMG avoid overreacting to Nasser's speeches, etc. "Cool and measured" response by British best likely to de-fuse situation. We would urge British take up matter directly with highest UAR authorities. Certainly there is no harm in direct UK-UAR dialogue and probably something to be gained. FYI. Our hope that combination of United Kingdom restraint and acceleration of process of Adeni "constitutional conference" (which British officials here last week hinted at) will check current trend toward erosion of British position. End FYI./7/ /7/Telegram 5522 from London, May 6, reported that an Embassy officer had discussed the points in circular telegram 2064 with Brenchley of the Foreign Office, who replied that his government was not overreacting to Nasser's speeches but that its actions were the direct result of the magnitude of the UAR/YAR-inspired subversive threat in the South Arabian Federation. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 ADEN-YEMEN) Rusk
58. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, May 8, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Yemen, Cables, Vol. I, 11/63-6/64. Secret. SUBJECT Our Consul at Aden reports that local conservative Arab leaders, as well as British colonial officials, have been rudely awakened by the revelation that they stand isolated and insulated from the currents of world opinion. The recent Security Council vote following the British attack on Harib and the recent resolution of the anti-colonialist Committee of 24 have been contributing factors. This, added to an almost pathological fear of infiltration from Yemen, has brought on what our Consul characterizes as "local jitters". The trouble is that rather than inducing the British officials to accommodate themselves increasingly to the forces of change at work in South Arabia, there has been an intensification of their garrison mentality. A demand for immediate independence by two of the leading Shaikhs, whose territory borders Yemen, derives purely from a desire for more drastic retaliatory action across the border. Since it is not clear how the removal of the British colonial umbrella would enable them to perform such action with impunity, it is probable that their demand for independence is designed as a stratagem to get the British to take more drastic retaliatory action. Our Consul believes that U.K. policy in South Arabia has been one of "temporizing and muddling through". He notes that nothing has been done to seek to reconcile opposing factions inside the South Arabian Federation and that former plans for "constitutional advance" for Aden have been shelved. In our Consul's view the best way for the British to preserve their base in Aden is to accelerate the process of "constitutional advance" leading to self-government. Meanwhile, a principal reason for the intensification of pressures on the British position in Aden is illustrated by a report just received from Cairo. It states that U.A.R. intelligence has documentary evidence that the number of European mercenaries recruited and organized by a British reserve officer for service with the Yemeni "royalists" is now forty-two. Benjamin H. Read/2/ /2/Signed for Read in an unidentified hand. [Continue with the next documents] Volume XXI Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |