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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XVIII Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-67 Department of State |
 350. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, November 28, 1966. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL UAR-US. Secret. Prepared on November 29. At the urgent request of UAR Ambassador Kamel, I called on him yesterday afternoon. He said he had asked me to come on a busy afternoon because of his extreme anxiety about the drift in US-UAR relations at a time of crisis in Near Eastern affairs. He had touched bases widely in the Department and in the White House without tangible results. He was aware that the Secretary would leave Washington December 4 for about two weeks and he feared the consequences if nothing occurred during that period. The heart of his anxiety is the stalemate on consideration of a possible PL-480 agreement. Maintaining that the key to peace and stability in the Near East is the continuation of effective US-UAR relations, he urged that technical discussions of the PL-480 question begin before the end of the year. He pointed out that the UAR is receiving massive military and economic assistance from the Communists while pursuing independent nationalist policies. This was possible because a food-link was maintained with the West. Kosygin had told Nasser that Russia would meet the UAR food requirements if this proved necessary. Kamel believes that, if this occurs, the UAR will slip irrevocably into the Soviet camp with dire consequences for peace and Near East stability. Despite the highly explosive situation which currently exists in the Near East, Kamel is confident that the area can be quieted down. He claims the UAR has no intent to bring Hussein down, since this would create a very dangerous situation for everyone in the area. When I raised the Ford problem, Kamel said that Ford had stupidly created the problem and that it was now incumbent upon the UAR and US Governments, as well as Ford, to resolve the issues. He said Ford assets had been blocked under UAR law over a customs dispute. He had been in direct contact with Ford and the company is prepared to make certain payments and this issue appears negotiable. Regrettably the Arab League Boycott Committee had met in the immediate aftermath of the Israeli action against Jordan. Under these circumstances, no Arab Government could oppose the boycott proposals of the radicals./2/ Nevertheless, some way could be found to get around this problem. He suggested that Eugene Black be authorized to raise it with Nasser when he sees him on December 1. /2/This portion of the conversation is recorded in more detail in telegram 92233 to Cairo, November 28. Kamel stated that the UAR Government had "long since" given up the notion that the Arab boycott was an effective weapon against Israel. He advised against a direct U.S. assault on the boycott apparatus and recommended that the companies involved take up matters with individual Arab governments. (Ibid., FT 11-2 ISR ARAB) Other documentation related to the boycott is ibid. Turning to the question of the recent departmental reorganization he asserted that all Arab Ambassadors concurred that the new structure and arrangements were less satisfactory. John P. Walsh
351. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/ Tel Aviv, November 29, 1966, 1025Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12 NEAR E. Secret; Exdis. Received at 6:14 a.m. 1845. Ref: State 91607./2/ In meeting with Eban last evening, substance of which reported separately, I also referred to arms control accordance para 3 reftel. I noted that we encouraged by his remark to me on Nov 2nd that GOI no longer believes desirable keep Nasser in dark about Israeli nuclear intentions and hopes find "middle ground," still protecting Israeli security considerations. Eban confirmed this GOI policy. I said that in circumstances, next week after current deluge Congressional delegations has passed, I would hope he and I can get together with PriMin to pursue discussion. He thought this good idea and will endeavor arrange appointment. I added that in meantime in line our understanding we would like to have another visit to Dimona and that AEC team is prepared to do so any time during next three weeks. I commented that it almost eight months since last visit. Eban said he will speak to PriMin and give me reply early as possible. /2/Telegram 91607 to Tel Aviv, November 25, instructed Barbour to request a meeting with Eban and Eshkol to follow up on his November 2 discussion of arms control with Eshkol (see Document 331) and to tell Eban that, in line with the U.S.-Israeli understanding on visits to Dimona, an AEC team was prepared to visit Dimona at any time within the next 3 weeks. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12 NEAR E) Barbour
352. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan/1/ Washington, November 29, 1966, 9:58 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Atherton and approved by Davies. Repeated to Tel Aviv and USUN. 93329. 1. Following summary FYI only and Noforn. Memcon/2/ is uncleared and subject to amendment upon review. /2/Not found. 2. In meeting with General Khammash afternoon Nov 29, Secretary expressed distress at situation which had brought Khammash to Washington, stated President and he have devoted much time to this problem and said he grateful for King's message, which Khammash delivered./3/ USG well aware of details Nov 13 Israeli raid and had made known in both Israel and SC our view that Israeli action was wrong and misguided. /3/A copy of the King's letter is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL JORDAN-US. 3. Khammash said as Chief of Staff it difficult be absent from Jordan at this time, but King Hussein felt it important convey at high level GOJ view of situation and corrective measures needed. Israeli raid, largest since 1956, had revealed Jordan defenses inadequate and adversely affected morale of Army. He had initially thought Israeli attack was beginning of invasion and had considered ordering return strike. If he had, area could have been plunged into war. 4. Khammash said while GOJ could cope with present demonstrations, they were most serious Jordan had experienced and revealed depth of popular feeling. Jordan now subject propaganda attacks from Syria, UAR and PLO. Public opinion in Jordan was convinced Israel attacked Jordan because Syria, which Israel had earlier held responsible for terrorism, was strong militarily and protected by USSR. In this situation Jordan was turning to its friend the United States. Must be understood that Nov 13 incident unlike incidents in past and situation would not return to normal if nothing was done. If USG unable to help, King faced with choice of (a) dying in battle with Israel rather than at hands of own people, (b) becoming hero by turning to Soviets for military equipment or (c) abdicating. If Jordan received equipment requested and money to pay for enlarged Army, all would be well. This connection Khammash asserted Jordanian officers sufficiently sophisticated to tell difference between real and token help. 5. In response Secretary's question whether opinions differed between East and West Bank in this matter, Khammash replied sense of defeat equally strong among all Jordanians. Only difference was that East Bank less vulnerable to Syrian, UAR and PLO propaganda. Jordan had been subject to such propaganda before but situation created by Nov 13 attack had made elements of population more responsive than previously. 6. Secretary enquired re King's personal safety. Khammash said King for present could depend on loyalty of armed forces. If nothing done, however, Nov 13 might in time become Jordan's new national day. 7. Secretary stressed he could not overstate gravity with which we viewed Israeli attack. Another such attack would have most serious consequences and there no doubt in Israel about this. At same time, he wanted emphasize two points: in our view attack (1) did not reflect Israeli scheme to seize West Bank and (2) was not aimed at King Hussein. He therefore could not comprehend how Israel failed to foresee consequences for King. 8. Secretary continued that US has strong fraternal feeling for His Majesty and interest in well being of Jordan. We would take urgent look at Jordan's request. While he could not comment in detail pending consultations with Defense colleagues, there was no question about our policy of support for Jordan. 9. Secretary said he now frankly more concerned about Syria and UAR than Israel. Did Khammash see any connection between recent Syrian-UAR security pact/4/ and current situation? Khammash said in his view it was USSR which brought those two countries together. Secretary commented that, while we had not discussed latest incident with Soviets, we had held discussions with them regarding Near East in UN context and he had discussed possibility of slow-down in arms race with Gromyko. We had, however, found no interest on Soviet side. /4/During talks held in Cairo November 1-7 by Nasser and Syrian Premier Yussef Zayen, Syria and the UAR agreed to resume diplomatic relations and on November 4 signed a joint defense agreement. 10. Secretary emphasized President deeply concerned re Israeli attack Nov 13 and had conveyed his views to Israel through more than one channel. Khammash responded that high GOJ officials do not doubt USG position but Jordan public disillusioned. It seemed to GOJ that only Jordan, which had longest frontier with Israel, was victim of "balance of strength" policy. Israel could get military equipment it wanted from various sources and UAR, Syria and Iraq could get theirs from Soviets. USG must show it won't let its friends down. Having already invested over one-half billion dollars in Jordan, USG must now judge how much Jordan is worth to it. 11. Secretary expressed hope Jordan's security problems could be met without interfering with GOJ development program. At this point he could only say we would have to see what can be done and would be as responsive as possible. Secretary noted that, just as Israel found it difficult guard against terrorism, Jordan undoubtedly realized that complete security not easy to guarantee. Khammash concurred, saying principal need was increased mobility and firepower to improve defense. Secretary said we were looking into possibility that techniques developed in Viet Nam might be applicable in detecting intrusions across Jordan-Israeli border. Khammash replied GOJ list included early warning system but equipment could not be too sophisticated in order permit rapid assimilation by Army. 12. Khammash noted GOJ had been subjected to repeated USG inquiries regarding stationing tanks on West Bank--a restriction not applicable to Israel. This had had unfortunate effect and he hoped subject would not be brought up again. Secretary said he appreciated problem and would give it further thought. In conclusion, Secretary assured Khammash we felt sense of solidarity with Jordan and would give GOJ request most serious attention. Rusk
353. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/ Washington, November 30, 1966, 3:47 p.m. /1/Source:National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 31-1 ISR-UAR. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Bergus, cleared in draft by Wolle, and approved by Davies. Repeated to Cairo. 93594. 1. While we not in position accept or reject Israel version of yesterday's air battle,/2/ neither are we certain that Israel's behavior is as "innocent" as it claims. We have some difficulty in understanding how aircraft allegedly destroyed over Israel territory happened to fall in UAR./3/ FYI Noforn. Our suspicion compounded by statement made to Dept Off by Israel Minister Evron yesterday that Piper was checking on reports of UAR troop concentrations in UAR territory near Qusaima. Evron then said he had "gone beyond instructions" in telling Dept Off this. End FYI Noforn. /2/On November 29, Israeli forces shot down two United Arab Republic MIG 19 aircraft on the Israeli-UAR border. /3/Telegram 3091 from Cairo, December 1, reported that according to information from the UNEF Commander there were daily incursions by Israeli reconnaissance aircraft into UAR airspace as far as Suez, since the UAR's MIG 17s and MIG 19s were incapable of matching the performance of Israel's Mirage aircraft. (Ibid.) Telegrams 3124 and 3206 from Cairo, December 3 and 7 respectively, reported that according to the UAR Foreign Minister and an official in the UAR Vice President's office, UAR aircraft frequently flew photographic missions over Israeli territory. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 31-1 ISR-UAR) 2. Statements in paras. I and K in Tel Aviv USDAO's 1272/4/ indicate Israel military well aware of political implications their actions. /4/Telegram 1272 from the Defense Attache Office in Tel Aviv, November 29, described an Israeli briefing on the incident. (Ibid.) 3. We do not believe that Israelis should be allowed to believe that they can practice their version of realpolitik with neighboring Arab states at this critical juncture without attracting notice of USG and arousing doubts as to their professed peaceful intentions. 4. Accordingly, unless factors unknown to us make it undesirable, Embassy Tel Aviv should advise Fonoff that while we still studying reports of air incident we would deplore behavior by any party which would tend to arouse anew Arab-Israel tension at this time./5/ We not at all sure that challenges to UAR and exploitation of incident by release photographs allegedly of UAR MIG being shot down by Israeli Mirage (which published front page today's Washington Post and New York Times) will produce result tending to strengthen position of Hussein in Jordan. /5/Telegram 1972 from Tel Aviv, December 7, reported that Barbour discussed the substance of telegram 93594 with the Foreign Minister and other high-ranking Israeli officials. (Ibid.) Katzenbach
354. Memorandum From W. Howard Wriggins and Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow)/1/ Washington, December 1, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. V. Secret. Filed with a brief covering memorandum of December 2 from Wriggins to Rostow, suggesting that he talk to Rusk and urge him to stop in Cairo on the way to Paris. Rusk was about to leave on a trip in which he visited several countries in Asia, concluding with a visit to Paris, where he attended a December 15-16 meeting of the North Atlantic Council. SUBJECT Before Secretary Rusk leaves for the Far East Sunday,/2/ we badly need to get him to focus on the UAR. Two decisions must be made: /2/December 4. 1. The food recommendation has been hanging fire in State for three weeks simply because Ray Hare tried unsuccessfully to talk with the Secretary before he discussed it in the IRG. As you remember, the Egyptian economic delegation told you officially in September that the UAR would have to have our answer by the end of November in order to get grain elsewhere if necessary. This is such an important decision that we should not make it by default. 2. Budget Bureau now has the Presidential Determination necessary to continue our technical assistance program. The President agreed in June to continue this when he approved offering CCC credit sales for six months, but we can hardly ask him to sign a new Determination without having some notion of where we're going. One way to handle this would be for the Secretary to stop in Cairo on the way to Paris. The main problem in our UAR relations is lack of confidence. Nasser believes we're out to get him, and the fact that our high level travellers bypass him just confirms his belief. The Egyptians still consider that postponement (for pressing US reasons) of the Secretary's scheduled visit last spring was a calculated slight, but the invitation has been repeated. A visit would have several advantages. If we can't make a food decision now, he could explain why. He could also make plausible our line that, even though we have difficulties with further concessional food aid, we're not trying to bring Nasser down. At the least, it would give the Secretary a chance for a heart-to-heart talk with Nasser which could be a sound basis for the President's decision. We are coming to believe that we've reached a "crossroads" in US-UAR relations--though not necessarily the "crossroads" Kamel keeps talking about. The Kennedy experiment is over. We gambled that a three-year food deal, personal correspondence, and a certain amount of human respect for Nasser might moderate his revolutionary policies. We probably went too far too fast, but we have been frankly disappointed in results. He continued clandestine organization against the more moderate, oil-rich monarchies; he ventured into the Congo rebellion; more recently, his army has become increasingly Draconian in the Yemen; Radio Cairo continues to agitate Arab "nationalism"; his policy often parallels Moscow's. Now that that experiment has run out of steam, and we have to decide among three possible courses: --We can give up, drop food aid and try to live with a potentially more troublesome UAR. --We can go on--if the President will approve--with an uncertain series of interim food agreements. --We can seek some new base for our relationship, though less ambitious than our 1962 effort. Our own inclination is to try the last, though we would settle for the second this time. We can't see that the first buys us anything and it could cost us a lot. Nasser could behave much worse and do much greater damage to our interests. On balance, within the Arab world he has been a restraining force vis-a-vis Israel. His present involvement in Syria is a force for restraint, not aggression. He has not precipitated attacks on Western oil interests or inhibited movement of oil. The Secretary's visit could be the first step in building something new. The main disadvantage to his going now without going to Amman would be our apparent support for Nasser at a time when Nasser's propaganda machine has King Hussein on the ropes. It would be ideal if the Secretary could go to Amman too though that may be impossible. We think this idea is worth considering. But the main point is to find out how the Secretary plans to handle these UAR decisions. If we're going to let them drift till he comes back, we ought to be signalling the UAR that we're just being indecisive--not saying no.
355. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, December 2, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VI. Secret. SUBJECT We've moved this week into the second phase of our effort to put together the pieces after Israel's 13 November raid. Hussein is still on top of his security situation. Although the army has stuck with him in putting down demonstrations, morale is still a serious problem. We must now show enough movement in improving Jordan's defenses to satisfy his military over the longer term. He sent his army commander, General Khammash, here Monday/2/ with a stupendous $200 million request for equipment, army expansion and budget support. Secretary Rusk and I have both received him/3/ in an effort to make Hussein feel he is getting a fair hearing. /2/November 28. /3/For Rusk's meeting with Khammash, see Document 352. No record of Rostow's meeting with him has been found, but a December 1 briefing memorandum from Wriggins and Saunders to Rostow is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. III. A December 1 memorandum from Wriggins and Saunders to Rostow concerning Macomber's meeting with Khammash that morning is ibid., Name File, Wriggins Memos. A memorandum of a November 30 meeting between Townsend Hoopes and Khammash is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 6648, 400.3295 Jordan. We will have to whittle Khammash's request down to keep Hussein from ruining Jordan economically, but we probably can't get off scot free. We'll have to put together some kind of package and will try to gear it to streamlining existing forces and improving border control. We don't agree with Hussein that this is chiefly a military problem because we don't believe--as he does--that the Israeli attack was the first step in grabbing West Jordan. We are holding Secretary McNamara in reserve to sell our final proposition to Khammash when we have a clearer idea what we can do. The Israelis have recovered their composure enough to take us to task mildly for supporting last week's UN Security Council censure of Israel. They claim the UN action gives a blank check to the Arab governments backing the terrorists. We're pressing them to beef up their own border control effort and to help improve the UN machinery there. They're willing to talk about improving their own system, but we'll have to press hard before they will be willing to see the UN beefed up. Nevertheless, we still feel the least that ought to come out of this mess is a system that will be a serious deterrent to continued terrorism. We will be back to you with a formal proposal later. Walt
356. Intelligence Memorandum/1/ No. 2205/66 Washington, December 2, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. III. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. A note on the memorandum states that it was produced solely by CIA and was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence. PALESTINE ARAB TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS 1. The tradition of terrorism in Arab-Israeli relations extends back into the 1920's and '30's. Before the Arab-Israeli war of 1948-49, terrorism was the principal weapon of both Arabs and Jews in harassing the British authorities in Palestine. In the early 1950's, the Arab governments organized paramilitary commando groups--fedayeen--which undertook raiding and sabotage missions into Israel. Israel's invasion of Sinai was in large measure a retaliation for this fedayeen activity, and the terrorist raiding ceased after the 1956 Sinai campaign. The PLO 2. As official support of terrorist operations ceased, many Palestinian Arabs became increasingly frustrated at the relative lack of aggressiveness toward Israel on the part of Arab governments. There was persistent agitation among Palestinians throughout the Arab world for some kind of representative organization, and this culminated in 1964 in the formation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The PLO received the formal sanction of the League of Arab States at an Arab summit meeting that year. 3. The organization is a kind of Palestinian government in exile but it has been careful to avoid such a designation because of King Husayn's well-founded suspicion that it posed a threat to his authority in west Jordan. The PLO's activities are mainly political and military; it has tried, for example, to form a "Palestine Liberation Army" around a core of Palestinian units which had been formed over the years in the Egyptian, Syrian, and Iraqi armies. Nasir exercises considerable influence over the PLO, though he does not completely control its leaders. The organization's "Voice of Palestine" broadcasts emanate from Cairo. The PLO is led by a dynamic super-orator, Ahmad Shuqayri, a Palestinian who at various times has been a UN representative for Syria and Saudi Arabia. 4. The PLO's long-range plans for opposing the Israelis initially omitted sponsorship of terrorist operations into Israel. PLO leaders and sponsors recognized that such operations would provoke Israeli retaliation, and very possibly lead to a war for which the Arab governments are still not ready. This policy was a source of frustration to many activist Palestinians, and it led to the emergence of the present generation of terrorist groups. The PLO has failed to persuade these groups to submit to over-all PLO direction, and, to meet their competition, has within the past few months felt compelled to undertake such activities on its own. The "Organization of Heroes of the Return" (to Palestine) is the group which appears to be the new PLO terrorist arm. Some of its members clashed with Israeli forces near the Lebanese border in mid-October. Fatah 5. The most prominent of the terrorist groups is Fatah (a reverse acronym of the Arabic for "Palestine Liberation Movement"). Fatah is sometimes also known by the name of its commando arm, Asifa (Storm). Fatah appears to be descended from a clandestine Palestinian organization--now inactive--which was formed in the mid-1950's. Some of its members had connections with the Muslim Brotherhood, a conservative, strongly anti-Nasir politico-religious movement. Fatah also may have had links with the Arab Higher Committee of Hajj Amin al-Husayni, the ex-Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, with whom the Brotherhood collaborated in regard to Palestine affairs. 6. In its present incarnation, Fatah emerged publicly in January 1965, when it claimed responsibility for terrorist incidents in Israel. Its leaders had previously participated in the organization of the PLO, but had become disenchanted. They are also disgusted with the continuing inability of most Arab governments to act decisively toward Israel, and are wary of any official control which might curtail Fatah's operations. 7. Syria, the most bellicose of the Arab states, is the one government whose policy comes closest to Fatah's violently anti-Israeli line. Damascus supports Fatah by providing it with a base for its operations, training facilities, and a propaganda outlet. The infiltrations into Israel, however, have been undertaken from Jordanian and Lebanese territory, since those borders are more easily traversed. This has occurred without the approval of either the Jordanian or the Lebanese government. Most of Fatah's financial support comes from wealthy Palestinians living in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. 8. The number of people who participate in Fatah, as well as in other terrorist organizations, is unknown and probably fluctuates. Many of the terrorists are professional thugs or smugglers, and some were active against Israel in 1955-56. The Israelis say Fatah has been responsible for 61 sabotage incidents. Israeli Foreign Minister Eban recently stated, however, that Fatah had been inactive for about six weeks. The PLF 9. A rival Palestinian terrorist organization called the "Palestinian Liberation Front" (PLF) has been credited by the Israelis with the 12 November road mining incident which triggered the Israeli raid into Jordan the next day. Jordanian officials also suspected the PLF of having perpetrated that incident, and they had begun a search for those responsible at the time Israel attacked. Little is known about the PLF. Like Fatah, it apparently aims at provoking a general Arab-Israeli war, but it is reputed to be more skilled in its operations. PLF members are said to regard Fatah as an organization of publicity seekers. 10. Some "terrorism" in Israel is more or less spontaneous. For years, Arab smugglers and crossborder operators have occasionally clashed with Israeli security forces. Incidents of this sort have been much reduced as the Israelis' security measures have been tightened. The organized, professional terrorism of the Fatah, the PLF, and of the PLO's new arm, poses problems for Israeli authorities that have no easy solution.
357. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ JCSM-751-66 Washington, December 5, 1966. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4443, Jordan 091.3 MAP. Secret. A stamped notation indicates that the memorandum was seen by the Secretary. SUBJECT 1. (S) Reference is made to a memorandum by the Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), I-28025/66, dated 28 November 1966,/2/ subject as above, which requests the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on further military actions which the United States should take to assist the Government of Jordan. /2/Not found. 2. (S) The internal crisis in Jordan which has arisen in the wake of the 13 November 1966 Israeli attack requires additional prompt responses on the part of the US Government to restore stability and bolster King Hussein. The stability of the regime and the maintenance of order are dependent upon the loyalty and effectiveness of the Armed Forces. In order to insure their continued support, any assistance to Jordan must be of such impact that it will demonstrate to the Armed Forces, the civilian population and the Middle East as a whole, that King Hussein has the active support of the US Government. 3. (S) The most immediate and probably the strongest impact action that the United States could take would be to suspend arms shipments to Israel. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff note the statement made by Secretary of State Rusk to the Israeli Ambassador on 21 November 1966/3/ that a recurrence of action across armistice lines could bring reexamination of decision to sell certain military equipment to Israel. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that should another incident occur under similar circumstances, the United States should suspend the sale and deliveries of military equipment to Israel. /3/See Document 343. 4. (S) King Hussein has stated that a requirement exists to improve internal security and Jordanian defensive capabilities by increasing the pay of enlisted personnel, increasing the size of the Armed Forces, and the addition of new equipment. In developing their views on these matters, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the Military Assistance Program to Jordan, the recommendations of the Country Team, and the urgent Jordanian requirements as presented to the Office of the Secretary of Defense by General Khammash. 5. (S) The complete list of equipment submitted by General Khammash is beyond Jordan's ability to operate and maintain effectively and would entail a heavy financial burden. Although it is impractical for the United States to furnish all of the equipment requested, a more modest equipment package should be provided which would assist in deterring future Israeli border raids, improve Jordan's border defenses, and have a less adverse impact on the Jordanian economy. 6. (S) Attached at Appendix A/4/ is a proposed package, which, with a pay increase, would meet, in part, the most pressing security needs of Jordan as expressed by General Khammash and provide an important psychological impact. As proposed by the referenced memorandum, this package has been developed without regard to planned financial ceilings on military and supporting assistance for Jordan. Cost of the equipment package is approximately $12.8 million. It would entail an increase of approximately 11,400 personnel, of which 4,500 would be part-time border village guards. Addition of these personnel and approval of a 25 percent pay raise would require an estimated $11.1 million increase in annual Jordanian defense expenditures. Armaments and equipment proposed in the package would produce no significant change in the arms balance in the Middle East. Additional military measures which could be taken to assist the Government of Jordan are also contained in Appendix A. A recapitulation of the arms and equipment package is contained in Appendix B. The equipment list submitted by General Khammash, annotated, where possible, with price and availability, is contained in Appendix C. /4/The appendices are not printed. 7. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that the provisions of the package require diversions of equipment from Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Korea and other countries and consider that the United States should not unilaterally make these diversions, but rather the agreement of these countries should be sought. 8. (S) In reference to the memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), I-28187/66, dated 3 December 1966,/5/ the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the United States take action now on the package proposed herein and not defer action due to dispatch of survey teams. Further comment on this memorandum will be provided concerning their views on the option for Jordan to purchase additional F-104 aircraft and the dispatch of a high-level mission or an air defense survey team to Jordan./6/ /5/Not found. /6/JCSM-758-66, a JCS memorandum of December 7 to Secretary McNamara, provided the comments. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4443, Jordan 091.3 MAP) JCSM-765-66, a JCS memorandum of December 9 to McNamara, provided further comments on the question of aid to Jordan. (Ibid.) 9. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that: a. The United States support in principle the Armed Forces pay increase proposed by General Khammash. However, before assuming this recurring annual cost, every effort should be made to obtain the necessary money from other Arab states such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. b. The United States provide to the Government of Jordan the arms and equipment package proposed in Appendix A and support the attendant increase in personnel. c. The United States take the additional military measures contained in Appendix A. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Earle G. Wheeler
358. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/ Washington, December 7, 1966, 3:47 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 15-7 ISR-US. Secret. Drafted and approved by Symmes. Repeated to DIA, OSD, USUN, Amman, Jerusalem, Cairo, Damascus, Beirut, USCINCEUR/USDUCOM, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, CINCUSNAVEUR, CTG SIX ZERO PT TWO, CINCUSAFE, CINCUSAREUR, COMSIXTHFLT, and JCS. 98110. Ref: Tel Aviv USDAO 1250 and 1293 Nov 66./2/ /2/Neither found. 1. In conversation sixth with Israeli Minister Evron Dept officer raised difficulties recently encountered by DATT in obtaining permission visit Israeli military installations and disapproval attache reconnaissance efforts voiced by some IDF officers. Using line taken by Ambassador in second reftel with Foreign Minister, Dept officer said attaches under standing instructions travel around Israel, particularly during times of crisis, and also to become acquainted with Israeli military installations. Their mission no secret, and Ambassador had reminded Foreign Minister on Nov 28 that Prime Minister himself had said attache travel around country welcomed provided there no roadblocks. Unless we had independent access to all parts of country we would not be in position provide assurances to certain other countries about Israeli intentions. Moreover, limitations on attaches would tend to create suspicions in our own minds about Israeli intentions. We therefore hoped any misunderstandings on part of IDF could be dispelled and there would be no question of free movement by our attaches. 2. Evron in somewhat defensive response ended up saying he was certain no restrictions would be placed on attaches. He also used Foreign Minister's line that DATT had asked to "inspect" installations in order to check out Israeli assurances regarding Jordan. Dept officer rejoined he certain request was to visit not to inspect and there must have been misunderstanding. In course conversation Dept officer also reminded Evron of easy access Israeli attaches have to US officials and agencies. Katzenbach
359. Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas/1/ Washington, December 9, 1966, 0013Z. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VI. Secret. The telegram was received at the LBJ Ranch at 6:52 p.m. on December 8. A handwritten "L" on the telegram indicates that it was seen by the President. A notation in an unknown handwriting reads as follows: "Walt: Let Komer tell Abe Feinberg do not want this--unless they want an enemy." CAP 661223. Information. Forewarned is forearmed and you should be aware that the Israelis are now zeroing in on our proposed small military aid package for Jordan. Ambassador Harman was in to see me this afternoon/2/ and conveyed the clear message that the Israeli Government is very much concerned that anything we do for Jordan will unsettle the delicate military balance in the area. We will be sending you more formally in the next day or two a specific proposal on Jordan. Defense still has not quite wrapped up all the details, but it is fair to say that the package will be minimal and will not seriously affect the Israeli-Jordanian military balance. However, we will have to reckon with an Israeli reaction no matter what we do. We are on firm logical ground in saying that we would be doing nothing more for Jordan than already planned if the Israelis had not raided on 13 November. After all, we are only picking up the pieces in a mess they created. But regardless of how firmly we take that line, the Israelis have regained their composure and are going to be pretty tough to deal with. /2/A memorandum of the December 8 conversation is ibid. We will include recommendations for handling the Israeli side of the problem when we send our final proposal to you. However, I wanted you to be forewarned of this aspect of the problem in case someone should try to reach you at the Ranch. [Continue with the next documents] Volume XVIII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |