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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XVIII Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-67 Department of State |
 310. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/ Washington, July 28, 1966, 3:49 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, REF PAL. Confidential; Noforn Except Israeli officials. Drafted by Campbell, cleared by Symmes and Sisco, and approved by Buffum. Also sent to USUN and repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem, and to Geneva for Goldberg. 16922. 1. Israeli Envoy Gideon Rafael, accompanied by Amb. Harman, today presented to Secretary results of GOI task force deliberations on possible initiatives on refugee problem. He began by saying GOI has not made any decision, but would like to put forth some tentative proposals for our consideration. 2. Rafael said GOI eliminated possibility of any overall peace proposal because Arabs would not accept that. Repatriation means for Arabs driving Israel out of Mideast. This left rehabilitation-resettlement as only possible basis for progress. 3. He recalled US and UN had negotiated resettlement projects with Syria, Egypt and Jordan under UNRWA rehabilitation fund in early fifties, and then proposed we prepare ground at GA for creation of similar rehabilitation instrument financed by international subscription to which Israel could contribute with help of loans. 4. When Secretary asked if GOI excludes repatriation, Rafael said yes, at this stage, because repatriation is symbol of Arab hostility to existence of Israel. Time is ripe, he said, for rehabilitation and against repatriation which is not realistic basis for settlement. GOI is inspired by Hussein's speech,/2/ he said, and believes his ideas about "breaking down walls of UNRWA and getting refugees out of camps" should be encouraged. /2/Reference is to a June 14 speech by King Hussein in which, inter alia, he declared his rejection of "the absurd logic and the weak policy which advocates keeping Palestinians in tents and camps surrounded by barbed wire." Telegram 787 from Amman, June 20, transmitted that portion of his speech. (Ibid., POL 15-1 JORDAN) The Embassy in Amman commented on the speech in telegrams 776, June 15, and 778, June 16, highlighting what telegram 778 called the King's "blistering attack" on the PLO, and his charge that the peril of Communism was greater and more dangerous than that of Zionism. (Both ibid.) 5. In reply to question, Rafael said Jordan should be approached separately, because divisions in Arab world would prevent Arabs from acting as group. Lebanon would go along when feasible, Harman added. 6. When Secretary asked if GOI already in touch with any Jordanians on this, Rafael said no, GOI wanted first to discuss with USG. GOI does not want to make approach, he said. 7. He then added GOI for time being only wants to prepare groundwork at UNGA for this project, i.e. to conduct debate in such way as to show Arabs UNRWA is not permanent fixture, that UN will not respond to further Arab attempts to politicize this question. When Secretary asked if GA then would be final rather than first step, Rafael said first steps would be reform of UNRWA, reduction of relief rolls, elimination of PLA, then assuring that host states prepared to take over responsibility--these would prepare ground for this proposal. 8. Rafael asked if US would take up proposal with Jordanians. Secretary said USG could not take lead. If we broached idea, question of repatriation would immediately arise. He suggested Israelis might wish approach SYG Thant and ask him if he would take this up. Jordanians should be asked if King Hussein's speech indicated any Arab interest in rehabilitation, he added. 9. Rafael said this idea was GOI constructive approach to problem. If this not acceptable, he indicated, many felt GOI should simply take no action but remain strong and wait for more favorable time for dealing with refugee problem. 10. Secretary noted that Arabs know rehabilitation has been available to them from outset. He said he had no indication they had changed in their negative attitude toward it. He also cautioned that UN unlikely to forget repatriation aspect of resolutions. 11. Secretary concluded by stating he not rejecting suggestion "if you and Arabs agree on it," but indicated again Israelis should sound out Arabs through their own means. 12. Above is full record of conversation and no additional memcon being prepared. 13. Rafael's earlier separate conversations with Assistant Secretaries Hare and Sisco followed same line as above. Memcons by pouch./3/ /3/A memorandum of Rafael's July 26 conversation with Hare is ibid., REF ARAB. A memorandum of his July 27 conversation with Hare and Sisco is ibid., REF 3 UNRWA. Rusk
311. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/ Washington, July 28, 1966, 6:42 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL UAR-US. Secret. Drafted by Bergus and approved by Hare. Also sent to Jidda and Taiz. 17321. Following summary uncleared FYI/Noforn and subject to revision upon review memcon. Salient points Secretary's remarks to UAR Ambassador Kamel July 28: 1. US wants find continually strengthened basis for its relations with UAR. This does not mean we seek agreement all points. Does mean it important that we look at points difference, resolve them if we can or try to circumscribe them if we cannot. 2. Secretary wants come Cairo but unable set date at this time. Not likely be before November. Secretary would like visit Cairo and other countries in area. 3. We would let Kamel know re appointment with President. 4. Congressional visits to UAR would be useful, probably more feasible after November elections. We could exchange suggestions as to whom UAR might wish invite. 5. Re Yemen, Secretary said we had taken full note Kamel's July 13 statement that UAR would do nothing exacerbate situation provided SAG did likewise. Everyone seemed want settlement but up to present settlement "just beyond our fingertips." We remained interested in settlement and would continue direct contacts with interested party. We did not wish undertake formal role in mediation but would pass on thoughts or ideas as they occurred. 6. Secretary congratulated UAR for having obtained necessary 10% American bank guarantees for CCC food purchases and said we would try expedite CCC implementations. 7. On UAR's longer term food needs, Secretary noted El Sayah July 22 statement to Hare that UAR hoped be able obtain food requirements without outside assistance by 1972. On unofficial basis Secretary suggested might be helpful if UAR could let us have what information it could on its plan. Seemed to Secretary that approaching UAR food problem in broader framework of world situation might allow all of us to be more constructive and more relaxed. 8. Secretary emphasized that maintaining confidence of IMF and IBRD was extremely important to any country. FYI. Kamel's reaction to para 7 indicated concern lest GUAR might get impression USG was foreclosing resumption of PL 480 Title I sales. He said this matter would have to be handled in Cairo with great delicacy. Secretary assured him our continuing interest UAR food problem. End FYI. Rusk
312. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/ Washington, July 28, 1966, 8:39 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12 ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Campbell, cleared by Symmes and Sisco, and approved and initialed by Rusk. Repeated to Geneva for Goldberg. 17501. After discussion Israeli proposal on refugee problem (State 16922),/2/ Secretary raised question of Israeli nuclear intentions. He noted Soviet interest in denuclearization and said that if Israel would agree to IAEA safeguards, he believed its Arab neighbors would also agree and USSR would go along. Would Israel agree to IAEA safeguards, he asked. /2/Document 310. Ambassador Rafael said Israel was not giving any thought to it at present because of GOI's concern for broader problem of conventional weapons. Rafael said Soviets did not indicate to Israelis in Geneva they would be willing to limit conventional arms in area in exchange for nuclear ban. He added Israel made clear its position it would not be first to introduce nuclear weapons in Near East. Secretary noted our assumption GOI does not wish go nuclear, and added: If you do, you will lose US support. If on the other hand, you accepted nuclear ban, he continued, your neighbors would follow you and that would be first step toward reduction of tensions. Secretary said we cannot guarantee USSR interested in conventional arms limitation, but nuclear question can be separated out and that consideration is fundamental to US position. Secretary then told Israelis that nothing would be more disastrous to GOI than enter nuclear weapon field, and urged them to agree to international safeguards. When Rafael protested nuclear ban does not take care of GOI's problem with conventional weapons, Secretary said: This means then you want to hang on to the threat of nuclear weapons. Rafael said no, GOI has made position clear in Knesset, but there are some people in Israel--not in govt--who say Israel should go nuclear. Secretary said either this card is in your deck, or it is not. If it's not, then get it out of the way by accepting safeguards. He again noted that if Israel is holding open the nuclear option, it should forget US support. We would not be with you, he said. Secretary asked Israel to bring this matter to attention of Eban. They suggested it might be discussed further while Eban is in US for GA. Rusk
313. Letter From the Charge in the United Arab Republic (Nes) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Davies)/1/ Cairo, July 28, 1966. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL UAR-US. Secret; Official-Informal. Dear Rodger: Ever since arriving here a little more than a year ago, I have sought some way of breaking out of the ever tightening circle of our relations with the UAR occasioned by our own political realities on the one hand and the continuing foreign adventures of the UAR on the other. May I say that I have always been absolutely convinced of the necessity, if at all possible, of retaining the maximum Western position in the UAR. Frankly I am discouraged. The following are my own comments and I have not discussed them with the staff: 1. Haikel's 22 July article (Cairo 381) and Nasser's 23 July speech (Cairo 388)/2/ could indicate that the UARG is no longer thinking in terms of an eventual affirmative U.S. response to their $150 million PL 480 food request and are preparing to act accordingly. /2/Both telegrams are dated July 22. (Ibid.) 2. If this is true, and there is other evidence to substantiate such a conclusion, we may, indeed, be in for the "hot" summer Haikel referred to earlier. 3. Without the restraints imposed by food expectations and facing a deteriorating internal economic situation and an external financial crisis, we may see an increasing resort to foreign "adventures" such as terrorism in Saudi Arabia designed as a prelude to a "war of liberation" against the Faisal regime, greatly increased terrorism in Aden to force a British withdrawal and humiliation before 1968, renewal of the campaign against Wheelus Field and open support for North Viet Nam and the Viet Cong. This latter change from the official neutral attitude could be presaged in Nasser's speech; "American hostile action against North Viet Nam is an obstacle to peaceful settlement--We must--denounce American hostile action--." 4. Since there has been no discernible improvement in the overall climate of U.S.-UARG relations since the May IRG meeting, I believe Washington should reconsider whether it is really in our long range interests, if indeed we wish to continue to seek to achieve our more limited objectives in the Near East, to tie food for the UAR so tightly to its performance in the Arabian Peninsula. Are our interests there more important than preserving what remains of the U.S. and Western position in the UAR; is it really wise to use food as a club at all? 5. Since I have no solid regional basis for recommending any change in our tactics at this time, I wish only to reiterate the dangers which may flow from a starving, frustrated and desperate Egypt. I would imagine that the IRG will again be meeting on the UAR food problem later in the summer and you might at that time like to stress, perhaps more forcibly than has hitherto been done, the very grave dangers involved in pushing Nasser into a financial and food corner. If we should embark upon a policy of endeavoring to replace him with a more moderate leadership in the UAR, this is of course another matter and one not supported in the current draft of our National Policy Paper. Do not feel that you need reply to this letter. I write you only because I want to be sure that all factors involved in our current tactics toward Egypt should be seen in the light of their possible repercussions. Sincerely, David
314. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, August 2, 1966. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Symmes on August 5. According to the President's Daily Dairy, the meeting took place at 12:46 p.m. in the President's office at the White House. (Johnson Library) President Shazar's visit was informal. Briefing material for the visit is ibid., National Security File, Country File, Israel, Shazar Visit Briefing Book. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS After a brief private conversation with President Shazar, President Johnson asked the other Israelis and Americans present to join him and President Shazar. President Shazar discussed some of the impressions he had gained in his visits to Uruguay, Brazil and Chile. He mentioned particularly educational problems faced by some of these countries and commented on some of the leaders he had met. President Shazar recalled he had first met President Johnson at the funeral of President Kennedy. He had been one of the first Chiefs of State received by President Johnson after the funeral. They had had a memorable conversation in which President Johnson assured him there would be no diminution in U.S. support of Israel as a result of President Kennedy's death, but, indeed, U.S. support might be even greater. He had reiterated to President Shazar assurance previously made by President Kennedy. After his return to Israel President Shazar said he had repeated to persons all over Israel what President Johnson had said to him. He continued to tell people about the President's assurances to Israel. President Shazar thanked President Johnson for the sale of U.S. military equipment to Israel. President Johnson responded that this had been a difficult decision because we do not wish to become an arms merchant anywhere in the world. Nevertheless, we had made the sales because we had been persuaded by Israel that the arms were necessary. President Shazar commented that Israel in turn does not like to have to buy arms. Israel would like nothing better than to live at peace with its neighbors, but Israel has been given no alternative. The Fatah raids on Israel have resulted in the murder of innocent Israelis. Israel has no alternative but to defend itself. To establish its own Fatah is no alternative. It must have military force to deter its enemies. President Shazar at one point apparently misunderstood President Johnson and thought he was referring to the current U.N. Security Council consideration of Syrian and Israel complaints. It appeared he thought President Johnson had referred to "Israeli aggression." He said that Israel had not always been happy about U.N. consideration of problems involving Israel. U.S. representatives in the U.N. did not always take a clear-cut line with regard to problems involving Israel and the Arabs. Unless the U.S.G. takes a clear-cut line with the Arabs and shows by its votes that it is opposed to aggression the Arabs will not get the message. U.S. action is particularly important in persuading the younger generation in Israel: a "skeptical generation" among a "believing people." The two Presidents had an extended discussion of the principles involved in the U.S. stand against aggression in Vietnam and its implications for U.S. assurances it will seek to deter and prevent aggression against other small states. President Johnson said that the U.S.G. did not want troops or money from Israel. We were asking for no material support from Israel in Vietnam. What we wanted was sympathetic understanding of the principles involved and what we are trying to do. The United States has commitments to other small states. It was important to ask this question: if, because of critics of our Vietnam policy, we did not fulfill our commitments to the 16 million people in Vietnam, how we could be expected to fulfill our commitments to 2 million Israelis? Yet some friends of Israel in the United States had publicly criticized U.S. policy in Vietnam and had called upon the President to disengage the United States from its commitment. President Johnson stressed that these critics seemed to believe that one could pick and choose how he would oppose aggression against small states. A principle was involved. Either we opposed aggression against small states and honored our commitments, or we did not. We could not fail to honor our commitments in one place and then try to hold to them in another place. Our failure to carry through in Vietnam would be bound to affect our ability to carry through in our commitment to other small states such as Israel. President Shazar and the other Israeli officials present indicated that they understood this principle and its implications. President Shazar noted that among the first things he had mentioned on reaching American soil was Israel's appreciation for the policy of the United States toward the security of small states from aggression. This applied to the situation in Vietnam and what the United States was doing there. Other Israeli officials recently had spoken along similar lines. The President interjected that he had received from the Israel Embassy a statement recently made by Foreign Minister Eban along these lines. President Shazar commented that he was happy he could say he had made his statement before the President had raised the matter. This indicated Israel's understanding of the principle. President Johnson emphasized that he had reiterated to President Shazar our assurances regarding Israel's security. In doing so, he also wanted to make clear how our commitment in Vietnam and public criticism of that commitment was involved. During an extended discussion President Shazar said that he was President only of Israel, not of world Jewry, and that he had no control over what Jews elsewhere in the world might say. He and the other Israeli officials present indicated, however, that they understood President Johnson was referring to the criticism of U.S. Vietnam policy that had been made recently by Jewish groups in the United States, particularly Rabbi Weinstein, and that it would be important for the Government of Israel to make known its views on this matter. President Shazar gave every impression of comprehension of the problem. President Shazar showed President Johnson the statement he proposed to read to the press upon his departure from the White House (attached)./2/ President Johnson indicated his approval of the statement. He also told Mr. Moyers that in speaking to the press about the call of President Shazar he might comment along the following lines: President Shazar had told the President about his recent visit to Latin America and his impressions of problems and leaders in the countries he visited. The two Presidents had then reviewed world problems and the desire of the United States and Israel to try to promote peace. President Shazar had stressed Israel's desire to live at peace with her neighbors. The two Presidents had discussed the intention of the United States to help small nations to defend themselves against aggression. There had been some mention of the joint U.S.-Israel desalting project and U.S. economic assistance to Israel. /2/Not attached.
315. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, August 12, 1966. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL UAR-US. Secret. Drafted by Bergus and approved at the White House on August 18. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting took place at 1:48 p.m. in the Oval Office at the White House. (Johnson Library) SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Dr. Mostafa Kamel, Ambassador of the United Arab Republic The President Ambassador Kamel expressed appreciation for being received. He conveyed the good wishes of President Nasser to the President and "to the newly-weds." Kamel then said that President Nasser had very much appreciated the President's photograph. President Nasser valued it highly not only for its own value but also as a symbol of the President's wish to have good relations. Kamel then presented Nasser's photograph to the President and said it was being given in the same spirit. The President expressed thanks. Ambassador Kamel then launched into a lengthy presentation which followed quite closely the presentation he gave the Secretary on July 13./2/ He said that Nasser wanted good relations with the United States, that these were important for the entire Near East and that good relations were compatible with the ideals of President Johnson. Nasser wishes to dispel confusion regarding our relations. Kamel thought it important that we differentiate the fundamentals from the nonfundamentals in our relations. The fundamentals included opposition to communism, continued flow to the West of oil, and calm in the Palestine situation. All other problems between us were secondary and they should not affect our judgment on the fundamentals. Kamel at this point and later in the conversation referred to the difficulties created by US communications media. Since returning from Cairo, Kamel could say authoritatively that the UAR would adhere to the fundamentals in our relationship and wished to work with us to resolve some of the smaller problems. /2/See Documents 307 and 308. Kamel likened US-UAR relations to a Catholic marriage in which there could be no divorce. The UAR had taken a number of actions to demonstrate its desire to work with the US. These had not just been words but were specifics. They had been intended as "signals" of the UAR's good intentions. The UAR would persevere in seeking a settlement of the Yemen issue but it was not simple and it would take time. The UAR was willing to accept nuclear safeguards "as prescribed by Vienna." Kamel warned that if any Middle East country obtained nuclear weapons it would create a very serious situation. At this point the President interposed that the US remained adamantly opposed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Near East. Kamel then reviewed the list of "signals" he had set forth in his July 13 discussion with the Secretary. The only new element was a statement that the UAR would do its best to make the maximum use of additional land reclaimed as the result of additional waters available from the Aswan High Dam. He stressed that after the present "transitional period" during which Egypt was obtaining its wheat needs through the CCC it would be essential to obtain some kind of food assistance in order to permit the UAR to remain non-aligned. He bespoke USG support for the UAR in the latter's discussions with the IMF and World Bank. The President thanked Ambassador Kamel for his presentation. He noted that he was leaving Washington within a very short time. He would not attempt to discuss each individual point raised by the Ambassador. He would ask Messrs. Hare and Rostow to analyze the purport of the Ambassador's presentation so that he could review it. The President said that if the Ambassador had any further points to make they should be communicated to Mr. Rostow. The President welcomed Ambassador Kamel's statement on nuclear safeguards. He expressed the hope that the Yemeni talks would succeed. He said that the US desired improved relations with the UAR. He did not feel that there were any basic differences between us. He respected the efforts which had been made to improve these relations. Improvement would come more easily if our differences could be discussed quietly and not publicly. As a final point Ambassador Kamel stressed the importance of PL 480 assistance to Egypt and his hope that an agreement could be accomplished by early next year.
316. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Hare) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Hoopes)/1/ Washington, August 22, 1966. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 ISR. Secret. Drafted by Wolle on August 18 and cleared by Symmes, Padelford of NEA/RA, and Warren of G/PM. Dear Tim: We have given careful consideration to your letter of June 30/2/ regarding certain weapons and components requested by the Government of Israel in connection with the A-4F package. /2/Not found. I continue to agree with you that the United States should stand by the decision that the Sidewinder 1-C air-to-air missile, the Bullpup B air-to-ground missile, the Rockeye II cluster anti-tank weapon and the tail warning radar should be refused to Israel on general policy grounds. I also remain of the opinion that we should continue to avoid specifying to the Israelis reasons for our refusal to comply with their requests. As I mentioned in my letter of August 1,/3/ we see no requirement in discussion of their requests to distinguish between "military" and "security" as opposed to "political" or other considerations and in fact see obvious disadvantages in making such distinctions. /3/Hare's August 1 letter to Hoopes, concerning an Israeli request to produce military equipment for the A-4 aircraft, agreed that there was no objection to Israeli production of non-lethal stores and fittings but that the United States should refuse authorization for Israeli production of any lethal items. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, ISA Files: FRC 70 A 6648, 452.1 Israel) It is our opinion that, as with the four items mentioned above, the United States should also refuse to sell napalm bombs and fuzes to Israel on general policy grounds. This is a type of weapon that raises particularly sensitive reactions among the Arabs, as among others. I am not convinced by the arguments advanced thus far by the Israelis that we should provide even limited quantities of napalm equipment. To provide napalm after Israeli use of it in the July 14 retaliatory raid on Syria and the August 15 incident with Syria would indeed risk substantial political liabilities in our relations with the Arabs. Sincerely, /4/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
317. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/ Washington, August 22, 1966, 10:53 p.m. /1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-2 ISR. Confidential. Drafted by Wolle on August 17; cleared by Symmes and Hare and in substance by UK Country Director J. Harold Shullaw, Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Spanish Sahara, and Tunisia Country Director John F. Root, Edward W. Schaefer of AFNE, and Kinsolving; and approved and initialed by Rusk. Repeated to Algiers, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Bonn, Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem, Jidda, Khartoum, Kuwait, London, Ottawa, Paris, Rabat, Rome, Tripoli, and Tunis and pouched to Taiz. 33056. Ref: Depcirtel 2464, June 15./2/ /2/Circular telegram 2464, June 15, summarizes a conversation that day between Lebanese Ambassador El Ahdab and Davies, in which El Ahdab expressed concern over the possible attendance by Ambassador Barbour at the ceremonial opening of the new Knesset in Jerusalem. (Ibid.) 1. Dept authorizes Ambassador Barbour to accept anticipated formal Israeli Government invitation to attend inauguration ceremonies new Knesset building Jerusalem August 29-31. 2. We consider this inauguration one-time affair that is not to be regarded as precedent or pattern for future nor as representing any change in USG policy on status of Jerusalem. USG continues to support 1948 UN General Assembly resolution that provided for international status Jerusalem under UN administration, and does not recognize Jerusalem as de jure capital of Israel. We trust attendance of official Americans at Knesset opening will not be spotlighted. These points being made to Israeli Embassy here and should be reiterated by Embassy to GOI at appropriate time. 3. Department is informing British, Canadian, German, Belgian and Italian Embassies here since they previously queried us on US position. Embassy Paris may draw on above at its discretion in speaking to GOF. Rusk
318. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/ Washington, August 30, 1966, 12:06 a.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 ISR-SYR. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Kinsolving and cleared in substance by Symmes and Davies. Repeated to Amman, Damascus, Cairo, Jerusalem, and CINCSTRIKE. 37395. Ref: Amman Embtel 470 to Dept./2/ You authorized to convey message contained para 10 reftel/3/ to Israeli Govt at level you deem most appropriate, making clear that we simply acting as channel of communication. At same time you may express hope that in this reportedly tense situation no Israeli action will be undertaken which might be seized upon as pretext for Syrian action./4/ /2/Telegram 470 from Amman, August 29, reported that Prince Hassan and Prime Minister Tell had told Burns of a Syrian report, relayed by the United Arab Command, that Israeli troops were massing on the Syrian frontier. They stated that, in the event of hostilities on the Israel-Syria border, the United Arab Command had ordered Jordan to launch an offensive into Israel. They felt that if they implemented the order, Jordan's forces would be cut to pieces, but if they did not, Jordan would be accused of treason to the Arab cause. (Ibid.) /3/Paragraph 10 reported the request that the United States explain Jordan's predicament to the Israelis in general terms and ask them to "keep the lid on." /4/Telegram 769 from Tel Aviv, August 30, reported that Acting Director of the U.S. Affairs Department Argov, to whom the Embassy had passed the message, stated that the report was baseless. The telegram further stated that all information available to the Embassy indicated the report was without foundation. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 ISR-SYR) Rusk
319. Study Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/ No. 1944/66 Washington, September 1, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. VI. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. A note on the cover sheet indicates that the paper was prepared in cooperation with INR and DIA. A table of contents is not printed. ARAB-ISRAELI ARMS SURVEY [Here follows Part I, an introduction.] II. Summary A. Arab-Israeli Comparison 1. Israel retains qualitative superiority over any of the various combinations of Arab states with which it could be expected to come into direct conflict. In addition, Israel possesses the industrial capability to improve and alter armored vehicles and to rehabilitate aircraft. As shown in Table Ib, the six Arab states--UAR (Egypt), Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan and Saudi Arabia--which are most likely to come into direct major hostilities with Israel have a two-to-one numerical superiority in tanks, three-to-one in major naval units, two-to-two in fighter aircraft and ten-to-one in bombers. 2. In armor, the Arab numerical superiority is offset by Israel's maintenance and training excellence as well as by factors of distance. For example, it is doubtful that Iraqi tanks could be sent across the Syrian desert quickly enough to play a meaningful role in conflict with Israel. This applies equally to self-propelled weapons. 3. Whatever the comparable technical qualities of the aircraft flown, the Israelis' better training, greater aggressiveness and superior maintenance give them a good chance of coping with the Arab threat. The Israelis' limitations include the small number of airfields and the short scramble time available to its aircraft because of the fact that all parts of Israel are within a few minutes' flying time of its neighbors. 4. The accelerating arms race is involving both the Arabs and Israel in advanced weapons development, particularly in the missile field. The Israelis probably will be able to deploy a French-built surface-to-surface missile with a range of about 270 nautical miles by 1967-1968; the UAR may be able to deploy a few considerably less sophisticated missiles of slightly less range by 1970. Neither Egypt nor Israel is likely to have nuclear weapons by 1970. 5. The Egyptian Navy presents the only significant sea threat to Israel, which has taken the calculated risk of not building up a comparable naval force. The Israelis believe that their air power can neutralize the sea threat. 6. During the period through 1970, it is unlikely that any major change in procurement patterns will occur. Israel will continue to look to Western sources. The danger of Jordanian and Lebanese acquisition of Soviet-built weapons seems to have been averted for this period. Both Syria and Egypt will continue to rely on the USSR for their equipment. Although Iraq will acquire major items from the USSR under its May 1966 arms agreement, it will probably continue to procure some items--artillery and possibly aircraft--from Western sources. [Here follow Part II. B, country analyses, Part III, likely actions of arms suppliers, and Part IV, an explanation of the tables, 11 tables, and a map.] [Continue with the next documents] Volume XVIII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |