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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XVIII Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-67 Department of State |
 320. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State/1/ Cairo, September 7, 1966, 1352Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, TRV ANDERSON, ROBERT B. Confidential; Limdis. 1246. Ref: State 35301./2/ /2/Telegram 35301 to Cairo, August 25, stated that former Secretary of the Treasury Robert Anderson's forthcoming visit to Cairo was completely private, but that Secretary Rusk had briefed him along lines recommended by NEA. (Ibid.) 1. Former Treasury Secretary Robert Anderson had lunch with me Sept 6 immediately following meetings with Kaissouni and PriMin Mohieddin. He said he had followed script suggested by Sec Rusk emphasizing following points: (A) USG unable make any food commitments to UAR at this time because our assistance is conditioned by Congressional attitudes and affected by pending legislation. Nevertheless USG has sincere desire for good relations with UAR and there are no inherent inhibiting factors. We do not ask UAR to abandon socialism or support US foreign policy. We do ask, however, that it be truly neutral between East and West and that it concentrate its energies on internal development. (B) UAR will be judged by its performance and not by expressions of intent. We do wish UAR to withdraw from Yemen and believe that this can be done with honor. The UAR must come to terms with the IMF and the IBRD and bring its expenditures into line with its avail resources. It is now extended far beyond its capabilities. (C) Public statements by senior UAR offs which tend to exacerbate differences between us are not helpful. There should be period of silence. (D) Sec Rusk sincerely wanted to visit the UAR and still does and was unable to come last spring solely because of the pressures of other work. It was not a political decision. 2. Mohieddin accepted points made by Anderson, apparently without rancor, and made following comments: (A) UAR wants to get out of Yemen but for this purpose needs clear and unambiguous agreement with the Saudis. (B) The UAR is interested in private foreign investment, particularly in fields of industrial and economic endeavor which have international implications and which are beyond the UAR's own ability to finance, e.g., petro-chemicals. Port Said free zone has been the subject of considerable contention with leaders of the ASU, and it is not likely that it will amount to a great deal in the near future. Other less controversial projects avail for foreign investment. (C) The UAR needs USG help. 3. Anderson will provide me within few days with copy his memorandum of conversation with Mohieddin which I will forward to Dept by pouch. 4. Kaissouni expects to see Anderson prior his departure from Cairo and has indicated he desires advice as to what he should do at forthcoming IBRD-IMF meeting. Anderson convinced that UAR cannot meet hard currency obligations to U.S. and international agencies falling due next year and that it would be much better for GUAR frankly to inform Bank and Fund members this fact as soon as possible rather than await default with consequent increased bitterness and lack confidence this will entail. 5. I find Anderson's visit has been useful and that repetition of line we have been taking here and in Wash DC by well-known Americans outside govt is all to good. He has been very cooperative. Nes
321. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State/1/ Cairo, September 10, 1966, 0745Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, TRV ANDERSON, ROBERT B. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Jidda. 1296. Former Treasury Secretary Anderson gave Blackiston/2/ resume at lunch September 9 his meeting President Nasser previous day. Meeting reported in press. Following points made by Nasser: /2/Slator C. Blackiston, head of the Embassy's economic section. 1. Yemen--We want to get out of Yemen but want firm agreement Saudis to insure non-restoration of Hamid Ed Din. Saudis only want verbal agreement this point. UAR fearful once its troops withdrawn Saudis will restore Imamate by force. 2. IMF--The IMF has been very hard in its negotiations with Dr. Kaissouni. 3. Food--The UAR food problem is critical. We must have wheat from abroad. Why did you cut it off abruptly? We could understand a gradual reduction but abrupt termination has made it impossible for us to plan for replacement. If you are our friend why have you done this? Do you want riots in the streets? We will get wheat from somewhere. 4. South Arabia--We have no designs on South Arabia. UAR has been giving no support to South Arabian nationalists other than money. We want British to meet with nationalists but they (British) have refused. 5. East-West balance--We must keep balance between East and West. If we lean too far in the direction of the East, we get complaints from you and if we go the other way, the Russians complain. The Russians gave us the High Dam and even supplied skilled workers when we did not have them. They sent wheat shipments when you stopped. These are the things we cannot forget. 6. Land reclamation--We now have the water from the High Dam to bring new lands into cultivation but we need help to develop areas like Salhia. 7. Subversion--They accuse me of having Nasserite agents in other countries of the Arab world. I have no organization and cannot control these people. Secretary Anderson's comments follow: 8. US-USSR relations--U.S. Government has no latent hostility to the UAR but what we can do for you is conditioned by UAR actions. 9. Armaments--We do not begrudge armaments. Every nation must have them, but the question is quantity and what you can afford. 10. IMF--The IMF is hard but it is composed of honest, dedicated, non-political people. I urge you to come to agreement with the IMF. It is the key to your problem. Without agreement all of your credit will dry up. Hard decisions are required. You have to decide for yourself where to cut. 11. Nuclear--Are you in favor of international safeguards? Yes. Can I then say this back in Washington? Yes. 12. Non aggression--Are you against aggression by any country in the Near East against any other country of the area? Yes. May I say this in Washington? Yes. 13. Salhia--If this is your great need are you prepared to devote all your available resources, plus what you may obtain from abroad, toward implementing this project? Yes. May I say this in Washington? Yes. 14. Public statements--You need to say what you have told me publicly (ref item 11, 12, 13 above). (Blackiston not entirely sure from recollection of conversation with Anderson whether latter stated Nasser committed himself to public statement or not. We hope have written memcon provided us early next week, and will forward to Washington on receipt.) Anderson saw Kaissouni again morning September 9 and provided rundown his conversation with Nasser. According Anderson, Kaissouni expressed great appreciation for points which Anderson made and frankness with which they had been stated. Nes
322. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/ Tel Aviv, September 14, 1966, 1115Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12 ISR. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Cairo. 946. Ref: State 17501./2/ /2/Document 312. 1. Emphasizing I had no specific instructions to raise the matter, I stressed to FonMin Eban Sept 13, in meeting arranged at my request and in anticipation of his prospective meeting with the Secretary in New York, our fervent hope that Israel would find way make clear to world in unmistakable terms that it would forswear nuclear weapons. I mentioned IAEA controls as vehicle accomplish end. I recognized that our visits Dimona and PriMin Eshkol's statement on subject gave us considerable reassurance in this respect but noted that as long as Israel seemed retain option take nuclear route, no matter how self limited it might be, this added to already acute danger world confronts in problem nuclear proliferation. I stressed the Secretary's personal interest and concern as this problem touches Israel and the Middle East and expressed my belief that the Secretary would wish discuss in New York. I stressed that essence of issue is not only that Israel remove this card from its hand but be seen publicly to do so. I used familiar arguments as to importance Israeli peaceful image, as stabilizing force in area etc., and added that since it obvious, as result various leaks, that Israel in fact not embarking on weapons production, GOI had nothing to lose and everything to gain in making gesture suggested. 2. Eban said he impressed with importance Secretary attaches to matter and that my comments lent urgency to full briefing on subject including consultations with PriMin he intended to undertake prior his departure for New York. He noted limitations of time and pressures of other matters in New York and expressed hope there would be opportunity discuss subject in detail it deserved. Expressed also his opinion that nuclear arms race somewhat more remote contingency in area than it had been, less pressing immediate possibility for example than clash with Syria. Referring to the Secretary's conversation with Rafael, he took exception to what had been reported to him as the suggestion the U.S. would be "through with Israel" if Israel did not do what we wanted in this respect. He felt this suggestion of sanctions against Israel was not in accord with the atmosphere of trust and good will that should prevail between good friends. (I responded that the Secretary's frankness with Rafael should be understood both in the context of our countries' friendship and of the strength of the Secretary's feeling on this subject. I added it not question of sanctions, on contrary it matter of losing U.S. support.) Eban said that Israel had said it would not manufacture nuclear weapons and would certainly not be the first to introduce them into area. This was an extraordinary assurance when set against the constant threats of Israel's neighbors to destroy it. More weight should be given to the PriMin's assurances. (I replied that this was an important contribution, but that a further dramatic gesture was essential.) Eban concluded that he had the signal. He hoped to be well versed on subject on arrival in New York and hoped to have something substantive to say. 3. Comment: In spite of Eban's testiness about some things and indications he considered matter had less immediacy than it had had, I believe he will try to get mandate from PriMin (it not excluded judging by some innuendos of his comments that he already has it) to make some useful contribution in direction we desire, and hope that he will go to New York prepared to discuss matter concretely and constructively. He will be interested in our views of Egyptian attitudes. We may be sure he will lay stress on Israel's immediate security concerns vis-a-vis Syria. I reminded him that we had done much lately to permit Israelis to sleep more soundly in their beds, and this is a factor obviously in favor GOI understanding this problem. Barbour
323. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/ Tel Aviv, September 14, 1966, 1151Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, REF PAL. Confidential. 949. Ref: State 42098./2/ Palestine refugees. /2/Telegram 42098 to Tel Aviv, September 7, commented that the Israeli proposals described by Rafael to Hare, Sisco, and Rusk (see Document 310 and footnote 3 thereto) were "patently unacceptable." The Israelis were proposing resettlement without repatriation, with the main cost to be borne by countries other than Israel, and they were asking the United States to assume the political liability of launching the plan. It instructed Barbour to tell Eban that the Department was "frankly disappointed" that after 6 months of deliberations, the Israeli Government had brought forth a proposal that seemed to be, if anything, a retreat from its former positions. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, REF PAL) 1. I conveyed paras 2A through 2H of reftel to Ambassador Rafael Sept 12. He subsequently passed to FonMin Eban who raised with me Sept 13. 2. Eban said we in "complex misunderstanding." There not any Israeli "proposals." Before Israel crystallized its thinking on this matter it wanted benefit our thoughts. This was not the end of GOI thinking on subject. GOI had not given six months to consideration of this matter, in fact it had not given six minutes. (By this he meant there had not been govt--Cabinet--consideration of ideas FonOff had had.) Eban continued this was rather "cold douche" on Israeli efforts to discuss problems like this with US in their early stages of consideration. Israel had never said it would try to rethink whole problem. What it was trying to do was find ways to give debate in UN new direction. It was inaccurate to say Israel had retreated from its earlier proposals. Israel in fact wanted to bring UN back to something like Resolution 513 of 1952 with its accent on rehabilitation and resettlement. UN position has steadily eroded in direction emphasis on para 11 and repatriation. If these tentative thoughts were non-starter then perhaps only thing left to do in UNGA was to try and hold the line. 3. I remarked that whatever exception might be taken to specifics of Dept reply mood of disappointment it conveyed was correct one. Absence of any mention of repatriation obviated at outset any broad UNGA support for these ideas. After six months and GOI despatch of high level envoy to discuss with the Secretary it reasonable for us expect something more forthcoming. (Eban interjected that 18 years had seen no progress on main issues. Israeli thought was to make progress on marginal aspects. "Palestinians coming across border with guns and knives" did not provide propitious climate for consideration these problems. Particularly difficult Israel come up with idea such as open ended $50,000,000 unilateral compensation.) I concluded that Dept remarks had been conveyed in spirit frankness that characterized our relations. There was erosion in Israeli positions in UN and while we were willing consult closely on tactics substance of what Israelis could offer was of overriding importance. 4. In subsequent brief conversation with Rafael, he confirmed Eban upset by Dept's reaction. He added, as I had anticipated, that FonOff consideration had consisted of efforts rethink numerous possibilities previously advanced and that conclusion had been essentially that none of them starters this time. He, therefore, of opinion expressed by Eban that probably only tactic at UN is to hold current line with as little fanfare as possible. Objective of talks with US was and is to assure maximum possible tactical cooperation, since it apparently not possible to redirect emphasis of debate toward humanitarian, and away from political, aspects of problem. Barbour
324. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ SecDel/MC/39 New York, October 5, 1966, 3:45-5:10 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL ARAB-ISR. Secret. The meeting was held at USUN. The memorandum is Part IV of V Sections. Records of the other portions of the conversation are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 67 D 305, CF 83. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS U.S. Iraq The Minister said there was a feeling in the Arab world that the method of US approach to the Palestine question had undergone a change in the last three years. When asked for specifics by the Secretary, the Minister cited the aircraft and tank deals with Israel. While he recognized the US position that this was done to equalize Soviet aid to Arab states, he disagreed with the belief that there could ever be a balance between the Israeli nation of two million people and the Arab community of nations. He also said that the Arabs had not been fully informed of the arms deal and he found the timing extraordinary. The announcement of the most recent arms delivery to Israel shortly after Kosygin had visited Cairo made it appear that the US was pro-Israeli and the USSR pro-Arab. He said that there was an impression throughout the Arab world that the present administration is less concerned with Arab sensibilities than the previous administration. The Secretary said the arms problem in the Middle East is triangular: The USSR arms aid is substantial to Egypt; this in turn causes anxiety among the UAR's Arab neighbors and in Israel. The US earnestly desires some regional understanding on arms levels in the Middle East but neither Cairo nor the Soviet Union has indicated any interest. We understand that the US cannot balance off all the powers in the Middle East; however, we have felt that US action was necessary from time to time for psychological reasons. The Minister said that Soviet arms provided the UAR, Iraq and Syria will never be used against another Arab country. No one objects to US arms aid to Jordan or Saudi Arabia and Jordan was recognized as having the most legitimate claim for armaments of any Arab country. The Secretary said that there are those Arabs who fear Israeli expansionism and those Israelis who fear the Arabs wish to drive the Israelis into the sea. He suggested that these two points appear capable of being eliminated. The Minister said that Arab fears of Israeli expansionism had a firm basis in historical fact. The Secretary assured the Minister that the US would not permit Israeli territorial aggrandizement and cited US intervention during the Suez crisis. The Secretary said that he was continuously hearing of these fears from both sides but did not believe that they were realistic. However, he did not underestimate the extent of such feeling. The Minister said his government was rather unhappy about further US reductions in its contribution to UNRWA, although he appreciated that the US continues to bear the financial brunt of the organization. The US was reducing its contribution at a time when Iraq and other countries were increasing theirs. The Secretary said that this was a difficult problem for us with Congress because we see no end to the refugee problem. The Minister said the central point was whether the refugees would be permitted to exercise the right of choice. The Secretary commented that there may be a distinction between individual choice by a family and organized choice for political purposes. He said that he believed that there would be no more refugees prepared to return to Israel than Israel would be prepared to accept. The Minister stated no genuine attempt had ever been made to ascertain the refugees' own views. The attempt by Joseph Johnson was a good effort but it was weakened by linking consultation with implementation. The Secretary asked for the Minister's reaction should UNWRA personnel begin to informally ask a number of refugees each week what their desires were. The Minister said that this was an "interesting" idea but first there should be agreement on the principle that the refugees should be able to freely express their views in accordance with paragraph 11, resolution 194.
325. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State/1/ New York, October 7, 1966, 2345Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL ARAB-ISR. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Cairo, Amman, Damascus, Beirut, Jidda, and Baghdad. 1353. Secto 48. 1. Following memcon uncleared, FYI, Noforn, subject to amendment upon review./2/ /2/Memoranda of the conversation are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 67 D 305, CF 83. During UAR FonMin Riyad's call on Secretary October 7, Secretary raised subject recent UAR press and radio campaign accusing CIA of being party of Jordan-Saudi-Israeli-British plot against Syria./3/ Secretary raised matter in context difficulties Executive branch has encountered in Congress this year on economic aid legislation. Secretary stated there is disposition on our part to have good relations with UAR and to cooperate in areas of common interest, including food. He expressed concern re press charges and categorically denied them. He expressed hope that such unfounded allegations would cease and there would be a period of calm and quiet in which to sort out our relations without undue pressures from respective public opinions. /3/A memorandum from William McAfee of INR/DDC to Hughes records an October 4 meeting among Davies, Bergus, James R. Gardner of INR/DDC, and a CIA representative, at which Davies noted the recent charges in Cairo about a Jordanian-CIA plot to overthrow the Syrian regime and asked what was going on. The CIA representative replied that as far as CIA was concerned, nothing. The group speculated as to the reason for the UAR charges but reached no decision as to what should be done about them. (Department of State, INR Historical Files, NEA-CIA Meetings, 1965-1967) 2. FonMin replied that the Secretary knew there was trouble within area at present time which UAR had hoped avoid. He called King Faisal prime villain with King Hussein, Prime Minister Tell as participants. FonMin said that while US could dismiss this as Arab problem sometimes US name used by both sides, in this case by Jordanians. Abu Asali told Egyptians he heard from Jordanians CIA connected with plot. Secretary stated USG aware some make this claim to add weight to their cause. FonMin said because US had taken sides in Arab region in past this association always comes to mind. 3. Riyad expressed puzzlement why Hussein undertaking present "adventure" which puts him in dangerously weak position. 4. Secretary closed conversation by stating that since assuming his position he had seen 54 coups d'etat none of which involved CIA; he asked FonMin to assure President Nasser that US not involved in Asali episode. 5. Other subjects discussed (Viet-Nam, South Arabia, Yemen) will be reported septels. Rusk
326. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Syria/1/ Washington, October 10, 1966, 4:31 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL SYR-US. Confidential. Drafted and approved by Atherton. 62966. Ref Damascus 384 and 392./2/ During conversation with Syrian Charge Kayyali October 7 (Memcon by pouch),/3/ Department officers (1) expressed concern and bewilderment over Syrian accusations USG involved in anti-SARG plotting, (2) stated categorically such accusations without foundation and asked Kayyali so report to his government, and (3) noted current anti-US campaign ran directly counter to desire often professed by Kayyali and Fonmin Makhus, which USG shared, for better US-Syrian relations. Kayyali noted SARG charges directed against CIA, not USG as whole. Department officers emphasized such distinction meaningless since no agency USG could pursue independent foreign policy. Kayyali replied he aware of this but same not true of elements in Syria (impliedly the military) responsible for current anti-American campaign who, he suggested, are relatively unsophisticated and not very smart. Department officers did not inform Kayyali Fonmin Makhus apparently shared view of these "unsophisticated" elements (Damascus 384). /2/Telegram 384 from Damascus, October 3, reported a meeting between Ambassador Smythe and Foreign Minister Makhus, who gave a long lecture on the aims of the current Baath regime, the futility of attempts to subvert the revolution, with a "pointed warning against outsiders seeking change in Syria." (Ibid., POL SYR) Telegram 392 from Damacus, October 4, reported that the Syrian Government was "heating up attempt convince itself and socialist friends US pushing hard to topple present regime." (Ibid., POL SYR-US) /3/The memorandum of conversation is ibid., POL 23-9 SYR. Rusk
327. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts/1/ Washington, October 11, 1966, 7:19 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 ISR-JORDAN. Secret; Priority All Addressees. Drafted by Atherton and Symmes; cleared by Campbell, Vladimir Toumanoff of the Soviet desk, and Sisco; and approved by Hare. Sent to Tel Aviv, USUN, Amman, and Cairo and repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, Baghdad, Jidda, Kuwait, Damascus, and Beirut. 63961. Arab-Israel Border Situation. 1. Israeli Ambassador Harman called on Hare today to discuss current security situation. Assistant Secretary Sisco also present. 2. Harman reviewed two incidents that happened over weekend, noting Syrians had quickly published Fatah communique on Jerusalem incident October 7. This was third incident in past three weeks from Jordan territory, two previous having taken place in south. Seriousness of Jerusalem incident lay in fact much more damage and loss of life might have occurred, it had taken place well inside Israeli territory, and perpetrators could only have come from Jordan. 3. GOI appraisal is SARG deliberately seeking involve GOJ. GOI also believes GOJ does not want to become involved in Fatah incidents, and taking measures to prevent them. Nevertheless, there strong domestic pressures on GOI to act if incidents from Jordanian territory not stopped. GOI therefore hopes GOJ can act to clean out their territory. 4. Harman recalled GOI had been told USG not prepared to go to GOJ every time there was incident apparently involving Jordanian territory. Series of three incidents, however, now justified Israeli request for USG to bring Israeli views to attention GOJ, particularly serious view GOI takes of Jerusalem incident. GOI wished GOJ to understand it under considerable pressure to take action and so far had resisted this pressure. 5. Other aspect of current situation involves Syria. Incident at Shaar Hagolan last Saturday is worst since 1965 in terms of fatalities and skill and sophistication with which it mounted. Four persons had been killed. GOI impressed by both planning and performance this incident in which border patrol had been lured into mine field by timed explosions. Saturday incident was part of a chain that had occurred from Syrian territory. GOI had reported other incidents in early September to Security Council. Incidents coming from Syria are being planned at higher military level and are based on doctrine of "popular liberation war." 6. Although SARG probably aware from SC discussions last July and August/2/ of public relations disadvantages publicly supporting Fatah incidents, Syrian Chief of Staff recently said SARG cannot stop Fatah. SARG had also broadcast communique on Saturday incident. /2/See footnote 5, Document 309. 7. Harman concluded by stating what Israel wants is to have Fatah incidents stopped. If chain continues, GOI will have no alternatives. Yesterday in New York Eban called on Secretary General and also circulated letter to President of Security Council stressing need to stop incidents./3/ Israel recognizes that asking USG to speak to Syria is fairly useless. Israeli PermRep in New York is trying to see Fedorenko to present Israeli views to Soviets. Prime Minister Eshkol was calling in Ambassadors of four big powers in Tel Aviv (including USSR) today. These diplomatic approaches have aim of impressing Syrians with importance of stopping incidents. /3/UN document S/7536. 8. Hare responded by assuring Harman USG deplores loss of life in Saturday incident and concerned about very real problems he had described. USG not disposed in any way to varnish over these incidents. Secondly, it seemed to us that attitude adopted by GOI was reasonable and instrumentalities it now using were correct. 9. At this point Harman broke in to explain both Jerusalem and Hagolan incidents had been subject complaints in UNTSO machinery, former in HKJIMAC and latter in ISMAC. Israel differentiating between two only to extent that one involved Jordan territory and other Syrian territory. GOJ had shown it could prevent Fatah incidents from its territory. GOI now wanted GOJ to take extraordinary steps to prevent any further use of Jordanian territory. GOJ should see it is prudent to take extraordinary measures to track down and stop terrorists. 10. Hare stated USG prepared to go to GOJ to make clear very serious nature of present situation. 11. In further discussion Harman emphasized that Israel raising Fatah matter as whole in present diplomatic approaches. Even Saturday incident has implications for Jordan since it occurred near Jordanian border and might have been additional attempt involve GOJ. Tracks, however, led to Syrian territory. Point is that SARG has adopted raiding doctrine that other Arabs give up in nineteen-fifties and trying to involve other Arabs. SARG must be made to see that this doctrine will not work and that other Arabs do not accept it. While other Arabs had not abandoned belligerence toward Israel, they at least were not following border-crossing and sabotage doctrine advocated by Syrians. Harman said Embassy had just received message reporting Israelis had found mine today at Maryan Baruch, near Tell Dan. If this mine had exploded, something serious might have happened. 12. In reply Sisco query, Harman stated SYG had seen Syrian Rep Tomeh yesterday but he had no report on results. In further comment Harman said absence of further incidents would be best way to judge whether Syrians getting message. On other hand, if incidents continued serious Israeli policy decision would be involved. 13. In discussion whether more formal approach to Security Council desirable, Harman said automatic Soviet veto discouraged Israel from such step. Hare and Sisco emphasized SC nevertheless could contribute toward improvement situation. Sisco granted Soviet veto always possibility, but present incident is clear cut, serious and part of pattern. SC members have been educated as result SC discussions last summer. GOI through present diplomatic moves has made its views clear and has helped create favorable circumstances for SC hearing based on clear evidence. Even if veto occurred there would be interesting test of Soviet attitudes and policies. Soviets also have interest in not allowing present situation mushroom. Thus, recourse to Security Council might be good and constructive political move and should not be precluded. 14. Harman deplored delays in UNTSO investigations incidents and tendency UNTSO to try to balance out evidence without fixing blame and responsibility. This characteristic would carry over into any Security Council hearing. What Israel wants is fixing of responsibility and cessation of incidents. 15. Sisco recalled that even in July SC hearing, when Israel was accused, Israel had not done badly. Moreover, USG statement/4/ had gone beyond UNTSO report to draw explicit conclusions re responsibility for Fatah incidents and obligations on parties to observe GAAs. In present case, Israel has not retaliated militarily, is exercising restraint, and pursuing political and diplomatic remedies; and particularly, if any thought being given presently to retaliation for recent incidents, due weight should be given to political advantages accruing to Israel in recourse to formal proceedings of SC. Harman said he would report these observations to Eban. /4/The texts of statements made on July 29 and August 3 by Acting U.S. Representative Sisco during the Security Council debate are printed in Department of State Bulletin, August 29, 1966, pp. 313-317. 16. Hare added that Israeli tactics in present situation had been pragmatic and wise. Israel was well aware our views on avoidance force. Soviets undoubtedly wish avoid anything more serious. UAR and GOJ also probably wish avoid military involvement. There high degree of abnormality in Syrian domestic politics that might have unforeseen results. 17. Harman said that SARG aware of advantages they enjoyed because of nature of terrain which would force Israel mount major military action. An irresponsible and irrational element in Syria wants war with Israel and is seeking to drag in other Arabs by forcing such major incident. In further comment, Hare again pointed out present measures being taken were designed to get message across to Syrians. Sisco suggested that even if formal SC action vetoed or without conclusive result, support thereby garnered by GOI would be politically important. 18. Harman said he would convey foregoing to his government and once again requested GOJ be informed about Israeli attitudes, which Hare affirmed would be done. 19. For Amman: Request Charge inform GOJ at appropriate level that, in context our continuing assessment of Syrian situation, we want inform GOJ of serious situation we see developing as result recent Fatah incidents. Failure all Arab governments to curb Fatah operations will, in our considered opinion, almost certainly lead to major Israeli retaliation that could embroil area as whole militarily. We are urging Israelis avoid retaliation and avail selves of UN machinery, but there is limit to our influence in this regard if Fatah incidents continue. We recognize GOJ has been making serious effort control Fatah. Nevertheless, several recent incidents appear to have been launched from Jordanian territory. In discussing with us GOI has taken line SARG deliberately seeking involve GOJ by staging Fatah incidents from Jordanian territory and that, although GOI believes GOJ sincerely attempting prevent such use its territory, it is under growing domestic pressure to take action. We therefore urge GOJ redouble efforts prevent further Fatah operations from or through Jordan./5/ /5/Telegram 823 from Amman, October 12, reported that Adams conveyed the substance of paragraph 19 to King Hussein that day. The King replied, indicating that his comments could be transmitted to the Israelis, that the Jordanian Government was exerting maximum efforts to wipe out Fatah cells and apprehend infiltrators. As a result it had arrested half a dozen Fatah saboteurs in the last few days and expected to arrest more soon. Noting that the Israeli side of the border south of Jerusalem was more populated than the Jordanian side, he urged that the Israelis redouble their efforts to patrol the common border, and he warned that if Israel attacked Jordan, the Jordanian Government would have no alternative but to attack. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 ISR-JORDAN) Rusk
328. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/ Washington, October 12, 1966, 7:27 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL ISR-US. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Sterner, cleared by Symmes, and approved by Hare. 64853. Following are highlights uncleared memcon of Secretary's talk with Israeli FonMin Eban October 8./2/ /2/Memoranda of the conversation are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 67 D 305, CF 83. 1. Vietnam. Secretary praised Eban's speech as constructive contribution in helping focus world attention to problem of initiating process negotiation. Eban indicated Israel believes onus of beginning negotiations now clearly rests with Hanoi. Secretary expressed doubt whether SYG would play any role in establishing contact between various parties as had been suggested in Eban speech. 2. Near Eastern Tour d'Horizon. Eban said he had never seen Arab world in such disarray. Question still remained whether Nasser would settle down and confine himself to UAR's pressing internal problems. Nasser had clearly not changed basic objectives toward Israel, but GOI believed magnitude his other problems would keep him from undertaking new provocations against Israel at this time. Eban characterized GOI relations with Lebanon and Jordan as good and felt that even with Syria there was good chance of keeping conflicts localized. Israel most concerned at growing Soviet influence in Syria and UAR. Israeli requirements were continued effective balance of strength between itself and Arab states and support of status quo by great powers. Question mark is attitude of Soviets. Gromyko had recently reiterated it possible for USSR have good relations with both Israel and Arab states. He had also reaffirmed that Soviet doctrine on non-use of force to effect territorial changes applied to Near East. Secretary observed Gromyko had shown no interest in dampening down arms race in area, excepting nuclear weapons. 3. South Arabia. Secretary said US was concerned at Soviet activities in southern end of Red Sea. Eban said Israel shared this concern because of Israeli shipping lines through Red Sea. GOI believed that after British withdrawal emergence of non-independent government in south Arabia was inevitable. 4. Palestine Refugees. Eban said while refugee problem was in political deadlock GOI still hoped shift emphasis somewhat toward resettlement and rehabilitation. Agreed, however, best that could be hoped for this session UNGA was to hold line against Arab pressures. Secretary raised question of polling refugee preferences. If two out of ten refugees wanted return to Israel, would they be accepted? Eban jocularly said he thought he could swing two in cabinet. He stressed difficulty carrying out fair polling in light of Arab political "psychosis" on this issue. Secretary said nonetheless he felt it possible gnaw away at refugee problem. Eban said any Israeli commitment on refugees would have to be based on knowledge of number refugees who might wish return. 5. Israeli Territorial Limits. In response Secretary mention of Arab concerns over Israeli expansionism, Eban stated Israel accepts present frontiers as inviolate. Arab contention Israel needs more land for economic reasons not logical since Israeli economy not agricultural but closer to that of Benelux countries or Switzerland. As for 3 million Soviet Jews, even if USSR opened doors wide, some would choose to stay in USSR, some would go to countries other than Israel, and only portion would come to Israel. 6. Soviet Jewry. Secretary said he thought Soviets might move on Soviet Jewry problem if they were pressed through non-governmental channels. Government-to-government approaches not likely be productive since USSR considers this internal matter. 7. Southwest Africa. Secretary and Eban agreed to desirability some gesture from South Africa to help head off Afro-Asian resolution and enable General Assembly come up with realistic moderate resolution. Rusk
329. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts/1/ Washington, October 17, 1966, 6:31 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 ISR-JORDAN. Secret. Drafted by Symmes, cleared by Campbell, and approved by Hare. Sent to Beirut, Damascus, Amman, Baghdad, Jidda, Cairo, Kuwait, London, Paris, Tel Aviv, and USUN. 67505. Ref: State 66870./2/ /2/Telegram 66870, sent to Amman and Tel Aviv, October 15, authorized the Embassy in Amman to give the Jordanian Government comments by Israeli Foreign Office officials in response to King Hussein's points (see footnote 5, Document 327) except those requiring further Jordanian reply. It stated that the U.S. Government had not changed its long-established position of avoiding the role of postman between the Arabs and Israelis except in the most serious circumstances. (Ibid.) Telegram 1279 from Tel Aviv, October 13, reported that the Embassy passed on King Hussein's points to Israeli Foreign Office officials, who stated that Israel had also increased precautions along the frontier and urged extra Jordanian precautions to curb infiltration in the Jerusalem area and Jordanian cooperation in MAC investigations. They also requested a more specific description of the area south of Jerusalem to which the King referred. (Ibid.) 1. In meeting with Israeli Amb. Harman today on another subject, Assistant Secretary Hare took occasion restate US policy against unilateral action and use military force in Arab-Israel situation. 2. After expressing gratification Israel had resorted to UN instrumentalities in present case,/3/ Hare emphasized US policy against retaliatory action still holds. Any idea that failure of UNSC to take effective action would justify Israel's resort to force is wrong, and it was important for that to be said now instead of later. /3/On October 12, Israel requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider its complaints against Syria. (UN document S/7540) 3. Harman acknowledged he understood US views in this respect. He said he would not speculate on what action Security Council might be able take or what his government would do if no effective results. He would say, however, that failure curb Fatah terrorist incursions would create "very, very serious situation." 4. In response Hare's query as to Israeli estimate Soviet attitude, Harman said he had not been surprised by public attitude taken by Soviets. He was nursing hope Soviets would realize seriousness of situation and restrain Syrians. It would appear be in Soviet interest to restrain present regime. 5. Asked if GOI had considered any initiatives that might be taken to improve situation along borders--such as parties electing cooperate more with UNTSO and MACs--Harman said he knew of nothing. He added that as far as he knew Syrian Perm Rep Tomeh had not responded to U Thant's discussion with him last week. 6. Hare reminded Harman that knowledge of recent exchange with Jordanians should be closely held. Rusk [Continue with the next documents] Volume XVIII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |