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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXI Near East Region Department of State |
 9. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/ Washington, September 23, 1965, 4:15 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 15. Secret. The initial "L" on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it. SUBJECT While we came out of the Arab Summit/2/ unusually well, we don't want to crow about it. You've already asked the new Moroccan Ambassador to tell King Hassan you're pleased at his role in keeping the lid on. Feisal also deserves credit. But this kind of statement is best kept confidential, since we get farther in this part of the world by quiet diplomacy. /2/Leaders of 12 Arab states held a summit meeting in Casablanca September 13-17. Arab Summit. As far as we can tell from preliminary reports, the Arab Summit did little more than maintain a semblance of momentum toward Arab unity. If the communiqu is a measure, the moderates prevented any tough positions against our role in Vietnam or the Congo, our support of Israel or our base in Libya. However, anti-Israeli plans were given another small push forward. Jordan. One troublesome result was that Hussein had a rough time explaining why he hasn't contracted for supersonics yet. His brethren gave him 60 days to sign up. According to one clandestine report, he agreed in effect to take MIGs then if he fails to get Western planes. We're working hard to persuade the French or British to sell planes, but the big problem is competing with the cut-rate MIG price. Hussein did resist stationing other Arab troops in Jordan, but reported offers to send an "interim" air squadron will be harder to resist. Nasser. We reserve judgment on how Nasser came out until more of the clandestine reports are in, but so far it looks as if he made no effort to dominate and was relatively restrained. He stuck to the position that no military action against Israel is possible in the near future. So we continue to get a picture of a somewhat subdued Nasser, although he may have adopted a wait-and-see attitude toward us until he finds out how we answer his food requests. We have indications, too, that government censors have been weeding anti-US noises out of the Cairo press recently. Water diversion and United Arab Command. The Arabs paid lip service to pushing ahead with diversion projects, but concentrated on building up their military ability to protect them. This will increase the pressure on Lebanon and Jordan to station other Arab troops on their soil, but may take a little of the heat off the diversion works. The Lebanese will still have a problem, however. They stopped work in July, under US and Israeli pressure, on the Arab plan to divert water into Syria. But they'd now like to divert enough water within Johnston Plan limits to irrigate their own arid south. They're sure the Israelis will retaliate, even if they only divert for their own needs. Iraq. An abortive coup against President Aref by so-called "pro-Nasser" elements apparently took even Nasser by surprise. As far as we can tell, there wasn't any Egyptian collaboration, even though the Egyptians are pretty well wired into those groups. The whole thing quieted down quickly without any significant change in the balance of political forces. Israel. The election (2 November) campaign is getting more tense. Eshkol's forces came close to losing a majority in elections in Histadrut, the big labor confederation (which may be a weathervane since it reaches most Israeli workers). This doesn't mean they'll lose control in the election, but it does underscore the vote-getting power of the Ben-Gurion name, especially among the less literate voters who have trouble understanding that Ben-Gurion is wrong this time. Since it increases the possibility that BG might win enough seats to be included in a governing coalition, Eshkol will probably run a little more scared; he'll increase the pressure on us to say something about our secret arms help or on desalting. [Here follows discussion of Greece and Turkey.] R. W. Komer/3/ /3/McGeorge Bundy initialed below Komer's signature.
On January 27, 1966, a U.K. delegation headed by Foreign Secretary Stewart and Defence Secretary Healey, in Washington to discuss problems relating to the current U.K. Defense Review, met with a U.S. delegation headed by Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara. Stewart stated that his government was extremely anxious that the United Kingdom not run away from its proper responsibilities, but pointed out that it had been overstretched in trying to maintain a wide range of commitments and was facing a serious foreign exchange drain. In discussing Middle East defense problems, Stewart argued that arrangements for defense of Libya could be more efficient and economical if the United States undertook a bigger share of its defense. Regarding the Arabian Sea-Persian Gulf area, he said it had been proposed that Aden become independent by 1968 and that the United Kingdom then withdraw from the base there. This would be compensated for by an increase in British forces in the Persian Gulf area, which they hoped would reassure the Shah. The U.K. Government hoped that Nasser would not represent the withdrawal as a triumph for himself, and that the U.S. Government would use its influence with Nasser to encourage him to refrain from making difficulties for them in connection with the withdrawal. The United Kingdom also planned to modify its commitment to Kuwait somewhat by not providing land forces hereafter except in case of a coup. Rusk said that the United States understood the British problem of being overstretched; it had a comparable problem with its Great Society programs being set back by the costs of Vietnam. He emphasized that the United States attached the greatest importance to Britain's retaining a world power role, and noted that it would be disastrous if the American people were to get the impression that the United States was entirely alone. On Aden and the Persian Gulf, he thought they could reach a common understanding, and he said that the United States would see what it could do to influence Nasser. (Memorandum of Conversation, January 27, Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 77-0075, Memo of Conversation Between Secretary McNamara and the United Kingdom) For documentation on the U.K.-U.S. discussions relating to the U.K. Defense Review, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XII, Documents 252-257. On February 22 the U.K. Government issued a Defence White Paper announcing that British forces overseas would be reduced by one-third over the next 4 years, and that the British base at Aden would be evacuated in 1968. 11. National Intelligence Estimate/1/ NIE 36-66 Washington, February 17, 1966. /1/Source: Department of State, NEA/IAI Files: Lot 70 D 304, POL 1 Israel, 1966, General Policy Background. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Acting Director of Central Intelligence Helms, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on February 17. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, and NSA participated in its preparation. The State, Defense, and NSA representatives concurred; the AEC and FBI representatives abstained because the subject was outside their jurisdiction. Paragraph references are to the Discussion portion of the estimate, not printed. THE EASTERN ARAB WORLD The Problem To assess the present situation and the outlook for the eastern Arab world over the next two or three years./2/ /2/This estimate deals principally with the Arab states from Libya eastward; the three Maghreb countries of Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco are considered only insofar as they are involved in eastern Arab affairs. [Footnote in the source text.] Conclusions A. For the last year or so, the Arab states have generally been more concerned with domestic problems than with such inter-Arab matters as the conflict between conservative and radical governments or rivalries among the radical leaders. However, the odds are against a long continuation of this inter-Arab dtente. The Arab states are generally susceptible to sudden political turmoil. An upheaval in any one of them, or the death of a ruler, could easily precipitate a collision of forces not only within that state but among others. Much still depends on Nasser who, though unlikely to regain the paramount influence he once had, remains the most important Arab leader. (Paras. 1-12) B. In the Arab-Israeli dispute, neither side is likely to initiate major hostilities, but neither will move toward a basic settlement. Border tensions will occasionally flare up, and the arms race will lead to increasing pressures on the US to supply expensive modern weapons. (Paras. 27-32) C. The socialist programs of the UAR, Syria, and Iraq are beset by economic difficulties, stemming from more ambitious development efforts than resources justify. The conservative governments, most of them blessed with oil revenues, are better off. In virtually all cases, government, rather than private enterprise, will be the directing force in the economies. Inter-Arab economic cooperation is likely to be limited, although oil-rich states are beginning to finance Arab economic and military schemes. (Paras. 13-19) D. Arab oil production will grow, and so will pressures on the oil companies for more revenue and greater control over production. Strong competition in the world oil market, however, sets limits on how far either side can go in this respect, and outright nationalization is unlikely. (Paras. 20-26) E. Britain's position will dwindle further. The UK will probably be able to maintain control in its protected states of the Persian Gulf over the next few years; its tenure in Aden, however, is considerably less certain. (Paras. 36-38) F. Tendencies toward Arab dtente have helped the US position in the area. However, US relations with the Arab world will remain troubled by the general Arab conviction that the US is basically pro-Israel, by the Arab radicals' belief that the US favors the conservatives, and by the conservatives' feeling that the US should support them more than it does. (Paras. 39-40) [Here follows the Discussion section of the estimate.]
The Fourteenth Session of the Ministerial Council of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) was held in Ankara, April 20-21, 1966. The session was attended by Foreign Minister Abbas Aram of Iran, Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan, Foreign Minister Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil of Turkey, Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart of the United Kingdom, and Secretary of State Rusk. For text of the communiqu, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pages 515-516. Documentation on the session is in the Department of State, NEA/RA Files: Lot 75 D 312, CENTO Files, 1965-1968 and CENTO Ministerial Files, 1962-1968.
13.Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts/1/ Washington, May 20, 1966, 7:15 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 3 ISLAMIC. Secret. Drafted by H. Eugene Bovis (NEA/UAR); cleared by Country Director for Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs Harrison M. Symmes, Director of the INR Office of Research and Analysis for Near East and South Asia James W. Spain, Bruce Buttles (NEA/P), Country Director for Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan Matthew J. Looram, Country Director for Turkey John M. Howison, and Staff Assistant Morris J. Amitay in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs; and approved by Davies. Sent to Rabat, Algiers, Tunis Tripoli, Khartoum, Mogadiscio, Cairo, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad, Jidda, Taiz, Kuwait, Tel Aviv, Tehran, Ankara, Karachi, London, Paris, Rome, and Moscow. 2285. 1. Department concerned about increasing charges US sponsoring Islamic Alliance./2/ Following is contingency guidance for background use with friendly diplomats, host government officials and others where appropriate on target of opportunity basis: /2/Since December 1965, Saudi King Faisal had been calling for stronger ties among Islamic states, i.e., including non-Arab but Islamic states such as Iran, as a counter to Nasser's Arab Socialist movement. a. US has neither supported nor opposed formation Islamic Alliance and sees no advantage in doing so. US aware published reports consultations among Islamic countries, but has played no role in them and, as non-Muslim country, has no position concerning them. b. Present indications are that no organized grouping such as Baghdad or Saadabad Pacts intended. Both Faisal and Hussein have stressed what they have in mind is not formal pact but greater Islamic solidarity designed to expand traditional Islamic conferences held annually Mecca following Haj. As for Shah of Iran, we see no evidence he has unrealistic expectations that Islamic solidarity could become important anti-Nasser device and doubt that he intends invest either prestige or resources in effort promote it. c. While we recognize significant common cultural element provided by Islamic heritage, we see little likelihood effective Islamic Alliance taking shape, given lack genuine community political interests Arab states and other Muslim nations. Notable recent examples Muslim failure agree on Islamic policy are Cyprus and Kashmir. In fact, renewed India-Pakistan hostilities in 1965 proved to be divisive issue among Arabs. Reaction of UAR and Syria to proposed Islamic Alliance raises doubt whether Islam still serves as force for unity of political action even among Arab states. d. We wonder whether any action, either Islamic Pact or Nasserist socialist crusade, serving to polarize Arab world into camps having image of "reactionary monarchs" versus "extremist" Arab states, might not be detrimental in long run to interests of all concerned. Polarization could lead to renewed propaganda campaigns, public attacks against one another and subversion in both camps. Rusk
14. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/ Washington, June 24, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Saunders Memos. Secret. WWR: It is not too hard to build a list of undramatic but constructive developments in the Middle East 1964-66. That may be all you can use in public. However, for in-house purposes, a much more sophisticated argument clinches your line. The big question is whether our basic position in the Middle East is stronger or being eroded. The long-run answer is that, while the Soviets continue to inch their way in, this is inevitable and the important thing is that we keep a base from which to protect our interests and to build the kind of Middle East that will stop the USSR short of eventual predominant influence a la Eastern Europe or Cuba. We are doing pretty well. We have succeeded in maintaining satisfactory working relationships on all sides of a series of local disputes that have threatened to drive us and the USSR into opposing camps. We have long believed that splitting the Middle East is a major Soviet objective. Our interests in the area are wide and varied enough that we judge it essential to avoid that kind of split. Carrying water on both shoulders sometimes seems immoral and is always difficult. But for power like the U.S. with its far flung conflicting interests there seems no other choice. The alternative is being driven to choose half our interests, sacrifice half and let the USSR pick up our losses. In early 1964 shortly after President Johnson took office, we were writing that: --1964 would be the year of the Jordan Waters crisis, forcing us to choose between Arabs and Israelis. The Arabs were strengthening their United Command and threatening to dry up the Israeli share of the Jordan. --Cyprus would become the center of a minor war, forcing us to choose between two NATO allies with the USSR gaining from the split. --Yemen would flare up again and force us to choose between defaulting on commitments to Saudi Arabia and opposing Nasser. None of these problems is solved. But none has erupted into the kind of showdown that would force us to take sides and effectively remove ourselves from the race in half of the Middle East. Shortly thereafter we began worrying with the Israelis that a serious arms imbalance was developing against them with Soviet help. With a series of arms sales to both Arabs and Israelis in 1965 and 1966, we have temporarily succeeded in restoring a deterrent balance. While we have made modest moves toward dampening the arms race, they have not been ripe enough to avoid establishing a new balance of forces. The USSR is making a new push in the Middle East, taking advantage of the new rift that seems to be opening between moderates and radicals and of neutralist pressures in Turkey and Iran. Recent modest successes in Damascus and Baghdad belong with the older Soviet position in Cairo and suggest that they are gaining ground. CIA argues that Soviet covert assets are building a formidable position. This argument demands consideration, but the fragile nature of Arab politics assures that the situation may change again and that the competition is still very much open. Soviet gains have been far less impressive than we feared in 1956. As long as we can avoid a complete split, we can compete. The key question in assessing these developments is, who profits from Arab unity? The new unity of early 1964--via summits and United Arab Command--seemed a growing threat to Israel then. Now it is disintegrating again. Presumably we should rest easier. Our strategists have debated for years whether we gain more from Arab unity or from Arab fragmentation. One side of the argument is that an efficient, united Arab movement backed by an integrated military could do a great deal of harm, although any such unity may be a pipe dream. One can also argue that, while we have nothing to lose from cooperation of like-minded Arabs or from Islamic friendship, our interests are better served by evolution of effective national centers than by a Nasser-dominated Arab union of some sort. But it is discomfiting that Moscow is pleased with the breakdown of Arab unity. The disadvantages of this spring's new fragmentation are that: --It sharpens the Cold War confrontation in the Middle East and gives the USSR new encouragement to fashion a pro-Soviet camp. --Nasser is pretty rational in calculating Arab chances in a fight with Israel, and he actually dampened down the more radical talk of driving Israel into the sea. Now the restraining influence of mild-tongued Arab unity is lifted. While Nasser may not feel any readier to drive Israel into the sea, he may feel forced to talk a more radical game in order to stay in line with his radical company. This talk encourages groups like the Fatah and PLO. --When Arabs are squabbling, both Israel and the US are convenient scapegoats, so tension and chances of a flareup increase. While on balance, the widening Arab split may seem a modest setback for us, Israel is a success and clearly here to stay--partly because of our help, largely because of Israeli's own efforts. Whether our support for Israel in 1948 was right or wrong, this has been a main tenet of our Middle East policy. Our purpose now is to buy time for an Arab-Israeli accommodation. While Arab-Israeli animosity is as great as ever, winds of change have begun to blow in the past year. The New Israeli government (particularly Eban) is seriously looking for bridges to build to the Arabs. Bourguiba on the Arab side has broken the solid Arab line that Arabs and Jews can never coexist. Resolution is far off, but the seeds of dtente may be in the ground. On balance, then, the real answer to your question is that, since 1964, we have surmounted a steady stream of problems that could have undermined our stance in the Middle East. Since our main purpose is to stay there and plug away at basic development, we can argue that we have bought time for the undramatic achievements which are going our way. HS
15. Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State/1/ 21GA/GP-16 Washington, September 12, 1966. /1/Source: Department of State, NEA/RA Files: Lot 71 D 218, Papers re Commu- nist Presence in the Middle East, 1966. Confidential. Drafted by Robert H. Flenner (EUR/SOV); cleared by Country Director for Soviet Union Affairs Malcolm Toon, Igor N. Belousovitch (INR/RSB), George C. Moore (NEA/ARP), Symmes, Country Director for United Arab Republic Affairs Donald C. Bergus, Country Director for Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq Alfred L. Atherton, and NEA Director of Regional Affairs Sidney Sober. TWENTY-FIRST GENERAL ASSEMBLY New York--September-October, 1966 Position Paper SOVIET ROLE IN THE NEAR EAST (ARAB STATES) The Soviet Union regards the Near East as a highly significant strategic area, and as a key element in the struggle between the USSR and the Western Powers for world domination. Soviet aims are to disrupt the West's defensive alliances in the area, deny the West the use of strategic bases, achieve predominance in the supply of military weapons, and establish economic and cultural ties which will in time supplant Western economic and political influence. At the same time, however, the USSR has been careful not to provoke a crisis in the area (as, for example, in the Arab-Israeli dispute) which might involve the Soviets in a confrontation with the Western powers. In its relations with the Arab States in the Near East, the Soviet Union has readily subordinated the interests of the local Communist parties to the larger purpose of establishing "correct" state to state relations. The Soviets have aimed at creating the image of the USSR as a respectable great power unselfishly assisting those states desiring its aid. The Soviet Union has had its most dramatic success in Nasir's United Arab Republic, which today depends upon bloc assistance for its military strength and much of its economic development. Internally, Nasir's revolution has adopted forms of state socialism and one party control which conform, superficially at least, with the Communist prescription for a "national democracy." Soviet influence has had some success in limiting Nasir's formerly severe repression of Egypt's Communists. At the same time Nasir continues to maintain contacts with some Western Powers. Aid from the United States, especially in the area of food grains, has relieved the Soviet Union from the unwanted burden of total support for the Nasir regime. Significant Soviet influence is also present in the Yemen, Syria and Iraq, all of which are largely dependent on bloc supplied arms for their military establishments, and have significant economic aid projects furnished from Soviet or other Communist sources. In none of these states, has Soviet influence succeeded in completely eradicating the Western presence. Only in Saudi Arabia and the British supported South Arabian Federation and the Sheikdoms of the Trucial Coast is there no Soviet diplomatic representation. Of the current problems in the area, from the Soviet policy point of view, the following are considered the most significant: 1. Breakdown of Arab Summitry The relapse suffered by the concept of Arab unity and the present disarray of the Arab world following the breakdown of Arab summit conferences signifies a return to the patterns of intra-Arab rivalry which the Soviets have exploited before. With the ranging of the self-styled "progressive" states receiving Soviet military and economic aid in contrast to more traditional regimes of Jordan and Saudi Arabia receiving assistance from the US and UK, great power rivalry becomes an integral aspect of the local confrontation. Support by the Western Powers for Israel gives the Soviets further opportunities to extend this influence with the "progressive" Arab regimes. 2. Instability in Syria Although the Soviets have been cautious in committing themselves to support the present highly unstable regime in Syria, they have already registered some important gains in the local political context. They wish to bolster the left wing Ba'th regime which offers them prospects of increased influence in Syria but apparently do not wish to weaken their influence in the UAR in the process and thus at the same time are working for a detente in Syrian-UAR relations. However, the Soviets, mindful of the potential impermanence of any Arab regime, seek to establish in Syria a possible alternative to their existing power base in the UAR. 3. Arab-Israel Dispute The current shrillness and bellicosity of Syria's stand against Israel is in part a function of the regime's internal weakness, although Syria has historicially taken an extreme position on Israel. The Soviet Union's support for the Arab position in this dispute does not appear to have changed significantly. Soviet propaganda is still generally directed against Israel's alleged role as an agent of Western imperialism rather than at its existence as a state. The Soviet Union will probably continue to support the Arabs with anti-Israel propaganda but will continue to attempt to limit Arab military action. At the same time, they will maintain correct, although not friendly, relations with Israel. 4. Arms Aid There does not appear to be any likelihood that the Soviet Union would agree in the near future to any arms limitation schemes in the Near East. Major shipments of arms continue to arrive in the UAR. A new multi-million dollar contract has just been signed with Iraq covering the period up to 1970 which will include modern supersonic planes and rockets. This deal is expected to stir demands of the neighboring states for increased aid from Western sources. Although the Soviet Union has supported the idea of a nuclear free zone in the Middle East, their interpretation of such a zone would presumably cover all US and other Western forces and bases in the Eastern Mediterranean. 5. Yemen and the Arab South Soviet arms aid to the UAR has contributed greatly to Nasir's ability to continue his intervention in the Yemen. The USSR has a sizeable investment in economic aid in the Yemen and can be expected to continue to support Nasirist influence as the best means to protect its own position there. At the same time, Soviet interests will be served by the British withdrawal from Aden and the possible supplanting of British by Egyptian influence in the area of the Red Sea. The Soviets will therefore probably attempt to prevent UAR supported attacks against Saudi Arabia or Aden, which might delay British withdrawal or, worse still, invite US involvement.
16.Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts/1/ Washington, October 28, 1966, 3:48 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL NEAR E-US. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Bergus on October 26; cleared by Davies, and Country Director for Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Spanish Sahara, and Tunisia John F. Root; and approved by Hare. Sent to Cairo, Baghdad, Amman, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, Beyda, Jidda, Kuwait, Beirut, Algiers, Tunis, Damascus, Taiz, and Rabat. 74768. US-Arab Relations in the Near East. 1. As is generally case of any major development in Near East, collapse of phase of "Arab unity" built around summitry has not proven unmixed blessing to U.S. interests or position in area. 2. Some of after-effects, e.g. reduction in Israel apprehensions, diminution of pressure on Jordan and Lebanon acquire Soviet arms, have been clearly advantageous. Prospect of united and effectively integrated Arab military confrontation with Israel has receded much further into future. 3. But in resulting disarray of Arab world and open resumption previous rivalries and intrigues there has arisen a welter of suspicion and unfounded charges against the United States. Moreover, some Arab states have taken actions against others which run counter to overall long-term U.S. (and Arab) interest in stability and peaceful development of area. Resulting increased intra-Arab tension has not yet threatened any U.S. vital interest in area. It has, however, produced less promising atmosphere for progress towards U.S. objectives. 4. Most difficult present case is that of U.S.-UAR relationship. For reasons primarily of UAR's making, status of U.S.-UAR relations at beginning of summer was such that we were unable continue food assistance. We have discussed situation frankly with UAR and expressed continuing readiness work for improvement relations to point whereby USG could resume some participation in UAR economic development. We think we have got this message across but at same time Cairo seems plagued by atmosphere of doubt and suspicion U.S. motives. Chorus we have heard from many UAR quarters recently generally consists of following elements: a. Most explicit acknowledgement we have yet had that UAR regime, under pressures worsening economic situation and continued Yemen impasse, is in difficulties and concerned about its future. In this context there have been indications of concern at appeals of Islamic traditionalism to large numbers of Egyptians. b. That Hussein and Faisal sensing possibility of overthrow Nasser regime are "up to something" in the Arab world. As examples Egyptians use alleged machinations in Yemen, "plot" against Syrian regime, Jordanian-Saudi support of Moslem Brotherhood elements within and outside of UAR, and of course, Faisal's efforts through Islamic solidarity movement "isolate and constrict" Egypt. c. Some elements in Egypt seem to believe USG, particularly "CIA," actively engaged in joint planning and operations against UAR regime with Saudis and Jordanians. Other Egyptians, while professing believe our assurances of innocence, take line that USG with its vast resources knows all that is going on in Arab world. Thus USG, although it preaches its desire for stability and development in Arab world, is not using its very considerable influence with Hussein and Faisal to forestall their actions. 5. Simplest and most effective means dispelling UAR suspicions would probably be indication to GUAR that USG prepared give generous consideration its food needs. But USG not yet in position make decision one way or other on this point. Our present concern is that UAR in present atmosphere of doubt and suspicion will take actions whose effect on public and legislative opinion in U.S. would be such as to reduce our options in U.S.-UAR relations for protracted period. This in turn could diminish what capabilities we have to exercise restraining influence on UAR and other "revolutionary" Arab states. 6. There are events in other parts of Arab world growing out of current intra-Arab tension which also trouble us. While current Syrian instability probably organic and generally unavoidable, strident statements of some Jordanians, including present PriMin, have seemed provocative. Indications that Saudis played role in precipitating current Leb bank crisis, for reasons of spite and against their own best interest in promoting free enterprise system in Arab world are measure of damage which can arise from current intra-Arab rifts. 7. Nor do we take particular comfort from prospect of increasing effort to rally area countries around Islamic banner. Long term implications for such non-Moslem groups in area as Israelis, Lebanese, Christian minorities, among others, are not pleasant. While there something to be said for Islam as bar to communism, there other good arguments to contrary. Certainly during pre-revolutionary period in Egypt when Moslem Brotherhood at peak its powers, this movement was implacably anti-Western and gave no impression that it understood or could cope with problems of economic and social development. Most of all, however, we think there has been trend towards secularization of Arab life, "separation of church and state" over last two or three decades. While it would be inappropriate for USG to praise or condemn efforts of individual Arab leaders to revivify political Islam, we believe it very much to our interest stay distinctly aloof from these efforts. 8. All of foregoing highlights present dilemma: How can USG, while retaining credible stance of neutrality in intra-Arab disputes, do what it can to prevent present quarrels from developing to point where there would be definite risks to our interests? How can we demonstrate that we play no favorites in Arab world and wish good relations with all against background of developing situation where it inevitable that at diverse times and in sundry places (currently Jordan and Saudi Arabia) there highly visible collaboration on programs in such important areas as budgetary support and military assistance, and where, as in Saudi Arabia, there natural close economic ties? 9. We have, of course, done what we could by way of high level conversations with UAR officials make clear our total lack of interest in UAR's internal affairs. We have supported Kuwait efforts for Yemen mediation and have urged all parties to Yemen dispute exercise restraint. We have pointed out to Arab leaders, both "traditional" and "revolutionary," unfortunate effect of inflammatory statements. We have deplored trends towards "polarization" in Near East. 10. What more can we usefully do? We would appreciate suggestions by addressees. Would authoritative public statement by high USG officials be of assistance? Statement could cite past public declarations of all Arab states of desire "practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors" and undertakings stabilize intra-Arab relations "on basis of respect for the independence and sovereignty of these States and to direct their efforts toward the common good of all the Arab countries. . . ." This language might be appropriate in that it taken from UNGA resolution 1237 (ES-III) of August 7, 1958./2/ Resolution was introduced by all Arab states, was drafted by them, and was passed without a dissenting vote. /2/For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, pp. 1047-1048. The resolution was actually adopted unanimously by the UN General Assembly on August 21, 1958. 11. Purpose of foregoing exercise would be lay appropriate foundation for appropriate diplomatic follow-up to effect that U.S. has broken free from mold that plagued Arab-West relations between two World Wars. U.S. shares aspirations of Near East peoples themselves for peace, independence, and economic development. We seek neither protectorates nor proteges in areas. Katzenbach
17. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Hare) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, November 15, 1966. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL UAR-US. Secret. Drafted by Bergus. The initials "DR" on the memorandum indicate that Rusk saw it. SUBJECT [Here follows a summary of circular telegram 74768, Document 16.] Twelve replies to our telegram have now been received. Several of them were too diffuse to be of much value. There were two posts in the area, Tripoli and Tunis, who seemed basically content with the situation as it now is. It would be difficult to say that any kind of consensus was reached by the other posts, but some of their findings are of interest. 1. It was generally felt that a mere public statement by a high U.S. official would not in itself be of much use. 2. There was considerable support for the idea of a visit to Near East and North African capitals by a high-ranking U.S. official. The Vice President, the Secretary, and the Under Secretary were put forward in this connection. 3. Four posts (Cairo, Baghdad, Beirut, and Amman) urged that PL 480 assistance to the UAR be resumed. Jidda said that it should not be resumed unless there were a quid pro quo (unspecified) from the UAR. Rabat spoke of the resumption of PL 480 assistance in terms of maintaining ties with the people (as opposed to the regime) of Egypt. 4. Three posts urged the halting or stringent restriction of future arms sales to the Near East. 5. There were also expressions of concern lest diminution of U.S. support for UNRWA rekindle Arab resentment at U.S. efforts to "liquidate" the Palestine problem. In conclusion, it is interesting that a general feeling of malaise about the situation in the Near East was signalled by ten of our posts in Arab capital. This was before the Israeli attack on Jordan of November 13, 1966.
18. Paper Prepared in the Department of State/1/ Washington, February 8, 1967. /1/Source: Department of State, NEA/ARP Files: Lot 69 D 350, POL 2a, Briefing Book Materials, Middle East, 1967, Meeting of NEA Advisers. Confidential. Prepared in the Office of Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. No date appears on the memorandum; the date used was the drafting date. This paper was one of ten staff studies prepared for a panel of outside academic advisers scheduled to meet with NEA officers for a Near East Policy Review, February 10-11. UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT COMMITMENTS Present Status The U.S. Government is committed extensively to countries in the Near East, although not in formal treaty relationship with Israel or any Arab state. The principal landmark or reference point in this regard is President Kennedy's May 8, 1963 statement that "we support the security of both Israel and her neighbors. . . We strongly oppose the use of force or the threat of force in the Near East. . . In the event of aggression or preparation for aggression, whether direct or indirect, we would support appropriate measures in the United Nations, adopt other courses of action on our own to prevent or put a stop to such aggression . . . "/2/ Subsequent reaffirmations have been made by President Johnson and/3/ as recently as December 1966 by Vice President Humphrey. /2/For Kennedy's statement, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, p. 373. /3/See ibid.: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-1964, Book I, pp. 740-741 and ibid., 1966, Book II, pp. 796-797. It is clear from the background and circumstances of these affirmations that our commitment to the security of Israel, in particular, is unequivocal. We believe the intention of the U.S. Government to uphold Israel's continued existence is clearly known and respected by the governments and peoples of the Near East, no matter how much some of them may argue that it is unjust. Vis--vis the Arab countries, the U.S. Government's security involvement is deepest in two instances: Saudi Arabia and Jordan. In Saudi Arabia a closeness of relations arising from a wholly American-owned oil industry has led us to give a special guarantee of territorial integrity. In essence, this commits us to come to Saudi assistance in event of what we regard as unprovoked attack./4/ /4/or a discussion of the nature of U.S. assurances to Saudi Arabia, see Document 287. In Jordan, because it controls a piece of geography we have consistently considered of great importance to area stability, we have over the last decade committed one-half billion dollars of aid as a sort of insurance premium against an explosion. The apparent result of this vast sum of material and moral support we have given King Hussein's regime is that we find ourselves increasingly seeing the preservation of this regime as an end in itself, so much so that our commitment to keep it afloat is fast becoming regarded in the area as nearly comparable to our guarantee to Saudi Arabia. Problem Area The constantly threatening lack of Near East stability causes us to wonder if the United States is in fact over-committed, or wrongly committed, there. From the point of view of resources for the task, it is realistic to expect that a declining quantity of USG money and material resources will be made available by the Congress for this area over the next few years. Perhaps we should apply the scarce available resources more selectively than at present. From another point of view, we might question whether existing USG undertakings in the area have materially contributed to the little stability the region has witnessed in recent years. One might argue that the region would have been more stable without our involvement, since area states might have been more concerned at the possible consequences to themselves of their own acts. From yet another angle, it has become very difficult to say with any precision whether in a given set of circumstances affecting Israel, Saudi Arabia or Jordan one of these clients is provoking a third party into the very action from which it wants our protection. This grey area may become even harder to interpret as time goes on. Should we therefore recede from our present commitments? Some Alternatives We could recede on all fronts from our 1948-66 historical record of promises of support for the security of Near Eastern states. This might, at the outset, take the form of placing new stress on a pledge of support for the United Nations' peacekeeping efforts--both the existing mechanisms and any future UN involvement triggered by complaints of aggression. Alternatively, we might simply drop, either in outright fashion or by gradually watering-down, our policy of support for one or more of the states with which we have special relations. This would of course raise a great hue and cry, and with respect to Israel would be virtually impossible. The logical outcome of this course would be for the USG to become the formal guarantor of Israeli security alone--a position favored by some elements of U.S. public opinion. Another possibility would be to change the nature of our commitments from virtual guarantees of territorial integrity against any aggression to guarantees only against threats from outside the area. Or we could consciously pick out one or more pieces of geography in the region and pledge our prestige to preserving the government(s) in control there. Such choice(s) would presumably be determined by a careful assessment of just where we should make a stand to retain the most important combination of United States interests. Finally, we can continue along present policy lines, determining as best we can, case by case, what actions are needed either to shore up our prime clients or to prevent major adverse affects on our own national interests.
19. Paper Prepared in the Department of State/1/ Washington, February 8, 1967. /1/Source: Department of State, NEA/ARP Files: Lot 69 D 350, POL 2a, Briefing Book Materials, Middle East, 1967, Meeting of NEA Advisers. Confidential. Prepared in the Office of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen, and Aden Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. No date appears on the memorandum; the date used is the drafting date. This paper was one of ten staff studies prepared for a panel of outside academic advisers scheduled to meet with NEA officers for a Near East Policy Review, February 10-11. NEAR EAST OIL: HOW IMPORTANT IS IT? Current Assessment The demand for Middle East petroleum will continue to increase for the next several years. The annual percentage rate of growth will gradually decline by 1970, however. The essential aspect seems to be that we and our allies must continue to have reasonable access to area oil supplies at reasonable cost in the decade ahead. Simple statistics on Middle Eastern oil can only be defined as staggering. Some of them: --The area contains 2/3 of the Free World's oil reserves, and provides over 1/3 of its current production. --Production costs are roughly 1/10 those in the U.S. --The area supplies over half of Western Europe's oil. --Over 85% of Japan's oil comes from the Persian Gulf. --Area oil production has increased from 1.3 million barrels per day in 1948 to over 9.5 million b/d at present, for an annual growth rate of 12%. The significance of the Middle East as a petroleum supplier was comprehended relatively slowly, since world demand for petroleum has increased more rapidly and to a higher level than was predicted. The area's productivity was also underestimated. Development of sources of energy other than petroleum--such as atomic energy--has proceeded more slowly than was expected, and development of sources of petroleum other than the Middle East has so far failed to diminish significantly the Middle East's primacy. Nevertheless, the absolute dominance of the pattern of supply by the Middle East to Western Europe is decreasing, as newer oil sources are factored into markets by the producing companies. This is a trend favorable to European security, since the lessons of 1956 disruptions were not lost on Western Europe. Production in Libya, for example, in late 1966 reached the level of a major Persian Gulf producer and actually surpassed Iraq's output, owing to the cut-back in Iraqi production because of Syrian blocking of the pipelines. Algeria and Nigeria have also become major suppliers to Europe, and Nigeria has the potential to become a Middle East scale producer. Intensive exploration of the Northwest European-North Sea gas fields is being pressed forward. Soviet oil is being bought in increasing quantities by several European countries. On the other hand, the Middle East producing countries are exhibiting signs of becoming more responsible and even more conservative in their relations with petroleum operators so as not to interrupt the flow of royalties and taxes from their oil production. The blow of the Mossadegh Madness to the Iranian treasury in 1951-54 was not lost on the other producing states, nor is Iraq's current loss of $630,000 per day because of Syria's closing of IPC pipelines unnoticed by other area oil suppliers. The USG's world-wide military commitments--including those in NATO, Viet-Nam, and general patrol operations by the Sixth and Seventh Fleets--require heavy reliance on Mid-East petroleum for both ourselves and our allies. No amount of effort could replace Arab-Persian oil in the Western European market within a reasonable length of time and for a reasonable cost. More than 60 per cent of our POL requirements in Viet- Nam are being met from the Persian Gulf. More than half of the Sixth and Seventh Fleet fuel supplies come from the area. Without Persian Gulf oil, production facilities of the US would be strained to the utmost to supply our military forces, and the cost would be upped about 150 per cent. (US oil reserves are being consumed rapidly. About one-fifth of our consumption is being imported now, and the percentage is increasing. Recovery of oil from shale and tar sands is technically feasible, but costs will be high and large investments will be required at a time when cheap petroleum could be brought from the Middle East in great quantities. Thus, the Persian Gulf area is a prolific potential future reserve for the US itself.) Strategic significance of Mid-East oil aside, the financial aspects are of prime importance. US companies have invested $2.75 billion in the area, and from this investment $750 million in profits flows back to the US annually. About 93 per cent of the US investment in the Middle East is in the oil industry. In addition, US companies have enormous investments in downstream operations--tankers, terminals, refineries, bulk plants--that would have to be re-programmed, modified, or abandoned if access to Gulf oil were denied. The Soviet view of Mid-East oil is difficult to assess as a whole. However, the commercial sales of Soviet oil, at costs in the West well below those charged East European states, suggest that the USSR expects to be competitive in the oil market place. It has been presumed that the Soviets would exploit difficulties that companies and host countries might encounter in mutual negotiations and operations, yet the evidence of significant Soviet activity in this connection is limited. The long-feared drive of the Russians for Mid-East oil is a restrained one if it is, indeed, an actual, sustained one. On balance, it appears that the oil producing states will continue for the foreseeable future to be greatly dependent on the West for marketing their oil. Nevertheless, we have attempted to inhibit the significant political penetration of the USSR into the Persian Gulf area. Some Alternatives 1. Our continuing and mounting problems in the area may be leading us into situations that can be so costly in money and strategic risks that the USG and its allies should embark on virtually a crash program to obtain fuel energy from other petroleum areas and from other sources of energy (atomic power, coal, oil shale, tar sands). We could then loosen political relations with the Mid-East producers and permit US companies to coast along for the life of their concessions, meanwhile expanding their production elsewhere. 2. Perhaps a more feasible course would be to strengthen our political ties with Iran and the Arab Middle East countries, play down our relations with Israel, and protect our fortunate access to the prolific oil resources of the area. We would hope that the countries themselves would continue to grow more responsible, interdependent among themselves, and interdependent with the West--which is, after all, the market for Mid-East oil. 3. We could focus on two or three of the most prolific producers and more friendly states--perhaps Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iran--and maintain minimum contacts with the other producers. Studies have shown that the West can stand loss of output from one or two major Mid-East producers but not three or four. 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