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 | FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1964-1968, Volume XVIII Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-67 Department of State |
 280. Memorandum of Conversation/1/ Washington, March 16, 1966. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 19 NEAR E. Secret. Drafted by Thompson. SUBJECT PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Dobrynin, after lunch at the Embassy today, referred to my earlier conversation with him some weeks ago on the supply of arms to Near Eastern countries. He remarked that while I was away on my Far Eastern trip, an article had appeared in the New York Times which contained a reference to a conversation which Secretary Rusk had had on this subject with Foreign Minister Gromyko last autumn. The Ambassador pointed out that this had been an informal, confidential conversation and it certainly did not help matters to have reference made to it in the public press. I said I had not been aware of this and was quite surprised to learn that there had been any publicity. The Ambassador said that the position of his Government remained as it had been. He said that with respect to atomic weapons in this area, if there was interest in making this area a nuclear-free zone, the Soviet Union would be prepared to support such a proposal. So far as other types of sophisticated weapons are concerned, he indicated that his Government considered this a very complex question and the tenor of his remarks was to the effect that they had little interest. He mentioned that some of these countries were concerned with their own security and, in this connection, they had to take account of United States Naval forces in the Mediterranean, as well as United States bases in the area. Our conversation was broken up before I had an opportunity to find out what countries they considered should be included in any atomic-free area and I would suggest that the Secretary may wish to pursue this when he sees the Ambassador before the end of the week.
Telegram 5017 to Cairo, March 7, 1966, transmitted the text of a letter from President Johnson to President Nasser replying to the message from the latter delivered by President of the UAR National Assembly Anwar al-Sadat (see Document 274). Johnson's letter expressed the hope that continued diplomatic talks between the United Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia would make it possible to reach a solution to the Yemen problem and that Sadat's visit would serve as the basis for continued improvement in relations between the United States and the United Arab Republic. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 UAR) Telegram 5030 to Cairo, March 8, instructed Ambassador Battle to seek an early meeting with Nasser to deliver the letter and provided talking points for the meeting. It instructed him to reiterate President Johnson's feeling that continuing quiet dialogue was the best way to do business and it laid out points he should make concerning Yemen and Aden. (Ibid., POL UAR-US) Telegram 2388 from Cairo, March 20, reported a conversation that day between Battle and Nasser, primarily concerning Yemen and Aden. Battle noted that Nasser had not raised the subjects of U.S. arms sales to Israel or Israel's nuclear potential. (Ibid.)
282. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/ Washington, March 24, 1966, 3:46 p.m. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL UAR-US. Secret. Drafted by Russell on March 23, cleared by Symmes, and approved by Hare. 5349. 1. Following summary uncleared, FYI, Noforn, and subject to revision upon review memcon. 2. UAR Ambassador Kamel met with Secretary March 22 prior to departure leave in UAR. Reviewed major issues affecting US-UAR relations. 3. Secretary said he wished raise troublesome issue that elicited Congressional interest, namely, activity UAR delegation at Tri-Continent Conference Havana and invitation next Conference convene Cairo. Conference statements on forcible subversion Latin American governments had irritated these governments and precipitated meeting OAS. US desired and compelled maintain solidarity with Latin American neighbors. UAR involvement this conference painful matter. 4. Kamel said while conference non-governmental he understood US sensitivity. He undertook raise matter with President Nasser and Prime Minister Muhyadin. Secretary suggested UARG might possibly dissociate itself from conference in press statement. 5. Kamel make lengthy presentation covering: a. Improved US-UAR relations justification for expanded economic cooperation. 1) Both Nasser and Sadat expressed desire improve relations [cl10]with US. 2) Over past months marked improvement tone UAR press. 3) Sadat visit outstandingly successful and offered opportunity that should be exploited. 4) Need to encourage flow of prominent visitors from business and economic fields to UAR. 5) Nasser welcomed US capital investment in fields land reclamation, fertilizer production, port development. 6) Deputy Prime Minister Kaissouni had said UAR willing permit 51 per cent US ownership in enterprises operating in UAR. 7) Nasser had indicated clear desire leave Yemen with honor (reported separate telegram). 8) UAR now requested US consider new PL-480 agreement, value $150 million, duration one year. Ambassador said conclusion such agreement would encourage pro-Western trend in UAR. He hoped agonizing efforts required conclude last agreement would not be repeated. 9) UAR hoped for US encouragement IBRD participate in UAR economic development. 10) UAR anxious for suggestions on how to attract US capital. 11) UAR wished facilitate visit by Congressional group and US businessman group to encourage private capital investment in UAR. b. Despite foregoing UAR had impression US procrastinating on economic cooperation. Nasser had gone far to meet US desires and would find himself exposed politically if US did not meet him part way. Failure US provide necessary encouragement pro-Western elements could precipitate involuntary reliance on USSR. c. Arab/Israel issue quiescent. No positive progress, but freezing of issue prevented deterioration. UAR public speeches for domestic consumption of minor significance. d. UAR willing accept US lead on controlling nuclear proliferation. UAR much concerned by intelligence reports that Israel working toward production nuclear weapons. Kamel referred to Shepilov proposal for NE nuclear control (circa 1959), refused by US. e. Re Near East arms race, Kamel said on instructions improved US-UAR relations would lessen urgency UAR arms acquisition. Whatever arms UAR acquired, purpose not militant, not for aggression. Arms needed solely for defense, as in case tripartite invasion 1956. 6. Secretary said he wished send greetings and picture President Johnson to President Nasser. Secretary sent personal greetings to Prime Minister Muhyadin, Speaker Sadat and Deputy Prime Minister Fawzi. In response subjects raised by Kamel, Secretary said: a. Unlikely Congressional group could visit UAR before adjournment Congress perhaps June or July. Meanwhile would be in touch with Congressional leaders. b. Hoped convey data proposed visit to UAR within few days. Possibility brief stop Cairo on way to or from CENTO Conference April 20-21./2/ /2/Sadat had invited Rusk to visit the United Arab Republic. (Memorandum from Hare to Rusk, March 18; ibid., DEF 12-5 JORDAN) Telegram 937 to Ankara, April 12, stated that due to the exigencies of Vietnam, Rusk planned to reduce the time incidental to his attendance at the CENTO conference to a minimum, precluding his acceptance of invitations to visit Istanbul, Tehran, Cairo, Tunis, and Rabat. (Ibid., ORG 7 S) c. Much interested and appreciative forthcoming statement by Nasser on area denuclearization. So far little cooperation from Soviet Union which tried draw in Turkey and Greece although part of NATO alliance. We would follow up. d. US anxious avoid involvement arms issues in Near East but sometimes drawn in, e.g., Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Israel. Such involvement complicated US relations but need meet legitimate defense requirements and maintain reasonable balance and security in area made involvement disagreeable necessity. Perhaps steady removal sources fear and suspicion offered means improve situation. US had no wish be major arms supplier. US unhappy at diversion economic resources to military ends. e. Economic cooperation: 1) US remains interested in UAR and its people. We pleased hear about additional steps taken by UAR to attract private investment. This channel permits bringing resources to bear without complication government budgeting. Channel effective and desirable politically. Possible we might help encourage business leaders visit Cairo as means developing momentum economic progress. Advantages participation international economic organizations also clear. 2) Food will be major issue in next decade. If all countries expanded food production to utmost, barely possible meet world food needs. US moving away from position surplus food producer. This last year US will have surplus resulting from domestic policy. In future planned production necessary meet domestic and foreign commercial needs. This situation requires new element discipline on all sides. Need for hard-headed decisions based on projection food production next decade. US itself could not meet world needs even if extra 60 million acres brought into production. 3) Bilateral aspect economic cooperation complicated by US political system. President needed help in dealing with turbulent US domestic politics. No official answer to UAR PL-480 request possible at this time. Politically two six-month agreements twice as easy to conclude as one one-year agreement. Kamel repeated desirability one-year program stressing need strengthen Nasser's hand in resisting Soviet pressure. Kosygin may visit Cairo May or June. Also emphasized need avoid any gap after termination present agreement June 30. 7. In conclusion Kamel requested Secretary's personal support for reactivation grain silo project and help in expansion UAR fertilizer production. Secretary responded with inquiry about estimates of losses to UAR from lack of grain storage facilities. Department officer estimated value losses might pay for cost silo project within three-four years. Rusk
283. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ I-22216/66 Washington, March 31, 1966. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4443, Israel 452. Secret; Sensitive. SUBJECT I am glad to report that we have now successfully completed negotiations for the sale of aircraft to Israel and Jordan. Tim Hoopes handled both negotiations for ISA, in close collaboration with State and the White House. The relevant papers for Israel are at Tab A, and for Jordan at Tab B./2/ /2/Attached but not printed. Israel Israel accepted all of the conditions set forth in your conversation with Foreign Minister Eban, but for reasons of "sovereign dignity," they desired to state certain of these as affirmations of Israeli policy, rather than as conditions tied strictly to an aircraft sale. Prime Minister Eshkol was said to be particularly adamant in refusing a formal written agreement which might indicate to future historians that he had bargained away Israel's future nuclear policy and opened the Dimona facility to US inspection for the sake of "a mere 48 airplanes." After debate with the Israelis on these points and after consultation with State and the White House, we accepted the Israeli formulations. These involved (a) an affirmation of Israeli policy not to be the first to develop nuclear weapons in the Middle East, in the body of the basic letter from Harman to Hoopes,/3/ but not under the paragraph dealing with specific conditions; (b) a statement of their specific undertakings to avoid and prevent criticism of the US aircraft sale to Jordan, in a memcon separate from the basic letter;/4/ and (c) a statement of their willingness to open the Dimona facility to US visits, in the form of a separate letter from Harman to Assistant Secretary of State Hare./5/ Notwithstanding these concessions aimed at assuaging the sensitivities of a small nation, we are satisfied that the conditions set forth by the President and yourself are fully incorporated in the agreements. /3/The letter under reference is dated March 17. Hoopes' March 23 reply to Harman and an additional letter of March 29 from Harman to Hoopes are also attached. /4/The agreed memorandum of conversation is dated March 17. /5/Harman's letter to Hare, dated April 11, states that the Israeli Government was prepared to issue invitations "from time to time" for visits to the nuclear reactor at Dimona by U.S. representatives. Airgram A-242 to Tel Aviv, March 28, noted that although the letter referred to visits "from time to time" rather than "periodically" as stated by McNamara and by other U.S. officials in conversations with the Israelis, the Department of State intended to continue to seek Israel's acquiescence in semi-annual visits. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 US) Jordan The only notable problem in the Jordan negotiation also involved a question of formulation, rather than of substance. We wished to make clear that the USG, while prepared to consider in principle a sale of 36 aircraft, insisted on describing the sale as involving an initial increment of 12 aircraft, with a follow-on sale of 24 aircraft being dependent upon satisfactory completion of the first increment. Jordan's problem, on the other hand, was to be able to show the United Arab Command a contract for 36 aircraft. We resolved this problem by insisting on our language in the Memorandum of Understanding/6/ (the basic instrument of the transaction) while making some concessions to the Jordanian position in the technical annex. As a practical matter, we have conclusive strings on this deal--i.e., cash on delivery of each aircraft, and also a requirement that Jordan be able to assimilate the aircraft into its defense establishment (adequate training for pilots and ground crews, and adequate maintenance funds from the UAC). /6/The memorandum of understanding was signed by Hoopes and Khammash on March 29. Public Disclosure Neither sale has been publicly disclosed as yet; and to the best of our knowledge, there have been no leaks. An agreed disclosure plan calls for informing 11 Congressional leaders immediately, and 10 additional members immediately after disclosure of the Jordanian sale. The plan calls for a low-key announcement by King Hussein from Amman within a few days, stating the basic facts of the sale, but without reference to the number of aircraft involved. This will place the State and Defense Departments in a position to respond to press questions; if asked, they will confirm the fact of the sale with minimal elaboration./7/ /7/For the text of a statement issued by the Department of State on April 2 on the sale of military jet aircraft to Jordan, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, p. 541. The Congressional briefing will concentrate on the Jordan sale, emphasizing the general pressures created by the inflow of Soviet arms to the area and the specific pressures created by the force requirements levied on Jordan by the United Arab Command. It will also indicate that we understand the implications for Israel and are acting to meet the basic Israeli requirements. The briefing will emphasize also our efforts over two years to find a solution to Jordan's aircraft problem in Western European arms markets, and our reluctant conclusion that only US aircraft can avoid the introduction not only of Soviet MIGs, but also of Egyptian or Soviet technicians--developments which would create conditions incompatible with our economic and military aid to Jordan and which would create new and dangerous instabilities in the Arab-Israeli confrontation as a whole. The timing of an announcement of the Israeli sale remains under consideration. We are anxious to avoid simultaneous disclosure of the two deals, as this could open King Hussein to an Arab charge that his arrangement with the US had triggered a larger sale to Israel. In this regard, the Arab Prime Ministers, at their recent meeting in Cairo, specifically condemned previous US military sales to Israel and warned the US against the consequences of future sales. Within limits, the Israelis agree with our arguments against simultaneity; they do not wish their deal to be linked to Jordan, preferring to place it in the larger context of the Arab threat as a whole. On the other hand, Israel definitely desires a short time-lag between the two announcements--perhaps 10 to 14 days--whereas we are hoping for an interval of about two months. Our view may be optimistic, and events could force an earlier disclosure. Nevertheless, we intend to keep the pressure on Ambassador Harman and his colleagues to reassure their American friends that Israel's interests are being met by actions of the United States, and thus to prevent or damp down domestic protests of the Jordan sale. As you know, this is a touchy business and must be played to some extent by ear. We will however be prepared to make an announcement of the Israeli sale from Washington at any time it is deemed necessary. The negotiations are, however, successfully behind us. John T. McNaughton/8/ /8/Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature and an indication that the original was signed.
284. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State/1/ Beirut, April 27, 1966, 1433Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL JORDAN-US. Confidential. Repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem, Jidda, London, and Tel Aviv. 1055. Re Amman's 651 to Department./2/ From Adams./3/ /2/Telegram 651 from Amman, April 25, reported a conversation on April 24 between Hare and Prime Minister Tell. The latter complained about delays in U.S. aid, criticized U.S. policy toward Nasser, and appealed for U.S.-Jordan cooperation for a joint assessment of the Middle East scene in order to anticipate and prevent unfavorable developments. (Ibid.) Hare visited Amman in the course of a trip to a number of Near East capitals, including Tel Aviv, Beirut, and Cairo. /3/J. Wesley Adams, Jr., Deputy Chief of Mission at the Embassy in Amman, was Charge in Amman after Barnes relinquished charge of the Embassy on April 23. 1. Following is summary of conversation had by Assistant Secretary Hare in Amman morning April 25 with King Hussein with Prime Minister Tell present, as approved by Hare in Beirut. 2. Tone of conversation much smoother, less abrasive than Hare's conversation 25th with Prime Minister and Court Minister reported reftel, but nonetheless firm. King set tone early in talk by expressing appreciation both for US approval supersonics package, which he understood had been most difficult for USG, and for economic aid. On latter he also expressed understanding difficulties but sincerely hoped there could be appreciable step-up in rate of loan approvals by USG in order keep steam behind Jordan's economic development. 3. Balance discussion devoted largely King's appreciation Jordan's external security position, the Communist threat in area, his dissatisfaction with US policy toward Nasser, and his desire achieve arrangement with USG for continuing evaluation developments in Middle East combined with some degree advance contingency planning. 4. Ambassador Hare employed discussion of aircraft, reported separately, convey to Hussein his feeling derived from discussion Eshkol and others/4/ that Israelis more relaxed re Arab military threat than on previous occasions and his distinct impression Israelis in mood keep things quiet on border. There was, however, no direct reference during conversation to recent border incidents. /4/Memoranda of Hare's April 24 conversation with Eshkol are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 ISR, POL ARAB-US, and POL ISR-US. 5. Discussing external threat Hussein expressed principal concern at possible Communist take-over in Syria saying Jordan could not tolerate such situation. He concerned by present trend that direction, thought Syrian situation would get worse before better but doubted Nasser had substantial assets there. Nasser, however, might try obtain US acquiescence to effort reestablish UAR with Syria. Listing friends on whom Jordan could count King mentioned Iran and SAG. He thought conditions Iraq somewhat improved and agreed Lebanon friendly. Kuwait and Gulf area were open to extremists. 6. Asked by Hare if they discerned any new pattern to Communist approach in Middle East Hussein and PriMin both agreed Communists had abandoned open, "united front" approach and were infiltrating poison directly into various groups, increasing number of which had adopted Marxist dogma and phraseology. Soviets according to Hussein are building a presence in Jordan and neighboring countries, largely through aid. 7. With Nasser Hussein said he expects deterioration in relations and he trying stabilize home base in anticipation Nasser storms. He thought Nasser would probably try get out of Arab Summit meetings, although he (Hussein) would try save them. Nasser, he said, must get out of Yemen. Replying to implied criticism US approach to Nasser Ambassador Hare asserted Nasser not a chosen US instrument, that USG had no illusion about Nasser and many decisions taken in face grave misgivings but in light USG interpretation its best interests. 8. In context threat of Syria and Nasser, Hussein said Jordan would do best resist through own strength but Jordan not an island and must work with friends. In obvious allusion US he asked whether Jordan's friends have a policy or do they approach Jordan only in terms Arab-Israel dispute. 9. Pursuing this theme Hussein and PriMin urged USG consider collaborating with GOJ in continuing assessment situation in Middle East directed toward preventing Communist take-over through some degree advance contingency planning. Carefully avoiding any implication favorable USG response such proposal, Hare pointed to nebulous nature contingencies and difficulty being precise about circumstances which would involve commitment. Major danger, he said, would lie in taking action in situation which seemed within commitment but which in actual fact was not of type envisaged. Past instances when Syria "lost" was case in point. However, USG would be prepared keep in very close touch on problem. PriMin urged us consider problem "with certain sense of urgency" since situation in Syria or elsewhere in Middle East could blow up at any time. 11. Summary: King Hussein and Prime Minister obviously hope that as result this conversation and that reported reftel, US will: 1) step up approval development loan agreements, 2) re-examine what GOJ regards as US support of Nasser, and 3) seriously and urgently consider possibility continuing review with GOJ of Middle East developments directed toward some degree contingency planning./5/ /5/Adams reported in telegram 695 from Amman, May 12, that he informed King Hussein the previous day that the U.S. Government had concluded this would not be in the interest of either government. (Ibid., POL JORDAN-US) Porter
285. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/ Washington, April 29, 1966, 5:45 p.m. /1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. V. Secret. A copy was sent to Bill Moyers. We will soon announce our aircraft sale to Israel./2/ We have made every effort to stave off an explosive Arab reaction like the row over the German tank sales to Israel in 1964-65. But I want to forewarn you that, at worst, Arab reaction could endanger some of our embassies. /2/It was announced on May 20. For text of replies made by Director of the Office of News Robert J. McCloskey to questions asked at a news conference that day, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, p. 540. We told Nasser through one of his advisers/3/ in hopes that a little warning might keep him from exploding in public. This tactic worked well when we sold Israel their Hawk missiles in 1962. However, he will make his annual May Day speech Sunday. If he sounds off on the sale, State will issue a low-key confirmation. If we get over that hurdle, we will press the Israelis to delay announcement until about 13 May--after the Arab Defense Ministers' meeting in Cairo. Before that announcement, we will brief other Arab leaders. /3/Telegram 2701 from Cairo, April 20, reported that Battle had informed Presidential adviser Hassan Sabry al-Kholy of the pending aircraft sale. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 ISR) Eshkol wants as early an announcement as possible, but will probably accept our timing. He has so far managed to contain his opposition reaction to the Jordan sale and can probably hang on a little longer. This announcement will win loud plaudits from Israelis and from their friends here. I am working on other new things you might do for Israel as you asked./4/ However, the $52 million in economic and food aid just announced, this sale of about $70 million worth of aircraft (though we will not publish the figure) and this year's slice of last year's tank sale ($21.2 million) are handsome evidence of your current support for Israel. /4/An April 23 memorandum from Rostow to Rusk, recording decisions made by the President in the course of a review of foreign policy problems, noted that the President wanted development of new ideas in several areas, including, "Ideas for working constructively with Israelis and Arabs." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt Rostow, Non Vietnam, April-July 1966) A May 21 memorandum from Rostow to the President stated that he had been canvassing "new things we might do in Israel." It noted that because Israel's economic performance raised it far above the level where AID normally pulled out, any new programs "should capitalize more on imagination than on large sums of AID money." It listed a number of possibilities. (Ibid., Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 3) Walt
286. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/ Tel Aviv, May 2, 1966, 1121Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 ISR-JORDAN. Confidential. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Damascus, USUN, Jerusalem, and CINCSTRIKE/MEAFSA POLAD. 1102. Depcirtel 2127./2/ /2/Circular telegram 2127 to Tel Aviv and other posts, April 30, stated that in a meeting that day between Davies and Evron concerning three Israeli raids into Jordanian territory the previous night, Davies urged against any action that would further escalate the situation. The telegram instructed the Embassy in Tel Aviv to reiterate U.S. concern and to add that if Jordan took the incident to the UN Security Council, the U.S. Government would be obliged to base its position strictly on the facts as eventually reported by UNTSO. (Ibid.) 1. I have conveyed to Bitan (FonOff) points made Depcirtel. After reiterating substance our concern as set forth by Davies to Evron, I noted especially U.S. position in event GOJ goes to UNSC. Also emphasized concern at increasing tension Syrian frontier urging restraint and disadvantages to all should Israelis have recourse military action. 2. Bitan said would immediately pass views to higher authority as he has already done with report Davies-Evron conversation. He took occasion reiterate Israeli motivation underlying recourse to this raid on Jordan. Emphasizing Israeli reluctance take such measure, he said single most important consideration from GOI standpoint is fact GOI must be able impress its border settlers with GOI ability protect them in face of attacks involving Israeli lives. He added that GOI experience in past has been that period of quiet and stability on borders has ensued following demonstration Israeli determination this manner although he admitted impossible be sure past pattern could be anticipated with confidence. He made major point that GOI unable devise effective alternative, only other recourse aside from diplomatic intervention being to UNTSO, which invariably takes position evidence insufficient convince it of Jordanian origin Fatah incursion. 3. Bitan said GOI disturbed by increasing tension Syria but he does not have impression action likely that connection in absence unforeseen variation in Syrian tactics. Barbour
287. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State/1/ Amman, May 2, 1966, 1748Z. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 32-1 ISR-JORDAN. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Beirut, Baghdad, Cairo, Jidda, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, and Damascus and passed to the White House and USIA. 668. Ref: Embtel 665./2/ /2/Telegram 665 from Amman, May 1, reported a meeting between Barnes and Tell in which Barnes urged against Jordanian retaliation for the Israeli raids of April 29-30, urged full Jordanian cooperation with MAC and UNTSO, and urged renewed vigorous Jordanian efforts to frustrate Fatah operations. (Ibid.) Barnes' instructions for the meeting were sent in circular telegram 2126 to Amman, April 30. (Ibid.) 1. In course conversation with King Hussein 6:00 p.m. May 2 on subject Israeli raids and GOJ reaction thereto, Hussein assured me that 1) GOJ doing all possible prevent incursions by infiltrators from Jordan territory into Israel and 2) although he under heavy pressure from domestic population and army to "do something" there would be no military retaliation by JAA at this time. However King added "Do not come to me on next occasion asking that I restrain army. We cannot continue take attacks this sort and retaliation apparently only language Israelis understand." 2. Told Hussein I had sought audience first because of remarks by Sharif Nasser earlier in day first to DATT (reported DATT 0609 May 66)/3/ and later [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that regime under heavy pressure both from civilian populace and army to take some sort retaliatory action for Israeli raids and his comment that next forty-eight hours would be critical in reaching decision on what course Jordan would follow. Referred also my talk PriMin May 1 reported reftel. Hussein's assurances would seem preclude military retaliation in absence any further attacks from Israelis. /3/Not found. 3. Asked what he thought were Israelis' objective these raids Hussein replied he unable comprehend them. He thought surely they understood such action played directly into hands of extremists within Jordan making pursuit moderate course by GOJ more difficult. As possible reason he suggested Israeli desire provoke Jordanians and set stage for major Israeli attack. He reiterated extreme difficulty his position and stressed hope USG could make GOJ see light in order prevent repetition latest events. 4. I thanked Hussein for his assurances which I said would be most appreciated Washington. Said I had to add that even should repetition occur would hope he would not find it necessary retaliate with force. Promised convey to Washington his plea for understanding of extreme pressure to which his regime subjected by incidents this sort. 5. Incidentally, in conversation with British Ambassador, who preceded me in audience with King, Sir Roderick volunteered remark that these latest Israeli raids make position of moderates like King and Prime Minister impossible. Israelis knew this and accordingly he wondered if they wanted peace. Added he had sent strong message this effect London. 6. Comment: King outwardly calm but reflected mental anguish at dilemma having restrain army once again in face political and army pressures. I avoided inquiring whether GOJ intended take issue to UN, fearing this might be regarded as US suggestion this effect. Hussein did not mention subject. Adams
288. Memorandum for the Record/1/ Washington, May 3, 1966. /1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 ISR. Secret. Prepared by Walt Rostow. Israeli Ambassador Harman spent most of his talk with me this morning outlining outstanding issues between our two governments. I chose to listen rather than engage him, except for Vietnam. (Evron and Saunders were present.) First, he described three major concerns in the current aircraft negotiations: 1. Because the Skyhawk will be up against superior opposition, the GOI wants it to have the best possible defensive equipment. Harman implied that, since the Skyhawk was Israel's third choice, the US had some obligation to upgrade its capability as much as possible. The Israelis want the Sidewinder 1-C whereas we have offered only the 1-A (according to him). They also want a radar warning system in the plane. 2. To improve performance, they want the Bullpup missile because of its air-to-sea capacity. Israel's answer to the threat of UAR naval bombardment is defense from the air--not a navy of its own. On the ground, Israel wants the Rockeye II anti-tank cluster bomb to combat armored concentrations. Harman said this would reduce the number of air sorties required. 3. Worrying about other evidence of our "lack of forthcomingness," he cited our unwillingness to sell napalm bombs fitted to the Skyhawk. He hoped we could help save expensive adaptation of their own ordnance. He felt that with secrecy--which is in Israel's interest as well as in ours--there would be no problem in our supplying this kind of equipment. Second, I preempted a lengthy exposition on desalting by saying I was thoroughly familiar and much interested. I told him the President was also personally interested, but we all knew certain ambiguities about the economics of the project remained. However, I was confident that we would be in touch with them "fairly soon." Harman said he was fully aware of the complexities and felt that perhaps the best way to get at these was for each side to appoint one man to "bat these problems around without commitment on either side." He felt that "the world is going to have this but without actual doing we cannot take the next step." He felt this project would help open an entire new industry akin to the atomic and space industries. Israel, because of its great need for water and its sophisticated agricultural and industrial economy, would be a good guinea pig. Third, Harman outlined problems in the future of our economic aid. He accepted that the question had been resolved for this year, but was particularly concerned about the common glowing Washington appraisal of Israel's economy. Despite good performance, Harman said defense costs were increasingly impairing economic progress. While Israel was very grateful for the ten-year credits on the tank and aircraft sales, nevertheless these would have to be paid back and would constitute a growing burden (defense costs now 11% of GNP). Not only would Israel have to pay its debts to the United States, but, since part of our aircraft deal required Israel to buy elsewhere as well, it would have debts in France where hardware is expensive. This all comes at a time when the flow of capital to Israel is diminishing. German reparations have ended and personal restitution to Israeli citizens will probably end during this decade. At the same time Israel's debts are falling due--$1.2 billion this year alone. Israel has had to slacken the pace of its development program, and some unemployment is developing, though very unevenly. He cited the problem of increasing industrial exports to the Common Market, but came back to rising defense expenditures as the prime problem--a problem we could help with. Fourth, he mentioned the recrudescence of trouble along the Jordanian and Syrian borders. He feared that discipline had broken down within the Jordanian ranks because of the rapid expansion of the Jordanian armed forces. In addition to Fatah incidents, there had recently been several occasions of "trigger-happy" behavior by regular Jordanian troops. A similar situation was developing along the Syrian border, but he could not tell how that would evolve. Fifth, he hoped we would think twice before resuming food aid to Nasser. He felt that Nasser's requests to us were admissions of weakness which gave us considerable leverage. Israel hoped we would not give him a boost while he was down. I asked him in conclusion why Israel found it so difficult to help us on Vietnam. Internally, he said Israel's coalition government depends in part on one left-wing anti-Communist party (Mapam), which the Prime Minister must handle delicately. Externally, he cited relations with the USSR as Israel's biggest problem outside the Middle East. The Soviets have left the Israelis in no doubt that they are watching very carefully Israel's position on Vietnam. He denied the Israelis were "out to lunch" on this issue, but felt Eshkol must be allowed to handle it in his own way. He felt that if Israel had been allowed to begin a small scale training program in Israel for South Vietnamese agriculturalists early this year, perhaps we would not be at our current impasse. He also regretted public statements here by South Vietnamese ambassador Vu Van Thai which set us back for some time. W
289. Memorandum From the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (Carroll) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/ S-984/ST-2 Washington, May 4, 1966. /1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4443, Israel 463.2. Secret; Limited Distribution; No Foreign Dissem. A copy was sent to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. SUBJECT 1. (S/NFD) A three-man team of U.S. nuclear experts visited Israeli atomic energy sites during the period 31 March to 4 April 1966, and the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) has submitted a preliminary report on the visit to the U.S. Intelligence Board. The team's observations and conclusions, as stated in the report, are summarized in this memorandum. 2. (S/NFD) In view of Israeli sensitivities associated with the visit and report, the AEC has requested that distribution be limited to those who have specific requirements for the information and that recipients of the report be cautioned of the need to hold the information and even the fact of the visit very closely. 3. (S/NFD) It is the unanimous conclusion of the three-man team that there is no evidence that Israel is producing or intends to produce nuclear weapons material. The principal observations supporting this judgment are as follows: The Dimona reactor, Israel's only potential source of plutonium for an indigenous nuclear weapons program during the next several years, is being utilized for nuclear research activities and the site has been opened to scientists from the Weizmann Institute at Rehovot and the nuclear research center at Nahal Soreq. Some of the research projects are supported by funds from U.S. Government agencies. The reactor has been operated at significantly reduced power, which is not consistent with a plutonium production effort, and the high irradiation levels at which fuel apparently is to be removed from the reactor would not result in plutonium well suited for use in nuclear weapons. In addition, there is no chemical processing facility at Dimona for the extraction of plutonium from irradiated reactor fuel. Finally, there is no evidence that diversion of the uranium inventory at Dimona has occurred, which supports the judgment that the reactor has been operated at low power and that no unreported fuel has been irradiated and removed from the reactor between U.S. visits. 4. (S/NFD) There is a possibility that the team may have been deliberately deceived by the Israelis, but the members of the team believe that this is unlikely. They felt it would be prudent, however, to note the following reservations: The team could learn nothing about the 80 to 100 tons of uranium concentrate purchased from Argentina. Although the team members are convinced that this uranium has not been delivered to the Dimona site and that the personnel there know nothing about it, this material could have been (or could in the future be) run through the reactor between U.S. visits without being detected as long as the indicated reactor utilization is low. For this reason, there would be some basis for concern if the reactor continues for another year to have a lower operating efficiency. If this is the case next year, the survey team should demand very concrete evidence to explain the failure of the reactor to operate at design power. 5. (S/NFD) The report also points out that the members of the team are not in a position to determine whether a reactor or chemical separation plant exists elsewhere in Israel. With regard to this point, it is highly unlikely that a reactor capable of producing significant quantities of plutonium could be built without being detected. It is possible, however, that a chemical processing plant capable of separating a few kilograms of plutonium annually could escape detection if a serious effort were made to hide it; such a plant would be very similar to other chemical facilities. 6. (S/NFD) The report of the team of U.S. experts is the best source of information on the Israeli nuclear energy program and there is no convincing intelligence from other sources which is in disagreement with the team's observations and conclusions. Joseph F. Carroll [Continue with the next documents] Volume XVIII Index | Foreign Relations Online | Historian's Office | Department of State | Secretary of State |