NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein.
| The State Department web site below is a permanent electronic archive of information released prior to January 20, 2001. Please see www.state.gov for material released since President George W. Bush took office on that date. This site is not updated so external links may no longer function. Contact us with any questions about finding information. NOTE: External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views contained therein. |
 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XVIII Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-67 Department of State |
 370. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan/1/ Washington, December 13, 1966, 9:34 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Atherton and Marshall W. Wiley; cleared by Handley, Macomber, and in substance by Wriggins and Hoopes; and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to London. 102121. Deliver to Ambassador Opening of Business December 14. 1. Khammash had appointment with Secretary McNamara morning December 13. We have sent to you by septel through Defense channels substance of response given Khammash at that meeting./2/ Response presented to Khammash as package having SecDef approval but not yet cleared throughout USG. We anticipate King will receive message from Khammash early December 14 reporting discussion. Khammash was very disappointed over amount equipment under consideration and King may have similar reaction. /2/See Document 367. 2. You should seek immediate audience with King and inform him President is sending Ambassador Macomber as his special emissary to give King full benefit USG views re GOJ request. President requests that King receive Ambassador Macomber, whom he has designated both as person favorably and personally known to King and as one who has been intimately involved in Washington deliberations this subject. 3. Macomber arrival now planned for Friday, December 16, and we prefer postpone discussions on force and equipment levels of JAA and economic and budgetary matters until he arrives Amman. Talking points for Macomber will be sent septel./3/ /3/Telegram 102795 to Amman, December 14. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 US/MACOMBER) 4. It essential that King not take action inconsistent with existing relationship between US and Jordan as emotional reaction to report received from Khammash. If you have any reason believe that King will take steps toward establishment Military Directorate for West Bank or other action detrimental our objectives, you should advise him that we believe this would have very serious consequences for Jordan and might seriously complicate US-Jordan relations. 5. FYI. Package we are offering GOJ represents both painful and substantial effort on our part, including diversion from other country programs in present extremely tight MAP funding situation. We aware it falls far short of King's request, but hope Macomber mission with your help will forestall drastic reaction damaging to our own and GOJ interests while we endeavor persuade King of necessity adopting more realistic course. To this end, our approach is to offer prompt delivery of significant equipment package and our assent to pay raise while sending Macomber to discuss USG concern re longer term implications for aid levels and Jordan's economic future which larger program, particularly increased force levels, would involve. End FYI. Katzenbach
371. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/ Washington, December 15, 1966, 6:03 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19-8 US-JORDAN. Secret. Drafted by Davies, cleared by Handley, and approved by Katzenbach. 103435. Acting Secretary saw Ambassador Harman and Evron 14th to inform them of USG decision to respond to King Hussein's request for aid by offering to supply small quantity arms. Package described as between $6 and $7 million, less than 5% of what King had asked. General description of items given when pressed by Israelis. Harman said his government would be most concerned about supply of artillery and repeatedly asked for details. Noted Eban's remark re tradition of working closely to resolve problems and expressed hope same policy would apply now. Stressed difficult psychological atmosphere existing in Israel and danger of leak on proposal without prior joint planning, particularly when Knesset in session. Acting Secretary indicated some better idea of items involved would be given but stressed that even considerably larger package would have no impact on military balance. He said that Jordan's need for defense on border other than Israeli could not be discounted. He pointed out the massive shopping list requested is what Hussein and his military experts feel is absolutely necessary to stabilize situation and we have task of working from list. We cannot reject list in entirety and substitute only police equipment nor can we delete principal items and achieve our objectives. These latter being: (1) to permit continuance Jordanian policies of restraint and moderation, particularly in connection with prevention of terrorist acts from Jordanian territory, (2) to assist King in his efforts to keep other Arab troops out of his country and, (3) to provide equipment of type not requiring increase in force levels of Jordanian Army. Davies seeing Evron 15th to discuss further nature of package./2/ /2/A summary of the conversation is in telegram 103654 to Tel Aviv, December 15. (Ibid.) Katzenbach
372. Memorandum From W. Howard Wriggins of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/ Washington, December 20, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. III. Confidential. SUBJECT Hussein and Macomber are bargaining hard./2/ /2/Macomber's reports from Amman are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 US/MACOMBER. Hussein welcomes the McNamara package, believes that the drama of the airlift will be very helpful, as will 6 F-104's in advance. He will do all in his power to prevent the stationing of non-Jordanian Arab troops in Jordan; he will continue his moderate policy toward Israel. Now remains at issue his force level. Macomber has pressed hard for no increase but for a substantial improvement in quality. General Khammash wants an increase of 10,000 from the present 50,000 on deck to 60,000. However, Macomber believes the King is under pressure to increase numbers as well as quality--his generals do not find it credible that they can meet the threat from both Israel and Syria without a numerical increase. (Note: The United Arab Command's plans for Jordan implied a total strength of 75,000 including an 8,500 national guard. The Government of Jordan has authorized a strength of 55,000, but had not gone farther than 50,000, a level we had never formally agreed to.) Macomber believes a 2,000-man increase is reasonable to absorb the new equipment we are adding. He hopes to hold the line at that. But if he can't, he feels the pressure is strong enough to warrant taking out a small insurance policy by accepting a 5,000-man increase, but for one year only. On budget costs, we and they had reached agreement on the Jordanian defense budget of some $54 million. We have been providing a declining level of budgetary support ($37 million in 1962, $32 million in 1966). We have told Congress that we are continuing to reduce this support. And we had planned cuts of $5 million a year beginning this year. DoD estimates that apart from the costs of the McNamara package the add-on costs are as follows: 1. pay raise: $6 million Where will this $12 million additional come from? 1. Khammash says he can cover these costs for one year out of UAC funds (though we are somewhat skeptical). 2. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait could be tapped by Jordan, with our backing, in the event the UAC contribution does not come through (but we're already expecting them to pick up the $70 million balance from the tank and plane sales and therefore can't expect much more). 3. We ourselves could scratch our $5 million cut in budget support, and might put in some additional contingency fund if necessary (though this would undercut the important goal of shifting Jordan to development funding). I assume the President would prefer to satisfy them with a bit more cash in the form of budget support than have a new crisis on his hands. Have you any reaction to the above before I join in a State-Defense meeting at 10:45?/3/ /3/The memorandum bears no indication of Rostow's reaction.
373. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State/1/ Amman, December 22, 1966, 0001Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 US/MACOMBER. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. 1570. From Macomber. Deptel 106069./2/ /2/Telegram 106069 to Amman, December 20, authorized Macomber to accept an increase of 2,000 in the force level and to accept another 1,000 if he was convinced it was absolutely necessary, stated that the United States would expect to share the burden of increased budgetary costs of an agreed force build-up, authorized him to reduce the cut in U.S. budget support for fiscal year 1967 to $2 or $3 million, and reminded him that he was authorized to yield the entire $5 million if he considered it absolutely necessary. It instructed Macomber to try to discourage the Jordanians from exercising their option to purchase 24 additional aircraft on or about January 1, 1967, and to advise the King that the United States was not prepared to recede from the terms of their agreement on payment for the aircraft. (Ibid.) 1. Concluded negotiations with King Hussein afternoon December 21. In course of this and earlier meetings we have come to following understandings: 2. King does not agree with our belief that there has been no basic change in Israeli policy toward Jordan. He understands, however, that US response is predicated on this assumption and aimed primarily at easing current situation, rather than dealing with longer term threat of revised nature. 3. His Majesty understands very difficult position facing us should it turn out that dramatic effort to strengthen Jordan army along lines of McNamara package was happening in apparent conjunction with introduction of foreign Arab troops into Jordan. While understanding the implications of this for USG, he also feels that introduction of foreign troops is incompatible with Jordan's own interests. He cannot give an absolute guarantee that he will be able to keep foreign troops out of his country but he does guarantee to the President that he will do all he can to keep them out. 4. The King has committed himself to hold increase in current actual force levels (50,000) to an increment of 3,000. He wishes President to know that he understands and shares US concern for escalating troop strength. He asks him to understand, however, that some increase at this time is absolutely essential. He also wishes to personally assure the President that at earliest opportunity he will try to cut back his troop strength. He has specifically agreed one year from now to reexamine need for additional 3,000 troops in light of political and financial conditions existing at that time. 5. King intends to continue his moderate policies and measures to enhance area stability. In this connection, Jordan will persist in its efforts to prevent terrorist infiltration into Israel. 6. King Hussein understands that USG is fully prepared honor US-Jordanian sales agreements of 1964 and 1965 provided GOJ can continue to meet payments on schedule from funds obtained from sources external to Jordan. He understands also that US not prepared to alter terms of these agreements. He knows we are willing to give vigorous diplomatic support to GOJ effort obtain necessary funds from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. He is fully aware, too, our position that any funds obtained from such sources or from UAC would be applied first to meeting GOJ obligations under US purchase agreements and would be available for general support of GOJ forces only after US obligations met. (In early February King plans to visit Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in search of funds; and in March will go to Libya for same purpose.) 7. With respect to option to purchase 24 additional aircraft,/3/ King understands that we are prepared interpret "on or about January 1" liberally and that we believe it would be preferable wait to exercise this option until he has, with our support, obtained necessary funds from Saudi Arabia or Kuwait. In any event, he understands if GOJ exercises option in January, payments totalling 5.4 million will have to be paid in January to USG and that these obligations would have prior claim on UAC funds over their use to finance any increase in force levels. /3/After extensive U.S.-Jordan discussions in early 1967 on this subject, Burns reported in telegram 2938 from Amman, April 12, that he met with Khammash, who was authorized by the King to conclude the revision of the F-104 package. The Jordanian Government was exercising its option for 6 additional F-104s and planned to exercise its option for the remaining 18 aircraft in March 1968. Delivery of the 18 aircraft currently on order was to begin in July 1967 and continue through June 1968. Delivery of the next 18 aircraft was to begin in March 1969. Payment due in 1967 on the ground package and the first 18 aircraft would be $26.5 million, with the possibility of deferring $2 million until 1968. (Ibid., DEF 19-8 US-JORDAN) 8. King understands that we acquiesce on enlisted men's pay raise of magnitude of twenty-five percent. In our agreeing to this, he understands that we will take raise into account in later negotiations for a new ceiling in Jordanian military budgetary expenditures to replace current 19.2 million dinar limitation. 9. I have informed King that under difficult political and financial circumstances he facing USG will not proceed with all $5 million projected cut in our budget support for FY 67. I have therefore indicated that, subject to Congressional appropriations, our budget support payments for the coming year will be reduced to $27 million rather than to $25 million. Also indicated that in restoring a portion of our cut I would have to make it clear that all our budget support for forthcoming year would be subject to 57 percent special letter of credit arrangement as we had earlier informed his government. 10. On basis of foregoing I have also told Hussein that we will deliver the equipment listed in McNamara package and make every effort to airlift a substantial portion of this equipment to Jordan in next 30 to 60 days. I have indicated that it will not be possible to augment package to extent he and General Khammash requested in our first meeting, but have given him list of machine guns, radios and communication wire, as spelled out Deptel 104754,/4/ noting that we were prepared to add these items to initial McNamara list. King expressed disappointment that package still did not include upgunning of M-48 tanks. He understands, however, that while this request can be considered on another, later occasion, it is not part of our current package. /4/Dated December 18. (Ibid.) 11. While indicating disappointment that other items had not been added to McNamara package, King Hussein said that present package dramatically flown in to Jordan will help situation here "very, very much." 12. King believes that advance loan of six F-104's, and their presence here will be most helpful. I have confirmed that we will attempt to deliver them to Jordan in course of January and early February. King understands that when American pilots are piloting the planes they will be used only for training of Jordanian co-pilots. He has also guaranteed that every effort will be made to avoid these planes coming into combat with any of Jordan's neighbors as long as they are being serviced on ground by US personnel, even when they are being piloted by Jordanians. Additionally, he is aware that if other foreign aircraft should be stationed in Jordan while the F-104's are still here on a loan basis, we will have to reexamine question of whether they should remain. 13. We have agreed on proposed text for public announcement of package along lines suggested Deptel 106068,/5/ with paragraph added for use in Jordan only. (Text being sent separately.)/6/ Hussein would like to make announcement Friday morning Amman time and agrees with us that numbers and types of equipment should not be revealed publicly. /5/Dated December 20. (Ibid.) /6/The text was transmitted in telegram 1572 from Amman, December 21. (Ibid.) 14. In course my final meeting with Hussein on December 21, we also discussed tactics of forthcoming Cairo meeting as well as King's current thinking with respect to changes in his government. These discussions reported in Embtel 1569./7/ /7/Dated December 22. (Ibid.) 15. After returning to office and dictating foregoing, I received call from Prime Minister Tell who said he and General Khammash had talked to King re agreement which we had reached and must see me at once. We met at Embassy residence and meeting began with my reviewing point by point all key language of agreement spelled out paras 2-12 in this telegram. Prime Minister and Khammash, in an intense and emotional effort, made in the next two hours one last try to obtain further concessions. While much of old ground again gone over, main thrust Tell-Khammash argument was that U.S. response was not enough and that by our failure to be more forthcoming we were denying Jordan minimum necessary support needed at this critical time. They asserted that King's sense of courtesy masking depth of his disappointment and that their own disappointment was "many times greater" than the King's. 16. Tell argued pay raise, which King pretty much committed to after meeting with officers previous evening, would not be possible. (I went over figures to show that it would be.) Tell also suggested that it might have been better to head off pressures for troop build-up by deciding not to take U.S. package and instead going ahead with plans to accept foreign troops into Jordan. Khammash felt King, after last night's meeting with officers, was also committed to much larger troop build-up than would now be possible. Khammash, in very emotional state suggested that he might not be able carry on. (Unless he calms down, I suspect he may resign in next day or so, as he did once before on a similar occasion. If so, I believe King will be able persuade him withdraw resignation.) 17. Throughout meeting I made it absolutely clear that while recognizing sincerity of their appeal we had come to the end of the line. I added, however, that in view of their comments, I thought I should contact His Majesty to see whether he was having second thoughts about the agreement we had reached. At that point Tell interjected to say that there was no question about going back on the deal, that it had been made and it was too late now for it to be unmade. Shortly thereafter, when Tell and Khammash finally concluded that there was in fact no more give in my position meeting ended. 18. While I have no doubt there was considerable sincerity in this eleventh hour effort on the part of Prime Minister and Chief of Staff, I believe that Hussein while disappointed is not as deeply disappointed as they are suggesting. Further I believe that under the circumstances we have made about the right deal. 19. When I returned to the office I found waiting for me to carry back to Washington a very courteous and appreciative letter to the President from King Hussein. Text of letter follows by separate telegram./8/ /8/Telegram 1571 from Amman, December 22. (Ibid.) 20. My continued presence here now will only raise false hopes that there is in fact further give in my position. I have said goodbye to King and will be leaving Amman for Washington morning 22nd. Burns
374. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/ Washington, December 22, 1966, 8:49 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19-8 US-JORDAN. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Davies, cleared by Handley, and approved by Katzenbach. 107579. 1. Under Secretary saw Ambassador Harman morning 22nd to inform him that US agreement provide additional arms Jordan would be announced at 10:00 p.m./2/ He noted difficulty of balancing between King Hussein's need to maximize our effort publicly and Israel's desire to see it minimized. /2/The texts of the announcement and a background briefing given by a Department of State spokesman on December 22 are in circular telegram 107544, December 22. (Ibid.) The text of the announcement is identical to that in telegram 1572 from Amman (see footnote 6, Document 373). 2. Under Secretary said package as described earlier except for very small number additional light arms such as M-1 rifles and machine guns. 3. The King was committed to hold his increase in forces to 3,000 men and has agreed one year from now to re-examine need for these additional troops. 4. King has assured us he will continue his moderate policies and measures to enhance area stability including efforts to prevent terrorist infiltration into Israel. 5. King has guaranteed that he will do his best to keep foreign Arab troops out of Jordan, although he stressed he could not make an absolute guarantee that he would be successful. 6. Ambassador Harman thought reaction in Israel would be low-key, although this would depend somewhat on the level of publicity given the agreement here and in the area. The action would not of course be welcomed. GOI, in fact, thought we were doing more than circumstances required. 7. Nevertheless, GOI understood our position and welcomed (a) the candor with which we have dealt with them on this problem; hoped this would continue on all matters; (b) King's determination to continue moderate policies; (c) continuance of efforts control terrorism; and (d) our assurances that we would be helpful to Israel on border control equipment and other matters. 8. Harman said he returning this weekend to Jerusalem to participate in discussion of general balance in the area. He thought that GOI comment on Jordan deal would be limited to statement along lines that matter would be studied and if military imbalance involved, Israel would move to correct it. 9. Harman suggested it would be useful if fact that no tanks or additional aircraft are involved could be leaked to press here. Also, he hoped that no reference to Israeli knowledge of or acquiescence in package would be made. 10. In later conversation with Davies, Minister Evron said Israeli Consul General New York had been fully briefed yesterday and instructed to allay concern among Jewish community leaders. Since Harman proceeding Israel via Miami Beach, we assume he will contact others of leadership there. Rusk
375. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/ Washington, December 30, 1966, 8:14 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AE 11-2 ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Michael Sterner of NEA/IAI; cleared by Wolle, Davies, and Saunders, and in substance by Trevithick and Rochlin; and approved by Handley. 111019. 1. Department hopes you will seize earliest opportunity follow up our request for visit to Dimona as well resumption talks on overall arms control problems. 2. Re former you should inform Eban that USG increasingly disturbed at pattern which USG-GOI exchanges on Dimona appear to be taking. Our desire make sixth visit to Dimona could not have come as surprise to GOI since principle of visits at six-monthly intervals long ago established. Yet each time visit falls due GOI delays in responding to our request to set date causing sour note be struck in US-Israeli relations. We see no reason why US-Israeli relations should be subjected to this periodic strain. We urge FonMin to give us early date for visit lest lack of GOI responsiveness be misinterpreted within USG. We would hope FonMin would agree with us as to desirability making visits, beginning with present one, automatic six-monthly procedure. Rusk
376. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State/1/ Cairo, January 9, 1967, 1437Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AID (US) 15 UAR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Passed to the White House. 3753. For the Secretary. I understand you are seeing my colleague Ambassador Kamel tomorrow./2/ In connection this appointment I hope you will read Cairo's 3744 and 3752/3/ which I trust my old friends in Secretariat will make available to you. I am deeply disturbed at drift and deterioration US position stemming in large part from strong Egyptian belief we are long overdue in giving them answer to their request of last March for additional food. I have seen the report of the IRG meeting of December 19, 1966,/4/ with which I strongly concur and urge your approval and that of the President of the recommendations contained therein. Regards. /2/Rusk met with Kamel on January 12; see Document 378. /3/Telegram 3744 from Cairo, January 9, reported a meeting of Owen T. Jones, the new director of the AID mission in Cairo, with UAR officials. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AID (US) 15 UAR) Telegram 3752 from Cairo, January 9, reported a meeting between Battle and Finance Minister Hasan Zaki, in which Zaki contrasted the delayed U.S. response to UAR food requests with the allegedly prompt Soviet response to the UAR request in December. Battle commented that the conversation underscored the importance of an early response. (Ibid., POL UAR-US) /4/At its meeting on December 19, 1966, the Interdepartmental Regional Group for Near East and South Asia decided that, on balance, it was desirable for U.S. long-run interests in its relations with the UAR and more broadly in the Near East to offer some food aid to the UAR. It recommended offering a package of $50 to $70 million of commodities for sale under P.L. 480. (Memorandum from Davies to Rusk, January 5; ibid.; and record of meeting, December 19, 1966; Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Harold Saunders, NSC, SIG, IRG) Battle
377. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/ Tel Aviv, January 11, 1967, 1321Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, AE 13 ISR. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Cairo. 2339. Ref: State 96223./2/ /2/Telegram 96223 to Tel Aviv, December 3, instructed Barbour to focus on the question of IAEA safeguards in his coming meeting with Eshkol and Eban. (Ibid., DEF 12 NEAR E) 1. In conversation with FonMin Eban Jan 10 (PM Eshkol on vacation and I did not wish delay discussion further) I urged that GOI reconsider carefully its stand on IAEA safeguards. Drawing particularly from reftel, I stressed importance we give to this matter, our confidence and reasons therefore that IAEA system inspection need not endanger Israeli security or reveal commercial secrets, and our view that unilateral Israeli accession to IAEA safeguards would be positive contribution to world peace, raising esteem in which Israel held in world and working in Israel's own self interest. 2. Eban's response centered about three points: (A) "national dignity" (B) national security (C) domestic political considerations. 3. Re (A) national dignity. Eban objected to Israel's being asked to give up something while the same demands were not being levied on UAR. He rejected idea that somehow Israel "owed UAR something" in this matter. Israel's own peaceful disposition on area nuclear matters had been made abundantly clear in recent statements by himself (Realite interview and "Meet the Press") and by Israel Delegation in UN. His researches showed him he said that a basic premise of arms control agreements was mutual recognition of sovereignty, right to existence of partners in agreements. There seemed to be no disposition on part UAR make such elemental concession in case Israel. Instead one only heard talk of war of liberation. He wondered whether USG was not seeking do too much to increase range of assurances to UAR and not taking sufficient account Israel's concerns. He said Israel's hopes for progress in this problem rested largely on the achievement of general non-proliferation treaty. 4. In my rejoinder I emphasized we not pushing Israel to take action under assumption Israel owed UAR anything. Rather we felt this was something Israel could do that would serve its own self interest and broader interests world peace. Nuclear variable lent whole new dimension to Middle East arms race and was regarded by us with utmost seriousness. We were not asking Israel to do anything we would not ask UAR, though in case latter, in view paucity its nuclear facilities, this almost academic question at this time. 5. As for possibilities general non-proliferation agreement we were hopeful, but its prospects were uncertain and we could not rely on it solely as a check to M.E. race at this stage. 6. Re (B) national security. In response my question Eban said that nuclear facilities in plural he had referred to in conversations Nov 2 were various components of Dimona complex and there no others. GOI concerned that details of Dimona lay out would become known to UAR through inspections and thence through important Egyptian presence at IAEA headquarters. Inquiry had been made to Israeli reps in Vienna and consultations undertaken with experts in Israel and both agreed inspection carried substantial security risk. 7. I countered with reminder that under IAEA procedures GOI would have say in who inspectors would be and that Israel's presence or lack thereof on IAEA Board of Governors would not affect protection it would enjoy in this respect. 8. Re (C) domestic political considerations. Eban's point here was closely related to "national dignity" argument. He asked how GOI could explain to Israeli people if it were to unilaterally accede to IAEA inspection while the UAR does nothing. Israeli people would wonder where national equality was then. 9. I suggested that Israeli people might very well understand such an action as we would: as a logical next step in the unilateral reassurances that Israel has already given to world about its nuclear intentions. It might even be argued that such unilateral action would be more palatable to Israeli public opinion than a bilateral agreement with Nasser, though I recognized that bilateral agreements would ultimately be desirable. 10. Eban said that he would again consult the PriMin and experts on the various technical problems. He agreed to take up with PriMin the suggestion that my next meeting on this subject be with both of them. Eban suggested that we consider putting in writing future exchanges on the subject. I said I hoped we would not formalize our discussions to this extent at this stage. It seemed to me that if we felt we needed to put things in writing we could use informal bout de papier procedure. He agreed. 11. In parenthetical remarks near end of discussion of subject Eban expressed GOI satisfaction with talks with Ambassador Bunker. Said GOI feeling was that water is essential aspect of desalting project not nuclear power. Any means technically feasible to get required water would be satisfactory to Israelis. 12. I closed with expressed hope GOI would give this subject careful priority attention it merited. Eban said he would be in touch as soon as he had had further discussions. 13. Comment: Foregoing is summary lengthy conversation being reported more fully by airgram./3/ Believe I covered all points of reftel with in some cases additional what, I hope, were supporting arguments. No doubt but that the going is heavy. MFA Assistant DirGen Bitan, who was present at conversation, said later at lunch he thought progress along lines we were pressing was unlikely. No doors have been shut however and I did not detect in Eban's remarks any desire to stop our exchanges. It would of course be quite helpful if we could convey to Israelis some sign of UAR give in practical matter of IAEA inspection. /3/A memorandum of the conversation was enclosed with airgram A-414, January 16. (Ibid., AE 13 IAEA) Barbour
378. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, January 12, 1967. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL UAR-US. Secret. Drafted by Bergus and approved in S on January 17. The memorandum is Part VI of VI. The other five memoranda of conversation are ibid. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS The Secretary opened the conversation by stating we were not yet in a position to give a reply to Egypt's outstanding request for food assistance. He had not had a chance to discuss the matter with the President. The Secretary adverted to Ambassador Kamel's presentation of December 29./2/ We had thought about many of the points he had raised and felt it might be useful to go a little further in the present discussion. /2/A memorandum of the conversation is ibid. As to the UAR's request for food assistance, the Secretary said this problem raised large questions having to do with food supplies and specific questions in terms of applicable US legislation. He felt that in his previous conversation, Ambassador Kamel had tended to discount the large question. The Secretary referred to the Indian situation and said that we were disappointed at the limited responses of other countries to India's needs. We must get out of the position of being held responsible on a bilateral basis for food supplies. In 18 months we had shipped over $1 billion worth of wheat to India. When it became apparent we could no longer maintain assistance at this level, there was an adverse reaction. We had sent Egypt a great deal of food. When it becomes difficult for us to continue we are accused of waging a war of starvation. We must get out of that context. The Secretary referred to the problems created by the Findlay Amendment and Egypt's trade with Cuba and the need for Presidential determinations./3/ We had been disappointed in the UAR's reaction to our request to exercise the option to purchase rice in accordance with the terms of the previous PL 480 agreement. The Egyptians seemed to feel that we had let them down by even asking that this be done. /3/Section 103 (d) of the Food for Peace Act of 1966 (Public Law 89-808, approved November 11, 1966; 80 Stat. 1526) forbade the sale under Title I of P.L. 480 to any nation trading with Cuba or North Vietnam except under certain circumstances if the President determined the sale was in the U.S. national interest, and forbade the sale under Title I of P.L. 480 to the United Arab Republic unless the President determined it was in the U.S. national interest. The Secretary said we did not know how much or on what terms the Soviets were giving food assistance to Egypt, but we welcomed this kind of help. He hoped that the UAR would give him the necessary priorities to food production in relation to its total resources. Ambassador Kamel said that this was an important meeting and that he wanted our help. He did not want to create a crisis in US-UAR relations. The Near East was now in a crisis situation and he wanted to work with us as a friend. He didn't wish to leave the room until agreement could be reached as to what should be said to Cairo. He felt embarassed by imposing on the Secretary's time but he felt most sincerely that the situation was very serious. He felt a deep sense of responsibility toward history. He had not come to ask for wheat in the pursuit of Egyptian or Arab interests but to participate in the protection of American and Western interests and the preservation of peace in the area. He said that prevention was better than cure. The Ambassador said that for six months he had been giving tranquilizers to Cairo. His little pharmacy was now exhausted. President Nasser was following these discussions very closely. The Ambassador then reviewed his well-known list of actions taken by the UAR over the last year which he felt should be read as signals of Egyptian desire to improve relations with the United States. He went on to say that there could be no peace in the area in the absence of a workable relationship between Washington and Cairo. There could be no peace in the area and the cold war would never finish if Egypt lost its position of non-alignment. The Near East was more important and more dangerous than Vietnam. Egypt could not be non-aligned if the US didn't do anything. Nasser had instructed him to say that the UAR's wheat supplies were very limited. The 250,000 tons en route from the Russians would last for a short time and the additional 400,000 tons were not yet under active discussion. What would be the effect in Cairo if after a month the Egyptian people came to believe the US was exposing them to famine--not Nasser, not the government but the Egyptian people? If wheat did not flow, the cold war will flare up. The Ambassador said he must have an answer. Egypt must have wheat. Failure to get it would cause the greatest repercussions on all our relations and interests in the Near East and even on US relations with the Soviet Union. This was a more important matter than the Soviet arms to Egypt or the Aswan Dam. It was indeed the most important decision the US had faced with respect to the Near East since World War II. The Secretary asked if he could pose a personal question. How could he interpret to his Cabinet colleagues or to Chairmen of Congressional committees the point that unless we provide food something bad would happen as anything but a threat? They would react strongly to threats. As to Egypt's orientation or non-alignment wasn't this something that Egypt could control? Kamel countered by asking if we were talking in theoretical or practical terms. He believed that threats and blackmail were inelegant and improper. If he were asked this question by members of the Cabinet or Congressional chairmen he would reply by stating that it was in the American interest to keep the UAR non-aligned. This needed more than speeches. Otherwise there would be greater and intolerable pressure on Egypt from the USSR. The Secretary asked why Egypt really needed so many arms from the USSR. Kamel replied because of Israel. Israel was there. Why would the US need more arms against the USSR? Only time would improve the Arab-Israel situation. Decades were needed and an essential element was good US-UAR relations. This would permit the UAR to build up its own confidence. Presently we were doing the contrary. If there were no wheat there would be more tension in the area. The Secretary asked if the UAR's military leaders were apprehensive of an attack from Israel, why was Egypt maintaining such large forces in Yemen? Kamel replied, "Who knows who brought us to Yemen and who knows who will bring us into other situations if you leave us?" The Secretary asked how it happened that this responsibility for feeding Egypt had been concentrated on the United States. Kamel said we should look upon our ability to give food aid to Egypt as a blessing. Egypt would not require any more help after two or three years. If we listened to him the USSR would disappear from the Middle East and an Israel settlement would become possible. There was no reason why Egypt should be forced to succumb to the pressure of a great power close to its borders. There followed some discussion as to how the Ambassador should report the conversation to Cairo. It was agreed that something along the following lines could be said: Kamel saw Secretary for 70 minutes January 12. Most of discussion was taken up with wide-ranging exploratory and useful discussion current problems in NE, many of which had been raised by Kamel in his December 29 meeting with the Secretary. Re UAR wheat request, the Secretary informed Ambassador Kamel that pressure of business relating to opening of Congress, State of the Union message, and other matters had not permitted him complete necessary consultations. These consultations presently going forward. It was hoped that there could be another meeting with Ambassador within about ten days.
379. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Lebanon/1/ Washington, January 13, 1967, 6 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967- 69, POL 7 LEB. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Gamon and John T Morgan of E/OMA and approved by Davies. 118193. 1. On January 12 Foreign Minister Hakim had general discussions on current situation in Near East with Secretary (at lunch) and Acting Assistant Secretary Handley. Without specifying magnitude, he also presented Lebanon's request for PL-480 and CCC credit assistance to Assistant Secretary Solomon. 2. Mr. Solomon expressed regret GOL had not taken up USG March 1966 offers/2/ which represented considerable effort for USG, given GOL's strong financial position. He explained USG would be in better position discuss government-to-government CCC deal when more was known about future of $21 million in CCC credits guaranteed by Intra./3/ /2/The offer, set forth in an aide-memoire with three attachments given to President Helou on March 8, 1966, was made up of (1) long-term credits under Title IV of P.L. 480 for the purchase of up to 40,000 metric tons of wheat valued at $2.6 million annually, (2) Commodity Credit Corporation export credits for purchases of wheat and flour, and (3) up to $20 million in possible long-term loans by the Export-Import Bank. (Ibid., AID (US) 15-11 LEB) Telegram 451 from Beirut, July 18, reported that the Lebanese Government accepted the P.L. 480 proposal but requested a larger program at a lower interest rate and accepted the CCC offer in principle but wanted a waiver of the requirement of a bank guarantee. (Ibid., AID (US) LEB) Telegram 30913 to Beirut, August 18, stated that during the preceding 4 months, the U.S. wheat supply situation had become critical and that only 20,000 metric tons of wheat could be programmed under a Title IV P.L. 480 agreement with Lebanon. (Ibid., AID (US) 15-11 LEB) /3/Documentation relating to the October 1966 Intra Bank failure is ibid., FN 6 LEB. 3. Hakim said GOL's intention was to protect Intra's creditors to maximum extent possible but that it could not give any creditors consideration more favorable than that given others. He said preliminary auditors report on Intra would be ready in about one month and its substance could be conveyed to Ambassador Porter. He said that it would be two to three months before issuance final report on basis of which informed judgement could be made on whether Intra to be refloated or liquidated. He emphasized GOL request should be considered separately from Intra problem, that GOL had not been party to Intra transactions and in fact at time his last visit in November 1965 had recommended CCC wheat authorization should not all be for account private Lebanese traders. He said he hoped CCC arrangement could be worked out with GOL, especially because Lebanon closest of all Arab states to U.S. policies and ideals. 4. Mr. Solomon said possibilities would be reviewed within USG to see what could be done under circumstances. 5. Memoranda of conversations with Messrs. Handley and Solomon follow./4/ /4/A memorandum of the conversation with Solomon and a memorandum of a January 13 conversation between Hakim and Under Secretary Rostow are ibid., AID (US) LEB. A memorandum of the conversation with Handley is ibid., POL 2 NEAR E. Rusk [Continue with the next documents] Volume XVIII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |