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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XVIII Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-67 Department of State |
 290. National Intelligence Estimate/1/ NIE 36.1-66 Washington, May 19, 1966. /1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. A table of contents is not printed. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Acting Director of Central Intelligence Richard M. Helms, and concurred in by the U.S. Intelligence Board on May 19. THE OUTLOOK FOR THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC The Problem To assess the situation of the United Arab Republic and to estimate developments in domestic and foreign affairs over the next few years. Conclusions A. Growing economic difficulties, the costly stalemate in Yemen, and other troubles have produced considerable discontent and even some active opposition in the UAR. The regime has responded by overhauling the security apparatus, by searching--unsuccessfully--for some solution in Yemen, by cutting civilian spending, and by stretching out its five year economic plan to seven years. B. The program of domestic retrenchment, particularly the cuts in civilian consumption, should help in dealing with economic problems, but it will have to be continued for several years to be effective. Foreign exchange earnings will probably be increased by recent important oil discoveries. To meet its economic goals, the UAR has some $1.1 billion in aid pledged by Communist countries and about $500 million promised from various Western sources; it will, however, still need about $2 billion during the Second Plan period (1962-1965), partly in foodstuffs and partly in other types of aid. US willingness to supply PL-480 food will greatly affect the willingness of other Western donors to contribute to Egypt. The UAR's need for Western aid will be an important but not overriding consideration in its conduct of foreign affairs. C. We see no better than an even chance of a settlement in Yemen in the next two years or so. Nasser is highly unlikely to accept a humiliating withdrawal. We also believe that he will try to avoid the risks of escalation, though there is some danger of clashes involving UAR and Saudi forces. His most likely course is to retrench militarily, holding the more defensible areas and hoping for some kind of face-saving settlement. In the meantime, antagonism between Nasser and the Saudis is likely to exacerbate inter-Arab relations generally, undermining the detente of the last two years or so. D. Unless Nasser's troubles get much more severe than at present, we doubt that his regime will be in serious danger of being replaced. A successful move to do so would require considerable backing from the armed forces; this appears unlikely in the near term. However, unless the government improves its economic performance and manages to revive greater political support, it will become more vulnerable in the long run. E. US-UAR relations have fluctuated considerably over the years, and present indications are for a downward turn. This results mainly from the reviving antagonism between Nasser and the more pro-Western Arab leaders--particularly Faisal. It is exacerbated by Nasser's troubles with the British in the Arabian Peninsula, by his resentment at tightened US aid policies toward the UAR, and by his belief that the US is increasing support for his adversaries. It is also encouraged by Soviet gestures toward the UAR. [Here follows the Discussion portion of the estimate.]
291. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, May 21, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 3. Confidential. Ambassador Goldberg has sent you a very imaginative proposal for tackling the Palestine refugee problem./2/ /2/Goldberg's May 19 letter to the President is ibid. His idea is to persuade Israel to announce unilaterally that it will allow any refugees to return to Israel who want to, subject only to annual quotas and security screening. This would be a bow to the Arab claim that the refugees have a "right" to return. Israel would offer compensation to those who wanted to settle elsewhere. While this might not work, Israel would at least have made a move to break the current impasse. Our preliminary reaction is that, even though there are some good new ideas here, the Israelis would not buy this. They feel they have to put upper limits on the number of refugees coming back into Israel for security reasons. If they were sure the Arabs would reject the idea, they might consider it to make political points. However, they feel that the present situation is tolerable and time is gradually eroding the problem. There are clearly fresh winds blowing in the Israeli Government and greater willingness to think about a long-term Arab-Israeli accommodation. We do want to guard against pushing these new thinkers too far too fast because their hard line cohorts will be all too ready to jump them. So we would want to work out any such initiative very thoroughly before proposing it to them. I think we ought to give State the outlines of Goldberg's plan to staff out in detail. If you approve, I will send it over without attribution. Walt
/3/This option is checked. Johnson's handwritten notes on the memorandum indicate that the President wanted his staff to "Hurry it up" and to thank Goldberg. Another note in an unknown handwriting states that Rostow called Goldberg in New York later that day.
292. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, May 23, 1966, 9:30 a.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. V. Top Secret. A handwritten note on the memorandum reads, "Rec'd 11:10 a." A handwritten "L" indicates that the memorandum was seen by the President. SUBJECT We are committed to a telephone call to Abe Feinberg about three matters: 1. U.S. support for Israeli technical assistance in Africa. You have in your hands a memorandum describing the options./2/ My recommendation is: I tell Feinberg that the Israeli Government will be hearing about this matter shortly through regular [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] channels. /2/A May 21 memorandum from Rostow to the President laid out options for meeting a request from Feinberg to increase [text not declassified] support for Israeli technical assistance programs in Africa. (Ibid.) 2. The Haifa loan. Dave Bell by noon today will be recommending that we use the "left over" money to support an additional Israeli project (the power plant at Tel Aviv, of which $10 million will in any case be financed by ExIm but we would put in $6 million of AID money). I recommend that I tell Feinberg on this item that we will shortly be suggesting to the Israeli Government a responsive way to meet their request. 3. Desalting. We now have in our hands memoranda from State and Hornig./3/ State suggests an approach which, while initially bilateral with Israel, would involve the strategy later to include the UAR in desalting enterprises. There are many unanswered questions which cannot and ought not be settled today. I recommend that I tell Feinberg that we have decided in principle to appoint a U.S. coordinator to explore with the Israelis the technical and economic aspects of the desalting project; and we shall be in touch with them shortly about the name of our man and terms of reference. /3/Rusk's May 21 memorandum to the President is ibid., Subject File, Desalting Projects, Vol. I. A May 20 memorandum from Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology Donald F. Hornig to Rostow is ibid., Files of Harold Saunders, Israel-Nuclear-Dimona. You should note that State's concept would involve at some appropriate time the U.S. coordinator on this project dealing not only with Israel but with the UAR. This is a concept you will wish to examine. There is no need to tell Feinberg about this today. One of the reasons for a bit of vagueness in reply to Feinberg today relates to the timing of an announcement of Harriman (or someone else) as the coordinator. We have just announced the Israeli aircraft. We may want to save the announcement of the coordinator for a later time this year. Walt
293. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/ Tel Aviv, May 24, 1966, 1137Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12 UAR. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Cairo, London, and Paris. 1229. Israeli strategic missiles. CA-11071, May 10, 66./2/ /2/Circular airgram CA-11071, May 10, instructed Barbour to renew the U.S.-Israeli missile discussions of April 1964 with Eshkol, in particular to try to halt any delivery to Israel of missiles falling under the initial French-Israel contract for 25 missiles mentioned to Feldman by Eshkol. (Ibid.) For Feldman's reports of his discussions of this subject with Eshkol, see Documents 36 and 37. 1. I had almost an hour with Eshkol morning 24th on missile question. I had given him prior knowledge of subject, and he was well prepared. Following is brief summary of highlights. 2. After I made pitch pursuant ref CA, and subsequent preliminary exchange, PM assured me a) there are no strategic missiles in Israel now; b) there will be no such missiles in Israel at least for two more years from now, perhaps three; c) he sincerely hopes within that period of time UAR will abandon its missile program, in which event Israel will do likewise. In any event Eshkol indicated that GOI not contemplating purchase of more than "two dozen, maybe one dozen more or less." He implied they were having development problems, and finding costs nearly prohibitive. 3. In view importance today's exchange and in order provide full flavor of Eshkol's sensible attitude towards missile question we preparing detailed memcon to be sent priority airgram./3/ /3/Barbour transmitted the memorandum of conversation with airgram A-1000, May 27. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12 UAR) 4. PM gave me paper and map summarizing current Israeli appraisal UAR missile program. Paper states, inter alia, guidance problems apparently still not overcome, but if gyro on which Egyptians now working proves successful, UAR might have about 60 operational SSM's by middle or end of 1967. Israeli appraisal also being pouched. 5. Comment: Noteworthy that Eshkol did not take issue with my point that in present circumstances, presence of SSM's in Israel would constitute Israeli introduction of new weapons into area. PM impressed us as fervently desirous avoiding further qualitative escalation in area arms. Barbour
294. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, May 26, 1966, 5 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12 NEAR E. Confidential. Drafted by Thompson and approved in S on May 28. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office. The memorandum is Part III of VI. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR The Secretary The Secretary asked the Ambassador if he had any reaction in Moscow to the discussion they had had with respect to nuclear weapons in the Near East./2/ Dobrynin said he had understood the Secretary was not talking about a possible treaty, but rather the policy of our two countries. /2/The subject was discussed briefly in the course of a wide-ranging discussion between Rusk and Dobrynin on March 18. According to a memorandum of the conversation, Rusk indicated the United States would be interested in a nuclear free zone in the Near East, provided that Turkey and Greece could be excluded. Dobrynin expressed skepticism as to whether Israel and the UAR would be interested in such an arrangement. Rusk expressed the opinion that both would be. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4443, 388.3, 1966) The Secretary agreed that a formal treaty might not be practical since the Arabs would probably not sign a treaty with the Israelis. Dobrynin said that the Soviets were not going to furnish any nuclear weapons to these countries and he assumed that we were not and therefore he had not pursued the matter further in Moscow. The Secretary pointed out that if all these countries would accept IAEA safeguards, this could be a good first step. He went on to explain, however, that what he had had in mind was the possibility that both the Soviet Union and the United States might get these countries to give separately private assurances to us and we could then each tell the governments on the other side. The Secretary asked if there had been any discussion of this subject with Cairo. Dobrynin replied that there was not, to his knowledge, but it was possible that this had come up during the recent visit of Mr. Kosygin to Cairo. The Secretary said he could tell the Ambassador quite privately that we were convinced that the Israelis were not planning to make nuclear weapons. Ambassador Dobrynin expressed some skepticism and wondered how an arrangement could be made. The Secretary said he thought that if these countries assured us that they would not go nuclear, they would not do so. He asked if it was the policy of the Soviet Government that there should be no nuclear weapons in this area. The Ambassador replied that there should not be any anywhere! The Secretary asked if the Ambassador had had any discussion in Moscow with respect to keeping sophisticated weapons out of the Middle East, such as missiles. Dobrynin, without directly relating his reply to any conversations he had had in Moscow, said that he did not see much possibility in this area until the Big Powers took some steps toward disarmament and set an example. Otherwise, it was difficult to convince these countries not to acquire such weapons.
295. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/ No. 0830/66 Washington, May 28, 1966. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. IV. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; No Dissem Abroad; Controlled Dissem/Background Use Only. A note in the source text states that the memorandum was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence in the CIA Directorate of Intelligence and coordinated with ORR and ONE. EGYPTIAN-SOVIET RELATIONS Summary Egypt and the USSR may be moving toward a period of closer cooperation in the pursuit of their common objectives in the Arab world. Nasir's reviving antagonism toward conservative and moderate Arab leaders, his concurrent tendency to try to unify "progressive and revolutionary" Arab forces, and his renewed hostility toward US and British policy in the Middle East have almost certainly increased his readiness to collaborate with Moscow. Moscow's present leadership will be cautiously receptive to opportunities Nasir may offer for extending Soviet influence in the area. They already appear to be preparing to work somewhat more closely with him than in the past in espousing his kind of Arab nationalism, socialism, and opposition to Western influence. There are, however, definite limitations on such cooperation well-recognized by both sides. [Here follow 17 paragraphs of more detailed discussion.]
296. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State/1/ Cairo, May 28, 1966, 1200Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL UAR-US. Secret; Limdis. 3091. Re Embtel 3050 and Deptel 6537./2/ /2/Telegram 3050 from Cairo, May 25, reported that Battle had been invited to a working dinner on May 27 with Sadat and Kamel. (Ibid.) Telegram 6537 to Cairo, May 26, suggested that in Battle's discussions with Sadat and Kamel, he should stress that the United States had made a sustained effort to seek good relations but that a number of disturbing developments had occurred recently, including the continued presence of UAR troops inYemen, attacks on U.S. policy in Vietnam, and distortion in the UAR press of U.S. arms sales to Israel. (Ibid.) 1. Following general expression concern new US-UAR strains by Sadat, I made general statement US desires seek understanding and not confrontation which I suggested be theme of evening. I pointed out that we had all been delighted with Sadat visit and that it had in everyone's judgment heralded new era good feeling between US and UAR. I then suggested that the main areas of their apparent concern today had existed prior Sadat visit. US guarantee territorial integrity Saudi Arabia which had been drug out publicly again as result bellicose statements here had, as the UAR knew, existed for some years. US arms sale to Israel had been known by UAR for over one year and I had informed UAR each step of way progress. Sale came as result great soul searching our part in framework US policy to refrain from becoming major supplier arms in area and represented very restrained step. Therefore elements particular UAR concern not new and resulted in part from UAR throwing into public arena matters that should be dealt with privately. Moreover, Al Ahram with full knowledge they were inaccurate had built up arms sales issue by charging US with much broader sales than actually the case. While visit King Feisal to Washington was new element visit had been scheduled some time ago for this year although date finally agreed to just before announcement. Difficult understand UAR actions in light their obvious past willingness work for improved relations when factors that now appeared of concern to them already existed. 2. Sadat then commented as follows with respect to subjects indicated: A. Arms for Israel. Made statement perfunctory objection not denying effect of Al Ahram story and admitting truth my statement that we had informed them at each stage development. Stated he wished express strong objection to sale but not to go into matter in depth. Little emphasis was placed on arms sale for remainder of evening. B. Islamic Pact. UAR is convinced British and Americans encouraging Islamic Pact. In fact, UAR has definite info US at CENTO meeting urged some countries join Pact. UAR convinced Pact anti-Nasser in design. I objected use word pact pointing out this nomenclature had, if not originated here, at least been repeated here with result general usage term around world when that not basic to idea as I understood it. C. Havana Conference. Nasser shocked Secretary Hare raised matter in recent meeting/3/ since UAR attitude such conferences consistent throughout revolution and UAR presence these conferences essentially moderating force. Obviously UAR had no subversive plans Latin America in which its interests limited. I pointed out Latin American countries with which UAR maintained relations could not be expected look with favor on resolutions inviting their overthrow and this concern inevitably resulted in US being drawn into issue which could cause difficulty in US-UAR relations. Sadat stated impossible change UAR policy and indicated 1968 conference would proceed on schedule. I predicted UAR could expect Latin American countries to reflect concern when specific intentions proceed conference became known. Sadat believed Latin American countries would and could wait until they saw nature of conference before they became unduly upset. /3/Hare met with Nasser on May 2 in Alexandria. Telegram 2820 from Cairo, May 3, reported that Nasser urged renewal of U.S. assistance; other subjects of discussion included Yemen and Vietnam. (Ibid.) D. Yemen. Confrontation between Nasser and Feisal already in existence. Feisal could not act as belligerent or confident as he does without US support. US appears completely on his side. Nasser's speeches to which US had objected so strongly came after months UAR effort resolve issue and he emphasised certain actions were threatened only in certain contingencies. Door still open and always open and basic desire for peace unchanged. Sadat told Secretary Rusk UAR would wait two months for solution and then shift to new policy which is exactly what has happened. However, desire for peace still exists and UAR open to help from third parties. Ambassador Kamel then suggested US mediate situation to which Sadat nodded pleasantly; for rest of evening Kamel kept referring to Sadat's desire for US mediation although only Kamel really pressed point. I stated one mediation effort already underway for which Sadat indicated little hope. I expressed doubt any country would wish enter mediation efforts unless it considered there was willingness both sides seek solution and all efforts at mediation not helped by public threats. Sadat warned President had speech scheduled June 15 at which time he expected to go beyond anything thus far in attack on Feisal. Speeches on Yemen had been popular in country and were essential in view loss Egyptian life and requirement to forestall charge Yemen operation had not been successful. Kamel again pressed mediation idea pointing out we were only ones concerned and only country with leverage on Feisal, therefore problem ours. I stated most emphatically Yemen war not our war and those directly involved must seek solution and not wait for outside help which they were hardly encouraging. E. Aden. Emphasis in dealing with South Arabian peninsula was placed subsidiary problem which could be solved if Yemen issue resolved. Deep distrust British expressed vehemently and we received no encouragement our urging for constructive help toward government Aden area reflective people's wishes. F. Aid. US aid always too little, too late, too tied with strings, etc. Level of aid going India and elsewhere makes UAR wonder why we will not help them as much as we help others. UAR desperately needs our food and economic situation very difficult but under no circumstances will UAR accept aid with strings. If UAR not assisted by US, great pressure will be exerted on them toward increasing reliance Eastern bloc. 3. Comment: Conversation was useful as means [garble--maintaining?] channels and exchanging points of view. While I spoke at great length on US attitudes along established lines, I do not believe we changed any minds and certainly we uncovered no flexibility on Yemen or Aden. Israeli arms sale seemed to be minimized and obviously far greater concern now for "US support" Feisal than support of Israel. I find it difficult understand extent their professed fear of Islamic Pact and of Feisal's Saudi Arabia given NE realities and its relative political-military weakness compared UAR. Great emotion attended exposition on Havana Conference which dealt with at great length out of proportion its relative importance compared to other items. There was shocking unawareness of the external effect President Nasser's speeches and repeated statements UAR reacts but does not act. I suggested that they not react to the wrong thing, pointing out UAR had over-reacted to unofficial AP story subsequently denied by US. While they occasionally showed signs of emotion, at all times conversation friendly. It was agreed meet again from time to time over next weeks. Battle
297. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, May 31, 1966, 2 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. IV. Confidential. Secretary Rusk recommends letting Ambassador Goldberg sound out the Israelis on the proposal he recently outlined to you (attached)/2/ for setting the Arab refugee problem. /2/See Document 291. Rusk's May 30 memorandum is attached but not printed. Another copy of Rusk's memorandum is filed with a May 31 memorandum from Saunders to Rostow commenting, "Attached recommendation comes because no one wants to shoot Ambassador Goldberg down." It continues, "NE doubts the Israelis will buy but doesn't want to squelch Goldberg's response to the President's request for new initiatives on the Arab-Israeli deadlock." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 5) He emphasizes that this should be a very informal and tentative probe. Since Eban took over, he has set up his own task force to study the whole Arab-Israeli problem. Eshkol is fully aboard. They are looking for ways to break down the "fortress Israel" idea and to build bridges to the Arabs. A lot of good ideas are forming. We do not want to break this fragile reed by overloading it at the start. The steps Eban's people are considering--greater contact between Arabs and Isaelis--lay them open to the charge of letting down Israel's defenses. To many sincere Israelis, repatriating Arab refugees would be their Trojan Horse. So asking Eban to accept Ambassador Goldberg's plan right now might push him too far too fast. Frankly, State does not give this idea much chance of success. However, Ambassador Goldberg's proposal does offer some new variations on the Johnson plan worth passing along to the Israelis as long as we do not push them. A hard sell would only backfire. So if you approve, I suggest you let me read back to State that you favor a carefully prepared low-key approach but want to be sure we do not appear at this stage to be pressuring the Israelis into something against their will./3/ /3/The President checked the approval line and wrote: "Put on my desk. L." A June 3 memorandum from Rostow to Rusk states that the President authorized Rusk to instruct Goldberg to explore with the Israeli delegation in a "tentative, informal, and low-key manner" Israeli willingness to consider a new initiative aimed at breaking the Arab-Israeli deadlock over the refugee problem. It noted that the President understood that the approach would "not appear to the Israelis as an attempt to push them into something they are not prepared to accept." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, REF 3 UNRWA) No record of Goldberg's approach to the Israelis has been found. Walt
298. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/ Washington, June 11, 1966, 10:33 a.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AE 11-2 ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Gamon on June 7; cleared by Symmes, James W. Spain of INR, Bromley Smith, Robert S. Rochlin of ACDA, and in substance by Robert H. Kranich of ACDA/IR and Stabler of AEC; and approved by Davies. 1085. Deptel 1052./2/ /2/Telegram 1052 to Tel Aviv, June 2, instructed the Embassy to tell Eban that U.S. officials were generally satisfied with the March 31-April 1 visit of the U.S. team to Israeli atomic installations but were concerned that Israeli personnel could supply no information about Argentine-Israeli transactions of uranium concentrate, which they understood had occurred and for which there were no provisions for safeguards equivalent to the IAEA safeguards system. The Embassy was instructed to request clarification of the whereabouts in Israel of Argentine uranium concentrate and its use or intended use, noting that this type of problem added to apprehension in high levels of the U.S. Government and elsewhere and underscored the need for IAEA type safeguards to reassure the world of the peaceful orientation of Israel's nuclear program. (Ibid.) 1. As soon after Prime Minister Eshkol's return from African trip as feasible you should see Foreign Minister Eban for review of arrangements under which USG has been invited visit Dimona. You should make following points: 2. USG appreciates considerable efforts to which GOI went to arrange for satisfactory visit in April 1966. We would like interpret success of that visit as good augury for future USG-GOI arrangements this field. 3. At same time we consider it most important there be no misunderstanding on part GOI of utter seriousness which USG, at highest level, attaches to prevention nuclear proliferation in Near East. As Secretary told Eban this is matter of fundamental significance to US-Israel relations. 4. As GOI aware, USG attaches considerable importance to periodicity of visits and trusts relevant details can be worked out satisfactorily. 5. For technical reasons USG considers that periodicity needs be semi-annual. Scientific reason (given to Embassy in Deptel 938, June 15, 1963,/3/ but apparently not then relayed to GOI because of Ben Gurion resignation) which you may give Eban is as follows: As is widely known and accepted by knowledgeable international scientific community, a reactor size of Dimona could be operated so as to discharge single fuel load approximately every six months if intended for ultimate production of weapons-grade plutonium, whereas for peaceful purposes the burn-up period would be about two years. /3/For text, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. XVIII, Document 274. 6. As previously stated on several occasions, what we want is full access to Dimona's facilities and records every six months. We believe this should be done as matter of course without need for complicated negotiations and protracted delays that have accompanied our visits so far. 7. You should use occasion to stress to Eban USG interest in substantive response to President's letter to Eshkol on IAEA safeguards dated May 21, 1965/4/ (Deptel 698, 1966, paragraph 5)./5/ It will be recalled USG considers placing Israel's nuclear facilities under IAEA controls a preferable alternative to bilateral arrangements under which US teams have been visiting Dimona. We have been impressed by Prime Minister's recent statements on nuclear policy and believe it would be in Israel's interests to give these statements added credibility that would result from IAEA safeguards. /4/Document 218. /5/Telegram 698 to Tel Aviv, March 1, instructed Barbour to stress to Eban the need to make arrangements for the long-pending Dimona visit. Paragraph 5 instructed him to remind Eban the President was looking forward to an answer to his May 21, 1965, proposal for IAEA safeguards. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AE 11-2 ISR) Rusk
299. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, June 14, 1966, 3:10 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Desalting Projects, Vol. I. Secret. The purpose of our meeting at 11:30 a.m. on Wednesday, June 15 on the Israeli and UAR desalting projects is to surface for you the wide range of opinion and controversy over them. I hope the discussion will give us a clearer sense of how to sort these out and move ahead. Basically, the argument is between the desalters and the disarmers, with varied views between: --The AEC and Interior want to push ahead with nuclear desalting. They admit money is a problem because a big nuclear desalting plant, while technologically feasible, is still not economic with normal commercial financing. --AID and Budget Bureau want to save us from building a white elephant which we would have to subsidize. --State hopes we can use these projects to bargain for IAEA safeguards on all Israeli and Egyptian reactors. They feel that subsidizing a plant might not be too big a price to pay. --The disarmament experts fear putting any new reactors in tense areas because they would increase ability to produce weapons. Some of them have little faith in safeguards or feel there may be better ways to buy nuclear controls. To make the most of this meeting, you might want to state your view of the problem and then follow up with the tough questions. Suggested talking points: The problem. We want to push ahead with nuclear desalting as rapidly as makes sense. We also want to keep Israel off the nuclear track. Can we do both? The questions. 1. If nuclear desalting still can't pay its own way without subsidy, what about other sources of water? We've talked so much about desalting, have we overlooked other angles in Israel? 2. Is there a chance that new technology combined with Israel's increased need for water will make desalted water economical in the 1970's? 3. If there is no other way, how much is the Israeli project worth to us? 4. Since we are worried about nuclear proliferation, how about non-nuclear desalting? Have we closed our eyes to this angle? 5. Should we go ahead with desalting if Israel won't accept safeguards on all its reactors? 6. How good are IAEA safeguards? Are they worth giving away a nuclear desalting plant for? How can we make them better? 7. Should we link the Israeli and Egyptian projects? Attached is a summary of Secretary Rusk's recommendations and of the paper prepared by Dr. Hornig's, Charles Schultze's and my own staff./2/ At the close you might say the discussion was helpful in exploring the issues that will be faced by our coordinator on the U.S.-Israel project; and that the next step is for Rostow, in consultation with those represented around the table, to formulate terms of reference for the coordinator for submission to you. /2/The summary is attached but not printed. Walt [Continue with the next documents] Volume XVIII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |