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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXI Near East Region Department of State |
 59. Special Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/ OCI No. 0333/64B Washington, May 28, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Saudi Arabia, 12/1/63-12/31/64. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence. THE CONFLICT IN SOUTH ARABIA The recent British campaign to put down the Egyptian-aided tribal rebellion in the Radfan area of the South Arabian Federation has focused attention on a border that has never been wholly defined and on problems of dissidence and sovereignty which for centuries have plagued whoever has held Aden and its surrounding hinterland. The largest natural port between Suez and the Persian Gulf, Aden has always played a major role in the trade of the southwest corner of the Arabian Peninsula, and its history has been intimately bound up with that of Yemen proper. Indeed, in traditional Arab usage, the term "al-Yemen" has been understood to include the area that now comprises the South Arabian Federation, and Yemenis and Arab nationalists often refer to this territory as the "occupied Yemeni south." Cairo, despite only lukewarm support from the Yemeni republican regime, now appears determined to end that "occupation." London seems equally determined to hang on because Aden's strategic importance--both militarily and economically--is all the more pronounced in view of the loss of British influence elsewhere in the Middle East. [Here follows the body of the special report.]
60. National Intelligence Estimate/1/ NIE 30-64 Washington, June 24, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NIEs, 30, Middle East. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on June 24. THE OUTLOOK FOR THE ARABIAN PENINSULA The Problem To estimate probable developments in the Arabian Peninsula over the next few years, and to discuss the interaction of these developments and of such external forces as the UAR, the UK, the US, the oil interests, and the Communist countries. Conclusions A. The modernizing, nationalist movement which has profoundly changed the rest of the Middle East in the past two decades has only recently started in the Arabian Peninsula. The great wealth which oil has brought in recent years, improved communications, and education are stimulating modernization and the intrusion of external forces. The conflict of these forces with traditional society and government and with one another will increasingly set the tone for the years ahead. (Paras. 1-4) B. The principal current problem is the confrontation between Nasser and the British, between Arab nationalism and Western strategic and commercial interests. The British feel that they need a special political and military position in the Peninsula in order to maintain their access to oil at an acceptable price. Nasser opposes the British presence and probably hopes eventually to replace British influence with his own. The most significant current manifestation of this controversy is the tension between the UK and the UAR over Aden and Yemen. (Paras. 10, 19-20, 39, 42) C. In Yemen, sentiment against the massive UAR presence is growing among republicans and royalists alike. The republicans are attempting to reach an accommodation with important northern tribes and certain royalist leaders, and thus effect a decrease in that presence. Nasser's fear of losing a predominant influence will make resolution of Yemen's internal problems long and difficult. (Paras. 7-9, 39, 43) D. British difficulties in building a stable Federation of South Arabia, by combining the relatively advanced Aden Colony with the backward sheikhdoms, are increased by UAR support for dissidents in both places. Nasser is likely to continue this support, and the British are likely to retaliate against rebels supported by him, possibly with attacks on Yemeni territory. Nasser almost certainly will not deliberately commit Egyptian troops to major action against the British, but hostility between Nasser and the UK is so strong that either side might take risks leading to an unintended military confrontation. (Paras. 23, 25, 43) E. Saudi Arabia's recent modest social and economic progress will probably continue at least as long as Faysal rules. Faysal will find it difficult to win positive support from the small but growing educated class and from urban labor, especially if the country fails to make political progress. However, we do not believe that critical pressures against the monarchy are likely to develop in the short term. Kuwait is taking its place among the modernizing Arab states, and, although free of direct British control, remains on good political and commercial terms with the UK. In the other sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf, Britain, recognizing that political changes are inevitable, will probably be able to cope with such pressures for change as arise over the next few years. (Paras. 12-15, 46, 47) F. The Soviets projected themselves into the Middle East with the 1955 arms deal with Egypt, but their only access to the Peninsula until recently has been Yemen. They would like to eliminate the Western position and influence, hence they are willing to assist Nasser's efforts to achieve the same ends. In Yemen, the Soviet presence and influence are considerable and may increase; they are not likely to match those of the UAR or to overcome traditional Yemeni xenophobia. Elsewhere there probably will not be any great increase in Soviet fortunes. We believe that Communist China will not achieve a significant position in the area within the period of this estimate. (Paras. 49-55) [Here follow the Discussion section of the estimate and an annex.]
61. Intelligence Memorandum/1/ OCI No. 1812/65 Washington, June 9, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Saudi Arabia, Memos, Vol. I, 12/63-4/67. Secret; No Foreign Dissem/Background Use Only. Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence, Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency. THE SECURITY SITUATION IN ADEN/2/ Summary /2/This memorandum has been coordinated with the Office of National Estimates and NE Division/DDP. [Footnote in the source text.] For the past nine months, the British authorities in Aden have been confronted with a terrorist campaign mounted from Yemen but directed by Egyptian intelligence. The British believe that this campaign is coming to have serious political impact, but they are reluctant to enforce rigorous new security measures for fear of blighting the development of an independent, relatively friendly government in southern Arabia. 1. Last November, an "Arab nationalist" campaign of terrorism began to attack the British position in Aden. This campaign is the work of a relatively small group of trained men, who are directed by Egyptian intelligence experts and who use Yemen as a safe-haven. So far, the attacks have been aimed mainly at British forces and Aden government officials, especially the Special Branch of the Aden Police, which is concerned with subversive activities. 2. The scale of the terrorism is not yet large. During the first five months of this year there was a total of 75 incidents, in which 8 persons (3 British) were killed and 69 (40 British) wounded. Together with other developments in Aden, however, the terrorism has had a significant depressing effect on local morale. Moreover, the campaign has succeeded to the point that local Special Branch officers must be replaced by expatriates, [2 lines of source text not declassified]. 3. The forces available to maintain internal security in Aden are considerable. There are 1,050 civil police, who may be assisted by 13,500 British troops in the Aden garrison. There are also nearly 5,000 British-led troops in the army of the South Arabian Federation, but most of these are already committed to security duties in the hinterland behind Aden which constitutes the Federation's territories. 4. These forces cannot function effectively, however, unless the authorities receive either substantial cooperation from the local population or backing from London for the enforcement of considerably more rigorous security measures. At present, neither of these conditions is being fulfilled. 5. The majority of Aden's 250,000 inhabitants are apathetic rather than positively anti-British; they tend to stand aside from a struggle which they feel is simply between the British and the Egyptian-backed terrorists. This attitude is very largely a reflection of the population mix--only a fifth to a quarter of the people are Aden Arabs, while some 80,000 (mostly laborers) are from Yemen, 40,000 are hillmen from the hinterland who themselves dislike the Adenis, and another 80,000 are orientals, mostly of Indian origin, who stand aloof from Arab politics. 6. The British are reluctant to introduce more rigorous security measures, which under the circumstances almost certainly would require using British troops, because they are in the process of trying to link the backward territories of the Federation with heterogeneous Aden to form what they hope will be a viable state functioning under their general guidance. This process began with the founding of the Federation in 1963 and looks toward completion--in the form of independence--possibly by 1968. Such an evolution would be difficult to guide under the best of circumstances. Faced with the pressures of Arab nationalism from at least a vocal minority inside Aden and from Cairo radio outside, the British are understandably chary of suspending the embryonic local government and using strong measures to suppress a terrorist campaign of which only they and the police have been the principal victims. 7. Thus the local government has been allowed to retain responsibility for antiterrorist action, although it has actually impeded security efforts. Curfews are applied only occasionally and in limited districts, to avoid offending any major part of the population, and the enforcement of special emergency decrees is lax. Moreover, travelers still pass freely to Egyptian-occupied Yemen. The situation is not helped by pay disputes between the government and the police and fire brigades, nor by a slowdown among the workers at the oil refinery, Aden's only large industrial installation. 8. The effect of British restraint is to put at risk one of Britain's most valuable military assets. Aden is a base for the protection of Persian Gulf oil; a garrison area for the defense of British interests in the Arabian Peninsula and in the Indian Ocean area generally; and a major British contribution to the world-wide Western defense system. As currently operated, it is the largest and busiest RAF station in the world and, after Singapore, the largest British base complex outside the UK itself. In terms of commercial strategy, Aden is the largest bunkering port in the world and the third largest port of any kind in the Commonwealth. It is not surprising, therefore, that the British high commissioner stresses the psychological importance of not giving the impression that this prize will shortly fall to Nasir. 9. [11 lines of source text not declassified] At some point in the not too distant future the British will have to decide whether the threat from terrorism is sufficiently dangerous that they must put the political development of Aden in jeopardy and use their own forces. (Map)/3/ /3/Not reproduced.
62. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/ Washington, June 10, 1965, 7:21 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 ADEN. Secret. Drafted by Moore, cleared by Davies and Judd, and approved by Talbot. Repeated to Cairo, Jidda, Taiz, and Aden. 7810. Ex-Aden Prime Minister Zein Baharoon, at start Leader Grant tour US, made following points in call on Assistant Secretary Talbot June 8: 1. Baharoon pessimistic about British efforts bring SAF to independence by 1968, anticipated HICOM would merely change his title to Ambassador at that time but would continue dictate to SAF government made up of feudal shaikhs and sultans. General form of government, unitary or otherwise, was of little importance, primary requirement being British goodwill to bring area to actual independence. Ridiculed proposed Constitutional Commission as having no authority and being of little use in determining desires population if British not aware of latter after 130 years in area. 2. Current terrorism clearly fostered by Cairo and connected to events in Yemen; would stop once Britain straightened up its relations with YAR. 3. Yemen-South Arabia union will not take place; Yemenis in Aden not in favor of such a union. 4. Faisal in fact seems desirous see Nasser remain in Yemen where he bogged down and being bled white. Nasser, for his part, clearly desires withdraw if possible without humiliation. 5. Concerning future of British military base, Baharoon said he and British had reached substantial agreement on its continuation. Additionally, alleged Zakaria Muhi-al-Din had specifically told him UAR not opposed to continuation of base provided it not used against Arab countries. 6. In summary, Baharoon predicted Aden could become "second Congo" in 1968 if more realistic and practical steps not taken by British to prepare for independence and if British did not rectify their relations with YAR. Without latter, successful independent life for SAF impossible. 7. Throughout conversation, Baharoon requested "greater activity" by US in Aden, London and Riyadh to bring about climate for successful Federation independence. On June 10 Department conveyed gist of above (except last point) to British Embassy (Everett). Latter correctly commented that Baharoon devoid of specific recommendations for steps British should take prepare people for independence. British, Baharoon and others obviously continuing struggle with problem of lack of framework for administration of area aside from that provided by present feudal rulers. Everett also mentioned recent meeting Minister State Tomson with UAR Ambassador in which Egyptian unyielding on practically all points connected with southern Arabia. Ambassador stated categorically at that time that UAR not ready withdraw troops from Yemen until favorable situation developed that country. London may also wish discuss Baharoon's views with Foreign Office. Rusk
63. Paper Prepared in the Department of State/1/ Washington, September 2, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, NEA/ARP Files: Lot 67 D 619, Political Affairs & Rel.--POL 2-a, Middle East General, 1965, Talbot-Mansfield Briefing Book. Secret. Drafted by Moore and cleared by Davies. SUBJECT The British, because of the importance of Persian Gulf oil, have been particularly concerned with maintaining their primacy in the Gulf, especially Kuwait. Their military deployment along the rim of the Arabian Peninsula has been geared speedily to implement the Anglo-Kuwaiti defense agreement of 1961. Aden, with a military base of some 14,000 British and Colonial troops, is the major logistic and command post for this deployment. However, because of growing local nationalist opposition, it is also the weak link in the Peninsular defense chain. To meet nationalist sentiment, HMG is attempting to groom for ultimate independence the South Arabian Federation, a loose grouping of semifeudal shaikhdoms comprising much, but not all, of the Protectorate, to which the more modern, prosperous, developing city of Aden has been joined. Within Aden, nationalist activity is centered in the combined People's Socialist Party and Aden Trade Union Congress (PSP-ATUC) and in the UAR-inspired National Liberation Front. The PSP-ATUC has publicly dissociated itself from the wave of terrorist activities in recent months in Aden and the Protectorate for which the National Front has claimed responsibility. In a Constitutional Conference in London in June 1964, HMG and the Federation leaders agreed that SAF independence would take place no later than 1968, that a new constitution would be drawn up providing for a bicameral legislature elected by direct means where practicable, and that the UK would surrender its sovereignty over Aden State as soon as possible. UK interest in retaining the military base was recognized. Subsequently the Federation rulers, with HMG approval, announced their intent to establish a unitary state. The PSP-ATUC rejected the results of this conference and demanded more rapid independence with a broader democratic base. British attempts to hold a further constitutional conference in March 1965 and, subsequently, to bring a fact-finding commission to Aden were thwarted by radical nationalist opposition. A July 1965 meeting in London of representatives of all Adeni and Federation political elements also foundered over Adeni insistence that HMG agree to evacuation of the military base and to immediate lifting of emergency security measures. The British insisted that the former was a subject for negotiation with the future independent Federation government and that the latter was impossible in the face of increasing terrorist acts. (In the last days of August and first of September the terrorists moved into a new phase of activity with the assassination of two ranking British civil officials in Aden.) There are no current indications of how the British now propose to move forward toward establishment of a constitution. HMG's attitude concerning the Yemen Arab Republic is dictated by its concern for the future of the SAF and the threat to the Federation which it feels is posed by a UAR-dominated Yemen. It views with particular concern support stemming from Cairo, as well as Yemen, for subversion activities by the National Front, whose members have frequently publicly espoused a Yemeni irredenta movement. Under the spur of economic necessity, HMG is currently undergoing an intensive review of its world-wide defense commitments. Consideration is being given in some quarters to cutting British troop strength in the Aden-Gulf area. The decisions taken as the result of this review will have a direct bearing on the course of British policies in Aden.
64. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts/1/ Washington, September 28, 1965, 7:10 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 19 ADEN. Confidential. Drafted by Moore on September 27; cleared by Symmes, Judd, Deputy Director of the Office of Northern African Affairs James J. Blake, Campbell, Ollie B. Ellison (NEA/P), and in substance by Director of the Office of News Robert J. McCloskey; and approved by Davies. Sent to Aden, Aleppo, Alexandria, Algiers, Amman, Baghdad, Baida, Basra, Beirut, Cairo, Casablanca, Damascus, Dhahran, Jerusalem, Jidda, Kuwait, Port Said, Rabat, Taiz, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, Tunis, London, and USUN. 509. Following is background, FYI, to British September 25 announcement suspension operation Aden Constitution. Over one year ago British promised independence to South Arabia, including Aden, not later than 1968. They have since been endeavoring work out with elements in area a constitutional framework for future state. Their efforts have been aborted by nationalist elements supported from Cairo who insisted on immediate implementation 1963 UN resolutions which inter alia called for national referendum, evacuation of British military base in Aden prior to independence, and immediate lifting emergency security measures. These latter measures have been instituted to preserve modicum of law and order in face growing terrorist campaign carried out by nationalists to enforce their demands. British have indicated their acceptance in principle of 1963 resolutions except for 1) evacuation of base, which they insist is matter for discussion between them and future independent South Arabian Government, and 2) lifting of security measures, which cannot be done in the face of terrorist attacks without plunging area into further chaos. In face deteriorating security situation and refusal of Aden State Ministers to condemn terrorism or cooperate in maintenance of law and order, British have suspended operation Aden constitution. They emphasize that this does not affect continued operation constitution other states in SAF, nor does it indicate any weakening their resolve grant independence not later than 1968. End FYI. If queried, Department press spokesman intends reply as follows. Addressees authorized draw on this in discussions with host government, press and diplomatic colleagues. We recognize that people of Aden and Saudi [South] Arabia have increasingly made manifest their legitimate desires for independence. The British Government has for some time been trying to bring together the various political groupings in Aden and Saudi [South] Arabia to work out a constitutional transition to independence, the date for which is set for not later than 1968. We note that, even though the Aden Constitution has been suspended in connection with acts of terrorism, the British Government has reaffirmed its intention to abide by that timing. We support an orderly evolution to independence in South Arabia and believe the ending of terrorism is a necessary step toward this end. Ball
65. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to Certain Posts/1/ CA-4185 Washington, October 15, 1965, 10:19 a.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 19 ADEN. Confidential. Drafted by David A. Korn (NEA/NE) on October 14; cleared by Campbell, Grant V. McClanahan (AF/AFN), Officer in Charge of Dependent Area Affairs Patricia Byrne, and Director of the Office of UN Political Affairs Elizabeth Ann Brown; and approved by Symmes. Sent to Aleppo, Amman, Asmara, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Dhahran, Damascus, Jidda, Kuwait, Taiz, Algiers, Rabat, Tripoli, Tunis, Addis Ababa, Mogadiscio, Nouakchott, Paris, Basra, Tel Aviv, and Khartoum and repeated to USUN, Aden, and London. SUBJECT REF /2/Document 64. A particularly strong Arab campaign against the British on Aden now appears to be in the offing in the current UNGA. The UK's suspension of the Aden constitution on September 25 (Department circular telegram 509) has been followed by demonstrations and strikes in Aden. On October 5 Arab representatives at the UN sent a letter to the Security Council protesting the British action. The Adeni oppositionists, meeting in Cairo, have formed a joint delegation (including two representatives each from the former Aden Government, the Organization for the Liberation of the Occupied South, and the National Liberation Front) to the UNGA to press their attack on British policy in South Arabia. The Aden question is scheduled for debate by the GA's Fourth Committee from October 14 to 25. The Arabs and the "anti-colonialist" bloc are expected to base their attack on the British on two previous UN resolutions: General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII) of December 11, 1963/3/ and a Committee of 24 resolution of May 17, 1965./4/ General Assembly resolution 1949 calls inter alia for self determination through universal suffrage, the "early removal" of the British military base, the freeing of political detainees and an end to "repressive actions", the formation of a provisional government, and the establishment of a UN presence in Aden. The Committee of 24 resolution reiterates these points, though in somewhat stronger language. It is anticipated that Arab UN representatives will introduce in the October 14-25 Fourth Committee debate a resolution similar to that voted by the Committee of 24, with added passages condemning the UK's recent suspension of the Aden constitution and requesting immediate liquidation of the base. /3/For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 593-594. /4/The Committee of 24 (Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries) adopted the resolution by a vote of 19 to 3 (including the United States) with 2 abstentions. Background In January 1963 the Crown Colony of Aden became the State of Aden and joined with a number of the Shaikhdoms and Sultanates of the former East and West Aden Protectorates to form the South Arabian Federation (SAF). A conflict immediately emerged between the Protectorate leaders and the Adenis. The latter, more advanced and better educated than the inhabitants of the Protectorates, feared that they would have little weight in a federation of states which were essentially tribal monarchies. The Adeni politicians demanded a unitary state, believing that this type of arrangement would give them a much better chance of dominating and directing the new entity. After the Labor victory in 1964, the UK agreed to consider a unitary state concept and SAF leaders also announced their willingness to support a unitary state. However, disagreement persisted between the British, the Adeni politicians and the leaders of the former Protectorate states regarding the timetable for independence and the definition of the new state. During the 1964 London Conference on Aden the British Government announced its intention of granting independence to Aden and the SAF not later than 1968. British efforts to follow up this announcement by the holding of a constitutional conference to create a framework for an independent state have been blocked largely by nationalist elements supported by the UAR who insisted on immediate implementation of the 1963 UN resolution. With funds and arms supplied by the UAR from its base in Yemen, the nationalists instituted an increasingly active terrorist campaign. This UAR support increased markedly following British retaliatory bombing of the Yemeni town of Harib in the spring of 1964, and the UN's subsequent "deploring" of the UK's action. Deterioration of the security situation and refusal of the Aden State Ministers to condemn terrorism and cooperate in the maintenance of law and order led the UK to suspend operation of the Aden constitution on September 25, 1965. The Base The UK insists that the future of its strategic base in Aden be determined by negotiation with whatever government emerges following independence. While most of the inhabitants of Aden State benefit either directly or indirectly from the base, there is strong nationalist sentiment against it, encouraged by the UAR. The UK apparently anticipates that the leaders of an independent government, faced with the full weight of their responsibilities and cognizant of the economic impact of a sudden British military withdrawal, would be more inclined to agree to the maintenance of the base for at least a limited period. British Position in UN The British position regarding the 1963 UNGA resolution is outlined in the attached Foreign Office guidance paper, recently given the Department by the British Embassy./5/ As indicated therein the British declare their general agreement with the resolution except for 1) evacuation of the base, which they insist is a matter for discussion with the future independent South Arabian Government; and 2) the lifting of security measures, which cannot be done in the face of terrorist attacks without plunging the area into further chaos. British reservations regarding a popular vote and the formation of a provisional government under present conditions are also set forth. /5/Attached but not printed. British officials admit that, for the present at least, they have no specific plans for solving the Aden crisis beyond the hope that suspension of the constitution will enable them to restore order and regain control of the situation in South Arabia. The Foreign Office is understood to be considering inviting the UN to send some type of representation to Aden to study the situation. US Position Any precipitate British withdrawal from the Aden area at this time would result in a chaotic situation in South Arabia harmful to general Western interests. Recognizing that the growth of nationalist pressures requires the granting of independence in the next few years, the British have been exerting efforts to establish the framework of a potentially viable government and to promote an orderly evolution to independence. Although we do not necessarily endorse all the moves which the British have taken, we support their goal of an orderly evolution to independence in South Arabia and believe that the ending of terrorism is a necessary step in this process. As in the past, we expect to continue to express this support in the United Nations. Our position in the forthcoming Fourth Committee debate on Aden will be along the following lines. 1. We favor the principle of self determination for the people of South Arabia and believe that the UK is endeavoring to work out acceptable constitutional arrangements toward that end. In this regard we note that despite its suspension of the Aden constitution the UK has reaffirmed its intention of abiding by its earlier promise to grant independence no later than 1968. 2. The ending of terrorism is a necessary step in an orderly evolution toward independence. 3. We opposed the May 17 resolution of the Committee of 24 on grounds that the resolution failed to take account of the progress toward independence already made in Aden and British proposals for further action in this direction. We will continue to oppose similar resolutions if presented to the Fourth Committee. (Our final decision can of course be made only after examination of the resolutions put forward in the Committee.) 4. We will be prepared to support the above points in a statement to the Committee. Posts may draw on the foregoing as appropriate in discussion of the Aden question with host Government representatives and diplomatic colleagues./6/ Rusk /6/On November 3, by a vote of 83 to 11 (including the United States) with 8 abstentions, the Fourth Committee adopted a resolution deploring the attempts of the administering power to set up an unrepresentative regime in the territory, calling on all states not to recognize any independence not based on the wishes of the people of the territory freely expressed through elections held under universal adult suffrage, and calling the complete and immediate removal of the British base at Aden essential. Resolution 2023 (XX) was adopted by the UN General Assembly on November 5 by a vote of 90 to 11 (including the United States) with 10 abstentions. The text is printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 615-616.
66. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, October 19, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 19 ADEN. Secret. Drafted by Moore. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Mr. Greenwood opened the conversation with the statement that while Britain would study UN developments concerning Aden, it did not expect that they would contribute towards progress in the area. He then briefly described political developments concerning Aden subsequent to the Labor Government's assuming power, including the UK-Federation agreement to establish a unitary state, the breakdown of plans to hold a constitutional conference in March 1965, and his subsequent trip to Aden in August when he persuaded Adeni leaders to talk in London on the basis of the UN principle of self-determination. He credited al Asnag with being of considerable help in bringing this conference about. Subsequently, however, al Asnag, Makkawi and other Adeni leaders brought a breakdown of the conference by their rigid insistence on full acceptance of the UN 1963 resolutions, particularly including lifting of the state of emergency. The subsequent deterioration in the security situation in Aden required the British to suspend operation of the constitution last month. Mr. Greenwood said that he honestly did not know what the next British step should be. He hoped to restore stability in the country and then perhaps build further on the moderate progressive forces there. He felt that all efforts should be exerted to persuade Nasser that the British were firm in their commitment to grant independence by 1968 and in their belief that no military base was defensible, either politically or morally, if its presence was not in accord with the wishes of the people concerned. He said that the future of the British military base in Aden, within the framework of the worldwide UK defense review, was still completely undecided. It was possible that the base might be given up or might be maintained on a reduced status. In response to Mr. Hare's question, he said that a reduction in the forces there might indeed abate Arab pressure since the fear existed that, with a larger number of troops, military pressure might at any time be exerted against Arab countries. He believed Nasser opposed the base partly because it was an insult to Arab nationalism, partly because it impeded his own aims at influencing the Gulf, and partly because he feared the growth of Saudi influence in the area which it fostered. Mr. Hare asked, aside from Nasser, what were the elements of difficulty in Southern Arabia. Mr. Greenwood said the basic problem was one of conflict between the more advanced Aden group and the Federation and Eastern Aden Protectorate leaders. The Adenis had great fear of domination by the Federal Army. Britain, for its part, could not impose actions on the Federation states since it maintained only advisory treaties with them. Responding to Mr. Hare's question about relations with Yemen, Mr. Greenwood said the Federation rulers were essentially closer to the royalists, while the Adenis favored the republicans. He did not expect that Yemen would in the foreseeable future be interested in the take-over of South Arabia since the Yemenis would have more than enough of their own troubles to think about. Mr. Hare asked if terrorism was continuing. Mr. Greenwood said there now appeared to be little terrorism in the Protectorate and that it had been greatly abated in Aden itself, with the exception of special snipers trained in Yemen. The biggest problem on the horizon was potential industrial unrest promoted by the NLF. While the ATUC was sympathetic to the British view, there was little they could do. The economy of Aden had already been greatly affected since many ships were now bypassing the port. (The port's continued importance for bunkering is indicated by the fact that four million of the six million tons of fuel oil annually produced at the refinery are dispensed to ships in Aden.) It was feared that if a tough line were adopted toward labor unrest, the result would be a general strike which would seriously hinder operation of the military base. Concerning the base, Mr. Greenwood said that the British did not want to vitiate its capabilities until we (the Anglo-Americans) had developed suitable alternatives, e.g., Indian Ocean facilities. In response to Mr. Stewart's query, Mr. Kitchen said that we indeed considered British military presence in Aden as important since, for instance, it gave the British the possibility of moving forces quickly to various areas of potential trouble. Mr. Kitchen continued that the British, because they are already in situ, have the potential to take many military actions which we do not have. Mr. Stewart responded that he did not see why the British should be "mercenaries" for the Free World if any particular action involved was not also specifically helpful to UK interests. In further discussion of the base, Mr. Greenwood noted that its usefulness for support of activities in the Far East was rapidly becoming impaired as "the various doors" for reaching it from the UK were being closed. Mr. Kitchen emphasized that the Shah of Iran was also concerned with the relaxation of Britain's hold in Aden. Mr. Stewart said that, nonetheless, the Shah had not raised the subject with the UK.
67. Special Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/ No. 26-65 Washington, November 5, 1965. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Saudi Arabia, Memos, Vol. I, 12/63-4/67. Secret. Prepared in the Office of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency. OUTLOOK FOR ADEN AND THE FEDERATION Summary British efforts to forge a viable Federation of South Arabia out of Aden Colony and the former Protectorate sultanates, and to work out some arrangement for the future of the military base in Aden, are in trouble. The main internal problems are traditional antipathy between town and tribe, Egyptian-sponsored terrorism in Aden and the sultanates and Adeni fear that the sheikhs would suppress political liberties through arbitrary police power. The UK has promised independence to the Federation in 1968, but British refusal to discuss the future of the military base with the Adenis have raised doubts among them about Britain's intentions. In the wake of deteriorating security situations, the UK has suspended local government in Aden proper. The British probably will make no significant political moves in the near term, but will concentrate on keeping terrorism under control which they can probably do. Over the longer term, the British will probably have to come to terms with those elements now in opposition if they are to have any chance of both creating a viable Federation and keeping the base on acceptable terms. 1. The status of Aden and the neighboring British-protected states in South Arabia is confronting the UK with a troublesome problem. It is the familiar but difficult one of granting independence to a colonial possession without abandoning local friends and interests deemed to be important. Among these latter, Britain's military base in Aden has loomed large, and this issue is a part of the broader question of the whole British military posture east of Suez and indeed of Britain's role in the Western alliance itself. 2. The UK's proposed solution was to establish the Federation of South Arabia,/2/ now composed of 16 sultanates and sheikhdoms on the southern Peninsula, together with Aden itself. Although the British retain overriding powers in respect of foreign affairs, defense, and internal security, the Federation is slowly assuming more authority in internal administration, education, and finance. The Federation's governing body is a Council, three-fourths of whose members are from ruling families from the Protectorate states and the remainder from Aden. Mutual suspicion between progressive Aden and the backward sheikhdoms is greatly hampering Britain's efforts to grant independence by 1968. /2/The Federation of South Arabia consists of the former Aden Colony (75 square miles and an estimated population of 220,000), and the Protectorate area. The Protectorate was for administrative purposes divided into the Eastern Protectorate (the Hadramaut) with four states, 90,000 square miles in area, and with an estimated population of 320,000, and the Western Protectorate with 16 states, comprising 22,000 square miles and a population of about 550,000. The Federation includes 15 of the Western Protectorate sultanates, but only one--the smallest--of the Eastern sultanates. [Footnote in the source text.] Aden 3. In British hands since 1839, Aden has been a major bunkering port on the imperial lifeline to India, since the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. It has grown from a tiny village to a city of some quarter million people of diverse backgrounds, chiefly Arabs but with many Indians and Somalis. About a third of the population is temporary migrant labor from Yemen. Thanks to a very large bunkering trade (Aden has a large refinery), its free port status, and its role as entrepot for Yemen, Aden enjoys a moderately high standard of living. There is a fair degree of education, and a vigorous labor organization of about 10,000 members, the Aden Trades Union Congress (ATUC), has grown up. 4. The British permitted limited political activity in the 1950s, and in 1959 12 members of the 23-man Legislative Council were elected under a restricted franchise. By the early 1960s there had arisen a sizeable political force, the People's Socialist Party (PSP), based on the ATUC. Both were headed by Abdallah al-Asnag, a middle class Adeni whose family has close ties with Yemen. The PSP has fought to broaden the franchise to include Arabs not born in Aden, which would give political control to the laboring class. As a long term goal it also advocates union of South Arabia and Yemen. No other party has much popular support. The Protectorate 5. In sharp contrast to Aden itself, the Protectorate states are economically backward and politically primitive. British control has been exercised indirectly through long-standing treaties of protection with some twenty sheikhdoms and sultanates. The British paid subsidies to the rulers and for years intervened only when tribal warfare threatened trade routes or general security. Beginning in the 1930s the UK largely pacified both Eastern and Western Protectorates. More recently, London has begun to stimulate education and some economic development. But the region's size, backwardness, and lack of resources--notably water--have impeded progress. The Protectorate states are still ruled in traditional fashion by leading families, although their participation in Federation ministries has given them some political experience. The Federation 6. The British were aware that this congeries of petty states had little chance to survive in the long run. In 1958, they dragooned six sultanates in the Western Protectorate into forming a Federation. The rulers were hesitant, but they were persuaded that federation would increase their ability to resist absorption by Yemen, and their heavy dependence on British subsidies made them amenable to British desires. All but one of the 16 Western Protectorate states have now become members; a Federation capital has been established near Aden; and the Protectorate Levies have become the nucleus of an army. The Federation government is beginning to function, but it remains dependent on UK subsidies for nearly two-thirds of its revenue. The three principal Eastern Protectorate sultanates, more educated and aware of the outside world through long-standing connections with Indonesia, East Africa, and Saudi Arabia, have remained aloof from the Federation. They are unwilling to join a state with so many problems, and at least for the present prefer their own semi-independent status. 7. Adenis generally are dubious about the benefits of the Federation, and their participation has been half-hearted at best. Aden joined in 1963 only after the governor exerted strong pressure on the Legislative Council, and half of the Council's Adeni members walked out before the vote was taken. Most Adenis fear that their money may be drained off to support the Protectorate areas. They demand representation in the Federation government out of proportion to the size of their population lest Aden be outvoted by the Protectorate representatives. Most important, and related to the representation issue, Adenis of all political shadings worry that the unreconstructed sheikhs and sultans will not only refuse to extend the electoral process in the Federation, but will also be able to suppress Adeni political freedom by control of the police and security forces. The British have responded to those fears by arranging that Federation police power be "delegated" to the High Commissioner. 8. Relations between the British and the responsible Adeni opposition deteriorated as a result of difficulties over elections for the Legislative Council in October 1964. [4 lines of source text not declassified] Asnag has been helped by Cairo, but he is probably a Baathist rather than a Nasserist. He has pushed for a government in South Arabia run by its people, not by hereditary chiefs or foreigners. 9. In response to the British move, Asnag boycotted the elections, though he probably could have won a third or more of the elected seats on the Council. Others in the PSP leadership wanted to contest the elections; some did, and the dispute between them and Asnag weakened both the PSP and Asnag's control over it. As a move to bolster his own position, and as a counter to more radical elements, Asnag has joined with other Adeni and Federation opposition elements in the Organization for Liberation of Occupied South (OLOS), which is based in Yemen. This group is pressing for a drastically reduced measure of British influence now and for its own dominance when independence is granted. In particular, it wants the status of the base settled before independence. Asnag's own current views on the future of the base are not clear, but 5,000 of his ATUC members are employed there, and as of 1964, he stopped short of demanding British withdrawal from it. The Military Base 10. The British have not made up their minds about the need for the Aden base over the long term. On the one hand, the base represents a political vulnerability for the UK, not only on the Peninsula, but in the area as a whole. It is a target of nationalist criticism and a rallying-cry for anti-British propaganda by Nasser and others. It is also an expensive proposition. On the other hand, a number of factors have combined to increase the military value of the base since 1950. Suez is gone. Growing nationalist movements in the area have increased the chances of military or terrorist activities against British oil interests. Troops formerly stationed in Kenya have had to be relocated. Since 1962, the UK military garrison has grown from 7,000 to some 22,000 personnel--5,000 RAF, 14,000 army, and 3,000 navy--and there has been a vast amount of military associated construction--barracks, warehouses, dependent quarters, etc. [3 lines of source text not declassified] 11. The future of the base is now under debate in London, and there are divided counsels, not only on its military worth, but also on the political measures necessary to keep it. We believe it highly unlikely that Britain will decide to abandon the base completely, and the real question is how and on what terms it can be kept. Senior British officials in Aden and in the Colonial Office in London have believed that a substantial measure of control over the political institutions of the Federation and of Aden state was needed to assure the UK's tenure at the base. Moreover, many of these officials--including the last governor, who developed and pushed the Federation scheme--felt more at home with traditionalist sheikhs than with modernizing nationalists. [3 lines of source text not declassified] Another school of thought in London prefers to work for a deal with an independent federation which would allow Britain to keep the base. Yemeni and Egyptian Involvement 12. A further complication is the long-standing Yemeni claim to all of South Arabia. For years, border troubles between Yemeni and the Protectorate were endemic. The Yemeni revolution of 1962 made no substantial change in this situation until the appearance of Egyptian forces and the rise of Egyptian influence in republican Yemen led to strong British fears of UAR meddling in Aden and the Protectorate. [2 lines of source text not declassified] the Yemeni Republicans and particularly the Egyptians began in 1963 to increase their efforts to cause trouble in South Arabia. Dissident tribesmen, armed and trained by the UAR, and sometimes including important exiled members of South Arabian ruling families, have tied down a substantial proportion of the Federation's 5,000-man army and some British forces as well. 13. British and Federal forces, however, have been able to control the dissidents in the Protectorate. Therefore, in late 1964, the Egyptians turned to Aden itself. Their puppet National Liberation Front (NLF) began to attack Arab police and British soldiers, as well as civilians. This campaign has seriously damaged the morale of the Adeni police officers, and the British have been forced to rely more and more on their own personnel to maintain security. Strikes and slowdowns have caused considerable economic loss. In particular, during a two-month labor slowdown in the port, more than half the bunkering trade was diverted elsewhere. 14. Though the Aden government was by no means a group of radicals, it tended to side with the NLF against the British, and blamed the terrorism on lack of progress toward independence. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] In September, however, the killing of two senior British officials goaded London into suspending the local government and imposing direct rule by the High Commissioner. The security situation is now fairly well under control. Outlook 15. The British have enough force in Aden to maintain security for the foreseeable future, but they will continue to be vulnerable to terrorist attacks and will probably continue to be harassed by labor troubles in the port, refinery, and base areas. British ability to control terrorism would be improved if the projected settlement in Yemen actually does lead to withdrawal of Egyptian forces there. They can continue to help the Federation leaders to organize ministries, get them functioning, and in general lay down the necessary foundation of an administrative system for the Federation. But this does not get at the basic problems: the restoration of local government in Aden and the forging of a working relationship between Aden and the sheikhs. 16. Beyond this kind of temporizing, the longer term choices open to the British are not particularly attractive. On the one hand, they can press ahead with the Federation plans, make whatever arrangements with the Federation sultans they feel they need for continued tenure at the base hoping that the sultans will prove able to make these arrangements stick. This would bring on an increase in violence, political disturbance, not only among the political articulate forces in Aden, but also to some extent in the more troublesome states of the hinterland. In such circumstances, Aden might try to withdraw from the Federation. In the Arab world generally, the issue would continue to constitute a liability for the UK. This course would probably prove too costly in terms of property damage, lives lost, and economic decline to endure for long. 17. On the other hand, the UK could move to permit the nationalist elements to take political power in Aden. This would probably require new elections under a broadened franchise, and the consequent installation of a nationalist government, probably radical, and certainly hard to deal with. Establishment of confidence between the British and the Adeni politicians will be at best a long and difficult task. Given recent terrorist activity, it is doubtful that British authorities could bring themselves to let even a few terrorists or terrorist supporters into the government. Moreover, the authorities would have to put heavy pressure on the sultans, who applaud vigorous British actions in Aden, to conform, and this would cause other problems in the Federation. Particularly in view of the economic importance to Aden of the base, however, we believe that the British could probably work out with the nationalists a reasonably satisfactory arrangement. 18. For the next several months at least, the UK is most likely to avoid a clear-cut decision and will concentrate on providing greater assurance of security in Aden. However, unless the independence promised for 1968 is to be postponed, London will have to begin soon to get a government in Aden which represents local opinion and which can participate in the Federation. The longer the period of drift persists, the more the nationalist forces will grow in size and strength and the harder the British task will be. In the end, the UK will probably be forced, in order to avoid chaos, to deal with the very people they have sought to exclude. For the Board of National Estimates: Sherman Kent [Continue with the next documents] Volume XXI Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |