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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XXI Near East Region Department of State |
 1. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon/1/ Washington, January 6, 1964, 6:20 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 UAR. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Slator C. Blackiston, Jr., (NEA/NE); cleared by Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs Rodger P. Davies, in substance by Chief of the Fuels and Energy Division Andrew F. Ensor of the Office of International Resources, and Officer in Charge of Lebanon-Israel Affairs H. Earle Russell, Jr.; and approved by Jernegan. Repeated to Cairo. 616. Embtel 611./2/ Cairo Summit./3/ /2/In telegram 611 from Beirut, January 6, Ambassador Meyer stated that in his talk with President Chebab regarding the forthcoming Cairo summit conference, he would like to be able to say that while cutting off Arab oil would create problems for the West, it would by no means be fatal. (Ibid.) /3/The heads of state of 13 Arab nations met in Cairo, January 13-17. The conference reached agreement on a three-part program of action: 1) a joint Arab project to divert large quantities of water from the headwaters of the Jordan River; 2) establishment of a unified Arab Military Command under Egyptian leadership; and 3) creation of a "Palestine entity" that would represent Palestinians in the Arab League. In your discussion with President Chehab you should be cautious re effect on West of cutting off of Arab oil./4/ Begin FYI: US/UK oil talks held in Washington last June/5/ concluded: (1) In event of a transit crisis, involving the denial of the Suez Canal and Middle East pipelines, by bringing into service available surplus of tankers and after establishment of new pattern of supply it should be possible to meet OECD Europe's full normal demand by end of three months. However during period of supply readjustment, in first 90 days of such emergency, a shortfall of about 7-1/2 percent of normal supply would result in OECD Europe which probably could be accommodated by stock run down of about seven days. Supply to all other Free World areas would continue to be fully maintained. /4/For documents relating to U.S. international oil policy, see Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XXXIV, Documents 175ff. /5/For the conclusions of the U.S.-U.K. oil talks in Washington, June 10-14, 1963, see ibid., 1961-1963, vol. XVIII, Document 291. (2) In event total denial of Middle East oil (definition Middle East includes Iran but excludes Libya) and no increases in production from OPEC countries outside Middle East, the Eastern hemisphere as a whole could be satisfied only to the extent of approximately one-half of normal demand. Further alleviation of Eastern hemisphere shortfall could be accomplished by rationing of supply in Western hemisphere countries. (In point of fact we think it highly unlikely that Iran and Venezuela would join Arab producers in cutting off oil to West over what is in essence Arab-Israel issue.) End FYI. Suggest you develop presentation along following lines. Aside from disruptions in economies of Near East producing countries as result oil cut off there would be serious though not insurmountable problems facing countries of Western Europe. US of course has sufficient capacity meet own needs and US and other countries outside NE would be in position provide relief Western Europe in emergency. However, ultimate result cut off would be force major consuming countries band together for own protection against NE producing countries and greatly stimulate development alternative energy sources i.e. atomic power, European gas, coal, tar sands, shale; all of which have promising future depending upon economics of situation. Should Near East come to be considered unstable source of petroleum supply with perennial threat of cut off for political reasons, West would develop alternative sources irrespective of cost. Rusk
2. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/ Washington, February 14, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. I. Secret. Mac, Attached fascinating report (from a source reliable in the past) is one indication among many that Arabs sense a change in our ME policy./2/ Though largely the product of circumstance (JFK's assassination, Jordan Waters crisis), it comes out as LBJ being pro-Israeli and reversing the three years of skillful Kennedy handling of the Arabs. It's around here too; Joe Kraft and Rollie Evans both mentioned it to me--and I most stoutly denied. /2/Reference is to TDCS 3/572, 910, February 12, from Cairo; not attached. Somehow LBJ has gotten wind of this. He was strong against saying too much in Weizmann speech;/3/ more recently he chided Harriman for getting him in trouble with the Arabs. /3/Regarding the President's speech at the Weizmann Institute of Science on February 20, see footnote 3, Document 13 in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. XVIII. But more is needed. I'm putting together with State a program of steps needed to protect our Arab policy through 1964, and to balance the things we'll do for Israel: (1) a loan to the UAR under certain conditions, (2) reassurance we're not helping Israel go nuclear; (3) LBJ letter to Nasser, etc. (4) Hussein visit; (5) another quiet try at arms control with Gamal. We've worked hard under JFK to come up with a promising NE policy; it worked--in Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and at Cairo Conference. We can't let it slide away by inaction--and I don't think LBJ would want this, because among other things it would create painful problems for us in the area (which with luck and suppleness we can avoid)./4/ /4/A notation in Bundy's handwriting reads: "Good, Do it--and let's get LBJ Nasser letter ready to go with Eshkol answer." For documentation regarding the actions Komer proposed, see ibid. Bob K.
3. Background Paper Prepared in the Department of State/1/ CWM-B/10 Washington, April 6, 1964. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, 12th CENTO Ministerial Council Session, April 28-29, 1964. Confidential. Drafted by Lee F. Dinsmore of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs; cleared by Davies, Jernegan, Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Regional Affairs John P. Walsh, and NEA/NR Officer in Charge of CENTO Affairs Matthew D. Smith, Jr. TWELFTH CENTO MINISTERIAL COUNCIL SESSION/2/ Washington, April 28-29, 1964 Background Paper The Situation in the Middle East /2/The Twelfth Session of the Ministerial Council of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) was held in Washington April 28-29. The session was attended by Foreign Minister Abbas Aram of Iran, Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan, Foreign Minister Feridum Camal Erkin of Turkey, Foreign Secretary R.A. Butler of the United Kingdom, and Secretary of State Rusk. For text of the communiqu, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 683-685. For documentation relating to the session, see Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, 12th CENTO Ministerial Council Session, April 28-29, 1964, and Department of State, NEA/RA Files: Lot 75 D 312, CENTO Ministerial Files, 1962-1968, 12th CENTO Ministerial Council Session, Washington, D.C., April 28-29, 1964. General Developments After a year of readjustment and realignment among the Arab States a "Summit" meeting in Cairo in January 1964 called by President Nasser created a stronger sense of unity among the Arabs than had earlier and more formal attempts to attach and join states in legal but unhappy union. In Iraq a Ba'th dominated government came in February and went in November of the same year. The Ba'th Party (pan Arab socialists) has held on in Syria only by packing the Syrian army with its adherents. Yemen is still a sensitive problem, with the strength of UAR troops in the country apparently about the same as a year ago. However, the Arab Summit sparked a series of contacts between the Governments of the UAR and Saudi Arabia, and there now seems to be a disposition on the part of the states concerned to settle the dispute over Yemen. Yemen itself will have to endure a drawn out period of organization, consolidation and adjustment. Meanwhile, Israel's forthcoming off-take of Jordan River waters from Lake Tiberias looms as possibly the most acute source of tension in the area. United States Policy in the Near East Political instability has been endemic in the Near East for the past several decades. Despite this, there has been considerable economic and social development which gives promise of providing a basis for greater political stability. The United States attempts to conduct its relations with states of the area on a strictly bilateral basis and to avoid being drawn into disputes either in an inter-Arab or an Arab state-Israeli context, except where vital United States interests are affected. The United States is equally interested in the integrity and well-being of all states of the area. It has no "chosen instrument" in its dealings with Near Eastern states; its aid programs, if examined on a per capita basis, have been remarkably evenhanded. The United States economic assistance and other programs are motivated by the belief that Free World interests will be served by economic, social, and political development of the peoples of the area. The United States believes that problems arising among the Arab states should be solved by those states without outside interference. Arab Unity and the CENTO Countries Just as the urge to unity is inherent in the Arab Islamic culture, so is the tradition and habit of strong individuality. Inevitably, the two drives clash. The ambitious plans of April 1963 for uniting the UAR, Syria, and Iraq were discarded as unworkable before September. Nevertheless, the January 1964 Arab Summit meeting brought Arab leaders back together long enough for them to remember their common heritage and to take new steps toward increased military, economic, and cultural consultation. Unity, in the strict sense of a single state made up of federated components, is unlikely in the foreseeable future. However the sense of unity, essentially a psychological phenomenon, was never stronger and cannot be ignored. Nevertheless, the United States believes that Arab unity does not pose a threat against CENTO states. It believes that the Arab states in considering the form of association they believe best for their interests should not be subjected to outside influences or pressures. The United States does not take a position for or against unity but would not favor any association brought about against the will of the majority of the peoples involved, brought about by force, or clearly directed against other states. The United States does not believe that, given geographic, organizational, and logistical considerations, a joint military command or other form of association of Arab military forces would appreciably affect the capabilities of these forces. Saudi Arabia and Jordan The United States has made clear its interests in the integrity of the kingdoms of Jordan and Saudi Arabia and has encouraged and contributed to the economic and social development of both countries. Jordan has made most satisfactory progress in the economic and social fields over the past several years and the United States believes that prospects for continued development and stability in this country are good. Jordan has recognized the USSR and the two countries are exchanging Embassies. The United States does not believe that this step will have any significant effect on its relations with Jordan nor that the present Government of Jordan intends to shift its international posture basically. In Saudi Arabia, Crown Prince Faysal has initiated a program of modernization, reform, and economic development which should in time serve to meet the aspiration of the Saudi people. The United States considers these programs to be the real first line of defense of these countries against subversive influence. A recent confrontation between Crown Prince Faysal, the effective ruler, and King Saud has resulted in Faysal's convincing the ailing and feeble King to relinquish all active leadership of government to Faysal. Kuwait In the past year Kuwait has consolidated its independence and has become a significant source of funds for Arab world economic developments. This use of its financial strength gives tiny Kuwait an opportunity to buy "integrity insurance." The comparatively vast resources of Kuwait as compared with its own needs also offer an Arab alternative to external sources of funding to support economic development. The extent to which Kuwait will be prepared to fund military equipment purchases by Arab states is not yet clear, but this eventuality cannot be overlooked. Yemen Despite agreement on July 4, 1963 between the UAR and Saudi Arabia to disengage from involvement in Yemen, UAR troops remain in large numbers (around 30,000), and Saudi Arabia, while stopping material aid to the royalists, is still giving moral encouragement and probably financial assistance. Nevertheless, the disengagement agreement has confined the conflict to within the borders of Yemen, has served to preserve and even strengthen the Saud regime, and has protected Free World interests in the Arabian Peninsula. Precipitate withdrawal of all Egyptian troops at this time would result in chaos in the country, and some form of outside security force will no doubt be required to keep peace in Yemen for years to come. Meanwhile the UAR-Saudi resumption of diplomatic relations on March 3, 1964 and a mutual announcement that neither had designs in Yemen are positive steps in the direction of some kind of a modus vivendi over Yemen. Yemen's economy is not in dire straits at the moment, but a certain amount of outside foreign assistance will be needed for any real economic development. Before this can be effective, however, Yemen needs a governmental mechanism which can make use of outside help. The Kurdish Situation (Noforn) After two and a half years of fighting, during which time the Kurds at their peak were able to engage regular units of the Iraq Army and defeat them and at their weakest were able to hold only the more inaccessible high country, the Government of Iraq and Iraqi Kurdish representatives agreed on February 10, 1964 to a cease fire. Unfortunately, a misunderstanding of the terms of that agreement seems already to have arisen, the government taking the position that it has complied with conditions agreed upon and the Kurds asserting bad faith on the government's part for not carrying out its bargain (the Kurds claim more concessions were made than the government is now ready to honor). Nevertheless, the government has been withdrawing Army units and equipment from the north, giving every indication it is not planning to make war any longer. There are reports of dissidence within Kurdish circles in Iraq, of a lack of cohesion between the tribal fighters and the Kurdish party's educated and more sophisticated cadre. The party militants are said to be threatening to resume the violence if the "autonomy" they fought for is not granted in sufficiently clear detail by the government. A final settlement is not yet clear nor is it in sight. Meanwhile, there are reports of arrests in Iranian Kurdish areas of persons believed to entertain similar Kurdish aspirations in Iran. These developments will bear close watching. The Kurdish nationalist fever is not new to Iran. The United States would regard Kurdish unrest in Iran, as it has in Iraq, as an internal problem.
4. National Intelligence Estimate/1/ NIE 36-64 Washington, April 8, 1964. /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on April 8. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, AEC, and NSA participated in its preparation. The State, Defense, AEC, and NSA representatives concurred; the FBI representative abstained, the subject being outside his jurisdiction. Paragraph references are to the Discussion portion of the estimate, not printed. MAIN TRENDS IN THE ARAB WORLD/2/ The Problem /2/This estimate does not cover Sudan and the Maghreb. [Footnote in the source text.] To estimate general trends in the Arab world over the next several years. Conclusions A. Political turmoil in the Arab world appears likely to continue for many years to come. The military have come to play an increasing role, but--except in Egypt--they have not proved to be a stabilizing factor. Iraq and Syria in particular are likely to remain highly unstable. The monarchies in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Libya will come under increasing revolutionary nationalist pressure, and one or more of them may be extinguished in the next several years. Nasser appears likely to remain the single most influential Arab leader. The noteworthy economic and social progress of the past ten years will continue, although, as in the past, it will be uneven and varied. (Paras. 3, 5, 8-10, 16-19) B. The emotional appeal of Arab unity will remain very strong, but in general the pan-Arab movement is likely to be confined to the kind of cooperation among independent countries that occurred at the Cairo summit meeting in January 1964. (Paras. 20-22) C. Arab attitudes toward Israel remain basically hostile, but a fair proportion of Arabs have gradually come privately and reluctantly to accept the fact that Israel will exist for many years to come. The Arab-Israeli arms race will cause tensions and could lead to limited or selective hostile action. Other danger points are the Jordan waters problem and the possibility of Israeli military action in the event of a radical political change in Jordan. Nevertheless, the general inhibitions on open warfare would be strong, and a serious rise in tensions could probably be contained by great power pressures. (Paras. 23-26, 29, 30) D. Arab relations with the West remain heavily influenced by hatred of "imperialism" and by Western support of Israel. The possibility of a sudden deterioration of Western relations with the Arabs over Israel is always present. The Arab nationalists generally will press for termination of Western base rights in the area. While they will also press for a greater share of oil revenues and a greater degree of participation in production, nationalization appears unlikely. (Paras. 31-33, 35) E. The Soviets probably believe that the tide is running against the West in the Arab world and that they can capitalize on the unsettled political situation and upon various tensions between the Arabs and West. If US-Arab relations should deteriorate sharply, there would probably be a noticeable strengthening of Soviet influence. We do not believe, however, that this would result in one-sided reliance on the Soviets or a more accommodating attitude toward local Communist parties. (Paras. 36-38) [Here follows the Discussion section of the estimate.]
5. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, September 10, 1964. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 NEAR E. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Officer in Charge of Arabian Peninsula Affairs George C. Moore. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Mr. John E. Killick, Counselor, British Embassy NE--Rodger P. Davies Mr. Davies opened the discussion by noting that our aim was to compare mutual assessments of the situation and to summarize the approaches of our two countries in order to lay the groundwork for subsequent higher level discussions. He stressed that both the U.S. and the U.K. had the same overall objectives in the Near East: we wished to prevent the U.A.R. from imposing itself on the area or from imposing a U.A.R.-dominated Arab solidarity. Where we differed was really only in methods of attaining these objectives. He would be less than frank if he did not admit that some courses of action proposed by London caused concern since they could only lead to a confrontation with the U.A.R. and Arab nationalism in situations where it is doubtful that the West had the capabilities to come out on top. Mr. Davies then spoke from the attached paper/2/ (a copy of which was subsequently given to the British participants) which gave working level views point-by-point on the British paper concerning the Middle East which had previously been provided. During this presentation the following additional comments were made. /2/Neither of the papers was attached. Concerning Libya, Mr. Killick summed up HMG's view that while the British might preserve certain overflight and landing rights in Libya as a result of the present discussions, they were under no illusion that these would last; realistically, they expected that Nasser would ultimately force them completely out. He agreed that, in the event of a republican coup in Libya, Libyan sentiment would be opposed to a U.A.R. takeover; it was questionable, however, if the Libyans would be sufficiently strong to prevent such a takeover. The British were in general agreement concerning our views on Jordan and noted that talks on Jordan's economy were again due in the coming few months. On Iraq, Mr. Killick commented that HMG feared Iraqi instability would be enhanced because the GOI lacked the governmental machinery to be able successfully to operate the socialized state which it appeared to be developing. He made no particular comments concerning the Gulf, Iran or the Omani rebels. On Yemen, Mr. Killick noted that, from the U.A.R. standpoint, this was a special operation, pre-dating the First Arab Summit; it did not fit the pattern with which Nasser was working elsewhere to advance Arab Socialism. Mr. Davies asked if much of the reported U.A.R. activity in the south (which was not yet as strong as it might be considering the resources available to the U.A.R.) should not be considered as a reaction to covert Saudi and U.K. aid to the royalists. He noted that success of his military in intervention in the form of continued existence of the YAR was vital for Nasser if he were to continue to have the support of his military commanders. On the other hand, the situation in that country was important for the British and only of peripheral concern for us. Thus, a determined effort to promote a viable YARG might be the best way to get U.A.R. troops moving out of Yemen. Mr. Davies also noted that return of one-third of Nasser's fighting forces from an area where they could easily be isolated increased his capabilities for action in other areas. On the question of oil in the Middle East, Mr. Killick emphasized that Nasser's activities were only a potential, not an actual, danger at the present time. He commented that London was perhaps more sensitive to the problems of Western Europe's need for oil than was the United States; that London's concern over the balance of payments and the necessity for relying on U.S.-dollar sources of oil supply was much greater than the United States perhaps realized. Mr. Davies said that the situation throughout the oil industry would change over time. There was a mutuality of interest between the Arabs and the West and the main Western needs would in effect be met as long as there was free access to the oil on reasonable price terms. Mr. Davies referred to a recent informal U.S. intelligence estimate that the U.S.S.R. was prepared to give massive political and economic support to the U.A.R. in the belief that the parallels between their system and the Arab Socialist Union gave them an opening for increasing their influence in the area. The U.A.R. was aware of Soviet motivations but was confident Arab nationalism and Islam were strong enough to prevent any Soviet breakthrough; in the interim, the U.A.R. could profit by continuing its contacts with the U.S.S.R. The estimate concluded that U.S. policy was based on an assessment that in the Arab world Cairo would always have more influence than Moscow, that any losses to our position throughout the area occasioned by Nasser's Arab nationalist drive would be essentially peripheral ("special positions," e.g., loss of Wheelus Air Base) and that our basic interests in the Near East would be maintained. We believed that forcing a major confrontation between the U.A.R. and the West would threaten our basic interests, rather than our peripheral ones, and could well lead to establishment of a true Communist puppet state in the area which would present problems of a much greater magnitude for us all. Mr. Davies suggested that, on this basis, we (the U.S. and the U.K.) and, later, our Western allies should work to improve our capability to influence trends in the U.A.R. particularly by increasing our aid to that country. The aim would be to make the U.A.R. economic structure more compatible with that of the West and to woo the U.A.R. into closer ties with the Western world. As a general final comment, Mr. Killick said that he agreed with much of the U.S. presentation. Noting that his remarks were personal, informal and unofficial, he said that there was a great deal of emotionalism in the U.K. in this pre-election time concerning issues in the Middle East. He agreed with Mr. Davies that the interests of both our governments would be served by delaying a confrontation between us concerning our policies in the Middle East until after our mutual election periods. Specifically, he said that London would not want us to change our policies except perhaps to give more importance to the threat of Nasser. In Yemen, HMG believed Nasser was after total victory and was himself forcing a confrontation. Mr. Davies responded that we did not disagree that Nasser should be prevented from establishing hegemony over Yemen, but we felt strongly that encouraging Saudi aid to the royalists--with almost inevitable U.A.R.-Saudi hostilities--was not the way to achieve this. We agree that Nasser aspires to dominate the Arab world, but we do not believe he has the capability. In the long run, the Arabs themselves, not we, will be the ones able to give check to Nasser if we do not unnecessarily interpose ourselves between them in their disputes and give free rein to the divergent and divisive forces among them. Western intervention could only consolidate the Arabs.
6. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, January 13, 1965. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 2 NEAR E. Confidential. Drafted by Wolle. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Oil Executives Arabian American Oil Company Gulf Oil Company Socony Mobil Oil Company Standard Oil Company of California Standard Oil Company of New Jersey Department Officers Governor Harriman after welcoming the visitors said the Department believed that USG Near Eastern policy had achieved a reasonable degree of success since the Suez crisis of 1956. The Arab-Israel problem and the question of Communist penetration continued to occupy much time and effort. He thought the Soviets had had very little reason to be happy over Near Eastern developments in the same period, though perhaps they were somewhat more happy recently due to Nasser's cooperation with the Congo rebels. The arms race in the area had been held fairly well under control. There were constant threats from Arab nationalism in the area. Recent actions by Nasser brought us face to face with a major policy question: how far does the USG want to push Nasser? The Governor said he thought nothing would please the Russians more than for the US to break with Nasser. Anyone advocating such action on our part would do well to give the question the most serious consideration. The Department views as dangerous the present trend in Congress toward taking legislative action which would end American aid to the UAR. Governor Harriman asked Mr. Talbot to extend these remarks. Oil Information Activity Mr. Talbot began by discussing the dissemination in the Middle East of information on petroleum and energy matters. He said British government officials had discussed with the Department recently the possible intensification of oil information efforts. What was contemplated was a program aimed at attacking the notion that the Near Eastern oil producing countries can dominate and thereby control the international energy market both now and in the future. The Department's basic feeling was that this task is and should remain the main responsibility of the oil companies, but wondered if the government could play an expanded role to supplement company efforts. Mr. Page confirmed that the companies had been doing a good deal along this line although relatively little through the press. He referred to various speeches given at regional professional and technical conferences and to frequent private discussions with government policymakers during the companies' frequent OPEC negotiations in the past two years. He felt it was a question of deciding whether to put on a campaign or simply keep at the present efforts. Mr. Barger thought the government could assist in this effort in some respects. He said Near Eastern oil leaders were often highly impressed by this type of information and gave as an example the deep impression made on the two Saudi members of the ARAMCO Board at a recent meeting by a Pacific Gas and Electric Company presentation on its activities in the nuclear energy field. Mr. Parkhurst thought that to be more effective the proper information should flow more to Arab politicians in addition to oil ministers and technicians as at present. Mr. Law warned of a possible adverse effect from putting too much stress on potential energy resources outside the Near East, in that it might make the Arabs want to get still greater benefits now from their oil to build up a reserve against the day 10 to 15 years from now when their oil earnings potential might be reduced. Mr. Tavoulareas added another word of caution, noting that Middle East oil production was bound to keep rising and that this fact might belie our admonitions about the energy potential of other areas. Mr. Barger reiterated he felt there was an appropriate US Government role aimed at preventing unthinking use of oil as a political weapon by radical Arabs. He thought the Bureau of Mines could increase its publicity on its research activities in western oil shales. Mr. Talbot summarized, stating that this discussion led him to believe the word is getting through now to the people who really count in oil decision-making in the area. The government's role was perhaps one of waiting for targets of opportunity rather than mounting a major information campaign. Governor Harriman added that the government might, however, do well to increase its dissemination of pertinent portions of scientific publications on oil. Review of 1964 Mr. Talbot recalled the Department's belief a year ago that 1964 would be an extremely rough year politically in the Near East. Fortunately there had been no real blowups, either over the Jordan Waters issue or others, and the year had been completed with far less damage than we had dared hope. There had been real problems, however, in several fields. Arab summitry had brought renewed threats to the status quo along the Israel-Arab borders. The UAR seemed to be soberly cognizant of the possible dangers of stirring things up, but the Syrians were plainly less averse to gambling with this potentially explosive situation. There had fortunately been no revival of fedayeen units. We remain concerned lest the Lebanese permit foreign (Arab) troops on their soil under the UAC banner. Jordan's United Arab Command-inspired military buildup plans also remain a large problem. In the boycott field the proposed Arab action against the Chase Manhattan Bank almost became a runaway. The Department interpreted the recent six-month postponement announced by the Arabs at Bahrain as a face-saving device, and we believe that barring unexpected developments Chase is now in the clear. The UAR action with its sister Arab states had been crucial on this issue and was a good example of the way the UAR could help us if the overall US-UAR relationship was satisfactory. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia had agreed during the year to bank the UAC. Whether they would keep this up was an important question. There were indications the Kuwaitis were beginning to get tired of being the financial "fall guy" all the time. Yet their keen hunger to be accepted as a full-fledged member of the Arab club might keep them on this tack. Mr. Talbot congratulated the oil companies on the success with OPEC issues which their painstaking negotiations seemed to have won. Current Situation Mr. Talbot said the principal focus of attention is now on our UAR policy. He reviewed in some detail recent events which had received much press attention, such as the library burning, the Mecom plane incident and Nasser's speech at Port Said. The library destruction clearly had been the work of African students who got out of hand in their demonstration over our Congo rescue operation due in part to laxity of the UAR policy. After much initial hesitation the UAR expressed regret and followed up by offering a building to house our library temporarily. The matter is now "on the tracks." Regarding the plane incident there are still many unanswered questions, yet it is not as fundamental an issue in our UAR relations as several others. Nasser's Port Said speech had been irresponsible, unnecessary and uncalled-for. We would probably never know just what kind of report was given Nasser of Ambassador Battle's conversation with Deputy Supply Minister Stino, which had prompted Nasser to lash out at us in his speech. Yet it is obvious that had not basic differences in UAR-US relations been nagging at him Nasser would not have waxed so suddenly and bitterly emotional over the Battle-Stino meeting. Yemen remains a matter on which the US and UAR do not see eye-to-eye, yet vital US interests are no longer seriously threatened by the Yemeni turmoil as had been the case in 1963, when the situation appeared to have within it the seeds of destruction for Saudi Arabia and perhaps a much wider area. The Yemen issue was now one among the Arabs. It is Nasser's problem, not ours, how to get his troops out, and the situation does not require US intervention. Mr. Talbot said the most serious current clash of US and UAR policies is in the Congo. Curiously, several Arab states, notably Algeria, Sudan and the UAR, have been more active in supporting the rebels in the Congo than have the great majority of black African states. Our present objective is to find a way to remove these three Arab countries from their active support to Congolese rebels. Governor Harriman pointed out that the Congo question is not solely an African matter but is tied in somehow to Russian policy, though the precise Russian role is not easily defined. He said the Department found it hard to tell whether the Soviets had stimulated the rebellion or were aiding and abetting it. He said that some thought the Russian participation in Congo troublemaking represented a Russian desire to offset the Chinese Communist penetration of Africa, which in recent years had been much more successful than Russian efforts in Africa. He noted the difficulty of defining just what the new Sudanese Government is doing and intending to do vis-a-vis the Congo. Mr. Talbot spoke of the great strains on the UAR economy. What is happening is precisely what Harvard economist Edward Mason had foreseen two or three years ago: UAR economists had planned a workable economic development program, but UAR politicians had forced its pace, desiring to double national income in ten years rather than twenty. Serious economic difficulty has resulted. The magnitude of Soviet and Chicom economic aid, and promises of future aid, dwarfs the scale of US economic assistance, and Nasser's present economic plight makes it natural for him to swing more and more toward reliance on his Communist supporters rather than on the West. Kuwait weighed in with massive financial support in 1964 when the UAR economic crisis became clearly recognized. For our part, we have not made any kind of development loan to the UAR since 1963. There is an Egyptian tendency to relate this fact to President Kennedy's assassination inferring that somehow the present administration has not the will or the skill for understanding and cooperation with the Arabs. We have not been able completely to disabuse them of this fallacy. Mr. Talbot recounted the history of the proposed $20 million commodity loan to the UAR, noting that in the end we had not proceeded with it. Mr. Talbot pointed out that our three-year PL 480 agreement with the UAR ends in July. This is our one instrument of policy with Cairo. Our present intention is to live up to this existing commitment by issuing purchase authorizations for the remaining commodities, provided there is UAR compliance with the normal terms of such PL 480 agreements. We are faced with deciding soon on a PL 480 agreement for the future. Was this the time to squeeze the UAR, or was it the time to give additional assistance to increase our leverage on her? There was the possibility that Congress in its present anti-UAR mood might legislate a decision. Mr. Talbot noted that our national interests in the area have not yet been put in jeopardy by the UAR. We still enjoy MATS rights, our warships can still proceed through the Suez Canal without inspection for nuclear weapons, our civil air rights remain untouched, the flow of oil to Western markets continues uninterrupted, and there had been no major outbreak on the Arab-Israel border. While the UAR had sided increasingly with the Soviets we have had a surprising number of comments in the last month from sources close to the UAR pulse that the UAR really thinks it has swung too far to the Soviet side this time and wants to move the pendulum back. Governor Harriman mentioned Nasser's potential influence for bad with respect to US base rights in Libya as well as US oil interests. Regarding the area arms buildup, Mr. Talbot noted that any Arab efforts which may be undertaken, either through the UAC or other means, are self-defeating due to Israel's refusal to be left behind at any level of armaments. Mr. Talbot said the US is going to push hard to attain rectification of the UNRWA ration rolls and expected considerable agitation by Palestinian refugees. Discussion Leading off for the companies Mr. Parkhurst said that what stood foremost in his mind was the depth of feeling in the Iranian, Saudi and perhaps Libyan attitude toward our UAR policy. The Iranians and the Saudis could not understand why we aided Nasser, and Mr. Parkhurst believed their doubts were justified. He believed personally that we should live up to our existing commitments, however. Mr. Page said it should be realized that a policy of continued aid to Egypt causes losses in the area as well as gains. During the recent OPEC negotiations the Shah had complained long and bitterly against US policy toward Nasser and had given the impression that Iran was moving closer to the Soviet camp. Governor Harriman interjected that he challenged this. He felt he knew the Shah extremely well, and over a long period of time, and he believed the Shah simply wanted more and better jet aircraft from the US. He did not believe the US would lose Iran over what the US did toward Nasser. He repeated an earlier observation that he was convinced the Russians would pay a tremendous price for the US to break with Nasser. Mr. Barger suggested the essentiality of forming a judgement as to what Nasser's real personal objectives are before one can properly decide how to deal with him. He went on to recommend that the US use USIS for some attacks on Nasser just as Nasser continually attacks us with propaganda. Governor Harriman stressed again that one should weigh very carefully the idea of breaking relations with the UAR. He found it extremely difficult to believe we could break with Nasser and still hope that Nasser would retain his freedom and not become a tool of the Soviet bloc. The Governor drew a parallel with the Yugoslavian situation, pointing out that our long and patient support of Tito against Moscow since 1948 was paying great dividends today, since Tito's staunch stand against the dictates of Moscow had made possible the growing independent spirit of other East European states. Concluding, the Governor admitted a good case could be made that both the US and USSR had been played for suckers by Nasser. He submitted that while this was not to our liking it left us in a much better position than if we pulled out of the UAR completely and left the field to the Russians. Governor Harriman left the meeting at this point. Mr. Barger felt that his remarks had been misapprehended. He was not advocating a complete break with the UAR but only a much stricter policy toward aiding Cairo. Mr. Talbot, addressing himself to Mr. Barger's earlier comment about Nasser's objectives, said there was no question but that Nasser had ambitions to be "Mr. Big" in the area. He believed that Nasser realized, however, that he had been blocked whenever and wherever he tried to achieve his ambitions by outright domination and that Nasser therefore was switching tactics in favor of a more congenial, cooperative effort characterized by Arab summitry. He remarked that it was surprising how many had expressed concern to us since the Nasser speech at Port Said lest the US actually break with Nasser. King Hussein did not see such a break as being in his interest, nor did the Lebanese. Mr. Law asked what the Department foresaw for Egypt after Nasser. Mr. Talbot responded that while it was always extremely hard to predict this kind of thing his best guess would be a closing of ranks around Ali Sabri and others distinctly more leftist leaning than today's UAR regime. Mr. Owen referred to the "story" around Washington that the oil companies were out to get Nasser and were lobbying in Congress for legislative action in this regard. Mr. Talbot said the version reaching him had it that the oil companies and the Zionists were cooperating under the inspiration of Bushrod Howard to achieve this. Mr. Owen wanted to make it clear the companies were taking no such action. Mr. Barger emphasized that he believed it entirely improper and unwise for the legislative branch of government to interfere with the responsibility of the President and executive branch to determine foreign policy. Mr. Law, referring to an earlier statement by Governor Harriman critical of Kuwait for indiscriminately showering financial support among her neighbors, stated that the Kuwaitis are realists and have but one interest in life: survival. They are spending their only asset--money--to buy friends and are likely to continue to do so. They are scared to death of the UAR. Mr. Tavoulareas called attention to the importance of understanding the way the Iranians and Saudis, and perhaps others, view the fact of extensive US aid to the UAR. They felt the US was showing neglect to its real friends while aiding a country that was playing ball with the Soviets and often intriguing against its Middle Eastern neighbors. Mr. Talbot remarked that the US and British Governments had made repeated assessments of Iranian allegations that Nasser was stirring up the Arab minority in Iranian Khuzistan. We had developed nothing indicating the Shah should be fearful of this, and had said as much to him, but there apparently continued to be a feeding of incorrect intelligence tales to the Shah which kept him stirred up on this subject. Mr. Parkhurst said the Department might be interested to know that the Shah, speaking to him privately a few days before, said he was favorably disposed to a Russian proposal that Iran pipe gas to the Soviet border for sale in Azerbaijan. Mr. Talbot concluded by stating that the protection of our interests in the area requires continual reassessment. Mr. Parkhurst readily agreed and on behalf of the visitors thanked the Department for this opportunity to be briefed and exchange views. As the meeting concluded Mr. Page came to Mr. Talbot and said he understood the Department had suggested having the Jersey Stand- ard and Socony Mobil representatives brief it concerning the status of IPC negotiations with Iraq. He said Socony's Henry Moses, one of the IPC negotiators, was expected back from Baghdad the same day and would be in touch with the Department. He said if the Department wished he would send down a copy of memorandum containing some of Wattari's more extreme remarks on OPEC and IPC views on them. Mr. Talbot accepted the offer. Mr. Talbot said the Department was continuing to hold the line on third-party activity, but the clock was continuing to run and there was a limit to our ability to hold the line in this situation.
The Thirteenth Session of the Ministerial Council of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) was held in Tehran, April 7-8, 1965. The session was attended by Foreign Minister Abbas Aram of Iran, Finance Minister M. Shoaib of Pakistan, Foreign Minister Hasan Esat Isik of Turkey, Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart of the United Kingdom, and Secretary of State Rusk. For text of the communiqu, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pages 585-587. For documentation relating to the session, see Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, CENTO--13th Ministerial Council, Tehran, April 7-8, 1965; Department of State, NEA/RA Files: Lot 75 D 312, CENTO Files, 1965-1968 and CENTO Ministerial Files, 1962-1968; and National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2468, CENTO Meeting, Tehran, April 7-8.
8. Special National Intelligence Estimate/1/ SNIE 10-2-65 Washington, July 15, 1965. /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on July 15. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence agencies of the Departments of State, Defense, and NSA participated in its preparation. The State, Defense, and NSA representatives concurred; the AEC and FBI representatives abstained, the subject being outside their jurisdiction. Paragraph references are to the Discussion portion of the estimate, not printed. SOVIET AND CHINESE COMMUNIST STRATEGY AND TACTICS The Problem To assess the nature, extent, and present effectiveness of Soviet and Chinese Communist overt and covert efforts in North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia,/2/ and to estimate the outlook for such efforts over the next several years. /2/The following countries are included in this estimate: all the Arab states (including those in northern Africa, i.e., UAR, Libya, Sudan, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco), Israel, Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Nepal, and Ceylon. [Footnote in the source text.] Conclusions A. Most of the countries in this area have been opened up to Soviet and other Communist penetration by the liquidation of European colonial empires and by the widespread emergence of movements of protest against the concentration of political and economic power in the hands of a small ruling class. Over the past decade or so, the USSR has injected itself dynamically into the whole area. China plays a significant role mainly in South Asia. With the exception of Yugoslavia, whose progress while maintaining a balance between the USSR and the West has greatly impressed certain leaders in the area, the East European countries have ridden into the area on Soviet coattails. (Paras. 1-4) B. Soviet influence in the area has been achieved principally through the customary instruments of contemporary statecraft. With a considerable degree of success, Moscow has exploited nationalist and anti-colonial resentments, encouraged neutralist sentiment, and taken sides in local disputes. The USSR, and to a lesser extent China, have mounted cultural and student exchange programs and expanded their trade relationships. The Soviets have extended economic aid to 16 of the 23 countries in the area, and six of them have armies that are largely equipped with Soviet arms and trained in Soviet methods. The economic and military aid programs have not only contributed to the Soviet image in the area, but also provide Moscow with some potential for leverage by slowing down projects, failing to deliver spares, and the like, though this leverage could not be exerted without some political cost. (Paras. 9-20, 33) C. The overt Soviet presence--for example, diplomatic, trade, military missions--provides cover for an extensive clandestine apparatus. The Committee for State Security (KGB) and the Chief Intelligence Directorate (GRU) play a wide role in carrying out foreign policy. Aside from the classic intelligence collection functions, these services conduct operations to denigrate the US and other Western powers, to capture and exploit press and other propaganda outlets, and to place individuals in positions in local governments, political parties, etc., where they can influence policy in Moscow's favor. The Soviets have recruited local officials at various levels, including some holding senior government positions. In general, the Soviet covert operations have been fairly successful. (Paras. 26-32) D. The Communist nations also strive to develop and use local Communist movements and international front organizations. The former include a few sizable legal or quasi-legal organizations, as in India, Greece, and Cyprus, and a dozen or so small, mostly illegal, but fairly well organized parties. Their organizational strength has enabled them to survive repression and, on occasion, to make significant but temporary gains in the wake of political upheaval. On the whole, the Communist parties have made little progress as mass movements; they have done best in attracting discontented intellectuals, while making little headway among the peasants who comprise the bulk of the population, and only somewhat more among workers. This has led the Soviets, in some countries at least, to slacken their efforts to develop a mass organization and turn instead to a tactic of infiltrating ongoing nationalist or revolutionary movements. (Paras. 21-25) E. In both overt and covert operations, the Soviets probably consider that they have met with a fair degree of success in establishing their presence and influence in the area. They have, broadly speaking, been most successful in the Arab world and least successful where fear of Slavic domination remains strong--in Greece, Turkey, and Iran. They will probably continue their efforts to establish an identity of feeling and interest with the modernizing forces in the "Third World," though tailoring their approach for individual countries. Some of the countries we are dealing with have adequately functioning political systems, sufficiently coherent societies, or strong enough leadership to be relatively impervious to Communist efforts to make them into Marxist socialist societies, barring a major upheaval. A number of others lack most or all of these qualities, and upsets in their fragile political situations could present Communists with good opportunities to gain a position of power. (Paras. 33, 34, 64-66) F. The prospects for the Communist powers in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia over the next several years might best be characterized as "more of the same." The generally low state of the local Communist parties is likely to persist, although the presence and influence of the Communist countries will expand. The influence of Marxism is likely to increase, particularly in those states following a socialist path. The Chinese will also be more active, although much of their effort will be directed against the Soviets, thus inhibiting Communist progress. We recognize that in some places situations could develop so as to provide promising opportunities for the Communists to come to power; nevertheless, we cannot specifically identify any such situation and--all things considered--doubt that any country of the area will come under Communist control. We believe that the forces of nationalism in the area will remain strong, and that nationalist leaders will continue, by and large successfully, to play off East against West. (Paras. 56, 57, 67, 69) G. Two sorts of development could give the Communists a considerable victory. The first, essentially unpredictable, is the emergence of a leader who decided to take his country into the Communist world, either rapidly like Castro, or by stages. Another would arise from a successful Soviet or Chinese effort to achieve a complete and continuing identity of interests with the nationalist forces of the "Third World." As long as this identity remains negative, devoted to eliminating special Western positions and the like, it will be troublesome, sometimes serious, but not fatal. But if these nationalist forces came to believe that the Western powers, and especially the US, were fundamentally opposed to their desire for national independence and domestic progress, the opportunities for the Communist powers to achieve a fundamental gain in the "Third World" would go up sharply. Countries which felt they had no other way to turn would be under very strong pressures to enter upon still closer collaboration with the Communist world. (Paras. 67-68) [Here follow the Discussion section of the estimate and an annex.] [Continue with the next documents] Volume XXI Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |