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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXI Near East Region Department of State |
 20. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/ Washington, May 16, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Saunders Memos. Secret. SUBJECT I. I went to the Middle East/2/ with this question: Why should the President care about the Middle East? I've been up and down US interests in the Middle East many times. But this time I set out to decide what President Johnson's interests are, given the goals that are closest to his heart. I came back with these thoughts: /2/On his trip to the Middle East, February 26-March 15, Saunders visited the United Arab Republic, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Aden, Jordan, and Israel. For his report on U.S.-UAR relations following his visit to Cairo, see Document 394 in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XVIII. A. He has more than the usual stake in peace for two quite personal reasons: --Especially while we are engaged in Vietnam, we want to spare him the political--and the human--burden of having to commit American forces in the Middle East too. --The "war of national liberation" as a technique has come to the Middle East--on Israel's borders and now in South Arabia. President Johnson in Vietnam has invested much of himself in demonstrating that we will not tolerate this brand of aggression. His friends in the Middle East are asking how he can stand against terrorist attackers in Vietnam and not in Israel or South Arabia? We must find a way to contain them or risk losing the respect the President has won for his courage in Vietnam. B. He has a political need as well as a personal desire to maintain a warm relationship with Israel. His friends in Israel see Arab terrorism as the greatest threat to their security today. C. In his effort to keep the dollar sound, he has a substantial balance of payments interest in the Arab states. The Middle East is the one part of Afro-Asia where we're solidly in the black. Our economists' estimate that the balance in our favor runs $400-500 million yearly. Against a worldwide deficit of $1.4 billion, that's significant. D. He has a stake in arms limitation. Israel must maintain qualitative superiority. But beyond that, the President is deeply committed to nuclear non-proliferation. The main hurdle in the Middle East is Israel. Before signing an NPT, Israel may want assurance from the US and USSR that major arms suppliers will keep the lid on the Arab arms inventory while the conventional balance is still in Israel's favor. In addition to his stake in the NPT, he is under increasing pressure on the Hill not to feed arms races and to reach an understanding with Moscow. E. He has a stake in economic development and social justice. This will influence fewer US voters than the other issues, but it will influence how the world judges his Presidency. He has said that the Great Society is his foreign policy. We know how earnestly he means that. Many people around the world judge him a great President because he shows America's concern for them as individuals. In the Middle East, he can be proud of our role in the many constructive things going on there. But on the political front we are cast only on the side of the remaining monarchies--the side of "Zionism, imperialism and reaction." One issue in particular overrides all others--the failure of over a million Palestine refugees to win "recognition of their rights." In their eyes, the President has compromised his own creed of justice by bowing to "Zionist pressure" and failing to force Israel to meet its obligations. II. Some of these interests are contradictory. The only way we have managed to protect them all at the same time is via a policy of friendship for all and refusing to choose sides. That policy has been remarkably successful when we consider the sharp animosities we've had to work around. But that policy will be severely tested in 1967-68. It is no longer certain that it--at least as we have balanced it in the recent past--is feasible or can serve the President's interests. What hits the visitor to the Middle East hardest today are the deepening political cleavages. First, there is the widening gulf among the Arabs themselves, between the moderate (Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Lebanon) and the pro-Nasser states. Second, the Arab-Israeli issue is heating up again. Third, there are the states who are making a good job of development and those whose political systems still seem unable to cope. This year, the pressures forcing us to choose sides--to abandon our past policy--are greater than at any time in this decade. How the Johnson Administration responds will affect each of the President's interests. Each Middle Eastern leadership group states the problem differently, but it all adds up to mounting pressure on us to choose sides: A. In Egypt, Foreign Minister Riad told me bluntly, "You are working against us everywhere in the Middle East. You have chosen sides." No amount of logic or argument will break this strong web of suspicion among the political leaders. One is almost forced to agree with many of our Israeli and Arab friends that the only language Nasser understands is firmness backed by unmistakable military power and the willingness to apply it. Nowhere in the Arab world is there cooler calculation that now is not the time to take on Israel. But Nasser sees clearer sailing in South Arabia and may stop there only if met by force. While this Egyptian suspicion makes Nasser all but impossible to work with, the visitor comes away convinced that nowhere else in the Middle East--save Israel--is there such a potential modern power to reckon with. If Egypt ever gets over revolutionary phobias and inferiority complexes, its 30 million people, its economic inheritance, its drive to lead, its pride of achievement and its military power make it unquestionably the Arab power. One could even go so far as to say that the UAR and Israel together or separately hold the key to the future of the Middle East. This is why I cannot believe it would serve the President's interests to break with Nasser. B. In Saudi Arabia, King Faisal's main concerns are Nasser's foothold in Yemen and fear that he will expand this by moving into South Arabia when the British pull out. For Faisal, Nasser is the agent of Communism and is out to topple moderate regimes throughout the area. Our failure to oppose a Nasserist takeover in Aden would be in Faisal's eyes our failure to oppose the advance of Communism in the Middle East and would cast doubt on the reliability of our commitment to preserve Saudi integrity. Faisal backs our stand in Vietnam and could not understand our hesitation to oppose openly the beginnings of terrorism in Saudi Arabia. He feels no one can trust Nasser and that our policy of trying to build a bridge to him has completely failed. C. In Jordan, King Hussein told me that the breach between Arab moderates and Nasser is complete. Hussein says this more in sorrow than in anger because he admits there was a time when he himself believed Jordan must back Nasser to the hilt. But Nasser has failed to live up to his responsibilities. Wasfi Tell, former PM and still a power behind the throne, told me bluntly, "It's time for you to choose sides." He believes that radicalism is on the wane and that Nasser will have to adopt more moderate policies or be replaced. In their eyes, Nasser's brand of revolution and "progressivism" is a dead wave of the past--not the wave of the future. These Jordanian leaders believe that our interests lie with the moderates. They feel we're wrong if we think we can still build a bridge to Nasser. Only by taking a firm stand against him can we halt the spread of subversion, buy time for the Arabs to learn to accept Israel (they were remarkably frank about this) and create an atmosphere conducive to development. D. Among the Palestinians on Jordan's West Bank, there is no sign of resignation to loss of their homes in Israel. "Don't make the mistake of thinking that time will solve the refugee problem," I was told over and over. "We have been wronged. America must acknowledge that our rights have been violated. President Johnson is a just man; he will help." From among the bitterest of these refugees the Palestine Liberation Army recruits its ranks and the Fatah terrorist group sends its saboteurs into Israel. But even the prosperous ones who have jobs in the fast-growing Jordanian economy say they will never forget and will look to the President for justice. E. Syrian officials are quite frank to say privately that their strategy is to make life in Israel so dangerous by their terrorism that new immigration will cease and people will even begin to leave Israel. At the same time, officially they disclaim responsibility for the terrorists. They hold us responsible for Israel's every move and believe--somewhat inconsistently--that the "Zionists exercise a veto over the President's policy." F. In Israel, Prime Minister Eshkol told me of the agony he suffers--not to mention the political pressures--when terrorists' mines take Israeli lives. They believe that limited use of force may be the only way to stop terrorism. They can't see why we should disagree. Chief of Staff Rabin as well as top officials in the Foreign Office argue that the US and the USSR have drawn the de facto limits of Communist expansion in Europe, Northeast Asia, Latin America and now in Southeast Asia. The time has come, they say, to draw the line in the Middle East. The Soviets are mounting a new offensive and must be stopped in their tracks. They see South Arabia as the potential turning point. Curiously, while they believe Nasser and the Soviets are working hand in hand in South Arabia, they admit that he has been the most restrained of the Arab leaders against them. They doubt we could buy him off from his main objectives today--which are largely directed against other Arabs--but no one took issue with our trying to maintain some kind of foot in the Cairo door. III. What this adds up to is great pressure on us to join a confrontation with Nasser and prediction that the US will lose its stature in the area if we refuse and fail to stop him, the USSR and the liberation armies. Against this is the almost unanimous feeling of our people in the area that, prickly as Nasser is, we're better off talking than fighting and we're better off working in Cairo than slamming the door. The problem, then, is to call a halt to aggression without open confrontation or appeasement. Our success--and our success in protecting all of the President's contradictory interest--will depend on two separate sets of decisions through the rest of this year: (1) How we deal with Nasser. (2) What we do in Aden. The great temptation--greater even now than when I was in Cairo before the current mess in Yemen--is to conclude without our friends that Nasser is a lost cause and throw in the sponge on trying to deal with him. But the question to answer is whether the President's interests will be better served by an open showdown or by trying to find some basis for cooperation. We will be looking at this in greater detail in the next few weeks, decision-by-decision, but my own conclusion--even after extensive talks in Cairo, Saudi Arabia, Aden, Jordan, Israel, and London--is that we can't afford to give up on the UAR. So in my book, working out a scenario for putting our relations with Nasser back in perspective is the first item on our agenda. Wheat is a dead issue for the moment now that Nasser has withdrawn his request, and we couldn't do much anyway in the wake of his recent speeches and humiliation of our people in Yemen. But there are other less conspicuous ways for us to be economically helpful. The main problem, however, is to break down the web of suspicion in Cairo that we are actively working to unseat Nasser's regime. In the end, this can only be done at the top political levels--and even then success isn't assured. The second problem is whether we stand by and allow a pro-Nasser element to take over in South Arabia and Aden as the British pull out. Even the British in Aden and London, I found, are not optimistic about their ability to avoid chaos. This is one of the most emotion-charged issues in the Labour Party and Parliament, and the Wilson government is determined to pull out on schedule. However, it has shown new flexibility in the last few weeks, and the President may want to press Wilson to stick with it during their talk next month. Our NSC meeting on 24 May will deal with this problem in more detail. Hal
Following the outbreak of the Six-Day War on June 5, 1967, all Arab states officially embargoed oil shipments bound for the United States, the United Kingdom, and West Germany. For documentation on the embargo, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XXXIV, Documents 228ff. For documentation relating to the Six-Day War, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XIX.
22. Report Prepared by the Special State-Defense Study Group/1/ Washington, undated. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 72 A 2468, Middle East 319.2, 17 July 67. Secret. A stamped notation on the report indicates it was received in the Office of the Secretary of Defense on July 17 at 12:49 p.m. Attached to the memorandum is a July 17 transmittal memorandum from Ambassador Holmes to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs explaining that the report consists of an examination of U.S. national interests and develops a series of interlocking strategies and recommended policy initiatives which, if undertaken, should help to relieve many of the existing U.S. difficulties in the Middle East. Holmes noted that, taken together, these strategies and policy initiatives could serve as a sound doctrinal foundation for U.S. actions. NEAR EAST, NORTH AFRICA AND THE HORN OF AFRICA: Introduction In late March 1967, the Special State-Defense Study Group undertook a study to develop perspectives on how best the United States could promote its long term national interests in the region encompassing the Near East, North Africa and the Horn of Africa./2/ The study group operated under the auspices of a Senior Policy Group consisting of the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. The content of this report represents the views of the study group and not necessarily those of the Senior Policy Group. Participating members of the study group were: /2/For purposes of this study regional groupings are defined as: Near East--United Arab Republic, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, the Persian Gulf States, Muscat and Oman, and the South Arabian States. North Africa--Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya. Horn of Africa--Sudan, Ethiopia, French Somaliland, and Somalia. Middle East--The area encompassing all of the above. (See Map, p. iv) [Footnote in the source text; the map is not reproduced.] Ambassador Julius C. Holmes, Study Director As originally conceived, the study was to consist of an analysis in depth of U.S. interests and policy objectives as they interact with the interests of other powers and with the evolution of forces and trends within the area. The purpose was to provide policy makers with doctrinal guidance that would be relevant to U.S. policy toward the area for the period 1967-1972. The Middle East crisis of May 1967, culminating in Arab-Israeli hostilities on 5 June, so profoundly affected the regional situation as to cause a reconsideration of the continuing validity of the original study concept. It was determined that certain primal elements within the study area would continue to dictate the broad pattern of events and that a regional study covering the longer term would still be of value. On that basis, the study group was directed to continue, integrating into its efforts as much of the post-hostilities situation as could be discerned. The scope of the study effort was foreshortened and the focus shifted toward the development of a U.S. strategy for the five year period. The immediate problems of a post-war settlement are not addressed except as necessary to develop a longer range perspective. It is recognized that resumption of large-scale Arab vs. Israeli hostilities would once again change drastically the factors on which this study is based, although as previously suggested, the significance of the residual factors is apt to remain high. The study group has proceeded on the assumption that such a war will not again occur within the five year period. Evidence is far from conclusive at this early stage and the possibility of Soviet cooperation in achieving a basic settlement of area problems appears remote, but there are elements in the situation which support this assumption. The study group believes that the general policy and specific initiatives recommended in the study would remain valid even in the event of renewed hostilities. Furthermore, they should help to delay or possibly prevent large-scale fighting. Within this framework, the study offers an appraisal of the basic forces and problems of the Near East, North Africa and Horn of Africa and their impact on U.S. national interests. It proposes long term U.S. policy objectives, outlines a strategy for the U.S. over the next five years and recommends a series of policy initiatives to promote attainment of the objectives. Abstract At mid-summer 1967 the Arab-Israel problem is at center stage in the triangle of counties covered by this study. However, narrow attention to the recent war and its aftermath can cloud evaluation of how forces in the area interact with U.S. and USSR global interests. It is abundantly clear that the USSR has a firm policy to achieve dominant influence in the eastern and southern Mediterranean basin. It is equally clear that the Arabs are as emotionally committed to destruction of Israel as were their ancestors to elimination of the Christian Kingdom of Jerusalem. The Soviets use Arab hatred of Israel to advance their interests and the Arabs use the Soviet presence and assistance to further their objective. The result is a situation which is damaging and dangerous for United States interests. These interests relate to the security and orientation of Western Europe which are of primary importance for the United States. In recent years the USSR has masked its direct threat to Europe by proclaiming a desire for detente but has continued that threat indirectly by its thrust into the Mediterranean. The Soviet Union has turned the area into a field of competition beyond which lie the ultimate targets of Europe and the worldwide position of the United States. U.S. National Interests U.S. interests in the study area are: --to prevent the Soviet Union or other hostile states from securing a predominant position. --to establish a basic compatibility between the West and the forces of political, social and economic modernization in the region and to prevent their falling under Soviet control. --to maintain the means of strategic access, particularly through the Mediterranean, that are required if Western strength is to be brought to bear in the Northern Tier of Greece, Turkey and Iran; and to hinder Soviet access to the region by strengthening the Northern Tier countries themselves. --to continue the use of U.S. military operational and strategic intelligence facilities insofar as they are needed to fulfill area and global needs. However, conditions could occur in which the presence of these facilities might imperil the political existence of host governments. In such cases, our use of the facilities will become less important than continuation of moderate Western-oriented regimes. --to preserve free world access to area oil supplies on acceptable terms. Although the U.S. is not itself dependent on this oil for its economic viability, Western Europe and Japan would face sharp economic dislocation, at least in the near term, if Middle Eastern oil were cut off. --to protect U.S. private investments and insure reasonable access to markets for U.S. commerce, both of which equate primarily to oil activities. In combination, net return from oil in the Arab countries and other trade with them contributes about one billion dollars annually toward the U.S. balance of payments. Additionally, U.S. interests are involved in the critical dependence of the U.K.'s world financial position on oil revenues and Britain's ability to purchase its petroleum needs for sterling. --to preserve the independence of Israel, as dictated by the broad sentiments of the American people. Soviet Activities In the study area, the Soviet Union pursues its indirect attack on Europe by using all means to eliminate Western, mainly U.S., influence; to disrupt NATO, CENTO and bilateral Western security ties in the area; and to obtain comparable positions of political, military and economic influence for itself. Its few direct material interests in the region are subordinate to these broad strategic goals. It is principally limited by the concern that local conflicts do not lead to direct U.S.-USSR hostilities and that Communist China does not gain from these situations. It profits from and fosters friction between Western-oriented and other states. It desires the continuation of Arab hostility to Israel since, by siding with the Arabs, it can count on long-term gains. It supports the radical Arab states, primarily the UAR, Algeria and Syria. At the same time it is opportunistic, ready to develop closer relations with any area state regardless of its political orientation and willing to take advantage of Western failures to give requested assistance. This is particularly true in the supply of arms, which the USSR does liberally, with great flexibility and success. It shows no concern for the destabilizing effects of weapons shipments and no interest in formal arms control arrangements. A change in this pattern of Soviet activity is not to be expected during the five-year period of this study. Certain trends in the area favor these Soviet tactics. The USSR is a relative newcomer to the region, not hampered by previous ties. It benefits from popular opposition to real or fancied Western "imperialism." It is favored by the continued domestic political flux in much of the study area and the anti-Westernism of increasingly more vocal and dissatisfied social elements. Favorable Factors There are also many factors which work in favor of the U.S. As the USSR becomes more firmly tied to certain policies, regimes and leaders, it will lose flexibility of response. It will face growing problems of conflicting interests among countries which it supports. Most importantly, its attempts to dominate the region will conflict increasingly with popular aspirations of independence, nationalism and Arabism. The U.S. and the West have solidly based ties of friendship and mutual interest with many of the area countries, particularly the Northern Tier. There is a reservoir of strength in the large numbers of persons throughout the area who have been trained in Western concepts. There are ties with the West of mutual economic interest, embodied in private commercial and oil enterprises and in the availability of vast amounts of capital and expertise for development. Strategy for the United States The following strategy for the U.S. is designed to blunt the Soviet drive and to capitalize on those forces which favor our interests. Central to this strategy is the conviction that any diminution of Soviet influence, even if initially favorable only to Western European nations, will ultimately benefit the U.S. The interlocking principles of this strategy are: --Safeguard the southern flank of Europe through diversification of Western involvement. Since World War II, the U.S. has often had to deal with problems in the study area virtually unaided and at considerable cost. There are major Western European interests remaining in the region; but our European allies have been unwilling fully to recognize this and to assume their share of the burden. Europe is a natural source of influence in the region. Consequently, the U.S. should press for greater unilateral and multilateral involvement of Western Europe, commensurate with its interests. France should play a stronger role, particularly in North Africa. DeGaulle's present position is not promising for the type of coordinated activity foreseen. However, the study group believes that French national interests will increasingly impel it in this direction, even though it may only be after DeGaulle that France again fully recognizes the extent to which its own interests and those of the U.S. are commingled both in Europe and the study area. The greater involvement of other powers in the region will also lessen the present tendency toward unstable bipolarization and a direct U.S.-USSR confrontation. --Strengthen the blocking power of the Northern Tier of Greece, Turkey and Iran. These states are of priority interest to the Soviets because of their Western security orientation and their geographic position. A secure Mediterranean remains the vital link between these countries and the Western alliance. There are serious doubts in the minds of Turkish, Iranian and Greek leaders concerning the likely responsiveness of the U.S. and most of the NATO community to Soviet challenges. Therefore the highest importance must be placed on strengthening U.S. and European ties with the Northern Tier. U.S. support for Turkey and Iran should emphasize more competitive U.S. terms for both economic and military assistance to counter Soviet efforts. Turkey and Iran also should be encouraged to play more influential roles in neighboring Arab states. --Lessen the public U.S. role in Arab-Israeli relations. U.S. interest in the security of Israel is at variance with other U.S. interests in the Near East, where the drawbacks of our association with Israel outweigh any advantages it could bring us. Nonetheless, the sentiment of the American people and government is such that in time of crisis the U.S. will support Israel. The U.S. should adopt a less obvious and direct role in Arab-Israel affairs to ease the impact on daily U.S.-Arab relations and reduce the extent to which the USSR profits. To avoid untenable positions, we should not in the future give broad assurances of concern for the territorial integrity and political independence of all area states. --Seek to rebuild U.S. relations with the Arab states, concentrating on the moderates. Reality compels us to build on those positions of strength we now have in states which are in various degrees fearful of and opposed to Egyptian imperialism. We will have to be more forthcoming materially and politically than in the past, but should avoid additional security assurances which harness us to particular leaders. Although we will be accused of siding with conservative monarchs, the distinction between so-called "revolutionary" and "evolutionary" routes to modernization is largely theoretical and need not disturb us. We must, however, press our friends toward modernization and political reform as being in their own interest. Prospects for the early establishment of harmonious U.S.-UAR relations are exceedingly slim. The U.S. cannot accept Egyptian efforts to resolve the Palestine question through force, eliminate Western presence or influence in the Middle East, or topple moderate Arab leaders. The foundations for long term U.S.-UAR cooperation can be laid only when Cairo signifies its willingness to develop communities of interest based on mutual trust and respect. Meanwhile, Western European nations should be encouraged to exercise whatever means they can to maintain the Western position in the UAR, and the U.S. should endeavor to keep the door open for development of mutual interests whenever this can be done with dignity. Comparable difficulties exist with Algeria. For the next few years, the principal expression of U.S. concern for Egypt and Algeria may have to emanate from private institutions. --Center primary U.S. interest in the Horn of Africa on Ethiopia. Our overriding concern has been the retention of the Kagnew Station facility. We have, however, developed more lasting assets among the modern element--particularly the military--which will constitute the important power center in the post-Selassie period. We should anticipate future developments by the gradual removal from Kagnew of activities that can be carried on elsewhere and plan for eventual total relocation when possible or necessary. Although withdrawal from Kagnew will reduce Ethiopian leverage for obtaining arms from us, we should continue to meet reasonable requests for military assistance. We should couple this assistance with pressure for Ethiopian armed forces reorganization as well as social and economic reforms. Somalia and the Sudan are of secondary importance. We should try to maintain some position of influence in both countries to protect our regional interest in Ethiopia. For the same reason, we should encourage the French to remain in French Somaliland or, upon decolonization, to maintain a significant base and provide a territorial guarantee. --Seek an improved U.S. military ability to operate in the area, consistent with political realities. The ability of the U.S. to support its interest or commitments in the area with military power involves complex political problems ranging from overflight and access rights to over-identification of U.S. power with specific nations in the region. Consideration of the possible employment of U.S. military forces has been conditioned by so many interacting and conflicting political factors that the credibility of U.S. commitments and extent of U.S. will to use military means are suspect by both friends and potential foes. To meet these difficulties in the Red Sea-Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf region, we should establish an "on call" military capability and regularly exercise it into the area. Politically secure bases in the British Indian Ocean Territories and alternate air access routes should be sought. To avoid U.S. over-commitment, planning for protection of U.S. and Western European interests should be multinational. In those area countries where we have a permanent military presence, we should strive for a low visibility to minimize problems for host governments. --Supply conventional arms pragmatically and flexibly to promote U.S. national interests, tempered by certain restraining guidelines. The supply and acquisition of arms are functions of the political context in which they occur. They are reflections of political events rather than primary causes of tension. Limitation efforts have little chance of success unless potential suppliers believe they would enhance their interests. Furthermore, states tend to measure the degree of their supporters' concern by their willingness to fulfill requests for arms. The USSR has continuously used the provision of weapons as the chief tool for promoting its political advantage in the area and is expected to continue to do so. It has no desire to enter limitation agreements. Since this is the case, we cannot unilaterally renounce the supply of arms as a tool for promotion of our interests. We desire certain states to be able to defend themselves. Additionally, furnishing weapons is a partial quid pro quo for our use of needed special facilities. For these additional reasons we should continue to supply arms on a pragmatic and flexible basis. Gradual increases in arms levels are to be expected until the evolution of events shows the USSR that its gains through an open arms policy are ephemeral. Although this is not apt to occur in the next five years, we should be alert for this eventuality and seize appropriate opportunities to probe Soviet receptivity to limitation agreements; should generally not supply any party to a dispute with a more sophisticated capability than is available to the other side; should where possible divert arms requests to other Western suppliers; and should seek a coordinated position among all Western suppliers. --Dissuade Israel and the Arabs from acquisition of nuclear weapons and strategic missiles and press for acceptance of international safeguards. The Arabs have no discernible prospects for developing nuclear weapons. They are not likely to receive meaningful assistance in this field from the USSR nor to jeopardize the further receipt of Soviet economic aid by accepting such help from Communist China so long as Israel does not have a nuclear capability. Israel, on the other hand, has the ability on its own to develop nuclear weapons in the relatively near future. Similarly, while the Arabs are not apt soon to obtain operational strategic missiles, Israel may receive such missiles under a contract with the French in the next two years. Forestalling Israeli acquisition of either nuclear weapons or missiles is of critical importance for area stability. Since Israel may develop the nuclear option for fear that its qualitative superiority in conventional arms will ultimately vanish, U.S. strategy should be composed ideally of two interlocking elements: the use of all possible means of pressure to induce Israel to accept suitable international safeguards on its nuclear activities and to delay indefinitely receipt of missiles; and, if needed as a bargaining tactic, the formal but secret guarantee by the U.S. to maintain Israel's qualitative superiority in conventional arms, from western European sources if possible, otherwise from the U.S. --Apply new techniques in the technical assistance field and encourage regional economic development. The drive for modernization is a fundamental phenomenon in the region. However, most study area states have expanding economic development needs which severely tax their modest capabilities in the public service, planning, financial and marketing fields. Their problems are compounded by multiplying populations and, for most, insufficient capital. It is important to the U.S. that the Soviet Union not be the uncontested supplier of these needs. The declining level of U.S. funds available for foreign development assist- ance limits the financial burden we can assume. However, there are specific inexpensive techniques which should be adopted for providing U.S. technical assistance and for assuring for the U.S. a role in modernization efforts. Although local political considerations frequently outweigh rational economic arguments for regional cooperative efforts, we should also seek to develop plans and projects that promise benefits on a regional basis, particularly those that spring from application of modern technological concepts. Policy Initiatives This study recommends thirty-seven specific policy initiatives for implementation of the proposed strategy. They vary in difficulty of application. However, it is envisaged that the full gamut of resources available to the United States would be used as appropriate to develop these initiatives, including bilateral and multilateral governmental discussions; political action programs; USIA activities; facilities of the U.N., IMF, IBRD and other public international agencies; and encouragement of the efforts of private organizations. These policy initiatives are, in summary: --Mediterranean Region: initiate discussions to focus the attention of Western European nations, particularly France, on their own security interests and the need to take greater responsibility; urge them to strengthen ties with radical states where the U.S. has little influence; promote combined NATO military planning for contingencies in the study area; create a small permanent NATO Mediterranean naval force. --Northern Tier: designate Turkey and Iran as countries for concentrated U.S. military and economic support; provide comparable aid to Greece; provide additional incentives for U.S. private investment and trade in Turkey and Iran; press the NATO countries to share in providing military assistance to Turkey; conduct low-level NATO naval exercises off the Turkish Black Sea littoral; preempt further Soviet arms sales to Iran; encourage greater Turkish and Iranian roles in neighboring Arab states. --North Africa: urge greater Western European, particularly French, involvement in economic development; press France to give greater military assistance to Algeria, reinstitute its military aid programs in Morocco and Tunisia, and play an active role in settling border disputes between Algeria and its neighbors. --Eastern Arab states and Israel: reduce U.S. prominence in Arab-Israel affairs, avoiding public unilateral initiatives while striving to perform an indirect conciliatory role; concentrate on support for multilateral solutions to the refugee problem; avoid any further broad assurances for the territorial integrity and political independence of all area states; insure that Israeli qualitative conventional arms superiority over potential Arab opponents is maintained; seek Israeli acceptance of international supervision of its nuclear activities, secretly guaranteeing its conventional arms superiority as a bargaining tactic if all other pressure fails; strengthen U.S. support of the conservative states; maintain a reserved official posture toward radical states, working through private U.S. institutions to cultivate mutual interests in non-controversial fields; assist the British to remain in the Persian Gulf and encourage Saudi Arabia to assume greater responsibility there; seek normal diplomatic relations with whatever regime arises in South Arabia and take no initiatives with respect to Yemen. --Horn of Africa: begin gradual reduction of U.S. presence at Kagnew Station; promise needed military assistance to Ethiopia, while pressing for the reorganization of the armed forces and social and economic reforms; in Somalia, continue a low level of development activities and police training; encourage France to remain in French Somaliland and to link ultimate departure to retention of a French base and security guarantee for the new state. --General Military Actions: create a modest multinational Indian Ocean naval force; establish an "on call" military capability, with forces ranging from the U.S. component of the multinational naval force to elements of the strategic reserve, supported by the C5A aircraft/Fast Deployment Logistic ship mix; regularly exercise "on call" forces into the Red Sea-Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf region; establish U.S.-U.K. facilities at Aldabra and Diego Garcia at an early date; plan alternate air access routes to the Near East; develop contingency alternatives for Kagnew Station and Wheelus AFB. --Technical Assistance: supply some AID financing for broadened activities of U.S. management firms; assign Technology Advisers to U.S. Embassies where we no longer have AID programs; subsidize salaries to facilitate employment by area governments of U.S. technicians and advisers; detail U.S. government experts to governments in the study area; encourage regional cooperation for application of new technological concepts for development. [Here follows the body of the report in 5 chapters constituting the remainder of Volume I and Volume II, consisting of 6 annexes.]
23. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/ Washington, August 9, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Saunders Files, Middle East Water. Confidential. SUBJECT To supplement my earlier memo on USG water planning,/2/ here is a clearer picture of what the World Bank is doing as a result of Mac Bundy's request. /2/Not printed. As background, it's useful to know that the Bank decided back in February to create a new Middle East and North Africa Department. Heretofore, the Middle East had been tacked on either to South Asia or to Europe. The Bank decided that if it were to give full attention to the Middle East's own regional prospects, it would have to get the area off by itself. Fortuitously, this department began operation on June 1st. Mac's approach came just at a time when they were beginning basic studies for their own purposes. To insure the most comprehensive planning possible, they've set up a special task force within the new department to concentrate on planning in the area from the Suez Canal through Iraq. They have made water their first priority with primary concentration on the Jordan Valley and secondary focus on the Sinai and Mesopotamia. They also hope to have preliminary views by mid-September on the role which desalting might play. Beyond their work on water, they will also be looking at prospects for industrialization, tourism, and natural resource exploitation. We've made our data available to the Bank, and it will probably turn to other governments later for similar support. Comment: While these studies will proceed at the usual measured Bank pace, Michael Lejeune, who heads this department, does appreciate their potential relationship to political settlement. My own feeling on this count is that what we really need, if politics requires, is enough staff work so that we could mention some of these plans in a speech and be certain that we were not completely off base. I don't feel that completed staff work is essential for this purpose. In any case, we probably can't expect the staffers to come up with finished plans in the political vacuum that exists today. On a related front, Dave Bell is in touch with the Bank to avoid overlap, and Ford is just getting its thoughts in order for a couple of projects to be done by Brookings and by Rand. I do not have the details on these yet./3/ /3/A handwritten notation on the memorandum reads: "HS--You are correct. Concentrate on that. WR" Hal
24. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, August 16, 1967. /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/NE (Critchfield) Files: Job 80-00205A, Box 5, IRG/NEA Working File, Near East, North Africa & Horn of Africa. Secret. SUBJECT 1. There was really no discussion of the Holmes Study/2/ as such; several central related issues were raised and debated for almost two hours. /2/Document 22. 2. Stuart Rockwell, the action officer on the IRG/NEA effort which parallels the Holmes Study, reported that a group centered in EUR and INR (Tom Hughes) thought the Soviet threat was overdrawn and the need for action less urgent than described in the Study. 3. Harold Saunders (White House) observed that the policy initiatives are the same tired old programs with which Congress is disenchanted. Additionally, he posed the following questions: a. Is the Middle East-North Africa an area of real significance to the United States? b. Even if the Soviet threat to the Middle East-North Africa is as described, would Soviet domination of this area really threaten our interests in Europe? c. Is it useful to consider policy initiatives that obviously are unsupported by Congress and are outside of our available resources and capabilities? 4. Assistant Secretary Battle held firmly to the view that the Holmes Study Group properly did not include the U.S. domestic political climate and the availability of resources in their consideration. At the same time, he said, it would be unrealistic to proceed very far with the Holmes proposals without obtaining broad policy guidance from the President on the proposed strategy. The alternative to the Holmes proposal, he thought, was a policy of disengagement and isolationism. 5. I briefly traced the history of the debate over the past decade on Soviet intentions and capabilities in the Middle East and noted the relevance of NIE 10-2/65 and more recent estimates on the Mediterranean, the Horn of Africa and the Near East. 6. Saunders' persistent effort to dismiss the Holmes policy initiatives as "old, tired and ineffectual measures" was vigorously met by State and Defense with the assertion that a thorough and responsible review had simply reaffirmed the efficacy of some of the old and tested instruments. Saunders was supported by Battle on the point that our existing arms sales and military aid policies were in serious trouble; that here a new approach was needed. Battle proposed that the IRG/NEA place this problem on its agenda for an early meeting. 7. Finally, there was much discussion of Western European interests in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Saunders argued that if the Soviet activities in the area were, as alleged, a threat to Europe, the Europeans had demonstrated remarkably little interest; thus, either the Europeans or the Study Group members were wrong. The dominant view expressed was that the U.S. relationship with most Western European nations in Africa and the Middle East had been partly competitive and that the role of the UK and U.S. as police of the Middle East and defenders of Western interests against Soviet aggression had long been taken for granted by Western Europe. I argued that the U.S. had hardly paid lip service to any policy of encouraging the Western Europeans to play a greater role in the area; in isolated instances when the United States Government had gotten into trouble, it had shown an interest, ad hoc, in increasing the consultation and cooperation with specific European countries on the problem at hand. There was full agreement that, regardless of the cause, Europe appears reluctant to play a military-political role in the Middle East. James H. Critchfield/3/ /3/Printed from a copy that indicates Critchfield signed the original.
Washington, September 14, 1967. /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/NE (Critchfield) Files: Job 80-00205A, Box 6, Soviet Presence in ME; Events Surrounding 1967 ME War. Secret. Drafted by Staff Director Arthur A. Hartman on September 18. SENIOR INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP Record of Discussion and Agreement of 21st Meeting PRESENT Under Secretary of State, Chairman Mr. Battle--NEA [Here follows discussion of administrative matters.] C. Holmes' Study Chairman thanked Ambassador Holmes and his group for work they have done in preparing this useful input into general USG consideration of policies and actions in Middle East over coming years. He asked that this discussion concentrate on Soviet threat aspect and Ambassador Holmes' projected consultation in NAC. Chairman mentioned that instructions to Ambassador Holmes for his NAC consultation were circulated to SIG members for information and that State would clear these in normal course. IRG/EUR will undertake to coordinate the "sanitized" version of Holmes' Report which would be authorized for circulation to other NATO partners. Ambassador Holmes presented his report and rather than repeating contents of report, concentrated on answering comments and criticisms he had received. He emphasized that the report had started out in March to estimate the situation in the area and particularly Soviet activity but that the emphasis of the report had changed after the outbreak of hostilities in June. He wanted to stress that the report had not intended to conclude that the sole or main aim of Soviet policy was to out-flank NATO. Rather, it was the intention of the drafters to indicate that Soviet activity in the Middle East was an expression of historic Soviet policy--an attempt to break out to warm water ports. He recalled that this had been Soviet aim at Potsdam and in later confrontations. He said that there had been Soviet gains since 1955 when the first Czech arms deal was announced, mentioning latest evidence in shipment of 400 tanks and 120 aircraft to Algeria. The report, he said, makes no claim to correlate the decline in Western influence with the increase in Soviet activity. They see no Soviet blueprint for what has happened in the area, but rather the Soviet Union has set out to move in where it could, and it has had some successes. He said that while the study may have over-emphasized Soviet ability to achieve dominance, they had pointed out certain blocks to Soviet activity in the form of radical nationalism and moderate leadership. He felt that they could not deal with all aspects of the problem and suggested that more work could usefully be done on trends in the area. He ended his presentation by saying he felt it was important for US to take whatever actions necessary to blunt Soviet penetration and that it is prudent to regard the threat as of maximum potential in deciding what actions might be taken. He hoped that out of consideration of this report and further activity would come agreement on a set of objectives--a strategy (quite separate from any initiatives) that would be a guide and doctrine, particularly for our overseas posts. Various members of the SIG made the following suggestions and comments, as of use to Ambassador Holmes in his consultations in NATO and as guidelines for future study within the Government: 1. Without appearing to over-emphasize likelihood US might in calm way suggest that NATO military authorities take a look at the implication for NATO of possibility Soviets might at some future date put forces in study area. Thought was expressed that Soviets might have come close to this in Syria in June. 2. In attempting to convince Europeans of importance Soviet activity, analysis should be more along lines Ambassador Holmes' oral presentation to SIG, in sense that it recognizes this is not just Soviet-Western clash in area, but that indigenous political forces play major role. In fact, these forces call in Soviets and encourage East-West competition as way of establishing their own independence. Our emphasis should be more on supporting the moderate, independent forces, rather than just obtaining influence. 3. We should examine the role of propaganda in recent Middle East Crisis and consider further what we and NATO countries can do in future to improve and coordinate our propaganda. (USIA has recently prepared a report on this which might be useful to Ambassador Holmes and Ambassador Cleveland.) 4. Although Holmes' Report indicates it unlikely Soviets will want bases in area, fact is Soviets have had operational access to facilities in area and intelligence community might wish to evaluate this access as a factual input into NATO study. Also use of Soviet instructors. 5. We also might prepare as much information as possible on the Soviet role in triggering recent events for discussion with our NATO allies. In addition, SIG members agreed study should continue on various gaps noted in the report and on the initiatives suggested. The Chairman directed the IRG/NEA in coordination with IRG/AF, to prepare an analysis on the trends in the area which would give a better view of what obstacles there might be to Soviet action in terms of indigenous activity by radical nationalists or moderates. (This report should be completed by November 1 and a SIG meeting scheduled to discuss it.) He also directed the IRG/NEA and IRG/AF to canvass immediate actions which we might be able to initiate in the study area even with present limited resources. (This should be completed by November 1.) Three other actions were requested: 1. A policy should be developed by IRG/NEA in cooperation with IRG/AF which provides guidance for our future arms transfers to the area and puts in some framework the recent requests for arms shipments and our proposed responses. (This should be completed by October 15.) 2. We should have a better assessment of our oil interests by the IRG/NEA in cooperation with the IRG/AF and whether or not the threat to these interests can be minimized. (This should be completed by November 15.) 3. We ought to have a better study of Soviet capabilities (political, military and economic) by the intelligence community--including the amount of resources the Soviet Union might be likely to devote to the area. This should be compared with the on-going costs in external resources needed by such major countries in the area as the UAR and Algeria. (This should be done by October 1.) It was agreed that there should be further discussions in the SIG on these subjects and that sometime in the near future it might be useful to schedule an NSC meeting or meetings for the purpose of airing these issues. I will send separate individual action memos based on the above. AA Hartman [Continue with the next documents] Volume XXI Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |