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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXI Near East Region Department of State |
 43. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ I-25133/66 Washington, August 2, 1966. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 6648, 680.1, Indian Ocean Islands. Secret. SUBJECT Issue: The British Embassy informed us officially on 14 July (Tab A)/2/ that HMG has decided in principle to build an air staging facility on Aldabra Island. They estimate the cost at 18 million pounds ($50 million). They ask: /2/Neither tab is printed. (a) Whether we wish to send a small group to participate in engineering surveys in September, and (b) Whether we are willing to fund one-half of the cost ($25 million) in return for equal use of the facility. Discussion: (a) The British have recently made counter-proposals on our draft agreement concerning future defense use of the "detached" islands, including Aldabra and Diego Garcia, which now constitute the British Indian Ocean Territory. Some differences remain for negotiation, but we do not anticipate that these differences will seriously delay conclusion of the agreement. One theme of the agreement is that the islands are available for defense use over a long period by both Governments and that to assure coordination there should be consultation on plans. The agreement also recognizes the possibility of joint financing for facilities in which both Governments may be interested. (b) Last year the Air Force proposed a facility on Aldabra similar to that now planned by the British. You did not approve funding for a USAF installation per se, but indicated willingness to help fund a British installation if we had assured use. The Air Force continues to have a strong interest in such a facility (see Tab B), and is supported by the Joint Chiefs. The current Air Force cost estimate for the facility is considerably lower than the British figure. (c) Last February you authorized Navy to make in-house studies toward development of engineering plans for construction of logistic support facilities on Diego Garcia, preparatory to programming action. A Navy PCP detailing this plan is in the final stages of preparation. The fact of this planning has been closely held. (d) A British installation on Aldabra would promote their continued military presence in the western Indian Ocean. Further, if we should fail to contribute toward its development, it is doubtful that the British would build it alone. Our contribution would thus advance the case of those within the HMG who have supported a British presence East of Suez. We would also have the physical facilities available for our own use whenever necessary. (e) A contribution toward the British facility on Aldabra would give us an excellent opportunity to stimulate British interest in participating in the construction and operation of facilities we may decide to build on Diego Garcia. By letting it be known in this context that we are examining the feasibility and utility of naval support facilities on Diego Garcia, we may be able to promote British participation and their continued presence in the central Indian Ocean area. Recommendations:/3/ /3/McNamara approved both recommendations on August 4. (a) That we accept in principle the British proposal for a jointly financed facility on Aldabra, and authorize the Air Force to participate in detailed planning with the British authorities, join in the September surveys, and include funding of the U.S. share in its FY 68 program. (b) That we inform the British that we are examining the feasibility and utility of austere naval support facilities including an air strip on Diego Garcia, and seek early arrangements with the British for a joint engineering survey. We would make clear to the British that we have made no final decision to build, and would seek to stimulate some degree of British participation in the project should it materialize. John T. McNaughton
44. Memorandum From the Secretary of the Navy (Nitze) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ Ser 001653 Washington, February 24, 1967. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 72 A 2468, Indian Ocean 323.3, 24 Feb. 67. Secret. A copy was sent to the Under Secretary of the Navy. SUBJECT 1. I believe we should reconsider the decision made last fall that approval for the proposed limited support facility at Diego Garcia would depend on substantial British participation and financing. The two recent episodes involving U.S. ships and South African ports have dramatically underscored the lack of any politically neutral and usable facility for the Navy in the entire Western Indian Ocean./2/ /2/For documentation on the controversies surrounding scheduled visits of the USS Independence and the USS Roosevelt to South African ports, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XXIV, Documents 602, 605, 620, and 630. 2. This situation is not likely to improve with time nor is the use of the Indian Ocean by U.S. ships likely to diminish. In these circumstances the logic of making early use of Diego seems to me to be impressive. We have just concluded a base rights agreement with the British providing for the use of Diego and other islands of the British Indian Ocean Territory. The location is ideal for use by our ships transiting the Indian Ocean to and from Viet Nam (Tab A)/3/ and its political visibility is very low. /3/The tabs are attached to the source text but not printed. On December 30, 1966, the U.S. and U.K. Governments signed a base rights agreement on the availability of certain Indian Ocean islands, including Diego Garcia, to meet the defense needs of both Governments. (TIAS 6196; 18 UST 28) For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 640-642. 3. More specifically, with a facility at Diego, a carrier transiting from the South China Sea to the east coast of the United States could refuel at Diego, then transit to Rio de Janeiro, thence homeward--all without oiler support and independent of Cape Town or any other politically vulnerable port. The extra distance would be only some 1200 miles. A tabulation of transit times and the money advantages of Diego as against present refueling arrangements not using Cape Town is at Tab B. 4. Developing Diego would not involve protracted new negotiations, nor would it foreclose any other option--such as renewing use of South African ports at a later time or of using fleet oiler support--but it would give us a valuable option for operations in the Indian Ocean which we now lack. 5. By no means am I suggesting that we abandon the effort to attract British participation. I share fully your views on the importance of their continued presence in that area. In accordance with Mr. Vance's decision, we have discussed with the Royal Navy the possibility of their participation. These talks have been encouraging and, although there has been no commitment, we anticipate a British response sometime in the spring. We are also going forward with plans for a joint UK-US survey of Diego which is now scheduled for 25 June-5 August 1967. It has been clear in our discussions with them thus far that, based on their earlier experience with our communications requirement on Diego, they have some reservation as to the firmness of present U.S. requirements to support this project. A decision by the U.S. to construct the facility would resolve British doubts and give support to those in the Government who favor continued UK presence East of Suez. 6. However, I am convinced that whether the British ultimately participate or not, we should make the decision now to build the kind of limited facility on Diego Garcia that you and I have discussed over the past year. In brief, that proposal was for a 26 million dollar austere facility, funded in two increments, which would meet existing requirements for transiting units and provide a nucleus that could be expanded if need arose. That proposal to my mind, remains feasible. A summary of it is at Tab C. 7. I therefore request your approval in principle to include in the Defense FY 69 Military Construction budget the first increment--$13 million--for a U.S. Naval facility at Diego with the understanding that we will continue our efforts to obtain British participation. Paul H. Nitze
45. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ JCSM-420-67 Washington, July 25, 1967. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 72 A 2468, Indian Ocean 323.3, 25 Jul. 67. Secret. SUBJECT 1. (S) Reference is made to: a. A memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), I-23377/67, dated 2 June 1967,/2/ subject as above, requesting the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the desirability of proceeding now with construction of such a facility, its value in various contingencies, and an evaluation as to whether the United States should proceed with construction in the absence of UK agreement to share costs. /2/Not printed. (Ibid.) b. JCSM-392-65, dated 20 May 1965,/3/ subject: "Indian Ocean Islands (U)," which reaffirmed the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that there were military requirements for the Chagos Archipelago and Aldabra and stated that funds should be programmed to assist the United Kingdom in reserving these and other Indian Ocean islands for future joint defense use. /3/Not printed. (Ibid.: FRC 69 A 7425, India 381, 10 Jul. 64) 2. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have examined the proposal for a Navy facility at Diego Garcia. An analysis of the requirement for a military facility on Diego Garcia and additional supporting data are contained in Appendices A through D hereto./4/ The following conclusions are derived from this examination: /4/Attached but not printed. a. Construction of the facility would carry out, partially, the strategic island concept previously recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a guide for US policy in the Southern Hemisphere. b. Construction of the facility now is fully warranted. US strategic interests in the area are important and will increase in importance in the future. Political instability of states along the Indian Ocean littoral is likely to continue for many years. Soviet Union infiltration of and pressure on those states are likely to increase, and it can be expected that Communist China as well will increase its efforts to exert influence upon them. An assured base, strategically located in the Indian Ocean, is, therefore, required. Increased base flexibility in the Middle East and east African areas would be realized by the unhampered use (as opposed to restricted use, that could be imposed politically) of an austere staging base for contingency operations; provision of a capability to meet multiple routing requirements of the Services; establishment of communications facilities to improve command and control of ships and aircraft in transit and operating in the area; and the availability of an alternate base to facilitate aircraft/ship operations where weather and range considerations are influencing factors. These conditions emphasize US interests and requirements in the Indian Ocean area. c. Because of the present lack of assured facilities in the Indian Ocean, the United States is limited in the range of options it can employ in deciding the level of response to a particular threat and, therefore, limited in the effectiveness with which it can protect US interests. The proposed facility would provide the means to support the options for a graduated and flexible response but would not, in itself, increase US commitments in the area. d. At the same time, a facility on Diego Garcia would be unlikely to embroil the United States in exclusively local problems, because of its isolated geographic location and the political arrangements which the British have made for the islands of the British Indian Ocean Territories. e. The facility would support the existing and projected Service requirements listed in Appendix A in an effective manner and with minimum investment. Although the initial project would be primarily a naval facility, the bulk of investment would provide improvements of a general purpose nature which could be developed further to meet additional future requirements. f. The facility would not, in itself, ensure a satisfactory UK presence east of Suez but could be a step in retaining a UK military capability, if it were to participate in the operation and manning of the facility. Though it would be desirable to obtain UK participation, the US requirement for Diego Garcia is such that the project should be undertaken unilaterally, if necessary. 3. (S) Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that: a. Since initial conversations have indicated that the United Kingdom is interested in the facility but is unable to contribute to the cost of construction, an approach be made to the Government of the United Kingdom to ascertain its interest in the following proposals: (1) The United States to build the facility ($26 million). (2) The United States and the United Kingdom to share equally the operating and maintenance costs, estimated at $1.47 million annually. (3) The United Kingdom to provide the commanding officer, man the facility, and pay manning costs. (4) The United Kingdom to pay for construction to meet any requirements beyond the US proposal. (5) Each country to have equal user rights. b. A decision be made to fund the first increment of construction ($13 million) in the FY 1969 defense military construction budget, regardless of the British decision. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: J.O. Cobb
46. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Secretary of the Navy (Ignatius)/1/ Washington, October 27, 1967. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 72 A 2468, Indian Ocean 323.3, 27 Oct. 67. Secret. SUBJECT Last February the Navy sent forward a proposal to construct a $26 million "austere" support facility on Diego Garcia, whether or not the British participate in its funding and use, because there would be money advantages to refueling carriers transiting the Indian Ocean at Diego Garcia as compared with current refueling arrangements. In April information on what other uses a Diego Garcia base might serve was furnished by the Navy in a separate study. I have reviewed the reasons for the facility that were set forth in these papers and have decided not to approve investment in Diego Garcia at this time. If in the future, investment in such a project can be arranged with the United Kingdom and will assure a significant British presence in the Indian Ocean, such a base proposal may be reconsidered. The money advantages the February 24, 1967, Navy memorandum/2/ showed for refueling carriers transiting the Indian Ocean are now open to question. If the cost tabulations include (1) the cost of carrier days lost by diverting to Diego Garcia from the quickest transit, (2) the cost of transporting oil by MSTS to Diego Garcia, (3) a reduction in oiler requirements that occur as a result of the base, and (4) the cost of the base, it is clear that using Diego Garcia for carrier refueling is more expensive than current arrangements. Moreover since the value of the carrier days lost by diverting to Diego Garcia is so much greater than the value of the oiler days saved by using the base, we probably would not use the island for refueling if its cost and use were free. /2/Document 44. Though I accept the principal cost conclusions of the April 15, 1967, Navy study, "Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of Diego Garcia in Meeting Indian Ocean Contingencies,"/3/ I still do not see a clear requirement for the base. As that study indicated, the base starts paying for itself only after a carrier task group is deployed continuously for more than 15 weeks. Current intelligence suggests no requirement for such an extended and uninterrupted show of force. /3/Not printed. My interest in encouraging a British military presence in the Indian Ocean area continues to be high. It is possible that the United Kingdom might be interested in a joint naval facility on Diego Garcia in the future, perhaps after a decision is reached on the Aldabra base. I would be prepared to reconsider the Diego Garcia proposal after we have reached a firm understanding with the British on Aldabra. Robert S. McNamara/4/ /4/Printed from a copy that indicates McNamara signed the original.
47. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ JCSM-226-68 Washington, April 10, 1968. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 73 A 1250, Indian Ocean 323.3, 10 Apr. 68. Secret. The memorandum indicates that McNamara saw it. SUBJECT 1. (S) Reference is made to: a. JCSM-420-67, dated 25 July 1967, subject: "Proposed Naval Facility on Diego Garcia (S),"/2/ which recommended funding the first increment of construction ($13 million) in the FY 1969 Defense Military Construction Budget. /2/Document 45. b. A memorandum by the Secretary of Defense, dated 27 October 1967, subject: "Austere Support Facility on Diego Garcia (S),"/3/ which deferred approval of a recommendation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to construct a naval facility on Diego Garcia. The memorandum, however, did contain a provision for reconsideration of the proposal after a firm understanding had been reached with the British on Aldabra. /3/Document 46. c. American Embassy, London, message 3989, dated 18 November 1967 (JCS IN 24820),/4/ which advised that: (1) the present state of Britain's financial condition had made it clear that the United Kingdom would be unable to go ahead with the Aldabra project; and (2) the British intend to remain in the Far East and the Persian Gulf, though there might be adjustments in the phasing of the UK force reequipment. /4/Telegram 3989 from London, November 18, 1967. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 1 UK) d. American Embassy, London, message 5577, dated 16 January 1968 (JCS IN 40259),/5/ which reported Prime Minister Wilson's announcement to withdraw UK forces from the Far East and Persian Gulf by the end of 1971. /5/Telegram 5577 from London, January 16. (Ibid.) e. A memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 15 February 1968, subject: "Determination of U.S. Overseas Military Base Requirements,"/6/ which directed that a special State-Defense study on overseas military base requirements for the period of the next decade be conducted for completion by 15 December 1968. /6/Not printed. 2. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reexamined the political situation and strategic requirements in the Indian Ocean area against the background of events evolving from the Arab/Israeli war and the UK decision to accelerate withdrawal from east of Suez. At the time of the decision made in reference 1a, the prospects for a limited but effective British presence in the Indian Ocean appeared excellent. Now, however, the British financial condition and the attendant retrenchment offer little probability of future UK participation in the development or manning of any joint US/UK Indian Ocean facility. The combination of circumstances emphasizes the necessity for reappraisal of US opportunities, responsibilities, and interests in the Indian Ocean area. 3. (S) The UK presence in the Indian Ocean area throughout the years has tended to stabilize the region and constrain internal strife. The accelerated British withdrawal east of Suez will create a power vacuum which has the potential to generate situations inimical to US national interests and long-range security. The Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic (CPR) can be expected to capitalize on the opportunities made available through the British withdrawal. The large number of newly independent nations of Africa and Asia, many with unstable governments and underdeveloped economies, generates political and economic tensions which facilitate Soviet/CPR penetration. 4. (S) The Soviets historically have sought to extend their domination over the neighboring nations to the south and long have coveted the natural resources of the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean littoral. Through military assistance, various forms of political, cultural, and economic contact, visits of high officials and military units, and the provision of military hardware, the USSR has recently undertaken a more active and direct presence in the Indian Ocean area. Predominance over the natural resources of the Indian Ocean area or dominating influence over the governments of the surrounding land areas by the USSR could have a serious impact on the economic and strategic positions of the United States and its allies. 5. (S) The Chinese have traditionally exerted strong influence in Southeast Asia, and Peiping now appears bent on restoring such a position. In Africa, the Chinese communists will probably continue to concentrate on establishing closer contact with governments such as Tanzania, at the same time supporting certain national liberation movements and engaging in subversive activities against other governments. 6. (S) Expanding Soviet and/or CPR presence in the Indian Ocean area could lead to serious situations in which the interests of the United States and/or its allies would be threatened. In such cases, the United States would probably be required to deploy forces to the area for sustained operations. The ability to support operations which may be required in this area will necessitate more timely, more effective, and, politically, more acceptable measures than currently are feasible. 7. (S) The United States contributes to the security of many nations throughout the area in various ways, including the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, participation in CENTO, and announced policy. In Africa, US objectives include safeguarding of strategic interests and promoting the development of independent nations free of external interference. It is anticipated that the use of regional facilities will be necessary to meet these commitments, yet there is no assurance that former UK military facilities or resources will be available following completion of UK retrenchment or that the use of local national resources will be politically or militarily feasible. 8. (S) A joint US military facility on Diego Garcia would provide the United States with a strategically located and politically insulated logistic support and staging base in the Indian Ocean in consonance with the Strategic Island Concept, previously recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and would serve as a link in an air line of communication in the Southern Hemisphere. The base on Diego Garcia should be an austere military facility capable of supporting limited forces deployed in response to contingency situations and occasional transitors. The central location makes it suitable for support of important functions, such as scientific research, intelligence collection, strategic communications, and strategic ICBM detection and warning. Appendices A and B hereto contain specific data and rationale. 9. (S) The Indian Ocean is a critical, strategic area from which large portions of both the USSR and CPR can be targeted from a submarine. Indian Ocean-based ballistic missile systems could expose targets within a 2,100-nautical mile window along the Soviet southern border to an additional threat. This threat would compound Soviet antiballistic missile defenses and further dilute the Soviet antisubmarine warfare effort. 10. (S) Immediate development of a joint US military facility on Diego Garcia will not in itself prevent the establishment of a Soviet or CPR presence; however, continued delay in construction of the facility, until circumstances demand counteraction, will permit the USSR/CPR to seize the initiative in the area without significant opposition. While the Special State-Defense Study Group is beginning a study of overseas base requirements, which would include consideration of Indian Ocean requirements in a worldwide context, the results and decisions thereon will probably not be available for at least one year. A decision on Diego Garcia should not be deferred awaiting completion of that study. 11. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that the early establishment of a joint US military facility on Diego Garcia is a valid military requirement. Accordingly, they recommend the approval of immediate establishment of a joint US military facility on Diego Garcia. They also recommend that you hold early discussions with the Secretary of State to examine and develop US political and military policy in the Indian Ocean area, with particular reference to the immediate establishment of a joint US military facility on Diego Garcia. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: John B. McPherson
48. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Nitze)/1/ Washington, June 15, 1968. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 73 A 1250, Indian Ocean 323.3, 15 Jun. 68. Secret. A copy was sent to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (SA). MEMORANDUM FOR SUBJECT A JCS memorandum dated 10 April 1968/2/ proposed the establishment of a $44 million joint military facility on Diego Garcia to enable the US to respond militarily to contingencies in the Indian Ocean area. I have reviewed the reasons presented by the JCS and have concluded that no justification exists at present for the establishment of a major support facility. We can reasonably anticipate that logistic requirements for the introduction of American forces into South Asia or the Middle East will be met by local governments in the event of serious crises in these areas. /2/Document 47. I do believe, however, that adequate justification exists for the construction of a modest facility at Diego Garcia. This facility--including ship-to-shore communications, telemetry, scientific, and intelligence monitoring capabilities, and attendant support installations--would provide us increased future flexibility at moderate cost. It could provide a potential backup site in the event that MIDEASTFOR cannot be based at Bahrein after the UK withdraws. In addition, some of our activities at Kagnew Station, Ethiopia, could be transferred to Diego Garcia should the security situation in Ethiopia warrant a reduction in our military presence there. The establishment of the facility would also demonstrate to concerned leaders that we are not totally uninterested in the area. Should further study reveal that Polaris submarine operations in the Indian Ocean are both feasible and desirable, Diego Garcia could serve as a useful site for replenishment and support. No additional construction or maintenance costs would be incurred in providing such support since the necessary anchorage work would have been accomplished. Moreover, we could in the future move quickly to Indian Ocean basing for Polaris should the Soviet ABM capability or ASW threat change suddenly. Consequently, I approve in principle the concept of a modest facility, and the development of a plan for its construction to include austere communications, POL storage, an 8000 foot runway and anchorage dredging, at a cost of approximately $26 million. This plan, including engineering specifications and Program Change Requests, should be submitted for my review by the Secretary of the Navy, in coordination with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Submission should be made in time for development of the FY 1970 budget. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs should coordinate with the Department of State to make an early approach to the British to obtain agreement to fly a British flag over the facility and to obtain whatever financial and manning participation may be possible. These negotiations should be undertaken with the clear understanding that implementation of any agreement is subject to final approval and release of funds by the US Government. Paul H. Nitze
49. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/ Washington, July 3, 1968, 1912Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15 IND US. Secret. Jointly drafted in G/PM, and by DOD/ISA Director of the Office of Foreign Military Rights Affairs Philip E. Barringer on June 28; cleared by Irving Cheslaw of the Office of UK Affairs, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Thomas H.E. Quimby, Carleton S. Coon, Jr., of the NEA Office of India, Ceylon & Nepal Affairs, Admiral James W. O`Grady of OPNAV, Thomas T. Huang of the Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Military and Regional Affairs, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans and Arms Control Morton H. Halperin, Bader (DOD/ISA), Kerr (DOD/ISA Office of International Logistics Negotiations), Major General Orwat (J-5), Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Ralph Earle, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Winthrop G. Brown, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs Philip J. Farley; and approved by Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Charles E. Bohlen. Repeated to CINCUSNAVEUR, CNO, CSAF, and Nairobi. 195858. Subj: US Military Facility on Diego Garcia. Ref: London 8538./2/ State/Defense message. /2/Telegram 8538 from London, April 30, reported that in principle the British Government would have no serious problem with the United States undertaking development of military facilities on Diego Garcia under terms of the December 1966 agreement. (Ibid.) 1. Following lengthy consideration here, decision has been reached in principle to establish modest US military facility at Diego Garcia, British Indian Ocean Territory. DOD plans for this facility as presently approved, subject to modification based on detailed engineering study, envisage construction of following: --Austere communications 2. Cost is estimated at $26 million, to be funded over two fiscal years. 36 months would be needed to make these facilities operational, and 48 months to complete them. Detailed construction plans will be based upon report of joint US/UK survey conducted in June 1967, and on "Project Rest Stop," prepared by Wall-Grad as joint venture for Naval Facilities Engineering Command. 1967 joint survey report is presumably available to interested UK Ministries, and latter document has been furnished to CINCUSNAVEUR and DAO London. 3. We recognize from reftel that possibility of UK participation is slim indeed. As bare minimum, however, we consider that British flag should fly over facility and that UK liaison officer would need to be appointed in order to establish necessary relations with other HMG officials and local inhabitants. Although facility would be available for UK use under 1966 BIOT Agreement and other applicable service-level arrangements, British financial participation would permit greater adaptation of Diego Garcia facility for line of communications support to UK forces in Hong Kong, thus assuming to some extent former role of Aden in this connection. 4. Majority of work to establish Diego Garcia facility would be undertaken either by Navy construction battalions or by use of US civilian contractors. We recognize US obligation under 1966 BIOT Agreement to utilize Mauritian labor to maximum practicable extent, but trust that under that same agreement UK will also take into consideration our own balance of payments situation and consequent need to undertake project with minimum adverse B/P impact. Migrant Mauritian laborers could be utilized for some aspects of construction, but for most part would not be likely to possess requisite skills. 5. Congressional funding for Diego facility has not been secured, but is contemplated for FY 70 budget. Previous experience on such matters indicates that prior UK consent is needed before individual line items will be considered by Congressional committees concerned. Accordingly, we would hope to obtain UK agreement in principle before September 1. 6. Embassy London should outline foregoing proposals and seek HMG approval in principle for construction and installation of proposed facilities pursuant to para 2(b) of BIOT Agreement. (Authority to use the facilities is provided by BIOT Agreement and no further UK approval is required.) London should particularly emphasize that (a) we plan no facilities at this time beyond $26 million package listed above; (b) we attach great importance to UK participation, and hope HMG will view matter in same light; and (c) implementation of any agreement is subject to final approval and release of funds by USG. Rusk
50. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State/1/ London, September 4, 1968, 1037Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15 IND-US. Secret. Repeated to CNO, CSAF, Nairobi, Port Louis, CINCUSNAVEUR, CINCSTRIKE, and DOD for OSD/ISA. 12335. Subj: Diego Garcia. Ref: State 195858 (Notal)./2/ /2/Document 49. 1. FonOff has finally ejected its long-awaited reply to our demarche of July 5 on US-proposed project for Diego Garcia. Text FonOff's letter being pouched Department by airgram./3/ Substance of British reply as follows: /3/Airgram A-4507, September 5. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15 IND-US) 2. HMG prepared to agree to proposed USG development of a facility on Diego Garcia, on understanding that A) Normal British participation will be provision of one or more liaison officers, and UK flag flying over facility; B) British naval ships and military aircraft shall have full rights of access to facility at all times under arrangements to be mutually agreed; C) Administrative details of project will need to be subject of detailed negotiations before construction is due to begin. These negotiations will encompass use of Mauritian and Seychellois labor, and question of resettlement of migrant population. Brooke Turner suggests two possibilities might be considered: Removal of population altogether to some locale outside territory, or onto other islands in Chagos group. In order approach this question, FonOff wishes to know US views on whether all should move, or whether some of them will be offered employment, during and after construction phase. FonOff also wishes further info about eventual size of facility, and which, if any, of other islands in Chagos group might be required for further development. D) Most difficult question likely to be how and when to make project public knowledge: It will clearly be necessary for both govts to concert closely over this. It is essential to preclude unfavorable reactions by Govts of India and Mauritius by taking them into our confidence before there is any possibility of project becoming publicly known or rumored. UKUN would prefer no public announcement before end of coming session of General Assembly. 3. Brooke Turner, presumably in prudence as well as courtesy, has appended copy of draft report by Dr. Stoddart on conservation at Diego Garcia. Essences synopsized in earlier Embassy reporting, but briefly recapitulated, recommend that before development of DG Atoll proceeds, further study take place by qualified entomologist, and that access to three small islets at mouth of lagoon be limited and that these be considered nature preserves. 4. We hope to be able to pass Department's thinking re points 2(C) and 2(D) in due course. Bruce [Continue with the next documents] Volume XXI Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |