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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XVIII Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-67 Department of State |
 380. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, January 16, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VI. Secret. A handwritten "L" on the memorandum indicates that it was seen by the President. SUBJECT Prime Minister Eshkol's informal message to you this morning/2/ makes it plain that the Israelis are not going to repeat the mistake they made in November. Our reaction to their raid on Jordan shook them badly. This time, they're carefully warning us that their patience with Syria has about run out. /2/See Document 382. Despite Eshkol's restraint, Israel is either on the brink of another attack or is pushing us to curb Syria. Israeli Charge Evron warned State this morning that "continuation of Syria's policy would force Israel to take action."/3/ Eban said about the same publicly. /3/In a meeting with Acting Assistant Secretary Handley that morning, Evron delivered an oral message stating in part, "The continuation of this aggressive policy will force Israel to take action in self-defense as is her international right and national duty." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 32-1 ISR-SYR) Since the first of the year, the Israelis have built a full record in the UN of Syrian-based attacks. To strengthen their case further, they've accepted U Thant's appeal for an emergency meeting of the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission. This costs little since press reports suggest that Syria will reject or sidestep the appeal. We probably can't stop the Israelis from another attack without laying our whole relationship on the line. We've offered border control equipment for them to test, but any system is months off. However, we're pulling out the stops short of a showdown to encourage continued restraint: --Katzenbach told representatives of the Jewish Council of Presidents this morning/4/ that an Israeli strike would consolidate support for the deteriorating Syrian regime. /4/A memorandum of the conversation is ibid. --We endorsed U Thant's appeal/5/ in a New York Statement. /5/A January 15 message from UN Secretary-General U Thant to the Israeli and Syrian Governments urged restraint and called for an emergency meeting of the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission. The text is in telegram 3582 from USUN, January 15. (Ibid.) --We're instructing Ambassador Smythe to tell the Syrians we believe Israel is on the brink of an attack and they can't count on us to hold Israel back./6/ We'll say the same in Cairo. /6/Telegram 119382 to Damascus, January 16, instructed Smythe to tell Foreign Minister Makhus that terrorist incidents were placing the Israeli Government under pressures that might become intolerable, that the United States considered that situation was dangerously close, and that the Syrian Government should not overestimate the U.S. ability to influence the Israeli Government against military reaction to acts of terrorism. (Ibid.) In a January 17 meeting, Makhus said that Syria had already agreed to the suggestion of an emergency ISMAC meeting but wanted it to deal with the question of cultivation in the demilitarized zone. (Ibid.) --We'll have a response to Eshkol for you shortly. Walt
381. Memorandum of Conversation Between the UAR Ambassador (Kamel) and Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff/1/ Washington, January 17, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. V. Secret. A copy was sent to the Department of State. SUBJECT At a two-hour lunch this afternoon Ambassador Kamel went over much of the same ground as he has with Secretary Rusk/2/ and Mr. Walt Rostow./3/ Much of what he said was a repeat of his familiar analysis of how important it is that the US maintain a position in Cairo over the next 3-4 years until oil revenue put the UAR on its own feet. Essentially, he made two points: /2/See Document 378. /3/A brief memorandum of Kamel's meeting with Rostow on January 14 is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. V. 1. The importance of a US decision on food aid within the next ten days. He had obviously absorbed Mr. Rostow's Saturday/4/ admonition that it was time he stopped describing Cairo's acceptance of Soviet wheat as a threat to the US and started thinking of it as a threat to the UAR. He made very clear that, in painting the specter of Moscow's filling the Egyptian wheat gap, he was not threatening the US but simply stating a fact of life--that a sick man needs moral support from more than one quarter. /4/January 14. 2. His three-part plan for progress in the Middle East which he had outlined to Secretary Rusk but not to Mr. Rostow: --Keep the Israeli issue in the icebox. --Achieve a modus vivendi among the Arab governments: (a) Use the good offices of the US to further the Kuwaiti mediation of the Yemen dispute; (b) Do what we can to help reestablish British relations with the UAR. He explained this second point as relevant to the first in that the British have substantial influence in Saudi Arabia and can do a lot to break down the animosity between Faisal and Nasser. --Maintain a workable economic relationship with the UAR, including encouraging the IMF and IBRD to help. He described the importance of this in ways that do not sound like a threat but they come close. As he put it: Just as no government can expect to have good relations with any nation in the western hemisphere without the approval of the US, so is it true with the UAR in the Middle East. He raised again the proposal he had made to Mr. Rostow on Saturday of our sending to Cairo another mission like the Ed Mason enterprise several years ago./5/ He felt that, if we agreed to a new round of food aid, he could sell this to Nasser. When he asked what I thought of the idea, I said I felt it could be useful if it connoted a willingness on the part of the UAR government to adopt more pragmatic economic policies and to consider the analysis of western economists. /5/Economist Edward Mason visited the UAR in March 1962. For the summary of his report, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XVII, Document 230. In general response I told him I felt he was addressing two points not necessarily wholly related. First is the political element of our response to UAR food requests. Contrary to some impressions that might be logical in Cairo, our delay in deciding should not be read as political. Second, I felt that our delay had to be read in the context of our broader concern over the world food problem. I explained how the US and the world are going through a transition in their thinking about agricultural development and food aid. Washington in particular in the last three months had been coming to grips with this new situation in a way that almost required delaying any decisions on food aid until we had sorted out our position on the worldwide problem. I realized the difficulty of convincing Cairo that preoccupation rather than premeditated neglect could be a reason for our delay, but I felt this was much closer to the truth and hoped he could convince his government. When I turned the discussion to Syrian-Israeli relations, he had little to offer in the way of interpretation but did volunteer that he had cabled Nasser yesterday that the UAR should do what it could to restrain Syria. I told him we appreciated that because we were very much concerned that the Israelis might launch another strike if terrorist activity continued, and especially if it cost another Israeli life. He diverted the discussion to an exposition on how the UAR had been quite responsible on the Israeli issue. I agreed that it had been better than some of its neighbors and hoped that in this instance it could do all in its power to avert another blowup. In parting, I left with him the two USDA paper-back books on the world food problem and outlined to him the new facts about the world food situation as we see it. He ended by reiterating his plea for a US decision "within 10 days". He retained his composure throughout, but was more emphatic than I had ever seen him. H.S.
382. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/ Washington, January 17, 1967, 9:17 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 32-1 ISR-SYR. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Sterner and Wolle; cleared by Davies, Atherton, Handley, Walt Rostow, and in draft by Buffum; and approved by Katzenbach. A note to Rostow from LN, dated January 17 at 7:35 p.m., attached to a draft of the telegram, states that Walsh had called to say that the telegram should go that evening and that Walsh had talked to Katzenbach who had not seen it but agreed that it should go; a handwritten note in the margin indicates that Rostow cleared with the President. The draft telegram and the note are attached to a January 18 memorandum from Wriggins to Rostow warning that the message might have given the Israelis an unintended signal because it was softer than the message Johnson sent to Eshkol after the Israeli raid into Jordan in November. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, Israel, 10/1/66-6/30/67) 120440. 1. Following is text of "piece of paper" delivered January 16 by GOI Embassy to White House, described as message from Premier Eshkol to President Johnson but bearing no salutation or signature line: "Today I took a most difficult decision--not to authorize a military reaction to the brutal Syrian provocation which took place yesterday morning. Terrorists from Syria mined the village of Dishon and put anti-personnel mines on a football ground. A young man was killed and others wounded. This outrage came as a climax to a period of sustained Syrian aggression which included the following acts over the past ten days: wholesale penetration of the Israeli side of the frontier; attacks with light arms on our farmers inside and outside the Demilitarized Zone; bombardment of Israelis on sovereign Israel territory with tank shells; laying of mines in roads and fields, and totally unprovoked shooting on Israeli vessels on Lake Tiberias which is Israeli territory. Through all this period we kept our reaction to the minimum and tried to avoid escalation. The country is seething with indignation. It seems that Syria wishes to appear as the champion of anti-Israel militance, and to embroil it in the aggressive policy. If we have decided not to act today it is because we still hope that Syria will understand the danger of her present course. Since we agreed to be in close and frank contact I felt bound to share my deep concern with you." 2. Embassy should deliver following message in response either through Foreign Ministry or Prime Minister's office. Message should be prepared in style similar to GOI text, i.e., on plain paper without salutation or signature lines. Text follows: "Thank you for writing to me candidly about the present difficult situation on Israel's northern border. I respect the courage you have shown in dealing with it. I was saddened to learn of the fatality caused by the mine explosion at Dishon. We share Israel's sorrow about this senseless and brutal act. I want you to know how fully I appreciate the painful dilemma that you and your colleagues face in coping with continuing acts of terrorism along Israel's borders. No government can be expected to adopt a passive attitude toward incidents that threaten the lives and properties of its citizens. The tragedy is that the search for security can lead to actions which, perversely, threaten to destroy chances for the permanent peace we all seek and which thus in turn pose a serious dilemma for this government. I am therefore particularly gratified by your decision not to authorize military retaliation. I say this, believe me, in full appreciation of how difficult that decision must have been for you. I am convinced, however, that there are, fortunately, alternatives to military retaliation that in the long run will provide Israel with a greater measure of security. Your government and mine are already engaged in discussions concerning possible ways in which technology we are developing might help strengthen the capability of the Israeli border forces to intercept infiltrators. I believe this to be a promising approach, and I can assure you of our continuing interest in seeing this program go forward. I earnestly hope that your government will continue to meet the present situation with the same high statesmanship which it has so frequently displayed in the past under trying circumstances. We believe that the evidence from years past demonstrates that military retaliation is not the answer to this problem. We have already seen enough of the present pattern of events in the Middle East to realize that armed reprisals not only fail to put a halt to terrorism, but on the contrary, strengthen the radical and irresponsible forces in the Arab societies that provide a favorable climate for terrorist activities. I am encouraged by the initiative of Secretary General U Thant in calling attention to the present dangerous situation along the Israel-Syria border and asking both the Israeli and Syrian Governments to agree to an emergency meeting of the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission. I welcome your government's initial favorable reaction to his proposal. I hope that your government will be flexible about the details of the emergency meeting in the interest of furthering the overall objectives of relieving tension on the border. We have instructed our Ambassador in Damascus to approach the Syrian Government urgently to call attention to the dangers of the situation, to stress our belief that acts of terrorism within Israel are a major factor threatening the peace, and to urge full cooperation with the Secretary General's appeal. Let me once again assure you of my personal close attention and deep concern for Israel's security."/2/ /2/Telegram 2421 from Tel Aviv, January 19, reported that the message was delivered on January 18. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 32-1 ISR-SYR) Rusk
383. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/ Washington, January 18, 1967, 8:20 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 19-8 US-ISR. Secret. Drafted by Davies and approved by Walsh for Katzenbach. 121337. Following summary for information only and contents should not be disclosed to foreign officials. It is uncleared and subject to amendment upon review of memcon. Ambassador Harman accompanied by Mr. Evron and General Geba met with Under Secretary January 18./2/ Ambassador Harman presented request for additional military assistance and US public support of Israel in its confrontation with Syria. /2/A memorandum of the conversation is ibid. Military assistance requested included: 1) 200 modern APCs on grant basis, 2) $2 million tank spares on grant basis, and 3) $14 million credit on "Hawk terms" for follow-on spares for Hawk missiles and M-48 tanks. Ambassador Harman reviewed dangerous situation arising from border incidents and terror attacks and noted that Government of Israel has left time before reacting in order to have pressures brought to bear by other powers in Damascus. He expressed appreciation for US demarche to SARG about which he had been informed. He thought it of major importance now for powers to point finger at Syria as responsible for terror attacks. He hoped that Syria would not be allowed to "fuzz" situation by taking position it could not control Palestinian groups. The Under Secretary noted that there were two sides to this approach. Therefore calling attention to actions and Syrian responsibility could have opposite effect from that desired. Acts have been carried out in such a way that Syrians can reap credit domestically yet deny responsibility in UN. We have urged the UN to take action and are giving strong support to its efforts. Although Ambassador Harman stated that there considerable risk in Israeli inaction in face of terrorism, greater risk could stem from ill advised action at this juncture. Ambassador Harman said he was basically optimistic about situation in Near East since Israel's borders have been almost quiescent from 1957 to 1965. There were indications of Arab realization that Israel was here to stay and now Arab solidarity seems well along the way to complete breakdown. The fixing of world attention now on the need to keep Israel's borders quiet could defuse a very dangerous situation. The Under Secretary undertook to look into Israel's military requests and to continue weighing the desirability of a stronger USG public statement on terrorism. Rusk
384. Action Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Handley) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, January 26, 1967. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AID (US) 15-8 UAR. Secret: Exdis. Drafted by George Bennsky of NEA/UAR. A January 27 memorandum from Deputy Executive Secretary Herbert B. Thompson to Katzenbach states that he understood the memorandum had been revised according to instructions from Katzenbach's office. A February 9 note, unsigned, attached to the action memorandum states: "Walt Rostow called to say that Eugene Black and Robert Anderson had called today to urge that we give another look at the food package for the UAR, despite Congressional problems, because of the urgency of the situation." An attached April 25 note to CMS from Walsh states: "Both of these seem to have been OBEd." SUBJECT Attached is the latest revision of recommendations for a new PL-480 program for the UAR. These consolidate the IRG/NEA decision and the dissenting views of AID, E and H in a range of four alternatives with back-up rationale. Representatives of AID, Agriculture, CIA, DOD, JCS, NSC and USIA participated in the IRG discussion under my chairmanship. Ambassador Kamel continues to press for a decision on his government's PL-480 request. He is again attempting to put off Cairo by telling them you have been too busy testifying on the Hill to finish up the consultations necessary to get a decision this week on this important and delicate matter. While he agrees that setting a time limit is not helpful, he says his government is growing ever more insistent for an answer. Thus he has reported to Cairo that he hopes to get the decision from you this week. This position remains the same, though more and more emphatic, that a negative decision would be a catastrophe, benefitting only the Soviets and those seeking confrontations and polarization in the Near East area to the detriment of western and moderate interests. Recommendation: That you sign the attached memorandum for the President.
Attachment Draft Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson Washington, undated. SUBJECT Recommendation: That you authorize us to negotiate a new six-month PL-480 agreement with the UAR in accordance with one of the following alternative proposals: Alternative A: A $68 million program containing 250,000 tons of wheat, 500,000 tons of corn and/or milo and some vegetable oil, tobacco and tallow. Dollar repayment over ten years, two year grace period, US Treasury rates. This would assist us in maintaining tolerable relations with the UARG. Alternative B: A $52 million program containing no wheat but all of the other commodities in A above on the same dollar repayment terms. The prospect of future US wheat assistance would be held out to the UAR. This might still be attractive enough to the UAR and indicate our desire to minimize policy differences. Alternative C: A $25 million program containing 250,000-300,000 tons of wheat, with the remainder made up of other commodities. Dollar repayment over fifteen years, no grace period, US Treasury rates. This could be acceptable to the UAR provided the preconditions attached to A and B above are sufficiently watered down. Alternative D: A $16 to $17 million program of 250,000 tons of wheat, just matching the recent Soviet wheat aid. The UAR might accept on credit terms of A above and provided there were no preconditions. However, this further shortening of the leash might well be counterproductive in terms of hopes for improved US-UAR relations. Discussion: Opinion is divided on this difficult and complex foreign relations problem. This is reflected in the spread of alternatives. The issue is where the balance falls--i.e., on the side of consequences to our Near East interests or with the unfavorable repercussions on Congressional attitude toward both food and dollar aid. PL-480 legislation requires that you determine it in the national interest to make concessional food sales to the UAR. Alternatives A and B represent the decision of the Inter-departmental Regional Group for Near East and South Asia. Considerations underlying this decision are: A negative or inadequate US response will be taken by Egypt as a challenge. The reactions of Egypt, the most powerful Arab country, can be detrimental to our interests, especially in the current increasingly tense and unstable Near East scene. There are few major situations in the area where we do not bump into Egypt and its influence. Recent American oil discoveries in Egypt have added new dimensions to that country's economic future and our interests there. Egypt has some influence in less developed areas where we contest with the Communists for position. US-UAR relations have not changed for the better since we ended PL-480 assistance in June. But time has run out on keeping Egypt's April 1966 request on ice as was indicated by Nasser's reference to a "starvation war" in a recent major speech. The implications of this long delay have had some beneficial effects in terms of increased Egyptian concern with its food and population problem and of signals from Nasser, through private American and foreign government contacts, of a desire for better relations. Offer of a modest PL-480 program, in terms of UAR needs, will preserve at least the minimum effective US-UAR relationship, maintain some of our influence in Cairo, keep up the hope of those around Nasser who favor good relations, continue to offer an alternative to ever-increasing reliance on the Soviets and provide an umbrella for cooperative Egyptian pound programs in the critical areas of agricultural production and population control. There will be adverse reactions to renewed PL-480 assistance from some leaders friendly to us in the Middle East area and from certain elements in Congress, but, on balance, IRG/NEA decided such criticism would be less disadvantageous to US interests than the probable foreign policy effects of not doing so. A fuller explanation of this rationale is set forth in Enclosures 1 and 2,/2/ including the conditions precedent to a new PL-480 agreement. /2/The enclosures, all unsigned and undated, are not printed. Enclosure 1 is entitled "Rationale for the Decision of the Interdepartmental Regional Group for Near East and South Asia Re PL-480 for the UAR." Enclosure 2 is entitled "Comments of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research Re PL-480 for the UAR." Alternatives C and D reflect concern with domestic reaction. AID, with the endorsement of the Economic Affairs and Congressional Relations Bureaus of State, believes that the disadvantages of further loss of Congressional support for the Administration's foreign aid programs outweigh the possible advantages to US foreign policy interests of a new PL-480 program with the UAR. AID is skeptical that Egyptians will starve if PL-480 is not available, and that such assistance affects Egypt's long-run policies toward the US and the Near East area. (By contrast, the IRG and Intelligence and Research Bureau assessments indicate that the UAR's long-term non-alignment policy is vulnerable to full dependence on the Soviets, that there is some scope for UAR changes of policies to avoid confrontations with the US, and that alleged starvation could be made into an issue.) If a decision is made to go ahead on foreign policy grounds, AID and the Economic Bureau believe the program should be kept sufficiently limited ($25 million) so that Congress can be shown we are still pursuing a "short leash" policy toward the UAR. The Congressional Relations Bureau believes that the opposition in Congress is so strong that no PL-480 program of any size should be initiated at this time. To the catalogue of Egyptian activities that incense some members of Congress may soon have to be added charges, yet unsubstantiated, of UAR use of poison gas in Yemen. A fuller explanation of these positions is set forth in Enclosures 3, 4 and 5./3/ /3/Enclosures 3, 4, and 5 consist of comments by AID, the Bureau of Economic Affairs, and the Bureau of Congressional Relations, respectively. Alternative D would undoubtedly be the easiest to live with from the domestic standpoint, but it would be too small to support any preconditions much less maintain a minimum effective relationship with the UAR. While it would match the 250,000 tons of Soviet wheat actually agreed to, it does not take into account the additional Soviet offer of 400,000 tons which apparently remains open but not yet agreed upon. Dean Rusk/4/ /4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
385. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/ Washington, January 27, 1967, 10:28 a.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 19-8, US-JORDAN. Secret; Exdis; College Run. Drafted by Atherton on January 26, cleared by Robert B. Houghton and Hoopes, and approved by Davies. Repeated to Amman. 126458. 1. Dept officer informed Israeli Ambassador Harman and Minister Evron Jan 26 that USG had now completed certain plans related to our earlier decision to accelerate F-104 deliveries and training for Jordan. In next few weeks we would be sending 6 F-104s to Jordan on temporary basis. These would be US Air Force planes, would be maintained by US Air Force personnel and would be withdrawn as Jordan's own F-104s were delivered. We were taking this step within context our effort achieve maximum psychological impact in Jordan through rapid and visible response to King Hussein's request for assistance. While in Jordan, aircraft would be used for training Jordanian pilots and ground crews. 2. Dept officer stated that this action would be presented publicly as integral part of our December commitment to accelerate training and delivery F-104s for Jordan. We did not intend to initiate publicity and would not comment on status of aircraft or details our arrangements with GOJ. We wanted GOI to know, however, that USG had taken every precaution to assure that there would be no incidents involving these aircraft; specifically, they would not be flown in border areas. Dept officer stressed that this and other details being very closely held and requests GOI do likewise. 3. Ambassador Harman said this information would be helpful to Prime Minister Eshkol in calming fears which presence these aircraft in Jordan might arouse. At same time, noting GOI's concern re publicity currently being accorded to airlift in Jordan, Harman urged that arrival of F-104s be kept in low key. In addition, he urged early favorable response to GOI request for delivery of eight rather than presently scheduled four A-4F's to Israel in December (Katzenbach-Harman Memcon Jan 18);/2/ such decision would help counteract potentially adverse reaction in Israel to arrival F-104s in Jordan. /2/See Document 383. Katzenbach
386. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State/1/ Cairo, February 1, 1967, 1051Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UAR-US. Secret. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, London, and Tel Aviv. 4279. 1. Bergus and Parker/2/ had 70 minute discussion with UAR Vice President Zakaria Muhieddin evening Jan 31. It can only be described as somber. Muhieddin marshalled his considerable resources of inner strength, charm, intelligence and last, but by no means least, quiet determination. Highlight of discussion was opening statement by Muhieddin who had obviously been very well briefed on previous Bergus conversations with UARG officials (FonMin, Presidential Adviser Al-Khouli, DePriMin Fawzi, et al). Muhieddin neatly and effectively summed up these several hours of conversation in few minutes. /2/Donald C. Bergus visited Cairo January 25-Feburary 1. Information concerning his trip is ibid., ORG 7 NEA. Richard B. Parker was Political Counselor of the Embassy in Cairo. 2. He was not optimistic over future of US-UAR relations. He believed UAR had made substantial contribution toward containment Arab-Israel dispute. He thought UAR had demonstrated its objective was to maintain truly independent nonaligned position. UAR had welcomed American economic interests in development its oil resources realizing that for "many years at least" UAR, as other Arab countries, needed American capital, know-how, and accessibility to Western markets. 3. He felt that USG has not brought itself to recognize forces of change at work in Arab world. UAR shared US desire for stability in area and did not "export revolution." (Comment: Muhieddin and other Egyptian interlocutors have been quite sensitive on this point.) But US seemed to feel it could best protect its interests by aligning itself with Arab leaders such as Hussein and Feisal (with much heavier emphasis on latter) who determined resist change. Feisal was doing his best promote US-UAR confrontation and apparently succeeding in his effort. Both Feisal and Hussein seemed convinced that time had come work openly and otherwise to cripple if not destroy present UAR regime. US, willy-nilly, had let itself become party to these efforts. 4. Primary theater of confrontation was, of course, Yemen. Muhieddin frankly stated that objective Jan 27-28 Najran bombings had been bring physical and moral "pressure" on Feisal to desist from anti-YAR activities. Muhieddin clearly implied such attacks on Saudi Arabia would continue despite UAR's full awareness that USG might react. 5. He acknowledged that UAR economic situation was not good, that serious mistakes had been made in the past, and that the next couple of years would not be easy. He made it clear that UAR would use its scarce hard currency resources purchase wheat and maintain relationships with "cooperative" creditors. Debt payments to others such as IMF or USG were obviously of lesser priority. He was pessimistic re new UAR-IMF stabilization agreement. 6. On wheat he spoke little and mostly in terms of resentment which US behavior in this field has created in India. He did not play on Nasser theme of US "war of starvation." He did however seem to believe there was something sinister in USG's lack of response to UAR requests for assistance. US, in his view, was trying string along Egyptians, perhaps as part of its strategy support activities Feisal and Hussein rather than giving clear-cut answer. 7. Muhieddin believed that US-UAR relations were at their lowest ebb since 1952. Things were even worse than during period 1956-59 crises in Near East. He felt that basic regard of Egyptian people for USG and Americans had survived foregoing without much difficulty. But he thought that it inevitable that animosity toward US would develop throughout Egyptian society and that restoration of friendship would not come quickly or easily. (Comment: This theme used by Fawzi and others.) 8. Throughout conversation Bergus and Parker did their best point out fallacies and contradictions Muhieddin's position. They drew heavily on Secretary's conversations with Kamel and Ambassador Battle's continuing discussions with UARG leadership. They stressed conviction that UARG assumption that USG had changed its basic policies toward Egypt and area was both erroneous and dangerous. While ensuing discussion with Muhieddin was hardly a "dialogue of the deaf" neither do we believe that there was much impact on him. 9. Bergus and Parker left with impression UARG becoming increasingly convinced that broad US-UAR confrontation is unavoidable. There is little basis for believing that Egyptians any longer flinch at such a possibility. In Egypt, as elsewhere in this part of world, there is strong streak of fatalism. Battle
387. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ JCSM-55-67 Washington, February 2, 1967. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 72 A 2468, Israel 091.3 MAP. Secret. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that it was seen by McNamara. SUBJECT 1. (S) Reference is made to a memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), dated 20 January 1967, subject as above, which requested the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on an Israeli request for military assistance on a grant aid basis. 2. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not consider that grant military aid to Israel is justified by the internal or external threat. In addition, neither the need for insuring Israel's pro-Western orientation nor Israel's economic condition justify such aid. Provision of grant aid to Israel would not be in consonance with established MAP policy and would be contrary to US interests in the Middle East. For additional information on the adverse effects of a grant aid program, see Appendix A./2/ /2/Neither Appendix A nor B is printed. Appendix A, unsigned and undated, is entitled "Advisability of Grant Aid/Sales to Israel." 3. (S) Israel's present military forces are capable of defending successfully against any individual or collective Arab attack; currently programmed arms shipments to Jordan and expected deliveries to other Arab states do not affect this capability materially. Israel's superior offensive and defensive capabilities would be improved by acquisition of 200 modern armored personnel carriers, but this improvement is not needed at the present or in the next three to five years to insure Israel's security. 4. (S) Aside from the basic questions of grant aid and Israel's security needs, providing armored personnel carriers to Israel in CY 1967 would either delay programmed deployments to Southeast Asia, further degrade our CONUS position, or require diversion from existing commitments to other countries. Moreover, a US agreement to sell additional major items of military equipment to Israel is not advisable since it would: a. Negate the effect of the US warning to Israel in the wake of its recent attack on Jordan. b. Aggravate the current unstable internal situation in Jordan. c. Serve to establish further the United States as the primary supplier of military equipment to Israel. d. Provoke adverse Arab reactions. e. Further contribute to the Arab-Israel arms race with the United States supplying both contestants. 5. (S) M-113A1 APCs are also produced in Italy under the US/Italian coproduction project; however, sale to Israel from this source is considered inadvisable for the reasons given above, since the Italian-produced model is outwardly identical to the US M-113A1. 6. (S) Suitable substitutes for the M-113A1 armored personnel carrier are available in Europe as noted in Appendix B; however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the United States discourage Israel from procuring any additional armored personnel carriers. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
388. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Davies) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/ Washington, February 8, 1967. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-8 ISR. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Atherton. SUBJECT The attached telegram/2/ summarizes a meeting February 6 between DOD/State officials and the Israeli Military Attache to consider our draft Memorandum of Understanding/3/ on US-Israeli cooperation in the field of anti-infiltration technology. From this meeting, as well as from other recent discussions with and public statements by Israeli officials, there has emerged an Israeli position which may be summarized as follows: /2/The attached telegram is a copy of telegram 132912 to Tel Aviv, February 7. Another copy is ibid., DEF 1 ISR. /3/Not found. 1. The application of electronic and other technological developments to the problem of protecting Israel's borders against Arab clandestine penetration attempts is not a new concept; Israel has been experimenting with this approach for some years. 2. The Government of Israel is prepared to examine and test the latest American devices and techniques to determine whether Israel can improve its own effectiveness in this field. It is disappointed, however, with what we have come up with so far and is not yet prepared to sign the proposed agreement. 3. In any case this approach can never provide a complete answer to Israel's security problem. To give it undue weight as part of a "static" defense policy would limit Israel's sovereign right to defend itself by whatever means it deems necessary. Even while Israel continues to practice military restraint it must maintain a credible deterrent posture. This means that it cannot permit the impression to be created that it has renounced the right to choose the manner, place and time in which it will act to assure the security of its borders. Politically, undue emphasis on anti-infiltration technology would create a defensive, ghetto psychology that would encourage increased Arab harassment and foster a defeatist attitude in Israel. Both of these developments would constitute a setback to Israel's search for a permanent settlement of the Arab-Israel problem. 4. Israel thinks the U.S.G. is overselling the anti-infiltration idea, creating the impression that it can solve Israel's security problem. Israel was particularly disturbed by the description of anti-infiltration technology as an "alternative" to military reprisal in the President's reply to Prime Minister Eshkol's recent message./4/ In the Israeli view this emphasis, which they also see reflected in comments by various U.S.G. officials, suggests a fundamental U.S. failure to understand the true nature of the threat Israel faces. Those on the Arab side who advocate terrorism--the Syrian Government, Palestinian extremists and their ideological mentors--must be shown that this is a self-defeating doctrine before it becomes too deeply rooted to be destroyed. By advocating "passive defense," the United States is encouraging the aggressor while asking the victim to limit his freedom of action. /4/See Document 382. We have endeavored to make clear to our Israeli contacts that we do not view our cooperative anti-infiltration efforts as a cure-all, but rather as part (one might say the U.S. component) of a more measured and precise response to the type and level of threat Israel now faces than are massive retaliatory raids of which Samu is the most recent example. The latter, in our judgment, exacerbate rather than contain the problem. The raids encourage the terrorists in their aim of goading Israel into intermittent hostilities with its neighbors. Fundamentally, we do not believe that Israel can achieve absolute security, so long as there is no peace between it and its Arab neighbors, or that it can shoot its way to peace. We think military retaliation is both ineffective and reckless and may in time give serious substance to Palestinian terrorism which, despite some tragic successes, is still a shadowy and relatively disorganized force. At the same time we agree that efforts to improve Israel's anti-infiltration capabilities should be carried out quietly, and we have accordingly endeavored to avoid focussing public attention on them. The fact is that the first official public acknowledgment of U.S.-Israeli cooperation under way in this field came in a press conference by Foreign Minister Eban on January 24. Israeli complaints that we are overselling the anti-infiltration concept seem prompted primarily by privileged references we have made in private forums to our joint efforts in this field, in an attempt to reassure Congressional and other friends of Israel in this country regarding our continuing interest in Israel's security. We would therefore not rule out some degree of Israeli stalling in getting the anti-infiltration device study into operation, but believe this to be primarily for tactical reasons. The Israeli Government, as you know, has argued that the United States over-reacted to Israel's November 13 raid against Jordan. Israel has also been clearly concerned that our reaction to that raid would adversely influence our response to Israel's requests for assistance in the economic and military field. Perhaps to counteract this as well as to maintain world sympathy and concern for Israel, Israeli spokesmen have made a concerted effort of late to dramatize the current Arab terrorist threat to Israeli security. The present Israeli tendency to downplay the importance of anti-infiltration technology, as an answer to terrorism, would appear to be a part of that effort. Despite some lack of enthusiasm in Israeli military circles, we do not interpret this as an indication of official Israeli indifference to our anti-infiltration proposals and believe we should continue to push those proposals quietly but firmly.
389. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, February 13, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VI. Secret. SUBJECT /2/The President met with Feinberg from 1:20 to 1:47 p.m. on February 14. Feinberg had requested an appointment with the President before departing for Israel on February 18. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) A February 13 memorandum from Saunders to Rostow states that he had recommended that the President see Feinberg because circumstances might force substantial reductions in the previous year's levels of economic and military aid and the President himself should lay the groundwork for this. (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VI) In preparation for your talk with Abe Feinberg, you ought to know where we stand on this year's Israeli aid requests. State, Defense and AID are putting them all together, and Secretary Rusk will have one package of recommendations for you in the next two weeks. My preliminary feeling is that aid for them will be tough this year and that you may want to use your talk with Feinberg to lay the groundwork for a slim response. We need not feel defensive about this since our aid in FY 1966 was the highest single year ever by 25% because of the plane sale (see attached chart)./3/ /3/The chart is not attached. The Israelis argue that they need continued help over the next 2-3 years while they work their way through the austere economic measures necessary to make them more competitive in European markets and help close their trade gap. They point to their especially high debt repayments and their heavy defense burden. But given their substantial foreign exchange reserves, some of their points are exaggerated by normal aid standards. These austerity measures have thrown Israel into a recession, which we expect to be short-lived. The government allowed Israel's growth rate to slip to 7% in 1965 (previously over 10%) but was shocked when it slumped to 1-2% in 1966. This is probably a main reason for their aid requests. They've made six separate requests, totaling at least $75 million: 1. Grant military aid--$9.4 million. They've asked for 200 armed personnel carriers and $2 million in spares for tanks we've already sold. They are clearly trying to match our December Jordan package. Since their raid caused that package, no one here wants to give in on this. Besides, we've never given grant military aid to Israel, and no one feels we should break that precedent, especially so soon after the Israeli raid. JCS sees no serious military requirement for the APCs. However, Eshkol considers the APCs important, and we'll undoubtedly end up considering a credit sale, though State and Defense oppose. 2. Credits of $14 million to buy maintenance items for Hawk missiles and tanks. They want the same terms we gave on the 1962 Hawk sale (10% down, 10 years, 3.5%). Defense doesn't believe we should finance maintenance and, in any case, couldn't come close to 1962 terms today. However, if you feel it's essential to come up with some military help, there might be a little give here with harder terms. 3. Development loans of $20 million. They got only $10 million last year (plus $10 million Ex-Im), and we've already given them that $6 million left over from FY 1963. With today's even tighter aid criteria it will be tough to justify any AID lending at all, though Ex-Im loans are still possible. Even the Israelis know this request is unrealistic. 4. PL 480--$32 million (same as last year). Congress has been increasingly critical of highly concessional sales to Israel where per capita GNP is already higher than in several European countries. However, we could probably come up with $23 million on harder terms, even without wheat. 5. Deliver 8 aircraft next December instead of the 4 now scheduled. We all feel this would be desirable but, since these are new production items needed in VietNam, we'll want to hear Secretary McNamara's final view. 6. An exception to AID policy to let Israel bid on AID-financed fertilizer purchases for Korea and VietNam. AID will probably come around on this since we can pay half in dollars and half in excess Israeli pounds. In addition, we have just agreed to increase their cotton textile quota by 35%. In the background is desalting. Ambassador Bunker's report will be ready shortly. His economic study/4/ appears to show that for either a nuclear or an oil-fueled plant an outright grant of some $50 million would be required to produce water at realistic cost. He found Eshkol more relaxed on the timetable than he had expected. It doesn't look as if we'll be spending much money on this in FY 1967, but if we ever decide to go ahead, it will cost us quite a bit. Of course, you will want to hear from Bunker before you say anything to Feinberg that could be read as a commitment. /4/Bunker enclosed a February 15 memorandum on "Israeli Desalting Project: Economic and Engineering Aspects" with a February 17 letter to Rostow. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Desalting Projects, Vol. II) What this adds up to is that--with last year's high aid level behind and desalting possibly still ahead of us--we ought to be able to make a low year stick this year. Therefore, I'd propose leveling with Abe, explaining your problems and asking his help in making them clear to others. If you have a moment, it would be worth your time to skim the attached description of the overall US-Israeli balance sheet./5/ It was done for our panel of outside consultants on Middle Eastern affairs who met here over the weekend. It's a neat and straightforward statement of what we've done for Israel and how our relationship has been pretty much a one-way street. You might want to get this balance across to Abe as a means of letting him know there are limits. /5/The attachment, unsigned and undated, entitled "U.S.-Israel Relations," is not printed. Walt [Continue with the next documents] Volume XVIII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |