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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XVIII Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-67 Department of State |
 300. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, June 16, 1966, 5:50 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. II. Secret. Dave Bell, George Ball and Charles Schultze recommend we go ahead with this year's budget support grant ($21.4 million) for Jordan. None of us likes budget support, but there is a clear political case for keeping Israel's longest and most vulnerable flank out of Nasser's hands. We have succeeded in getting out of straight budget support everywhere except in Vietnam ($500 million), Korea (steadily falling but still $50 million in FY 67 plans), Laos ($20 million) and Jordan. But in each case there's important political justification. In Jordan, an 8% annual growth rate raises hopes that Jordan is moving toward ability to pay its own way. As you told Israeli Foreign Minister Eban in February, we would rather not subsidize Jordan, nor sell tanks and jets to Arabs. But after painful consideration, we see no other way to keep Soviet-backed radical Arabs off Israel's softest flank. So far our policy has worked. Hussein resisted heavy Arab pressure to take MIG's. He has privately agreed to keep his armor off the west bank of the Jordan where Israel would be hard-pressed to defend. He has squelched fanatical Arabs raiding across Israel's borders. He has resisted heavy pressure from his military--whose support keeps him in power--to retaliate when Israel has attacked Jordanian villages harboring those raiders. Secretary Fowler does not approve this grant because of the balance of payments drain (50% is not tied to US procurement). I recommend you read Charlie Schultze's excellent memo (attached),/2/ which spells out the compromise he has negotiated with Bell. This is the best he feels we can do to meet Secretary Fowler's legitimate concerns. /2/A copy of Schultze's June 14 memorandum, along with copies of Ball's June 10 memorandum and Bell's May 14 memorandum, are attached to a copy of Rostow's memorandum, ibid., Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 6. I recommend you approve the Bell/Ball/Schultze program. We will continue reducing the payments drain, but cutting back too quickly would undermine Hussein. The kind of deal we have with him may be cheap at the price. Few other events would be as likely to tempt a pre-emptive Israeli attack and trigger a major Mid-East fracas as the threat of a Nasserist takeover in Jordan. We cannot afford to get caught in a mess like that, especially while we are pushing ahead in Vietnam. Walt
301. Airgram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/ CA-12335 Washington, June 17, 1966, 8:26 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12 UAR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Wolle; cleared by Symmes, Brewer, Rochlin, Toumanoff, Garthoff, Sisco, DePalma, and Acting SCI Deputy Director J. Wallace Joyce; and approved by Davies. Also sent to Cairo and repeated to Paris and London. SUBJECT REF /2/See Document 293 and footnote 3 thereto. 1. The Department agrees with Embassy Tel Aviv that Prime Minister Eshkol's stand on the missile question is eminently reasonable and encouraging. We consider it provides a basis for further efforts to resolve this aspect of the UAR-Israel arms race. However, before considering how this question might best be handled further in both Tel Aviv and Cairo, we believe it would be helpful to clarify the kind of UAR undertakings which Israel would consider acceptable, and the kind Israel would be prepared to make in return. This is the more important in view of the Israeli estimate of the UAR missile program which implies that acquisition of gyros is the sole obstacle to activation of a 50-60 missile UAR stockpile. If Eshkol, whether or not he is firmly convinced of the accuracy of this estimate, feels his actions must be governed by it, the question of undertakings may involve verification and/or destruction. 2. What we have in mind would be some sort of private statement by each side, through the US or in some other manner, that each is prepared to abandon both indigenous offensive (meaning surface-to-surface ballistic) missile activities and acquisition of such missiles from abroad. To see how feasible this might be, Embassy Tel Aviv is requested to approach Eshkol along the following lines soon after his return from Africa: A. We are gratified at the Prime Minister's statesmanlike position on the missile question evidenced in the May 24 conversation. B. We believe this may afford an opportunity to encourage the UAR to abandon its missile program if Israel were to do likewise. We would have in mind that neither nation would (1) import offensive missiles or parts or (2) make such missiles or parts. We would assume that private declarations, either through the US or in some other manner, would be acceptable. (FYI. It would be helpful to have as precise a statement from Eshkol as possible on these points. End FYI.) If Eshkol resists committing Israel on its indigenous program the Embassy may state that continuing research work in either Israel or the UAR would presumably not be precluded. However, missile production and testing would have to be foresworn. C. You should mention in low key that US information on the UAR missile program does not support the Israeli assessment handed to Ambassador Barbour on May 24. If discussion ensues on this question, you may say that, for example, our information indicates the UAR is having trouble with numerous aspects of its program, including structural problems, guidance difficulties, other design problems, and skyrocketing costs of research and development. D. If Eshkol raises questions about either verification or destruction, you should seek his reasons. You may suggest that he remain flexible on these questions for the moment, until UAR views can be ascertained. You may point out in this connection that we recognize these questions may become problems but that we think such factors as the rising costs and poor progress of the UAR missile program, as well as Cairo's presumed desire for Israeli restraint, might make some mutually advantageous arrangement possible. 3. FYI. The Department is giving careful thought to possible modalities for enabling Israel and the UAR, should some private understanding be attained on non-introduction of missiles, to carry off the matter publicly without undue repercussions should the two countries so desire. End FYI. 4. For Cairo. The Department would appreciate the Embassy's comments on possible modalities that might help enable Nasser to make a private self-denying declaration of some sort on missiles. On what basis might some public position be desirable and feasible? It occurs to the Department that the UAR leadership may already have given thought to this subject, what with the lagging progress of its current missile program, its growing economic headaches generally, and the prospect that as things now stand Israel will probably be in position to deploy offensive missiles long before the UAR can demonstrate a capability to do so. Rusk
302. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, June 18, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, UAR Memos, Vol. IV. Secret. The Egyptians asked us in March to negotiate a new one-year $150 million PL 480 agreement. Our present six-month deal runs out this month. Nasser badly needs this food--and on heavily concessional terms if he can get them. His supplies will run out in October. Allowing time to ship, he must buy somewhere by early August. His economy is in worse shape than ever--reserves are all but exhausted. Despite Nasser's need, Secretary Rusk recommends we not sign a new Title I-IV agreement now./2/ Instead, he proposes we offer to sell (probably $50 million) on CCC credit terms slightly better than those the UAR can get commercially from our competitors. We do not want to refuse to supply desperately needed food (our wheat was 60-70% of the supply in the cities last year). Besides, we want our farmers to make the sale since it is on fairly hard terms. Congress will be a lot more tolerant of CCC than of PL 480. /2/Rusk's June 16 memorandum is attached but not printed. We do not want to give Nasser a flat "No." This is not necessary, and his violent reaction could cause us a lot of trouble. Instead, the Secretary would like to leave the door open to Title I-IV later. He would also continue Title III ($8-9 million in school lunches), the AID technical assistance program ($2 million) and the projects we support with our excess local currency. We recommend this line with some regret./3/ We still think it is worth trying to get closer to Nasser and to avoid splitting the Middle East into US and Soviet camps. But Nasser has left us little choice. He has almost dared us publicly not to renew our agreement. He has lambasted us on Vietnam. He continues to stir things up in Yemen and South Arabia. In general, he has not picked you up on the suggestion you made to Sadat last winter to discuss our differences quietly and build a more constructive relationship. /3/A June 4 memorandum from Saunders to Rostow states that the mood at a May 25 meeting of the Interdepartmental Review Group for Near Eastern Affairs (IRG/NEA) was not angry but "just fed up." He continued, "We've tried hard over the past five years to do business with Nasser. But his public comments in the past few weeks are almost the last straw. We've tried our best to avoid a showdown, but Nasser seems to be forcing one--for reasons we haven't figured out." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. IV) IRG/NEA was one of several interdepartmental groups dealing with regional issues. Its records are in the Department of State, NEA/RA Files: Lot 70 D 503. We are not quite sure what he is up to. Our guess is that he is worried about his political base. For the first time, he has discovered plots among his junior officers and a serious assassination plot among the educated young men he thought he could count on. His stalemate in Yemen has alienated the military. So he is caught between the moderates who know the UAR must retrench to move ahead economically and his old-timers who talk a good revolution but have no idea how to develop a modern economy. Taking the Secretary's line is taking a calculated risk. Nasser may react violently, but we think he is expecting this kind of answer so should be braced for it. Our unreadiness to agree on PL 480 now could hurt the moderate prime minister, who is pushing a sensible economic program. If he fell, his successor would probably be pro-Soviet and less sensible economically. It is equally possible, however, that mounting economic pressures will force Nasser to lean more heavily than ever on his Prime Minister as the only hope of pulling the UAR out of its economic mess.
/4/The approval line is checked. Walt
303. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/ Washington, June 20, 1966, 6:40 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID (US) 15 UAR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Wheelock, Atherton, and James H. Bahti of NE; cleared by Macomber, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations Douglas MacArthur II, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Anthony M. Solomon, Symmes, Davies, Mrs. Jacobson at the Department of Agriculture, Mrs. Bitterman of Food for Peace, and Bromley Smith; and approved by Handley. 6653. Deptels 6581, 6537./2/ Subject: PL-480. /2/Telegram 6581 to Cairo, June 4, informed Battle of the consensus reached by the IRG/NEA at its May 25 meeting on aid programs to the UAR and requested his comments. (Ibid.) Regarding telegram 6537 to Cairo, see footnote 2, Document 296. 1. You authorized explain to UARG, at levels you deem appropriate (Embtel 3144),/3/ that we cannot at present time give favorable response new PL-480 request. /3/Telegram 3144 from Cairo, June 7, conveyed Battle's concurrence in the program laid out in telegram 6581 to Cairo and suggested that his initial talk should be with Kaissouni, who had submitted the request for aid. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID (US) 15 UAR) 2. Likewise we do not want give negative response and sincerely hope overall climate US-UAR relations will improve enough in future to make favorable response possible. 3. Therefore we propose keep request under consideration and will so inform press, public, and foreign representatives when questioned. 4. Drawing on points made in reftels to extent you feel appropriate, you should emphasize our present inability move positively in no way represents change in US policy toward UAR, has no punitive intention, represents no attempt impose definite conditions, and was not result of representation from any third country. Rather it simply reflects what is possible for us given present overall state of US relations with UAR. 5. In keeping with sincere desire be as forthcoming to UAR as present conditions permit, you may advise UARG: a. According our calculations, May-June wheat crop, shipments under present PL-480 program, recent CCC purchases, and anticipated foreign deliveries will cover UARG wheat needs through September or October. We willing meet additional requirements by offering CCC export credits for wheat/wheat flour. While there no absolute limits on amounts other than those imposed by US supply situation and UAR needs and ability finance, we are thinking tentatively in terms of 600,000 tons. Tobacco, corn, vegetable oil also available. b. Anticipate three year credits for wheat/wheat flour, tobacco, corn; one-third repayable end first year, one-third end second year, one-third end third year. Vegetable oil credit maximum one year and dependent supply situation. c. CCC credits last year required 100% US bank guarantee. Under present regulations US bank guarantees only 10%. While this might present problem for total credits of perhaps $50 million, UARG has been able to secure US bank 10% guarantee for CCC credits now being utilized. Waiver US bank guarantee unlikely. FYI: View commercial arrearages and foreign exchange position there also practical limits on amounts that UAR banks can guarantee. We unable specify limits at this time, but suggest total guarantees significantly greater than $50 million might be considered excessive. End FYI. d. USG also willing continue technical assistance projects, local currency loans for economic development, and renewed Title III program (about $11 million) in FY 67. Rusk
304. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, June 21, 1966, 7:40 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Jordan, Vol. II. Secret. I have checked with Secretary McNamara, as you requested, on the economic program loan for Jordan. I have just received word from him that he concurs in the recommendation of Secretary Rusk, David Bell, Charles Schultze, and myself./2/ /2/Rostow's June 17 memorandum to McNamara requesting his views, a June 21 message telling Rostow McNamara had called to give his concurrence, and a memorandum of June 27 from McNamara to Rostow giving his formal concurrence are ibid. In relation to this loan, you will be interested in a talk I had this morning with Shimon Peres, former Israeli Defense Minister, whom Abe Feinberg brought in. He spoke with great respect of Hussein and cited the unspoken "agreement" between Israel and Jordan to dampen border troubles. He made clear that Israel prizes Hussein's independence of Cairo to which our aid to Jordan is decisive.
/3/The approval line is checked. Walt
305. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, June 25, 1966, 5:30 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Desalting Projects, Vol. I. Secret. The source text bears Johnson's handwritten notation, "Walt, See me. L." It bears no indication of his approval or disapproval. Following our meeting with you on desalting in the Middle East,/2/ we have carefully studied our commitment and drawn up tentative terms of reference for the U.S. coordinator. /2/The President met with Rostow, Schultze, Hornig, and other members of his staff on June 15 to discuss the question of appointing a coordinator on desalting projects in Israel and the United Arab Republic. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) See Document 299. A memorandum for the record by Saunders, dated August 10, records a 20-minute meeting of Johnson, Rostow, Schultze, Hornig, and other staff members on Israeli and UAR desalting, evidently the June 15 meeting, although Saunders, dates it on June 22. According to the memorandum, Rostow outlined key questions to be answered, Schultze and Hornig stated their views, and Johnson asked Rostow to find out the extent of the U.S. commitment to Israel on the project and then "tell me what I ought to do." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Harold Saunders, Israel-Nuclear-Dimona, 4/1/66-12/31/66) On the commitment, I conclude (the full record is attached):/3/ /3/Not attached. 1. We are publicly and privately committed to help Israel with technical assistance to study and plan a desalting program. 2. We are committed to help "as much as possible" with construction costs if studies prove the project feasible. The engineering study concluded that the project is technologically feasible but that its long-term economic costs and benefits still need to be determined. 3. We are not committed to a nuclear desalting plant, and the option of an oil-fueled plant remains open. However, we have talked enthusiastically about using nuclear energy and now have a study saying it is technically feasible. But we still have room to maneuver if a nuclear plant turns out to be politically or economically undesirable. 4. We are committed to appoint a high-level U.S. representative to discuss with an Israeli counterpart financing and other practical aspects of how to move ahead on the project. Therefore, I recommend you approve the following steps:/4/ /4/None of the options in this memorandum is checked. (1) Appoint our representative as soon as we can arrange it, even though we are not yet ready to talk to the Israelis. Our own position is still not firm on important policy issues, including how we might help finance the project if we decided to go ahead. The coordinator can help pin down our position and should share in formulating his final instructions. Any first-rate man would wish to help shape the enterprise from an early stage. I recommend Douglas Dillion as the man best equipped to handle the difficult economic aspects of this project while still having the necessary diplomatic experience. The Israelis have mentioned Bob Anderson as combining the same qualifications. Averell Harriman and Mac Bundy are also on Secretary Rusk's list.
(2) Tell the Israelis privately now whom you have appointed, but ask them to agree to hold off joint announcement until later in the summer in order to give him time to do his homework. For both domestic and foreign political reasons, we want to space our Israeli gestures. We announced the aircraft sale 20 May. We now have this year's AID loan almost ready for announcement but do not want to put it out while Faisal is here. We have $6 million left over from an old loan that you have delayed transferring to a new one. That could move any time. We have President Shazar coming the first week in August. We want to fit announcement of the coordinator into this schedule in order to reap maximum domestic advantage and minimum Arab reaction.
(3) Give the coordinator the attached terms of reference./5/ Briefly, these instruct him to: /5/The attached "Terms of Reference for U.S. Coodinator on Israeli and UAR Desalting Plants" is dated June 25. A virtually identical document dated August 12 was sent to the President with a memorandum of that date from Rostow outlining plans for Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker to begin his work as coordinator at the end of August and present his recommendations in November, recommending delaying announcement of Bunker's appointment until mid-September, and recommending the President's approval of the terms of reference. Johnson approved Rostow's recommendations. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. V) --Take about two months to review all available economic data (perhaps with the help of a good economist or other specialist) to find out whether further study is needed. A clear picture of Israel's water position in the 1970's is needed to determine how much concessional or grant financing or continuing subsidy would be involved if we went ahead. Don Hornig argues rightly that we should not pile one study on another, and the Israelis will not stand still for that either. But my understanding is that we still do not have an economic picture of Israel in the 1970's which gives us a clear picture of what water prices will be acceptable then. --Recommend what further study may be needed after he has completed these preliminary reviews. If he feels we need no more study, he should recommend a USG position. If he thinks we should go ahead with the project, he should recommend a way to finance it. He should also recommend the timing and content of his first approach to the Israelis.
(4) Tell the coordinator to look especially closely at the problem of requiring the Israelis to accept IAEA safeguards on this, Dimona and all future reactors. Our current position is to make this our price for going ahead with a nuclear plant. We know the Israelis will not accept this condition readily, if at all. But we would stick with our position rather than prompting the bureaucracy to begin thinking about fall back positions already. However, our coordinator will have to know this problem inside out to argue our case with the Israelis. Moreover, we must be realistic about Israeli resistance on this point and will have to know whether there are other good ways to achieve our objective.
(5) Attach the coordinator to the White House. The Israelis want to feel that he is your man and, from our point of view, that is not a bad idea. Only here will he find enough freedom from bureaucratic lobbying to sort this out. However, this might bring you more directly under fire, and it might be possible for a man of Dillon's or Harriman's stature to retain his independence if located in State.
Don Hornig's staff and Charlie Schultze's have participated in working out this approach. Walt
306. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/ Washington, June 27, 1966, 7:09 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL UAR-US. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Russell, cleared by Symmes and Officer in Charge of UK Affairs Thomas M. Judd, and approved by Handley. Repeated to London. 6689. 1. UAR Ambassador Mostafa Kamel upon return to Washington from leave and consultation in UAR told Department officer June 24 he found in Cairo atmosphere suspicion and fear of US intentions. Yemen prime issue facing UARG and many Egyptian officials believed US supporting King Faisal's intransigent stand in order bring down Nasser regime. President Nasser thought UAR had satisfied major US needs through moderate constructive policies, i.e., a) nonaligned UAR position and avoidance close association with USSR and communism, b) US oil interests intact, c) Israel in "ice box." US reluctance cooperate with UAR strengthened hand leftist elements anxious discredit Muhyadin government. In order gain ascendancy, these elements seeking undermine US-UAR relations and create climate that would prevent US sale wheat to UAR. 2. After enormous effort and at great risk to personal career, Kamel said he had convinced Nasser and key UAR officials of need for UAR give US clear evidence its desire improve relations. 3. Kamel cited as examples of past UAR actions indicative of desire cooperate with West: a. Settlement of difficulties between UARG and Pan American Oil Company. b. Offer to compensate damages to USIS Library. c. UAR letter of intent to Westinghouse to arrange financing for construction nuclear power and desalting plant. (Apparently failure of International General Electric to arrange financing for this project has induced UARG to try its luck with Westinghouse.) d. UARG decision purchase three Boeing aircraft for United Arab Airlines. e. Submission of draft law to National Assembly to solve outstanding difficulties with Shell company. f. Invitations to Davies, head of Food Machinery Corporation, and other US businessmen to visit UAR and interest them in participation economic development projects. 4. As measure continuing UAR desire for closer relations with West, Kamel said he authorized state: a. UAR has no desire make UK position in NE difficult. UAR prepared help UK in orderly honorable withdrawal from South Arabia provided HMG complied with UN resolution. (Kamel feels UARG believes desirable resume diplomatic relations with UK, perhaps after discussion this issue at OAU conference Addis Ababa in September. Helpful UK attitude toward solution Yemen problem would do much facilitate resumption relations.) b. UAR does not believe in making axis. If Faisal wants Islamic pact UAR not inclined respond by creation "progressive" axis, e.g., UAR, Syria, Algeria. UAR desires close bilateral relations with other Arab states, but no axis. UAR meetings with one or more Arab states for purpose exchange views only. c. UAR unaware of and did not support Shuqairy announcement plan send PLA volunteers to help Viet Cong. In fact UARG arrested Syrian head of volunteer group in Cairo. d. Uncertain whether proposed Tricontinent Conference (AALAPSO) will take place in Cairo as scheduled 1968. If it should, UAR will be model of moderation and help US against ChiCom activities. e. Decision taken settle all outstanding US claims en bloc as was done with Belgian claims. f. Kamel carrying letter to Secretary from Sadat renewing invitation visit UAR. Also has gift photo of President Nasser for President Johnson. 5. Kamel stressed need for corresponding evidence US desire cooperate with UAR: a. He was instructed to ask for the sale of $50 million of wheat on CCC credit. USG help with 10% guarantee (i.e., $5 million) from US banks also sought. b. Foregoing arrangement would ease pressure on UAR to assure meeting immediate food needs. Kamel recognized problems posed by election year and said he clearly expected no public response to UAR PL-480 until late November. Desirable however reassure UARG by secret advance expression intent respond favorably. Kamel convinced if US does not signal intention conclude PL-480 agreement, Soviet Union will provide wheat. Ambassador said only his persuasion prevented UAR acceptance Soviet wheat offer at time Kosygin visit. c. Kamel said imperative US make Faisal understand wheat issue not plaything. Only then would Faisal abandon hope damaging US-UAR relations and follow path of reason that could permit Yemen settlement. 6. Department officer had impression UAR Ambassador may have been given last chance to bring home bacon, despite skepticism at home about probable success his efforts. Kamel made point of suggesting you inform Deputy PriMin Fawzi, FonMin Riad, and Presidential Adviser al-Kholi that he made detailed expose to Department officer upon arrival, hopes to see Assistant Secretary Hare and White House Special Assistant Rostow week June 27 and Secretary upon return from trip to Far East July 9. 7. Department officer conveyed gist Deptel 6653/2/ to Kamel and summarized report your meeting with Kaissouni (Embtel 3267)./3/ He also cautioned against expecting US officials be impressed by actions taken by UARG (e.g., Pan American and Shell) which dictated primarily by Egyptian economic imperatives. Constructive attitude toward Yemen and South Arabia and demonstrable progress toward improving area stability might brighten prospects future US-UAR cooperation. /2/Document 303. /3/Battle reported in telegram 3267 from Cairo, June 23, that he met with Kaissouni and explained the U.S. response to his March request for a new $150 million P.L. 480 agreement. He observed that the session had gone quite smoothly and commented, "We, in fact, puzzled by low key reaction and lack of effort pressure US for immediate favorable decision." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID (US) 15 UAR) Ball
307. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/ Washington, July 13, 1966, 7:18 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL UAR-US. Secret. Drafted by Donald C. Bergus, and approved by Hare. Repeated to Jidda, London, and Tel Aviv. 7004. Following summary uncleared FYI/Noforn and subject to revision upon review memcon. 1. UAR Ambassador Kamel saw Secretary for nearly ninety minutes July 13. Kamel opened by saying Secretary had been missed in Cairo. Secretary expressed regret Vietnam matters had prevented his visit. 2. Kamel detailed number of officials and other leaders he had talked to during his sojourn Cairo, complimented Ambassador Battle, and said he had been in UAR during very critical period in US-UAR relations. He now in position convey officially that Nasser wants work with President and Secretary strengthen relations. As evidence UAR intentions, GUAR had taken following actions: 3. A. Yemen and South Arabia. Nasser had told Battle UAR did not wish complicate Yemen situation but to settle it. UAR welcomed Kuwaiti mediation, cooperating with Kuwaitis and hoped Saudis would do same. UAR had no intentions jeopardize US oil interests or take over South Arabia. UAR proposed USG exercise its "good offices" informally to help settle matters. UAR would take no action leading to deterioration Yemen situation if Saudi Arabia did not aggravate. 4. B. Viet Cong. Kamel understood US reaction to opening VC office Cairo. At same time, USG in past had asked UAR to speak to Hanoi. NVN reaction had often been tell UAR to speak to VC. Therefore Egyptians thought that mere "formality" of permitting VC (who were already in Cairo) open office might be helpful. UAR had no intention embarrass USG. 5. C. AALAPSO Conference. While Egypt not big country it had big government and not always possible control all its actions. Nasser, when told of US reaction to UAR's hosting AALAPSO conference in 1968, had said, "who knows what will happen between now and 1968." In any event USG should not condemn UAR a priori. 6. D. "Blocs" in NE. Nasser had said he against idea of any "blocs, groups or axes" in area. Splitting of Arab world would create tension, attract cold war and Communist exploitation. It was not Cairo that had proposed Islamic Pacts, etc. UAR urged USG use its influence discourage groupings in NE. 7. E. UK. Kamel told Secretary "officially but secretly" that UAR disposed resume relations with UK. Thought it might take place after upcoming OAU meeting at Addis. Intimated that US might help by speaking to Prime Minister Wilson when he visited US. Said no real conflict between UK and UAR over South Arabia. 8. Kamel then moved to steps he hoped USG could take to respond to UAR actions. a. Kamel delivered Secretary second invitation from Sadat which he said had been authorized by Nasser. Hoped Secretary would visit Cairo perhaps around end of year. Secretary expressed thanks. b. Kamel asked for opportunity meet with President. Secretary said we would take it up. 9. Kamel then reviewed economic actions UAR had taken: settlement for library, discussion re global agreement for US claims, Panam oil agreement, decision buy Boeings, invitations to American industrialists, etc. 10. Kamel reverted to situation Cairo during his stay there. Said we had won that particular battle but situation still at crossroads. Nasser had spoken to Kamel re US reactions to his speeches on Yemen. Nasser said US should ask for reasons before condemning. There some elements in GUAR who were telling Nasser US was working with Faisal overthrow Nasser. Others did not question US intentions but said USG not using enough influence with Faisal and that risk (e.g. demise of Nasser regime) was the same. Nasser under pressure to save his regime. Nasser saw reports of Congressional and other influential Americans' statements re "no wheat for Egypt" as invitation to Egyptian people to revolt. UAR Army in Yemen faced with choice between something that could be called victory in Yemen or debacle. Some felt that if debacle in Yemen or revolt in Egypt seemed inevitable there was something to be gained by precipitating crisis now. Nasser had asked Kamel explain pressure UAR was under. Felt USG would understand because it had similar situation in another part of the world. 11. Kamel then outlined "transitory" steps he hoped USG would take soon: 1) Reiterate US desire for honorable settlement in Yemen. 2) Secretary's visit to UAR at turn of year. 3) Appointment with President for Kamel. Perhaps correspondence at Presidential level could be resumed; 4) Visit of US Senatorial delegation to UAR. 5) Support UAR efforts obtain 10% bank guarantee for CCC wheat. 6) Move ahead with grain silo project. 7) Encourage IBRD to resume loans to UAR. 8) Support UAR efforts obtain help from IMF. (Secretary interposed UAR's need to maintain confidence of Bank and Fund. This essential in creating attractive atmosphere for private capital. Visits of leading American industrialists also helpful.) 9) Postpone UAR debt payments to USG agencies. 12. Kamel said that on longer term we had to face up to resumption PL 480. CCC might keep wheat channel open for few months. Important thing was that channel not be closed. If it were closed price would be high, although Kamel admitted US could probably afford it. Question would be whether UAR remained nonaligned or not. It was as simple as that. 13. Final question was question of nuclear weapons in area. UAR would accept international controls over its atomic activities. Secretary said this was very important statement. Kamel said that if Israel produced atomic weapons USSR would obtain bases in NE. Kamel suggested that approach might be in context non-nuclear areas ultimately to be tied into global agreement. 14. Secretary said he hoped see Kamel again within very few days and give him official answers to many important questions Kamel had raised. Rest of conversation taken up with informal, exploratory comments by Secretary./2/ /2/See Document 308. Rusk
308. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, July 13, 1966. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL UAR-US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Bergus and approved in S on July 25. The memorandum is Part III of III parts; Parts I and II are ibid. For the remainder of the conversation, see Document 307. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS The Secretary Ambassador of the United Arab Republic, Dr. Mostafa Kamel Kamel concluded by saying that the UAR wanted to cooperate with the United States, that it had taken measures to prove this, and that he hoped to have an opportunity to convey this directly to the President. The Secretary said that he wanted to see Ambassador Kamel again soon to make an official comment on his presentation. As for Kamel's request to see the President, we would take this matter up. The Secretary wanted time to think about the other points. The rest of the Secretary's remarks would be made on a personal basis and should not for the time being be reported. The Secretary had followed the Ambassador's presentation with interest and appreciation. He was grateful for the renewed invitation to visit Cairo and would be in touch with the Ambassador about it. He hoped that the Ambassador would come in again in a very few days. On the question of divisions in the Arab world, the Secretary wanted the Ambassador's frank assessment of the competition between the Arab Socialist countries vs. the conservative ones. While we would not expect Egypt to stop saying its methods were the best way to achieve economic development, would it be possible for Egypt to consider this a problem that each country should solve for itself? Kamel replied that Nasser was convinced that it was not his business to change other countries. He felt that if the Yemen were solved, this problem would be resolved. The issue of "groupings" among Arab states depended heavily on US-UAR relations. It was important that Egypt not feel it was being cornered. The Secretary expressed personal appreciation for Ambassador Kamel's efforts in the field of US-UAR relations. As to food, the problem was changing dramatically. There would be a Development Assistance Committee (DAC) conference next week to talk about the world food problem over the next ten years. The world was facing a terrible crisis. Before World War II the underdeveloped countries sold food to the industrial countries. Now the industrial countries were sending 40 million tons annually to the underdeveloped countries. Surpluses had been exhausted. As a colleague of the Secretary's had remarked, there could no longer be a "garbage-can approach" to the problem. Acreage would have to be increased to meet the additional food needs. The orders of magnitude were staggering. We would be sending India wheat in quantities amounting to about 60% of what the US consumed annually. But still this was a relatively small percentage of India's annual need. It was a worldwide problem which everyone must go flat out to solve. The countries short of food would have to take rigorous measures. We had so insisted to the Indians. The US had taken risks in drawing down its own food reserves to meet the needs of others. Maybe, the Secretary continued, we should look at the UAR in the context of the world food problem. We could examine what the UAR was doing in such fields as use of Aswan Dam waters, desalination, etc. and come to a projection over a ten-year period. This might establish a different framework than the one under which the US has sent food in the past. A framework of total effort might be an improvement on past methods which have sometimes been unhappy. The Secretary reemphasized that he was speaking informally, personally and unofficially. The Secretary had been stimulated by the UAR statement of willingness to accept international controls on nuclear activities. This was a most important development. We would see what we could do to make it of significance. The United States was utterly opposed to the introduction of nuclear weapons in the Middle East. On Yemen, the Secretary was not sure that a direct role by the United States was the best way a solution could be found. If the US got into the negotiating process it would bring a lot of extra baggage with it in the form of relationships and understandings in other fields. Perhaps the formal Kuwaiti role could be built upon. The Secretary would comment officially later. His impression was that both sides desired a settlement. Certainly the Yemenis themselves must pray daily for a settlement. What perhaps was needed was more diplomatic precision in instruments of settlement. During Faisal's visit to the United States, the Secretary had been struck by the fact that he had not wanted to create difficulties for the UAR. Faisal had referred to Nasser as his "Arab brother" and said the Arabs must find ways to live with each other. Faisal had told the Secretary privately that he would not object to food going to other Arabs. The Secretary thought that the view that the Bank and Fund have a constructive role to play in Egypt's development was a good one. The Secretary said there was no element of truth in the proposition that the US had any interest or any activity in an attempt to overthrow President Nasser. This would be beyond the pale. A delicate problem in US-UAR relations arose from the fact that the United States at long last was becoming sensitive. This was not just a problem of Zionist pressures. There was growing recognition of the need for protecting the sense of dignity of the President and the Secretary of State. Kamel returned to the possibility of resuming Presidential correspondence. The Secretary said we would think about this. The US, continued the Secretary, had exhausted its capability to go on its knees bearing gifts. We did not necessarily want gratitude. We could live with silence but not with abuse. Kamel said he had done what he could in this regard.
309. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State/1/ Amman, July 16, 1966, 1335Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 6-8 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Passed to the White House and USIA. 124. Ref Amman 106./2/ /2/Dated July 14. (Ibid.) 1. In noon audience with King Hussein I raised subject armor on West Bank. Said had hoped raise subject informally in course future discussions other matters but had thought best bring subject his attention now in view his current plan for extended absence Jordan (Embtel 116),/3/ his expressed desire I discuss such matters only with him, and our concern that no indiscreet use be made of tanks during his absence. /3/Dated July 15. (Ibid., POL 7 JORDAN) 2. Recalled King's discussions with Ambassador Barnes in March 1965 (Embtel 536, March 12)/4/ and understanding then reached that, while he could make no commitment re internal disposition of armed forces, it was his intent under normal conditions keep armor off West Bank. Said we had been aware for some time presence small number of tanks south of Jenin; had assumed they moved there following Israeli raids night April 29-30, but had not mentioned them in expectation would be withdrawn as situation calmed down. /4/Document 188. 3. King responded that above was correct description his intentions, that in fact two tank battalions had been withdrawn into hills on East Bank and that few, if any, tanks remained on West Bank. He avoided flat statement none there, and I did not pretend to any exact knowledge as to number and whereabouts of any remaining. Rather, I expressed satisfaction tanks in fact were being withdrawn, at same time stressing U.S. concern avoid any confrontation American tanks across Jordan-Israeli frontier, alluding specifically to Congressional concern this spectacle in Pak-Indian confrontation. 4. Expressing his understanding, Hussein went on refer to recent incidents between Syria and Israel,/5/ asserting this further demonstration Israeli intent keep pot boiling. I countered to extent only of saying fortified nature Syrian side made it highly unlikely incursions into Israel made without knowledge Syrian military. /5/Terrorist incidents on July 13 and 14 in Israel near the Syrian border were followed by an Israeli airstrike against Syrian territory on July 14. Following complaints by both Israel and Syria to the UN Security Council, the Council discussed the incidents between July 25 and August 3. On July 29, Jordan and Mali submitted a draft resolution condemning Israel's July 14 attack, calling on the Israeli and Syrian Governments to cooperate with the UNTSO Chief of Staff and urging reactivation of the Mixed Armistice Commission (UN document S/7437). On August 3, the Security Council voted on the draft resolution, which failed of adoption by 6 votes to 0, with 9 abstentions, including the United States. 5. Comment: I avoided any allusion to report JAA plan station two tank battalions on West Bank but hope that if such is plan, my reference to indiscreet use of tanks during King's absence will bring delay or reconsideration. In any case, Hussein certainly again aware our continuing concern. Adams [Continue with the next documents] Volume XVIII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |