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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XVIII Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-67 Department of State |
 390. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, February 14, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. V. Secret. SUBJECT Secretary Katzenbach would like to discuss at lunch/2/ the UAR's April 1966 request for a new PL 480 agreement. This is the toughest--but the most important--decision facing us in the Middle East today. Many of us--and Nasser's vice president as well--feel we're rapidly sliding into a showdown. Nasser more and more sees us behind all his troubles in the Middle East. To us, the UAR looks increasingly incompatible in interests, outlook and temperament. /2/The President had lunch at 2 p.m. on February 14 with McNamara, Katzenbach, Rostow, White House Press Secretary George Christian, and Special Assistant to the President Joseph Califano. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) No record of the discussion has been found. Although Egypt needs the food, the real question is whether we try to maintain a relationship with Nasser. Last summer, we extended $70 million in CCC credit, but that's run out. The USSR tided Nasser over with 250,000 tons of grain--about five weeks' imports--and appears to have offered to help round up another 400,000. Even that will leave the UAR at least 600,000 tons short of its FY 1967 grain needs. But entirely apart from food needs, Nasser regards our decision as the main indication of whether or not we're out to get him. We have little else going for us, since our economic aid has shrunk to a little technical assistance and school feeding. One key question is whether abandoning the field would result in unchallenged Soviet influence or whether Nasser's own interest in maintaining his independence would bring him back to the West. Many of our friends--some Israelis, British and Saudis--have urged us to stand aside and let the full weight of Nasser's economic problems hem him in. His foreign exchange is at rock-bottom, and he has even had to default his latest repayment to the IMF. Yet it was interesting to hear that Israeli Teddy Kollek during his last trip here told Averell Harriman that we should "keep our relations with Nasser open and not leave the field to the Soviets." He felt we had given Nasser too much in the past but hoped we wouldn't go to the other extreme now. Since our effort over the past 5 years to get closer to Nasser has gained us little positive, it's tempting to try the tougher line. But we've received enough quiet signals from Nasser through Bob Anderson and other private Americans to make us wonder whether he isn't already as close to the brink of complete dependence on Moscow as he can afford. Most recently Nasser's top military man has invited a group of top-level US business executives to visit the UAR this Easter. If he is trying to find a western anchor again, it's hard to cut him adrift completely. Why should we care? We're all reluctant to picture the consequences of a break with Nasser. Arguing that line rubs us all the wrong way because no one likes the idea of paying off a bully. Nevertheless, there are few major situations affecting our interests in the Near East, where we don't bump in to Egyptian influence. Nasser could cut off important overflight rights--as he has just done on our airlift to Jordan./3/ He could turn the Arab boycott into an even more effective restraint on American trade. He can make plenty of trouble for friendly regimes--and for us--in Jordan, Saudi Arabia or Lebanon. He could cause trouble for our shipping in the Suez Canal, bring out the demonstrators against Wheelus Base, stir up more trouble for Israel via the Palestine Liberation Organization or even trigger the nationalization or harassment of our oil companies. /3/The UAR Foreign Office informed the Embassy on February 12 that the UAR Government had decided to cancel its previous permission for U.S. aircraft to overfly the UAR carrying arms for Jordan. (Telegram 4542 from Cairo, February 12; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 17-1 US) More positively, Nasser is still the most powerful figure in the Middle East. At least out of respect for Israel's power, he has restrained wilder Arabs who have pushed for a disastrous Arab-Israeli showdown. Despite its mounting economic problems, the UAR has the trained manpower and the will to modernize that will make it the most advanced nation in the area. Two American companies have brought in promising oil finds, and the chances of the UAR becoming a substantial oil exporter look good. It's hard to argue that we should burn all our bridges with the capital of the Arab world. Secretary Katzenbach has been considering four alternatives: 1. A $68 million agreement through June including 250,000 tons of wheat, 500,000 tons of corn and/or milo and some vegetable oil, tobacco and tallow. Dollar repayment over 10 years, 2 year grace, US Treasury rates. 2. A $52 million deal with all the above except wheat. Same terms. 3. A $25 million program with 250-300,000 tons of wheat and the remainder in other commodities. Dollar repayment over 15 years, no grace, Treasury rates. 4. A $17 million program of 250,000 tons of wheat, just matching the recent Soviet deal. Dollar repayment over 10 years. This spread of alternatives reflects the division of opinion. The first two are the choices posed by those concerned chiefly with the consequence for our Near East interests. The last two reflect concern with domestic reaction. AID and Doug MacArthur have predicted strong reaction on the Hill. We would also expect strong reaction from our friends in the area. But while I understand all the pressures for letting this decision ride, I have watched our relations with Nasser closely since 1961 and am reluctant to see us close this door. Our experience in Indonesia is strong argument for buying a little insurance against a better day. This program is not all political. The UAR is a natural potential showplace to demonstrate what can be done in agricultural production and population control. Its problems are as acute as anywhere, and yet it has the homogeneous population, compact area and happy combination of water, soil and climate to get relatively quick results. The government is putting more into agricultural development, and so far in FY 1967, it has bought some 700,000 tons of grain here on CCC credit. Time is running out, Ambassador Kamel has seen Secretary Rusk twice, and the Secretary has promised to get him an answer. This need not influence our decision, but in all fairness we ought to answer soon and not allow the decision to drift any longer. Our purpose at lunch is to get a sense of your priorities. Walt
391. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/ Washington, February 23, 1967, 6:54 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AE 11-2 ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Sterner; cleared by Davies, Atherton, Handley, and Wriggins, and in substance by Trevithick and Rochlin; and approved and initialed by Rusk. 142711. From Secretary to Ambassador Barbour. Your A-478/2/ describing conversations with two Israeli contacts suggests Israel could be much closer to nuclear weapons capability than we had supposed. We are requesting urgent assessment these and other recent reports by Washington intelligence community. While we will reserve judgment pending outcome that assessment, potential implication these reports makes it even more pressing to obtain response from Eshkol on our request for visit to Dimona. You will recall that on January 16 he promised invitation would be forthcoming "within a few weeks."/3/ You should inform Prime Minister that highest levels of USG are aware you requested GOI agreement to visit as long ago as November and are frankly disturbed at lack of GOI response. We hope Prime Minister will be able set date for visit in very near future. /2/Airgram A-478 from Tel Aviv, February 7, is filed as an attachment to a February 22 memorandum from Handley to Rusk, which summarized reports suggesting that Israel's nuclear program might be moving at a faster pace than previously indicated. (Ibid.) A February 17 memorandum from Davies to Bunker, outlining NEA views on the Israeli desalting project, states, "Some recent intelligence reports suggest that Israel may be constructing a chemical separation facility and proceeding so far in the production of bomb components that assembly of a nuclear weapon could be completed in 6-8 weeks." It states, however, that pending a fuller assessment, NEA was inclined to view these reports with reservations. (Ibid., E 11-3 ISR) In a March 9 letter to Davies, Barbour commented, "I was pleased to see the NEA paper's cautious appraisal of recent alarming reports on Israel's nuclear activities and intentions. Such caution is well placed. Moreover, my own impressions from such information as is available to us is that Dimona is not running at full blast." (Ibid.) /3/Barbour reported this conversation in telegram 2371 from Tel Aviv, January 16. (Ibid.) Rusk
392. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State/1/ Cairo, February 24, 1967, 0932Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 1 UAR-US. Confidential. 4793. 1. In farewell call Feb 23 on Anwar Sadat he remarked that US policy in Middle East and particularly toward UAR even worse than that of John Foster Dulles. Dulles had said flatly UAR broke and US had no intention of providing aid. We dangled hope of aid and never gave answer while at the same time he suspected we engaged in unfortunate behind scenes actions with enemies of UAR as well as arming them. Our delay in response brought forth speech by President last night/2/ with its many uncomplimentary references to US. /2/Battle reported in telegram 4780, February 23, that in a February 22 speech, Nasser made extensive attacks on the United States for creating, supporting, arming, and protecting Israel, supporting Arab "reactionaries," applying economic and psychological pressure against the UAR, and refusing to provide arms aid to Egypt in the 1950s. (Ibid., POL 15-1 UAR) 2. I very earnestly urged Sadat accept fact US had no basic goal in area other than peace and security and no chosen instrument. Reviewed many factors involved in world food problem. Pointed out that at various times we were accused being more partial one Arab than another but accusations often reflected inter-Arab differences. Arms sales to Jordan concerning which he had expressed alarm had initially stemmed from UAC levying of requirements on Jordan. What had happened is that events had changed relationships between Arabs and that what appeared satisfactory to UAR in past now suggested plotting by US which totally untrue. 3. Comment: Sadat highly emotional in charges against US altho very warm and cordial to me personally. Like many others he appears convinced indecision US on wheat reflects positive opposition UAR. We are getting this line from many quarters at present. Battle
393. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State/1/ Cairo, March 4, 1967, 1533Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UAR-US. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Jidda, London, and Amman. 5030. 1. I made farewell call which lasted one hour and ten minutes on President Nasser March 4. After exchange pleasantries during which he expressed regret my departure, I said I wished reflect on some of my final conclusions and impressions as I left this country where I had made many friends and in which I had had a very rewarding tour of duty. 2. I said I was more convinced than when I came of the rightness of US goals in the area. Seeking peace and stability as we do, we must attempt maintain as friendly relations as possible with as many countries as possible. This not an easy course. In large measure changes in relations Arab countries to each other frequently resulted in suspicions re US motives and aims. For example, I mentioned sales arms Jordan stemming from UAC assessment defense needs that country, an arrangement which Egyptians now appeared in some strange way view with suspicion. On Yemen, Saudis suspected we more tolerant Egyptian attitudes than of their own and Egyptians considered we supported Saudis. In truth we have no material interest in Yemen and wish only see peaceful resolution that problem, which is danger to relations between our friends the Saudis and our friends the Egyptians. In accordance his instructions, Hassan Sabry el Khouly and others his government have kept me fully informed re UAR efforts at various times resolve situation. I still hoped way could be found bring about peaceful resolution this difficult area problem. At various times Egyptians had indicated to me that if US wanted solution Yemen problem, we should play more active role that direction. I wanted to ask him today whether on my return Washington to assume broader responsibilities for area relations I should urge my government offer join in one of several offers mediate or take initiative on our own in that direction. 3. President then launched into lengthy discussion Yemen, saying he had gone to Jidda to conclude agreement Feisal against advice his colleagues and had entered agreement "on my own responsibility". As he landed for Jidda meetings, he felt nervous and uncertain, but felt he must make effort resolve conflict. Since that time many actions had entered into situation, including Islamic Pact, Aden problem and other difficulties. He could not at present be hopeful solution. Yemen operation not now costly to UAR although has been in past. UAR can remain indefinitely and will do so if necessary. He was always interested offers solution but not hopeful in view Feisal's arrangements Jordan and in view their determination to view his earlier efforts as sign weakness, which Jidda agreement had not in fact reflected. 4. I said I took it from his remarks that he would not oppose any efforts by US if we thought we could be helpful but he did not appear hold out much hope chance success any US efforts. He replied this was his attitude although he appeared pause and be somewhat reflective in his response. 5. Nasser then launched into thirty minute tirade of most emotional character yet displayed in my meetings with him. He said UAR proud, independent country with its own dignity. He had decided in thinking over my call on him to be very frank and he hoped I would not take offense at anything he said, but he must deal lucidly and frankly with issues. UAR would not respond US pressure. It did not want American wheat. During time we had provided wheat he had gone to bed each night disturbed that UAR dependent on US for food and had resented each item in American or world press reminding UAR that five out of each eight loaves of its bread were provided by US. UAR would not accept interference by other countries. It was not influenced by Russia and would not be. Whether he remained or not, attitudes UAR re its own independence would be consistent and those lieutenants he trained would take same position as he took. UAR had no designs other countries contrary our impression and our press but wanted, for example, Aden to be ruled by revolutionary forces and not British stooges. Re Israel, his views are well known. He hoped Arabs could return. 6. He then switched to IMF, asking why he should pay IMF 104 million dollar debt when it would not give him seventy million dollars to which he felt entitled. In meeting in that room a few days ago, when some of his colleagues voiced concern re UAR relations IMF, he had stated UAR must stand on own feet and if IMF and all Western Interests refused do business with UAR, UAR would still survive and make progress. UAR would have been better off if it had not in developing its economic plans based those plans upon continued supply wheat which had distorted development efforts by permitting broader program than justified. If any country attempted hurt UAR, UAR would respond and no doubt could do damage US and other countries. 7. I replied by asking his permission be as frank with him as he had been with me, saying I would not under any circumstances wish offend him in my last meeting but I must answer as frankly as he had on statements he had made. 8. The US had entered into food arrangement, which admittedly had become issue of its own between us, in hope providing help which would accelerate development and be of help to Egyptian people. Based on his speeches, it appeared he had given up hope continuing these arrangements before I had and before Executive Branch had completed deliberations on matter. During recent days, for example, consultations had been under way with Congressional leaders, that consultation had not been helped by his own statements and those of Heikal with respect our relations and motives. (I mentioned specifically latest Heikal article.) 9. He interrupted, saying he had given up hope of wheat several months ago and reminded me that he had never before brought up wheat in conversation with me and that I had always raised matter first. He could not approve efforts his Ambassador Washington to obtain wheat in manner that appeared be begging on knees. 10. I went on to say US Government and I personally respected need for UAR be independent, dignified country and we wanted see it develop viable economy and we still hoped for success in those goals and in his achievements and aims for his people. 11. He referred to fact that he owned several newspapers in Beirut and that Saudis and Jordanians also had newspaper spokesman in area. Indicated he had been restrained in his response many of their attacks on UAR but could only accept so much and had had to respond to them. 12. I said that I wished remind him as I had in past that he was world figure and that each utterance coming from him was read and interpreted throughout world and that his remarks more important than newspaper stories one kind or another. While this great compliment to his influence in world, it was also responsibility to bear as I well recognized. I said there was no doubt ability many countries hurt each other, including ourselves, but we must find way to build lasting friendship which I was convinced both sides really wanted. I hoped he could find satisfactory relationships IMF and with West. He replied, "If we cannot, we will go on with other countries." 13. In closing I repeated that US policy in area had not changed and that we sought continued friendship UAR and that while I had not succeeded in removing suspicions and doubts and problems from agenda, I had every intention in new assignment continue my efforts and I hoped he would view future as long time indeed in which we would try overcome various problems between US in relations often marked by such ups and downs. 14. Nasser was more emotional than I have ever seen him and at moments developed glaze over eyes typical of that we have seen when he makes speeches. He was at all times extremely cordial to me, very friendly and warm and at various moments of tirade against US said not to take it personally. In view his attitudes re US mediation Yemen, I cannot be hopeful. Suggest we wait few days, however, to see whether idea picked up by lower level officials. Battle
394. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas/1/ Washington, March 6, 1967, 1321Z. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. V. Secret; Eyes Only. The message is dated March 4; it was received at the LBJ Ranch at 10:21 a.m. on March 6. A handwritten "L" on the telegram indicates that it was seen by the President. CAP 67111. Fresh from his stop in Cairo, Hal Saunders of my staff who is quietly touring the Middle East/2/ has reported the following. /2/Saunders visited the UAR, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, and Israel. He reported his conclusions in a May 16 memorandum to Rostow, which Rostow forwarded to the President on May 17. (Ibid., Name File, Saunders Memos) 1. Nasser should be told soon one way or the other about wheat. It has come to symbolize our future intent toward him and his regime. 2. Help on the IMF negotiations is nearly as important. Officials argue they've cut expenditures, have made real economic achievements. Their self help performance is "relatively positive." 3. No one in Cairo believes the Soviets and Nasser are working hand in glove. There is parallelism of policy, but Cairo wants to avoid Soviet control. 4. Because the UAR is the chief power in the Middle East, and modernizing rapidly, Saunders believes we should build some kind of new relationship. 5. He doubts this can be done unless you and Nasser meet somewhere to define your areas of common interest and disagreement. He acknowledges the risks, but hopes we will consider this carefully, since Cairo persists in seeing everything we do in the area as directed against him--those not actively with him must be against him. (WWR Comment: Perhaps a letter from you could do the job.) 6. Hal commends a cautious but revitalized policy to rebuild our position in Cairo, avoiding equally the over-enthusiasm of the early 1960's and the distrust of today. Comment We've shown this to Nick Katzenbach only. He plans to pursue wheat for the UAR a bit further on the Hill before making a recommendation to you. Probably a small amount as a gift, about matching the Soviet Union's 250,000 ton gift (which Ellender, among others, seems to prefer over a credit sale!). We have some doubts on the timing, because it may be seen both in Egypt and Arabia as a reward for raising hell. But this will be looked into before the recommendation comes to you. Hal will be back in ten days, when we can go into the complex of Middle East issues with a fresh look. Fm Harold Saunders 8693 To the White House eyes only for Walt Rostow and Howard Wriggins Following impressions my intensive talks in Cairo with Foreign Minister, Treasury and Economy Ministers and others bear on your wheat decision. First. We ought to say something to Egyptians about wheat soon one way or the other. Dragging out line that we have food request "under consideration" reaps all disadvantages of negative answer without gaining advantages of keeping door open. Months of ambiguity plus other events Mid East have convinced Egyptians we have cast our lot with other side and for that reason have decided against wheat aid. They say bitterly that even Dulles gave them an answer. Second. Wheat decision unfortunately more than ever symbol our future intent because it involves both development and human requirements. We would be a lot better off if we could get off this wicket but for moment it looks as if wheat alone can break stalemate. I think we might get away with dollar sale as long as grace period long enough to cover next three years which Egyptians see as period of real economic pinch. After that, they not euphoric but do seem have reason hope oil and other slowly increasing exports plus improved import substitution will begin pay off. Third. To economic insiders, help in new IMF negotiations almost as important as food decision. Main point made to me by Nazi Deif and Hamed El Sayeh whom you met last fall is that they have succeeded in bringing expenditures under control in six months since IMF talks began. Therefore new situation exists here and Gunter Mission must come end March with some give its position. Fourth. Despite political symbolism both these issues and contrary conception created by usual intra-USG justification our aid program in UAR. This far from purely political program designed bribe Nasser keep out of our UAR. Washington, especially the press and Congress, badly needs understand that UAR not just proverbial rathole down which we pour our aid. All Washington fully aware foreign exchange bind. Point not widely appreciated is degree to which this a place of real achievement and sound planning. I now understand why World Bank relatively optimistic despite gaps in execution. I well know weakness this argument in offsetting Nasser's polemics, but it important President know that self-help case relatively positive. Fifth. I found no one Cairo willing assert that Nasser and Soviets working hand in glove. Soviet-like political model adopted for pragmatic reasons since Western style democracy not suitable Nasser's style. Hard evidence any firm Moscow-Cairo understanding lacking. Soviet influence and parallelism interests substantial. But Egyptian desire avoid Soviet control is unanimous impression. Sixth. Because Egyptians are making honest development effort and do not look like Communist tools, believe it still possible build some kind US-UAR relationship if we consider it worthwhile. After seeing energy with which Egypt modernizing, I do not see how we can do otherwise, though I recognize domestic pressures may tip judgment other way. Common argument for relationship is that Nasser can cause us so much trouble elsewhere. This true but in my view misses simpler main point that Egypt clearly chief power modern Middle East. Seventh. If we do want to sustain long-term US position Cairo, only sound foundation I can see is eventual meeting between Nasser and President. Because our contradictory interests in Near East will always feed Egyptian suspicion we working against them, only way establish accurate picture limits our objectives is for two Presidents reach understanding each other's purposes and agree on inevitable areas disagreement. I could see this working out much as President's understanding with Ayub. I realize hard thought needed weigh risks for President against disadvantages, but I am convinced as never before that wide gulf misunderstanding unlikely be bridged any other way. Ambassador Battle essentially agrees, though he wisely cautious we should not try this unless we willing sustain followup. My main reason for arguing this case is that our biggest problem in Cairo today is that no amount of logic sufficient persuade Egyptians that everything we do in Near East not directed at them. It amazing what shreds of evidence they have woven together to prove this to themselves. These not just debating points. Every official I talked to from Foreign Minister on down obviously sincerely believes this. Main thread this fabric of illogic seems be philosophy those not helping them must be against them. Unfortunately, there just enough truth their evidence to make it difficult refute. For instance, editorial and Congressional statements that get most play made by people who have in fact chosen sides here. Even more damaging, McNamara statement that tensions in Middle East "sparked by UAR" considered coup de grace in argument that we view Cairo as the enemy. Therefore, if we wish stop drifting this part of world one major pillar revitalized policy must be some effort rebuild in Cairo. Last five years have taught us not go too far too fast or expect too much. Fortunately international tools at hand in IMF and World Bank study and not impossible try moving gradually to position we shooting for in 1961-62.
395. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, March 15, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Israeli Aid, 5/67. Secret. Johnson's handwritten note on the memorandum reads: "Put on my desk & get chart on our Israel aid by years. L." SUBJECT 1. Your talk with Abe coincides with the arrival here of State-DOD recommended response to recent Israeli assistance requests./2/ /2/A March 8 memorandum from Rostow to the President states that Feinberg came in that day after his return from Israel to report "a strong feeling in Israel that we are shifting our policy away from them." Feinberg urged U.S. responsiveness on the Israeli requests, especially by granting or allowing the Israelis to purchase 200 armored personnel carriers and by providing credit for Hawk missile and Patton tank spare parts. (Ibid.) 2. Abe has reported that exaggerated Israeli publicity on our shipments to Jordan, pressures from Syria, and economic recession resulting from overenthusiastic anti-inflationary measures have left the Israeli Government nervous and discouraged. 3. You may wish to consider the following factors in assessing what we ought to do for them this year: (a) Their December raid on Samu precipitated our emergency military assistance to Jordan, costing us about $9 million this FY for defensive military equipment. The Joint Chiefs hold this has not changed the military balance in the area. In sum, the Israelis do not have much of a claim on us for the steps we took to help sustain Hussein after their raid nearly brought him down. However, Nick and Arthur told the Jewish community leaders we would take our increased commitment to Jordan into account "in giving sympathetic consideration to Israeli requests for assistance." While we made no commitment to match exactly for Israel what their action at Samu forced us to in Jordan, Arthur, under continuing pressure in New York, feels strongly we should do nearly that. (b) Israel has not yet given us permission to visit the nuclear plant at Dimona. Our last visit was in April, although we had an informal understanding that visits would be allowed every six months. (c) They have not yet replied to your letter of May 21, 1965 to Eshkol urging acceptance of IAEA safeguards. (d) We have already increased our textile import quota by some 60%, a concession worth $2.5 million in Israeli foreign exchange earnings. 4. State and DOD have recommended the restricted package (items (c) to (f), below). Items (a) and (b) are fall-backs suggested by State. Nick recommends that no package be agreed until firm arrangements have been made for the next inspection of Dimona. (a) Sell 100 Armoured Personnel Carriers on commercial credit. (The Israelis asked for grant assistance for 200 APC's. DOD recommends against supplying any APC's now, but State believes half their request, on a sales basis, would be tolerable, and could be justified as improving their border patrol capability. Value roughly $3.7 million.) (b) Provide standard DOD credit for Hawk and Patton tank spares. (DOD opposes, since we do not usually provide credit for spares, but an exception in this case is recommended as an inconspicuous way to help on the military side. Value roughly $14 million.) (c) "Fifth echelon" maintenance facilities for the Hawk missile system. (State and DOD recommend this.) (d) Encourage an Ex-Im loan for a fertilizer plant. (The Israelis asked for a $20-million development loan, but they are too well-off to qualify for a DL.) (e) Permission to bid on potash and phosphate fertilizer sales to South Korea and Vietnam. (AID reluctantly approves.) (f) PL 480--$19 million of a commodity mix, without wheat, payment 75% in dollars, 25% local currency. (They asked for $35 million. State and Agriculture recommend.) 5. An important question is how we communicate this package, if it meets with your approval. Ideally, it would be best to tell Feinberg none of these details, but reserve them for official discussions with Ambassador Harman. If possible, it would be best simply to hear him out sympathetically, indicate that our careful studies are nearing conclusion, and remind him of some of the steps Israel has not taken to be helpful to us. But if you feel it necessary to tell him something, you could indicate that some APC's will be available on terms to be discussed with the Israeli Government, and that the matter of spares will also be discussed. State's documents are attached,/3/ but they are so complicated that we have not referred to them in this memo. /3/Two March 15 memoranda from Katzenbach to the President are filed with Rostow's memorandum. One set forth recommendations with Department of Defense and AID concurrence. The other suggested a fallback position if the President wished to be more responsive to Israel's requests. It also stated that the Israeli Government had not responded to the latest request for a Dimona inspection, that Eshkol had not replied to Johnson's letter of May 21, 1965 (Document 218), urging Israeli acceptance of IAEA safeguards, and that Israeli officials had not been forthcoming about their missile development program. It recommended no response to Israel's current aid requests at least until arrangements had been made for the next Dimona inspection. Walt
396. Memorandum From the Country Director for the United Arab Republic (Bergus) to Lucius D. Battle/1/ Washington, March 16, 1967. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UAR-US. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Bergus. Battle left Cairo on March 5 and assumed the duties of Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs on April 5. SUBJECT Your farewell talk with Nasser demonstrates that once again CIA operations [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] have created a major problem in US-UAR relations./2/ The response of CIA here to Nasser's allegations/3/ [2 lines of source text not declassified] was unsatisfactory. CIA appears to hope that these incidents can be swept under the rug. This should not be allowed to happen. At the same time I think that any approaches made by the Department to CIA on this subject should place the matters raised by Nasser with you in their proper perspective. These particular incidents simply reinforce some basic suppositions which I believe that many of us have felt for a long time. I would hope that our discussions with CIA would therefore concentrate primarily on the basics to the end that a more acceptable method [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] can be found. These observations are submitted to you in line with this hope. /2/Battle reported in telegram 5031 from Cairo, March 4, that during his March 4 conversation with Nasser (see Document 393), Nasser referred to their December 10 conversation (see footnote 3, Document 341), told Battle that the UAR Government had information about two alleged former CIA agents, and charged that a third country's contacts with the Egyptian army were under U.S. direction. Battle stated that he was unaware of any information concerning the charges and that he wanted to review them and deal harshly with any such actions, which were clearly contrary to U.S. policy. (Department of State, INR Historical Files, Roger Channel Telegrams, Cairo) /3/At a March 16 meeting among Davies, Bergus, Gardner, and a CIA representative, the CIA representative stated that there had been no thought of using the alleged agents to work against Nasser, that the charge that a third country's contacts with the Egyptian army were under U.S. direction was a lie, and that "it was ridiculous to think that the Agency had any thought of trying to overthrow Nasser." (Ibid., NEA/CIA Weekly Meetings, 1967-1969) In the Near East CIA is happiest and most productive in those situations where it has been welcomed by the local authorities and used by them as an adjunct to its own internal security services. [2 lines of source text not declassified] These close relations naturally create an instinctive warm glow between the CIA and these particular countries. While this in itself is not reprehensible, I do believe that it colors the attitudes of the CIA and contributes to a readiness there to divide the Near East into "the good guys" and "the bad guys". I think that this factor should be constantly borne in mind both by the CIA leadership and our own policymakers on the seventh floor and in the White House. At issue is the question as to whether the US can in fact accept the proposition that some at least of the Near East states are fully sovereign, are jealous of their sovereignty and are legitimately entitled to that jealousy. There should also be recognition that CIA in the 50's had and then lost [1 line of source text not declassified]. That there should be feelings of nostalgia for this among the CIA leadership is probably also natural but such feelings should not be allowed to color judgments. CIA, at least in the Near East, has yet to prove that it can operate usefully and effectively in a sophisticated and/or hostile environment. Since the loss of its [2 lines of source text not declassified] the CIA has been able to produce very little by way of useful intelligence [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] UAR. This little has been produced at considerable risk to our relations and presumably considerable cost to the taxpayer. At the same time intelligence targets in the UAR are probably increasing in number. We may have come to the point where the experts should make a basic re-examination of targets in the UAR and methods of achieving them. Hide-bound attitudes as to methods plus the nostalgic hostility towards the Nasser regime mentioned above can only give us more trouble in Egypt. [5-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] The only safe assumption is that the UAR is probably aware of most, if not all, of our intelligence operations in Egypt or with Egyptians in other countries. From this assumption flow two rather important considerations: 1) We are constantly at risk that the UAR will blow an operation at a time and in circumstances of its own choosing, 2) That Egyptian informants are being coached to tell us what the UAR wants us to hear. This must be kept in mind in evaluating the product of such informants.
397. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, March 17, 1967. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VI. Confidential. Prepared by Rostow. Copies were sent to the State Department and to Wriggins. In conversation with Mr. Abe Feinberg yesterday/2/ the President indicated: /2/The President met with Feinberg and Rostow from 1:20 to 1:46 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) 1. That before we moved on the Israel package, we would like a date set for a visit to Dimona. 2. Without making it explicitly contingent, he referred to the failure of Eshkol to respond to the President's letter of March May 21, 1965 recommending accepting IAEA safeguards. 3. He indicated some of the headings of a possible Israeli package, pointing out that unresolved disagreements existed within the government. 4. He said he would get to it after Guam./3/ /3/President Johnson met with South Vietnamese officials on Guam March 20-21. 5. He instructed me to assure that State, Defense, and AID came closer together on an agreed package. Mr. Feinberg said that he had strongly made the case that Israel could not expect U.S. grants in the military field; that the APC's were extremely important to give a sense of security in the face of continuing Syrian raids and incidents; he pressed hard for feed grains rather than wheat in the PL 480 program. WR
398. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/ Washington, March 19, 1967, 4:51 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 32-1 ISR-JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted and approved by Robert B. Houghton and cleared by Davies and Sterner. Also sent to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, Damascus, and Jerusalem. 158247. Ref: Amman's 2566 and 2567./2/ /2/Telegram 2566 from Amman, March 19, commented on a telegram from the Defense Attache Office in Tel Aviv (not found) transmitting a message from Rabin to Khammash. The telegram expressed concern about the possibility of another Israeli attack on Jordan and recommended warning the Israelis against the possible "catastrophic consequences" of such an attack. Noting that the Jordanians had rejected any direct contact with Israel in the wake of the Samu raid, it recommended that if the Israelis had information for the Jordanians, they should forward it to the Embassy in Amman, which would pass it to the appropriate authorities. (Ibid.) Telegram 2567 from Amman, March 19, reported that Khammash confirmed that it was still Jordan's policy to take all possible action to prevent infiltration into Israel. (Ibid.) 1. While we believe GOJ fear of Israeli retaliatory raid at this juncture is exaggerated, Dept in complete accord Embassy Amman's analysis likely consequences in Jordan should raid take place. In circumstances, Ambassador should, at level he considers appropriate, inform GOI soonest of GOJ's concern and efforts GOJ making prevent infiltration drawing on substance reftels. Ambassador should leave GOI in no doubt as to Dept's strong disapprobation retaliatory raid against Jordan which we firmly believe could have catastrophic consequences for Jordanian regime. GOI should also be made aware of Department's conviction that GOJ doing everything within its capabilities to stop infiltration./3/ /3/Barbour reported in telegrams 2985 and 2990 from Tel Aviv, both March 20, that the Embassy had conveyed the Department's position to the Israeli Government. (Ibid.) 2. Embassy Amman's offer to pass to GOJ any appropriate info relevant to border situation should be made to GOI./4/ /4/Burns reported in telegram 2597 from Amman, March 21, that he relayed the substance of Rabin's message to Khammash, who replied that arrangements for direct Jordanian-Israeli patrols, telephone contact, or direct exchange of information were politically impossible at that time but that Khammash would be happy to receive information conveyed through U.S. Government channels. (Ibid., POL 32-1 ISR-JORDAN) Telegram 159758 to Tel Aviv, March 21, stated that although the Department agreed to a U.S. role as a channel of information in this instance, it considered that the Mixed Armistice Commission was the proper "third party" in such cases and did not wish to be regularly involved as a channel between parties. (Ibid.) Rusk
399. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/ Washington, March 24, 1967, 5:11 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 17 UAR-US. Secret; Limdis. Drafted and approved by Battle and cleared by Bergus. Also sent to Jidda. 162169. Following uncleared memcon is Noforn, FYI only and subject to revision: At his request UAR Ambassador Kamel called on Secretary Rusk March 23. In beginning Ambassador referred his likely departure indicating that while he had no orders he had received indications likely assignment European post. He then reviewed history US-UAR relations over recent years emphasizing that US interests in Middle East great and preservation those interests depended in part on US relations UAR. During periods those relations good US interests better protected than in periods strain between two countries. Non-alignment basic to UAR policy and without non-alignment friction between Great Powers could develop with strong likelihood confrontation in area particularly in view increasing importance Soviets attach Middle East. Over recent years basic US presence has been PL 480 wheat. Kamel now under specific instructions not ask for wheat although purely personally he recognizes wheat has been major counter Soviet influence. While wheat arrangements between us now discontinued must make major and speedy effort find way restore relations between us. Situation now highly delicate but not impossible overcome. Kamel recommended we search for new avenues cooperation but was not specific in suggestions. Urged we take new look at Yemen and as he had suggested many times before recommended offer US good offices to bring about solution this difficult problem. UAR does not wish overthrow Faisal and has no desire harm US interest in area. Faisal on other hand appears desire prolong Yemen conflict to bring about US-UAR military confrontation which would be very difficult situation for both countries. Essential US overcome belief in UAR that US does not want conflict to end and condones Faisal's actions. Ambassador Battle recalled suggestion he made President Nasser during their last meeting re possible US willingness help pave way solution. Neither President Nasser nor Vice Presidents Amer and Sadat to whom similar suggestion advanced appeared encourage possibility. Kamel responded by urging US make another effort this direction. Kamel then reviewed importance Western position UAR and expressed concern difficulties with US increased as result absence relations with UK. He urged US encourage UK take initial step to bring about resumption relations, since UK larger power and must not be reluctant make first move. In summary Kamel urged early action by US find modus vivendi, based on continuation icebox policy re Israel and effort restore waning confidence between US-UAR. He emphasized again situation sensitive but controllable. Secretary in responding expressed concern difficulty US had to get across fact to Nasser that US wants good relations UAR. Expressed concern that Nasser has concluded for reasons not clear to us that US wishes ill to UAR regime. This not the case with President Kennedy, President Johnson nor Secretary Rusk. Suspicions erode confidence and undoubtedly affect willingness Nasser listen to us in our statements desire maintain good relations. Secretary agreed Israeli problem probably manageable and domestic pressures not as important an influence politically as some Arab observers believe and not of nature to eliminate chance good relations. Secretary then mentioned Arab neighbors afraid of UAR. Nasser has created impressions that have led to fear of his intentions. Leadership cannot be demanded, it must be granted. If UAR wished to lead Arabs and Arabs willing to be led US would have no objection but this would be different situation from insistence and coercion. We would hope Nasser could find way to reassure Arabs including King Faisal of peaceful intentions in manner which would remove attitudes of fear. One effect of level of arms Russia has put into UAR is to upset equilibrium and raise concerns other countries. Imperative some effort be made settle arms race. Once in past Secretary had asked Gromyko whether Russia willing assist in limiting arms race. Gromyko had replied affirmatively with respect nuclear arms but negatively with respect conventional arms. Therefore must conclude USSR considers present policy advantageous to Russian interest particularly when Russians make public reference to special friendships with UAR, Algeria and Syria. Another point of difficulty is that Nasser has never fully understood problems inherent in dealing with giant democracy and all its complexities. What is said can make tremendous difference in attitudes and speech such as that on February 22 can cause great harm. This particular speech came at moment of consultation Congressional leaders re new PL 480 agreement. While US does not need flattery or cajoling silence itself might be great contribution. One channel we must look to in period strain is private field. Business ties and private investment to extent UAR wishes permit can help improve political relations. Secretary agreed consider various points made by Ambassador and expressed appreciation his efforts over past years improve relations between US-UAR. Rusk [Continue with the next documents] Volume XVIII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |