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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XVIII Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-67 Department of State |
 360. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, December 9, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VI. Secret. As instructed, I called Abe Feinberg pronto. I told him I wanted to clue him privately so he could head off a developing problem which, otherwise could cause nothing but trouble all around. The situation in Jordan was still very dicey. We were working day and night to overcome a crisis which Israel itself had created. As usual, we had to pick up the pieces. It was imperative--in our own interest, in Jordan's, and above all in Israel's--that we strengthen Hussein's position and his support from his army. This would almost inevitably require expediting some arms already contracted for, and quite possibly some added sweeteners. But when we told Israel's Embassy this, we had gotten a lot of backflap about why we hadn't consulted Israel first before talking with Jordan, about bad faith if we sold new arms to Jordan, etc. I wasn't up on these matters any more, but wanted him to know that such rejoinders had caused much high level annoyance here. So I urged that Abe tell his friends to keep their shirts on, and not start telling us how to handle Jordan again. Their credentials were hardly very good on this subject; the very time when we were being forced again to clean up their mess was no time to start hitting us from the flank and souring relations. Abe should pass this word in spades, as coming from a friend. Abe said he'd see Eban (now in New York) pronto. But he wondered whether more arms to Jordan would create a new arms imbalance; in this case he urged a formula to help Israel out too. I retorted that asking us to compensate Israel would leave a very bad taste just now. In any case I doubted that any significant military imbalance was likely; we weren't foolish. The problem was rather one of preventing the truly major imbalance which would result if Jordan went sour. Abe wanted me to know the "domestic political angle." The entire US Jewish community felt it was isolated after Israel's censure by the US. To add another pinprick by announcing arms to Jordan alone wouldn't sit well. I said I'd pass on this message, but urged he pass on the full flavor of mine. This was just the wrong time to "rock the boat"; Eban would be wise to pour oil on troubled waters. R. W. Komer/2/ /2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature and an indication that the original was signed.
361. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, December 10, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. III. Secret. The memorandum, filed as an attachment to Rostow's December 12 memorandum to the President (Document 361) was apparently drafted by Wriggins, who sent it to Rostow with a December 10 covering memorandum. SUBJECT We can't come close to meeting Hussein's $200 million request. We don't have the money, and that big a program would ruin Jordan's promising economic development. So Secretary McNamara has designed a small package to tackle Hussein's main problem--his army's morale./2/ It includes only $4.7 million (reprogrammed from existing appropriations) on top of $3.5 million already in Jordan's FY 1967 military aid program. Instead of enlarging his forces, it would help him improve pay, mobility and organization to tide him over the present crisis of confidence with the army. /2/Material concerning the proposed aid to King Hussein is attached to a December 9 memorandum from Hoopes to McNamara, on which the Secretary indicated his approval. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 6648, 381 Jordan) This offer probably won't satisfy Hussein. We see it as the starting point for a tough series of negotiations over our whole aid program. We may have to give a little, but before we do we'd send former Ambassador Bill Macomber to try to talk Hussein back to reason. If you approve this approach, Secretary McNamara will go over the package with Hussein's army commander at 11:00 a.m. Tuesday. Secretary Katzenbach also requests your approval of the attached message from him to Hussein explaining the rationale for the package./3/ We feel the Secretaries should handle this initial response, since you've already sent the King one message/4/ and may have to step in again later. /3/The proposed letter from Katzenbach to King Hussein, undated, is attached to a December 10 memorandum from Katzenbach to the President, attached to this memorandum. /4/See Document 346 and footnote 4 thereto. No matter what we do, the Israelis and their friends will object. But we're just cleaning up the mess Israel's raid created and we've taken Israel's military concerns into account. Our JCS says this small package will not affect the military balance on Israel's borders. If you approve, State and Defense will brief key Members of Congress on the program, and we'll tell the Israelis what's involved as soon as we've told the Jordanians.
/5/The President did not check either the approval or disapproval line but wrote: "Check this out thru UN & Goldberg." Walt
362. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State/1/ Amman, December 11, 1966, 1320Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL JORDAN-US. Secret; Immediate; Exdis; Noforn. Repeated to London, CINCSTRIKE, OSD, Cairo, Beirut, Damascus, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Baghdad, Kuwait, and Jidda and passed to the White House. Rostow sent a copy to the President with a covering memorandum stating that he would want to read "this rather ominous cable." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. III) 1456. 1. I was called to see the King late yesterday evening at Homar, the King's private residence outside Amman. EmbOff accompanied me. 2. The meeting with the King lasted one hour. I have never seen him so grim or so obviously under pressure. It was apparent that he had to use the utmost in self-restraint to keep his emotions from erupting openly. At several points in the conversation he had tears in his eyes. Then he said that although the surface manifestations of discontent in the form of demonstrations had abated, pressures under the surface were in fact building up. The discontent on the West Bank is deeper than he had imagined. "The growing split between East Bank and West Bank has ruined my dreams." The only thing that binds the army to him, he said, is traditional loyalty, but this tie is daily growing weaker. "There is near despair in the army and the army no longer has confidence in me. A contributing factor is that the army is over-extended throughout the country for reasons of internal security, and this is causing the army and the people to become increasingly fed up, an obvious objective of those opposed to this regime." The King observed that he is beset on all sides by enemies, outside Jordan and within Jordan, with Syria openly calling for his overthrow, publicly offering arms for the purpose, and covertly infiltrating arms and terrorists into Jordan to help achieve the purpose. 4. The King said he simply must have Washington's decision on his request for assistance. Nor could he longer forego the presence and help of General Khammash in Amman at this critical time. General Khammash had been in Washington for nearly two weeks, and as yet he has been given no answer. Khammash's appointment with Secretary McNamara has been twice postponed, and the appointment is now set for Wednesday. The King is aware that the Israeli FonMin is visiting Washington early next week, before Wednesday./2/ The King wishes General Khammash to leave Washington on Wednesday evening, and whatever answer General Khammash is given before he leaves will have to be considered by the King as the final answer. Time is running out on him, said the King, and he can no longer delay making decisions on the courses of action he must take. In the circumstances a temporizing answer to Khammash would have to be considered as a negative answer. /2/December 14. 5. If General Khammash receives an answer "which is not responsive," the King would not go to Washington, as, until recently, he had contemplated doing should Khammash fail to get a satisfactory answer. The King said he greatly admires President Johnson and it would give him great personal satisfaction to meet with the President personally. But the pressures building up on him are so great, he said, that there is no longer time for a trip to Washington. Nor, if Khammash is unsuccessful, would a trip by him, he reflected, with its attendant publicity, serve the interests of either of us. For a decade, the King said, we and he have been partners. And in this critical hour we are the only friend to whom he can turn. If we cannot help him, he said, then he must move quickly to an alternate course. "The right answer from the US would enable me to justify my past policy to my army, to my people, to the PLO, and to everyone else. If I do not get the right answer, even I must conclude my past policy has been a failure." 6. Since he was unsuccessful in obtaining postponement of the Arab Defense Council meeting in Cairo, the King said, and since Khammash has not gotten an answer from us, the King had felt he had no choice but to make a concession to the pressures he was subjected to at the Cairo meeting. Friday he had had to instruct his delegation in Cairo to agree to the stationing of Saudi and Iraqi troops in Jordan. The King said that three brigades of these foreign Arab troops would be involved. In return for this concession the Arab Defense Council had agreed to meet Jordan's demands, which include, inter alia, the strengthening of Egyptian forces in the Israeli border area (presumably Sinai). The stationing of Iraqi and Saudi troops in Jordan would not come about for a least two months, said Hussein, since a great deal had to be worked out first. I asked the King whether in the event the US were responsive to his request for assistance he would nonetheless have to go through with the stationing of Iraqi and Saudi troops in Jordan. The King replied that he supposed he might somehow be able to head it off during the course of the technical negotiations to come in this regard. He said he is not happy with the instructions he had to send to his delegation in Cairo. 7. The King said that if the US cannot be responsive to his request for assistance, he saw three courses open to him. 8. The first course was to turn to the East. "I will not try to mislead you, nor to blackmail you, by telling you I will turn to the East. I cannot and will not do so. My reign has been devoted towards building Jordan to be a self-sufficient, moderate, evolutionary state. I have all my life fought the East. If in the end Jordan feels she must turn to the East, it would have to be under someone else, not with me." 9. The second alternative, said the King, was to "batten down the hatches and take on everyone who is working against me at one and the same time." This was a course which tempted him, said the King, because he was ready for a fight and he did not care about his own fate. But, he said, "The deck is stacked against me and I do not have the right to commit those who have been loyal to me to a course which would likely mean their doom." 10. The third alternative, said the King, is the one which commends itself to him as the best. He would declare the West Bank a "military directorate" and call on all Arab states, and the PLO, to furnish forces to be stationed on the West Bank for the protection of that area. Jordan would leave on the West Bank its pro rata contribution of forces, and withdraw the remainder of its forces, now stationed on the West Bank, to the East Bank. The King would not, he said, make this as an offer, to be accepted or rejected by the Palestinians and by the other Arab states. He would simply announce this is what he has decided to do, and if other Arab states do not furnish the necessary defense forces, that would just be too bad. At least this arrangement would permit him to make a redoubt of the East Bank, he said, and "this might offer me one last chance to serve my cause." The King observed that Prime Minister Tell thought of the "military directorate" idea as a means of calling the bluff of Palestinians and of other Arab states. Hussein indicated he diagnoses the situation in Jordan as more critical than does Tell. He indicated further that he is serious about establishing a "military directorate," and not as a means to call a bluff. The King said he was quite aware that if the West Bank were transformed into a "military directorate", much as he envisages, Israel might decide to take military action. He said this was a chance he and all the Arabs would simply have to take. To try to maintain the status quo in the face of an unfavorable response from Washington to his request for assistance was clearly impossible. 11. Comment: There were many indications during the course of the conversation that the King has become suspicious of US motivations and intentions with respect to Jordan. He is perturbed that we were not able to give General Khammash an answer during the first week the General was in Washington. I gather his apprehensions are twofold: (A) that, as he sees it, we are so closely tied to Israel, and the Israelis can generate such pressure on us, that this is a powerful inhibiting factor in our ability to respond to the King's request for assistance; (B) that the King believes the US does not have full appreciation of the seriousness of the situation concerning Jordan or of what the King considers the potent desires of others to replace our influence in Jordan, or even to liquidate Jordan. 12. I think we can take at face value the King's statement that we must give General Khammash an answer by Wednesday and that the answer we give will be considered by the King to be the final answer. 13. I regret I cannot say with any degree of certainty what the King and General Khammash would consider to be a "satisfactory response." Since General Khammash is in Washington, and he is the key man in this regard and the King will likely abide by Khammash's judgment, the Department is in a better position than Embassy Amman to probe the answer. I am fairly certain, however, that the package outlined in paragraph 6 of our tel 1415/3/ represents minimum, and I cannot exclude the possibility that even that package is undershooting what Khammash and the King consider to be the minimum. /3/Telegram 1415 from Amman, December 6, reported disaffection in the Jordanian Army and urged a positive response to the Khammash mission. Paragraph 6 recommended providing the army with a $20 million package of defensive equipment, increasing annual budgetary support by $16 million to finance a defensive buildup, delivering previously negotiated ground and air packages, leaving the door open to future negotiations on items on which they could not reach agreement, and preparing for an increased deployment of equipment on the West Bank. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23 JORDAN) 14. The concept of a Palestine entity is not a new idea with the King; he was turning over something of this sort in his mind last summer in political rather than military terms as a means of coping with his West Bank problem. 15. The King said he hoped the views he had expressed at the meeting last evening could be brought to the personal attention of the President. Burns
363. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, December 12, 1966, 11:35 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. III. Secret. SUBJECT At this morning's breakfast with the Vice President, Bob McNamara, Nick Katzenbach, Bill Handley, Bill Macomber, Howard Wriggins, and Rodger Davies, the King's problem was thoroughly discussed. Sisco and Goldberg could not attend; but both have been brought in. Nick talked with Goldberg and, while not familiar with the details, Goldberg agrees this is broadly the right course. Sisco, who was committed to breakfast with Eban, is now going over the package./2/ The conclusions were as follows. /2/Rostow's handwritten note in the margin reads as follows: "He has gone to New York to clear with Goldberg. We'll hear later in the afternoon. W." 1. The proposed package was insufficient to meet the King's essential political needs. 2. Movement on a larger package would be appropriate only as we pressed discussions with Israel on improving border surveillance technology. These will be started by Nick with Eban today and would go forward at the UN and in the Middle East with Israel, and, hopefully, with the Arab countries as well. 3. Bob McNamara, Nick, and the others agreed that the package for Hussein should be expanded in the following ways: (a) delivery of the 12 F-104's presently in the Jordanian pipeline should be accelerated. Six should be drawn from the inventory within 30 days and delivered to Hussein even though the pilots and ground environment are not yet ready; (b) 18 self-propeller antiaircraft units should be airlifted within 30 to 60 days; (c) the $4.7 million package to improve mobility, firepower, and effectiveness--which you have already seen--should also be airlifted. 4. When he talks to General Khammash, Bob McNamara would make clear that, while this is less than the King asked for, it is a substantial and prompt response and that we have several parallel concerns: (a) the King should stress quality, rather than quantity, and we could only make this package available if he agrees to keep his manpower at present levels; (b) we assume he would continue his policy of moderation and restraint and his considerable efforts to prevent guerrillas from using Jordan as a base for operations against Israel and we will consider helping him to improve his border police (AID is reviewing this part of his problem); (c) no United Arab Command troops should be situated on the West bank area of Jordan. 5. Several present hoped that you could personally take ten minutes with Khammash before he sees Bob McNamara tomorrow at 11 o'clock to discuss: (a) our concern for Hussein's future; (b) our substantial and prompt response; and (c) our need to discuss the longer run financial implications of this assistance. However, Nick does not want to trouble you, knowing that, if you see Khammash even for five minutes, you will feel it necessary to see Eban. I believe you should keep out at this stage. 6. We will get flack from the Israelis no matter what we do, although Eban acknowledged to Goldberg the raid was a grave error. It was the consensus of all present, including the Vice President, that this sort of package is what is required and we'll have to use our discussions with Eban to insure Israel's friends here sit tight. 7. Unfortunately, time is short, because Khammash should see McNamara and McNamara leaves for European discussion tomorrow afternoon. Nevertheless, I see little alternative to helping Hussein in this way. And we will press hard on Israel the importance of border stabilization through the UN if possible and directly, if that is the only way. 8. I, therefore, recommend you accept the attached package, plus accelerated delivery of 6 F-104's within a month and 18 40mm AA guns within 60 days, under the conditions set out in paragraph 4. 9. Nick and Bob suggest Bill Macomber, an old Jordanian hand, shortly go out to talk, on your behalf, to his friend Hussein. His cover would be an examination of the AID implications of Hussein's defense problem. 10. A short letter from you to King Hussein will come up shortly for signature./3/ It could be carried back by the King's emissary, General Khammash, who returns on Tuesday evening, Dec. 13, or Wednesday, Dec. 14. /3/Rostow sent the draft letter to the President with an undated memorandum from Katzenbach recommending that he send it, a December 12 memorandum from Katzenbach (Document 365), and a covering memorandum of December 12. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. III) The letter was not sent. Walt
364. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, December 12, 1966, 2:15 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. III. Top Secret; Sensitive. Mr. President: You should read this quite extraordinary revelation by Hussein./2/ /2/A copy of telegram 1457 from Amman, undated but received December 11, is attached to this memorandum. It reported that during the conversation reported in telegram 1456, from Amman (Document 362), King Hussein told Burns that he had been in contact with Israeli leaders for the past 3 years through secret correspondence and meetings. He stated that he had met with Golda Meir, Eban, and others, had told them that he had done his utmost to eliminate terrorism against Israel from Jordan, and had warned them that he could not absorb or tolerate a serious retaliatory raid. Expressing great bitterness, he declared that the attack was a complete betrayal of his efforts in the interest of peace and stability. A copy is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL JORDAN-US. Among experts there is some doubt as to its truth; but it could be that the contacts existed in a very narrow circle and were not known to the whole government or to the Israeli military. In that case, as they faced heavy pressure to retaliate, those who had the contacts would have been in a most difficult bind. This final warning about secrecy is justified. Walt
365. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach to President Johnson/1/ Washington, December 12, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. III. Secret. Filed with a December 12 covering memorandum from Rostow to the President, which also forwarded the draft letter to King Hussein cited in footnote 3, Document 363. SUBJECT I have the following recommendations with respect to increased military assistance to Jordan. I have discussed these with Ambassador Goldberg and he is in agreement./2/ /2/Telegram 101492 to USUN, December 13, from Katzenbach to Goldberg, transmitted the text of Katzenbach's memorandum, noting that it was "the memorandum which we discussed last night." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19-8 US-JORDAN) 1. We should proceed with the recommendations in the attached memorandum which expedite current programmed MAP assistance and include an increment, primarily of defensive weapons, totalling $6 to $7 Million./3/ /3/Not attached. 2. We should candidly inform the Israeli Government about this program. Based on my conversation with Foreign Minister Abba Eban, I believe that the Israeli Government will accept this program as necessary to support the regime of King Hussein. Eban quite candidly said that the Israelis had as much of a stake in preserving the King as we did. 3. Ambassador Goldberg believes that we are likely to have a sizable domestic problem with respect to the increment even if the Israeli Government quietly agrees to it. He believes, and I agree, that in presenting this to the Israelis (and to the Jewish community in this country) it would be helpful to give something to the Israeli side of the ledger: We recommend a. We tell the Israelis that we will make every effort to speed up deliveries of Skyhawks (A4's). Bob McNamara has no objection to this commitment and believes delivery probably can be speeded up somewhat to enable some delivery in advance of the scheduled date. b. We tell the Israeli Government that we will attempt to assist them in working out static defense plans and, to the extent possible, help with hardware to make this effective. We should further state to them that while we cannot presently commit ourselves to any dollar-for-dollar offsetting through AID or otherwise of our increased commitments to Jordan, we will take this into account in giving sympathetic consideration to Israeli requests for assistance; for example, we might be able to subsidize some of their African operations which indirectly benefit us. (There is a good deal of opposition to any firm commitment in this respect and many Government officials believe that we should not really offer anything in this regard to Israel at this time. Ambassador Goldberg and I believe, however, that to meet the sensibilities of the Israelis (and their domestic supporters) that we should make this general commitment as an appropriate response. The amount is not large and such a commitment would help the Israelis and help us domestically. We believe this can be worked out to the satisfaction of all, particularly since it is not necessary to do this simultaneously with the Jordanian move and can be worked out at a later date.) Ambassador Goldberg would be happy to take this up with Ambassador Harman, who could help us greatly here with the Jewish community./4/ /4/There is no indication of the President's approval or disapproval. Respectfully,
366. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/ Washington, December 14, 1966, 7:29 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 ISR-JORDAN. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Davies on December 13, cleared by Handley, and approved by Katzenbach. Repeated to Amman, Cairo, USUN, and CINCSTRIKE. 102760. Israeli Foreign Minister Eban accompanied by Ambassador Harman and Minister Evron called on Acting Secretary December 12. Eban opened by noting substantive change in Israel's security situation over past two or three years. Israel's deterrent capacity had achieved a viable balance in that no neighboring state wished military confrontation. Israel's enemies were now employing new method of expressing active hostility: guerrilla warfare, classic strategy of the weaker side. Arab press reflected tremendous interest in guerilla warfare as practiced in Algeria, Viet-Nam, etc. Arabs now viewing this as answer to direct confrontation. This technique plus the ideology of adding the "sixth entity," the Palestine nation, to the five opposing Arab states created a major problem. This entity serves as the "liberating force." Its activities create a serious situation and the prospect looks ominous. Perhaps no more than twenty people were involved in disrupting train service between the capital city and the coast, sabotage in the capital city, and causing safe travel on certain frontier roads to be problematic. The action on November 13 was designed to meet these problems. US and Israeli views diverge on wisdom of this decision and US conclusion is that this answer is not valid. Israel is not committed to this course as the answer but seeks to gain understanding seriousness of the problem and of fact that Israel is looking for an answer. The government had decided to look at static defense measure including reinforcing frontier guards, increasing patrolling, adopting and investigating all kinds of electronic and other electrical devices, increasing the number of vehicles available for patrols, fencing and illuminating certain frontier settlements, and asphalting certain border patrol routes to prevent mining. These measures were burdensome economically and any US experience in these fields would be useful./2/ /2/Telegram 96200 to Tel Aviv, December 3, records a December 1 conversation between Davies and Bitan, in which Davies stated that U.S. officials were studying technical devices to assist in detecting cross-border infiltration, which might be of use to the Israelis, UNTSO, or Jordanian security forces. Bitan expressed enthusiasm and urged U.S. flexibility to provide such materials. Telegram 96200 also instructed the Embassy to confirm to the Foreign Ministry that U.S. study of this was continuing. (Ibid., POL 32-1 ARAB-ISR) The Acting Secretary welcomed this approach and said we would seek to be helpful. We would be in touch with the Embassy very shortly on the matter. He asked whether the UN peacekeeping effort couldn't be strengthened by adding more personnel and providing more mobility. Mr. Eban replied that UNTSO would be more effective if the organization were less interested in investigating incidents and more in preventing them. Since the SYG has raised the question of strengthening UNTSO, he felt Israel would join the dialogue. He noted that Israel did cooperate with UNMOS, while Syrians locked them in their observation posts and do not permit them to move more than fifty yards therefrom without escort. Mr. Eban expressed concern at the exaggerated interpretation on the other side of the meaning of the events of November 13. Israel believes that maintenance of the territorial status quo and existing regime in Jordan is of great importance for Israel's security. Hussein however fells Israel aspires to topple his regime and grab the West Bank. The King was way off the track on this. The Acting Secretary said he was prepared to accept these assurances but no matter what Israel's motivation, its actions made things extremely difficult and precarious for Hussein. Israel can't now say it didn't mean to precipitate the situation. It exists, and Israel must live with the consequences. The tragic aspect is that Israel damaged the King's position at a time when all the trends in Jordan were favorable. However what was done is past and we must look to the future and a future with King Hussein in place is desirable for both Israeli and US interests. Picking up the pieces will take patience and some actions which we will undertake Israel will not like. Mr. Eban touched on the adverse impact on Israel's psychological atmosphere of the "insensitive and intemperate" Security Council resolution censuring Israel. He appealed for understanding and asked that in arriving at our decisions we weigh this factor. Twice in the recent past Israel had been asked to give assent or not to object to things we had found it necessary to do for Jordan. Israel had expended its efforts to be helpful. The Acting Secretary remarked that Jordan had also made efforts that might have been more effective than Israel had been willing to give credit for. This is part and parcel of King Hussein's feeling that Israel's motivation must have ends other than mere retaliation. Nevertheless despite the divergence in our views on this action there are many areas of agreement between Israel and the US and nothing is being undone. Our objective is to seek to stabilize the border and help Jordan prevent incidents fomented by others. To do this, we must have someone to work with; therefore, we seek to shore up King Hussein's regime and to restore the status quo ante or even improve on this. The magnitude of King Hussein's request for assistance is such that we are not able to meet it in entirety. What we have under consideration will not alter the military situation or threaten Israel in any way. We plan to do the minimum necessary to bolster the King's position with his armed forces. Mr. Eban said that in shoring up the regime Israel and the US shared an interest. However, Israel hoped that what we did would not adversely affect Israel's economic, political or military position. Of particular concern was the type of hardware that might appear on Israel's frontier. It had been a tradition with the two governments to discuss problems such as these and to reach a consensus. This had created an atmosphere of confidence. If Israel's reaction to what the US planned to do is a factor in the situation, Mr. Eban hoped the GOI could be taken into our confidence as we reached decisions. Mr. Eban touched on the situation in Egypt noting an apparent contradiction in its policies. On the one hand Egypt seemed to be exercising prudence in not seeking a confrontation with Israel and, he believed, Nasser was exercising restraining influence on Syria. At the same time, however, propaganda from Cairo within the past two days had taken on a new stridency in attacking King Hussein. Mr. Eban suggested that if there is a dialogue between the USG and the UARG, the US seek to moderate Cairo's output. Radio Cairo and the Voice of the Arabs he thought were of extreme psychological importance in the present situation. Katzenbach
367. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, December 13, 1966. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 6648, 333 Jordan. Secret. Drafted by Hoopes and approved by Secretary McNamara on December 17. Filed with a December 16 covering memorandum from Hoopes. SUBJECT Secretary McNamara opened by expressing the US Government's admiration for the coolness and courage with which King Hussein and the Government of Jordan were meeting the present crisis. He reiterated the US view that the Israeli raid of November 13 had been a serious and unfortunate miscalculation; he acknowledged that great psychological damage had been done, and that the pressing problem now was to repair that damage. He said however that we have reason to believe that the raid presaged no basic change in Israeli policy. He said he would hand General Khammash a paper which represented his own recommendations, that he had discussed this paper with his colleagues in the USG, and that he believed they were in agreement with him. While the paper did not represent at this point a definite US decision and was therefore labeled "draft," he expected that it would be formally approved, and he wished General Khammash to take a copy with him. He said that the President was prepared to send Ambassador Macomber to Jordan immediately to discuss the entire range of problems, including those dealt with in the paper. (It was subsequently agreed that, since General Khammash was pausing for 24 hours in London, it would be more appropriate for Ambassador Macomber to depart Washington on 14 December than 13 December.) The Secretary then read aloud, paragraph-by-paragraph, the paper entitled "Measures For Strengthening Jordan's Defenses" which is attached as Tab A hereto. At the conclusion of the reading, General Khammash appeared grave, quiet and crestfallen. He responded in a low voice. He said that he was aware of the large financial and manpower implications in the lists he had presented on his arrival here, but that the lists did not exaggerate Jordan's true requirements. He said terrorism is rising; Jordan is beleaguered; Israel is not the only foe; Jordan must also face the PLO, Syria, and the UAR. Iraq is another potential enemy, although quiescent for the moment. Unfortunately, whatever the Israeli intentions may be, their assurances can no longer be trusted. The Jordan Army was humiliated by the raid of November 13 and this has caused the people of Jordan to view the Army with suspicion; it has also caused the Army to question King Hussein's leadership and his policy of moderation toward Israel. General Khammash said that Jordan was projecting no military buildup, but was merely seeking to remedy "deficiencies" in supporting arms, especially artillery and air defense. He emphasized that the Jordan Army is presently handicapped by obsolescent equipment, and that it needs a great deal more mobility than was indicated in the US response (60 APC and a number of trucks). He said he must be very frank regarding the US response. He appreciated the assistance it represented, but it would not meet the criteria of "adequate defense" as set by the Jordan Officer Corps; therefore, it would not meet the problem of loyalty and reliability. Again he expressed the view that the projected increase of 16,000 men and the infusion of new equipment would represent no military buildup. He expressed the hope that Ambassador Macomber would be endowed with the necessary authority to "expand the list." The Secretary said that the US response had been developed in the context of three constraints: (1) availability of items, having in mind the heavy US requirements in Southeast Asia and Europe; (2) the financial cost to the US, having in mind the continuing downward congressional pressures on the MAP budget; and (3) the heavy cost to Jordan arising out of a substantial enlargement of its armed forces. With respect to point (3), he alluded to a "partnership relationship" between the US and Jordan, and said that partners must restrain each other from irresponsible acts. General Khammash said he could only repeat that he was "honest," and that his requests represented "bare minimum needs." The Secretary said that we agree in principle on the necessity of some pay increase for enlisted personnel, but we want to discuss with Jordan how the funds can be found, and also how Jordan proposes to finance the purchase of the ground equipment and the F-104s under existing agreements. He said that these would be among the matters which Ambassador Macomber would be prepared to discuss in Amman. General Khammash asked whether the Secretary had yet seen his own paper assessing the current situation in Jordan. The Secretary replied in the negative, and General Khammash then presented him with a paper which he had prepared after his arrival in Washington./2/ The Secretary thanked him for the paper and said that the US earnestly desires peace and stability in the Middle East. He said that he hoped sometime to visit Jordan "as a tourist." General Khammash assured him that we would be welcome "in office or out." The Secretary concluded the meeting by reiterating the US view that King Hussein has acted with courage, wisdom and restraint; that we believe the US package represents a substantial and prompt response; and that Ambassador Macomber will be departing Washington on 14 December to pursue the entire range of outstanding problems with the King and the Government of Jordan. /2/The paper, undated, bears a notation that Khammash gave it to McNamara during their meeting. (Ibid., OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4443, Jordan 091.3 MAP) The meeting was adjourned at 11:40 a.m. Townsend Hoopes
Tab A MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN JORDAN'S DEFENSE In a meeting of December 13, 1966, between US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and Major General Amer Khammash, Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of Jordan, the Secretary of Defense made the following points: 1. The US understands and shares the great concern which the Israeli action of November 13 has caused the Government of Jordan. The US has notified the Government of Israel, in the strongest terms, of its concern and of the serious implications of US-Israeli relations should there be a recurrence. The US has strong reason to believe that the attack at Samua does not presage a change in Israeli policy. 2. The US appreciates the unfortunate effect which the raid has had on Jordan's sense of security and on the morale of the Jordan Armed Forces. The US fully recognizes the important role the armed forces play today, and must play for some time to come, in the maintenance of Jordanian stability and security. The US is especially aware of the need to assure the armed forces that adequate measures are being taken respecting their basic equipment, organization and pay; and also to increase the visible defense of Jordan's border villages. The US is prepared to provide prompt and meaningful assistance to meet these needs. 3. The US is seriously concerned however about the financial implications of Jordan's projected force goals and indicated equipment requirements. Security is vital, but it can never be absolute; moreover, it is rarely a function of the size of armed forces, but is more often a function of their quality and spirit. It could be a tragedy for all concerned if the Government of Jordan were to embark upon a military buildup which later events proved to have been an incommensurate response, and for which resources were shown to have been inadequate. 4. The US believes it would be wiser for Jordan to concentrate on qualitative factors designed to improve the firepower, mobility and communications of its forces, rather than to embark upon a force expansion at this time. The US must ask the Government of Jordan, as a condition of further assistance, to forego any manpower increases until it can discuss more fully with the King and his advisers the financial implications of any force expansion. 5. The US notes the Government of Jordan's view that some increase in the pay of enlisted ranks is required in the present circumstances. The US agrees in principle, but would want to discuss this matter with Jordan to determine how the necessary resources could be found. 6. The US has already accelerated the delivery of certain items in the current program as a first step in our effort to meet the problem facing the Government of Jordan. 7. The US is now prepared to deliver (by airlift to the extent feasible) an additional quantity of material within the next 30-60 days as set forth in the Annex hereto. The US regards this additional material as representing a very substantial and forthcoming response. It requires diversions from US forces and from the forces of several allied and friendly countries. It is designed to meet the indicated priorities of the Jordan armed forces and at the same time to constitute a sufficiently prompt and dramatic manifestation of US support to meet the psychological problem facing King Hussein. 8. The 6 F-104 aircraft listed in the Annex will be provided on a loan basis from the United States Air Force inventory, pending the availability of the planes originally designated for Jordan. These latter aircraft will be available for substitution beginning in July 1967, as agreed between the two governments, and will constitute a more modern and powerful version of the F-104 A/B than the loan aircraft. 9. Jordan must recognize that the United States is constrained from meeting its full requests by their adverse financial implications for both the United States and Jordan, and their adverse implications for a Middle East arms race, which the United States does not wish to stimulate. 10. The US notes the intention of the Government of Jordan to proceed with the purchase of ground equipment under the US-Jordan agreement of 1965 and to exercise the option to procure additional F-104 aircraft under the US-Jordan agreement of 1966. The US is fully prepared to honor these agreements, provided that the Government of Jordan can give satisfactory assurances that the necessary funds for their purchase and support will continue to be forthcoming from sources external to Jordan. This is in accordance with the terms of both agreements. In this connection, the US is prepared to give strong diplomatic support to Jordan's efforts to obtain the necessary funds from sources such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, but cannot contemplate a change in the terms of the contracts. 11. The US will continue to keep under close study the situation in the Middle East and the requirements of the Jordanian armed forces. The US is prepared to send a special emissary to discuss with the Government of Jordan a number of questions, including (a) the relationship of recent events to the limits on Jordan's budget as defined in the several US-Jordan agreements; (b) the optimum size and appropriate equipment of the Jordanian armed forces; (c) the levels of external assistance likely to be available from traditional sources; and (d) what role the US might usefully play in a Jordanian effort to develop supplementary financial support from other Arab states which have an important stake in the continued integrity and stability of Jordan. 12. The US reaffirms its admiration for the manner in which the King and the Government of Jordan are facing the hard problems created by recent events, and extends renewed assurances of US friendship and support. [Here follows an annex entitled "Equipment To Be Furnished Jordan."]
President Johnson raised the subject of Jordan and Israel during a telephone conversation with Arthur Goldberg at 5:40 p.m. on December 13, 1966. After discussion of unrelated subjects, he asked Goldberg if "they" had checked with him about Jordan and Israel, stating that he had told them not to do anything for India, Pakistan, Jordan, and Israel without checking with him. Goldberg replied that they had, that Katzenbach had given Johnson a memorandum of the conversation (presumably Document 365) and that he was seeing Ambassador Harman on December 16. Johnson said, "What we'll do is, the proper time, we won't be chintzy with them, we'll go back to Africa or something else. We can't make a deal, but I just think they're damn fools to let that Hussein get thrown out." Goldberg replied, "Well I think they know that, and I'll be glad to talk to them." Johnson indicated his approval, and after brief comments on unrelated subjects, the conversation concluded. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Conversation Between President Johnson and Ambassador Goldberg, December 13, 1966, Tape F6612.02, Side A, PNO 3)
369. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, December 13, 1966, 8:55 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VI. Confidential. Mr. President: Nick and I saw Feinberg, Krim, and David Ginsburg who happened to be in New York. We went through the scenario, as you directed. They all indicated at the end that they thought it would be manageable not only with the Israelis but with their friends here. They intend to get to work much as they did on the earlier Jordan package./2/ /2/A December 13 memorandum from Saunders to Rostow expressed his "disquiet" at the handling of the "Jordan package." He stated that although the package was small and defensive and represented the minimum necessary to meet King Hussein's political requirements, the delay in reaching a decision had seriously weakened its impact, weakened Khammash's faith in the United States as a reliable friend, and downgraded his stature in the King's eyes. Such details, he commented "do not receive the attention they deserve when the President writes the details of the scenario." He complained that Rostow and Katzenbach had had "to rush off to New York on a blizzardy afternoon, leaving State headless," to talk to the Jewish community, and asked, "Is there no way to stiffen the President's will and enliven his memory concerning all we have already done for Israel, so that he (and you and Secretary Rusk and Nick) is not victimized in this way?" (Ibid., Name File, Wriggins Memos) We assume Arthur saw the Israeli Ambassador today./3/ I will let you know as soon as I have a report. /3/Telegram 3188 from USUN, undated, received on December 14, stated that in accordance with Goldberg's telephone conversation with Katzenbach, he had briefed Israel's UN Representative Comay along the lines of the Katzenbach memorandum. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19-8 US-JORDAN) I will see Abe Feinberg tomorrow here in Washington. Walt [Continue with the next documents] Volume XVIII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |